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WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING

18 6 5.

OFFICE.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, February 20, 1865.

Resolt,ed by the Senate of the United Statet5, (the House of Representatives concurring,) That in order to
enable the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War to complete thE>ir investigations of certain important
matters now before them, and which they have not been able to complete, by reason of inability to obtain
important witnesses, they be authorized to continue their sessions for thirty days after the close of the present
Congress, and to place their testimony and rE>ports in the bands of the Secretary of tbe Senate.
Resolved further, That the Secretary of the Senate is hereby directed to cause to be printed of the reports
and accompanying testimony of the Committee In the Conduct of the W!lr five thousand copies for the use of
the Senate and ten thousand copies for the use of the House of Representatives.
Attest:
J. W. FORNEY, Secretary.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES OF THE UNITED STATES,

March 1, 1865,

Resolved, That this House do concur in the foregoing resolution with the foliowing amendment:
Strike out the words "thirty days" and insert the words ninety days in lieu thereof.
Attest:
'
EDWARD McPHERSON, Clerk.
By CLINTON LLOYD, Chief Clerk.

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

March 2, 1865.

Resolved, That t.he Senate agree to the foregoing amendmE>nt of the House of Representatives.
Attest:
J. W. FORNEY, Secretary.

I certify the foregoing to be a true copy of the original rewolution and the amendment of the House thereto
and the c.oncurrence of the Senate therein.
J. W. FORNEY,
Secretary of the Senate of the United States.

SHERMAN-JOHNSTON.
•
Testimony of },faJor General William T. Sherman.
WASHINGTON, Jtfay 22, 1865.
Major General W. T. SHERMAN sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your rank in the army 1
Answer. I am a major general in the regular army.
Question. As your negotiation with the rebe} general Johnston, in relation to
his surrender, has been the subject of much public comment, the committee
desire you to state all the facts and circumstances in regard to it that you deem
of public interest, or which you wish the public to know.
Answer. On the t5th day of April last I was at Raleigh, in command of an
army composed of three armies-the army of the Ohio, the army of the Cumberland, and the army of the Tennessee. My enemy was General Joseph E. Johnston, of the confederate army, who c1mmanded about 50,000 men retreating
along the railroad from Raleigh, by Hillsborough, Greens borough, Salisbury, and
Charlotte. I commenced pursuit by crossing the curve of that road in the direction of Ashborough and Charlotte. After the head of my column had crossed
the Cape Fear river at Aven's ferry, I received a communication from General
Johnston and answered it ; copies of which I sent promptly to the War Department, with a letter addressed to the Secretary of War, as follows:
.. HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION 0~ THill MISSISSIPPI,

"In the Field, Raleigh, North Carolina, April 15, 1865.
"I send copies of a correspondence begun with General Johnston, which, I think, will
be followed by terms of capitulation. I will grant the same terms as General Grant gave
General Lee, and be careful not to complicate any points of civil policy.
"If any cavalry has started towards me, caution them that they must be prepared to
find our work ctone. It is now raining in torrents, and I shall await General Johnston's
reply here, and will prepare to meet him in person at Chapel Hill.
"I have invited Governor Vance to return to Raldgh with the civil officers of his State.
I have met ex-Governor Graham, Mr. Badger, Moore, Holden, and others, all of whom
agree that the war is over, and that the States of the south must resume their allegiance
subject to the Constitution and laws of Congress, and must submit to the national arms.
This great fact once admitted, all the details are eal:!y of arrangement.
"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General.
"General U. S. GRANT and Secretary of War."

I met Geoeral Johnston, in person, at a house five miles from Durham Station, under a flag of truce. After a few preliminary remarks, he ~:!aid to me
that, since Lee had surrendered his army at Appomattox Court House, of
which he had just been advised, he looked upon further opposition by him as the
greatest possible of crimes; that he wanted to know whether I could make him
any general concessions~anything by which he could maintain his hold and
control of bis army, and prevent its scattering; anything to satisfy the great
yearning of their people; if so, he thought we could arrange terms satisfactor_y
to both parties. He wanted to embrace the condition and fate of all the armies
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of the southern CC'nfederacy to the Rio Grande; to make one job of it, as he
termed it. I asked him where his powers were; whether he could command
and control the fate of all the armies to the Rio Grande 1 He answered that
he thought he could obtain the power, but he did not possess it at that moment.
He did not know where Mr. Davit~ was, but he. thought if I could give him time
he could find Mr. Breckinridge, whose orders would be obeyed everywhere, and
he could pledge to me his personal faith that whatever he undertook to do
would be done.
I had had frequent correspondence with the late President of the United
States, with the Secretary of War, with General Halleck, and with General .
Grant; and the general impression left upon my mind was that if a settlement
could be made consistent with the Constitution of the United States, the laws of
Congress, and the proclamation of the President, they would be not only willing
but pleased thus to terminate the war by one single stroke of the pen.
I needed time to finish the railroad from the Neuse bridge up to Raleigh,
and thought I could put in four or five days' good time in making repairs to my
road, even if I had to send the propositions to Washington. I therefore consented to delay twenty-four hours to enable General Johnston to procure what
would satisfy me as to his authority and ability, as a military man, to do what
he undertook to do. I therefore.consented to meet him the next day, the 17th,
at 12, noon, at the same place.
We did meet again. After a general interchange of courtesies he remarked
that he was then prepared to satisfy me that he could fulfil the terms of our
conversation of the day before. He then asked me what I was willing to do.
I told him, in the first place, that I could not deal with anybody except men recognized by us as "belligerents," because no military man could go beyond
that fact. 'rhe Attorney General has since so decided, and every man of common sense so understood it before; there was no difference of opinion on that
point. As to the men and officers composing the confederate armies~ I told him
that the President of the United States, by a published proclamation, had
enabled every man in the southern confederate· army of the rank of colonel and
under to procure and obtain amnesty by simply taking the oath of allegiance to
the United States, and agreeing to go to his home and live in peace. 'J.:' he
terms of General Grant to General Lee extended the same principles to officers of
the rank of brigadier general and upwards, including the highest offieer in the
confederate army, viz., General Lee, the commander-in-chief. I was, therefore,
willing to proceed with him upon the same principles.
Then a conversation arose as to what form of government they were to have in
the south. Were the States there to be dissevered; and were the people to be
denied representation in Congress 1 Were the people there to be, in the common language of the people of the south, slaves to the people of the north 1
Of course I said " No ; we desire that you shall regain your position as citizens
of the p nited States, free and equal to us in all respects, and with representation, upon the condition of submission to the lawful authority of the United
States as defined by the Constitution, the United States courts, and the authorities of the United States supported by those courts."
He then remarked to me that General Breckinridge, a major general in the
confederate army, was near by, and if I had no objection he would like to have
him present, I recalled his attention to the fact that I had on the day before
explained to him that any negotiations between us must be confined to belligerents. He replied that he understood that perfectly. "But," said he," Breckinridge, whom you do not know, save by public rumor, as the Secretary of War,
is, in fact, a major general; I give you my word for that. Have you any objection to his being present as a major generall" I replied, "I have no objection
to any military officer you desire being present. as a•part of your personal staff."
I, myself, had my own officers near me at call..
..

SHERMAN--JOHNSTON.

5

Breckimidge came, a stranger to me, whom I had never spoken to in my life,
and he joined in the conversation. Whilst that conversation was being carried
on, a courier arrived and handed G~neral Johnston a package of papers. He
and Breckinridge sat down and looked over them for some time, and put them
away in their pockets. What they were I know not; but one was a slip of
paper, written, as General Johnston told me, by Mr. Reagan, postmaster general
of the southern confederacy. They seemed to talk about it sotto voce, and finally
handed it to me ; I glanced over it. It was preceded by a preamble, and closed
with a few general terms. I rejected it at once.
We then discussed matters-talked about slavery-talked about everything.
There was a universal assent that ~lavery was as dead as anything could be;
tha.t it was one of the issues of the war, long since determined; and even
General Johnston laughed at the folly of the confederate government in raising
negro soldiers, whereby they gave us all the . points of the case. I told them
that t:!lavery had been treated by us as a dead institution; first by one class of
men from the initiation of the war, and then from the date of the emancipation
proclamation of President Lincoln, and finally by the assent of all the paKties.
As to reconstruction, I told them I did not know what the views of the
administration were. Mr. Lincoln up to that time had, in letters and by telegrams to me, encouraged me, by all the words that could be used in general
terms, to believe in not only his willingness but his desire that I should make
terms with civil authorities, governors, and legislatures, even as far back as 1863.
It then occurred to me that I might write off some general propositions, meaning
little or meaning much, according to the construction of parties, what I would
term ''glittering generalities," and send them to Washington, which I could do
in four days. That would enable the new President to give me a clue to his
policy in the important juncture which was then upon us; for the war was
over-the highest military authorities of the southern confederacy so confessed
to me openly, unconcealedly, and repeatedly.
I therefore drew up that memorandum (which has been published to the
world) for the purpose of referring it to the proper executive authority of the
United States, and enabling him to define to me what I might promise, simply
to cover the pride of the southern men, who thereby became subordinate to the
law~ of the United States, civil and military. I made no concessions to General
Johnston's army, or the troops under his direction and immediate control. And
if any concessions were made in those general terms, they were made because I
then believed, and I now believe, they would have delivered into the hands of
the United States the absolute control of every confederate officer and soldier,
all their muster-rolls, and all their arms. It would save ns all the incidental
expenses resulting from the military occupation of that country by provost
marshals, provost guards, military governors, and all the machinery by which
alone military power can reach the people of a civilized country. It would have
surrendered to us the armies of Dick 'l'aylor and Kirby Smith, both of them
capable of doing infinite mischief to us by exhausting the resources of the whole
country upon which we were to depend for the future extinguishment of our
debt, forced upon us by their wrongful and rebellious conduct.
I never designed to shelter a human being from any liability incurred in consequence of past acts to the civil tribunals of our country. And I do not believe a fair and manly interpretation of my terms can so construe them, for the
words "United States courta," "United States authorities," "limitations of
executive power" occur in every paragraph.
And if they seemingly yield terms better than the public would desire to be
given to the southern people, if studied clearly and well it will be found that
there is an absolute submission on their part to the government of the United
States, either through its executive, legislative, or judicial authorities.
Every step in the progress of those negotiations was reported punctually,
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clearly, and fully by the most rapid means of communication that I had. And
yet I neglected not one single precaution necessary to reap the full benefits of
my position in case the government amended, altered, or absolutely annulled
those terms.
As these matters are necessarily mingled with the military history of the
period, I would like, at this point, to submit to the committee my official report,
which has been in the hands of the proper officer, viz: General Rawlings, chief
of staff of the army of the United States, since about the 12th instant. It was
made by me at Manchester, Virginia, after I had returned from Savannah,
whither I went to open up the Savannah river and reap the fruits of my negotiations with General Johnston, and to give General Wilson, far in the interior,
a safe and sure base from which he could draw the necessary supply of clothing
and food for his command.
It was only after 1 had fulfilled all this that I learned, for the first time,
through the public press, that my conduct bad been animadverted upon, not
only by the Secretary of War, but by General Halleck and the press of the
count!,- at large. I did feel hurt and wronged that Mr. Stanton coupled with
the terms of my memorandum, confided to him, a copy of a telegram to General
Grant, which he had never sent to me. He knew, on the contrary, that when
he was at Savannah that I had negotiations with civil parties there, for he was
present in my room when those parties were conferring with me; and Xwrote
him a letter setting forth many points of it, in which I said I aimed to make a
split in Jeff. Davis's dominions b-y segregating Georgia from their cause. Those
were civil negotiations; and far from being discouraged from making them, I
was encouraged by Secretary Stanton himself to make them.
By coupling the note to General Grant with my memorandum he gave the
world fairly and clearly to infer that I was in possession of it; now, I was
not in possession of it; and I have reason to know t'hat Mr. Stanton knew I
was not in possession of it.
Next met me General Halleck's telegram, indorsed by Mr. Stanton, in which
they publicly avowed an act of perfidy, namely, the violation of my truce,
which I bad a right to make, and which by the laws of war and by the laws of
Congress is punishable by death, and no other punishment'.
Next they ordered an army to pursue my enemy, who was known to be surrendering to me, in the presence of General Grant himself, their superior officer;
and, finally, they sent orders to General Wilson and to General Thomas, my
subordinates, acting under me on a plan of the most magnificent scale, admirably
executed, to defeat my orders and to thwart the interestS' of the government of
the United States.
I did feel indignant-! do feel indignant. As to my own honor, I can protect
it. In my letter of the 15th of April I used this language: "I have invited
Governor Vance to return to Raleigh with the civil officers -of his State." I
did so because President Lincoln had himself encouraged me to a similar course
with the governor of Georgia when I was in Atlanta. And here was the opportunity which the Secretary of War should have taken to put me on my
guard against making terms with civil authorities, if such were the settled
policy of our government. Had President Lincoln lived, I know he would
have sustained me.
The following is my report, which I desire -to have incorporated into and
made part of my testimony :
"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

"In the Field, City Point, Va., May 9, 1865.
"GENERAL: My last official report brought the history of events, as connected with the
armies in the field subject to my immediate command, down to the first of April, when the army
of the Ohio, Major General J. M. Schofield commanding, lay at Goldsborough, with detachments distributed so as to secure and cover our routes of communication and supply back to
the sea at Wilmington and Morehead city; Major General A. H. Terry, with the lOth corps, being
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at Faison's depot. The army of the Tennessee, Major General 0. 0. Howard commanding,
was encamped to the front and right of Goldsborough; and the army of Georgia, Major General
H. W. Slocum commanding, to its left and front; the cavalry, Brevet Major General J. Kilpatrick commanding, at Mount Olive. All were busy in repairing the wear and tear of our
then recent hard march from Savannah, and in replenishing clothing and stores necessary
for a further progress.
"I had previously, by letter and in person, notified the lieutenant general commanding
the armies of the United States, that the 10th of April would be the earliest possible moment
at which I could hope to have all things in readiness, and we were compelled to use our railroads to the very highest possible limit in order to fulfil that promise. Owing to a mistake
in the railroad department, in sending locomotives and cars of the five-foot gauge, we were
limited to the use of the few locomotives and cars of the four-foot eight and a half inch gauge,
already in North Carolina, with such of the old stock as was captured by Major General Terry at
Wilmington and on his way up to Goldsborough; yet such judicious use was made of them, and
such industry displayed in the railroad management by Generals Easton and Beckwith, and
Colonel ·wright and Mr. Van Dyne, that by the lOth of April our men were all re-clad, the
wagons reloaded, and a fair amount of forage accumulated ahead.
''In the mean time Major General George Stoneman, in command of a division of cavalry,
operating from East Tennessee, in connexion with Major General George H. Thomas, in
pursuance of my orders o f - - - - - - , had reached the railroad about Greens borough, N. C.,
and had made sad havoc with it; and had pushed along it to Salisbury, destroying en route
bridges, culverts, depots, and all kinds of rebel supplies, and had extended the breach in the
railroad down to the Catawba bridge. This was fatal to the hostile armies of Lee and
Johnston, who depended on that road for supplies and as their ultimate line of retreat. Brevet
Major General WHson, also in command of the cavalry corps organized by himself under
Special Field Orders No. - - , o f - - - - - , 1864, at Gaylesville, Alabama, had started
fi·om the neighborhood of Decatur and Florence, Alabama, and moved straight into the heart
of Alabama, on a route presclibed for General Thomas after he had defeated General Hood
at Nashville, Tennessee; but the roads being too heavy for infantry, General Thomas had
devolved the duty on that most energetic young cavalry officer General Wilson, who, imbued
with the proper spirit, has struck one of the best blows ot the war at the waning strength of
the confederacy. His route was one never before touched by our troops, and afforded him
abundant supplies as long as he was in motion, viz., by Tuscaloosa, l::ielma, Montgomery,
Columbus, and Macon. Though in communication with him, I have not been able to receive
as yet his full and detailed reports, which will in dl:Jil time be published and appreciated.
"Lieutenant General Grant also, in immediate command of the armies about Richmond,
had taken the initiative in that magnificent campaign, which, in less than ten days, completed
the evacuation of Richmond, and resulted in the destruction and surrender of the entire rebel
army of Virginia, under the command of General Lee. The news of the battles about Petersburg reached me at Goldsborough on the 6th of April. Up to that time my purpose was to
move rapidly northward, feigning on Raleigh, and striking straight for Burkesville, thereby
interposing between Johnston and Lee. But the auspicious events in Virginia bad changed
the whole military problem, and, in the expressive language of Lieutenant General Grant, the
"confederate armies of Lee and Johnston became the strategic points." General Grant was
fully able to take care of the former, and my task was to destroy or capture the latter.
"Johnston at the time, April 6, bad his army well in hand about Smithfield, interposing
between me and Raleigh. I estimated his infantry and artillery at thirty-five thousand,
(35,000,) and his cavalry from six to ten thousand, (6,000 to 10,000.) He was superior to
me in cavalry, so that I held General Kilpatrick in reserve at Mount Olive, with orders to
recruit his horses and be ready to make a sudden and rapid march on the 1Oth of April.
"At daybreak on the day appointed, all the heads of columns were in motion straight
against the enemy; Major General H. W. Slocum taking the two direct roads for Smithfield;
Major General 0. 0. Howard making a circuit by the right, and feigning up the Weldon
road to disconcert the enemy's cavalry; Generals Terry and Kilpatrick moving on the west
10ide of the Neuse river, and to reach the rear of the enemy between Smithfield and Raleigh.
General Schofield followed General Slocum in support. All the columns met, within six (6)
miles of Goldsborough, more or less cavalry, with the usual rail barricades, which were swept
before us as chaff; and by 10 a.m. of the 11th, the 14th corps entered Smithfield, the 20th
corps close at hand. Johnston had rapidly retreated across the Neuse river, and, having his
railroad to lighten up his trains, could retreat faster than we could pursue. The rains had
also set in, making the resort to corduroy absolutely necessary to pass even ambulances. The
enemy had burned the bridge at Smithfield, and as soon as possible Major General Slocum
got up his pontoons and crossed over a division of the 14th corps.
"We then heard of the surrender of Lee's army at Appomattox C. H., Virginia, which was
announced to the armies in Orders, and created universal joy. Not an officer or soldier of
my armies but expressed a pride and satisfaction that it fell to the lot of the armies of the Potomac and James so gloriously to overwhelm and capture the entire army that had held them
in check so loug; and their success gave new impulse to finish up our task.
" Without a moment's hesitation we dropped our trains, and marched rapidly in pursuit to
aud through Ra,Jeigh, reaching that place at 7.30 a. m. on the 13th, in a heavy rain. 'fhe
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next day the cavalry pushed on through the rain to Durham's Station, the lith corps following
as far as Morrisville Station, and the 17th corps to Jones's Station. On the supposition that
Johnston was tied to his railroad, as a line of retreat by Hillsborough, Greens borough, Salisbury, and Charlotte, &c., I bad turned the other columns across the bend of that road towards
Ashborough.-(See General Field Orders No. 55.) The cavalry, Brevet Major General J. Kilpatrick commanding, was ordered to keep up a show of pursuit towards the ' Company's
Shops', in Alamance county. Major General 0. 0. Howard to turn to the left by Hackney's
Crossroads, Pitts borough, St. Lawrence, and Ashborough; Major General H. W. Slocum to
cross Cape Fear river at Aven's ferry, and move rapidly by Carthage, Caledonia, and Cox's
Mills. Major General J. M. Schofield was to hold Raleigh and the road back, and with
his spare force to follow an intermediate route.
"By the 15th, though the rains were incessant and roads almost impracticable, Major General Slocum bad the 14th corps, Brevet Major General Davis commanding, near Martha's
Vineyard, with a pontoon bridge laid across Cl\pe Fear river at Aven's ferry, with the 20th
corps, Major General Mower commanding, in support; and Major General Howard had the
15th and 17th corps stretched out on the roads towards Pittsborough, while General Kilpatrick
helo Durham Station and Chapel Hill University. Johnston's army was retreating rapidly
on the roads from Hillsborough to Greens borough, he himself at Greens borough.
"Although out of place as to time, I here invite all military critics who study the problems
of war to take their maps and compare the position of my army on the 15th and 16th of
April, with that of General Halleck about Burkesville and Petersburg, Virginia, on the 26th
of April, when, according to his telegram to Secretary Stanton, he offered to relieve me of the
task of cutting off Johnston's retreat. Major General Stoneman at the time was at Statesville, and Johnston's only line of retreat was by Salisbury and Charlotte. It may be that
General Halleck's troops can outmarch mine, but there is nothing in their past history to
show it. Or it may be that General Halleck can inspire his troops with more energy of action. I doubt that also, save and except in this single instance, when he knew the enemy
was ready to surrender or 'disperse,' as advised by letter of April 18, addressed to him when
chief of staff at Washington city, and delivered at Washington by Major Hitchcock, of my
army.
"Thus matters stood at the time I received General Johnston's first letter and made my
answer of April 14, copies of which were sent with all expedition to Lieutenant General
Grant and the Secretary of War, with my letter of April 15. I agreed to meet General
Johnston, in person, at a point intermediate between our pickets, on the 17th at noon, provided the position of the troops remaine~ statu quo. I was both willing and anxious thus to
consume a few days, as it would enable Colonel Wright to finish our railroad to Raleigh.
Two bridges had to be built and twelve miles of new road made. We bad no iron except by
taking up that on the branch from Goldsborough to Weldon. Instead oflosing by time, I gained
in every way, for every hour of delay possible was required to reconstruct the railroad to our
rear, and improve the condition of our wagon roads to the front, so desirable in case the negotiations failed, and we be forced to make the race of near two hundred miles to head off or
catch Johnston, then retreating to.'Yards Charlotte.
"At noon of the day appointed' I met General Johnston for the first time in my life, although we had been exchanging shots constantly since May, 1863. Our interview was frank
and soldierlike, and he gave me to understand that further war on the part of the confederate
troops was folly ; that ' the cause' was lost, and that every life samificed after the surrender of
Lee's army was the highest possible crime. He admitted that the terms conceded to General
Lee were magnanimous and all he could ask; but he did want some general concessions that
would enable him to allay the natural feFJ.rS and anxieties of his followers, and enable him to
maintain his control over them until they could be got back to the neighborhood of their
homes, thereby saving the State of North Carolina the devastation inevitably to result from
turning his men loose and unprovided on the spot, and our pursuit across the State. He also
wanted to embraee in the same general proposition the fate of all the confederate armies that
remained in existence. I never made any concession as to his own army, or assumed to deal
finally and authoritatively in regard to any other. But it did occur to me that there was presented a chance for peace that might be deemed valuable to the government of the United
States, and was at least worthy the few days that would be consumed in reference. To push
an army whose commander had so frankly and honestly confessed his inability to cope with
me were cowardly and unworthy the brave men I led. Inasmuch as General Johnston did
not feel authorized to pledge his power over the armies in Texas, we adjourned to meet the
next day at noon.
"I returned to Raleigh and conferred freely with all my general officers, every one of
whom urged me to conclude terms that might accomplish so complete and desirable an
end. All dreaded the weary and laborious march after a fugitive and dissolving army back
towards Georgia, over the very country where we had toiled so long. There was but one
opinion expressed, and if contrary ones were entertained, they were withheld or indulged in
only by that class who shun the fight and the march, but are loudest, bravest and fiercest
when qanger is past.
"I again met General Johnston on the 18th, and we renewed the conversation. He
satisfied me then of his power to disband the rebel armies in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana,
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and Texas, as well as those in his immediate command, viz., North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia and Florida. The points on which he expressed especial solicitude were lest their
.States were to be dismembered, and denied representation in Congress, or any separate
political existence whatever; and the absolute disarming his men would leave the south
powerless and exposed to depredations by wicked bands of assassins and robbers.
"The President's (Lincoln's) message of 1864; his amnesty proclamation; General
Grant's terms to General Lee, substantially extending the benefit of that proclamation to all
officers above the rank of colonel ; the invitation to the Virgmia legislature to reassemble
in Richmond by General Weitzel, with the supposed approval of Mr. Lincoln and General
Grant, then on the spot; a firm belief that I bad been fighting to re-establish t):1e Constitution of the United States ; and last, but not least, the general and universal desire to close a.
war any longer without organized resistance, were the leading facts that induced me to pen
the 'memorandum' of April15, signed by myself and General Johnston. It was designed
to be, and so expressed on its face, as -a mere 'basis' for reference to the President of thE>
United States and constitutional commander-in-chief, to enable him, if he chose, at one blow
to dissipate the military power of the confederaey, which had threatened the national safety
for years. It admitted of modification, alteration and change. It had no appearance of an
ultimatum, and by no false reasoning can it be construed into a usurpation of power on
my part. I have my opinion on the questions involved, ' and will stand by the memorandum ; ' but this forms no part of a military report.
"Immediately on my return to Raleigh, I despatched one of my staff, Major Hitchcock,
to Washington, enjoining him to be most prudent and careful to avoid the spies and informers that would be sure to infest him by the way, and to say nothing to anybody until the
President could make known to me his feelings and wishes in the matter.
"The news of President Lincoln's assassination, on the 14th of April, (wrongly reported
to me by telegraph as having occurred on the 11th,) reached me on the 17th, and was announced to my command on the same day, in Field Orders No. 56. I was duly impressed
with its horrible atrocity and probable effect on the country. But when the property and
interests of millions still living were involved, I saw no good reason why to cl1ange my
course, but thought rather to manifest real respect for his memory by following, after his
death, that policy which, if living, I felt certain he would have approved, or at least not rejected with disdain.
"Up to that hour I had never received one word of instruction, advice or counsel as to
the plan or policy of government looking to a restoration of peace on the part of the rebel
States of the south. Whenever asked for an opinion on the points involved, I bad always
evaded the subject. My letter to the mayor of Atlanta bas been published to the world,
and I was not rebuked by the ·war Department for it. My letter to Mr.---, of Savannah,
was shown by me to Mr. Stanton before its publication, and all that my memory retains of
his answer is, that be said, like my letters generally, it was sufficiently "emphatic and could
not be misunderstood." Both these lettP.rs asserted my belief that, according to Mr. Lincoln's
proclamations and messages, when the people of the south had laid down their arms and
submitted to the lawful power of the United States, ipso facto, the war was over as to them;
and furthermore, that it any State in rebellion would conform to the Constitution of the
United States, 'cease war,' elect senators and representatives to Congress, if admitted, (of
which each house of Congress alone is the judge,) that State becomes instanter as much in
the Union as New York or Ohio. Nor was I rebuked for these expressions, though it was
universally known and commented on at the time. And again, Mr. Stanton in person at
Savannah, speaking of the terrific expense of the war, and difficulty of realizing the money
necessary for the daily wants of government, impressed me most forcibly with the necessity
of bringing the war to a close as soon as possible for .financial reasons.
"On rhe evening of April 23 Major Hitchcock reported his return to Morehead city with
despatches, of which fact General Johnston, at Hillsborough, was notified, so as to hP ready in
the morning for an answer. At 6 o'clock a. m. on the 24th Major Hitchcock arrived, accompanied by General Grant and members of his staff, whCI had not telegraphed the fact of
his coming over our exposed roads for prudential reasons. I soon learned that the memorandum was disapproved without reasons assigned, and I was ordered to give the forty-eight
hours' notice and resume hostilities at the close of that time; governing myself by the substance of a despatch then enclosed, dated March 3, 12 m., at Washington, D. C., from.
Secretary Stanton to General Grant, at City Point, but not accompanied by any part of the
voluminous matter so liberally lavished on the public in the New York journals of tJ1e 24th
of April. That was the first and only time I ever saw that telegram, or had one word of
instructions on the important matters involved in it. And it does seem ~ttrange to me that
every bar-room loafer in New York can read in the morning journals 'official' matter that
is withheld from a general whose command extends from Kentucky to North Carolina.
"Within an hour a courier was riding from Durham's Station towards Hillsborough with
notiee to General J obnston of the suspension of the truce, and renewing my demand for the
surrender of the armies under his immediate command, (see two despatches of April 24, 6
a. m.,) and at 12 m. I had the receipt of his picket officer. I therefore published my Orders
No. 62 to the troops terminating the truce at 12 m. on the 26th, ftnd ordered all to be in
readiness to march at that hour, on the routes prescribed in Special Field Orders No. 55 of
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April 14, from the positions held April 18. General Grant had orders from the President to
direct military movements, and I explained to him the exact position of the troops, and he
approved of it most emphatically; but he did not relieve me, or express a wish to assume
command.
"All things were in readiness, when, on the evening of the 25th, I received another letter
from General Johnston asking another interview to renew negotiations. General Grant not
only approved, but urged me to accept; and I appointed a meeting at our former place at
noon of the 26th, the very hour fixed for the renewal of hostilities. General Johnston was
delayed by an accident to his train, but at 2 p. m. arrived.
"We then consulted, concluded, al).d signed the final terms of capitulation. These were
taken by me back to Raleigh, submitted to General Grant, and met his immediate approval
and signature. General Johnston was not even aware of the presence of General Grant at
Raleigh at the time. There was surrendered to us the second great army of the so-called
confederacy; and though undue importance has been given to the so-called negotiations
which preceded it, and a rebuke and public disfavor cast on me wholly unwarranted by the
facts, I rejoice in saying that it was accomplished without further ruin and devastation to
the country, without the loss of a single life to those gallant men who had followed me from
the Mississippi to the Atlantic, and without subjecting brave men to the ungracious task of
pursuing a fleeing foe that did not want to fight. As for myself, I know my motives, and
challenge the instance, during the past four years, when an armed and defiant foe stood before
me, that I did not go in for a fight, and I would blush for shame if I had ever insulted or
struck a fallen foe.
.
4
' 'I'he instant the terms of surrender were approved by General Grant, I made my orders,
No. 65, assigning to each of my subordinate commanders his share of the work, and, with
General Grant's approval, made Special Field Orders No. 66, putting in motion my old army,
no longer required in Carolina, northward for Richmond. General Grant left Raleigh at 9
a. m. of the 27th; and I glory in the fact that during his three days' stay with me I did not
detect il). his language or manner one particle of abatement in the confidence, respect, and
affection that have existed between us throughout all the various events of the past war;
and though we have honestly differed in other cases as well as this, still we respect each
other's honest convictions. I still adhere to my then opinions, that by a few general concessions, ' glittering generalities,' all of which in the end must and will be conceded to
the organized States of the south, this day there would not be an armed battalion opposed
to us within the broad area of the dominions of the United States. Robbers and assassins
must in any event result from the disbandment of large armies; but even these should be
and can be taken care of by the local civil authorities without being made a charge on the
national treasury.
"On the evening of the 28th, having concluded all business requiring my personal attention at Raleigh, and having conferred with every army com·mander, and delegated to him
the authority necessary for his future action, I despatched my headquarters wagons by laud
along with the 17th corps, the office in charge of General Webster, to Alexandria, Va., and
in person, accompanied only by my personal staff, hastened to Savannah to direct matters in
the interior of South Carolina and Georgia.
" I had received across the rebel telegraph wires cipher despatches from General Wilson,
to the effect that he was in receipt of my orders No. 65, auil would send General Upton's
division to Augusta, and General McCook's division to Tallahassee, to receive the surrender
of those garrisons, take charge of the public property, and execute the paroles required by
the terms of surrender. He reported a sufficiency of forage for his horses in southwest
Georgia, but asked me to send him a supply of clothing, sugar, coffee, &c., by way of
Augusta, Georgia, when he could get it by rail. I therefore went rapidly to Goldsborough
and Wilmington, reaching the latter city at 10 a. m. of the 29th, and the same day embarked
for Hilton Head, in the blockade runner R.ussia, Captain A. M. Smith.
"I found General Q. A. Gillmore, commanding department of the south, at Hilton Head,
on the evening of April 30, and ordered him to send to Augusta at once what clothing and
small stores he could spare for General 'Vilson, and to open up a line of certain communication and supply with him at Macon. Within an hour the captured steamboats Jeff. Davis
and Amazon, both adapted to the shallow and crooked navigation of the Savannah river,
were being loaded, the one at Savannah, and the other at Hilton Head. The former started
up the river on the 1st of May, in charge of a very intelligent officer, (whose. name I
cannot recall.} and forty-eight men, (all the boat could carry,) with orders to occupy temporarily the United States arsenal at Augusta, and open up communication with General
Wilson, at Macon, in the event that Genu1al Upton's division of cavalry was not already
there. The Amazon followed next day ; and General Gillmore had made the necessary orders
for a brigade of infantry, to be commanded by General Molyneux, to follow by a land march
to Augusta, as its permanent garrison. Another brigaJe of infantry was ordered to occupy
Orangeburg, South Carolina, the point furthest in the interior that can at present be reached
by rail from the sea-coast, (Charleston.)
" On the 1st of May I went to Savannah, where General Gillmore also joined me, and the
arrangements ordered for the occupation of Augusta were consummated. At Si:Lvannah I
found. the city under the most admirable police, under direction of Brevet Major General
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Grover, and the citizens manifested the most unqualified joy to hear that, so far as they were
concerned, the war was over. All classes, Union men as well as former rebels, did not conceal, however, the apprehensions naturally arising from a total ignorance of the political
conditions to be attached to their future state. Anything at all would be preferable to this
dread uncertainty.
"On the evening of the 2d of May I returned to Hilton Head, and there, for the first time,
received the New York papers of April 28, containing Secretary Stanton's despatch of 9
a. m. of the 27th of April to General Dix, including General Halleck's from Richmond of
9 p.m. the night before, which seems to have been rushed with extreme haste before an excited public, viz., morning of the 28th. You will observe from the dates that those despatches were running back and forth from Richmond and Washington to New York, and
there published, whilst General Grant and I were together in Raleigh, N. C., adjusting, to
the best of our ability, the terms of surrender of the only remaining formidable rebel army
in existence at the time east of the Mississippi river. Not one word of intimation had been
sent to me of the displeasure of the government with my official conduct, but only the naked
disapproval of a skeleton memorandum sent properly for the action of the President of the
United States. The most objectionable ftlatures of my memorandum had already (April 24)
been published to the world in violation of official usage; and the eontents of my accompanying letters to General Halleck, General Grant, and Secretary Stanton, of even date,
though at hand, were suppressed. In all these letters I had stated clearly and distinctly that
Johnston's army would not fight, but if pushed would 'disLand' and scatter into small and
dangerous guerilla parties, as injurious to the interests of the United States as to the people
themselves; that all parties admitted that the rebel cause of the south was abandoned, that
the negroes were free, and that the temper of all was most favorable to a lasting peace. I
say all these opinions of mine were withheld from the public with a seeming purpose ; and
I do contend that my official experience and former services, as well as my past life and familiarity with the people and geography qf the south, entitled my opinions to at least a
decent respect.
"Although this despatch (Mr. Stanton's of April 27) was printed 'official,' it had come
to me only in the questionable shape of a newspaper paragraph headed 'Sherman's truce
disregarded.' I had already done what General Wilson wanted me to do, viz., had sent him
supplies of clothing and food, with clear and distinct orders and instructions how to carry
out in western Georgia the terms for the surrender of arms and parolling the prisoners made
by General Johnston's capitulation of April26; and had properly and most opportunely
ordered General Gillmore to occupy Orangeburg and Augusta, strategic points of great value
at all times, in peace and war. But as the Secretary had taken upon himself to order my
subordinate generals to disobey my ' orders,' I explained to General Gillmore that I would no
longer confuse him or General Wilson with 'orders' that might conflict with those of the
Secretary, which, as reported, were sent, not through me, but in open disregard of me and of
my lawful authority.
" It now becomes my duty to paint in justly severe character the still more offensive and
dangerous matter of General Halleck's despatch of April 26 to the Secretary of ·war, embodied in his to General Dix of April 27. General Halleck had been chief of staff of the
army at ·w ashington, in which capacity be must have received my official letter of Aprill8,
wherein I wrote clearly that if Johnston's army about Greensborough was pushed, it would
'disperse;' an event I wished to prevent. About that time he seems to have been sent from
Washington to Richmond, to command the new military division of the James, in assuming
charge of which, on the ~2d, he defines the limits of his authority to be the 'department ot
Virgi ia, the army of the Potomac, and such part of North Carolina as may not be occupied
by the command of Major General Sherman, (see his General Order No. 1.) Four days later,
Af.ril 26, he reports to the Secretary that he had ordered Generals Meade, Sheridan, and
"'\\right to invade that part of North Carolina which was occupied by my command, and
pay no regard to any truce or orders of mine. They were ordered to 'push forward regardless of any orders save those of Lieutenant General Grant, and cut off Johnston's retreat.'
He knew at the time he penned that despatch, and made those orders, that Johnston was
not retreating, but was halted under a 48 hours' truce with me, and was laboring to surrende1·
his command and prevent its dispersion into guerilla bands; and that I had on the spot a
magnificent army at my command, amply sufficient for all purposes required by the occasion. 'fhe plan of cutting off a retreat from the direction of Burksville and Danville is
hardly worthy one of his military education and genius.
'' When be contemplated an act so questionable as the violation of a truce made by competent authority, he should have gone himself and not have sent subordinates, for he knew I
was bound in honor to defend and maintain my own truce and pledge of faith, Hen at the
cost of many lives. "'When an officer pledges the faith of his government, he is bound to defend it, and he is no soldier who would violate it knowingly.
"As to Davis and his stolen treasure, did General Halleck, as chief of staff, or commanding officer of the neighboring military division, notify me of the facts contained in his despatch to the Secretary 1 No, he did not. If the Secretary of War wanted Davis caught,
why not order it, instead of, by publishing in the newspapers, putting him on his guard t()
hide away and escape 1 No orders or intimation to arrest Davis oi his stolen treasure ev"
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came to me; but, on the contrary, I was led to believe that the Secretary of War rather preferred he should escape from the country, if it were made unknown to him.
" But even on this point I enclose a copy of my letter to Admiral Dahlgren, at Charleston,
sent him by a fleet steamer from Wilmingtorr on the 25th of April, two days before the bankers of Richmond had imparted to General Halleck the important secret of Davis's movements,
designed, doubtless, to stimulate his troops to march their legs off to catch t!teir treasure for
their own use. I know now that Admiral Dahlgren did receive my letter on the 26th, and
ha.d acted on it before General Halleck had even thought of the matter. But I don't believe
a word of the treasure story; it is absurd on its face, and General Halleck or anybody has
my full permission to chase Jeff. Davis and cabinet, with their stolen treasure, through any
part of the country occupied by my command.
"The last and most obnoxious feature of General Halleck's despatch is where he goes out
of his way and advises that my subordinates-Generals Thomas, Stoneman, and Wilsonshould be instructed 'not to obey Sherman's commands.' This is too much, and I turn
from the subject with feelings too strong for words, and merely record my belief that so much
mischief was never before embraced in so small a space as the newspaper paragraph headed
' Shf'rman's truce disregarded,' authenticated as 'official' by Mr. Secretary Stanton, and published in the newspapers of April 28.
"During the night of May 2, at Hilton Head, having concluded my business in the department of the south, I began my return to meet my troops, then marching towards Richmond hom Raleigh. On the morning of May 3 we ran into Charleston harbor, where I had
the pleasure to meet Admiral Dahlgren, who had, in all my previous operations from Savannah northward, aided me with a courtesy and manliness that commanded my entire respect
and deep affection. Also General Hatch, who, from our first interview at his 'fullifenny
camp, had caught the spirit of the move from Pocotaligo northward, and had largely contributed to our joint success in taking Charleston and the Carolina coast. Any one who is
not satisfied with war should go and see Charleston, and he will pray louder and deeper than
ever that the country may in the long future be spared any more war. Charleston and secession being synonymous terms, the city should be left as a sample, so that centuries will
pass away before that false doctrine is preached again in our Union.
"We left Charleston the evening of the 3d of May, and hastened with all possible speed
back to Morehead city, which we reached at night of the 4th. I immediately communicated
by telegraph to General Schofield, at Raleigh, and learned from him the pleasing fact that
the lieutenant general commanding the armies of the United States had reached the Chesapeake in time to countermand General Halleck's order and prevent his violating my truce.
invading the area of my command, and driving Johnston's surrendering army into fragments.
General Johnston had fulfilled his agreement to the very best of his ability, and the officers
charged with issuing the paroles at Greens borough reported about 30,000 already made, and that
the greater part of the North Carolina troops had gone home without waiting for their papers; but that all of them would doubtless come in to some of the military posts, the commanders of which are authorized to grant them. About 800 of the rebel cavalry had gone
south, refusing to abide the terms of the surrender, and it was supposed they would make for
Mexico. I would sincerely advise that they be urged to go and stay. They would be a
nuisance to any civilized government, whether loose or in prison. "Vith the exception of
some plundering on the part of Lee's and Johnston's disbanded men, all else was quiet.
When to the number of men surrendered at Greens borough are added those at Tallahassee, Augusta, and Macon, with the scattered squads who will come in at other military posts, I have
no doubt full fifty thousand armed men will be disarmed and restored to civil pursuits by the
capitulation made near Durham's Station, North Carolina, on the 26th of April, 1865, and
that, too, without the loss of a single life to us.
"On the 5th of May I received and here subjoin a further despatch from General Schofield,
which contains inquiries I have been unable to satisfy, similar to those made by nearly every
officer in my command whose duty brings him in contact with citizens. I leave you to do
what is expedient to provide the military remedy.
["'By telegraph from Raleigh, N.C., May 5, 1865.]
"' M~ior General "V. T. SHERMAN, Morehead City:
"'When General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he said the lines had been
extended to embrace this and other States south. The order, it seems, has been modified so
as to include only Virginia and Tennessee. I thil!k it would be an act of .visdom to open
this State to trade at once. I hope the government will make known its policy as to the
organs of State government without delay. Affairs must necessarily be in a very unsettled
state until that is done. The people now are in a mood to accept almost anything which
promises a definite settlement. What is to be done ·with the freedmen is the question of all,
and it is the all-important question. It requires prompt and wise action to prevent the negro
from becoming a huge elephant on our hands. If I am to govern this State, it is important
for me to know it at once. If another is to be sent here, it cannot be done too soon, for he
will probably undo the most that I shall have done. I shall be glad to bear from you fully
when you have time to write. I will send your message to General Wilson at once.
"' J. M. SCHOFIELD, ~Iajor General.'
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'I give this despatch entire to demonstrate how intermingled have become civil matters
with the military, and bow almost impossible it has become for an officer in authority to act
a pure military part. There are no longer armed enemies in North Carolina, and a soldier
can deal with no other sort. The marshal and sheriff, with their posses, (of which the
military may become a part,) are the only proper officers to deal with civil criminals and
marauders. But I will not be drawn out into a discussion of thiR subject, but intstance the
case to show bow difficult is the task become to military officers, when men of rank, education, experience, nerve, and good sense of General Schofield feel·embarrassed by them.
"General Schofield, at Haleigh, bas a well-appointed and well-disciplined command ; is
in telegraphic communication with the controlling parts of his department, and remote ones
in the direction of Georgia, as well as with Washington, and has military possession of all
strategic points. In like manner, General Gillmore is well situated in all respects, except as
to communication with the seat of the general government. I leave him, also, with every
man he ever asked for, and in full and quiet possession of every strategic point in his department. And General Wilson has, in the very heart of Georgi a, the strongest, best
appointed, and best equipped cavalry corps that ever fell under my command; and he has
now, by my recent action, opened to him a source and route of supply by way of the Savannah river, that simplifies his military problem. So that I think I may, with a clear conscience, leave them and turn my attention once more to my special command-the army with
which I hdlve been associated through some of the most eventful scenes of this or any war.
"I hope and believe none of these commanders will ever have reason to reproach me for
any 'orders' they may have received from me. And the President of the United States
may be assured that all of them are now in position, ready and willing to execute to the
letter and in spirit any orders he may give. I shall henceforth cease to give them any orders
at all, for the occasion that made them subordinate to me is past; and I shall confine my
attention to the army, composed of the 15th and 17th, the 14th and 20th corps, unless the
commanding general of the armies of the United States orders otherwise.
"At 4 p. m. of May 9 I reached Manchester, on James river, opposite Richmond, and
found all the four corps bad arrived from Raleigh, and were engaged in replenishing their
wagons for the resumption of the march towards Alexandria.
"1 have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN,
"General JoHN A. RAWUNGS,
"Cltief of Staff, Was/,ington, D. C."

"Mojor Gene1·al 1 Commanding.

Question. Did you have, near Fortress Monroe, a c.onference with President
Lincoln; and if so, about what time 1
Answer. I met General Grant and M:r. Lincoln on board a steamboat, lying
at the wharf at City Point, during the evening of the 27th of March. l renewed my visit to the President on board the same steamer, anchored in the
stream, on the following day, General Grant being present on both occasions.
Question. In those conferences was any arrangement made with you and
General Grant, or either of you, in regard to the manner of arranging business
with the confederacy, or in regard to terms of peace 1
Answer. Nothing definite; it was simply a matter of general conversation;
nothing specific and definite.
Question. At what time did you learn that President Lincoln had assented
to the assembling of the Virginia rebel legislature 1
Answer. I knew of it on the 18th of April, I think; but I procured a paper
with the specific order of General "\V eitzel, also a copy of the amnesty proclamation, on the 20th of April.
Question. You did not know, at that time, that that arrangement had been
rescindAd by the President 1
Answer. No, sir; I did not know of that until afterwards. The moment I
heard of that, I notified General Johnston of it.
Qnestion. Then at the time you entered into this arrangement with General
Johnston you knew that General ·Weitzel had approved of the calling together
of the rebel legislature of Virginia, by assent of the President 1
Answer. I knew of it by some source unofficially, and succeeded in getting
a copy of the paper containing General Weitzel's order on the 20th or 21st of
April.
Question. But at the time of your arrangement you did not know that that
order had been rescinded 1
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Answer. No, sir; I learned that several days afterwards, and at once sent
word to General Johnston.
Question. At the time of your arrangement you also knew of the surrender
of Lee's army, and the terms of that surrender 1
Answer. I had that officially fi·om General Grant; I got that at Smithfield,
on the 12th April.
~uestion. I have here what purports to be a letter from you to Johnston,
which seems to imply that :you intended to make the arrangement on the terms
of Lee's surrender. The letter is as follows:
"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
" In the Field, Raleigh, N. C., Aprill4, 1865.
"GENERAL: I have this moment received your communication of this date. I am fully
empowered to arrange with you any terms for the suspension of further hostilities as between
the armies eommanded by you and those commanded by myself, and will be willing to confer
with you to that end. I will limit the advance of my main column .to-morrow to Morrisville,
and the cavalry to the University, and expect that you will also maintain the present position
of your forces until each bas notice of a failure to agree.
"That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the same terms and conditions
as were made by Generals Grant and Lee at Appomattox Court House, on the 9th instant,
relative to our two armies ; and, furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order to
suspend the movements of any troops from the direction of Virginia. General Stoneman is
under my command, and my order will suspend any devastation or destruction contemplated
by him. I will add that I really desire to save the people of North Carolina the damage they
would sustain by the march of this army through the central or western parts of the State.
"I am, with respect, your obedient servant,
"W. T. SHERMAN, Major General.
"General J. E. JOHNSTON, Com-manding Confederate Arm.y."

Answer. 'rhose were the terms as to his owu army ; but the concessions I
made him were for the purpose of embracing other armies.
Question. And the writing you signed was to include other armies 1
Answer. The armies of Kirby Smith and Dick Taylor, so that afterwards no
man within the limits of the southern confederacy could claim to belong to any
confederate army in existence.
Question. The President addressed a note to General Grant, perhaps, not to
you, to the effect of forbidding officers of the army from entering into anything
but strictly military arrangements, leaving civil matters entirely to him.
Answer. I never saw such a note signed by President Lincoln. Mr. Stanton
made such a note or telegram, and says it wa.s by President Lincoln's dictation.
He made it to General Grant, but never to me. On the contrary, while I was
in Georgia, Mr. Lincoln telegraphed to me, encouraging me to discuss matters
with Governor Brown and Mr. Stephens.
Question. Then you had no notice of that order to General Grant 1
Answer. I had no knowledge of it, official or otherwise.
Question. In the published report of your agreement there is nothing said
about slavery, I believe 1
Answer. rrhere was nothing said about slavery, because it did not fall within
the category of military questions, and we could not make it so. It was a legal
question which the President had disposed of, overriding all our action. We
had to treat the slave as .free, because the President, our commander-in-chief,
said he was free. For me to have renewed the question when that decision
was made would have involved the absurdity of an inferior undertaking to
qualify the work of his superior.
Question. 'l'hat was the reason why it was not mentioned 1
Answer. Yes, sir. Subsequently I wrote a note to Johnston stating that I
thought it would be well to mention it for political effect when we came to draw
up the final terms with precision. 'l'hat note was written pending the time my
memorandum was going to Washington, and before an answer had been returned.
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Question. At the time you entered into those negotiations was Johnston in a
condition to offer any effectual resistance to your army?
Answer. He could not have resisted my army an hour if I could have got
hold of him; but he could have escaped from me by breaking up into small parties,
or by taking the countty roads, travelling f.tster than any army with trains could
have pursued.
Question. Then your object in negotiating was to keep his army from scattering into guerilla bands ?
Answer. That was my chief object. I officially notified the War Depart-·
ment.
Question. And not because there was any doubt about the result of a battle 1
Answer. There was no question as to the result of a battle, and I knew it;
every soldier knew it; every man in North Carolina knew it .Johnston said in
the first five minutes of our conversation that any further resistance on his part
would be an act of folly, and all he wanted was to keep his army from di::;persing.
By Mr. Loan:
Question. In your examination by the chairman you stated that you were
acting in pursuance of instructions from Mr. Lincoln, derived from his letters
and telegrams at various times.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Have you any of those letters and telegrams which you can furnish
to the committee 1
Answer. I can furnish you a copy of a despatch to General Halleck, from
Atlanta, in which I stated that I had invited Governor Brown and Vice-President Stephens to meet me; and I can give you a copy of Mr. Lincoln's answer,
for my despatch was referred to him, in which he said he felt much interested
in my despatch, and encouraged me to allow their visit. But the letter to which
I refer specifically was a longer letter, which I wrote to General Halleck from
my camp on Big Black, Mississippi, at General Halleck's instigation, in September, 1863, which was received in Washington, and submitted to Mr. Lincoln,
who desired to have it published, to which I would not consent. In that letter
I gave my opinions fully and frankly, not only upon the military situation, but
also the civil policy necessary. Mr. Lincoln expressed himself highly pleased
with my views, and desired to make them public, but I preferred not to do so.
Quel-ltion. And by subsequent acts he induced you to believe he approved of
those views.
Answer. I know he approved of them, and always encouraged me to carry
out those views.
By the chairman:
Question. The following is a letter published in the newspapers, purporting to
have been addressed by you to Mr. Johnston, dated April 21, 1865:
"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
"In the .Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 21, 1865.
"GENERAL: I send you a letter for General Wilson, which, if sent by telegraph and courier,
will check his career. He may mistrust the telegraph, therefore better send the original, for
he cannot mis take my handwriting, with which he is familiar. H e seems to have his blood
up, and will be hard to hold. If he can buy corn, fodder, and rations down about Fort
Valley, it will obviate the necessity of his going up to Rome or Dalton.
"It is reported to me from Cairo that Mobile is in our posses1>ion, but it is not minute or
official.
"General Baker sent in to me, wanting to surrender his command, on the theory that the
whole confederate army was surrendered. I explained to him or his staff officer the exact
truth, and left him to act as he thought proper. He seems to have disbanded his men, deposited a few arms about twenty miles from here, and himself awaits your action. I will not
hold him, his men, or arms, subject to any condition other than the final one we .J;Uay agree on.
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''I shall look for Major Hitchcock back from Washington on Wednesday, and shall promptly
notify you of the result. By the action of General Weitzel in relation to the Virginia legislature, I feel certain we will have no trouble on the score of recognizing existing State governments. It may be the lawyers will want us to define more minutely what is meant by the
guarantee of rights of person and property. It may be construed into a compact for us to
undo the past as to the rights of slaves and 'leases of plantations' on the Mississippi, of
'vacant and abandoned' plantations. I wish you would talk to the best men you have on
these points; and, if possible, let us in our final convention make these points so clear as to
leave no room for angry controversy.
"I believe if the south would simply and publicly declare what we all feel, that slavery is
dead, that you would inaugurate an era of peace and prosperity that would soon efface the
ravages of the past four years of war. Negroes would remain in the south, and afford you
abundance of cheap labor, which otherwise will be driven away; and it will save the country
the senseless discussions which have kept us all in hot water for fifty years.
"Although, strictly speaking, this is no subject of a military convention, yet I am honestly
convinced that our simple declaration of a result will be accepted as good law everywhere.
Of course I have not a single word from Washington on this or any other point of our agreements, but I know the effect of such a step by us will be universally accepted.
"I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
"W. T. SHERMAN,
"Major General United States Army.
"General J. E. JOHNSTON,
" Commanding Cmifederate Army."

That is the letter in which you say that it would be well to declare publicly
that slavery is dead 1
Answer. Yes, sir, that is the letter.
By Mr. Loan:
Question. Will you furnish the committee a copy of the letters written by
you to Mr. Stanton, in January last, from Savannah 1
Answer. I will do so.
'l'he CHAIRMAN. And when the manuscript of your testimony is prepared it
will be submitted to you for revision, and you can add to it any statement or
papers that you may desire or consider necessary.
'l'he WITNESS, (sl:lbsequently.) I have revised the above, and now subjoin
copies of letters from my letter-book in the order of their bearing on the
questions raised by this inquiry.
"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
"In the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 18, 1865.
"GENERAL: I enclose herewith a copy of an agreement made this day between General
Joseph E. Johnston and myself, which, if approved by the President of the United States.
will produce peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. Mr . .Breckinridge was present at
our conference in the capacity of major general, and satisfied me of the ability of General
Johnston to carry out to the full extent the terms of this agreement; and, if you will get the
President to simply indorse the copy and commission me to carry out the terms, I will
follow them to the conclusion.
"You will observe that it is an absolute submission of the enemy to the lawful authority
of the United States, and disperses his armies absolutely; and the point to which I attach
most importance is, that the dispersion and disbandment of these armies is done in such a.
manner as to prevent their breaking up into guerilla bands. On the other hand, we can
retain just as much of an army as we please. I agreed to the mode and manner of the surrender of arms set forth, as it gives the States the means of repressing guerillas, which we
could not expect them to do if we stripped them of all arms.
"Both Generals Johnston and Breckinridge admitted that slavery was dead, and I could
not insist on embracing it in such a paper, because it can be made with the States in detail.
I know that all the men of substance south sincerely want peace, and I do not believe they
will resort to war again during this century. I have no doubt but that they will in the
future be perfectly subordinate to the laws of the United States. The moment my action in
this matter is approved, I can spare five (5) corps, and will ask for orders to leave General
Schofield here with the lOth corps, and to march myself with the 14th, 15th, 17th, 20th, and
23d corps, via Burkesville and Gordonsville, to Frederick or Hagerstown, there to be paid
and mustered out.
"The question of finance is now the chief one, and every soldier and officer not needed
should be got home at work. I would like to be able to begin the march north by May 1.
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"I urgt', on the part of the President, speedy action, as it is important to g·et the confederate armies to their homes as well as our own.
"I am, with great resprct, your obedient servant,
"W. T. SHERMAN,
".Major Gencml, Commanding.
"Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT, or 1\Iajor General HALLECK,
"Washington, D. C."
"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE l\IISSISSJPPI,

"In the Pield, Raleigh, N. C., Aprill8, 1865.
"GEXERAL: I rereivcd your despatch describing· the man Clark detailed to assassinate
me. He had better be in a hurry, or he will be too late.
''Tho news of .Mr. Lincoln's death produced a most intense effect on our troops. At first
I feared it would lead to excesses; but now it has softened down and can easily be guided.
None evinced more feeling than General Johnston, who admitted that the act was calculated
to stain his cans~ with a dark hue; and he contended that the loss was most seri9us to the
south, who had begun to realize that Mr. Lincoln was the best friend the south had.
"I crumot bclie,,e that even l\lr. Davis was pTivy to the diabolical plot, but think it tho
emanation of a !-lot of young men of the south, who are very devils. I want to throw upon
tlw south the care of this class of men, who will soon be as obnoxious to their industrial
classes as to us.
"Ha<l I pushed Johnston's army to an extremity, it would have dispersed and done infinite mischief. Johnston informed me that General Stoneman had been at Salisbury, and
was now about Statesville. I have sent him orders to come to me.
"General Johnston also informed me that General 'Vilson was at Columbus, Ga., and
he wanted. me to urrest his progress. I leave that to you.
'• Indeed, if the President sanctions my agreement with Johnston our interest is to cease
all destruction.
"Please give all orders necessary according to the views the Executive may take, and
influence him, if pos~ible, not to vary the terms at all, for I have considered everything,
and believe that tho confederate armies once dispersed vve can adjust all else fairly and well.
"I am yours, &c.,
·
",V. T. SHERMAN,
"~Major General, Commanding.
''General H. ,V. HALLECK, Chief of Staff; Washington, D. C."

Lest confusion shoulJ result to the mind of the committee by the latter part
of the above letter, I ·will state it was addressed to General Halleck as chief of
staff: when he was the proper "maker of orders" to tlw commander-in-chief.
'rhe whole case was changed when, on the 22d of April, he became the commander of tile separate division of the James.
As stated in my testimony, General Grant reached Raleigh on the 24th. On
the 25th, on the supposition that I would start next day to chase Johnston's
army, I wrote him the following· letter, delivered in person:
"HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

"In the Field, Raleigh, N. C., .April25, 1865.
''GENERAL: I had tbo honor to receive your letter of April 21, with enclosures, yesterday,
and was well pleased that you came along, as you must l1ave observed that I held the military control so as to adapt it to any phase the case might assume.
"It is but ju~;t I should record the f~tct that I made my terms with General Johnston
under the influence of the liberal terms you extended to the army of General Lee at Appomattox Court Honse on the 9th, and the seeming policy of our government as evinced by the
call of the Virg·inia legislature and governor back to Richmond under yoms anu President
Lincoln's very eyes. It now appears this last act was done \Yithout any consultation with
you or any knowledge of Mr. Lincoln, but rather in opposition to a previous policy well
considered.
"I have not the lem;t def'ire to interfere in the civil policy of our government, but would
shun it as something not to my liking; but occasions do arise when a prompt seizure of
results i~; forced on military commanders not in immediate communication with the proper
authority. It is probable that the terms signed by General Johnston and myself were not
clear enough on tile point, well understood between us, that our negotiations did not apply to
any parties outside the o:fficurs and men of the confederate armies, which could easily have
been remedied.
"No :mrrender of any army, not actually at the mercy of an antagonist, was eYer maue
without "terms," and. these always define the military status of the surrendered. Thus, you
2
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stipulated that the officers and men of Lee's army should not be molested at their homes solong as they obeyed the laws at the place of their residence.
''I do not wish to discuss these points involved in our recognition of the State governments
in actual existence, but will merely state my conclusions to await the solution of the future.
'' Such action on our part in no manner recognizes for a moment the so-called confederate
govemment, or makes us liable for its debts or acts,
" The laws and acts done by the several States during the period of rebellion are void, because done without the oath prescribed by our Constitution of the United States, which is a
'condition precedent.'
''We have a right to use any sort of machinery to produce military results; and it is the
commonest thing for military commanders to use the civil governments in actual existence as
a means to an end. I do believe vYe could and can use the present State governments lawfully, constitutionally, and as the very best possible means to produce the object desired, viz :
entire and complete submission to the lawful authority of the United States.
"As to punishment for past crimes, that is for the judiciary, and can in no manner of way
be disturbed by our acts ; and so far as I can I will use my influence that rebels shall suffer
all the personal punishment prescribed by law; as also the civil liabilities arising from their
past acts.
''What we now want is the new forms of law by which common men may regain the positions of industry so long disturbed by the war.
"I now apprehend that the rebel armies will disperse, and, instead of dealing with six or
seven States, we will have to deal with numberless bands of desperadoes, headed by such
men as Mosby, Forrest, Red Jackson, and others, who know not and care not for danger
and its consequences.
" I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
"W. T. SHERMAN, ~llfajor General.
''Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT, Present."

On the same day I wrote and mailed to the Secretary of War the following:
"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
"In the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 25, 1865.
"DEAR SIR: I have been furnished a copy of your letter of April21 to General Grant, signifying your disapproval of the terms on which General Johnston proposed to disarm and
disperse the insurgents, on condition of amnesty, &c. I admit my folly in embracing in a
military convention any civil matters; but, unfortunately, such is the nature of our situation
that they seem inextricably united; and I understood from you at Savannah that the financial state of the country demanded military success, and would warrant a little bending to
policy.
''When I had my conference with General Johnston, I had the public examples before me
of General Grant's terms to Lee's army and General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia
legislature to assemble.
''I still believe the general government of the United States has made a mistake; but that
is none of my business-mine is a different task; and I had flattered myself that, by four
years of patient, unremitting, and successful labor I deserved no reminder such as is contained in the last paragraph of your letter to General Grant. You may assure the President
that I heed his suggestion.
"I am truly, &c.,
"vV. T. SHERMAN, Major General, Commanding.
"Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington."

'l'he last sentence refers to the fact that General Grant had been sent to
Raleigh to direct military movements. '!'hat was the first time in my life I
had ever had a word of reproof from the government of the United States, and
I was naturally sensitive. But all I said to any one was to General Meigs, who
came with General Grant, that it was not kind on the part of Mr. Secretary
Stanton. 'l'he fact, however, did not qualify my military conduct. rrhe final
interview with General Johnston followed, and the terms of capitulation were
agreed on and signed, and General Grant started for Washington, bearing the
news; when on the 28th of April I received in the New York 'l'imes the most
extraordinary budget of Mr. Stanton, which for the first time startled me, and
I wrote to General Grant this letter :
"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
" In the Field, April 28, 1865.
•' GENERAL: Since you left me yesterday I have seen the New York Times of the 24th instant, containing a budget of military news, authenticated by the signature of the Secretary
of War, which is grouped in such a way as to give very erroneous impressions. It em braces
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.a copy of the basis of agreement between myself and General Johnston, of April IS, with
commentaries which it will be time enough to discuss two. or three years hence-after the
government has experimented a little more in the machinery by which power reaches the
scattered people of the vast country known as the south; but, in the mean time, I do think
that my rank (if not past services) entitled me at least to the respect of keeping secret what
was known to none but the cabinet until further inquiry could be made, instead of giving
publicity to documents I never saw, and drawing inferences wide of the tru th.
"I never saw or had furnished me a copy of Mr. Stanton's despatch to you of the 3d of
.March, nor did Mr. Stanton, or any human being, ever convey to me its substance, or anything like it; but, on the contrary, I had seen General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia
legislature, made in Mr. Lincoln's very presence, and had failed to discern any other official
hint of a plan of reconstruction, or any ideas calculated to allay the fears of the people of
the south, after the destruction of their armies and civil authorities would leave them
"·ithout any government at all. We should not drive a people into anarchy, and it is simply
impossible for our military power to reach all the masses of their unhappy country.
"I confess I did not want to drive General Johnston's army into bands of armed men,
going about without purpose, and capable only of infinite mischief. But you saw, on your
arrival at Raleigh, that I had my armies so disposed that his escape was only possible in a
disorganized shape, and as yon did not choose to direct military operations in this quarter, I
infer that you were satisfied with the military situation. At all events, the moment I learned
{what was proper enough) the disapproval of the President, I acted in such a manner as to
eompel the surrender of General Johnston's whole army on the same terms as you had prescribed to General Lee's army when you had it surrounded and in yom absolute power.
"Mr. Stanton, in stating that my orders to General Stoneman were likely to result in the
escape of 'Mr. Davis to Mexico or Europe,' is in deep error. General Stoneman was not
at Salisbury then, but had gone back to Statesville. Davis was supposed to be between us,
and Stoneman was beyond him. By turning towards me he was approaching Davis, and
had he joined me, as ordered, I then would have had a mounted force needed for that and
other purposes. But even now I don't know that Mr. Stanton wants Davis caught, and as
my official papers, deemed sacred, arc hastily published to the world, it will be imprudent
for me to state what has been done in that respect.
"As the editor of the Times has (it may be) logically and fairly drawn the inference from
this singular document that I am insubordinate, I can only deny the intention. I have
never in my life questioned or disobeyed an order, though many and many a time have I
risked my life, my health, and reputation in obeying orders, or even hints to execute plans
and purposes not to my liking. It is not fair to withhold from me plans and policy (if any
there be) and expect me to guess at them, for facts and events appear quite different fi-om
different stand-points. :For four years I have been in camp dealing with soldiers, and I can
assure you that the conclusions at which the cabinet arrived with such singular unanimity
differ from mine. I conferred freely with the best officers in this army as to the points involved in this controversy, and, strange to say, they were singularly unanimous in the other
conclusion, and they will learn with pain and sorrow that I am deemed insubordinate, and
wanting in common sense; that I, who havE'\ labored day and night, winter and summer, for
four years, and have brought an army of 70,000 men, in magnificent condition, across a
country deemed impassable, and placed it just where it was wanted almost on the day appointed, have brought discredit on the government. I do not wish to boast of this, but I
do say that it entitled me to the courtesy of being consulted before publishing to the world
a proposition rightfully submitted to higher authority for adjudication, and then accompanied by statements which invited the press to be let loose on me.
"It is true that non-combatants, men who sleep in comfort and security whilst we watch
on the distant lines, are better able to judge than we poor soldiers, who 1 a.rely see a newspaper, hardly can hear from our families, or stop long enough to get our pay. I envy not
the task of reconstruction, and am delighted that the Secretary has relieved me of it.
"As you did not undertake to assume the management of the affairs of this army, I infer
that on personal inspection your mind arrived at a different conclusion from that of Mr.
Secretary Stanton. I will therefore go on and execute your orders to the conclusion, and
when done will, with intense satisfaction, ieave to the civil authorities the execution of the
task of which they seem to me so jealous; but as an honest man and soldier I invite them to
fol~ow my path, for they may see some things and hear some things that may disturb their
philosophy.
" With sincere respect,
"vV. '1'. SHERMAN,
"Major GeneraL, Commanding.
"Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT,
"General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.
"P. S.-As Mr. Stanton's singular paper has been published, I demand that this also be
made public, though I am in no manner responsible to the press, but to the law and my
proper superiors.
"W. T. SHERMAN,
"Major Gtneral, Commanding."
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Since my arrival at Washington I have learned from General Grant that this
letter was received, but he preferred to withhold it until my arrival, as he knew
I was marching towards "\V ashington with my army. Upon my arrival I did not
insist on its publication till it was drawn out by this inquiry. I also append
here the copy of a letter from Colonel T. S. Bowerl', Assistant AdjutDnt General,
asking me to modify my report as to the point of violating my truce, with my
answer.
"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF TilE UNITED STATE~,
'' Washington, lliay 25, 1865.
"Major General W. T. SIIER~IAN, Commandzng Military Division of the .111ississippi:
"General Grant directs me to call your attention to the part of your report in which the
necessity of maintaining your truce at the expense of many lives is spoken of. The general
thinks that in making a truce the commander of an army can control only llis own army,
and that the hostile general must make his own arrangements with other armies acting
against him.
'' 'Vhilst independent g·enerals acting against a common foe would naturally act in concert,
the general deems that each must be the judge of his own duty, and respou::;ible for its execution.
"If you should wish, the report will be returned for any change you deem best.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"T. S. BO\VERS, Assistant Adjutant General."
"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE :MISSISSIPPI,
"Washington, D. C., llia'!J26, 1865.
" CoLONEL: I had the honor to receive your letter of May 25 last evening, and I hasten toanswer. I wish to precede it by renewing the assurance of my entire confidence and respect
for the President and Lieutenant General Grant, and that in all matters I will b~ most willingto shape my official and private conduct to suit their wishes. The past is beyond my control, and the matters embraced in the official report to which you refer are finishPd. It is
but just the reasons that actuated me, right or wrong, should stand of record; but in all
future cases, should any arise, I will respect the decision of General Grant, though I think
it wrong.
"Supposing a guard bas prisoners in charge, and officers of another command should aim
to rescue or kill them, is it not clear the guard must defend the prisoners? Same of a safe-guard. So jealous is the military law to protect and maintain good faith when pledged
that the law adjudges death and no alternative punishment to one who violates a safe-guard
in foreign parts. (See Article of vVar No. 55.) For murder, arson, treason, and the highest
military crimes, the punishment prescribed by law is death, or some minor punishment; but
for the violation of a 'safe-guard' death, and death alone, is the prescribed penalty. I
instance this to illustrate how in military stipulations to an enemy our government commands
and enforces 'good faith.' In discussing this matter I would like to refer to many writers .
.on military law, but am willing to take Halleck as the text. (See his chapter No. '27.) In
the very first article he states that good faith should always be observed between enemies in
war, because when our faith has been pledged to him, so far as the promise extends he ceases
to be an enemy. He then defines the meaning of compacts and conventions, and says they are
made sometimes for a general or a partial suspension of hostilities for the 'surrender of an
army,' &c. They may be special, limited to particular places or particular forces, but of
course can only bind the armies subject to the general who makes the truce and co-extensive
only with the extent of his command. This is all I ever claimed, and clearly covers the
whole case. All of North Carolina was in my immediate command, with General Schofield,.
its department commander, and his army, present with me. I never asked the truce to have
effect beyond my own territorial command. General Halleck himself, in his Orders No. 1,
defines his own limits clearly enough, viz., "such part of North Carolina as was not occu-·
pied by command of Major General Shennan." He could not pursue and cut off Johnston's
retreat towards Salisbury and Charlotte without invading my command, and so patent was
his purpose to deflJ and violate my truce that Mr. Stanton's publication of the fact, not even
yet recalled, modified, or explained, was headed, 'Sherman's tntce dis1·egarded,' that the
whole world drew but one inference. It admits of no other. I never claimed that that trucebound Generals Halleck or Canby within the sphere of their respective commands as defined
by themselves.
"It was a partial tn1ee of very short duration, clearly within my limits and right, justified
by .events, and as in the case of prisoners in my custody, or the violation of a safe-guard
given by me in my own territorial limits, I was bound to maintain good faith.
"I prefer not to change my report, but again repeat that in all fut~re cases I am willing t()
be governed by the interpretation of General Grant, although I again invite his attention tOo
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the limits of my command and those of General Halleck at the time, and the pointed phraseology of General Halleck's despatch to Mr. Stanton, wherein he reports that he had ordered
his generals to pay no heed to my orders within the clearly defined area of my command.
''I am, &c.,
"\V. T. SHERMAN,
"Major General U. S. A., Commanding,
'' Colonel 1:. S. BOWERS,
"Assistant Adjutant Gene1·al, Washington, D. C."

I now add the two letters written to Mr. Stanton at Savannah, and the
despatch from Atlanta, mentioned in the body of my testimony, and Mr. Lincoln's answer.
"HEADQUARTERS MILI'I'ARY DIVISION OF THE MlSSISSIPPI,
"In the Field, Savannah, January 2, 1865.
''SIR: I have just received from Lieutenant General Grant a copy of that part of your telegram to him of December 26, relating to cotton, a copy of which has been immediately furnished to General Easton, my chief quartermaster, who will be strictly governed by it.
'' I had already been approached by all the consuls and half the people of Savannah on this
cotton question, and my invariable answer has been, that all the cotton in Savannah was
prize of war and belonged to the United States, and nobody should recover a bale of it with
my consent, and that as cotton had been one of the chief causes of this war it should help
pay its expenses; that all cotton beeame tainted with treason fi·om the hour the first act of
hostility was committed against the United States some time in December, 1860; and that
no bill of sale subsequent to that date could convey title.
"My orders were that an officer of the quartermaster's department, United States army,
might furnish the holder, agent,. or attorney a mere certificate of the fact of seizure, with
description of the bales marked, &c., the cotton then to be turned over to the agent of the
Treasury Department to be shipped to New York for sale. But since the receipt of your
despatch I have ordered General Easton to make the shipment. himself to the quartermaster
at New York, where you can dispose of it at pleasure. I do not think the Treasury Department ought to bother itself with the prizes or captures of war.
"Mr. Barclay, former consul at New York, representing Mr. Molyneux, former consul here,
but absent since a long time, called on me in person with reference to cotton claimed by
English subjects. He seemed amazed when I told him I should pay no respect to consular
certificates, and that in no event would I treat an English subject with more favor than one
of our own deluded citizens, and that for my part I was unwilling to fight for cotton for the
benefit of Englishmen openly engaged in smuggling arms and instruments of war to kill us;
that, on the contrary, it would afford me great satisfaction to conduct my army to Nassau
and wipe out that nest of pirates. I explained to him, however, that I was not a diplomatic
agent of the general government of the United States, but that my opinion, so frankly expressed, was that of a soldier, which it would be well for him to heed. It appeared also
that he owned a plantation o the line of investment of Savannah, which, of course, is destroyed, and for which be expected me to give him some certificate entitling him to idemnification, which I declined emphatically.
"I have adopted in Savannah rules concerning property, severe, but just, founded upon
the laws of nations and the practice of civilized governments, and am clearly of the opinion
that we should claim all the belligerent rights over conquered countries, that the people may
realize the truth that war is no child's play.
"I embrace in this a copy of a letter dated December 31, 1864, in answer to one from Solomon Cohen, a rich lawyer, to General Blair, his personal ti'iend, as follows:
'' 'GENERAL: Your note enclosing Mr. Cohen's of this elate is received, and I answer frankly
through you his inquiries.
" 'First. No one can practice law as an attorney in the United States without acknowledging
the supremacy of our government. If I am not in error, an attorney is as much an officer
of the eourt as the clerk, and it would be a novel thing in a government to have a court to
administer law that denied the supremacy of the government itself.
"'Second. No one will be allowed the privileges of a merchant; or, rather, to trade is a
pdvilege which no one should seek of the •government without in like manner acknowledging
its supremacy.
'" Third. If Mr. Cohen remains in Savannah as a denizen, his property, real and personal,
will not be disturbed unless its temporary use be necessary for the military authorities of the
city. The title to property will not be disturbed in any event, until adjudicated by the
courts of the United States.
"' Fou1·th. If Mr. Cohen leaves Savannah under my Special Order No. 143, it is a public
acknowledgment that he 'adheres to the enemies of the United States,' and all his property
becomes forfeited to the United States. But as a matter of favor he will be allowed to carry
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with him clothing and furniture for the use of himself, his family, and servants, and will be
transported within the enemy's lines, but not by way of Port Royal.
'' 'These rules will apply to all parties, and from them no exception will be made.
"'I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,
" '\Y. T. SHERMAN, llfajor General.
"'Major General F. P. BLAIR,
"' Commanding 17th Anny Cm-ps.'
"This letter was in answer to specific inquiries; it is clear and specific, and covers all the
points, and should I leave before my orders are executed, I will endeavor to impress upon
my successor, General Foster, their wisdom and propriety.
"I hope the course I have taken in these matters will meet your approbation, and that the
President will not refund to parties claiming cotton or other property, without the strongest
evidence of loyalty and friendship on the part of the claimant, or unless some other positive
end is to be gained.
"I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
"W. T. SHERMAN,
1

"Major General, Commanding.
'

Hon.

EDWIN

M.

STAKTON,

"Secretary of Wa1·, Washington, D. C."
'' HEADQUARTERs MILITARY DrYISlSON oF THE l\lississiPPl,

"In the Field, Savannah, January 19, 1865.
"Sm : When you left Savannah a few day;; ago yon forgot the mnp which General Geary
had prepared for you, showing the route uy which his di viRion enkred the city of Savannah-being the first troops to occupy that city. I now send it to you.
"I avail myself of the opportunity also to enclose you copies of all my official orders
touching trade and intercourse with the people of Georgia, as well as for the establishment
of the negro settlements.
''Delegations of the people of Georgia continue to come, and I am satisfied that a little
judicious handling and by a little respect being paid to their prejudices, we can create,a
schism in Jefferson Davis's dominions. All that I have conversed with realize the truth
that slavery as an institution is defunct, and the only questions that remain are what disposition shall be made of the negroes themselves. I confess myself unable to offer a complete solution for these questions, and prefer to leave it to the Elower operations of time.
We have given the initiative, and can afford to await the working of the experiment.
" As to trade matters I also think it is to our interest to keep the people somewhat dependent on the articles of commerce to which they have been hitherto accustomed. General Grover is now here, and will, I think, be able to manage this matter judiciously, and
may gradually relax and invite cotton to come in in large quantities. But at first we
should manifest :no undue anxiety on that score, for the rebelo would at once make use of
it as a power against us. We should as;sume a tone of perfect contempt for cotton and
everything else in comparison with the great object of the war-the restoration of the Union
with all tts rights and power. If the rebels burn cotton as a war measure, they simply play
into our hands by taking away the only product of value they now have to exchange in
foreign ports for war ships and munitions. By such a course also they alienate the feelings
of the large class of small farme:s that look to their little parcels of cotton to exchange
for food and clothing for their families I hope the government will not manifest too much
anxiety to obtain cotton in large quantities, and especially that the President will not indorse the contracts for the purchase of large quantities of cotton. Several contracts, involving from six to ten thousand bales, indorsed by Mr. Lincoln, have been shown me, but
were not in such a form as to amount to an order for me to facilitate their execution.
''As to treasury trade agents and agents to take charge of confiscated and abandoned property, whose salaries depend on their fees, I can only Eay that as a general rule they are
mischievous and disturbing elements to a military government, and it is almost impossible
for us to study the law and regulations so as to understand fully their powers and duties.
I rather think the quartermaster's department of the army could better fulfil all their
duties and accomplish all that is aimed at by th~ law . Yet on this subject I willleavp
Generals Foster and Grover to do the best they can.
"I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
"W. T. SHERMAN,
'' Major General, Commanding.

"Hon.

EDWIN

M.

STANTON,

"Secretary of War, Washington, D. 0."
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"HEADQUARTERS l\fiLITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

''In the Field, Atlanta, Georgia, September 15, 1tS64.

"1\ly rep('H't is done, and will be forwarded as soon as I get a few more of the subordinate
reports. I am awaiting a courier from General Grant. All well, and troops in fine, healthy
camps, and supplies coming forward finely.
"Governor Brown has d1sbanded his militia to gather the corn and sorghum of the State.
I have reason to believe that he and :::\tephens want to visit me, and I have sent them a.
hearty invitation.
"I will exchange 2,000 prisoners with Hood, but no more.
"W. T. SHERMAN,
'' Ma;'or General, Commanding.
"General HAJ.LECK, lVushington, D. 0."
" WASIIINGTON, D.

c.

I

"September 17, 1864-10 a. m.

'' Major General SHERlllAN: I feel great interest in the subjects of your despatch mentioning
corn and sorghum, and contemplated visit to you.
"A. LINr:'OLN,
''President of the United States."

I have not possession here of all my official records, most of which are our
west. I have selected the above from my more recent letter books, and offet
them to show how prompt and full have been my official reports, and how unnecessary was all the clamor made touching my actions and opinions at the
time the basis of agreement of April 18 was submitted to the President. All
of which is most respectfully submitted.

\V. T. SHERMAN,
Majm· General U. S. A.

/

LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, June

29, 1864.

Resolved, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be instructed to inquire what

progress has been made in the construction of the iron-clad steam gunboats contracted for
in the year 1862, by whom the contract was made on the part of the government, who
planned the models of the same, and who is responsible therefor ; have any of them been
finished; if so, what was the condition of the vessel after she was launched; are the other
vessels contracted for to be built on a plan or model similar to the Chimo, lately launched
at Boston; and all information which may be had touching said gunboats.
Attest:

J. W. FORNEY, SecTetary.

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War submit the following report:
During the year 1862 the necessity for some light-draught armored
vessels for operations on our western rivers and the shallow bays and
sounds upon the Atlantic and Gulf coasts became so urgent that the
Navy Department determined to provide some for that purpose if
possible. Application was made to Mr. John Ericsson, the inventor
of the original Monitor, for a plan of a light-draught monitor,. to carry
one turret, and to have a draught of from six to six and a half feet.
On the 9th of October !fr. Ericsson submitted to the department a
plan, which, to use his own words, ''was not intended as a working
plan, yet it defined with clearness and precision the general principle,
and the mode of building the Yessel, engines, boilers, and propellers."
Mr. Ericsson not having time to make all the calculations and detailed working plans, that work was confided to Chief Engineer Alban
C. Stimers, of the United States navy. Mr. Stimers had been engaged
with Mr. Ericsson in the construction of the first monitor, had gone
in that vessel, in the capacity of engineer, from New York to Hampton roads, had there assisted in the contest between the Monitor and
the rebel iron-clad, the Merrimac, and since that time bad been engaged more or less, by order of the Navy Department, in superintending the construction of the other monitors contracted for by the
department. The detailed plan having been prepared by Mr. Stiwers,
the department advertised for proposals as follows :
[Advertisement.]
LIGHT-DRAUGHT VESSELS FOR RIVERS AND BAYS.
NAVY DEPARTMENT, February 10, 1863.
The Navy Department will receive proposals for the construction and completion, in every respect, (except guns, ordnance stores, fuel, provisions, and
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nautical instruments,) of armored steamers, of about seven hundred tons, of
wood and iron combined, having a single revolving turret.
On personal application at the Navy Department in Washington, or to RearAdmiral Gregory, No. 413 Broadway, New York, parties intending to offer can
examine the plans and specifications, which will be furnished to the contractors
by the department.
No offer will be considered unless from parties who are prepared to execute
work of this kind, having suitable shops and tools, of which, if not known to
the department, they must present evidence with their bid.
The act of Congress approved July 17, 1862, prohibits the transfer of any
contract or order, or interest therein.
The bidders will state the price, and the time within which they will agree to
complete the vessel or vessels, and the bid must be accompanied by the guarantee required by law, that if awarded to them they will promptly execute the
contract.
Propositions Will be received until the 24th day of February, and they must
be indorsed "Proposals for vessels for river defence," to distinguish them from
other business letters.

From the bids thus received a general average price was established, of a little less than $400,000 each, and during the months of
:March, April, and May, 1863, contracts were made for the building
of twenty light-draught monitors upon the same plan. Mr. Stimers
was placed in charge of their construction, and the contractors were
directed to look to him for instructions. He was ordered to consult
with Mr. Ericsson in preparing his plans and drawings for contractors, and, at his own request, was authorized to establish an office
and employ assistants in New York city, where he could have facilities for frequent and easy consultation with Mr. Ericsson.
In May, 1864, the first of these vessels, the Chimo, built by Mr.
Aquila Adams, was launched at Boston. She was found to be a failure, so far as the original design was concerned, of a light-draught
river monitor. All these vessels having been designed upon the
same plan, further work was at once suspended upon them. A commission was appointed on the 11th of .J une, 1864, to examine them,
and to recommend what should be done with them to remedy their
defects. The commission reported on the 9th of July, 1864, recommending that five of the vessels should be changed into torpedo boats,
by removing the turrets, &c., in order to lighten their draught, and
that the other fifteen should be changed by building up their sides
twenty-two inches, increasing their draught, but rendering them
more serviceable as monitors. That recommendation was adopted by
tbe department, and the proposed changes have been carried out.
These vessels were found to be defective in draught and in speed.
Instead of being some fifteen inches out of the water when fully
completed and equippecl, as was the original design, it was found
that they would barely float, their decks being awash with the water.
rrheir speed, instead of being from seven to nine knots an hour, was
found upon trial to be only from three and a half to four knots an hour.
The increased draught was caused, first, by reason of a miscalculation
of the weights of the materials and the amount of displacement; and,
S9condly, in consequence of the additions and alterations made in the
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plans after the contracts were entered into. Many of these altera·
l,ions were considered necesf:mry from the experience gained by the
navy in the attack made by the monitors and other vessels upon the
rebel forts in the harbor of Charleston, and were adopted to obviate
defects which that engagement 8howed to exist in the monitors. The
addition of a water-tank around the vessel was made upon the suggeotion of Admiral Smith, chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks,
for the purpose of enabling these light-draught vessels, when navigating unkno\vn waters, to sink themselves, so that when they should
run aground they could be floated off by pumping the water out of
the tanks.
The errors in the calculations of weights and amount of displacement would appear from the testimony to be in a great part attributable to Mr. Stimers and those in his employ. He had almost the
entire control of the matter ; to him was intrusted the making the
caJ.culations, drawing the plans, and superintending the work of construction. He had the calculations made by a young man in his
office, who Mr. Stimers says was a man of ability, but too young and
inexperienced to make all the calculations upon which were to be
built twenty vessels, at a cost of several millions of dollars. Mr.
Stimers says that although he had great confidence in the ability of
this young man, yet he deemed it necessary that his work should be
reviewed by others of more experience ; for that purpose he says
that he submitted the calculatiOns to Mr. Lenthall, chief of the Bureau
of Construction and Repairs, stating that they were the work of a
young man, and it was important that they should be verified, and
requested that it should be done, which was refused. This statement of Mr. Stimers is flatly denied by Mr. Lenthall.
~fr. Stimers also states, that according to orders, he consulted with
·Mr. Ericsson in regard to the plans and alterations and additions to
·the original plan, and also consulted, or endeavored to do so, with
the Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, Mr. Isherwood, and
the chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repairs, Mr. Lenthall.
Mr. Ericsson, while admitting that he was shown many of the plans
and drawings prepared under the directions of Mr. Stimers, denies
that he was consulted at all, even in regard to those matters which
were shown to him. And Mr. Lenthall and Mr. Isherwood deny that
they were ever consulted by Mr. Stimers in regard to these lightdraught monitors.
The defect in the speed wa8 cam~ed mainly by the increased draught
of those ve8sels ; the principal difficulty being caused by the immersion of the overhang protecting the rudder, which prevented the
screw from properly operating, in consequence of its being partially
enclosed in a box under the water. Some of the witnesses attribute
some of the lack of speed to the engines not being such as should
have been put in those vessels.
The fact having been fully established that those vessels, as originally planned and constructed, failed to accomplish the purpose for
which they were designed, your committee have not deemed it neces-
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sary to take testimony in regard to all the details, nor in their report
to refer to all the details which appear in the testimony.
It is due to Engineer Stimers to state that his dut.ies aR general
inspector and superintendent of the construction of monitors and
iron-clads were very arduous. He says :
"I had to visit Boston, Philadelphia, Chester, Pennsylvania, and Wilmington, Delaware, ~esides a great m3Jly places about New York. There were new
vessels also being built in Cincinnati and Pittsburg, although I did not visit
there until some time after that ; but there was a great deal of correspondence
growing up, making out all these new contracts, teaching civilian inspectors
what their duties were, and learning what were the views of the Navy Department, and of Captain Ericsson. I was consequently occupied pretty closely."

He does not appear to have been influenced by any desire other
than to make as serviceable vessels as possible. A misunderstanding arose between him and Mr. Ericsson, which led Mr. Ericsson to
deny any responsibility in the matter, and for some reason there was
an unfriendly feeling towards Mr. Stimers upon the part of the chief
of the Bureau of Steam Engineering and the chief of the Bureau of
Construction and Repairs. Mr. Stimers states that he always regarded those officers as inimical to the construction of iron-clad vessels.
He says:

•

" I always felt that it was a regular fight--that we had to conquer them
before we could get them to do anything. On the one side i.t was a fight with
the bureaus, and on the other side it was a fight with the contractors, to make
them do anything right. It was a very unpleasant position which I held."

On the other hand those officers deny that they either had or have
now any unfriendly feelings to·wards monitor or iron-clad vessels, but
express a very poor opinion of Mr. 8timers.
When it was found that these vessels were failures as originally
designed and constructed, M!". Stimers was removed from the position he had held in relation to them, and they were placed in charge
of other officers, and altered as recommended by the commission appointed to examine them. The five changed into torpedo boats were
altered at a cost of from $50,000 to $60,000 each ; the other fifteen
were altered at a cost of from $80,000 to $100,000 each. With these
alterations they would appear to be a very serviceable class of vessels,
though uot so serviceable as they should be, considering the expenditure of time and money upon their construction, except those fitted
up as torpedo boats, which are of hut little utility.
Your committee cannot refrain from the expression of the opinion
that it was unwise to order the construction of so many vessels upon
precisely the same plan, without first testing the questions involved,
by the construction of one or two, or at least carrying them so far
forward towards completion as to enable the department to understand and remedy the defects which have been shown to exist in those
light-draught monitors.
Respectfully submitted.
B. F. WADE,

Chairman.

LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS

NAVY DEPARTMENT, December 15, 1864.
Sm: In conformity with your verbal request of yesterday, I have the honor
to submit, for the use of the Committee on the Conduct of theWar, a few hasty
notes on the light-draught monitors. As the war progressed and assumed greater
proportions, and our armies penetrated into the interior of the rebel territory,
the navy occupied and patrolled the great rivers and the numerous estuaries,
but the class of vessels that of necessity performed this work and protected the
army communications were found to be insufficient or unsuitable for the duty.
They were wooden boats of light draught, purchased from the merchant service;
their machinery, boilers and magazines were above the water-line, and their
crews had no protection whatever against sharpshooters hiding behind trees
upon the river bank. 'rhis necessitated the building up of light iron bulwarks
(the vessels were too frail to carry anything heavier) as a protection against
musketry. The enemy, however, found many high points upon their inland
waters where they could plant batteries of artillery, which looked down upon
the gunboats, and were consequently out of reach of their heavy guns. Gallant
attempts to attack such batteries, to pass them, and to keep Ol)en the army line~:~
of communication, were attended with many fatal disasters and a loss so mew hat
of the prestige of the gunboats. From every squadron and flotilla the department was called upon for a light-draught iron-clad vessel that should be able
to resist the ordnance used by the rebels. The urgency of the demand, and the
painful accidents and disasters constantly occurring, could not be treated with
indifference. An invulnerable vessel of light-draught not only had never been
attempted, but an extended inquiry seemed to forbid the consideration of the
subject. Nevertheless, the inventor of the Monitor, at the request of the department, and after several weeks' consideration of the subject, proposed a
general plan of a monitor, to draw about six feet and four inches of water, to
have a single iron turret eight inches thick, with two eleven-inch guns, and to
be otherwise well protected against the projectiles used by the rebels. The
department would have been glad to have been spared from further experiments
in the unexplored fields which the necessities of this war forced it to tread, but
it did not shrink from the responsibility which attaches to radical measures,
although neither the past nor the present afforded any light to guide it. The
rebel government furnishes an example of perseverance and faith in the construction of iron-clad vessels, which is probably due to the fact that opposition
and investigation are silenced in that section of our country. Wherever their
iron-clads have appeared, they have been defeated or destroyed: the Merrimack
by the Monitor ; the Atlanta by the Weehawken; the '.rennessee by Rear-Ad
miral Farragut's fleet ; the Louisiana and Mississippi, with six or seven semiiron-claus, when Rear-AC\miral Farragut captureu New Orleans; one up tbe
Yazoo, and two up the lled river, to prevent their falling into Rear-Admiral
Porter's hands; the Arkansas by the Essex; several half iron-clads by the
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flotilla of Acting Rear-Admiral Davis at Memphis; the Chattahooche blown up
in the Appalachicola river, and the Albemarle sunk by Lieutenant Cushing.
Notwithstanding the invariable and fatal disasters attending these vessels, which
are of the same type, the rebels are known to have quite a number now under
construction on the rivers and at the few ports remaining in their possession.
'l'he department accepted the general plan of Captain Ericsson, but his offer
to build was declined. The law requires that advertisements shall be issued,
and contracts given to the lowest bidder. The elaboration of the plan of Captain Ericsson and the preparation of the drawings and specifications were confided
to Chief Engineer Stimers, who was instructed to consult with and follow the directions of that gentleman. Chief Engineer Stimers had been associated with Captain
Ericsson in the construction of the original Monitor, and took passage in that vessel
to Hampton roads as a volunteer, at a time when many of our engineers and constructors predicted that she would never be heard of again. It was owing to his zeal
and skill and faith that all the engines of that vessel performed their functions
during that memorable contest with the Merrimack, and from that field he was
transferred to New York as general superintendent of iron-clads under construction. Chief Engineer Stimers is 1·esponsible for the detailed drawings of the
light-draught monitors, and for the calculations as to their displacement. It
was expected that they would not draw over six and a half feet of water, and be
out of water amidships about fifteen inches. The contracts were made generally
in the spring of 1863, and the vessels were to have been finished in the fall of
that year. The last contracts made for vessels of this class were in June, 1863.
The Ohimo, at Boston, was the first one finished. She was u.nder the entire
direction of Chief Engineer StimArs. Instead of being fifteen inches out of
water, she was only three on an average, showing a miscalculation of twelve
inches. The department immediately removed ~ir. Stimers from the position
of general superintendent, and placed the question as to what should be done
to remedy the difficulties occasioned by his error in the hat:tds of Rear-Admiral
Gregory, Chief Engineer Wood, and Captain Ericsson. As Rear-Admiral
Dahlgren and Acting Rear-Admiral Lee had asked for several monitors to be
fitted with torpedo arrangements, without turrets, the gentlemen to whom the
matter had been submitted determined that the five most advanced of the lightdraught monitors should be fitted to meet the wants of Rear-Admiral Dahlgren
and Acting Rear-Admiral Lee, and that all the others, fifteen in number, should
have their sides built up fifteen inches higher, in the same manner that the roof
of a house is raised, and an additional half story put on. This will give those fifteen
vessels 130 tons each more capacity, and a draught of a little less than eight feet.
Of course the cost is increased, but not much out of proportion to the increased
capacity. Vessels that are built from ten to fifteen feet out of water are insensible to an error of a foot in the draught, though it is not unusual with engine
builders to find themselves under the necessity of raising their shafting to remedy such errors; but in steamers calculated to be only fifteen inches above the
water, a foot of error is fatal. A simpler and cheaper craft would have been a
casemated vessel like the rebel iron-clads; but such a vessel on shore in the inland waters is helpless, whereas a turreted vessel discharges her guns towards
every point of the compass, whether aground or not. This was exemplified
when the Osage, a light-draught turreted steamer, got aground in Red river in
April last. She was attacked, while in this position, by a large force under the
rebel General Greene, whose command was entirely cut to pieces, with the loss
of their general, in the insane attempt to capture a monitor, although hard and
fast aground.
The foregoing is a brief summary of what I should testify to before your
committee. The whole subject has given the Secretary much anxiety, but the
department cannot be justly held responsible for anything more than colTect
ideas. Mechanical details belong to those permanent officers whose specialty
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it is to put into practical operation such vessels as the exigency of the war forces
the department to adopt.
I am, very respectfully, &c.,
G. V. FOX,
Assistant Sec1·etary of tlte 1:-lavy
Hon. B. F. WADE,
Clwirman Committee on the Conduct if the War, U. 8. Senate.

TESTIMONY TAKEN AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS.

BosTON, MAss., Tuesday, December 20, 1864.
W. L. HANSCOM, sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Please state your place of residence and present occupation.
Answer. I rE>side in Boston. I am naval constructor at the Charlestown
yard, and have been there a little over five years.
Question. Where were you stationed before that 1
Answer. At the Kittery navy yard.
Question. For how long a time 1
Answer. I was there about six years as naval constructor.
Question. Have you ever constructed any ships that you modelled yourself 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How many, and what were their names 1
Answer. The Mohicanand Kearsarge, (which are both of the same model,) the
Canandaigua, the Genesee, the Tioga, the Maratanza, the Monadnoc, an ironclad, ar1d others.
Question. Will you state to the committee what you know in relation to the
light-draught iron-clad monitors, or gunboats, as they are called.
Answer. My attention was first directed to these vessels upon the trial trip
of the Chimo. A few days previous to that time the opinion had been circulated that that one~ at any rate, was to be a failure, and that there were 19
others precisely like the Chimo. 'rwo or three days after she made her trial
trip I went and examined her. She was afloat then, and minus her powder,
shot and shell. I took the height of the top of the plating at the side of the
vessel above the water at that time. On the starboard side it was out 1 inch ;
inches-making a mean height above the water of 2~ inches.
on the port side,
The stern was under water 1 inch, and the stem was out of water 7 inches.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. Had she a turret on then?
Answer. Yes, sir; her turret was on, the guns were in the turret, the pilothouse was on-in fact, she was very nearly complet8d-but had not her powder,
shot, or shell on board, and probably some 15 or 20 tons of coal less than her
regular amount.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What effect would the addition of her full amount of coal, shell,
&c., have had upon her 1
Answer. It would have carried her down about five inches, in my opinion
and that would have bronght the top of the plating at the side about three
inches below the water. 'rhe tortoise ba~k would have been just above the
water. Rather a small margin for a man to go to sea with.
Question. Could the boat have been used for any purpose, as she was 1

3t
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Answer. I don't think she could-that is to say, out of the harbor. WhHe
she was riding at the wharf the guns could have been fired on board of her,
without any danger of her going down.
Question. Could she have been used even for harbor defence 1
Answer. She was scarcely fitted for that, being so far under water as to be
unsafe.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. What was her speed 1
Answer. I was informed that it was a little less than four knots at that time.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Do you know how much it was intended that those boats should
be out of water when finished, with their full armament and all their equipmenta on board 1
Answer. My impression is, that it was intended to l1ave the top of the plating
at the side above the water 15 inches. I saw, on one of their drawings, a line
drawn to represent the water, and I measured that, and found it to be 15 inches
below the top of the plating.
Question. These vessels were built with water compartments 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was the object of that?
Answer. The object was to sink the vessel down and protect the sides in
case of an engagement.
Question. Would it have been a useful arrangement in the event that the
vessel had been as high out of the water as it was intended 1 _
Answer. I think it would.
Question. But in these vessels it was entirely unnecessary 1
Answer. It was entirely unnecessary.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. I will ask you, as a naval constructor, is there any difficulty in
ascertaining how much a vessel of given dimensions will be out of water when
it is completed, supposing you build it with a view to have it of a certain height
above the water 1 Are there any rules by which vessels can be constructed so
as to be a certain height above the water 1
Answer. Yes, sir; there are rules by which we can determine very closely
the draught of water of the vessel if we know at the commencement the weight
that is to be taken on board.
Question. In ordinary ship-building is there any rule as to what proportion
of the ship, when loaded, should be out ' f water 1
Answer. We lay it down as a fixed pri ciple, that one-third part of the entire
capacity must be above the load line for s fety in a sea-going vessel.
Question. Suppose that the rule is not observed, or that there is any considerable variation from it, one way or the other, what will be the effect 1
Answer. In proportion to the deviation from that rule, we risk the safety of
the vessel, whether it be more or less above the water.
Question. Well, when the contractor knows precisely what his loading is to
consist of, or how much burden the vessel is to carry, would it be gross negli
gence for him to deviate, say a foot, fi·om the design 1
Answer. It would.
Question. Do you know what pains were tJ.ken to ascertain as to the construction of these vessels 1
Answer. I do not, sir.
Question. I will ask you whethe~· there would have been much difficulty in
ascertaining how much this vessel would be out of water, the parties knowing
what they were to build and what they were to carry 1
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Answer. No, sir. There was less obstruction, so to speak, in the way of
ascertaining accurately the weight of the ship than there is with wooden vessels,
for the weight of different kinds of iron does not vary so much as that of different
kinds of wood. In their specific gravity they are almost invariably the same.
Question. You say, Mr. Hanscom, that these vessels were faulty. Can you
describe in what the difficulty consists 1
Answer. It may be summed up in want of capacity to sustain the great
weight. The fault was in not ascertaining the weight of the vessel and the
capacity of the displacement. It might have been one of these only. They
might have ascertained the exact weight of the vessel, and failed to discover
the exact displacement; or they might have made an error in both particulars.
Question. Is it practicable, in boats built on this principle, to make them so
that they will have the ordinary speed 1
Answer. I think it might be done.
Qu6lstion. How should that be done-by the engines or by the build of the
vessels 1
Answer. By the proper engines and the proper form of the vessel, both.
Question. Was the plan of this description of vessel unknown to naval
constructors 1
Answer. It was a new thing to naval constructors. The form of the bottom
was not new to naval constructors. All of them must have seen vessels of a
similar form.
Question. Could they be improved for any warlike purpose by divesting them
of their turrets 1
Answer. That would bring them out of the water, and it would be possible
to move them with greater safety from one port to another.
Question. But could they be worked in action without exposing the men to
being picked off by sharpshooters 1
Answer. No, sir, they could not. The men are exposed without the turret,
and the vessels are hardly fit for war purposes without the turrets.
Question. What would be the effect of building the sides up fifteen inches 1
Answer. That would raise them some above the water, and it would increase
the draught.
Question. How much, in your judgment, would it increase the draught 1
Answer. The additional weight would not increase the draught over two
inches.
Question. Then they would be able to bear the turrets, and work with them 1
Answer. Yes, sir, but the draught would be increased beyond what was
' seemingly first intended.
Question. Can they, in your judgment, be made useful vessels by building
up in this way 1
Answer. Something may be done with them if they are raised up. In their
present condition nothing can be done with them in the way of fighting. There
may be some rivers or harbors where these vessels may be very useful.
Question. Would they ever be sea-going boats 1
Answer. No, sir; they would be dangerous at sea.
Question. What would be the effect of a storm on such a vessel at sea; would
it swamp her 1
Answer. The tendency would be to break her in pieces amidships. The
great strain upon the 1·ivets in the thin iron would be apt to break them, or
tear the iron out. The reason of that is, that they have not the strength sufficient to sustain them when the support is changed from the middle to the end.
The iron-clad that I am building is tied up by bands of iron running from top
to bottom, to sustain her when the support is changed from end to end. That
may be illustrated by putting a board into the water; while it is on its edge it
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won't break. In other words, the relative s11rength is as the distance from the
circumference to the centre.
Question. If I have understood you, Mr. Hanscom, you consider these vessels, as originally draughted and built, a failure 1
Answer. I do.
Question. And that in that condition they would be utterly useless as war
vessels 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you say you think they might be made of some use by altering them as it is now proposed to alter them 1
Answer. Yes, sir, that is so. I think that by raising them up 22 inches, as I
understand it is proposed to do, they may be serviceable in some particular
cases.
Question. I will inquire of you now whether contracts have been made with
the government for the alteration of them all ?
Answer. I have understood that to be the case.
Question. Are you informed of the progress that has been made in the construction of these ves:::els 1
Answer. I am not. I think there is one-the Squando-which is very nearly
cempleted.
Question. Do you know with whom the contracts were originally made 1
Answer. I do not.
Question. Who planned the models of these light-draught monitors 1
Answer. I can only tell that from hearsay.
Question. What is your understanding about it 1
Amwer. I have heard it stated that Mr. Stimers and Captain Ericsson got
them up; then some alterations were suggested which Captain Ericsson would
Jl4)t agree to.
.
Question. By whom were those suggestions made 1
Answer. I have heard that they were made by Mr. Stimers.
Question. Did you understand that they were built according to their suggestions 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you understand that all the vessels constructed are to be of a
model similar to that of the Chimo 1
Answer. I understand that to be so.
Question. As a prudent naval constructor, would you advise the altering of
all these monitors in the way the Squando is being altered, or would it be better
to try the experiment on some few of them first, to see what purpose they
would answer 1
Answer. I should recommend that one be tried before the others are completed.
Question. Is there any doubt in your mind as to the entire success of this altered one 1
Answer. Well, I don't know what would be called success. They would
not be very good; they would not have much speed; they would not be very
light draught; they would not be very well protected from the enemy's shot,
because the sides are too thin, and the deck too rounding, offering a surface at
right angles with the line of fire. If we are to consider all these things, I
should say that they would be imperfect vessels, after they were completed,
even by raising the deck 22 inches.
Question. And you would not have sufficient confidence to go on and finish
them all until you had tried some 1
Answer. No, sir.
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By 1\-fr. Odell :
Question. What is the character of the alterations now being made on the
Ohimo 1
Answer. The turret has been removed, and a gun has been placed on a platform laid upon the deck, to be used without any protection to the men. Some
other alterations have been made, but I do not know the extent of them.
Question. What is your opinion of the value of the boat, with the intended
alterations, when completed 1
Answer. As a fighting vessel, she will possess very little value. It is proposed to make a torpedo boat of the Ohimo, but with the little speed she has,
she will be very unsuitable for that, and her value is very little.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. And to put her to this use would be an entire change from her
original design, would it not 1
Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Odell:
Question, Is there a distinct class of vessels known as torpedo boats 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What are their peculiarities 1
Answer. They are much smaller than these light-draught monitors, and possess considerable speed. I think I can give you very nearly the size. The
length is about 75 feet, beam about 15 feet, and depth about 7 feet. That
forms a distinct class of boats.
By Mr. Wade1
Question. What is the speed of such boats generally 1
Answer. I understand that they go eight knots an hour. I have heard that
the one that went from Mystic, Connecticut, made eight knots, and believe it to
be so.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. What would be the proportionate cost of the two boats 1
Answer. A regular torpedo boat, such a boat as is known by that name now,
might cost about one-tenth the price of one of these monitors.
Question. How many of these vessels are being altered to torpedo boats 1
Answer. I have understood, six. The Secretary's report tells the exact number.
Question. You have already stated that, in your judgment, a torpedo boat
would cost about one-tenth what these boats cost: would a regular torpedo boat
be equally efficient for the purpose 1
Answer. I should think it would be more efficient, being much more easily
handled, anti having greater speed; and, furthermore, it would not be so easily
seen in the night time.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Are not these boats altogether too large to be used succ&Ssfully as
topedo boats 1
Answer. They are much larger than I would build for that purpose if I was
directed to build a torpedo boat 1
Question. Will you state what would be considered an unreasonable deviation
from the estimate in relation to the draught of these vessels 1
Answer. Anything more than three inches would, if it was fully known at
the oommencement of the design what was the weight to go on board.
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Question. 'l'hen, if the vessel varied more than three inches in her draught of
water, you would say that there had been a gross error in the calculations 1
Answer. Yes, sir, if it was the intention to obtain a specified draught of water;
and in this case it was absolutely necessary for the success of the boats to meet
that expectation of a certain draught.
Question. 'These boats, when now completed, will draw nearly two feet mvre
than it was contemplated they should draw, will they not ?
Answer. They will draw at least twenty inches more than was contemplated
at the commencement of the work.
Question. If these boats had been so constructed as to have drawn any more
water than it was originally designed they should draw, could they have been
used for any other purpose except for harbor and river defence, or on smooth
water?
Answer. No, sir, I think not; they are not sea-going vessels by any means.
Question. How much is the speed of a boat diminished in consequence of her
being fifteen inches lower in the water than was contemplated 1
Answer. That is very difficult to tell. My impression is that these vessels
fall nearly one-half short of the expected speed. Comparing the Chimo with
the Casco, finished with the turret off, I find that the speed of the Chimo is diminished about one-fifth.
Question. How much is the Casco out of water, or what is her draught 1
Answer. I have not measured that. I judge that she is out now about twenty
inches.
Question. Then <:;he is out of water as much as it was contemplated she
should be 1
Answer. A little more; but she has no gun, or powder, shot, or shell on
board.
Question. Then, with the same engines, even if these vessels had been out
of the water as much as was contemplated, their speed would not have exceeded
five knots an hour ?
Answer. I don't think it could. The speed of all these vessels will not be
the same, because much will depend on the friction of the machinery.
Question. Judging from the tests that have been made of these boats, you
think their speed could not exceed five knots an hour, even if they had been so
constructed as to comply with the original conditions 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I don't think it could have gone over five knots in any
case 1
By Mr. Odell:
Question. You consider that one of the failures of these boats consists in lack
of speed 1
Answer. Yes, sir
Question. Could that have been regulated by different propelling power 1
Answer. I think it could.
Question. That is one of the mistakes in the boats 1
Answer. Yes, sir; that helps to complete the failure.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Won't you state what you deem to be the defects of these boats'
so far as you have discovered them 1
Answer. Among the different points that constitute the failure are, want of
speed, want of a proper construction of the bottom of the vessel, the thickness
of the side armor, and the roundness of deck.
Question. The model of the boat remaining the same, can the weight be reduced so as to make this, in your judgment, a serviceable boat 1
Answer. No, sir.
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By Mr. Wade:
Question. I will inquire whether, in your judgment, a skilful constructor
could have built these boats originally, so as to have complied with the designs
of the Navy Department 1
Answer. I think he could.
Question. State whether you constructed the lionadnock, so called 1
Answer. I did.
Question. What are her tonnage and speed 1
Answer. The tonnage is 1,564; the speed is variously estimated from nine to
eleven knots.
Question. Is she a turreted boat ?
Answer. She has two turrets and four 15-inch guns, with two pilot-houses
on top of the turrets.
Question. When was she finished 1
Answer She was reported ready for sea on the 1st of October, but did not
get off until about the 8th.
Question. Do you recollect her drauzht of water, with all her loading on
board, equipped for the voyage 1
Answer. It was about twelve feet.
Question. By nautical men is she deemed a success or not ?
Answer. I believe she is deemed a success in every way, for that class of
vessels. I will state a few facts in regard to her. I received an order to build
a vessel of wood, to be plated with iron, to carry four 15-inch guns, with a certain number of men, 300 tons of coal, provisions for a certain length of time,
and machinery to weigh so much, the draught of water not to exceed twelve
feet, and the vessel to be from eighteen inches to two feet out of water when
ready for sea.. The plating was to be five inches on the side, and an inch and
a half on deck. The turrets were to be ten inches thick, twenty-one feet inside
diameter, with pilot-houses on the tops of the turrets. After the vessel was
commenced I was notified that parties in Philadelphia were to construct the
engines and machinery, and that they were referred to me for any information
in regard to the location of the machinery, length of shaft, and form of the vessel. I received a letter from these parties, however, requesting me to meet
tl1em in New York to determine upon the position of the turrets and the machinery, and the general arrangement. It was impossible for me at that time to
leave the yard on account of the multiplicity of business, but my brother, who
was stationed at the Kittery navy yard, and had the building of another of these
vessels, met this party in New York, representing himself and me. They came
to some conclusion in regard to the location of the turrets and the machinery,
and the general arrangement. But while they were doing that, I drew a plan
of the position of the turrets and the machinery, and the general arrangements
of the ship ; and when he returned I received from these parties in Philadelphia
a sketch showing the conclusions they bad come to, which did not meet my
views at all; and in reply I sent them a sketch of my plan, with instructions
to follow it, as the whole thing at that time seemed to rest upon me. They replied to that, stating that they regretted that I had come to such conclusions ;
that they were very objectionable, and that, inasmuch as they had no authority
in the case, they would have no responsibilty ; and, in conclusion, they regretted
that their machinery would not have a fair test by being so arranged.
Question. Is the speed of the Monadnock in consequence of the superiority
of the engines over the iron-clad you have heretofore described, or is it owing
to the construction of the boat ?
Answer. I think it is in part due to both. I think the engines are very ex-
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eellent, very well contrived, and work free from friction; and that the form of
the boat offers less resistance, in proportion to the displacement, than these
little light-draught monitors.
Question. What do you say of the engines of this light-draught monitor that
made only five miles an hour 1
Answer. I have not examined them closely, but there seems to be a fault in
those engines. 'J.lhe size of those engines would seem to allow us to hope for
more speed than they have attained._
Question. May not this account for the slowness of the vessel, in::ttead of
it being attributable to the build of the vessel 1
Answer. I think a large proportion of the hindrance to speed is to be attributed to that. The position of the propeller is not the very best to give speed.
A certain portion of the arm of the propeller is in a box, and of course that
adds nothing towards propelling the boat.
AQUILA ADAMS sworn and examined.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. Are you acquainted with any of the light-draught monitors that have
been built in this vicinity 1
Answer. I am not acquainted with any except the one I built myself.
Question. What is the name of that 1
Answer. The Ohimo.
·
Question. Please to state what time the contract for that was made.
Answer. Either in March or April; I think March, 1863.
Question. What were to be her dimensiom: and draught of water 1
Answer. I do not recollect precisely, but I will r!ltate as near as I recollect,
if that will answer your purpose. She was to be 225 feet in length, have 45
feet beam, and to draw 6 feet 6 inches.
Question. Was she to be an iron-clad monitor, with a turret 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. State whether you built her on that plan.
Answer. I built her for that purpose; that is, for the purpose of a light-draught
monitor.
Question. Did you build her according to any plan furnished by any body?
Answer. Yes, sir; I built her according to plans and specifications furnished
by the general inspector, Mr. Stimers.
Question. Did he see her from time to time, as you were at work on her 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Q,uestion. Did she correspond, as you were at work on her, with his views 1
Answer. Yes, sir, as near as a thing of that nature could.
Question. When you had finished and launched her, what were her appearance and condition 1
Answer. Well, immediately after she was launched, that is, previous to her
having her turret on, or her pilot-house, and with some of her deck-plating not
yet on, it was thought that she drew more water than was anticipated, but they
had not ::tufficient data at that time to tell positively whether that was the case
or not.
Question. Without these things on board, how much of her was out of water?
Answer. When she was launched, I think she was thirty-seven inches out
forward and nineteen aft.
Question. How much was she out after you got on her turret and when she
was fitted for sea 1
Answer. I think that when we went on our trial trip her stern was from three
to four inches under water; that is to say, the water came up on the crown.
Her bow was in the neighborhood of eight inches out of water; that is to say,
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she was a little by the stern, owing to having her coal on board-that is, aft
amidships, and putting that on board sent one end down a little and the other
up a little; but as her ammunition. is to be stored forward, she could have been
trimmed with that, and would probably have been on an even keel if that had
been on board.
Question. Where would that have brought her1
Answer. I should think that might have brought her pretty well down even
with the water with that amount of coal on board.
Question. Was her turret on at this time 1
Answer. Yes, sir; everything complete ready for sea, with the exception ·of
her ammunition. I won't say everything; for instance, her boats were not
lashed up in place; they might weigh a ton or two tons; but she was reported
ready for sea.
Question. What would a proper supply of ammunition for that vessel weigh 1
Answer. Somewhere about forty or fifty tons. That is something that the
Navy Department decides. Of course that is optional with the party going
with the boat. When she was completed, the captain reported the fact, and
that he was ready to go to sea in her.
Question. Was the trial trip a successful one 1
.Answer. Well, that would depend upon what you might call success. She
did not come up to the anticipated speed, and she drew more water than they
had calculated upon.
Question. How much water did she draw at that time 1
Answer. I should think she drew ten inches more than was calculated. rrhis
is from memory, you know, and I cannot speak accurately, having no data;
and it is all so close, that a very little variation would sink her.
Question. Well, sir, was she in a condition to go from one harbor to another
safely, with all her load on board?
Answer. I expressed a willingness at that time to go on from Boston to New
York in her, and so did the captain and all my officers and men.
Question. Do you consider that she would have been seaworthy when thus
loaded 1
Answer. I should not consider that she would have been seaworthy in very
rough weather. In rough weather we should have made a port, provided we
had undertaken to go round that way. That was the intention.
Question. She was not in a condition, then, to stand ordinary rough weather 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. If she was really a vessel that could go round and do business,
why did they want to alter her1
Answer. That I don't know. That was not a matter within our control or
province to ask any questions about it.
Question. Are you a naval constructor 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. What is your business in relation to ships 1
Answer. Well, before I built this one, I built marine engines and stationary
engines. Before the war broke out my business was confined almost exclusively
to Cuba.
Question. Then you are not a naval architr.ct?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. If I understand you, you differ from Mr. Hanscom in his idea that
the vessel was really of no use before she was built up 1
Answer. As I understand him, he does not believe she is of use as a torpedo
boat.
Question. He didn't believe she could be of L1Se as a monitor, did he 1
Answer. No ; I think he had an idea that she could not be used as a monitor as she was when completed.
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Question. Well, your opinion is, if I understand you, that she could be 1
Answer. I think she could have been used as such for harbor and riTer defence; that is, I think she could have been used here in this harbor.
Question. Your opinion is, that they are making a great mistake in changing
them 1
Answer. No, sir; I don't ~hink so.
Question. Well, do you believe the Ohimo will answer the purpose that it
was designed these monitors should answer, without any change or alteration 1
Answer. I think she would answer in the harbor where she was constructed,
but I don't think her suitable to go from harbor to harbor, or from river to
river.
Question. But why did yon and your whole crew agree to go on her so
willingly, if you don't think she is a proper vessel for that purpose 1
Answer. I don't think she is a proper sea vessel, but I think she could have
made the voyage, and was willing to take that risk on account of the occasion.
'They seemed to want her, and had made great. efl'orts to get her done.
Question. Have they used her since she was finished 1
Answer. No, sir; she is not completed. You understand that she was completed as a monitor first.
Question. You say they wanted her very much. Why, then, didn't they
use her1
.Answer. I imagine that they didn't consider her seaworthy, and didn't consider it safe to risk that property in going between harbor and harbor. I think
it was a wise precaution; but, at the same time, I felt willing to risk myself
on her.
Question. What speed did she make 1
Answer. On the trial trip, I think she made 3! knots.
Question. Was that as much as was expected of her when she was constructed 1
Answer. No, sir. All I know in regard to what was expected of her is what
I have heard, from time to time, among engineers.
Question. What did they think she would make 1
Answer. It was variously estimated from five to seven knots. Some have
gone as high as eight knots; but very few.
Question. What are you doing with her now 1
Answer. Well, we are making a torpedo boat of her.
Question. Is it not necessary that a torpedo boat should have considerable
speed, and be so far seagoing as to be safe in going from harbor to harbor 1
Answer. She is safe now. The removal of the turret and pilot-house raises
her perhaps twenty inches out of the water. 'The Casco, which has been
changed in the same way, has succeeded in going from here to New York,
making a speed, as I have understood, of five knots an hour. I consider the
Chimo safe now.
Question. Do you consider her any better for the purpose of a torpedo boat
than the ordinary boats built for that purpose 1
Answer. I don't think she is so good for that purpose.
Question. How much does it cost to build a good and efficient torpedo boat 1
.Answer. Well, such a boat as I have heard M:r. Wood has designed and is
getting up I should say would cost somewhere from seventy thousand to eighty
thousand dollars.
Question. What is the cost of this monitor 1
.Answer. Well, the original contract price was, I think, three hundred and
ninety-five thousand dollars. But they have made changes in her since they
first started, as we have gone along, and it is a question yet to be decided how
much they are to allow for the changes they have made; that is, for the deviations from the understanding of what she was to be.
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Question. How have they changed the vessel from the original contract 1
Answer. They have added a number of things. There is quite a list of them.
I could better give you that list at some other time. If I gave you one now, it
would be only a partial one.
Question. About how much should you think the cost of these deviations
from the original plan would be 1
Answer. I should think it would be one hundred thousand dollars.
Question. And still, with all her alterations, she is good for nothing, as I understand you, for the original purpose designed 1
Answer. She is good for nothing for the original purpose designed. That I
understand to be the decision of the head ones at Washington, and therefore
they say, "Change her."
Question. And, in your judgment, she is not equal, as a torpedo boat, to
a boat that would cost seventy thousand or eighty thousand dollars 1
Answer. No, sir. I would state, however, that this boat will carry a gun on
her deck, which a torpedo boat would not.
Question. Would it be of much use to have a gun on deck, the gunners being
entirely exposed to sharpshooters, and every danger of that kind 1
Answer. Well, it has always appeared to me a very singular idea to have an
iron-clad boat with a gun exposed.
Question. That would be the case with this, however.
Answer. Yes, sir; that is the case with this. But what they design to use
the boat for I don't know. I don't even know the design they intend to use
for firing the torpedo, or anything of that kind. They give me my ideas of
what I am to do from time to time.
Question. You are the mere builder of the ship, according to the plans and
directions of some other person 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And that person was Mr. Stimers 1
Answer. Yes, sir. It was to him that I looked for instructions.
Question. So you do not profess rskill in the construction of ships 1
.Answer. No, sir.
Question. Only in building them according to plans furnished 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question To what do you attribute the slowness of the Chimo 1
Answer. Well, I attribute her slowness to her increased draught.
Question. And your opinion is that, had she been built according to the design of the department, she might have performed better 1
Answer. My opinion is that had she been built according to the original intentions in regard to her-that is, the first ideas-she would have made more
speed.
Question. If you can recapitulate now some of the alterations or deviations
from the original contract or design, I would like to have some of the most essential ones, to see what it was that they altered her for from time to time.
Answer. Well, one pretty important change was putting in additional crossfloors, as they are called; in other words, strengthening the bottom of the
ship by adding cross-floors and kelsons.
Question. What would be the expense of that, and how far would it increase
the weight 1
Answer. That I don't recollect; it was a year and a half ago, and I don't
recollect much about that, only I know the fact that the change was made.
Then another important change was the addition of a large and heavy wroughtiron ring to the bottom of the turret-a ring something like fifteen inches wide
and five inches thick, and, I should think, from a rough estimate, it might weigh
fifteen or eighteen tons. That one item would sink her an inch, if I am right
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in the weight, and I think I am. Then they added two inches to the thicknesi!
of the pilot-house, and added to the height of those two thicknesses; that is to
say, those two thicknesses were carried up higher than the original pilot-house.
That added to her weight considerably. Then it was originally intended thai
the engines should have cast-iron frames. Instead of having cast-iron frames
they were ordered to be made of wrought-iron.
Question. That was an additional expense, I suppose 1
Answer. An additional expense, but not much addition to the weight, as near
as I can recollect. Then there was an addition of about twenty per cent., I
think, to her condensing surface. Then it was odginally designed to put in the
Worthington pumps, as they are called, but it was finally decided not to put
them in, and they gave us a design for a pump. '.rhat added very much to the
cost and to the weight. There were one or two iron bulkheads added, which aYe
the partitions that go across the vessel. Iron was substituted for wood, I think.
Question. What was the object of that-to give her additional strength 1
Answer. Yes, sir; to give her additional strength. A wooden one, of thti
same strength, would have been heavier, I think.
Question. But an iron one would cost the most, would it not 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. It is said that Captain Ericsson and Mr. Stimers disagreed about
something in regard to the construction of this vessel. Do you know how that
was 1
Answer. No, sir, I do not. The only thing I know about it is this : in completing the ship I asked if I should say built by so-and-so, and designed by Mr.
Stimers 1 No, Mr. Stimers said, I should not say that, because they were not
designed by him, but that I might write Captain Ericsson for instructions
about it. I had never corresponded with Captain Ericsson, and knew no more
about him than I did about the man in the moon ; but at that time Mr. Stimers
disowned the design, as he had once or twice before.
Question. Did your contract include the engines 1
Answer. Yes, sir, everything; I built the ship complete, machinery and all.
Question. Do you know of any defect in the engines of this boat 1
Answer. No, sir; I do not know of any defect in the design.
Question. Had the engines sufficient power to work well1
Answer. Yes, sir; I think less boiler would have answered, and that would
have lightened the ship.
Question. Would it not have weakened the power of the engines 1
Answer. It would have weakened the power of the engines, provided the
boiler could not have supplied all the steam necessary. But the fact is that
there were thirteen engines on board of her-that is, what we should call thirteen engines ; they were not all independent. In other words, two engines
drove a pump; two other engines drove a pump; another engine drove a pump
another engine drove another pump; another engine drove another pump; and
we used two engines for turning the turret, and two engines for turning the
blowers.
Question. Is that so on all these turreted iron-clads 1
Answer. Yes, sir; there is an immense amount of machinery on board of
them. Now, then, there might be a case when we should want to run all these
engines at the same time. Such a contingency might occur, and then we should
want all the steam the boiler could supply; but it is not a contingency that
would be very likely to occur. If the ship sprung a leak, for instance, it might
be necessary to run all the engines possible, but it is very doubtful. At any
rate the vessel had two pumps, each of them capable of taking out three thousand gallons a minute.
Question. Had she more of these engines than are ordinarily used in such a
ship1
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Amwer. About the same number, sir, as in vessels of the monitor class.
Question. \Vas her boiler larger than is usual in the same kind of ships 1
Answer. I have no data to make that assertion upon, but that is my impression.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. You say the monitor was completed and made a trial trip. Since
then you have been directed by the government to make alterations. Are you
making those alterations for a sum agreed upon, or are you to be paid what they
cost1
Answer. I am to be paid what they cost.
Question. Can you tell us what they will cost 1
Answer. I cannot, sir.
Question. Can you approximate it 1
Answer. Yes, eir, I can approximate it; I should think they might cost in .
the neighborhood of $50,000; I should think more.
Q,uestion~ How long is it since you first commenced making these alterations 'l
Answer. I think I commenced about June.
Question. Could you in that time, if the government needed a torpedo boat,
have constructed one and finished it 1
Answer. Just about.
Question. So that the government, if it had desired a torpedo boat, could have
had it in less time than it cou1d have these alterations made 1
Answer. Providecl this boat was done, I think I could have built a new torpedo boat, having had this experience, in the time that I have been making this
change.
Question. How much longer will it take you to complete the change, so that
your boat will be ready for service 1
Answer. Ten days, or a fortnight, perhaps.
Question. In your judgment will not this boat be totally worthless as a torpedo boat?
Answer. Well, as I understand, or as I form an opinion of what a torpedo
boat should be, I think she is entirely useless.
Question. And being usele:::s for a torpedo boat, can you conceive any purpose
for which she can possibly be used 1
Answer. No, sir; I am not much acquainted with the torpedo arrangements
any way, but so far as my ideas are concerned, and so far as I have heard others
express their ideas, they want something small; someth ingthat they can manceuvre
readily; something with speed-with such speed as it can have in proportion to
its size.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. You made your contract, Mr. Adams, with the Navy Department 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you give the government credit for the material you take out
of the vessel 1
Answer. Everything we take out belongs to the government. Some portions
of it have been sold to parties who had not got their boats done. The turret
still remains on my place.
Question. Do you understand that your contract price was about the same
that was given for the other nineteen 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I understand it to be so.
Question. Were the contracts made by bids 1
Answer. My impression is that the government called for bids, and then, after
studying the matter over, and seeing the variation of the bids, established a
price.
Part Iv--2
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Question. Did you make a bid 1
Answer. I don't think I did. I have forgotton whether I did or not. I think
I took it at their own price.
Question. If you had made a bid, wouldn't you be likely to remember it 1
Answer. I made a bid for different machinery at that time, but I don't think
I bid for these boats. I think I solicited one of them at ·their own price.
Question. Do you know who did bid for them 1
Answer. No, sir; I don't. I think Mr. Archibald bid, and Merrick & Sons.
Question. As far as you know, have the parties to whom these contracts were
originally awarded built these vessels 1
Answer. Yes, sir; they have now. 'l,here was a boat given out, I think, to a
Portland man by the name of Leonard, and he made some arrangement withparties here to build the hull, and be would build the wood-work. The parties
here started to build the hull, but the Portland folk!:'! thought it was not right,
but that, if the department had decided to give one of the boats to Portland, the
boat should be built there for the benefit of the place. So the deparynent stopped
the work here, and ordered it to be built in Portland; and it was taken down
there, and is being built there.
Question. When were you to have this vessel finished 1
Answer. I think it was to be done in eight or nine mo11ths after the date of
the contract. She was done about May, I think.
Question. You contracted to build this vessel, according to the plans and specifications furnished you by Mr. Stimers, for $395,000 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And from those plans you have deviated, from time to time, as he
has directed you 1
An~:~wer. Yes, sir.
Question. Now I will ask you whether those deviations were made with any
stipulation as to cost, or whether you had any agreement with Mr. Stimers as to
what they should cost 1
Answer. Well, perhaps I had better explain a little. We were furnished
with drawings to work by. Now, when we came to make any deviation from
what we conceived to be the original idea, we corresponded concerning it, but
did not stop work; we kept on at our own risk, following his directions. rrh.ere
were some changes made that we did not know to be changes, and, of course,
kept on; but those who had built boats before, similar to them, and understood
that these were to be in such and such respects like those they had built before,
knew the changes, and perhaps corresponded in relation to them, and perhaps
not. At any rate we have tried, from time to time, to get a settlement; to have
a full understanding in relation to these extras; but up to the present time have
not succeeded in so doing. The matter has been before the board-that is to
say, the constructors say, "We consider that such and such things are extra."
rrhe board says, "We do not consider such things extra, but we consider such
and such things extra, and we will allow you an equitable price for those things."
That thing remains to be fully acted upon.
Question. You say some of these things are changes, but you did not know
it. How could that be, with the specifications before you 7
Answer. The specifications did not go into details; they were changes from
the usual manner of building such vessels.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. Then there was no stipulation as to the price of these extras 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. You have received compensation for this vessel, in harmony with
the first contract, at the rate of $395,000 1
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Answer. We have received the original contract price, and $25,000 on the
extras upon the original contract.
Question. You refer in your testimony to $100,000 as being about the sum
claimed by you for extras. Does that refer to the completion of the boat as a
monitor, according to the original design 1
Answer. Yes, sir. ·
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Were you delayed in time in consequence of these alterations 1
Answer. Yes, sir; very much.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Was there any forfeiture in case the vessel was not completed
within the time specified 1
Answer. I think it was not put in that form. I think the price was to be so
many thousand dollars if it was done at such a time; so many thousand dollars
if it was done at such a time; and so many thousand dollars if it was done at
such a time. '.rhe amounts and dates I do not recollect now.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. vVas Mr. Stimers present when the Chimo was launched 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know what his opinion was as to her draught of water when
she was launched 1
Answer. His assistant, I think, first mentioned to him that his opinion was
that she drew more water than had been anticipated. 'rhen Mr. Stimers took the
data that he had at hand, and made a calculation, as near as he could, how much
she would be out of water when all was aboard, and I think he left it in the
neighborhood of four inches out of water; and that came very near to what was
actually the case.
Question. Do you know whether or not he reported that fact to the department?
Answer. I do not; but I think he did. I think there was a correspondence
in regard to it.
Question. Do you know why he went on and completed her, putting the turrets and everything on, when he knew that, when completed, she would be only
four inches out of water 1
Answer. No, sir; I do not.

WEDNESDAY, DecembeT 21.
GEORGE SEWELL sworn and examined.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. vVill you please to state what relation you have to the navy, shipbuilding, &c.1
Answer. I am chief engineer in the navy.
Question. Are you in government employ 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; I am chief engineer of the navy yard at Charlestown.
Question. Are you an architect or draughtsman in ship-building ?
Answer. Ship-building is not exactly in the line of steam-engineering, but it
is part of our profession to acquaint ourselves with everything of the kind that
is going on, and I have a good knowledge of the art.
Question. How long have you been engaged in the navy, and how long have
you been an engineer 1
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Answer. I have followed the profession for over twenty-five years, and have
been in the navy since 1847.
Question. What do you know in relation to the light-draught monitors that
are building in the vicinity of Boston 1
Answer. I have never been officially connected with them. The only knowledge I have of them is derived from observation now and then.
Question. How many are building in this vicinity that you know of, of that
class 1
Answer. There are three or four over to East Boston, now on the stocks.
Question. Can you state what progress has been made upon those 1
Answer. I cannot, as I have not been over there to look at them fer some
time. One tl1at was built there-the Casco-has gone to New York.
Question. How is it with the one called the Chimo 1
Answer. She was built at South Boston. She is now at the navy yard, fitting
for sea.
Question. Did you see her after she was launched, or about the time of her
being launched 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Describe her condition then, if you please.
Answer. I should think she was about thirty inches out of water at the bow,
and at the stern about fifteen inches, as near as I recollect. I never measured
it, but judging by my eye I should say that was about the distance. Amidships, she would be a mean between 30 and 15-or, 22z. She is nearly straight,
I think.
Question. What had she on board at that time 1
Answer. '11 here was nothing above deck. She had her boilers and machinery
in.
Question. Her turret on 1
Answer. Her turret was not on; her pilot-house was not on.
Question. Her furniture, coal, &c. 1
Amnver. No, sir ; no chains, anchors, furniture, coal, Qr anything of the kind ;
no water.
Question. Did you see her afterwards, when these things had been put on
board 1
Answer. I did.
Question. What was her condition then 1
Answer. On her return from the trial trip I went over to South Boston and
went on board of her. I should think that the top of the armor-plating on the
stern was about one or two inches under water ; I should think her bow was
probably out eight or nine inches.
Question. How were the sides 1
Answer. The sides appeared to be some four or five inches out of water.
The surface of the water was quite rough, and I could not tell exactly. I did
not measure these distances, but judged by my eye.
Question. Had she all the ammunition on board necessary for a voyage at
that time 1
Answer. That I can't say, but I think not. She would have to go to the
navy yard to get her ammunition, and she had not been there.
Question. How much water did she draw at the time 1
Answer. That I don't know.
Question. Had you the means of knowing anything of her speed at the trial
trip 1
Answer. None whatever, except hearsay. I was absent from the city at the
time, on duty.
Question. Did you examine her engines and propelling power 1
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An8wer. I merely went below and took a cursory glance at the engine-room;
that is all.
Question. Did yon discoYer anything that you supposed to be a defect in
that apparatus for propelling her 1
Answer. I did not, so far as the efficiency of the engines was concern ed.
Question. From your knowledge of ships, what do you say of her sailing
qualities, when you saw her, equipped as she was ; was sqe fit to go to sea 1
Answer. In my opinion, she was not.
Question. What use could the government have put her to, as a vessel designed
to be serviceable in time of war 1
Answer. She would have been useful for harbor defence here. In the condition she was in she could never have been taken to another harbor, where she
would have been obliged to encounter rough weather to get her there.
Question. In your judgment, would it have been perilous to h:we undertaken
to take her round to New York 1
Answer. I think it would.
Question. Well, the government, convinced of that, have undertaken her
alteration, have they not 1
Answer. Yes. sir.
Question. What have thP.y done 1
Answer. They have taken off the turret, and the gnns that were in the turret;
they have taken out all the pipes and valves which were intended to fill the
compartments to sink the vessel lower in the water when fighting; th ey have
taken out of her the heavy condenser for the main engines, and substituted
something lighter ; they have taken out the turret engines, and all the gearing
and machinery connected with them.
Question. Have they built up her sides 1
Answer. They have not.
Question. Well, with all these out, to what warlike purpose could she be put
that would be useful, in your judgment 1
Answer. I am not aware of any useful purpose to which she can be applied
in the present war, but I think the Navy Department have some duty which
she can perform.
Question. Could she be useful for harbor defence in her present condition,
without a turret 1
Answer. She might be of some service in repelling the entrance of a hostile
vessel into this port, or any port where she might be located. She is to h l.Ve
one gun mounted on deck.
Question How much better would she be than any wooden vessel, for that
- purpose 1
Answer. Not any. She will not be as good, owing to her lack of speed,
which a wooden vessel would have carrying the same armament.
Question. State whether her men, in managing that gun, would not be totally
exposed to the enemy 1
Answer. Not more so than on the double-enders, and vessels of that kind,
where the bulwarks are thrown down so as to fight the guns. ·
Question. But the men would have no protection in managing the gun, from
the enemy's shot, would they 1
Answer. Not the slightest.
Question. Do you know what speed she can make in her altered condition 1
Answer. I do not. I do not think she has been tried under steam since she
has been altered. The Casco, however, that has been altered precisely as the
Chimo is to be, and has gone to New York, makes, I am told, five knots. They
altered her in a way which gave thP propeller a better chance to work. r.rhey
cut away some of the box behind, and put on new screws of less pitch.
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Question. Do you know whether she draws more water than the original
contract contemplated 1
Answer. I can't say as to that. I don't recollect what their draught of water
was to be. I have heard it was either six or six and a half feet. I never had
anything official :~.bout it.
Question. The government, if I understand it, have raised up the sides of
some of these vessels1
Answer. They have contracted, I believe, to raise the sides of all that were
not launched, twenty-two inches.
Question. Do you know how many of them had been launched at that time 1
Answer. I only know of two-the Casco and the Chimo. The N aubuck was
ready to be launched, and I believe has since been launched, without any raising. She was built at Brooklyn, by Mr. Perine.
Question. Do you know of any alterations that were made by Mr. Stimeri3, or
.directed by him to be made, from time to time, wbile these vessels were in progress 1
Answer. I have no knowledge of anything of the kind.
Question. They are raising up one of them in this harbor, or. about here, are
they not 1
Answer. I think they are raising up three of them, making them twenty-two
inches deeper in the hold.
Question. What will be the effect of this alteration on the boats with regard
to their efficiency 1
Answer. It will improve their efficiency very much. It will lift the overhang clear out of the water, or nearly so, I think, and, as the overhang goes up,
it will leave twenty-two more inches of the screw available for propulsion. It
will lift it nearly out of the box. That will be a very great improvement.
They will also be much stronger.
Question. You speak of the screws being 'p artly in a box. What necessity
was there for that 1
Answer. None that I am aware of.
Question. Did it not impair the efficiency of the screw, and decrease its propelling power very much 1
Answer. Certainly it did, to a very serious extent.
Question. What useful purpose was it made for 1
Answer. That I can't say.; I don't know of any useful purpose.
Question. Is it useful for the screws of vessels to be boxed in this way 1
Answer. Not so thoroughly boxed as in this case. In some of the monitors
the upper edge of the blade will be something like a foot inside of the overhang.
Question. Did you see the first monitor that was built-the one that had the
engagement with the Merrimack 1
Answer. I did. I have been on board of her.
Question. How does this craft differ from her in its build and construction 1
Answer. The original monitor had no tanks all round the vessel for the purpose of sinking her at will; it had not the immense raft of timber round it which
appears in these iron-clads, aud the original monitor's deck was flat, this is
crowning. That deck was built in the ordinary way, and this deck is made up
of an immense number of beams, put close together and caulked, making a very
heavy d-€ck.
Question. How about the shape of it 1
Answer. I can't say so much about the shape of it. I don't think the screw
of the original monitor entered at all into the overhang, but I will not be certain on that point; I can't say as to that. These monitors have an ordinary
inclined engine for propelling them, but the original monitor had two of Eries~on's patent lever engines in.
Question. Will you give us your opinion as to the additional draught of water
that will be caut~ed by building up the sides of these monitors twenty-two inches 1
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Answer. Well, the displacement of these vessels per inch is about six te~' n
tons I shouldn't think that raising the sides (the iron is about five-eighths of
an inch thick) would add to the weight of the vessel more than forty or fifty
tons. It may sink her two or three inches; I should not think it would exceed
four.
Question. What do you know about the torpedo boats1
Answer. We have only one real torpedo boat, and that is the Stromboli. She
is about seventy-five feet in length, fifteen or seventeen feet beam, and draws, I
think, six feet water. In the Stromboli there are two water-tight doors. In
the inner door there is what we call a ball-joint, or spherical joint, and thro 11gh
that sphere runs what is called an out-rigger, which can be extended out between twenty-five and thirty feet. The operation is this : to start with, the
outer door is shut and the water pumped out of the compartment between the
two doors; then the inner door is opened, and you go in and attach a torpedo to
the end of this bar; you then close the inner door, open the outer door, and,
with some machinery inside, you advance this bar with the torpedo on it. After
you explode it you bring the bar in again, shut the outer door, and then pump
the water out between the two doors, open the inner door, and go in and put on
another torpedo, close the inner door, open the outer door, run out the torpedobar and explode the torpedo, and so continue as long as necessary.
Question. What is the speed of such a vessel1
Answer. The Stromboli runs from six to seven knots, and cost, I believe,
about $7 5,000.
Question. In your judgment, as acquainted with ships, would it be as efficient
as one of these monitors for use as a torpedo boat 1
Answer. Oh, she is worth a dozen of them, being so much smaller, and more
manageable, and having the power of exploding her torpedoes one after the other
without exposing the men on deck. Now, in this vessel, (the Ohimo,) unless
they alter her from her present condition, after you have exploded one torpedo
you have got to expose yourself to the attacks of the enemy on the beach or in
the bushes, in order to attach another, while in this other vessel nobody is exposed.
Question. Would it be more economical for the government to convert these
monitors into torpedo boats than to build new ones 1
Answer. I should advocate building new ones. ·They are small vessels, and
can be built rapidly, and are really what you want·; and these are mere makeshifts.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Do you consider these boats of any value whatever as torpPdo
boats 1
Answer. I can't see where they can be of any real value; but the NaYy Department, no doubt, can make them serviceable.
Question. Do you know for what purpose these boats were originally intended 1
Answer. I do not. I was at sea when they were commenced. They must
have been intended, however, for some very shatlow streams, as they wanted a
Yery light draught.
Question. Do you know what it was designed the speed of these boats should
be?
Answer. Well, I can ouly speak from hearsay, that they were to go nine
knots.
Question. Can you point out the reason why they fall so far short in speed 1
Answer. V\T ell, they draw more water than it was intended they should,
which, of course, makes the resistance greater. I consider this overhang and
the boxing of the screw as the main causes of their falling off in speed; but a
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vessel drawing more water of course requires more power to attain the same
speed.
Question. Is there any necessity for that overhang on the monitor 7
Answer. I am opposed to it, and have always been. I can see no good in
it; on the contrary, it is a positive detriment, and endangers the safety of the
vessel at sea. One great objection to this overhang is the drag in the water,
which is very detrimental to the speed; and another is, the great opportunity
which it gives a heavy sea to destroy the vessel. It presents such an immense
flat surface for the sea to strike against, that it is difficult to make them sufficiently strong. The overhang evidently sunk the first monitor, by tearing what
they called in her the upper hull from the lower hull.
Question. What are the reasons given for that overhang by the inventor,
Mr. Ericsson 7
Answer. It is, as I understand it, to prevent the stern from being run into by
an enemy's vessel, anu the destruction of the rudder and probably the screw.
The Monadnock has very little overhang indeed.
Question. The Casco is now about as much out of water as it was designed
these vessels should be, is she not 7
Answer. I can't say as to that.
Question. How much is she out of water ?
Answer. I have not heard, and I have not had a chance to see for myself.
Pretty much everything that was done on her was done over to East Boston,
where she was built, and as I never had any official connexion with these vessels
whatever, what I know about them is from my own private observation.
Question. With how much accuracy ought the draught of water of such avessel to be estimated 7
Answer. Within two or three inches at the most. It is a simple mathematical calculation. You make your drawings; you see what weight you are going
to put in; you see by the formation of the hull what the displacement is to be;
we all know what a cubic foot of water weighs; a vessel always displaces her
own weight exactly, and it is very easy to ascertain what the draught is to be.
Question. Then, if this vessel draws over three inches more water than was
originally estimated, it is an inexcusable error or mistake on the part of the
constructor 1
Answer. Yes, sir; that is, if there was on more put on her in the shape of
weight than was intended when she was originally designed. If more weight
has been put in than was intended when the vessel was del:'igned, she will necessarily draw more water. Just as much as the weight is increased, of course, she
goes down-an inch to about every sixteen tons.
Question. Do you know who determined the amount of weight on these
ves.,eb1
Answer. I do not.
Question. But they were found to be so deep in the water, even before the
armament was taken on board, that they were not fit for service, were they not 1
Answer. That was the common talk among those who were building them,
and among professional men who noticed these things. That was the talk, long
before the Chimo was launched, of the builder, Mr. Adams; he often said she
would not float; meaning by that, not that she would sink, but that she would
float so deep that she would not be serviceable.
Question. Will these monitors that are now being built up ever be fit for sea
service 1
,
Answer. They will not be fit for sea steamers at all; can be taken from port
to port in fine weather.
Question. They will only be fit for harbors and rivers 1
Answer. Harbors and rivers.
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Question. They will draw 22 more inches than it was originally intended
they should, in order to bring them as far out of water as was designed 1
Answer. I don't know what the original intention was, and I don't know
what their present draught is; but they will draw, I should think, about four
inches more water than they do at present, with the additional raising of the
sides and deck.
Question. Do you know who is superintending the construction of those that
have been built here 1
Answer. 1\Ir. Wilmarth, superintendent of the Chimo. I think Chief Engineer Moore is now superintending those at East Boston· that are being raised
in the hold. Mr. Robinson superintended the Naubuck at Brooklyn, and the
late Chief Engineer Long superintended, a part of the time, the one built at
Chester.
Question. Suppose that these vessels were originally designed to navigate
rivers where only vessels with a draught not exceeding six and a half feet could
go, will these vessels be of any use for that purpose when they are built up 1
Answer. rl'hey will not, unless the depth of water will allow for the increased
weight that has been put on them.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. Are you acquainted with the currents of our western streams 1
Answer. No, sir; I have never been out there.
Question. Suppose the current is four miles an hour, would the Ohimo be able
to stem that current and go up stream 1
Answer. It would depend on what speed she can make.
By 1\Ir. Gooch:
Question. What is the thickness of the armor-plate of these vessels 1
Answer. Three inches at the surface of the water.
Question. Would not the thickness of the plate and the fact that the men
who work the guns must all be exposed on deck, without protection, render
them of very little, if any, value for harbor defence1
Answer. They would be as valuable as other vessels of the navy whose guns
are exposed.
Question. Do you know bow many men it will take to man the Chimo in her
present condition 1
Answer. I think the admiral said yesterday that forty-four was her complement.
Question. How many are usually required on a torpedo boat 1
Answer. I think the crew of the Stromboli amounts to either nine or eleven
pereons, all told.
Question. Is a gun exposed on deck of any value to a torpedo boat 1
Answer. It would not be to a vessel like the Stromboli. In this case it
would. It could be used to clear the banks of any enemy while the men were
exposed in attaching the torpedoes.
Question. And, with the speed of these boats, could they ever catch anything1
.Answer. Never.

THURSDA v,

N ATHAKIEL l\fcKA v sworn and examined.
B'y Mr. Wade:
Question. Where do you reside 1
Answer. In East Boston.

December 22.
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Question. What business or profession do you follow ?
Answer. I follow ship building, steam-engines and boilers.
Question. How long have you been engaged in that business 1
Answer. Ever since 1848. I was foreman for my brother from 1851 to 1857,
~nd have been in business for myself since 1857.
Question. Have you done any work for the government 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Please state what work you have done for the government.
Answer. On the 4th day of May, 1863, I received a contract for a light-draught
monitor called the Squando, and in about 20 days after that I received the
plans and specifications.
Question. From whom did you receive the plans 1
Answer. Mr. Stimers.
Question. With whom did you make the contract for building her 1
Answer. With the Navy Department. I wrote a letter to the department on
the 20th of April stating that I would like to build a vessel such as were being
built at East Boston, and they sent on a board to examine my premises, and
then gave me a contract.
Question. What was the contract price for building it 1
Answer. $395,000, for six months.
Question. What were the dimensions of the craft to be 1
Answer. She was to be 225 feet long, 45 feet wide, and 9 feet and one inch
deep.
Question. What depth of water was she to draw ; was anything said ,
about it in the contract 1
Answer. No, sir; she was supposed to draw 6~ feet of water. We had nothing to do with the draught. We had nothing to do but build the vessel as the
plans came.
Question. Is Mr. Stimers a ship- builder 1
Answer. I don't know his experience ; he is an engineer in the navy, and has
been for some years.
Question. Do you know whether he has ever attended to ship-building as a
profession 1
Answer. No, sir; I never knew anything about him except that his first
start was on the original Monitor at Hampton Roads. He took her down
there, and he has been to sea a good deal.
Question. You have built the vessel according to his directions 1
Answer. Yes, sir; every blow that has been struck, every rivet that has been
driven, has been according to his directions.
Question. Did not the contract specify how she was to be built 1
Answer. She was to be a light-draught monitor, according to plans and specifications furnished by the department.
Question. How could you contract for the prices without specifications as
to how she was to be built 1 She might be finished in one way much cheaper
ihan in another, might she not?
Answer. Oh, they were all to be built alike as I understand it; there were to
be twenty in all, and there were twelve out when I took mine.
Question. Did you know what the specifications were to be 1
Answer. I had looked at the one at the Atlantic works and at others.
Question. As you progressed with the work, were there any alterations from
the original design 1
AnsweL Alterations as fast as they could come by Adams express.
Question. Can you specify some of the principal alterations 1
Answer. Some of them were cross-floors on the bottom; a ring round the
turret and pilot-house, making the turret and pilot-house thicker, vacuum engines
and the condenser lengthened.
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Question. Was there any change in the bulkheads 1
Answer. Yes, sir; there were several new bulkheads added. It was necessary that that should be done, but they didn't think of it before there were
hundreds of alterations.
Question. Were these alterations or deviations from the original plan a&tended with more expense than that plan 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How much more do you suppose 1
Answer. Well, over a hundred thouRand dollars.
Question. Was there any price agreed upon between you and Mr. Stimers for
these alterations 1
Answer. Sometimes he would make a bargain when he sent on the alterations ;
finally, the department found that he was giving so many orders that they cut
him off from making alterations unless they were notified and knew what the
changes were to be, so we would have to wait a week or so to see whether the
changes would be made or not. He said he had to write to Washington and
submit them to the department.
Question. Then all the material changes were submitted to the department 1
Answer. No, sir; very few of them. When they found that Mr. Stimers wa:;
going so far in these alterations, and there was so much fault by other peol->le,
they stopped him.
Question. Did the department know that he was making alterations to the
extent of $100,000 1
Answer. I don't think he said a word to them about it, but went right along
and did just as he pleased. He did not care for the department or anybody else.
Question. Do you know whether he received any directions from Mr. Ericsson in regard to these alterations 1
Answer. I never heard Ericsson's name mentioned in the matter until recently.
Question. Did the $100,000 include the raising at the sides of the vessel1
Answer. No, sir. Those were made while Mr. Stimers was there.
Question. Before it was decided to raise them up 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How much will raising them cost 1
Answer. We have a special contract for that at $90,000.
Question. Then the boat, when completed, will cost $190,000 more than was
supposed at first.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What condition is your vessel in now 1
Answer. l\fy vessel will be ready to launch the last day of this month.
Question. Will you state the reasons that induced the department to have the
sides of the vessel raised up 1
Answer. Because they thought she would not be seaworthy.
Question. Had you seen any of these monitors after they had been launched ?
Answer. Yes, sir; I had been on board the Chimo.
Question. What was her condition when she was launched, and how did she
appear in the water1
Answer. She was very low in the water. I was on board the Casco also
after she was launched.
Question. Did these vessels have all their munitions of war, fuel, and the like,
on board when you saw them 1
Answer. 'The Casco did not have any fuel on board of her; she was not completed.
Q.uestion. How was it with the Chimo 1
Answer. The Chimo had her turret off when I was on board of her.
Question. Did you see her with the turret on after she was launched 1
Answer. No, sir; I did not go on board of her.
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Question. Why was the turret taken off1
Answer. I understood she drew too much water and could not carry it.
Question. In your judgment, would she be a seaworthy boat according to the
original plan 1
Answer. Some people say they would go to sea in her, and some say they
would not. I should not want to go to sea in her.
Question. That depends upon a man's hardihood and courage; but we want
to know whether she could traverse the ocean, from port to por.t, with safety 1
Answer. There is not an iron·clad in the world that could traverse the ocean.
I have never seen one that could.
Question. Could she do so as well as any of them 1
Answer. Well, yes, sir.
Question. How many inches was she out of water 1
Answer. At the centre of the stern she was two and a half inches out of water; forward she was some fifteen inches out.
Question. Do you know anything of her speed 1
Answer. I do not.
Question. What useful purpose could she be put to, as a ship-'of-war, with
her turret off 1
Answer. Well, I suppose she is just as good as any of those double-enders,
or any of those gunboats that fight with batteries on shore. There is nothing
to affect the men any more than on a wooden vessel, and no splinterR to hurt
them. l think she would be better in a battle than any wooden vessel, because
the men wonld not be so liable to be hurt.
Question. Do you know how much water the Chimo drew 1
Answer. About eight feet, I should think.
Question. Do you recollect what the double-enders draw 1
Answer. I think they draw about the same.
Question. Do you consider the Chimo of any value at all as a ship-of-war 1
Answer .. She was not intended for a ship-of-war.
Question. vVhat was she intended for 1
Answer. For a torpedo boat, as I understand.
Questinn. I mean, for what was she originally designed 1
Answer. 'ro go up rivers and into shallow places, and encounter the enemy
wherever they should be met. I think these vessels are better than a gunboat
would be; they are iron, and they can resist shot and shell better.
Question. vVhat is the thickness of the armor of this vessel?
Answer. Three inches.
Question. How was it on the deck 1
Answer. Two half-inch plates, making one inch.
Question. You have built one of these vessels and nearly finished raising up
the sides, how far 1
Answer. 'rwenty-two inches.
Question. With her full complement of men and munitions of war on board,
what will her draught of water be 1
Answer. I don't think it will be any more than it was before, or not more
than six inches more.
Question. 'rhat would give her a draught of about ten feet and a half1
Answer. I think she will not draw that.
Question. Is so long and shallow a vessel as she is. strong enough to go to
sea 1
Answer. Well, I shouldn't think she would go to sea; there is no iron vessel
of that class that will. It is impossible, as I said before, for a vessel of that class
to go to sea, with the power they have in them; they were never intended to go
to sea; they would probably go round Cape Cod, like many of our sound steamers, that were never meant to go to sea. '.rhese monitors were intended for
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rivers and harbors. No vessel was ever built any stronger in the sides or deck
than they are; they are as strong as they could be made.
Question. As strong as they could be made of these given dimensions; but if
you had built them higher they could have been made stronger 1
Answer. Oh, yes. 'fhere could be no trouble except in the hotto1TI of the
vessel; the sides are amply strong, they would never give out at all except from
shot or shell.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. You stated that you wrote to the department f01; the privilege of
building one of these vessels ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How came you to do that 1
Answer. I wanted somethiug to do.
Question. I understand that; but were there no bids made for the buildiug
of these twenty vessels 1
Answer. There were, but I did not bid. I think they got a great many bids,
and then gave what they thought it was worth.
Question. You mean to say that the department fixed a price which they
would give for building these twenty vessels 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I suppose they received a great many llids, und averaged
them the same as they do in a great many other cases.
Question. You understand that the same price was paid for them all1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How much have you received upon your first contract 1
Answer. There are about $75,000 due on the o.riginal contract.
Question. Now, what arrangement did you make with the governmeut or
any of its agents in regard to compensation for the changes that were made
from the original plan 1 Was any price agreed upon 1
Answer. Sometimes they would put down the amount that was to be paid;
for instance, Mr. Stimers said that other parties had agreed to lengthen the pilothouse for $1,000, and he would give us that; I think the price to be paid for
the bulkheads was $1,400 or $1,500.
Question. What proportion of these alterations, amounting to $100,000, did
you have any agreement with the government in reference to the compensation
that was to be paid 1
Answer. But a very small proportion of them; sometimes we would write them
that such a thing was extra, and sometimes we would not, they came so thick
We expect the Navy Department will pay us every cent for the deviations from
the original plans.
Questiou. By what arrangement do you expect this to be done 1
Answer. We expect they will look over the different plans and give us just
what a private individual would for the extra work. We know they will.
Question. Who is to be the judge of it 1
Answer. The engineers. 'l'hat is all the way we expect to be used. We received a great many plans, and we have endeavored to follow them as far as we
possibly could.
Question. 'l'hese alterations that you are riow making, under contract, for
$90,000, you understand to have been ordered in consequence of the failure of
the vessels to realize the expectations of the Navy Department 1
Answer. Yes, sir, or of Mr. Stimers; he furnished us the plans.
Question. At whose instigation was this change made 1
Answer. Well, l\1r. vV ood and Admiral Gregory directed the change. I have
done my business through them entirely. I suppose they found the vesseL:;
were not efficient, and they had to make the change. Mr. Stimers was dismissed
and Mr. Wood put in his place.
0
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By Mr. Wade:
Question. "\Vho agreed to pay $90,000 for raising the sides of the vessel1
Answer. Admiral Gregory, at the Parker House, after we had fought him
there, with some of the other builders, for four or five hours, to get more.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Is the same price to be paid for these alterations on each of the
vessels 1
Answer. No, sir; the price to be paid dependR upon the stage the work is in.
My vessel was further advanced than some of the others, and I get $90,000.
None get over that, some less. I think these vessels will be very efficient when
they are done.
Question. Efficient for what purpose 1
Answer. For river and harbor defence; that is what they were originally
intended for.
Question. As a practical man, would you say that their armor was sufficient
to resist the force of such armaments as they would naturally come in conflict
with 1
Answer. Well, they would not stand some fortifications that have a much
heavier armor.
Question. How much force would they stand ?
Answer. :Field artillery. r.rhere are a great many places up the J ames, the
York, and all the southern rivers, for instance, where you could not go with a
gunboat, that you could reach 'with these iron-clads.
Question. Is the strength of their armor the same as that of the double-enders 1
Answer. ,..rhe double-enders have no armor at all; they were merely low
wooden vessels; they have nothing but little thin bulwarks of iron. I think
these vessels, when completed, will be very good vessels. There is plenty of
work in them, and everything is done in the best possible manner.
Question. What speed do you expect to get out of this vessel 1
Answer. I think she will go five or six knots.
Question. You said your contract was to finish this vessel in six months.
Answer. Yes, sir. In four months at $395,000, in six months at $386,000.
One reason we did not finish her in four months was, because there were not
men enough in the country to do it; and another reason was, the plans never
oome to hand until a year after the contract was made.
Question. Didn't you know the number of men in the country when you made
your contract 1
Answer. Well, sir, you might get them all on the vessel, but you could not
get them all on one sheet.
Question. Do you feel yourself under any obligation in consequence of not
completing the vessel at the time specified in the contract?
Answer. Not at all, sir.
Question. Has the work been done as rapidly as it could be done under the
circumstances in which you were placed by the government.
Answer. Yes, sir. We worked as rapidly as we could. We have worked
night and day on it; but there have been so many alterations and so much delay
that we have got almost discouraged. We hope, however, to live through it.
By :Mr. Wade:
Question. If the speed of your boat is five knots and the current is four, how
rapidly will she go up 1
Answer. Well, if the current is very strong, it would be like trying to make
water run up hill. You can't make water run up the roof of this house.

LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS.

31

On a subsequent day Mr. McKay submitted the following statement, reque8ting that it might be appended to his deposition :
rrh e draught of water of the Squando, when ready for sea, will be 7 feet 9
inch ~~ ; dimensions as she now is: length, 225 feet 4~ inches; breadth, 45 feet
1 ~ inch ; depth amidships, 11 feet -fr inch.
In regard to any orders I received in reference to the alteration or construction, they all came from the office of Chief Engineer Stimers. rrhe first drawing
came to us on the 27th day of 1\Iay, 1863-the last received from him was at the
time of his removal from office. We received one general plan as late as April
26, 1864, eleven months after the date of contract. We have received in all
from :M:r. Stimers 120 letters. Most of these are in relation to alterations and
deviations from the first plans we received from him. We have received also
83 sheets, containing plans and drawings enough in number and size to contain
the drawings for the machinery of our entire navy, with all the plans complete.
\Ve received al~:~o a bound book, 4 by 6, of 92 pages, printed in small type.
E ach mechanic in charge had to have one of these books in his pocket, so that
l1e would not make any deviation from the plans or specifications. It was
ca1led the "Specification Book," and termed by our mechanics "the monitor
prayer book." If there had been any deviations from this book the work would
have been condemned. It came from Mr. Stimers's office. He made some additions to it, after the issue of the first volume, which were pasted in the back
of the book. I am aware that there has been a mistake in those vessels in all
their weights. In the first place, had Mr. Stimers remained in power, he would
have sunk every one of them by his additional alterations on alterations. He
was not satisfied to finish the vessels as they were intended, nor do I think he
would ever have finished them, for they would have sunk at the wharf with the
immen-,e quantity of iron he put in them, which was of no value, and only for
experiments. 'l'here seemed to be no end to the work, as long as he had a
draughtsman. rrhe engines are finished in the most ~ elaborate style, all polished.
Parts that should have been made of cast-iron were made of wrought, at a cost,
when finished, of two dollars per pound. A great many parts which should
l1ave been made of cast-iron were made of brass, and finished in the most
elaborate style, got up regardless of expense. This looked well on paper, and
Mr. Stimers did not care how long it took a man to finish it. Had those engines been got up as simple and plain as the engines on the Monadnock, and
the engines for the naval vessels generally, by Mr. B. F. Isherwood, they would
have been completed in three or four months, where it took six months to make
them. I ~an confidently say that there is more copper pipe in one of those
boats than there is in one of our large frigates. They were as thick again as
were required. Those were Mr. Stimers's instructions. All of the orders
were in this way. There is more machinery and parts of machinery in the
Squando than there is in the iron-clad .Monadnock. If the plans furnished
from first to last were spread out they would cover the entire deck of the vessel,
and there would not be room enough left for Mr. Stimers to add another.
I cannot see that the Navy Department are at fault for this mistake. The
country was in want of vessels-of-war, and the department are in duty bound to
furnish them as ordered. r.rhey have done their duty, as far as I can see. 'rhey
are merely agents for the people; and I am confident they have been very efficient in the discharge of all their duties. Mr. Fox bad great confidence in Mr.
Stimers 's abilities to construct those vessels and superintend the directions of the
plans and their entire arrangements. Mr. Fox did all in his power to make
those vessels efficient. He placed an agent with full power, and that agent did
all that he knew to make them seaworthy and fit for harbor defence, and failed
to accomplish his design; and he was removed immediately, as I am aware any
business man would remove an agent when he did not perform his duty in accordance with his instructions. I am confident that no detail of the instructions of
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the light-draught monitors was ever executed in any of the departments at
W ashingtou. I never received a letter nor a word from Mr. Lenthall on them,
except for our approved bills, when they had been passed by Mr. Stimers, with
his signature as approved. I called on Mr. Isherwood once for some information;
he told me that he knew nothing about them. This was a short time after I
received the contract. A mistake has been made, and the country must bear it.
This country is only in its infancy in naval warfare. I am aware that the navy
has done a great deal, and is now doing daily, and getting a great deal of valuable experience; and they will produce, in a short time, some of the most efficient vessels-of-war that ever floated. The navy commenced the war with three
~:!team vessels, and have now over six hundred. I think that great credit is due
to the Navy Department for their efficiency in keeping such a fleet at sea, to
guard all the rivers, inlets, and coast of the south. Where is there a country
as large as this, or a Navy Department in the world, that has done tto much as
ours in so short a time, and made so few mistakes 1 Look at .France and England, that have been building armed vessels for hundreds of years, and have not
succeeded yet; and we have been at war but two or three years, and have now
afloat some of the most efficient iron-clads in the world.
I am confident that I never should take another government contract with
such a field of plans as I have had the last ejghteen months. The following is
an extract from one of the one hundred and twenty letters received from Mr.
Stimers : "You will readily understand, therefore, why I would prefer you to
follow strictly the plans sent. Being myself an engineer, I don't require the opinion of a board to enable me to decide upon the excellence of the plans of something of which I have had a special experience."
N. l\1cKAY.

EBEN HoYT sworn and examined.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. What is your position in the navy 1
Answer. Chief engineer.
Question. Where are you located 1
Answer. In East Boston and Chelsea. I am now inspecting the light-draught
monitors Squando and Nauset, also an iron double-ender, iron propeller boats,
turrets, &c., for the government.
Question. You have inspected them from time to time, of course, as they have
progressed ?
Answer. Yes, sir, day by day. I was first ordered to this duty in May, 1863,
as the inspector of the Chimo, at South Boston; and in September was detached
from the Chimo, and ordered to East Boston, to inspect the monitors Squando
and N anset, also other work.
Question. Are these light-draught monitors all of the same dimensions, build,
&c.?
Answer. They were intended to be, and they were all built from t.he same
drawings and specifications.
Question. When was the Chimo commenced 7
Answer. The keel was laid about the middle of May, 1863.
Question. What draught was she intended to have 1
Answer. The only evidence I have as to that is what appears in the specifi·cations. The specifications state that the loaded draught of water was to be six
feet six inches.
Question. Was she to be a turreted vessel?
Answer. With a single turret, mounting two guns-one 150-pouncler Parrott
rifle, and one 11-inch gun.
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Question. The drawings and specifications were made by whom 1
Ans,.,·er. The drawings and specifications were issued from Mr. S timers's
office. I have been present at his office on several occasions, and have seen him
(Mr. Stimers) supervising the detail drawings, but I have no knowledge from
whence the general drawing odginally came. The practice of the office was, to
send the drawings to the government inspecting engineers, to be by them fur*
nished to the contractors. All the drawings, specifications, and directions that
I received came from Chief Engineer Stimers, and, at the latter part of the work,
were approved by Admiral Gregory.
Question. Are yon acquainted with Mr. Stimers as an engineer 1
Answer. I have been acquainted with hi'll very nearly eight years.
Question. Was he ever a ship-builder and draughtsman 1
Answer. 1\'Ir. Stimers is a practical engineer and draughtsman, and has been
for many years interested in matters connected with iron and wooden ship-building. I have had quite an intimate acquaintance with Mr. Stimers professionally.
I made my first cruise in the frigate 1\ferrimac, in 1857, on the Pacific station,
and Mr. Stimers was chief engineer of the vessel.
Question. He has been more an engineer than a builder of ships, has he not 1
Answer. Well, the term" mechanical engineer" includes designer and builder.
For instance, our present duty, in connexion with these iron-clads, is to superintend and inspect all the machinery and workmanship that enter into the construction of the hull, the armature, the turret, and every part of the vessel; and
the same, also, with the iron double-enders. '.rhere is a difference between an
engineer and an engine-driver. To be a driver involves simply a very elementary knowledge of steam, and the manipulation of certain machinery; but to be·
a mechanical engineer involves, of course, a knowledge of the details of publication and construction, and of all matters appertaining to the profession.
Question. It amounts to this, then, that you consider Mr. Stimers a mechanical engineed
Answer. I consider Mr. Stimers a thorough mechanical engineer.
Question. Did Mr. Stimers, in the construction of these vessels, change the
original design at any time 1
Answer. I have no evidence that the original specifications and drawings were
of Mr. Stimers's design. Mr. Stimers, as general inspector, did make quite a num,..
berof changes in the vesssls. For instance, in the first drawing received by Mr.
Adams (builder of the Ohimo) there were no cross-floors to stiffen the b ottom of th.e
hull, and it was evident that without these cross-floors there would not be suffi.cient strength. We will say that the draught of water is seven feet. There
would be, then, an upward pressure of three pounds per inch upon every square
inch, which would tend to break the vessel up. That pressure is now resisted
by stanchions and cross-floors. On the first drawing there were no cross-floors
shown. Afterwards, another general drawing came, showing cross-floors and
transverse bars of reverse iron under the boilers ; also a heavy base ring) fitted
to base of turret ; two inches of armor plating were added to the pilot-house, and
two inches to the smoke-pipe. These last changes were shown to be necessary
by the experience gained at Charleston.
Question. Were these changes made before the craft was launched 1
Answer. Yes, sir; long before. There was a time, in the construction of the
Ohimo, when the drawings did not keep pace with the work, but I cannot remember any time when the drawings were not in advance of the work on the
Nanset and the Squando. I wish to call particular attention to this ::;tatement,
because the assertion was made here, a moment ago, that such was not the case,
but that parties were delayed on account of not receiving the drawings. So
far as my experience is concerned, I am satisfied that the drawings, with the
exception I have named, have been in advance of the work. We must not, howPart
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ever, confound the alterations from the original plans with the alterations in
raising the boats.
Question. When this craft was launched, and her turret put on, and her coal
and munitions of war put on board, did she sink lower in the water than she
was expected to 1
Answer. I was not present when all the coal, munitions and appurtenances
were placed on board, but I will make this statement: that with water in the
boilers, and some coal on board, (the exact quantity I cannot now state,) the
vessel did draw more water than the draught proposed by the specifications.
Question. How much mor~ 1
An swer. At the time I allude to the Chimo was drawing, to the best of my
1·ecollection, six, or, at most, seven inches more water than the draught specified.
rrhe draught of water specified is six feet six inches. She then drew a little
over seven feet-seven feet and one inch.
Question. Is it difficult for a dranghtsman to ascertain beforehand how deep
his vessel will be in the water, if he knows the weight she will carry 1
Answer. It is mathematically and practically impossible. Statements are
made and presented to the public that certain iron-clad vessels have approached
to within one-fourth of an inch of their intended draught. Take, for instance,
the Dictator for an illustration. Now, as I understand the displacement per
inch of that vessel, one-fourth of an inch of the intended draught would be perhaps nine tons in a fabric weighing some thousands of tons. I will give you
one illustration to show bow material varies. The tops of these light-draught
monitor cross-floors are fitted with angle iron, toppings 2~ inches by -{6 iron.
Messrs. Morris & rrasker, of Philadelphia, a firm that manufactures large
quantities of this angle iron, have tables showing the various forms, and usually
the weights per lineal foot of each sized bar. The weight of this iron is given
as five pounds per lineal foot; the actual weight was six pounds and five onehundredths per lineal foot. It would be utterly impossible, therefore, in building an iron structure, to do more than approximate to the weight of that structure. To ascertain the draught of water it is necessary to ascertain the exact
form of the hull and the weight of the vessel, and what she is to take on board.
But in practice we deal with uneven plates and angle iron; also with woods of
various density.
Question. I know, but I put the question hypothetically. If you know the
shape of the vessel and the weight of the cargo, or whatever is to be on board,
are there not rules to ascertain how much she will draw 1
Answer. The difficulty is not in the mathematical calculation, but in the
fact that the wdght of the material will vary. You may assume, for instance,
that a plate of iron one foot square and one inch in thickness weighs forty pounds.
A plate exactly one foot square and one inch in thickness will weigh forty pounds;
that is, that would be the average weight in a number of plates; but there will
be a variation in the thickness and density of all plates used in practice. Mr.
Stimers insisted that all of the light-draught monitor armor plates be fully one
inch in thickness, and many of the plates weighed forty-three pounds per square
foot, and were but slightly over the required thickness.
Question. How near cau you approximate, practically, to it 1
Answer. I have had experience inspecting ten iron vessels, and from my observation I should judge that it would be proper to add full ten per cent. in
weight over the calculations to the iron structure. You have, for i!',stance,
plates that are intended to be one quarter of an inch in thickness, but the rolls
in rolling the iron will spring, and you will find the plate thicker in the centre.
Question. Of course, then, if you were constructing a craft that was to draw
only six and a half feet of water, you would make that allowance to start upon 1
Answer. I should say, decidedly, that an allo·wance of that kiud should be
made. The iron we get now is somewhat different from the material furnishBd
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before the war. The mills have been hard pressed, and they are not careful to
give exact thicknesses called for. For instance, we get angle-iron that comes
fi'om c~rtain rollers that llave turned out thousands of tons. In rolling the angle iron through these rollers it enlarges the spaces which form the outline of
the angle-il·un; consequently we have increased weight per lineal foot. This
evil would be corrected by requiring certain weights per foot or per plate.
Question. Why was the turret taken off the Ohimo, when it was originally
designed that it should have a turret 1
Answer. I do not know, sir. If the intention was to lighten the vessel, my
opinion is that other things could have been taken from the vessel that would
have secured sufficient lightness for all practical purposes-without taking the
turret off-say for harbor defence.
Question. Don't you know that it was because, nfter the vessel was launched,
it was found that she could not carry her turret efficiently 1
Answer. It is very evident, sir, that the boat had a greater draught of water
than was intended. It is now a question only of engineering and opinion as to
what should have been removed from that vessel to have lightened her. You
will see, by looking at the plan, that there are a great many heavy weights besides the turret, and a great many small pieces, the aggregate of which would
make quite a number of tons.
Question. Do you believe that, as originally constructed, she would have
answered the purpose for which she was designed ?
Answer. If that purpose was harbor defence, I believe the Ohimo would have
been an efficient vessel.
Question. What do you mean by that 1-to lie still in the harbor and use her
turret1
Answer. No, sir. I assume that the Ohimo had a speed of five knots an
hour, which I deem sufficient speed for lJarbor purposes; and also the fact,
(and the calculation has been made by reliable parties,) knowing the then condition of the vessel, that it would have required 270 tons weight to have brought
the crown of her deck level with the water.
Question. rrhen you think the commissioners who directed the raising up of
the sides of these vessels were mistaken 1
Answer. No, sir, I do not say that is the case.
Question. Suppose they were designed to sail up rivers and into shoal water,
and defend themselves against an enemy, were they efficient for that purpose 1
Answer. No, sir, they were not. They could not successfully contend with
a very strong current.
Question. What was the difficulty 1
Answer. 'l'he difficulty was excessive draught of water and too little speed.
Question. So far as these two elements are concerned, they will not be
changed for the better by raising the sides, will they?
Answer. It will not lighten the draught of water, nor increase the speed.
'!'hey were called "light-draught iron-clad monitors," with a draught of 6 feet 6
inches. It is very evident now that they are no longer light~draught monitorsat least comparatively.
Question. You say that, as originally constructed, they drew too much water,
and had not speed enough to be useful on rivers; now the government propose
to raise them up on the sides 22 inches: will that decrease the draught or _increase the speed 1
Answer. It certainly will not decrease the draught; and that addition alone,
provided no other alterations were made, certainly would not increase the speed.
Question. Then they will be no better in their altered condition for the purpose originally designed than they were before they were altered 1
Answer. If you please, I will make an explanation. rl'here is one other
alteration that has been made-the raising of th.e stern overhang. 'l'he oYer-
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hang of the Ohimo was much submerged, and perhaps fully one-third of the
effective propelling power was destroyed by that overhang. In raising the sides
of these other vessels the overhang has also been raised 22 inches; also its
shape has been altered; and if these boats make more speed than the Ohimo
did, it will be entirely due to the fact that the overhang and the propellers have
been altered and improved. 'l'he pitch of the old propellers was twelve feet;
these are nine feet. The overhang, also, has been so altered that the water is
projected directly aft by the propellers, and they will be far more effective tB.an
before. If there is an increase of speed, therefore, it will be due to this alteration.
Question. Do you think there will be an increase of speed from the same
propelling power?
Answer. No, sir, I do not, as the hull will offer more resistance.
Question. What is the use of that overhang 1
Answer. 'l,he overhang is placed there to protect the rudder and propellers.
My opinion, as an engineer, is that one-third of that overhang would accomplish
all that it is necessary to accomplish, and furnish sufficient protection. If the
rudder was entirely unprotected except the post, a shot striking the thin plates
would hardly produce greater damage than to make a hole through the rudder,
which would not materially affect the strength or usefulness of the same. I
have seen side-wheel steamers used in front of Vicksburg with many of their
paddle-boards knocked out by shot, and the only apparent effect was that the
engine moved a little faster, but the boats were not much disabled.
Question. Then, if I understand you now, you say that if the original purpose
of these light-draught monitors was to ascend rivers and to navigate shoal waters,
that design has not been accomplished, either by the vessels as originally constructed or by their alteration.
A~swer. No, sir, certainly not. There is one other point to be considered.
The Ohimo was floating in salt water. If she had been used as a 1·iver boat, and
·on the Mississippi, or any of our fresh-water rivers, it is very evident the draught
of water would have been increased. Then there is another fact. These vessels in construction amount to this: an iron scow, containing machinery, boilers,
coal, &c., supported by a pine raft.. It receives support from that raft as long
as the raft has buoyancy. Assuming the weight of pine to be 47 pounds per
foot, and the weight of salt water 64 pounds per foot, there will be that relative
proportion of buoyancy. But it will be impossible to prevent the water from
percolating through this raft, and ultimately it will become saturated, and in
that case the buoyancy is decreased, and the draught of water increased. It is
increased in proportion as you add pounds of water to each cubic foot of pine.
Question. What is the thickness of the armor of the Ohimo ?
Answer. Three inches.
Question. Her turret was to be more than that, was it not 1
Answer. The turret is eight inches in thickness.
Question. Is armor three inches thick sufficient to resist rifled ordnance 1-say
a Parrott 32-pounder 1
Answer. 'l'hrfe inches of armor, arranged as it is on that vessel, with that
large amount of oak armor backing, is sufficient to resist shell from either rifled
or smooth-bore ordnance, but entirely inadequate to resist solid shot. Of course
I am speaking of the heaviest description of ordnance.
Question. What thickness of armor is used on a large monitor, like the Dictator 1
Answer. I understand the armor of the Dictator to be ten inches in thickness,
and the turret fifteen inches.
Question. You don't suppose that the light armor of these vessels was designed to encounter fortifications on land 1
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Answer. I presume they were intended to encounter the enemy wherever
found. If they were intended for picket-boats, to accompany army operations,
and contend with sharpshooters and field artillery, the armor is amply sufficient,
and the thickness of the turret is amply sufficient; but of course it must be
evident to you that such a vessel would be very unfit to encounter another
monitor like the Dictator or the Monadnock.
Question. You say she would be sufficient for harbor defence. \V ould she
be sufficient to resist the arm·1.ments she would be likely to encounter 1
Answer. I speak of harbor defence as opposed to the aggressive powers of a
foreign foe. I am not aware of any vessel built by the British or French government, that carries armor sufficient to resist our projectiles, that would be
able to enter our harbor. 'l'heir heavy vessels have a draught of from 27 to 34
feet. We assume that these monitors will have a draught of seven or eight feet,
and such vessels wonld be very efficient to defend Boston, Newburyport, Gloucester, and others of our coast towns.
Question. Suppose the enemy should encounter her with craft like the Monadnock or Dictator, or any of that class of vessels 1
Answer. 'l'he Monadnock or Dictator, or any of that class, would speedily
overpower a vessel of this class. 'l'hey have greater powers of offence and
greater powers of resistance.
Question. 'l'hen she would not be first rate for harbor defence 1
Answer. I say these vessels would be well adapted for harbor defence against
a foreign foe, with the means that European powers have to assail us. For instance, the Alabama, the Georgia, and other confederate vessels have been in
the vicimty of our coast, and we have anticipated raids from them. Now, it is
very evident that a light-draught monitor would be very ample protection for almost all our harbors against that class of vessels; and their value will be evident, when we consider the fact that many of our harbors and some valuable
seaports are without any means of defence, not even land fortifications.
Question. You would not recommend the building of such vessels for harbor
defence?
Answer. No, sir. With the experience we have had with that class of vessels
I should not deem it advisable to build any more like them for any purpose
whatsoever.
Question. Another quPstion is, are they well adapted for torpedo boats 1
Answer. 'rhey are very poorly adapted to be used as torpedo boats against
ships or steamers. 'l'hey may be valuable boats to be used in blowing out obstructions, or any purpose of that kind, where speed is not an important consideration. A torpedo boat to encounter an enemy at sea, or to encounter a floating structure, like a steamer, must have speed. If its speed is not superior to
that of the enemy, it is very certain that the torpedo will fail to do damage.
Question. How much would it cost to build an efficient torpedo boat?
Answer. Well, it would depend entirely upon the purpose for which it ha.s to
be used.
Question. Such as we do build 1
Answer. I do not know what they have cost.
Question. Would it be over $100,000, in your judgment 1
Answer. 'l'here is no doubt that a torpedo boat could be built that would be
a valuable torpedo boat, after the design of Chief Engineer Wood, which we
believe to be the best, for $100,000. I of course refer to a small craft.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. You suggested that this boat might have been lightened, so as to
have answered the purpose for which she was already designed, without taking
off the turret 1
Answer. Yes, sir; that is decidedly my opinion.
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Question. Will you inform us how you would have lightened her, and still
have left the turret 1
Answer. Well, sir, I should have removed one boiler, the water com part·
ments, pipes, and all the attendant valves and appurtenances for same; I should
have removed the vacuum engine and its condenser, substituting a simple pump,
and a jet condenser; I should have docked the vessel, and removed two-thirds
of the overhang, leaving simply a sufficient amount to protect the propellers
and rudder post; also reduced thickness of armature at stern; removed Andrews's pumps, engines and pipes, and made many other minor changes. I don't
say that that would have made the Chimo a thoroughly efficient boat, but I believe that, for the purposes of harbor defence, and in smooth water, she would
have been a better boat than she is now.
Question. And do you think you could in that way have lightened her so
that she would not have drawn more than six and a half feet ?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. How much would have been her draught of water after you had
lightened her all you could 1
Answer. Well, her draught would have been, we will say, six feet eleven inches.
It would not have made a difference of more than a few inches ; still it would
have been an improvement. Then there would have been the difficulty which
I have mentioned, and which all these boats will have to contend with, and that
is, that they are now in salt water, and will have to pass into fresh water to be
available on many of our rivers. Then there is this other fact, which is a very
important fact, but one that has not been discussed, that this pine raft will very
soon become saturated; constantly increasing the draught of water.
Question. Assuming that these boats draw seven feet in salt water, how much
more will they draw in fresh water 1
Answer. l t is a matter of calculation. I will approximate it by saying that
it will make a difference of one inch and a half.
Question. And how much will the draught be increased when the pine raft becomes thorougl1ly saturated with water, as it will?
Answer. Well, I should say five inches and a half. The timbers of these
vessels are not "fayed," af: we say, close together; it would be impracticable
to do that ; consequently the water circulates around and among the timbers ;
but, as I said before, in time the water will saturate them. I should judge that
if one of these vessels, that is now being altered by raising the sides twentytwo inches, was placed in fresh water, and considering that the pine raft becomes nearly saturated, the draught of water would be increased at least seven
inches.
Question. Then would the Chimo have floated, in that condition of things, in
fresh water 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. vV ould she have floated and could people have lived on board of
her in fresh water 1
Answer. I think so. The total depth from the crown of the deck to the
bottom of the keel in the Ghimo was nine feet and one inch; consequently we
may add weight by saturating the pine raft, and virtually add weight by passing from salt water to fresh water, until we approach a draught of nine feet and
one inch, and you see the vessel is still floating. I suppose that with a draught
of ejght feet and ten inches the vessel would sjnk ; the water wonld pass into
crevjces and places not water-tight. You see that if the calculation that has
been made is correct, with the Chimo's deepest draught, she was still272 tons
above water.
Question. Do you know whether the commission appointed to decide what
alterations should be made in these vessels, considered the suggestions you have
made in regard to retaining the turret 1
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Answer. I have never had any conversation with the parties, but presume
they did. It was a matter that was considered by Mr. Stimers.
Question. You say it was a matter considered by Mr. Stimers. Did he propose to make these alterations 1
·
Answer. No, sir; I am not aware that he did. Mr. Stimers•was aware of one
fact, that the material was weighing more than was anticipated in his calculations, and he was also aware of the fact that the pine and oak being used were
not seasoned. Now, properly seasoned oak will weigh .13 pounds per cubic
foot; but the oak that was used on these vessels in some cases weighed 64
pounds per cubic foot.
Question. Why were these builders permitted to use oak not seasoned 1
Answer. 'rhere was no other suitable timber in the country. These contracts
called for an immense amount of timber. Some of these deck timbers were 45
and 50 feet in length before being moulded and sided. I do not believe it would
be possible to procure an equal amount of oak timber like that used in these
twenty monitors in any reasonable time. I think, in that respect, the country
was almost exhausted.
Question. You say tl1at Mr. Stimers was aware that the material was heavier
than had been estimated 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; he was aware of the fact, because an order was issued from
his office that this oak timber should be kiln-dried ; but he was informed by the
contractors that it was utterly impossible. I don't say that it would have been
impossible to arrange some apparatus to have done that, but it seemed to be, at
the time, practically impossible.
Question. When Mr. Stimers became aware that the weight of the material
wa.~ greater than had been estimated, in vessels where it was so necessary as in
these, that the exact displacement should be known, was it not his duty at once
to make the calculation as to the effect of that increased weight 1
Answer. It would certainly appear so, sir.
Question. You have stated that the weight of the material would exceed the
estimate some ten per centJ
Answer. Yes, sir. For instancfl, in the specification (for the light-draught
monitors) we are told that the total displacement of a draught of six feet and six
inches is 1,175 tons. And, on the other hand, the displacement per inch is
given in the specification at 17-fiJ tons. Now, this displacement of 1,175 tons
includes the weight of coal, men, and provisions, and all, at this draught of six
feet six inches, and at least 120 tons should have been added to the 1,175 tons
estimated displacement-this 120 tons would add about seven inches to the
calculated draught of water.
Question. The fact being known that the material was ten per cent. heavi€r
than was estimated, would not a calculation at once have shown that the di splacement would be so much greater as to sink these vessels so low as to impair
their efficiency, if not to destroy it altogether 1
Answer. No, sir, I think not. When I made the statement that Mr. Stimers
was aware of the fact that the material weighed more than had been calculated,
I estimated the difference, from personal experience, at ten per cent. I don'~
know what his opinion was with regard to this increase. He may not have
considered the increase to be nearly so large as that.
Question. Knowing that it was in excess of the estimate, was it not his duty,
where it was so indispensable that the exact displacement should be known, in
order to determine how much these vessels would be out of water, at once to
have made a calculation to determine accurately what the excess of weight was,
and the effect of it 1
Answer. Yes, sir, it was his duty to have taken that mattflr into consideration, and to have ascertained what the draught of water would be, considering
that excess.
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Question. That would be particularly the case where twenty vessels were
being built according to the same plans and specifications, would it not 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. When did you become a ware that these vessels would sink lower
in the water than was contemplated by the original design 1
Answer. Well, it was always my opinion that they would do that, but the
p~·actical evidence of the fact was after the launch of the Ohimo.
Question. When was the department informed that these vessels could not
be built according to the original design, to draw six feet and a half of water 1
Answer. I don't know that the department ever received any such information. I presume that the department were immediately informed of the draught
of the Ohimo, after launching, and also from time to time as those additional
weights were placed on board. At least, Mr. Stimers was in Boston and personally supervised the completion of that work, and I think Admiral Gregory
was present when she was about completed and ready for trial.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. As soon as you began to put in the timbers you knew that the
weight of the material was greater than the estimate 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I would also say that these vessels are very strong.
They have great longitudinal strength. They have also great transverse
strength. The floors are not, perhaps. quite as strong as might be desired, but
excepting the overhang, so far as strength is concerned, they will be abundantly
capable of steaming about in our bays, harbors, and rivers, and perhaps at sea.
Question. Have you made any estimates, so that you can tell us what will
be the expense of the alterations that were made on these vessels, under the
original contracts 1
Answer. No, sir. In all cases where any additions were proposed, Mr.
Stimers sent the contractors a letter informing them that these alterations were
proposed to be made, and usually sending drawings, and asking the contractors
to estimate the probable cost of these additions. In some cases the contractors
and Mr. Stimers did not agree as to cost, some of the contractors insisting that
the drawings that were sent represented parts that were not included in the
original contract. But I think the contracts and specifications amply covered
them. The boats were to be fitted complete with all their appurtenances ;
and it would be impossible in a general drawing, or in any specifications, to
describe all the parts. 1!-..,or that reason, in all the government contracts there
is a provision that whatever omissions may have been made in the specifications or drawings shall not relieve the contractor from his responsibility to fit
them complete for sea.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Do you consider the engine a success 1
Answer. I consider the engine a decided success. It is well arranged, strong,
simple, and compact, and I think will be perfectly reliable; in fact it is so very
simyle that there are but few parts liable to get out of order.
~uestion. Is it in harmony with the vessel-with her size, proportions, &c. 1
Answer. I consider the engine entirely in relation to the awonnt of steam
the boilers can furnish. I think the engine will work off all the steam that the
boilers will make. If that is the case, then the boilers and the engine are in
harmony. But, of course, to obtain greater speed it would have been necessary
to have had more heating and grate surface, and a proportionate area of piston.
Question. I will put the question in this form: Is the failure in speed to be
attributed to a defect in the hull, or in the propelling power 1
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Answer. I think it is to be attributed entirely to a defect in the bull-to that
overhang to which I have referred. There was an immense mass of oak in the
Chimo that was submerged, and in addition to the legitimate resistance which
the hull meets with, that had to be towed astern. And, aside from that, it obstructed the full and free action of the propellers. The alterations remove that
difficulty very thoroughly. There is a very great improvement in that respect.

DoNALD

McKAY sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Where do you reside, Mr. McKay t
Answer. I reside in Boston.
Question. How long have you been engaged in ship-building 1
Answer. It is somewhat over thirty years.
Question. Have you built any vessels for the government 1 and if so, state
what.
Answer. The iron-clad monitor N anset is the first vessel I have built for the
government. I am now building an iron double-ender gunboat.
Question. Will you give to the committee all the information you have in
relation to the iron-clad monitors, such as you are now building 1
Answer. My contract was made with the Bureau of Construction and Repair,
acting in the name of the Secretary of the Navy, dated the lOth day of June,
1863, with instructions that the plans and specifications would be furnished
me by Admiral Gregory, of New York. I have no ·knowledge who planned
the model of the same, or who is responsible therefor, further than the statement of Chief Engineer Stimers to me, to the effect that be designed her in all
her details, both of hull and machinery; and from the commencement to the
time of Mr. Stimers's removal as general inspector of iron-clads I received all
plans and instructions in relation to her construction directly from him. Hence
I have reason to believe that he is responsible.
It was found on launching the Chimo and Casco that they had too much
weight for their displacement. (These are of the same class as the Nanset.)
This discrepancy in weight may be accounted for, first, by excess of weight of
the material used, both iron and wood, the actual weights being much over
those made by calculations based on the rules laid down, and the tables of
weights as furnished by the manufacturers of iron. In all my tests of the
weight of iron I have found it to overrun the standard. It was intended to
use seasoned timber, but such as was required could not be found in the country;
hence it was necessary to use unseasoned, producing a heavy excess of weight
in this particular.
~'urthermore, experiments with the monitors at Charleston suggested a number of improvements necessary to be made to make them more efficient, necessitating an addition 'of considerable weight of material, which, in my judgment,
the boats would have borne, and not materially exceeded the contemplated
draught of water, but for the excess of material as above stated, as by a calculation which I made I found that after they were equipped for sea it would
have required 400 tons to have entirely immersed them.
When it was discovered that more displacement was required to make them
a:~ efficient as possible, it was decided to raise the decks, and build up the hulls
twenty-two inches of those not too far advanced. This I have done with the
N anset, with all possible despatch. This alteration, I believe, will make the
boats more efficient and comfortable, and add materially to the strength, and,
in my judgment, the money spent in this alteration is well spent.
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The material and workmanshp of the N anset and the other boats, so far as I
have seen them, are of the very best; and instead of the department's paying too
high for them, I would say that I would not to-day contract to duplicate the
Nauset for less than $200,000 more than the price agreed to be paid for her.
A good deal has been said in opposition to this class of vessels by some of
the builders, and others who have had no experience in ship-building, and koow
nothing of its science, and, furtl1ermore, are unfriendly to the government, and
say and do what they can in opposition to the administration.
The committee should, I think, take into consideration the prejudice and
jealousy of various parties, who are not disposed to look with favor upon anything not designed by themselves. I consider this class of boats, if properly
built according to this general plan and specification, with an increase of Spe€d,
say eight knots, the best yet designed for our coast and harbor defences.
Question. What alterations have been made from the original plans and
specifications, as furnished by Admiral Gregory 1
Answer. From time to time changes were made. Plans were always sent
forward at the time the changes were ordered. _
Question. Can you describe more particularly the alterations which have
been made 1
Answer. No alterations were made in the dimensions of the hull. The
changes consisted in adding more material; for instance, strengthening the
pilot-house, adding a base ring to the turret, and vacuum engines, and some other
things that were deemed essential by the inspector, after the experience at
Charleston and other places where the monitors were in action.
Question. You account for the increased displacement above the estimate
from the fact that the weight of the material used in the construction was
greater than had been estimated 1
Answer. Yes, sir, and in the extra weight of materia] added for improvements.
Question. Ought they not to have taken that into account in making their
original estimate 1
Answer. Yes, sir, I think they should.
Question. Has not the displacement been increased considerably in consequence of the alterations 1
.Answer. It has. More material has been added to the vessel, which would
require more displa~ement to carry the weights.
Question. Ought not the calculations, where so much exactness was required
as in estimating the displacement of these vessels, to have been made on the
actual facts, instead of relying upon any rules?
Answer. Ship-builders generally rely upon the rules and tables of weights,
both of iron and wood, as laid down, in making their calculations for displacement. It would have been impossible to have made these calculations on actual
weights, except all the material of hull and machinery were first got out ready
for use, and weighed before the model was made and displacement calculated;
this, as you know, would be entirely impracticable. As near as I can calculate, if the vessel had been constructed of seasoned timber, and iron at standard
weight, and uo alteration made increasing the weights, she would not have eJ£ceeded the intended draught of water of 6 feet 6 inches.
Question. Was it not a well-known fact to everybody who had paid any attention to the subject, that it was not posl:lible to obtain seasoned timber, such
as these vessels called for, at the time the contracts were made 1
Answer. Yes, sir; it was not in the country. Individuals could not obtain
it, and the government could not obtain it. There was not a ton of seasoned
oak in the market suitable for these boats.
Question. Then to call for the use of that material in four or six months was
to call for an impossibility 1
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Answer. Well, oak cannot be seasoned in less than three years.
Question. Then the contracts called for an impossibility in that particular 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Within what time was it possible for you to have finished this
vessel. provided there had been no alteration in the original plans 1
Answer. Well, I think it would take a year to complete these vessels. They
were much more difficult than any one had any idea of when they commenced
them.
Question. In what time did you think it was possible to complete the Nauset
when you commenced her 1
Answer. I thought I could complete her within the time specified in the
contract.
Question. What was the time mentioned in your contract 1
Answer. It was eight months.
Question. The Nanset is being built up twenty-two inches, is she not 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Will you tell us for what purpose that vessel will be efficient when
she is completed 1
Answer. Well, I think she will be as efficient a vessel as any of the monitors
that have been built before. I think she will have more strength. Her
longitudinal strength will be far superior to that of the first monitors.
Question. Would this vessel be an efficient vessel if an attack was to be
made upon the ports in Charleston harbor 1
Answer. I think a vessel of that class would be a very efficient vessel.
There is so little surface above the water that I think the invention is a very
valuable one. They are difficult to hit, and they might fire and do great
execution, and receive very little damage. r:l'hey might get an unlucky shot,
and sink; but I think the chances are very much in their favor.
Question. Would such a monitor be efficient in an attack upon Wilmington 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I think she is just the vessel they want. I .think she
would be of great value to the government, and as many more like her as they
could get there.
Question. Was any price agreed upon for the alterations that were made in
this vessel as she progressed from time to time, until the proposed alteration,
whereby you are to raise her up twenty-two inches 1
Answer. No, sir; except that in some cases Mr. Stimers requested me to
make an estimate of the cost, which I did, and he signified his acceptance.
Question. vVhat was the original contract price 1
Answer. $386,000. They were all on the same scale, the whole twenty.
Question. Did you have any communication with any of the department,
except Mr. Stimers, in relation to the alterations that were made 1
Answer. No, sir; I have never had any communication with the department,
or the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Steam Engineering, at Washington,
on the subject.
Question. Since making the contract, which you say was made with the departmeu t, or somebody representing the department, have you made any contract
or agreement with anybody, except Mr. Stimers, in relation to the Nauset 1
Answer. No, sir; not until I commenced the alteration of raising her twentytwo inches; when I made agreements with and received orders from Admiral
Gregory and Chief Engineer Wood.
Question. What is the amount of the alterations, exclusive of the last one
proposed-the building up of the sides 1
Answer. I have never made any calculation.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. You feel you have a claim against the government 1
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Answer. Oh, yes; I have got several thousand dollars, which have already
been granted by Mr. Stimers from time to time.
By :Mr. Gooch:
Question. You have seen the Chimo 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Would she have been of any service without the alterations 1
Answer. No; I think she drew too much water-that is, with all her equipments on board.
Question. In your judgment, could these vessels have been so altered as to
have retained their turrets, and yet been so lightened as to have made them
serviceable 1
Answer. That I have not calculated. It would involve questions for engineers to decide, and engineers differ in respect to it.
Question. Will you state to the committee just how far these boats will be
trustworthy at sea after they have been built up twenty-two inches 1
Answer. Well, I think they will be full as trustworthy as any monitor that
has been built (except the Monadnock and Dictator class) since the commencement of the war. I have seen almost all of them, and I think these will be full
as good and safe boats in every respect.
Question. How far do you consider that the monitors are trustworthy 1
Answer. I think they were never intended for sea-going vessels. A seagoing vessel is a vessel that can visit a foreign coast; that can, as Englishmen
say, "coast round Cape Horn;" but I don't think any of these vessels are fit
to go to sea. They are fit to go up and down our American coast, in the care
of good pilots, and go from port to port, as they have done. I think that is
the design of this class of monitors ; and the usefulness they will be to the
country will be in defending our harbors and coast. I think that, after these
vessels are built up, they will be fully as good as those down at Charleston,
and stronger.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. You speak of their strength-you mean of the wood-work, not of
the armor 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I mean altogether.
Question. What was the thickness of the armor of the original monitor 1
Answer. I have understood that it was five one-inch plates.
Question. Will you state the difference between this class of monitors and
those now in use 1
Answer. Well, the other monitors have not near the amount of wood backing
that theRe have. I consider these vessels more efficient in every respect than
the first class of monitors-better sea-boats, better for war purposes, heavier
built, better constructed, and more costly vessels.
Question. And yet they were to be of lighter draught 1
Answer. They were to be, in the first place, of lighter draught.
Question. If you had been called upon to design an iron-clad monitor, which
was to draw as much water as these will when completed, should you have
built her on the same model that these are being built 1
Answer. Well, similar to that. I might have made them a little shorter and
a little wider, but I should have had to make them about the same shape. To
get that draught, you have got to make something very nearly resembling a
box. It is very difficult to get a vessel of that draught to carry that armament. There are over five hundred tons of iron in one of these vessels.
Question. What do you estimate the speed of the Nanset will be when she
is completed 1
Answer. I consider that it will be six knots in smooth water.
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Question. What alteration have you made in the overhang 1
Answer. We have reduced its weight, and have raised the whole work,
allowing the water to have free course to pass from the propeller. V\r e have
made a great improvement upon the overhang.
Question. What has been the effect of that alteration 1
Answer. It has never been tried.
Question. What do you estimate will be the advantage from the alteration of
the overhang 1
Answer. I think it will increase the speed a knot and a half.
Question. Is the overhang now as small as it can be, and still protect the
rudder 1
Answer. Yes, sir. Men of experience consider that the rudder must be protected. I consider it as very essential to protect the rudder; but there are a
good many who think that the rudder may be entirely bare. I am not of that
opinion.
Question. In your opinion, is it a practicable thing to build an iron-clad seagoing monitor if no limitation is made as to draught 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I can build one that will be sea-going. They have built
them in England, and we can build them here. Tlley have built them for
Russia, for the Spanish government, and for the Germans, to be used in the
Danish war.
Question. How far have they been tested 1
Answer. Very satisfactorily.
Question. Are they similar to ours 1
Answer. I think they are copies,fac similes, of Ericsson's first monitors in
the turret arrangement, and very nearly so in the hull, and they have been
very efficient.
Question. Do you know the size of those English monitors 1
Answer. They arA vessels of some 1,500 or 1,600 tons, some of them carrying two turrets. 'rhese vessels could be constructed so that there would be no
danger in going across the Atlantic. I should have no hesitation in crossing
the Atlantic in the Monadnock. She could go across as safely as an English
steamer. I consider these vessels of the lVIonadnock class the finest ever built
for sea-going and war purposes. I think they could not possibly be better for
that class of vessels.
Q.uestion. For what purpose could these light-draught monitors be used that
the Monadnock could not be 1
Answer. The Monadnock draws about twelve feet of water. It is a very
important thing to get a vessel drawing only seven and a half or eight feet.
You can choose your point, and if you find the enemy are getting too much for
you, you can run into shoal water and get out of the way.

By Mr. Odell :
Question. What do you estimate the cost of the N anset will be, after she
shall have been completed under the plans you are now at work upon 1
Answer. The cost will be somewhere between five""and six hundred thousand
dollars, when completed for sea--much less than I would build one for now.
Question. You state that your original contract was for $386,000, and that,
by a subsequent contract, you are to have $86,000 for raising the sides twentytwo inches, and that you have a claim in addition to these two amounts 1
Answer. Yes, sir; we have a claim for alterations made from time to time.
Questions. And for these alterations no specified price was agreed upon 1
Answer. No, sir; they were ordered without stipulation in regard to cost,
except in a few instances
Q!.1estion. How are you going to adjust these accounts 1
Answer. We sPnd in our bills for a certain piece of work; for instance, add-
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ing· the ring to the turret ; setting forth that we have done so and so, giving the
weight of the iron, and our opinion that it is worth so much. In almost all
cases they have cut it down. We have not settled yet; but I have been told
that every man who has settled has settled without a dollar of profit.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. The original plan of these monitors contemplated the introduction
of water compartments, for the purpose of sinking the vessel down when necessary?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. 'l'hat apparatus has been abandoned in the improved monitors 1
Answer. Yes, sir, the pipes have been taken out. I consider that these vessels, if built according to the present plans and orders, will be good vessels,
and valuable to the country. At least, mine will be. I cannot vouch for the
others further than that I have seen a good many, and have observed that
the work was well and substantially done.

B. F. LEONARD sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. \Vill you state your place of residence and occupation 1
Answer. My place of residence is Carver, Massachusetts; my occupation
has been that of machinist and engine-builder previous to inspecting. I commenced my inspecting duties in iron-clads the 1st of June, 1863.
Question. By whom were you employed for that purpose 1
Answer. Mr. Stimers employed me.
Question. Had you known Mr. Stimers prior to that time 1
Answer. I had not.
Question. How happened you to be employed for that purpose?
Answer. I was recommended to Mr. Stimers by an acquaintance of mine,
Mr. Murdock, formerly employed in the Bureau of Engineering at Washington.
Question. What vessels have you inspected 1
Answer. None but the Suncook, one of the light-draught iron-clad monitors,
now being built by the Globe works at South Boston.
Question. Will you give us all the information you have in relation to these
iron-clad monitors 1
.Answer. My instructions have been received from Mr. Stimers until this
last alteration was ordered, and since then from Chief Engineer Wood. 'I'he
keel of the Suncook was partly laid when I commenced inspection, and I found
some iron which was not as thick as required by the specifications, and had
that removed and other iron put in its place ; and from that time I believe the
work has been done according to the contract and specifications. As regards
the efficiency of the vessel when finished, I am of opinion that it will not
answer the purpose it was intended for on account of drawing too much water.
Question. How far is the Suncook advanced 1
Answer. vVell, the deck is very nearly on, and her sides plated, with the
exception of riveting· up inside the hull, and a little of the vertical cross-floors.
The contract proposes launching the 15th of next month.
Question. Can you describe the alterations which were made from the original
plans and specifications, as she has progressed from stage to stage 1
Answer. I cannot. The alterations are such as Mr. Hoyt described. We
have had three general plaus. 'I'he last is the one where the vertical crossfloors are described, the ring round the turret, the increased thickness of the
pilot-house, and also the addition of the vacuum engine and the condenser.
Question. Do you know what it is estimated the Suncook will draw after
the alterations are made 1
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Answer. No, sir; I have never seen any estimates.
Question. Do you know what it is estimated her speed will be?
Answer. I never have seen any estimates of her speed.
Question. Had you ever had any connexion with, or knowledge of, wooden
or iron-clad vessels before you were appointed inspector 1
Answer. No, sir; I had never been employed in the construction of any.
Question. Had you any knowledge of, or had you ever been employed in
oonnexion with marine engines 1
Answer. No, sir. I had been engaged a number of years in building stationary engines, and I also had a knowledge of the materials used in shipbuilding, such as iron. I have built rolling-mills, and the machinery for rollingmills, and I consider that I am a judge of iron and of the materials of which
ships are constructed.
(,J,uestion. But you had no particular knowledge of ship-building or of marine
engines until since your appointment to your present office 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Has there been any other inspection of the Suncook except that
made by you since your appointment 1
Answer. No, sir, except an inspection of the boilers by a committee chosen
for that purpose.

FRIDAY, December 23.
Re.ar-Admiral SILAS H. STRINGHAM sworn and examined.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. What is your position in the navy of the United States 1
Answer. I am rear-admiral on the retired list of the navy of the United
States.
Question. And stationed where 1
Answer. In command of the station and navy yard at Boston.
Question. How long have you followed the seas 1
Answer. J!'~ifty-four years last June.
Question. \Vhat knowledge have you of the light-draught monitors, twenty of
which were ordered to be built by the government 1
Answer. I have very little knowledge except as they have been turned over
to me to assist in fitting them out at the navy yard.
Question. Have you seen any of them after· they were launched 1
Answer. I have seen the Casco and the Ohimo at the navy yard.
Question. Did you examine them enough to form au opinion as to their usefulness as vessels-of-war ?
Answer. Well, I must say I did not give them a critical examination. They
were not under my charge at all, except to assist in fitting them out; and an
older officer being responsible for them, I did not give them a critical examinatioo.
Question. Was the turret on either of these vessels when you saw it 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. It had been taken off?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What useful purpose could such a thing be applied to with the
turret taken off?
Answer. I must say that I don't know exactly to what use they could be
applied to be serviceable. With a big gun on deck they might lay off at a dis-
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tance and bombard an enemy; but I should think a small wooden vessel, a
bomb-boat, or a schooner, would be equally serviceable.
Question. What do you think of their seaworthiness in that eondition 1
Answer. They might make the passage from one port to another in that CDndition; but if they were to undertake to go to sea without another vessel to
take care of them, it would be very dangerous. r.rhey would not be seagoing
vessels.
Question. Did you hear what their speed was 1
Answer. I heard that the speed of the Chimo, before the turret was taken off,
was three or four knots.
Question. Would that be sufficient power to enable them to ascend our
rivers 1
Answer. In some cases it would, and in others it would not. Some of our
rivers average thrP;e and a half knots an hour. With a strong breeze against
them, although they would not hold much wind, they would not make any
speed against it; they might just hold their way.
Question. Would they be useful, in your judgment, rigged up as torpedo
boats 1
Answer. From what I have heard I think they might be so. Showing but
very little surface on the water, they might, in the night, go into places where
they would not be discovered.
Question. Would they answer that purpose as well as smaller wooden cr.aft
built for the purpose 1
Answer. I think the wooden craft would have more speed, and be better
adapted to that purpose.
Question. What would be the effect on their usefulness in shoal water and in
our rivers if the sides were built up 22 inches, and the draught increased a foot.1
Answer. If the deck was raised as well as the sides, I don't think it would
be much of an improvement, except that it would give better accommodations
to the men.
Question. Would it add much to their usefulness 1
Answer. I think not. My opinion, however, cannot be considered a very
strong opinion, because I have not, as I said before, examined them critically.
Question. Would vessels that draw morP, than six and a half feet of water be
very useful about the shoals of southern ports and in southern rivers 1
Answer. Not in North Carolina ports and those waters, and I have no doubt
these were intended for that purpose. You cannot build an iron-clad to have
only that draught; their weight must take them down.

SATURDAY, December 24, 1864.
IsAAC NEWTON sworn and examined.
By Mr. Wade:
Question. What position do you bold in the navy 1
Answer. }.,irst assistant engineer.
Question. Where are you stationed 1
Answer. I have been here in Boston for four or five months superintending
the alterations on the Casco and the Chimo.
Question. How long have you acted as an engineer 1
Answer. Well, I should say about ten years. I entered the navy June 14,
1861, as first assistant engineer.
Question. What information have you in regard to the light-draught monitors
so called, twenty of which were ordered by the gov-ernment 1
Answer. My acquaintance with the monitors commenced with the first vessel
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of that class; I assisted in superintending her construction, and was chief engineer of her for about five months.
Question. Were you with her when she had her encounter with the Merrimac1
Answer. Yes, I was connected with her shortly after her keel was laid; was
with her on the James river during McClellan's campaign, and after that) was
detached and ordered to report to Rear-Admiral Gregory at New York.
Question. What do you know about the construction of the light-draught
monitor called the Chimo 1
Answer. She is one of the twenty ordered by the government in 1863.
Question. Who modelled and designed her 1
Answer. Mr. Simers.
Question. Did Mr. Ericsson have anything to do with it 1
Answer. I should say not. Of course the turret, and the machinery that.
appertains to the turret, are his.
Question. Yes; but I will ask you who is responsible for the draught and
build of that vessel ?
Answer. Mr. Striners.
Question. Did you have a knowledge of the progress of the work as it went
on 1
Answer. As much as I could, being at headquarters, where all the correspondence with the contractors was carried on, and where all the drawings were
made. I had general charge of the drawingd at the office in New York.
Question. Was the plan altered from time to time as the work progressed 1
Answer. I do not think the model was altered; the details, that did not
affect the total weight very much, were.
Question. But they did affect the expense 1
Answer. There were several things found to be necessary during the fights
in Charleston harbor, which were ordered to be put on these vessels in common with all other monitors ; for instance, a base ring was found necessary at
the bottom of the turret, and some additions of weight were made in that way.
Question. Can you give any idea of the expense of these deviations from
the original plan 1
Answer. No, I cannot tell you that exactly; I could ascertain it by reference
to papers ; but it would be a mere guess if I undertook to give it now.
Question. What do you say, as an engineer and a gentleman skilled in shipbuilding, to the draught and build of these monitors for the purpose designedthat is, for shallow water 1
Answer. If there had been no mistake made in the draught of water they
would have been efficient for that-in still water.
Question. What mistake was made in the draught, in your judgment 1
Answer. I think there was a mistake of about ten inches.
Question. Please explain that.
Answer. They were too deAp in the water. A great trouble was that they
trim about one foot by the stern. This latter is not a very unusual mistake
in ship-building. In an engineering point of view this error in the trim is no
greater than, if as great as, was made in balancing the weights with the displacement on the two-turreted wooden monitor Monadnock. In this case, as
the constructor had the free disposal of the principal weights, there was no
difficulty in adjusting them equally with the displacement. In single-turreted
vessels, the steam machinery being in one end, and the quarters for officers and
men in the other, it ·is a very difficult matter to trim them without the use of
ballast in the forward part. There is no objection, however, in this, if provision
is made for it in the design.
Question. How happened that 1
Part IV--4
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Answer. Because there was more weight aft of the centre of gravity of the
displacement than before it, and from an under-estimate of weights.
Question. Was it difficult for a competent draughtsman to construct her so that
she would not draw more than six and a half feet of water 1
Answer. It is not difficult for a competent draughtsman to ascertain displacement; but to arrive at the weight he should not take the results of his calculations,
but leave a margin, unless he is going to build her himself, and can have he!' under
his own eyes, and weigh everything.
Question. I speak of cases where it is essential to have the vessel of a particular draught. Would it not be necessary that some particular pains should be
taken to ascertaip. the weight 1
Answer. The draughtsman should calculate the weights, and then add a margin
to that. I should say that would be the only safe way.
Question. What margin should you say it would be proper to add?
Answer. That is a very difficult question to answer. I should say ten per
cent. at least.
Question. Did I understand you to say that a mistake of ten inches was made
in the draught 1
Answer. I think about ten inches. One of the great troubles was that
they trimmed badly; they were by the stern. If they had been on an even keel
it would not have been so bad, but I think they would have been too far down
even then.
Question. Was this same mistake made in regard to the whole twenty 1
Answer. They were all supposed to be identical. They were all built from
tracings taken from the same drawings and from the same specifications.
Question. Did you see the Ohimo after she was launched 1
Answer. Yes; I saw her after she was completed.
Question. Well, what was her appearance when she was launched 1
Answer. I did not see her when she was launched. When I saw her and
took charge of her she was finished-had her turret, guns, and everything on.
Question. What induced them to take the turret off?
Answer. She could not carry it. However, that was an after consideration,
I think. The immediate cause was that some high officer in the navy required
some of them for special service without turrets.
Question. You say she could not have carried her turret 1
Answer. I do not think she could have carrifld her turret. It would have
been an evenly balanced thing whether or no she could. It would have been
necessary to take one of her boilers out, and make radical changes to dispense
with weight.
Question. In your judgment was she good for anything as a war vessel when
she was finished 1
Answer. She was too deep; she would not have been a very efficient war
vessel.
Question. What could she do 1 .
Answer. Well, if another vessel came up close to her, she could fire at her;
she could not go after her, without her opponent's speed was very slow.
Question. You say she could not carry her turret 1
Answer. In smooth water I think she could have carried it.
Q,uestion. Would it have been safe to take her from harbor to harbor 1
Answer. I should say no-decidedly not.
Question. Without her turret she would be no better than a wooden vessel,
would she?
Answer. If they wanted her for a torpedo boat or a reconnoitring ves3el she
would be better, because she could go up and let the enemy shoot while the·
reconnoissance;was being made.
Question. What was the speed of the Ohimo on her trial trip'?
II
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Answer. I understood it was from three and a half to four knots.
Question. Would that give her sufficient power to ascend our rivers 7
Answer. Of course, if there was no great current in the river, she could go
up.
Question. Against tide-water in our harbors would she make any speed 7 '
Answer. She would just about bold her own in that respect.
Question. Is there any rule by which ship-builders ascertain the amount of
water a vessel will displace 7
Answer. Certainly ; that is necessary in building any ship. That is ascertained by calculating the capacity of the immersed portions of the vessel.
Question. Is it difficult to ascertain, within two or three inches, what a ship
will draw if she is to be built for a certain service 1
Answer. I should say it was, decidedly, unless you weigh the materials that
go into tlte vessel.
Question. Provided it is essential to have a particular draught, should not that
pains be taken 1
Answer. If you allow a sufficient margin, I should say not. If you add a
certain margin to the specific gravity of the materials, as laid down in the tables,
your vessel will draw less rather than more.
Question. Do you know whether or not any alteration was made in the build
of these vessels 1
Answer. I should think not.
Question. Some of these vessels have been built up on the sides twenty-two
inches, have they not 7
Answer. Yes; fifteen of them.
Question. What will be the effect of that on them 7
Answer. It will make them much better boats.
Question. What will they be good for when they are built up in that way 7
Answer. They will be good for operations on rivers and in other watersAlbrmarle sound, for instance; they will be better boats than before.
Question. They will draw quite as much water, if not more 7
Answer. Of courRe they will draw more, because more weight has been added;
but they will still be very light-draught iron-clads.
Question. Well, if their object was to ascend rivers, would they be useful
boats as a general thing; wouldn't they draw too much water?
Answer. That is a very light draught, considering the impregnability and battery
of the ships and their strength.
Question. You mean for sea-going boats 7
Answer. They are not what I call sea-going boats. I think they can be
taken down our coast with safety, watching times. You perceive a great deal
has been added to their strength by raising the sides, and they are more comfortable.
Question. But for the purpose for which they were originally designed-that
is, to draw not more than six ,and a half feet of water, and for service on rivers
and shoals-they would not be useful?
Answer. Their usefulness would only be impaired as much as the additional
one foot adds to their draught.
·
QueRtion. What is the thicknesii of the armor on these vessels 7
Answer. On the sides three inches, and the backing, I think, is very thickit must be four feet thick. They are very hard things to shoot through, even
with their three-inch armor on.
Question. What was the thickness of the original monitor 7
Answer. l!'ive inches, with a backing of three feet of white oak.
Question. Would this armor, the light draught, be heavy.enough to withstand
the heaviest artillery 7
Answer. I should say not the heaviest, but such as, at the time they were
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planned, they would be likely to meet in rivers, and suc.h calibre as they would
be likely to meet now. They would not stand 15-inch guns, nor, probably,
11-inch, at close quarters, with a heavy charge; but they would stand temporary
batteries thrown up on rivers, &c.
~uestion. As an engineer, would it be difficult for you to construct a vessel,
with the armament and impregnability contemplated in these light-draught
monitor~, that would not draw more than six and a half feet of water 1
Answer. I should say, with my present experience, I could readily do so, but
at the time these were proposed I could not, because I knew nothing about them.
It was a problem never before attempted.

By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Describe particularly the service which the fifteen light-draught monitors, now being built up, will be able to perform.
Answer. 'J.1hey will be able to hold and defend a great. part of our inland
waters.
Question. What, in your opinion, will be the maximum and service speed 1
Answer. The speed will depend upon the depth of water which they navigate.
The speed will be eight miles; the maximum a little more.
Question. Did Engineer Stimers accompany the original Monitor on her
trip to Hampton roads, and wae he on board during the fight with the Merrimac; and if so, what part did he perform during the engagement 1
Answer. He did accompany the original Monitor; he was on board during
the e11gagement; he operated the turret in a very efficient manner, and at the
same time encouraged the gunners, and thereby, no doubt, promoted the energetic and effective service of the guns.
Question. How many different classes of monitors have been constructed by
the government since the original Monitor, and what is the difference and function
of each class 1
Answer. The Passaic class, the Oanonicus class, the Monadnock and Miantonomah class, the Dictator and Puritan class, the Kalamazoo class, now in
process of construction, and the light-draughts, besides some river monitors
built out west, like the Chickasaw and Winnebago, which proYed so efficient at
the battle of Mobile bay.
The Passaic and Canonicus classes have iron hulls and single turrets; the midship
section of these is nearly the same, except that the latter have less wooden
backing and much thicker armor; they also have thicker deck plating; they
have finer r::w dels and much more steam power; they are also provided with a
different anchor arrangement. The Monadnock and Miantonomah classes are
for all practical purposes identical; they have two turrets, wooden hulls, two
propellers; the iron armor is the same as the Passaic class, but the deck plating is
heavier. 'J.1hese classes are of moderate draught of water, are very manageable, have proved themselves to be capable of enduring heavy weather, and are
peculiarly adapted for harbor defence, and operations against the rebels.
The efficient service of the Passaic class in the South Atlantic squadron is
now a matter of history.
The Dictator and Puritan class are relatively large vessels; have very fine
models, immense steam power, by far the heaviest armor ever put afloat ; they
will have very high speed, and can handle their guns where probably no English
iron-clad could fire a gun, at least with any accuracy. From their greater speed
they are fitted for marine offensive operations against the iron-clads of a naval
enemy ; they can stand any weather without discomfort. The Kalamazoo
class are adapted for the same work as that just mentioned; they have two turrets,
and armor even thic~r; their hulls are of wood, built in the strongest manner.
Question. Who planned these different classes of monitors 1
Answer. The original Monitor~ Passaic, Dictator, and Puritan classes were
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planned by Ericsson's own hand, and built accordingly. The Canonicus class
and lig·ht-draughts Ericsson furnished a general plan, which was modified and,
in the case of light-draughttt, radically changed by Chief Engineer Stimers. The
hulls of the wooden monitors were planned by the naval constructors ; those for
the Kalamazoo class by Mr. Delano. The turrets and all appurtenances to
them, the pilot-house, steering gear, wrought-iron gun-carriages, and friction gearport stoppers, &c., were made from Ericsson's drawings.
Question. Who was the general inspector of each of these classes of monitors?
Answer. Of the iron vessels and the turrets of the wooden ones Mr. Stimers,
until he was detached from that duty.
Question. What duty have you performed since you left the Monitor 1
Answer. Superintended a great part of the planning, examined the execution
of the work to a considerable extent, instructed contractors, carried on correspondence, examined bills and accounts and similar office work, besides, on several
occasions, accompanying the monitors down the coast.
Qnestion. Are you sure Captain Ericsson had no part in planning the lightdraught monitors 1
Answer. With the exception of the turrets, nothing has been made to his
drawings.
Question. Do you know if Mr. Stimers had consultations with Captain Ericsson in relation to the light-draught monitors 1
Answer. I know he called at his office several times.
Question. Do you know whether there was a rupture between Captain Ericsson and. Mr. Stimers; and if so, what was its cause, and at what time did it
occur 1
Answer. There was a rupture, and it was occasioned by the manner in which
Mr. Stimers tested the friction gear of the Canonicus, and it occurred last winter.
Question. Do you know what instructions Mr. Stimers received from the
Navy Department in relation to the light-draught monitors 1
Answer. I do not kuow what instructions he received.
Question. When was Mr. Stimers removed from his position as general inspector, and why was he removed 1
Answer. Last June; the order which removed him did not give the reason;
therefore I cannot state why.
Question. You were chief engineer of the original Monitor during her engagement with the Merrimac; will you state your opinion why that battle, decisive
as it was, was not more so 1
Answer. It was due to the fact that the power and endurance of the 11-inch
Dahlgren guns, with which she was armed, were not known at the time of the
battle; hence the commander would scarcely have been justified in increasing
the charge of powder above that authorized in the Ordnance Manual.
Subsequent experiments developed the important fact that these guns could
be fired with thirty pounds of cannon powder with solid shot. If this had been
known at the time of the action, I am clearly of opinion that, from the close
quarters at which Lieutenant Worden fought his vessel, the enemy would have
been forced to surrender.
Furthermore, I think that if our gallant commander had not been severely
injured by a shot or shell, fired but a very few yards off, and which struck the sight
aperture in the pilot-house through which he was looking, we would have stood
a very good chance of "badgeriug" her to a surrender, as our shots, striking
near the water-line, had already made her leak seriously. The leaking-so it
has been stated in rebel sources-was aggravated by her futile attempt at ramming the Monitor.
It will, of course, be admitted by every one that if but a single 15-inch gun
could possibly have been mounted within the Monitor's turret (it was planned
to carry the heaviest ordnance) the action would have been as short and decisive
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as the combat between the monitor Weehawken, Captain John Rodgers, and the
rebel iron-clad Atlanta, which, in several respects, was superior to the Merrimac.
I think, also, that this very decisive result would have been obtained if the
12-inch wrought-iron gun at the New York navy yard had been in the Monitor's
turret and fired with respectable charges. This gun has been fired with two
224-pound shot with forty-five pounds of powder.
Question. Have you watched the career of the iron-clads during the present
WM?

.

Answer. I have done so, attentively.
Question. With what result?
Answer. It has firmly riveted my conviction from the beginning that the
monitor system of iron-clads is a complete and positive solution of the great
naval question of the clay.
Question. What do you consider the special function of iron-clad vessels 1
Answer. To protect our harbors from the attack of foreign fleets, to fight
foreign iron-clads, and for such operations against the rebels as the exigencies
of the war require. It has been admitted by the British defence commission,
and other high authorities, that no forts, of any description, can prevent the
passage of a fleet of steamships through an unobstructed channel. I think
General Barnard expresses the same opinion in his Dangers and Defences of
New York. The experience of the present war certainly corroborates this view
of the case. The enemy's iron-clads must be met by iron-clads.
A further consideration of this question also suggests that we should have
three classes of iron-clads: 1st, Dictators and Kalamazoos, to catch swift foreign
iron-clads ; 2d, Passaics and Oanonicuses, as heavily armed as the former, but
only fast enough to navigate the coast; 3d, light-draughts, to hold and defend
our rivers, &c. Of course the 3d class cannot be as impregnable as the other
two. The 2d class we must have, to defend our harbors.
Question. Are you familiar with the experiments which have been carried on
at Shoeburyness, England, with guns against armor 1
Answer. Yes, as much as one on this side of the Atlantic can be. These
experiments have been very extensive, but at the same time of quite a de::mltory
character, as may be instanced by the fact that Whitworth, a long time since,
penetrated a Warrior target with a fiat-headed steel shot, but it was a very long
. time before the ordnance authorities found out that the efficiency of the projectile
itself was not in the fiat front, but in the material of which it was made.
Question. As an engineer, what bearing, in your mind, have these experiments on the iron-clad question 1
Answer. To condemn broadside iron-clads for general naval purposes.
Question. Why 1
Answer. Without going into any of their other deficiencies, I will simply
state that, from the nature of the case, it is impossible to build them of any
practicable and manageable size which can sustain armor of the thickness required
to keep out Bhot from modern ordnance now in service. The English iron-plate
committee have, I believe, virtually reported this.
Question. Are you familiar with what bas been done in England in constructing powerful ordnance for iron-clad warfare 1
Answer. Yes ; it bas been chiefly in fabricating wrought-iron guns on what
is termed the Armstrong coil system, which consists in shrinking successive
cylinders, made of long bars of iron coiled spirally and welded over each other.
Question. How will our ordnance designed for the same service compare with
theirs 1
Answer. English ordnance for this duty is still in the experimental stage ; no
guns which will compare with ours have been introduced into service. We
have plenty of 15-inch guns, mounted and used in turrets in battle, which are
permitted by the Ordnance Manual to be fired with sixty pounds of powder and
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solid shot against iron-clads; no broadside iron-clad yet designed can resist this
gun. The only gun in England proposed for service, which will compare with
it for this purpose, is the experimental 13~-inch Armstrong, which is not yet,
I believe, regarded as a success. Mr. Fox, I believe, insisted on the introduction
of the 15-inch; without it our turrets would be toQthless. My present standard
of perfection for a gun for iron-clad warfare is a piece of 15-inch calibre, with
strength sufficient to stand with safety one hundred pounds of cannon powder
and a solid spherical shot of steel. I consider an impregnable vessel, with
the speed of about fourteen knots, mounting one or two such guns, capable of
being trained to any point of the horizon-in other words, mounted on a swift
monitor-to be a match for the whole iron-clad fleet of England, for they must
either get out of the way or be sunk se1·iatim.
Question. You have stated that the monitor system solves the problem, &c.
Will you state your reasons for this opinion ?
Answer. It is the system which permits of the maximum thickness with the
minimum capacity ofvessel; not only are the guns protected, but the hull from
one end to the other is covered with armor, and the propeller and rudder are
also completely protected. It permits of the use and perfect control of the
heaviest ordnance which can be fabricated. It is the only system which is alike
applicable to light-draught vessels for service in shoal water, as well as the very
largest class with very heavy armor and armament.
Question. Are you familiar with the construction, impregnability, aud ordnance power of the heavy turret iron-clads built and building by the government 1
Answer. I am.
Question. In your opinion, as engines of war, how do they compare with the
iron-clads built and building in England?
An~wer. With the exception of two or three badly designed turret ships the
English have simply rung the changes on broadside iron-clads. They are now
convinced that the plan at first adopted of merely protecting the central portion
of the vessel and the water· line is erroneous. 'rhe Warrior, according to the
London Mec.hanics' Magazine, is now to be lengthened in three places, so that she
can carry armor over the entire length. I should think this was a virtual condemnation of the new semi-protected iron-clads of Mr. Reed, the chief constructor
of the navy, from which so much was expected. 'rhey cannot carry armor of
the whole length. Cceteris paribus, the area to be covered with armor varies
as the square, while the displacement or the capacity to carry it varies as the
cube of the lineal dimensions; hence the necessity for very large iron-clads built
on the English plans.
The following is a list of the iron-clads built and building for the English
navy:

Ot
ALL VESSELS BUILT AND BUILDING.

0:

~

~

Names of vessels.

.....0

...,;

co

Cll

§
0

E"

Q)

ij,_;

t

oOJ
_..,+>

~

'§,
§
~

~
~

~

~

00
S...,;

~00

'al

§

"dco

§a>

"d~

00~

..... o

~

....

Q)

~~

0

~~

o.c

""'o
O,a

z0

~

"'a
......,..

.: 00

o"d
~2

~ra

0~
"' Cll

~2:

ti,o:J

,_;

t>D

s:l

~cO

.c

~
.!<1

OJ

CUPOLA.

~
.....
0

~

~

'0.,..

g

.....0

~
.....

'"
0

~

~

;:::1

1;3

=

8

~

~E" ~P=l

~
~

.....
0

t>D

~
A

~

...~

~

~

0

.s

"d

~

~
~

il
§

~.,..
"d
rL2
.=l
~
-.,-.---.,.----------l-b____l_b---.,-.-·-.--.--._______ ,___- ~ ~-- - - - - - - . , - . s:l

~

Jt.

Q)

P=l

zn.

Jt.

~

380 o

58 4

20

Black Prince ...•.....

6,109

380 0

58

20 0

Resistance .......•....

3, 710

280 0

54 1

Defence
Hector.
Valiant ............. ..
Royal Oak ........... .
Prince Consort .•..... _
Caledonia.
Ocean ________ ....... _
Royal Alfred ......... .
Zealous._
Achilles.
Minotaur ...... _..... .
Northumberland .... ..
Agincourt ........... _
Favorite_ ...•. _...... _
Research ............ .
Enterprise ......... ..
Royal Sovereign ..... .
Prince Albert. ...... ..
Lord Warden_ ....... .
Lord Clyde_ .......• ..
Bellerophon .•........
Pallas

3, 720

280
280
280
273
273
273
273
273
252
380
400
400
400
225
195
180
240
240
280
280
300
225

54 2
56 5

4

~

s.

o

6,109

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0

0

zn.

Warrior .•.•........•.

4, 089
4, 063
4, 056
4, 045
4,125
4, 047
4, 045
3, 716
6, 079
6, 621
6, 62l
6, 621
2,186
1, 253
990
3, 963
2, 529
4, 067
4, 067
4, 246
2, 372

~
.....

+>

SIDE ARMOR AND CASEMATE.

ipo4

~
.110
40

26

26 9

lp14

no~
40

26

18 2124 10

18 2
18 7
18 7
58 6
18 10
58 5
18 7
59 2
18 7
58 5
18 7
58 5
18 10
18 0
58 7
58 3} 20 2
59 3t 20 2
59 3t 20 2
593t202
46 9
14 1
38 6
12 0
12 5
36 0
62 ot
9 7
48 0
8 6
58 9
18 9
58 9
18 9
15 6
56 0
15 o
50 0

I

24
24
24
24
25
25
25
25
25
26
25
25
25
20
14
14
22
20
25
25
23
21

11
8
8
7t

lot
lOt
lOt

7t

3
3t
8
8
8
5
0
4
11
0
3
3
6

o

5,

6

110

6

110

10
10
11
11
n
n
11
12
12
12
12
12
10
2
4

110
110
110
110
110
110
no
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110

s:l

~

s.

26 3t

s

"d

68

68
68 ~
po
~ 2
32
68 {
po
t 2
32 5
24
68
24
68
24
68
24
68
24
68
24
68
24
68
8
68
20
68
26
68
26
68
26
68
...... ......
2
68
...... ......

s

:aE" s :aE"

s

.9

.;.:

rL2

.::l

zn.
4t

zn.

zn.

Jt.

zn·

o

18

9-16 ................ tl04

I4

o

5, 471

14. 4

925 nt

213 0

4t

18

9-16 ................ tl04

4 0

5, 774

13. 6

<>
§~6

9t

143 o

4t

1819-16

t70t 1 3 6

2, 424

11.8

24

lOt

143 o

4t

18

216 0
216 0
All .... ..
All.. .. ..
All.. .. ..
AlL. .. ..
All.. .. ..
103 0
213 0
.. - (//) .. ..
.. - (1/) ... .
... (1/)- .. .
66 3
34 9
34 0

4t

4t

4t
4t
4t

4t
4t
4t

ti

5t

~
~

4t
4t

#

J _..... _.....

6

90 3
39 2

~

#
4t

4t

zn.

co

~""

zn.

.(tt) .............. All ..... .

r~g

z0

21.3.

-~;). :(~~::: :::::: :::::: !}t:::::
p~

E"

Jt.

4t

36

~

9-16

18 9-16 -... .. .. .. .. .. . .
18 9-16 - . ~. . . • . . . • . . . . .
.............. - . .. .. .. .. ..
.......... _... _.. . . • .. .. ..
.... ...... .... .... .... ....
..........................
..........................
..........................
18 9-16 ................
9 9-16 ................
9 9-16 ........ - ........
9 9-16 . .. . . .. . .. .. .. ..
..........................
. .........................
.. ........................
.... ...... 4 5t 17 lt
18
t 4 5t 17 H

:~~~

;t.

zn.

t70i 3 6
2, 533 I 11.6
24 10
82
4 0 ....................... .
82
4 0 .....•............ -....•
82
4 0
3, 703 12. 5
24
8
92
4 o
4, 234 13. 1
24 8t
92
4 0 ....................... .
92
4 0 ....................... .
82
4 0 ....................... .
82
4 0 ....................... .
t 104
4 0 ..•..................•••
tl04
4 4 ....................... .
tl04
4 4 ....................... .
101
4 6 ....................... .
64 · 28 ....................... .
50
2 0 ...................... ..
45
l 6 ....................... .
82
4 0 ....................... .
72
3 o ....................... .

I

I

·::: ::::::
:::: ::::::::}No 'engine's ordere'd.
10
H .... .... .... ....
I

*Not the tons displacement. t Effective. t Speed attained at the measured mile, in smooth water, with boilers new and free from scale, bottom of vessel clean, and w1th picked coal
and stokers, conditions which cannot obtain in service. §The draught of these vessels exceeded this at the trial. II All except 24 feet at the bow partially protected. ,Y 12 ton guns.
**Armament not. yet decided on. tt 110 or 63 pound rifle guns, probably; 5t·inch thickness armor plate.
·
N. B. The "length" given is in every case the length between perpendiculars. The "draught" is the mean low draught, taking the actual draught of ships completed and equipped,
and the estimated draught for the others. The ''length of the casemated part" is the length of protected battery. The height ont of water is measm·ed at the top of the plank-sheer, and
does not include the hammock berthing. In the Royal Sovereign and Prince Albert it is measured to the top of the deck only, as the bulwarks will be made to turn down.

t-t

1-4

~

~

~
I

t;

~

g;
~

~
~

ts:

z0

1-4

~

~

fiJ

; ,

LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS.

57

Without stating anything further than that they are penetrable from one end
to the other, and carry no ordnance which can penetrate our heavy monitors,
while the monitors have guns which can easily penetrate them, I think the inference is safe that they are no match for our vessels.
Question. Will you state the function of the overhangs, so-called, of the monitors; whether you consider it an element of weakness, and whether any of the
vessels have exhibited signs of weakness in this part; whether it has been improved since the original Monitor, and whether it can be still further improved 1
Answer. The overhang is a projection of the hull, both at the bow and stern.
At the bow it permits of taking in the anchor under fire; at the stern it completely protects those important parts, the propeller and rudder. rrhe armor
also forms a projection on the sides, which prevents the vessels from rolling, and
adds immensely to the longitudinal strength from the peculiar manner it is
attached to the hull proper. As the models have been made somewhat finer,
the stern overhangs have been made smaller since the first Monitor. I do not
believe the overhang of the first Monitor was ruptured. None of tl!e Monitors
which have succeeded her have exhibited any signs of weakness in this part.
I think that no further improvement is essential. The Dictator, Canonicus,
Monadnock, and Kalamazoo classes have only the aft overhang; the armor projection at the sides was partially abandoned in the Canonicus class, and wholly
so in the Monadnock class. I think this to be a mistake; one of the most experienced officers in iron-clads has informed me that the increased rolling is a
serious objection.
Question. Could the Navy Department, on any other than the monitor system,
have constructed an efficient iron-clad fleet 1
Answer. rrhey could not. If broadside iron-clads had been adopted, in order
to compete with those which foreign powers were producing, they must at least
have been their equals in size, &c., for it is easily demonstrable they, the conditions, could not be met with smaller proportions. It would have cost us more
money and three times as much time to have built a Warrior and Black Prince
than it did to construct both the Passaic and Canonicus classes, and they would
have been to us worse than useless vessels. The rapid fire of broadside vessels
is, of course, in many cases, necessary in silencing forts, and, I believe, they
have always been on hand when required during the present war.
Question. What rate of speed have you seen one of the Passaic and Canonicus
classes of monitors attain 1
Answer. I have seen the Montauk, one of the Passaic class, steam but a trifle
short of 82- knots; this was on a trip from New York to Hampton roads. She
was in good trim, her bottom clean, and the steam machinery in good order. I
have seen the Canonicus steam nearly nine knots, but, from the great steam
power of this class, I am clearly of opinion that, with a few not very expensive
or extensive alterations to the motive machinery, about ten knots could be
readily attained.
Question. What is your opinion of the part the monitors performed in the
naval battle in Mobile bay 1
Answer. They certainly performed a very important part at that battle; the
result, without their presence, to say the least, would have been very doubtful.
r.rhe iron-clads consisted of the Manhattan and Tecumseh, of the Canonicus
class, armed with 15-mch guns, and the Chickasaw and Winnebago, light 1\Iississippi monitors. rrhe Tecumseh was sunk by a torpedo, and, therefore, did
not participate in the fight. The iron-clads took a position between the wooden
ships and Fort Morgan, for the purpose of keeping down its fire, as well, I suppose, as to partially protect the wooden vessels by being placed between them
and the fort. When the Tennessee started from under the guns of Fort Morgan,
for the fleet, she paid no attention to the monitors, but to keep out of their way
if anything, but made for the wooden ships. She was severely rammed by the

58

LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS.

heavy wooden vessels striking at high speed, and received their fire with but
trifling injury, while, in return, she inflicted severe injury with her guns. If the_
ram had been equipped with large smooth-bores, throwing spherical shells with
time fuzes, instead of the unreliable rifle shells from the comparatively smallbore rifles with which she was armed, the damage to the wooden vessels would
have been still greater. If Lieutenant Commander Perkins, of the monitor
Chickasaw, who hammered away at the Tennessee's stern at rlose qum·ters, had
been possessed of the Manhattan's turret, with the lf)-inch guns, the Tennessee
could scarcely have held out te11 minutes after he came within iron-clad range.
The loss in killed and wounded in this battle was, I think, 2~9, exclusive of -~
those lost on the Tecumseh; no one was injured on the monitors. I understand
that the rebel officers taken prisoners said that if it had not been for the d-d
monitors they would have sunk every wooden ship in the bay.

AsToR HousE, NEw YoRK, December 28, 1864.
GEORGE

w. HoLLOWAY sworn ana examined.

By the chairman :
Question. Please state your position in the navy of the United States.
Answer. I am acting first assistant engineer in the United States navy. I
am stationed on board the United States steamer Casco, now lying at the navy
yard in Brooklyn.
Question. How long have you been connec.ted with that steamer 1
Answer. Ever since the 21st of October, 1864.
Question. This Casco is what is called a light-draught steamer, one of the
twenty that were ordered to be built 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. By whom was she built 1
Answer. By the Atlantic Works.
Question. What is her draught 1
Answer. I think it is seven feet five inches.
Question. That is when she has her complement on board 1
Answer. No, sir, that was her draught when leaving Boston; we had but
fifty tons of coal on board and nearly all our ordnance.
Question. Were you on board of her from Boston here, acting as engineer?
Answer. Yes, sir.
·
Question. How far was she above the water-line, or out of water, when she
was running 1
Answer. She appeared, when she was under headway, to draw more water at
the stern than she did when her engines were started, or when lying at anchor.
Question. Describe bow she worked on the passage, and what were her seagoing qualities, as you discovered on that voyage.
Answer. She worked very well all the way. We worked the engines moderately, they being new; we worked them up so as not to allow the crank-pin
to beat too much, because we had a steamer in tow, ancl thought there was no
need of running any risk. We run her as fast as we could without heating the
crank-pin.
Question. Was she towed from Boston 1
Answer. She was towed by the steamer Pierson.
Question. What speed does she make by herself 1
Answer. I am not able to say what speed she can make. I have never been
on a trial trip when the log has been held, to know what speed she would make.
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I went down the river, and had a trial trip previous to that, but I never ascertained her speed.
Question. You say her engine worked well; how was it about the power of
the engine 1 Did you put on pretty much all the power without straining the
bottom of the boat 1
Answer. At the trial trip previous to leaving Boston she worked very well at
sixty turns. As soon as we came to run a speed of about sixty-five or seventy
turns there appeared to be a very great deal of vibration in the bottom.
Question. What did you infer from that 1 that the bottom was not stout
enough to bear the power of the engine at high speed 1
Answer. I did not consider that the bottom was stiff enough to run the engine faster than sixty-five turns unless necessity required it.
Question. What speed do yon suppose she would make by such an effort
from the engine as would be safe 1
Answer. I suppose there can be got five knots out of her safely without
doing any injury.
Question. Would she make as much head if she was loaded down, or when
she had more load on, with the same power 1
Answer. I think it would retard the speed. The overhang at the stern appears to form a very strong eddy by being down. She appears to haul a great
deal of tide-water when she is down.
Question. What is that occasioned by 1
Answer. It is occasioned by not having clearance in the overhang-hanging
in the water so much.
Question. Cannot that be remedied 1
Answer. It could be remedied by the vessel being higher out of the water.
Question. Do you consider her a safe boat to navigate from harbor to harbor
along the coast 1
AnRwer. By herself? No, sir. I should not think she was, by my experience.
Question. How is it about leaking on the voyage 1 Did you discover 1
Answer. The leakage appeared to be in the iron work on top. It appears
that there has been no cement put between the layers of the sheets, and the
water runs right through and finds its WftY down into the hold below.
Question. Was she under water so as to occasion that when she came along 1
Answer. YeA, sir, several times.
Question. How was it when you came around Point Judith, where there was
anything of a sea 1 Did it make over Ler 1
Answer. We had no sea that you could call a sea; but what there was appeared to wash right over her, and that is the time she would leak-when she
would be buried in the water.
Question. When she had a full complement of naval stores, fit for sea, she
would lie still deeper in the water, would she not 1
Answer. Yes, sir, certainly.
Question. What would she do on our rivers, or against a strong tide 1
Would she make much headway 1
Answer. You could not get a great deal of speed out of her against a very
heavy current.
Question. I suppose you had nothing to do with her construction 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Nor the alterations of the plans in the course of construction 1
Answer. No, sir.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. You were assigned to her, after she was completed, as working
engineer1
Answer. Yes, sir.
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Question. Have you anything further to state on this subject 1
Answer. There is one other statement. I should consider that she would be
safe to be towed from one harbor to another, provided she was braced properly
in her bottom ; she appears to have no strength at all in her bottom.
Question. Can she go with her own engine without being towed 1 ·
Answer. You could not get speed enough to stem a heavy gale of wind.

CHARLES A. CROOKER sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. Please state the relation you hold to the navy of the United States.
Answer. I am acting master, in command of the steamer Casco. I have been
connected with that steamer since November 22, 1864.
Question. Was she fully completed when you had connexion with her first 1
Answer. She was, as far as the contractors were concerned; the men at the
yard were doing some work on her.
Question. Have you any knowledge of the contract by which she was built 1
Answer. None at all.
Question. You came around with her from Boston to New York 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Describe what you observed with regard to her seaworthiness, and
all you noticed about her.
Answer. In our passage from Boston to New York we had a very smooth
sea nearly the whole of the way, and she was quite buoyant for a vessel of her
kind. In coming around Point Judith, where there was something of a choppernot a heavy sea, a short sea-the water came over her so as to go down her
hatchways, consequently she leaked through the deck considerably; and in
coming into the sound, past little Gull island, it was rugged, and she took seas
over in the same manner and made considerable water. Her hawse-pipes for·
ward are very bad, very leaky, and the leak is there now.
Question. What load did she have on board when you came around 1
Answer. She had when leaving Boston probably 125 tons, including all.
Question. How much more would be on her when fitted for a cruise or voyage,
with a full complement of men, munitions of war on board, provisions, &c.1
Answer. About fifty tons more.
Question. What amount of water did she draw on her way around as she
was then loaded ?
Answer. Seven feet five inches.
Question. How much more would it have sunk her to have hail a full com·
plement on board, as you have just stated 1
Answer. Very little. I have not calculated the displacement of water-say
one and a half or two inches.
Question. How much was she out of water when she was loaded in the way
you brought her around 1
Answer. She was above the water seven inches aft-one foot three and a half
inches midships, and one foot five and a half forward.
Question. Bhe had a turret 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. That had been taken off 1
Answer. It had either been taken off or was never put on. There was no
indication of its having been put on.
Question. She was intended for a turret?
Answer. She was.
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Question. You understood her to be one of the twenty light-draught monitors of the same model1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. So far as you know, were they all alike 1
Answer. So far as I know, they are. There is another one at the yard in
Charlestown-the Chimo.
·
Question. Did you have any trial by which you could satisfy yourself what
speed she would make 1
Answer. Yes, sir. We put into Newport harbor on account of the fog, and
when it cleared away I got under way without the steamer in tow, and going
out on the smooth water with some sixty revolutions, she made, as near as I
could judge, about five or five and a half knots. I did not heave a log, because
we were going only a short distance.
Question. Could she have made her way through the rough water without the
aid of the steamer ?
Answer. I presume she could have made her way through. I do not think
there was any current to interfere with her.
Question. What effect did the little sea that you observed have upon her1
Answer. But very little. In coming around Point Judith I could perceive
that she rolled some, and there was a little rise and fall to her bows.
Question. What inference did you draw from that-that she was weak 1
Answer. No, sir; it was not rough enough to try her.
Question. If she will not make over five miles an hour, would she be useful
on any of our rivers 1
Answer. Well, I should think not, if there is much current. She would
make about five knots at the present time; in the course of a few months she
will not be able to make tllat.
By 1\h. Odell:
Question. Why not 1
Answer. On account of her bottom fouling.
vessels; and don't know how soon they foul.

I am unacquainted with iron

By the chairman:
Question. Do you understand that they foul quicker than wooden bottoms 1
Answer. Very much quicker.
Question. If she would not be able to navigate our rivers, for what useful
war purpose could she be put to without the turret 1
Answer. I do not know, except for some harbor defence. She is very long225 feet-and in a narrow river it would be difficult to turn her around, or to
work her, except to go right ahead. If there were short turns a vessel of that
kind would be difficult to manage.
Question. Her men, of course, would have no protection from attacks from
the banks of the river, seeing she carries no turret 1
Answer. Not the slightest; not in working her gun.
Question. If she would be of no use for this purpose, would she be good for
a torpedo vessel?
Answer. 1'hat would depend upon whether it was a narrow river. If there
was plenty of sea room for her to work in, I do not know but she would. I
am unacquainted with the torpedo business, and hardly know what kind of
vessel would be required. She works very slowly. I suppose for a torpedo
vessel you would require one to work fast. She is heavy and moves slowly.
Question. You say she might possibly be used for harbor defence; how could
you use her to defend a hm·bod
Answer. When you are not near enough for sharpshooters to operate. A
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dozen sharpshooters, in coming up one of those rivers, would pick off every
one of the gunners. She might do on our wide rivers, where there is little
current.
Question. For what is called light-draught steamers, do they not draw too
much water?
Answer. I should think they did-seven feet five inches.
Question. Do you know how they came to draw more than six and a half
feet of water 1
Answer. No, sir; except it is the weight of iron that is put on.
Question. Are you acquainted with ship-building 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. How far is she seaworthy 1
Answer. I hardly like to give an opinion in regard to her seaworthiness. I
do not feel confident.
Question. It is an opinion, of course 1
Answer. This is the first one I have ever been in.
Question. You have been in her further than anybody else, and you are an
old seaman 1
Answer. I find that all my old seamanship was nearly thrown away on one
of these vessels.
Question. Would she be safe to go without being towed, coastwise, from
harbor to harbor, in your judgment 1
Answer. I should think not. I should think if her engines should be dis-
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and there is no opportunity for rigging any.

By Mr. Odell:
Question. Did you have your water on board?
Answer. We condensed our water.
Question. Do you know of anything important that we have not inquired
about 1
Answer. I do not know anything more than what they are doing now, or trying to do, here at the yard with her-putting a screen around the pilot-house
and fitting her iron pipes. I presume it will be a hard matter to make her
decks tight without taking up the iron plating.

Mr. W. W. W. WooD sworn and examined.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. What is your connexion with the navy 1
Answer. I am a chief engineer in the navy, and have been for the last twenty
years, and am now general inspector of all machinery being constructed for the
navy under Rear-Admiral Gregory, general superintendent.
Question. State what you know of the facts connected with the building of
these twenty vessels, and whether they have met the intention in their construction.
Answer. It was the intention of the department to construct these lightdraught vessel::; to draw about six feet for the purpose of placing turrets on board
of them, making them, in fact, turreted, light-draught monitors, after the plan of
Captain Ericsson; they were designed to carry one turret with two guns, and
to be propelled by two screws, and were intended for service on our coast, bays,
and rivers. The design, I think, included a water compartment around them for
the purpose of admitting water and sinking them down several inches ; and in
view of relieving them, in the event of their getting aground, very rapidly, hav-
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ing an immense pumping power for the purpose of discharging the water from
these reservoirs. 'That plan was rather novel, and had not been adopted in case
of other vessels of the monitor type.
Mr. Stimers made the design~ of the vess.els and had the superintenlence of
them up to the time of the completion of the Chimo. That vest'lel was ready
for service and was found to draw rather more water than was intended; the
department then relieved him from that duty and placed the whole thing under
the supervision of Captain Ericsson, Rear-Admiral Gregory, and myself.
In the mean time the different commanders of the squadron south were very
desirous of getting some vessels around with torpedoes for the purpose of protecting the wooden fleets from the attacks of the rebel iron-clads. And it was
then determined to convert six of these vessels, almost completed, into
torpedo vessels, retaining the impregnable pilot-house, placing one 11-inch gun
forward, making some modifications and changes in relation to the screws, cutting out the overhang at the stern underneath, giving greater clearance for the
exit of the water abaft the screws, by which greater speed would be obtained,
lightening them as much as possible by removing the heavy condensing apparatus at the stern, and sending them south for the use of the commanders, and
for the service of the department by them. 'l'he others it was decided to raise
twenty-two inches, to retain the turrets and strengthen the bottoms by placing
in additional cross-flooring, cutting away the raft at the stern and the overhang,
so as to give them easier angles of clearance; to adopt screws of nine feet instead
of twelve feet, as originally intended, so as to secure greater speed and strength,
and at the same time retain all the impregnability of the structure first contemplated. '11he change in raising them would probably produce some five or six inches
greater draught, with the additional height of twenty-two inches. So far as the
machinery is concerned they have immense boiler power, and the object was to
obtain greater speed by working up the engine at higher velocity with screws
of diminished pitch-which changes have been very nearly completed in nearly
the whole of them at this time. One of them will be launched on Saturday next
(December 31,) as I understood this morning, and these will be very soon completeo. Others will follow in rapid succession.
Question. Do you mean to say that .1\fr. Stimers had the designing of the
whole of these twenty steamers 1
Auswer. The details of the design were made by him, so far as I know, (for
the whole of them,) from a plan first submitted by Captain Ericsson, but very
materially changed by him in the final execution of the work.
Question. You spoke of his being relieved; you mean from the superintendence of the whole of them 1
Answer. Yes, sir; the department removed him.
Question. Are you aware of the reasons of his being removed 1
Answer. No, sir. I never heard any reasons assigned for it ; I was simply
ordered to assume the duties incident to the general inspection of the whole
work under contract for the department.
Question. As a practical engineer, and one acquainted with the intentions and
designs of the government in the use of these vessels, were they what the government intended 1
Answer. I think that they drew more water than the government originally
intended ; in other respects, I do not know sufficient of the designs of the department to give an opinion.
Question. As they were launched on the odginal design, were they fit for the
lll.Se intended and designed by the government 1
Answer. They drew too much water to be ali useful as the government prob- ·
ably intended.
Question. How much water did they draw with the turret on 1
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Answer. It varied in the different vessels; I will be able to give you that tomorrow.
Question. We want only a general idea.
Answer. Only one of them was thoroughly equipped for sea, and I think
that the top of her armor was probably some three inches under the water at the
extremity, aft.
Question. You mean to say that, with the turret on, a part of the vessel was
submerged?
Answer. Yes, sir ; the extremity, aft.
Question. Do you know about the cost of the vessels-the original contract 1
Answer. I should prefer to bring the exact figures to-morrow; I believe it
was $395,000.
Question. What do you know about the cost of the alterations, say, on the
si~ which are now intended for torpedo boats 1
Answer. We are receiving the bills for them now ; the exact amount has not
yet been determined. Inspectors were placed at the different establishments to
keep a record of the time of the mechanics employed, and the material, that an
account might be rendered when completed. These bills have not y et come in
to such an extent as to enable me to know the cost of the changes. It will vary
in the different vessels in proportion to the work required. Some of them were
further advanced than others, and of course the cost of changing, inconsequence,
will be greater. The cost of raising up the vessels varied from about $55,000
to $80,000 each, dependent upon the state of progress of the work at the
time the ch~nges were decided to be made. The work was immediately stopped,
as soon as this error in the draught was known, on all the vessels.
Question. 'Vill you state what, in your judgment, was the fault in the construction of these vessels 1
Answer. It was an error in the calculation of the displacement; the vessels
had not sufficient displacement to sustain the weight at six feet draught.
Question. Is that an error that is necessary among scientific men 1
Answer. It is an error that is very frequently made. I have always found it
in vessels of this kind ; it is not admissible because these monitors are so constructed as to show but very little surface above the water as a target to fire at;
and if they go down any deeper, of course it becomes a very serious matter.
One of the difficulties was, that the material furnished in a great many cases was
thicker, and of course weighed more than Mr. Stimers estimated. H e probably
did not make a proper allowance for this variation in the practical execution of
the work, and he had very little margin to work on.
Question. Having but little margin, was it not important that it should be
watched with great care for the interest of the government 1
Answer. It was decidedly very important.
Question. It was a matter that could have been corrected at the time, could
it not?
Answer. It could have been corrected at the time.
Question It was within the control of the constructors 1
Answer. It was within the control of the constructor.
Question. Do you know anything in relation to the delay in the completion
of those contracts 1
Answer. At the time these vessels were first designed, this class of vessels had
never been very thoroughly tested under fire, or at least not sufficiently so as to
develop all the faults of design in this type of vessels. As the work progressed
and the faults were discovered, it was necessary to change, in very many cases,
the plans from the original designs, in order to make them more perfect and
more impregnable, and that they might answer more fully the purposes for
which they were constructed. Some delay took place on this account, and from
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the great difficulty in obtaining materials at that time. I have heard these reasons stated by some contractors.
Question. So far as you know, was the delay from reasons such as contractors could overcome 1
Answer. I do not think that they could be overcome ; the iron mills had
already as many contracts as they could fill.
Question. Are you a-cquainted with the condition or terms of the contract in
reference to the time of completion 1
Answer. I have read the contract; I do not now remember exactly the time
specified ; it varied.
Question. Do you consider that it was possible for these vessels to be built
within the time prescribed by the Navy Department to the contractors, taking
the circumstances into consideration 1
Answer. Under certain conditions they might have been executed in that
time, I thiQk ; that is, if they could have obtained all the materials and all the
men, and thrown aside everything else.
Question. Were those conditions within the control of the contractors 1
Answer. I should think not.
Question. You have referred to the alteration of the~e boats for torpedo boats.
Are you familiar with the kind of torpedo boat the department are constructing 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I have constructed all that they have had constructed.
Question. What kind of boat have they constructed for that purpo~e?
Answer. We constructed six small picket boats, about 40 feet long, 11 feet
bottom, to carry a howitzer, a crew of eleven men, with a 1·iHe screen to protect
them, to make no noise, to return the water of condensation to the boilers, to
carry about eight days' fuel, to make a speed of about ten miles an hour, and
carry a torpedo. The first one of these boats constructed was the one with which
Lieutenant Cushing destroyed the Albemarle. I gave the designs for the construction of the boat, the torpedo, and everything about it. They are very remarkable little boats, I can assure you, and they do not cost over $5,500 each.
The torpedoes are entirely new in their construction, very powerful avil. certain
in action, and are capable of destroying any number of vessels in a very 12-hort time.
By the chairman :
Question. How long have they been known or invented 1
Answer. I have had this matter under consideration for about a year and a
half, since the advent of iron-clad vessels, and no failure has ever been made in
any of the experiments.
Question. You have given us a description of the torpedo boat and its success; now please state how these monitors can be used for the same purpose,
and what the prospect of the usefulness of these six boats is.
Answer. My opinion is that if these vessels were in Hampton roads, or in
the sounds at the mouth of the Roanoke river, or at the entrance of Savannah
river, or in Mobile bay, or in the harbor of Charleston, they would be able very
probably to destroy the rebel iron-clads, if they should come out to make an
attack on our wooden fleet. Greater speed would make them very much more
desirable, but in case of an attack upon any of our vessels they would be able to
reach and to destroy the enemy's vessels without doubt.
Question. Would they be as serviceable as the torpedo boats you have just
described for that purpose 1
Answer. These small picket steamers to which these torpedoes have been attached are very valuable vessels. The iron-clads are fortified with armor, and
the probability is that they would stand a very much better chance of not being
sunk by the enemy's shot than what the smaller vessels would. But a torpedo ve~
sel proper has been constructed, and is now in the James river-the Spuyten
Devil, formerly th e Stromboli. H er crew are not exposed at all; they work by
Part I V - - 5
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a steam engine beneath the water-line, and it is so arranged that the torpedoes
can be discharged every four minutes probably. She is also armed with shell,
and worked by some apparatus to remove obstructions, and to be fired at any
practicable depth of water. The vessel is now lying at Dutch gap, in advance
of the fleet.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Did you state the cost 1
Answer. No, sir; I suppose her cost will not vary far from $110,000; she is
armor-plated to a considerable extent.
Question. The first cost of the monitors was $395,000, as estimated, and the
change from their original intention to torpedo boats will add very materially to
that sum. How much 1
Answer. I should judge it would vary from $50,000 to $60,000 each; probably not so much. I have not examined the accounts.
Question. Is there any advantage in these boats for torpedo purposes, to compensate for the great disparity between these torpedo boats proper you have
described and the cost of these boats aft~:,r the pattern we are examining into 1
Answer. My own impression has been that time was the object, and to place
these vessels in service so that the country might receive the benefit of themthat this was the most advantageo-q.s thing that could be done at the time. 'l'hese
vessels could be converted in very much shurter time than other vessels of that
class could be built, costing less money.
Question. Could not you have built boats after the pattern of the Spuyten
Devil quicker than these alterations have been made 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. In regard to the class of light-draught torpedo boats, are they rrovided with any armament 1
Answer. Yes, sir; they are designed to carry one 1l-inch gun forward.
Question. vYhat protection will the men have, the turret being removed, in
working the gun 1
Answer. The same protection that all our wooden vessels have. The wooden
bulwark don't amount to anything; in fact I consider that the men are safer on
these iron-clads alongside a 11-inch gun, than with a light wooden bulwark such
as they have on the wooden vessels. In one case you have the danger fi·om splinters, and in the other you have not, and the probability is that the torpedo vessel, in going into action, would shell all the banks of the river and drive away
all the sharpshooters at a great distance, so that they could not approach at all.
I presume no prudent commander, in going up a river or approaching an ambush,
would fail to do so. 'l'hat matter was all considered in making the alteration.
Question. You have referred to the alteration of the other fourteen monitors
by raising them twenty-two inches; please give us the intention and probable
effect of that alteration.
·
Answer. 'l'he alteration involved in raising up these vessels is simply to make
them serviceable vessels; to increase their strength and retain the turrets.
'I' hey would then be very serviceable as monitors, drawing about 7 ~ feet of
water. ~I'hat is the only change that could be made under the circumstances to
remedy the fault of construction.
Question. 'l'he change is a necessity growing out of the failure in the original
construction 1
Answer. Yes, sir; in consequence of the error of displacement.
Question. To what use can these vessels be put 1
Answer. I think they will be serviceable vessels for harbor defence in our
·bays and sounds.
Question. What speed will you be able ·to get out of them 1
Answer. I think we shall get from 6 to 7 knots an hour out of them. In the
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torpedo vessels the raft was not cut away at the stern, as wiii be the case with
all the others. The overhang was cut out underneath, in order to get a freer
exit of the water passing from the screw. r.rhe Chimo was reported to have
made 5 knots with 60 revolutions, as well as I remember; these engines will be
worked up to 90 or 100 revolutions; they have boiler power sufficient to produce that speed. The bottoms of them are reported to spring, but that is the
case, more or le~::~s, with all iron structures. The stanchions which are placed
on the floors underneath the deck will counteract that vibration to a very considerable extent.
By the chairman:
Question. State how far these monitors have progressed towards completion.
Answer. Some of them will be completed in probably six or eight weeks from
this time.
Question. What expense could we save in abandoning any portion of them 1
Are they all very forward 1
Answer. Oh, yes, sir; they are too far advanced ; there are no changes you
could make in them to save expense if you determine to complete the vessels.
Captain Ericsson, Admiral Gregory, and myself have had this matter under
consideration for some time past, and we have determined to complete them and
make them as efficient as possible with the least amount of expenditure.
Question. You would not consider them of any value in their original state,
before being raised for any war purpose, would you 1
Answer. They might lie in our harbors and use their turrets, with their
draught of water; but for all the purposes of navigation and moving about I
should consider that they would have been inefficient.
Question. Where is Mr. Stimers now 1
Answer. On board the Wabash, as chief engineer, now off Wilmington,
North Carolina.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Please state about the disproportion of the boiler to the cylinder.
Answer. The boilers are very largely in excess of the power required for
c.ylinders of that capacity; that adds to the weight.
Question. Is the propelling power of these vessels a failure, or is the failure
in the construction of the hulls 1
Answer. They are a failure so far as the dimensions of the steam cylinder is
concerned, in proportion to the amount of boiler power. The boilers are capable
of supplying a greater amount of power than can be transmitted by engines of
the dimensions placed on board.
Question. Why did they make that disproportion between the boiler and the
engines to be propelled ?
Answer. In the first place there were a number of engines placed on board
for various purposes, that were to be supplied with steam, which would render
a large boiler power absolutely necessary ; but the cylinders constituted the
motive power of the vessels, and they were, I consider, inadequate. I presume
the constructing engineer thought they were entirely sufficient for the purpose.
They were not so, however, in my judgment.
Question. Have you seen the original plan submitted .o f the light-draught
monitors designed by Mr. Ericsson 1
Answer. I have.
Question. In your judgment as an engineer, which plan was preferable, or
most likely to accomplish the object 1
Answer. My opinion is, that the plan submitted by Captain Ericsson was
decidedly preferable to the one ultimately adopted. They could have been buHt
in much less time and at much less expense, and therefore would have fulfilled all
the essential objects of the department in the eonstrur.tion of those vessels.
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Question. You say that the boiler in this engine was in excess of the cylinder and stroke of the engine ; about how much larger should the cylinder and
how much longer should the stroke have been, to have been in harmony with
the power of the boiler 1
Answer. I should have placed in them at least from 40 to 50 per cent. _more
power.
Question. How much would that have added to the propelling power of the
engine 1
Answer. It would have been in the same ratio.

JOHN ERICSSON sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. In what relation do you stand towards the twenty monitors ordered
to be built by the Navy Department, and afterwards built under the superintendence of Mr. Stimers 1
.A,nswer. I have nothing whatever to do with those twenty monitors; directly
or indirectly.
Question. What do you know about those monitors-whether they are
effective or otherwise, and whether or not they are in accordance with your
first plans 1 State all that you think material upon the subject.
Answer. It will be necessary for me to commence where the department
desired me to plan a light-draught vessel for the Mississippi and its tributaries.
In the latter part of August, 1862, Mr. Fox called at my office in this city and
told me it was very desirable to have vessels of a very light draught for the
Mississippi and the other rivers, and he desired me to make some plan,
but his condition was four feet draught of water. I told him that could not be
done ; that it was necessary to have six feet draught to make a boat impregnable.
He left me. I commenced reflecting upon the subject. Let me state that this was
an unofficial, private conversation, and perhaps it is proper for me to say now
that the whole of my services in connexion with the government have been
voluntary, and the communications with me have nearly all been unofficial. I
have received no compensation for my labors; never asked any. My professional emoluments make me independent of that, and what I have done has
been from motives of patriotism, and with very great pleasure. Having reflected
upon the subject, I found there were so many diffieulties in it that I must give
it up, and for three weeks I did not act. Mr. Stimers then informed me that
Mr. Fox had written to him a letter saying that he must not give up the light draught vessels, and that I was the only man that could plan them. I then
took up the subject again, and by the 9th day of October, 1862, I had my
plans and specifications ready, and sent them on that day to the Secretary of
the Navy. He did not acknowledge the receipt of them, but I heard through
Mr. Stimers, informally, that they were received.
The plan of light-draught monitor which I forwarded to the Navy Department was not intended as a working plan, yet it defined with clearness and precision the general principle and the mode of building the vessel, engines, boiler,
and propellers. It was understood by the Navy Department that I had not
time to attend to the detail of calculations and planning. Accordingly the work
was confided to Chief Engineer Stimers.
,
Several months elapsed. I heard nothing on the subject. I expected in
the mean time that an advertisement would appear in the papers for building
.vessels according to the plans I had sent in. Nothing having been done, Mr.
Stimers called on me one day in December and said thaL he had returned from
Washington, where he had received instructions to make out plans of these
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light-draught vessels founded upon my original plan that I had sent in; but,
much to my surprise, he did not come for advice or instruction, but only to tell
me what he was going to do, thereby giving me to understand that he had
received full authority to act. I had been, and I am now, under the impression
that the department intended that he should do nothing without consulting me.
Mr. Fox said, at that first conversation, he was desirous of having the vessels
built in three months. My mind, therefore, was directed to great simplicity in
the construction of these vessels. We had no iron and no rolling mills; they
were all occupied; it was therefore a .necessary point to dispense with the use
of iron as much as possible. On the Mississippi we had no workmen that
could do this; for, let me state emphatically, I planned these vessels for the
Mississippi and its tributaries. I conceived the idea of building a plain, oval
tank with a flat bottom and upright sides, that could be done in an ordinary
establishment in forty days. Around this I attached a raft made of timber, the
idea being to give stability and impregnability to this wooden raft. Wood is
plenty out west; iron and workmen they have none. I saw no difficulty, and
would have entered into a contract to furnish such a vessel in ninety days, if
built upon this simple plan. The engine itself I proposed to be on the simple~t
high-pressure principle, employing patterns and casting such as they were in
the habit of using out west, so as not to lose time by planning and making
patterns.
Having stated this, I will now proceed to tell you of my interview with Mr.
Stimers. You see that the leading feature of my plan, in order to meet the
difficulties of the day, was simplicity as well as impregnability. Here is a copy
of the plan I sent to the Secretary of the Navy. (Exhibits a plan.) For this
I never got any acknowledgment, excepting indirectly. Mr. Stimers told me
that Chief Engineer Isherwood objected to my boiler because it was of low
evaporating power, and he had devised two boilers that would extend across the
entire vessel, built in a very different manner from the simple boilers that I had
planned. I objected strongly to that at once, and told him if they made such
boilers, standing side-by-side, it would be impossible to brace the vessel so as
to make it sufficiently strong. I argued this point at considerable length with
him, but he did not yield the point; he thought the kind of boiler that Mr.
Isherwood had devised was the best. He next informed me that he was going
to put in engines of only twenty-two inches diameter, and thirty inches stroke.
I told him that that was utterly insufficient-that that power would not be
enough to propel so big a vessel. He further stated to me that he was going
to place these engines fore and aft in the vessel, using bevel gear to drive the
propellers. I remonstrated against it, and told him it would not answer. When
he left me he did not say that he would not use such engines, nor did he say
that he would. He further stated to me that the propellers, as I had arranged
them, were objected to; that they should be placed side-by-side, instead of one
after the other. '!'hen he left my office and, I believe, went to work to plan a
vessel on this general principle, (showing the drawing,) but with the modifications that I have stated. I heard nothing further, though I knew he was planning the vessels, and had several engineers assisting him. His office was next
door to mine. I wae never invited to enter that office; nor would I have entered it, as far as that goes, because my plan was deviated from. The planninr
went on for a very long time. I was consulted only as to certain arrangements
about the turrets, not in relation to . the vessels, the hulls, the engines, or the
boilers. At last his plans were ready, and I am informed that he went to
Washing-ton with them. A few days after he returned to New York again..
He called on me and told me that he was going to introduce a series of water
tanks, or water compartments, all r<>und the vessel. r.rhat involved an entire
change of the whole system, which I objected to, stating that the difference in
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the draught of water that could be obtained by these tanks was not worth
having-it would be only a few inches. He proceeded with a new set of plans
upon this new system, and at last got his plans ready and went to Washington
with them, without ever exhibiting them to me, or consulting or advising with
me. 'l'he plans were shown to the contractors, I am informed, and they reg~I
lated their prices according to the work specified, which plans I had disapproved
and utterly repudiated.
But let me state here that I have reason to believe that the department was
then under the impression that Mr. St.imers had consulted with me. I had
several private letters from Mr. Fox that indicated that he supposed that Mr.
Stimers had consulted me in relation to the details. It was a delicate subject
for me to meddle with. I could not object to it, because no direct information
had been asked; I had r~imply advised the engineer strongly against what he
was doing.
Now, when these plans were ultimately sent in and presented to the contractors, I received a letter that brought out the fact that Mr. Stimers had not
acted according to my advice. So I supposed at that time that the department were aware that he had deviated from my plans, or, rather, that he had
11ot taken my advice in what he was doing. The contractors were then in
Washington. Mr. Stimers was looked upon by the department as a very efficient, skilful engineer. I myself believed him to be so, and I did something
to impress that idea on the department. It was not till he had made all these
plans that I discovered that he was not a planner. Though he is an engineer
of good general knowledge, and very efficient in many things, he is not a mau
who has the ability to plan.
I believe now that I have stated everything that relates to the original conception of these vessels-what I did propose to build-and I will now show
you the plan of that which has been built, but which I again repudiate as not
being at all in accordance with my original plan.
Question. What do you suppose the cost of a vessel constructed on your plan
would have been1
Answer. The question was pnt to me whether I would build a vessel on my
original plan, and at what price. I said I would construct vessels on my own
plan, and I gave the department the price, $375,000 each. rrhe department
thought that, in view of the simplicity of my mode of building, it was too high.
So my offer was rejected, and offers were accepted to build the vessels on Mr.
Stimers's plans-for I call them his plans. In the mean time prices had advanced and iron was difficult to be had; the rolling mills had nearly doubled
their prices. rrhis (exhibiting the plan of the present monitors) is the second
plan that Mr. Stimers produced and carried to Washington, and which was carried into execution.
Question. How does it differ from your plan, and wherein do you regard this
as defective 1
Answer. The great difference is this: that instead of having a simple tank,
surrounded or bedded in a wooden raft, this is a double vessel, very complicated to build, heavy, expensive, and full of braces. It is very difficult to exhaust the water out of these tanks. A system of piping had to be carried around
the entire vessel. Powerful pumps had to be applied to these pipes in order to
exhaust the tanks of water after they had been filled. The change involved
great additional weight, great expense, and took three if not four times the
length of time to build as the simple plan which I proposed. I have stated that
the tanks were useless because they contained so little water, that when you
pumped them out, if the vessel could have carried the weight which they expected, it would not have changed the draught of water more than six inchet~.
Let me state in .this connexion that in my original plan of a wooden raft, which
makes the ship so strong, I attached it directly to the vessel's sides, whPreas in

LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS.

71

this new plan there is a tank intervening between the two, so that the wooden
raft had to be attached to the tank itself. I have before stated that I objected
to the boiler that Mr. Stimers put in, and that the engines were too small to do
the work, but Mr. Stimers said that Mr. Isherwood insisted on having engines of
only eighteen inches in diameter, and Mr. Stimers says he got them up to
twenty-two inches. The turret was arranged very nearly in accordance with
my principle and my instructions. The draughtsman came and took my instructions in relation to many parts about the turret. I have stated that the
propellers were differently placed from my original plan, and that I objected to
the change. Here let me !:lay that these arguments and these objections I made
to Mr. Stimers, and that I never had occasion to make the statements to the department. In consequence of introducing the tanks the raft was diminished; it
was not so impregnable as on the original plan. I place these deviations at the
door of Mr. Stimers, for he had power to do anything, the department supposing
he was working upon the general plan which I had submitted.
Question . .For what purpose were these tanks of water provided in the vessels designed by Mr. Stimers7
Answer. I do not know of any that I can find any reason for.
Question. Were they anything but an incumbrance to the ship 1 Could they
have been of any use?
Answer. Yes, if the ship had been sufficiently buoyant, and they could have
contained water enough. It is certainly a good feature that when you do not
know the depth of the river, and you go along cautiously, and yet find yourself
on a bar, by pumping out the tanks you are relieved and go ahead. But I prefer to get a sounding apparatus on board and to take the depth as you go along.
Practical officers of the navy, however, applauded the idea. Admiral Smith, I
know, was very much in favor of it.
Question. Were not these water-tanks entirely abandoned by the commissioners who were consulted as to what could be done with these vessels afterwards, when it was determined to raise them 1
Answer. Decidedly; they not only abandoned the tanks, but took out the
pipes, pumps, and everything that added to the weight of the vessel, as the only
means of raising her up.
Question. You advised a more powerful engine than Mr. Stimers insisted
upon having. What kind of engine did you advise?
Answer. '.rwo small inclined engines of thirty inches diameter, operating directly upon the screw shaft.
Question. How much more powerful would your eng·ines have been than Mr.
Stimers's1
Answer. About ninety per cen,tum-nearly twice as powerful. The boilers
put in were disproportioned to the size of the cylinders-nearly twice as powerful as they ought to have been. That loads the vessel down, and that is what
we are laboring under now.
Question. Could you have constructed these vessels on your original plan at
the price you stated to the department ?
Answer. Yes, unquestionably. I named a price that yielded a profit, or I
would not have advised my friends to enter into it.
Question. What will be the cost of raising up these monitors twenty-two inches,
in your judgment 1
Answer. I made a rough estimate under the present high prices, and told the
department I thought it would cost about $100,000 each vessel; but it appears
that they have got it done for less.
Question. Will that cure the original defects in the construction of the vessel
of which you spoke 1
Answer. It will not. It is the best that can be done. The vessels are all
too far advanced to admit of any radical change.
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Question. You understood these vessels to have been designed originally for
the navigation of the Mississippi and its tributaries. Will these monitors, when
they are improved by building them up, be useful for that purpose 1
Answer. Yes; they should be efficient river vessels.
Question. Will they not draw too much water?
Answer. A great many of our western rivers will admit them. It will enable
us to hold all the principal places if we have these tuiTeted vessels going. I
would say here that I look upon them as a great improvement upon the western
iron-clads.
Question. You think they can be made efficient vessels for the navigation of
our rivers 1
Answer. Decidedly.
Question. Would they be seagoing vessels in their improved state 1
.Answer. By no means; they might go from inlet to inlet; they were never
intended for anything more.
Question. With their present weak engines can they stem the current of the
Mississippi-say four miles an hour 1
Answer. Easily; very readily.
Question. Do you know anything about the speed of the one they have constructed, that was brought around from Boston-the Casco?
Answer. She ought to go six sea miles easily. With the propellers as now
changed there is less pitch given to them, so that if they run the engines up to
a higher speed, I will undertake to navigate that vessel six knots at any time.
By removing the turrets we have brought the vessels very nearly to the original draught.
Question. What speed would your engine give to your vessel?
Answer. In rivers I calculated eight knots, or a little more than nine statute
miles. That I look upon as being sufficient speed for such vessels.
Question. Do you consider that the monitors that you do not raise up can
be converted into torpedo boats, so as to be of any essential service?
Answer. I think the torpedoes can be operated from them, but as gunboats I
deem them to be more important.
Question. As originally built, without the sides being built up-just as Stimers built them, and as the Casco was finished-are they of any use for war
purposes 1
Answer. Not till the turret was removed, because they were under water instead of above. When the turret is removed it is then a very good gunboat.
'.rhere are no such gunboats in any country as they would be; no impregnable
gunboats, as these will be.
Question. There is no protection for the men 1
Answer. '.rhey will be shot down, as on other boats. That is a small objection. If the gun is shot away we put on another gun. '!,here being no bulwarks the men are less exposed, because there are no splinters.
Question. But sharpshooters can take aim better than when the men are behind bulwark31
Answer. The guns they carry are very powerful 11-inch shell guns, and they
wiil be able to clear the shores.
Question. In your judgment, can the Casco go from harbor to harbor without
being towed by some other craft 1
Answer. Yes, in fine weather; but with strong head winds it is better to l1ave
her towed. But all the monitors will do better by themselves than it is supposed.
Question. Do you know any reason why the department did not adopt your
plan1
Answer. I believe the reason is that the water-tank system was looked upon
as a very essential improvement for river boats. Some of our ablest men were
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of that opmwn. But for tl1at feature, I am of opinion, from what I heard at
the time, that they would not have been built upon Mr. Stimers's plan. r.rhat
was looked upon as a considerable improvement on my system.
Question. If there is anything material that you think is essential for us to
know, besides what you have stated, please state it.
Answer. By raising the vessel twenty-two inches we have greater strength
of sides, and they are better able to resist the longitudinal strain than before ;
and, barring the increased draught of water, they would be good and efficient
vessels in every way.
Question. Have you made any material improvements upon the plan of the
monitors since your first conception of them 1
Answer. None whatever; but the form of the hull has more of a sea-going
character; instead of a floating battery, the hull now looks like any of the ordinary ships. That is the only change of any account.
Question. Are the large monitors, as we call them, of the Dictator class,
built on the same plan as the original monitors 1
Answer. The plan is essentially the same; there is less overhang at the bow;
with that exception, it is essentially the same. But the Dictator is a fine seagoing monitor, exceedingly sharp, lively as a duck, and steers in the most perfect manner. Two men can steer her like a pilot-boat. She turns around in
twice her own length.

Rear-Admirall!,RANCIS H.

GREGORY

sworn and examined.

By the chairman:
Question. In what position do you stand in regard to the navy 1
Answer. At the breaking out of these troubles they promoted me (I do not
call it so) on the retired list. I was an applicant for sea service ; I wanted it
very much. The government thought proper to set me to work superintending
the building of vessels soon after 1861. They built twenty-three gunboats
very soon, and then came an order giving me the general superintendence of all
vessels of wood and iron, and all the machinery building by contract outside of
the navy yard on the Atlantic seaboard. I have been at that since.
Question. Are you acquainted with the class of light-draught steamers ordered by the department, twenty in number, of which the Chimo was one 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What do you know in regard to the contract for their building 1
Answer. I did not know anything of the plan of the vessels or the contracts
until they were made. When a portion of them were contracted for, I received
an order stating that the contracts were given out and they would be under my
general superintendence.
Question. Who is responsible for the draught and plan of these monitors 1
Answer. I should suppose that the Bureau of Construction would be. It has
been usual in the service ever since I was in it, for fifty-six years, to make use of
aU the talent they have about them. In old times the board of commissioners,
where they had naval constructors at the differaut stations, used to consult them
to build a frigate or sloop-of-war. r.rhey would caH upon all those people to
send in plans, and have the advantage of the experience and talent of the
whole body.
Question. To whom did they ultimately intrust the superintendence of themthe draught and specification 1
.Answer. In all previous instances they always came from the Bureau of
Construction or from the naval commissioners.
Question. What agency had Mr. Stimers in the construction of these vessela 1
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Answer. He had almost everything to do with it, I believe; because not
many days after I had received the orders stating to me that they were under
my general superintendence, there came an order stating, very laconically, that
Mr. Stimers would havelcharge of those vessels building on the Ericsson plan,
and he took the charge. I understood at the time that Mr. Ericsson was to be
consulted on all occasions. I believe that was the view and intention of the
government at the time. Mr. Stimers is an ambitious man, pretty talented, but
he had not experience, and was led away by his ambition, I suppos~. He wanted
to control the whole thing, and he drew up the plans, so far as I know anything
about it; because under him walil established a large office, with many of the
finest draughtsmen in the country, and they made drawings which were passed
around to the different contractors. But after some time a letter was written
to me from the Secretary of the Navy saying that :Mr. Stimers was not
authorized to make any deviation from any plans, contracts, or instructions
that had been given, without the sanction of the department, or the proper
bureau.
Question. What time was that 1
Answer. I have got all the dates at the office; it was some few months after
they commenced. Another order came from the Secretary of the Navy at that
time saying that he was to make no communications to the contractors, or to
the bureaus, or the dE>partment, excepting through me.
Question. Did he go on to do anything without consulting you 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What did he do without your knowledge or consent?
Answer. He went to work making expensive alterations in the vessels from
the original plans. They had plans and specifications drawn up ; then he
would figure it over, perhaps, and think he could make some improvement ; so
he would issue his order to change. After a while a number of contractors
came to me to know how they could get along-increasing the expense, work
partly completed, new plan ordered, to tear it all down: who is going to pay
for this 1 In that way there was a very heavy bill of extra charges made.
Question. Did you agree that the government should be responsible for these
alterations 1
Answer. No, sir; I did not know anything about it.
Question. Do you know whether the Bureau of Construction knew what
alterations he was making 1
Answer. No, sir; I do not believe they knew any more than I did.
Question. Have you any idea of the expense of these alterations and deviations from the original plan 1
Answer. Oh yes, sir; that is a matter of warfare between myself and the
contractors now settling up; some of them bring in bills of $50,000 and
$80,000, but we don't give it to them. But this was done: When Mr. Stimers
was checked, then if he wanted to make any alterations or suggestions he addressed his letter to me, and I would refer it to the bureau, and invariably they
would write back, " Yon will consult Mr. Ericsson, and if he agrees to it, and
you approve of it, it will be done." In that way a good many alterations were
made by authority, supposed to be an advantage to the vessels.
Question. Was Mr. Ericsson, in fact, consulted about these alterations, and
did he assent to them 1
Answer. Many of them he did not at all. We had a rule that when any
contractor made an authorized alteration that increased the expense, to pay
them that bill right off outside of the contract. As soon as they were done
they were entitled to receive the pay, and I gave them always the certificates
to get it. But in some instances bills were brought to me, and I did not know
that the alterations had been made.
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Question. Have you the means of forming any estimate of the amount that
will have to be paid for these alterations of plan 1
Answer. It will amount to somewhere between $40,000 and $50,000 for
each one.
Question. rrhat is exclusive of the expense of building up the twenty-two
inches 1
Answer. Yes, sir; that is an appendix to the original contract. I was aware
a long while before any action was taken upon it that these vessels were a failure entirely; that they were not going to float; they had not displacement
enough to float all that was put into them.
Question. Did you make that known to Mr. Stimers 1
Answer. Certainly I did; and he showed me their calculations gone over
and over again, and assured me that Mr. Ericsson knew all about it, and it had
his approbation, and that the bureau at Washington understood it. I knew
better than that.
Question. Did you ever communicate your suspicions that these vessels were
total failures to the department 1
Answer. I did to the Bureau of Construction.
Question. Who was at the head of it ?
Answer. Mr. Lenthall; I advised him once by Jetter to have an investigation.
Question. About what stage of the building was that 1
Answer. When they were pretty well done.
Question. You have seen some of these after they were launched ?
Answer. I have seen them in every stage they have been in. I have them
under my charge uow.
Question. What do you say of them 1 What are they good for in the condition in which Mr. Stimers had them finished 1
Answer. Nothing at all-could not float. 'rhe first one we got afloat was
the Chimo. Mr. Stimers proposed to go to Boston and take that vessel entirely
under his own charge, pledging himself to put her to sea in one month completely equipped, armed and ready for service. I was asked my opinion about that.
I said I did not know whether it could be done; if anybody could do it I supposed be could. I was asked if I recommended it. "Yes," said I, "I recommend it." and I signed the paper. I was to have nothing to do with it. So
he went on to Boston and called about him all the engineers, anybody and everything, anyhow and in every way, worked there night and day, and got her to
go on a trial trip. I went there; her stern was four inches under water then; he
wanted to go to sea. But they could do nothing with her, and they aU came
to a stand. As soon as the Secretary of the Navy found this out be tripped
Stimers right up. I think the Secretary of the Navy and Mr. Fox believed all
that while that Mr. Ericsson was the counsellor throughout; but Mr. Ericsson
did not know anything about it, because when they found that these vessels
were complete failures, and the department was astounded, I was telegraphed
to and went with two of the first engineers in the service, with Mr. Ericsson,
and there we got at the regular building plan, and Mr. Ericsson told me that
was the first time he ever saw it. He spread it out, and said he did not think
a man could be capable of so much folly. 'rhen we were ordered to consider
what coul<i be done with them, and we went into that consideration with Ericsson, Wood, and King, and we came to the conclusion that the only remedy was
to raise the decks. Some were nearly completed; others were on the stocks.
Then it fell to me to bring all this about. With Mr. Ericsson's advice I called
together the contractors. They wanted this, that, and the other. We pinned
them down, looked into the thing closely, and, according to the condition that
each vessel was in, I made an agreement wi~h them for from $50,000 to
$90,000. Some had the decks on, and it was an immense work to take them
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off. Now we have one ready to be launched to-morrow. That will be a fine
vessel-just what they intended at first.
Q.uestion. Will she be able to ascend our rivers 1
Answer. Oh, yes, sir.
Question. How much water will she draw 1
Answer. They will draw about 7 feet-not more.
Question. What speed 1
Answer. I suppose about 7 knots.
Question. Do you expect that with the engines they have got 1
Answer. Yes, sir; we have been altering the form of the stern. Mr. Stimers
had got the propeller into a box ; the water conld not get to it nor from it.
Now we have altered the form of the vessel to advantage and put in different
pro_pellers.
<cluestion. Do you think they will be sea-boats?
Answer. They never will be very good sea-boats; they will be as good a.s
any of these monitors; they will be a foot out of water.
Question. Will you be able to get them from place to place without towing 1
Answer. Oh, yes, sir, I should think so; they have always had tow wherever they have been, lest their machinery might give out.
Question. How about their being finished in the time the contracts called for 1
Answer. The contract called for their completion at a specified time, but they
were not finished, and could not have been.
Question. What was the reason 1
Answer. There was more work than they calculated; it was a new business,
. and nobody made any right calculation at all. I have seen so much of that
iron work, and there was never an instance in which it was done. The Dictator was to be done in twelve months, and it is not done yet. They would have
forfeited their contracts; they could not have helped it.
Question. They are built of green timber instead of seasoned 1
Answer. No, sir. We had a regular timber inspector, the best we could get.
In som~ instances it was represented that they could not get the timber that the
contract called for-that it was not to be had-and the bureau in some instances
would permit them to use that nearest to it, because they wanted to get the
vessels out. I do not know that there was any ·damage done to the public on
that score; if there was, I did it, because they trusted that business to me.
Question. How long will it take now to complete the remainder of the vessels 1
Answer. I think we will have them all out by May.
Question. How much do you suppose it will cost to complete them 1
Answer. They are to cost $55,000,$60,000, $70,000, $80,000, and $90,000, according to the state they were in. r.rhat is going to finish them, fit them out, and
do everything to make them complete, as the contract originally called for. We
only give them this money for pulling to pieces and reconstructing. One of
them is to cost more than $90,000-the rrunxis. She was the second vessel ;
she was fitted out right after the Chimo, and we attempted to get her out, but
we found it would not do--she was too deep in the water. So we brought her
back and made another effort to finish her up; mounted her guns and everything; but it was found she would not answer any purpose at all. One
oonsiderable expense att~nding all this is that the bottom frames were so weak
that we had to put in additional floors. One of the vessels was found so weak
an her bottom that we had to take her to pieceE. She is now hauled up in
Philadelphia, not by the contractor, but by another party, under a special
agreement to be taken to pieces, her turret taken off, and to be reconstructed
and delivered to the government, as she ought to have been originally, with all
the alterations, for $115,000. 'I'hen there are five of them that are to be made
into torpedo boats. That suggestion came from Mr. Ericssou. I was against
i't. 'l'he boats are sluggish in their movements, 225 feet long, anJ you cannot
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get them into narrow waters. It is like setting a trap for certain game ; if the
game comes to it, very well. I was ordered to make five of them. After a
while I thought Mr. Ericsson's genius was going to fix torpedoes ; I bad not
enough of it, and did not pretend to have. Come to find out, he had not. I
had fixed torpedoes on the picket-boats, and we put them on. '!'here are three
of them here now.
Question. Is not that torpedo boat much more efficacious than these can be
made1
Answer. Certainly.
Question. Do you or not believe that it is a useless expense to undertake to
turn any of these into torpedo boats?
Answer. It will not be much expense with these we have got now, because it
is all done pretty much.
Question. Can you use them to any advantage at all for that purpose 1
Answer. I do not think they can be, and I have already represented that to
the department. I said to Mr. Ericsson, " Why not make gunboats of them 1"
So be mounted an 11-inch gun right on the deck. I would sooner stand my
chance on open decks than behind wooden bulwarks. I have recommended to
the department to make these five stationary vessels, where they want to guard
some passage. They do not want half the crew that they would otherwise.
Question. But they are totally inefficient vessels for the purposes they were
designed for ; you could not do anything with them 1
Answer. I do not think you could put tl1em to any better use than we have
put them. The more I looked into the torpedo business the less I liked it. At
la.st I proposed to Mr. Ericsson to mount a pivot-gun, and take the turret off,
and put a pilot-house on. I believe the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Fox, and
Mr. Lenthall thought everything was going on very nicely, and that Mr. Ericsson was the adviser all along ; I thought so till some time before they came to
the conclusion to the contrary.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. How could you be deceived about Mr. Ericsson's not having
advised, when you were right here and saw him every day 1
Answer. All that business was done between him and Mr. Stimers. Mr.
Stimers would bring plans to me. I would say, "Has that been submitted to
Mr. Ericsson ?" He would say, " Yes."
'rhen come to find out, Mr. Stimers
had probably gone and talked with Mr. Ericsson on the subject, and Mr. Ericsson did not understand it, perhaps, or know anything about it. And Mr.
Ericsson soon got out with Mr. Stimers, and did not pay much attention to
him. But many times when Mr. Stimers would make propositions to me he
did it unwillingly, because he wanted to be supreme and go right to headquarters, or dictate himself. When he was compelled by the orders of the
government to submit everything to me, I would ask him, " Have you seen
Mr. Ericsson about that 1" and he would say, "Yes, and he understands it,"
or "Mr. :Fox u11derstands it." I would send his letters addressed to me to the
bureau, and the answer invariably was, "You will advise with Mr. Ericsson;
if he concurs, and you approve of it, it may be done."
Question. Is there anything else that is important in connexion with this
matter that you wish to state 1
Answer. Not that I know of.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, Janum·y 16, 1865.
Sm: I lmve the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th
ultimo, enclosing a copy of a resolution of the Senate in the following words:
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"Resolved, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be instructed to
inquire what progress has been made in the construction of the iron-clad gunboats contracted for in the year 1862, by whom the contract was made on the
part of the government, who planned the models of the same, and who is responsible therefor; have any of them been finished 1 if so, what was the condition of the vessel after she was launched 1 are the other vessels contracted
for to be built on a plan or model similar to the Chimo, lately launched at Boston 1
and all information which may be bad touching said gunboats."
I am requested in the letter transmitting a copy of the resolution to "furnish
the committee, as soon as convenient, with such information upon the subjectmatter of the resolution as may be in possession of the Navy Department."
I presume that a mistake has been made by the committee or by the Senate
in their inquiry relative to the "iron-clad gunboats contracted for in the year
1862." In the spring and summer of 1863 contracts were made for twenty
turreted vessels of the monitor class. Not doubting that the resolution of the
Senate and the investigations and inquiries of the committee have reference to
those contracts and those vessels, my response will be made as if the resolution
read 1863 instead of 1862. The mistake of a year in regard to the execution
of these contracts-provided they are, as I suppose, those referred to-is important to the contractors as well as to the department, and should therefore be
corrected.
In answer to that part of the resolution which inquires "by whom the contract was made on the part of the government," I have to state it was by the
chief of the Bureau of Construction, under advertisement issued by this departmenton the lOth of February, 1863. A reference to the message of the President
and accompanying documents of the 1st session of the present Congress may
be had for a list of bidders and award of contracts under direction of this
department.
It is asked "Who planned the models of the same, and who is responsible
therefor 1"
rrhe general idea of a light-draught iron-clad inside of a raft of wood was furnished by Captain John Ericsson, of New York, the distinguished inventor, at the
request of this department. The details of the plan, and the preparation of the
working drawings, were intrusted to Chief Engineer A. C. Stimers, who was
instructed by the Bureau of Construction to consnlt with Captain Ericsson and
take directions from him. '.ro that extent Chief Engineer Stimers is responsible.
"Have any of them been finished 1 if so, what was the condition of the vessel
after she was launched 1"
None of the light-draught turreted vessels are quite finished. The Casco, converted into a boat for reconnoitring and torpedo purposes, has recently made a
passage from Boston to New York. Complaints were made by the officers of
discomforts, as complaints were formerly made of the brigs and schooners of the
navy, so many of which, like the Grampus, Somers, Porpoise, and Bainbridge,
have gone to sea and never been heard of. The Chimo was the first of her
class which was got into the water, and led to the discovery that due allowance
had not been made for all the weights. She floated on an even keel only about
three inches above the water, instead of fifteen as was intended and expected.
Several of the same class which have been since launched have varied considerably from this, all of them being high out of the water, notwithstanding all
were made from the same drawings, showing that there have been variations in
model or in the weight of materials used in construction.
Before any of this class of vessels had been launched Rear-Admiral Dahlgren
and Acting Rear-Admiral Lee had strenuously urged the department to send
them some monitor-hu1ls without turrets, to be used for the purpose of reconnoissance and as torpedo boats. Five of the light-draughts most advanced were
therefore ordered to be finished without the turret. When relieved of this weight
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the necessity and expense of raising their sides, and thereby increasing their
capacity, was obviated. The other fifteen were recommended to be enlarged by
building them higher, thus increasing their capacity about one hundred and
thirty tons, and rendering them consequently more efficient. Previously the
same plan was adopted in constructing and completing the second batch of
monitor vessels which have just passed through the baptism of fire at Fort
Fisher, and have remained at anchor on that coast--exposed as it is in the
winter season-ninety miles from a harbor, during the most terrific gale of wind
ever experienced, according to the Wilmington papers, and performing, as RearAdmiral Porter reports, to the admiration of everybody.
" Are the other vessels contracted for to be built on a plan or model similar
to the Chimo, lately launched ai Boston 1"
I have already stated that twenty light-draught monitors were contracted for
in the spriug and summer of 1863. All were designed upon the monitor plan,
which has been so serviceable, but modifications and alterations were made of
five, omitting the turrets for specific purposes by special request of naval officers.
The resolution, in conclusion, calls for "all information which may be had
touching said gunboats."
The necessity of light-draught iron-clads to operate in the bays, sounds and
rivers, as well as for defensive purposes, was forced upon the department at an
early period of the present struggle. Not only was the contest in which we
were engaged peculiar, but the means and measures to meet and suppress it,
particularly those of the navy, were novel and without precedent. Most of the
lines of army communication were by water, and the navy was expected to
protect them and render them secure. A brief experience and a few engagements made it evident that light-draught, unprotected, wooden boats, with magazines, machinery and boilers exposed, could be driven off by field artillery behind earth works. Light-draught iron-clads became, therefore, an imperious .necessity, and the convictions of the department, and of all indeed who gave the
subject intelligent consideration, were irresistibly in favor of such vessels; but
we were without models, and the wants of the country were pressing. Neither
of the maritime powers of Europe had built or attempted to build a light-draught
iron-clad. The Navy Department, in this emergency, was compelled to feel its
way, without experience or precedent in any quarter to gnide it. Appeals had
been made in vain to Congress to provide a proper establishment for the construction of iron and armored vessels, where plans and models might have been
developed and matured with studied deliberation and skill. When the contracts
for these vessels were entered into, delays were inadmissible. Difficulties with
foreign powers seemed imminent, and, in the absence of any national establishment, immediate contracts for the construction of armored vessels were called
for on every hand. 'l'he authorities of the States and cities on the seaboard
were appealing to the department and the government for iron-clad vessels to
defend their harbors from the two or three rovers that were then already abroad,
and great apprehensions were entertained that certain formidable ships in the
process of construction in :~!...,ranee and England for the rebels would soon visit our
coast. Many who may now be forward to criticise and censure the enlarged
and energetic action that was taken were at that time profuse in censure of the
department for delays in not more promptly providing whatever vessels were
necessary for the service.
Congress having omitted to provide an establishment for the construction of
an iron navy where this class of armored vessels of light-draught could be constructed, the department has been compelled to rely on con~ractors and outside
parties in different sections of the country for the work. The parties contracting
have generally exerted themselves to meet in good faith the requirements of the
government, and it is a subject of just congratulation that, in this great emergency, when the department was compelled to act without precedent to guide
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it, and when the ~overnment had omitted to furnish a suitable establishment,
private enterprise and our skilled mechanics have so well met the difficulties
presented.
Mr. J. B. Eades, of St. Louis, furnished the light-draught river boats which,bave
been so successful on the Mississippi and also in the bay of :Mobile. Captain
Ericsson, the inventor of the Monitor class of vessels, furnished the idea which
is now near practical consummation. Although as yet untried, these vessels
differ so little from the original Monitor that there is every reason to anticipate
their success. To predict otherwise would be presumption, yet it has been the
misfortune of the department to encounter hostility and forebodings of failure
with every improvement which has been made during the war, and often from
those of whom encouragement and support might reasonably have been expected. Some of the best engineers and constructors in the service of the
government, as well as others, expressed their want of confidence in the first
Monitor, and declared it would prove a failure ; it was represented that she
could not float-that she would plunge to the bottom when launched, and that
to send her to Hampton roads would be recklessness amounting to crime. A
constant succession of struggles against prejudice, ignorance, and fixed habits
and opinions, has been the fate of the department at every step which the extraordinary exigencies of this war bas compelled it to take. While it is not
difficult to criticise and point out mistakes in a new description of vessel, which
the change in naval warfare has suddenly called into existence, and to suggest
alterations and improvement:;; on what has already transpired, it is a satisfaction
to the department, which was compelled to encounter this opposition, to know
that this class of vessels, subjected at the beginning to ridicule, and subsequently
to obloquy and denunciation, has been successfully tried in battle and in
storm-that these vessels have equalled the expectations of the country in
periods of peril, and are being extensively copied abroad. Other governments
are adopting them, while many of the discontented of our own country still
question the wisdom of building vessels of the class which bas at a critical moment rendered unequalled service to the Union and saved the capital of the
nation.
In encouraging contrast with the illiberal and prejudiced opinions which
have opposed all improvements, denounced them in advance as failures, and
been dissatisfied even with successful results, are the observations and reflections of the sagacious and sensible author of the recent valuable work ori
"English and French Neutrality," who, appreciating the difficulties of the department, remarks, at page 458 of his instructive volume :
., It is no small proof of ability in the management of the navy that there
was skill enough to provide, and independence enough to use, a form of warship and a kind of cannon before untried, but which time and experience have
shown were alone, of all ships ann weapons then known, capable of meeting
the emergency."
At the present time the call for light-draught iron-clads comes from every
squadron engaged in this struggle. Acting Rear-Admiral Lee says that within
the limits of his command there must be a large increase of light-draught ironclads. Vice-Admiral l!"'arragut, before he left the scene of his great exploits,
asked for additional iron-clads, especially those of light-draught, and declared
that the coast could not be held unless he bad them. In each of the blockading and river squadrons they are required.
Nearly two years have elapsed since any contracts have been entered into
for this class of vessels, and it is hoped the present war is so near its close that
no further expenditures for additional ones will be necessary ; hut should the
war continue a year longer, more will be wanted.
My acknowledgments are due to the committee for tbis opportunity to express my views. I shall feel under obligations to them or others, as will the
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whole country, for any improvements or suggestions which they may propose
in consequence of their investigations, or for any undetected errors or mistakes
which they may discov0r, in order that their conclusions and recommendations
in this great emergency may be brought to the aid of the department on this
most interesting and important subject.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of tlw Navy.
Hon. B. F. WADE,
Cl~airman f!! the Committee on the Conduct if the War.

WASHINGTON,

January 21, 1865.

Captain G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your official position 1
Answer. I am Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
Question. 'l'he committee have been instructed to inquire into the matter of
the construction, &c., of the light-draught monitors, so called. Will you state
to the committee the objects and purposes for which those monitors were constructed 1
Answer. They were intended for in-shore work in rivers, creeks, inlets, and
bays where our vessels were obliged to go in the operations of the war; stv•.h
as defending the lines and communications of the army, and for offem.ive operations on the part of the navy; the whole southern country being filled with
creeks, very differently from our northern country. "\Ve cannot keep possession of such places with wooden boats. Light-draught wooden boats have
their magazines, machinery, and boilers above the water, and they can be prevented entering into these creeks by musketry; or if not by musketry, by artillery. We lost a great many vessels, men, and valuable officers in attempting it, and they finally demanded, as it were, some iron vessels, which would
penetrate those rivers and creeks, and hold them against the lighter works
which the enemy used.
Question. Were those monitors constructed upon any new plan 1
Answer. They were a copy of the original Monitor, with the addition of what
is called a raft of wvod around them of three feet thick, for the purpose of preventing them from being rammed, penetrated, and sunk, as many of our vessels
had been.
Question. What draught were they intended to have 1
Answer. From six feet eight inches to seven feet.
Question. Were they all constructed upon the same plan 1
Answer. Precisely, with this difference, that when we had contracted for
thirteen of them the fight at Charleston took place, which demonstrated the
necessity of additions to all the monitors to strengthen them. The contract for
the additional number, involving the changes demonstrated to be necessary by
that fight, did not involve any extra expense.
Question. With whom did you consult first with reference to the construction
of those monitors 1
Answer. We consulted with the people in our department. Mr. Lenthall is
our chief of construction, and he declared it would be impossible to make an
iron-clad vessel for seven feet of water.
Part I Y - - 6
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Question. What draught of water were they designed to have, according to
contract 1
Answer. From six and a half to seven feet-I think not to exceed seven feet.
I then wrote to Captain Ericsson, in~uiring if it was possible to construct such
a vessel. At. first he thought it was Impossible. It never had been done anywhere in the world. He finally presented this plan of a monitor with a wooden
raft.
Question. Did he make a proposition to the Navy Department as to how he
would build them 1
Answer. Yes, sir, at the request of the department.
Question. Who superintended the construction1
Answer. We advertised for proposals on the general plan of Captain Ericsson, modified and changed by Mr. Stimers.
Question. Do you recollect the difference between the plan proposed by Captain EricRson and the plan as modified by Mr. Stimers1
Answer. There was considerable .difference in the engines and machinery.
Captain Ericsson's was only a general idea, without a plan. He is a peculiar
man, and he works out his plan as he goes along. He tried that with the
original Monitor and the Dictator. At the commencement he gives a general
idea of a vessel, and as he goes on he works out the details. Stimers't~ plan is
an elaboration of Ericsson's.
Question. After the plan of these monitors was first designed, was the plan
not changed 1
Answer. Some additions and extras were added.
Question. Was the depart.Jpent consulted from time to time in reference to
these alterations and changes 1
Answer. It seems that they were not, though it should have been done.
I ought to state here, as you want to know why we took Stimers's plan instead of Ericsson's, that Ericsson gave a general idea only, and Mr. Stimers,
who was working in Captain Ericsson's office, under his directions, and on perfectly amicable terms, elaborated his plan, and Mr. Lenthall and Mr. Isherwood
preferred Stimers's plan to Ericsson's. When we advertised for proposals there
was only the matter of ten thousand dollars difference between Captain Ericsson's offer and Mr. Stimers's. Stimers's plan was elaborate and full, and, in the
opinion of Lenthall and Isherwood, was better than Captain Ericsson's.
Question. Did not one important difference consist in tl1is: that one contemplated water-tanks, to be filled with water, which could be pumped out, and the
vessels thereby lightened if they run aground 1
Answer. 'l'hat arrangement was added by Admiral Smith. Stimers did not
propose it. 'l'hey were put in on Admiral Smith's suggestion. That was a
very important variation fi·om the original plan, and has involved a great deal
of expense and trouble.
Question. Did not that add very much to the weight of the craft 1
Answer. Yes, sir, it complicated the question very much.
Question. Was the department consulted about that variation before it was
carried into effect 1
Answer. Yes, sir. It was approved or consented to by Mr. Lenthall, who
was our chief constructor. He did not think very favorably of it, or very unfavorably of it; but Admiral Smith thought well of it, and the change was made
at his suggestion.
Question. Did it not involve a great deal of ma~hinery, such as pipes,
pumps, &c.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know what the additional expent~e has been of the various
changes which have been made from time to time from the original draught or
proposition 1
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Answer. I should not like to say from recoiiection, as that is a matter of
exact record, and can be obtained at the department. I don't think the matter
is entirely closed yet between the department and the contractor<~.
Question. Did these monitors, according to their original plan, with turrets,
answer the purposes for which they were designed 1
Answer. They would not float; that is, they floated so near the surface of
the water that it was not safe to send them where they were wanted. The
building of light-draught vessels on the western waters involved no complication,
because they were not to go to sea. '!'he building them on the coast of the
United States involved other questions, because of the fact that they would
have to be taken by sea around to the ports where they were needed, and that
sea on the Atlantic coast is the worst in the world. It is bad enough in summer; and in winter no coast is so bad. Therefore these boats had to be constructed entirely different from the western boats. Here we have to take them
to sea to get them where we want them, and that constitutes the complication
of building them on the seaboard.
Question. After they failed to answer th~ purpose according to their origina
construction, did you undertake to change them 1
Answer. We put them into the hands of Admiral Gregory, Captain Ericsson,
Chief Engineer Wood, and associated Chief Engineer King with them, and
called upon them to propose to the department what had better be done to
render them useful. They recommended that they should be lifted up in precisely the same manner as were the second class of monitors which were found
to be too low. We built them up twenty-two inches, with the exception of five.
As Admirals Dahlgren and Lee wanted some monitors sent to them without
turrets, it was determined that five of them should be floated by taking the
turrets out, instead of by lifting them up.
Question. Have any of them been finished so as to be submitted to a test
to determine their usefulness 1
Answer. No, sir. I think I should say in regard to these vessels that they
were an experiment, as everything else connected with naval matters bas been
during this war. We had no tools when the war commenced. When the
President declared the coast of the United States, which was greater than that
of all Europe, under blockade, there were no vessels, no men, no sailors, and
but very few officers to make the blockade effectual. That clique of traitors, of
which Barron and Maury were the chief, had run the government for twenty- .
five or thirty years, and when they went off they took away many of the
archives ofthe department, and when we went in there, there was nothing but
a great war upon hand. All those old ships of ours seemed to have been built
with the idea that they never should enter southern po · ts. The gun department, under Admiral Dahlgren's charge, had been kept in a high state of efficiency. Our guns were the best shell guns in existence, and are now. They
have never been surpassed. In the matter of constructing vessels we had verr
little experience, and we were called upon to take charge of this whole southern .
coast. In building our monitors we had no aid from former experience; men
differed as to the practicability of the plan; Lenthall said the monitors would
go to the bottom, and Isherwood had no confidence. And yet we went ahead
and built them; and when we were called upon to assist in the attack on
Charleston, every captain of the monitors declared they could not remain there '
in a storm of wind. Our own people, as loyal as you and I are, had no faith ;
but we had to go ahead or fail, and go ahead we did. We won with the original.
Monitor, and we thought that the best type of a vessel for shore work ..
Abroad no vessel for war purposes had been built of a light draught. They had
never built anything of a lighter draught than from twenty to twenty-seven feet ..
Those vessels could not be used on the coast of the United States except in
one or two ports. They are built for European warfare. When a vessel is
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bunt of 8,000 tons the question is a simple one. Suppose you have to carry, as
did the knights of old, eighty pounds of arms; if you were ten times as strong
and large as you are, you could carry them easily, and even more. So in
England, they met this question of carrying heavy arms by building vessels so
big that they could carry the arms with no difficulty. But the question with
us was to construct the smallest vessel and yet have it carry an armor that
should resist shot. At the west that question was a very simple one, where
the vessel was not exposed to a gale of wind and high seas. But on the
Atlantic coast the question was a very different one. We lost one monitor in a,.
gale.
Now, in reference to these light-draught monitors, so called, we took the
Monitor as a type of a shore vessel, because it had been successful. Theso
vessels have failed inasmuch as they were overloaded. It was a miscalculation
from want of skill and care in the engineer who worked out the weights,
There should have been more allowance made for them. If that had beeB done1'
and the vessels had been built without those water tanks, with engines of very
simple construction, without the surface condensers, and without any unnecessary jimcracks, they would have been finished a year ago, and we should have
had them to assist in the attack on vVilmington, which was one object in having
them constructed. As it was, we had to make the attack without them.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Are you sufficiently acquainted with the plan of Captain Ericsson
to be able to say he could have built those monitors as he designed, and not
have had them draw over six or six and a half feet of wated
Answer. It is a matter of calculation as to what a vessel will draw, and
Ericsson has more ability to make that calculation truly than any man living.
I will add that his vessel would have been more simple, more cheaply made,
with less machinery, and would have been done in less time. But the pxice he
proposed was only, I think, $10,000 less than the enlarged and elaborate plan
of Mr. Stimers, which, in the opinion of Lenthall and Isherwood, would make a
much superior vessel.
Question. Were not instructions given to Stimers to confer with Captain
Ericsson 1
Answer. Mr. Lenthall has that order. I have seen it. I hunted it up, because I carried that order from the Secretary to Lenthall. It was, not to permit any change or alteration without consulting with Captain Ericsson ; and we
never imagined it was otherwise.
Question. When was it first discovered that such was not the case 1
Answer. I cannot say when; but it was after the work was -very well advanced.
Q,uestion. Then, among the changes you made, you proposed to build the
sides of the monitors up twenty-two inches 1
Answer. Yes, sir; to lift them up as you would lift up the roof of a house,
and put in half a story of walls.
Question. How much will that increase the draught beyond that originally contemplated 1
Answer. About a foot.
Question. Then for what purpose will those monitors be useful1
Answer. A vessel of eight feet draught will be able to enter any of the southern creeks and ports which we have been in. 'I'hey wHI go into all the southern ports, where we have been operating, and in case of a war with a maritime
power, with England for instance, she will have to attack us with wooden vessels, because her iron-clads are of too great draught to operate on our coast with
the exception of two or three harbors; and one light-draught monitor, in my
·Opinion, is more than a match for any wooden vessel in the English navy, not
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excepting the Victoria, a three-decker, and 130 guns; for this reason she can
keep in shoal water and choose her distance, while the other vessel cannot reach
her. At such a distance as she chooses she would be invulnerable, and could
set the other vessel on fire with shell without difficulty.
Question. When these vessels are built up as ll<>W proposed, how will their
ability to go from port to port compare with those originally designed 1
Answer. These vessels are not built for sea-going vessels, but they will be
very much improved for this reason : the strength of a vessel is in a great degree dependent on her depth. The higher the sides of a vessel, the stronger
she is, because it is like taking a plank and attempting to break it edgewise;
if it is two inches you will snap it; if it is six inches you cannot. The stronger
they are, the better able they are to get along the coast.
Question. If these vessels had been far enough out of water as to have rendered it desirable, in case of a fight, that they should be sunk lower, would not
the tanks suggested Ly Admiral Smith have been an improvement 1
Answer. Unquestionably; and not only that, but if in running with the
tanks full she should get aground, the pumping out of the water would lift her
four inches, and that four inches might allow her to get off in one hour, or on
one tide, when otherwise she might remain for days. But the objection to the
tanks was, that it complicated the problem, which was already a complicated
one, of getting a light-draught vessel with a heavy armor; and it also added to
the expense, and delayed their construction, so that we have been obliged to
operate without them, when they were designed to be of great use in the war.
Question. What was intended or expected to be the speed of these monitors 1
Answer. My impression is that the speed was to be about seven and a half
knots.
Question. Do you know what the speed of those which have been tried has
proved to be 1
Answer. The only one that has been tried is the one which carne around
from Boston without a turret, and fitted out as a torpedo vessel. She ran five
knots.
Question. Do you know whether or not there has been any fault or imperfection in the engines of those vessels, which has prevented their attaining the
speed originally contemplated 1
Answer. There has been some dispute about the engines. Captain Ericsson
thinks there is a great deal too much boiler for the size of the engine. li:lherwood thinks there is not. It is a difference of opinion among experts about
these engines, and they are investigating it in the House of Representatives.
The engines were unnecesf3arily expensive in their design, I think It is the
tendency of an engineer, and of a naval engineer especially, to elaborate; and
that, in time of war, adds not only to the expense, but creates enormous delay,
for the reason that establishments that make engines are accustomed to make
plain and cheap ones; and if they are called upon to make any others there is
likely to be great delay.
Question. Will it not probably be possible to increase the speed of those vessels, and will not their efficiency depend very much upon their rate of speed 1
Answer. A vessel which is built for the purpo~e of operating in the creeks
and shoal waters of our southern coast, and in our harbors, as these were, can
never operate anywhere else. Speed is not an important object. In a veesel
which goes to sea, speed is almost the highest consideration ; but in a harbor,
these vessels must operate on the defensive, and not on the offensive ; and on
the defensive you are to be attacked, and if you are to be attacked in port your
speed is not important. One of the elements of speed, and a yery important
element, is size; and size you cannot get with a light-draught, shoal-water
vessel, cased with iron. 1'he l\1:onadnuck is the fastest iron·cased vessel we
have got of the monitor class.
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Question. What is her speed 1
Answer. She will go ten knots, which is eleven and a half statute miles.
Question. Is she considered a great success 1
Answer. Yes, sir; everybody is perfectly delightea with her. She has two
screws, two turrets, and she can fire directly ahead, or behind, or on either side,
and Captain Parrott says he would just as soon be in her as in any other vessel.
I saw a letter this morning from Captain Thatcher, commanding the Colorado,
and he, who has heretofore had all the prejudices of his class against iron-clads,
says "I am a convert from this day forth to iron-clads; they have done better
than anything else." While they were all very anxious, during the storm at
Beaufort, about their big frigates, these iron-clads were safely riding at anchor
with the sea rolling over them.

WASHINGTON, .January 23, 1865.
Mr. JoHN LEN'I'HALL sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. What connexion have yon with the Navy Department 1
Answer. I am chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repairs.
Question. What do you know about the building of twenty light-draught monitors, under the act of Congress appropriating ten millions of dollars for that
purpose1
Answer. rrhe design for those vessels, which I saw, was a sketch submitted
by Captain Ericsson. The next was a more perfect plan, proposed by Engineer
Stimers. That was shortly before the advertisement was made for contracts.
Question. Did Mr. Ericsson ever submit any proposition to construct any of
these vessels 1
Answer. I think he did ; bnt it did not come to me. I think it was made
directly to the Navy Department.
Question. Can you state wherever, and in w'hat particulars, the plan of Mr.
Stimers dHfered from that of Mr. Ericsson 1
Answer. I should think the external forms of the vessels were almost identical.
I never c~ompared them, the one with the other, but my impression at the time
was that they were of the same external form. The plan that Mr. Stimers finally
determined on embraced a water chamber, which was not embraced in the plan of
Mr. Ericsson. That, I think, was the main feature of difference between them.
Question. Do you know what led the department to prefer the plan of Mr.
Stimers to that of Mr. Ericsson?
Answer. I cannot say. I will state that I recollect there were some minor
differences as to some of the outlines of the vessels, but nothing of any moment.
I made no particular examination of them however.
Question. vVhat agency had the Bureau of Construction and Repairs in making
the contracts for the building of these monitors and seeing that those contracts
were executed 1
Answer. When the plans had been prepared an advertisement was issued by
the Navy Department, and all the bids were received by it. The department
opened the bids and awarded the contracts. When that was done, I was directed, as in all other cases, to prepare the contracts. The contracts were executed by me merely as the agent of the department for executing such papers.
Question. You harl no power to judge and determine concerning the merits
of the different plans, &c.1
Answer. No, sir; there was, at that time, not sufficient data upon which any
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one could do that but the pPrson who devised the plan. It was merely an outline plan.
Question. Were these light-draught monitors with turrets an experiment at
that time 1
Answer. No, sir, I think not ; they were of the same genera] class and type
of vessel as the other monitors. 1'hese were designed more particularly for
rivers, wbile the others were for bays and harbors.
Question. These were designed to be of lighter draught and for shoaler water
than any you had before 1
Answer. Yes, sir; these were to be of six or seven feet draught. The others
were ten or eleven feet.
Question. Was Mr. Stimers, in constructing those vessels, directed to take
the advice and counsel of Mr. Ericsson 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I remember that, after the contract had been madeprobably six weeks after-one of the contractors suggested a change or modification, and he was directed to consult with Captain Ericsson upon the subject.
That letter was addressed to Admiral Gregory. There was no direct communication with Mr. Stimers.
Question. Had the department frequent correspondence with Mr. Stimers
while those vessels were being built 1
Answer. No, sir, not a great deal; I think none directly with Mr. Stimers.
Question. Was the department consulted from time to time in regard to the
alterations that were made 1
Answer. I think not; or very seldom.
Question. Had he any communication or correspondence with your bureau,
or with the department 1
Answer. He had none direct with me.
Question. Do you know whether he had with the Navy Department 1
Answer. I cannot tell.
Question. Do you know whether he did make alterations without consulting
with your bureau or with the department 1
Answer. I think there were some alterations made by him; I do not know
what they were; I cannot call them to mind now.
Question. Can you tell what the expense of those alterations was 1
Answer. We have paid some extra bills. Some of the alterations were suggested as modifications rendered necessary by the experience before Charleston. Some of those were paid for; I do not know but all of them have been
paid for .
.Question. Do you know whether Mr. Stimers did consult Mr. Ericsson, as he
was directed to do, as to the propriety of any of these alterations 1
Answer. I do not know; after giving the order for him to do so, I took it
for granted that the order was Cf:Lrried out. I had no means of knowing whether
he carried it out or not.
Question. Have you any evidence that he did so consult with him 1
Answer. No, sir; I have no evidence one way or the other.
Question. I think you have already stated that you do not know why the
department preferred the plan of Mr. Stimers to that of Mr. Eric8son?
Answer. No, sir; I do not know. Externally they were substantially the
same. I did not measure them, or put the one drawing upon the other. But
to the eye they appeared to be substantially the same thing.
Question. Was not Ericsson's the simplest and the easiest and quickest to
get up 1
Answer. The water chamber was the principal addition made to Mr. Stimers's
vessel.
Question. What useful purpose was that water chamber supposed to subserve 1
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Answer. It was, I presume, to increase the draught of the vessel upon occasion to lower it in the water, when under fire in time of action.
Question. That addition was afterwards abandoned, was it not 1
Answer. When they had to reduce the weight of the vessel, they had to
abandon it.
Question. Were these light-draught monitors as constructed by Mr. Stimers
of any consequence 1 would they answer the purpose for which they were
originally desig·ned 1
Answer. They were more deeply immersed than it was suppo::~ed they would
be. Their decks were down on awash with the water.
Question. And they could not carry their turrets 1
Answer. They could not carry their turrets with all that it was intended to
put on them. They were intended to be fifteen inches out of the water, or
about that much.
Question. Was it not a great fault in the construction of a vessel to make
auch a difference in the amount of displacement 1
Answer. It appears now that all the alterations increased the weight of the
vessel, which, I suppose, was not at first intended or calculated. There was a
constant addition of weight.
Question. Should not a naval constructor know how he was increasing the
weight, and calculate so as not to sink his vessel down too far in the wated
Answer. I had supposed that was done; I do not know whether it was done
or not.
Question. They certainly could not have done so if the vessel would not
carry all the weight it was contemplated it should carry. However, I will ask
what was the condition of these monitors at the time it was ascertained they
would not answer their original design 1 How many were completed 1
Answer. I think only one, when it was ascertained that they would not
carry the weight that it was designed to place on them.
Question. At how early a period was it ascertained that they were defective
in that respect 1
Answer. I have not the dates with me, but I think it was some time in the
spring, or early in the summer of last year.
Question. I would like to ascertain about that.
Answer. I think it was ascertained from a vessel in Boston, the Ohimo.
Question. Can you tell in what condition each of these twenty light-draught
monitors were at that time 1
Answer. I do not remember now. I think I can ascertain from the records
of the bureau.
Question. As soon as it was ascertained that those monitors were defective
in that Tespect, did the department stop all further work on them 1
Answer. I think it did ; but the work on these monitors was under the control of Admiral Gregory. He communicated with me or the department as he
seemed to think necessary.
Question. As I understand it, after it was ascertained that those monitors
would not answer the purpose for which they were originally designed, a commission was appointed to examine them, and devise what remedy could be
applied 1
Answer. r.rhat was ordered by the department; I do not now remember when it
was.
Question. They proposed that the sides of the vessels should be built up
twenty-two inches.
Answer. Yes, sir; they made that suggestion.
Question. What will be the expense of tbat 1
Answer. Admiral Gregory recPived proposals from all the contractors, varying
from $70,000 to $90,000. Some of the vessels were in a greater state of fOl·wardness than others.
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Qnestion. And the expense of building up the sides was greater according
to the greater state of forwardness of the vessel 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Are you a nautical man enough to be able to say whether these
vessels in their improved state will be useful vessels 1
Answer. I think they will be useful for river service-not for sea service.
Question. What speed have they now, according to the best information which
the department has 1
Answer. I think they have made four knots.
Question. That would hardly enable them to stem the current of the Mississippi, would it 1
Answer. I do not know what the current of the Mississippi it'!, and therefore
I cannot tell. Of course their greater immersion has reduced their speed from
what it would otherwise have been.
Question. Do you recollect the speed of the one without a turret which was
brought around from Boston to New York 1
Answer. I do not remember exactly. I think it was something ovm· four
knots, as near as I can now recollect. But I hardly think a trial on the ocean is
a fair trial for tliese vessels.
Que13tion. Was it really prudent in the department to direct the construction
upon the same model of so many vessels, when it was rather an experiment 1
Answer. So far as being mo;nitor vessels was concerned, they were not an experiment.
Question. But we had not made any light-draught monitors to ascend rivers,
&c., at that time 1
Answer. No, sir. I am not competent to judge as to the policy of building
so large a number, for that would not come within the sphere of my judgment.
When they commenced I did not know how many they intended to make, and
at the time the advertisement was issued I do not think the department itself
bad determined how many it would make. But I cannot state as to that.
Question. 'rbese were all to be built upon the same model?
Answer. Yes, sir; that is often the case. When the first authority was given
to build steam frigates, six were built at once. They told me to design and
build five of them; and they were all upon the same model.
Question. But they were a kind of vessel which was old-fashioned and well
understood ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Will you furnish the committee, from the records of your bureau,
whatever information you have concerning the time when it was discovered these
monitors were defective, when the commiE>sion was appointed, and when and
what they reported; the condition in which each ve~sel was at that time, and
the expense of raising or modifying each vessel as proposed 1
Answer. I will do so, as far as I can.
NAVY DEPARTMENT, BuREAU oF CoNSTRUCTION A~D REPAIR,

January 26, 1865.
STR: In reply to the inquiries in the memorandum handed me by the committee, I would respectfully state1. The department was informed by Admiral Gregory, on the 31st May, 1864,
that the O?imo had proved defective.
2. The work that might interfere with modifications to these vessels was
then suspended.
3. Some of the vessels were nearly completed; others from two-thirds to
three-fourths finished.
4. The corpmittee to examine the vessels was appointed by the department
on the 11th June. and their report was dated the 9th July, 1864.

90

LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS.

5. Accompanying is the cost, as agreed on by Admi,ral Gregory, for making
these vessels twenty-two il).ches deeper, which increased their tonnage one hundred and thirty tons. Five of these vessels have been converted for torpedo
purposes.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN LENTHALL,
Cl~iif of Bureau.

Ron.

BENJAMIN

:F'.

WADE,

Chairman qf the Committee on the Conduct if tlw War,
United States Senate, Washington.
STATEMENT.

Name.
.

Cost of raising
vessel 22 inches.

Nauset ...........•.... $86, 000 00
Cohoes.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89, ODO 00
Waxsaw...... . . . . . . . . 89, 140 25
Squando . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90, 000 00
Shawnee . . . . . • . . . . . . . . 90, 000 00
Suncook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87, 500 00
Wassuc............... 55,275 60
Umpqua...... . . . . . . . . 85, 000 00

Name.

Cost of rai sing
vessel 22' inches.

Etlah ....•.... ·. . . . . . $82, 500 00
Klamath ,...... . . . . . . 89, 000 00
Yuma............... 89, 000 00
Koka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58, 665 86
Shiloh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82, 500 00
rrunxis ......... -.. . . 115, 500 00
Yazoo ............... 68,000 00

WASHINGTON, Februa'r y .11, 1865.
C. STIMERS sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your position in the navy of the United States 1
Answer. I aw a chief engineer of the navy.
Question. We have been directed by a resolution of the Senate to inquire
into the building of certain light-draught iron-clads, twenty in number, with
which we understand you h~d something to do.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Please tell us, in your own way, all that you know about their construction, and whatever of importance you may think it necessary to state in
that connexion.
Answer. These vessels of course have a history, and I propose to give you a
full understanding of that history, as far as I know it, in order that you may
know something about them. We were building monitors designed by Captain
Ericsson. Admiral Gregory was the general superintendent of their construction. I served under him in the capacity of gelileral inspector. The duty of
general inspector was only to see that the materials were good, and that the
work was well done. In performing that duty, I had to visit the various points
where the vessels were building, to examine them. There we!'e serving under
me local inspectors, who during the time I was absent followed my instructions
in regard to these examinations. Besides the duty of general inspector proper,
I had other duties to perform.
The first monitor was about to be built, it having been proposed by Captain
Ericsson, and accepted by the government, after the advice of a board of our
highest naval officers, among whom was Rear-Admiral Joseph Smith; who
being a bureau officer, it was placed under his direction to be built. I was orALBAN
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dered to superintend that building. At the time I received those orders I was
engaged in the blockading fleet off Charleston, and I came here to receive instructions. They were the usual instructions, to see that the materials were
good and that the work was well done, and to use all vigilance. But in charging
me verbally in regard to it, the Secretary said: " You have been chosen for this
duty because we understand you to be an engineer who looks at new things
without prejudice, either for or against; and we want such a man for this thing.
Now I wish you to go to New York and work with Captain Ericsson, as well
as you can. This being a new thing, it is probable that he will find a great
many details which he will want to modify. Whatever you and he can agree
upon between you, as being better for the vessel or for the government, you can
do it. Do not trouble us with letters about inatters which we certainly cannot
understand here. This is so different from things which we have had to do with
before, that you must judge about these things yourself. We believe that Captain Ericsson is devoted to what he projects, and will think more of his reputation than he will of a dollar or two; and you will look out for the interests of
the government."
It was provided in the contract that the vessel Rhould have masts and sails
sufficifnt to drive it six knots an hour, in a fair breeze of wind. That was put
in in Washington-not by Captain Ericsson.
Question. By whose order was that put in 1
Answer. I suppose it was upon the recommendation of the Board of Admiralty that examined the planR, but I do not know. The contract was given
to me in that way. Captain Ericsson laid it before me, and pointed out many
things of that kind that he thought it would be better to change. I took the
advice of such naval officers as I could meet with, whom [ thought good authority, in regard to the masts and sails. I consulted with Admiral Stringham,
and be agreed with me that it would be very bad to put them on ; and under
the authority which had been given to me, I assumed to leave them out. And
it was understood that, in regard to many matters, questions of cost, &c., they
should be left until the final payment. There was a reserve of twenty-five per
cent., to be paid after it was found that everything was satisfactory. l state
these things to show you that in building this very new clasf'i of vessels, there
had to be a great deal of consultation between the designer and the inspector,
besides the duty which was imposed 1.1pon me of looking to the excellence of the
materials and workmanship. When the Monitor was completed, we went down
with it to Hampton roads and fpught with the Merrimac. Its success was so
marked that it was decided by the government that they would not experiment
auy mor~, as we were in the midst of a great war, but would adopt immediately
something which had proved itself so successful. They accordingly went on to
build more of the same class right away after that; we commenced ten vessels
that were to be like the original Monitor, with the exception of having such
improvements as onr experience in going from New York to Hampton roads,
and in the battle there, had pointed out as proper. As I had been the superintendent of the first vessel, had gone in her to sea, and had been with her
during the fight, I was looked to by the government to point out those things
which would be improvements; and it was stipulated in the new contracts that
the working drawings should be submitted to me. I do not remember the exact
expression in the contract, but it was discussed in the Navy Department, and it
was decided to put that clause in-that is, that Captain Ericsson should show
me his plans before they were issued to the workmen. That, however, did not
work well in operation, as Captain Ericsson was a proud man, and I did not
fthink it g-ood policy to do anything to hurt his feelings. He therefore was not
in the habit of showing me his drawings. He was an older man than I was,
and I had respect for his age and experience; and I found the drawings as I
could. Still we had to consult together a great deal about these new vessels.
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We had only that one trip at sea, and that one battle of the first vessel, for experience. While this was going on, and these vessels were being built, the
government looked forward to building more. They found that the war assumed
greater proportions, and they wanted a greater number of these vessels. Besides, they had always felt that it was necessary to prepare for foreign wars.
When I was going to New York to assume the new duties of constructing
more vessels, the Secretary of the Navy said to me: "I wish you to keep in
your mind always that these vessels may not be used in this war, but may be
required to protect our harbors against-the iron-clad vessels of foreign nations.
Always keep in view, during their construction, that that 'is the most important
point to consider. ':J:.1bose things which occur in battle between heavy ships
and iron ves~els are the things for which you must provide."
·
I was showing you that they were going on to build more vessels. But there
was no one to de~ign them, and that created a difficulty at once. Of course I
was familiar with that to a certain extent, but I was busy as general inspector,
and had no time to design vessels. It was proposed in the first place that I
should design some vessels, for they did not like all of Captain Ericsson's
plans ; and it was proposed that I should design some vessels in New York,
and lea-ve out some of the things which they considered imperfections in his
plans. But after I got there I told them I shruld have my hands full to act
as general inspector. And I found, too, that Captain Ericsson had some feeling upon the subject. He did not like that any other than himself should design monitors. I told them that I thought we could get all his genius for our
benefit better by looking to him as the head of the whole matter, leaving him
to design everything, while I would act as general inspector, and would employ
all my time to see those plans carried out. That plan was accordingly adopted.
Now when we came to build some more than these ten monitors, we did not
like some of their peculiarities. We wanted more speed, and some other qualities which they did not possess. Captain Ericsson was himself too busy to
design othfirs ; I was too busy to make them, and we had no one else to go to.
I then suggested to Captain Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, that if
he would permit me to establish an office in New York near Captain Ericsson's
office, and hire some draughtsmen, and put an aesistant engineer there, an officer of the government, to see that they performed their work properly, we could
get Captain Ericsson to draw a general plan which would embody these
changes, and then he could let me have the drawings which he had, and these
draughtsmen could modify them. It would only require a few directions to
make the modifications. If he would do that, I would promise him that no
drawing should go out of my office until it had been submitted to Captain Ericsson for his approval; so that we could retain Captain Ericsson as designer,
without putting upon him the labor of making the designs. That was thought
the best way of getting out of the difficulty, and it was done. About this
time of getting up a new class, of which we built nine, of the river and h:ubor
monitors, Captain Ericsson drew a general plan and submitted a general description of the river aod harbor monitors of the Tippecanoe class. r.rhose
plans and descriptions were submitted here, advertised for, and contractors
took contracts to build them. 1'he specifications were made out in my office,
constantly consulting with Captain Ericsson and Mr. Fox about the changes
upon which we all agreed. 'I'he general plan was made by Captain Ericsson
and transferred to me; and from that we made out the working plans.
Just about this time we talked also about a light-draught vessel. We were
getting possession of the western rivers, on which we needed some of them, as
well as in a great many of our harbors, where we found that we wanted vessels
of a light draught to go under heavy batteries and come out again. l\'Ir. Fox was
very solicitous that we should get up something of that kind. Captain Ericsson said he would get up a general plan, in the same way as before; he did so,
and it was sent on to Washington. There was cousiderable delay about it,
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however; and they were in a great hurry for the vessels, for they wanted them
very much indeed. Every letter from Mr. Fox contained something about
hurrying up Captain Ericsson about the light-draught monitors. I had occasion to come on to Washington at times, and the first time after the plans were
sent on here-perhaps a month after-! inquired at the department what they
were going to do about the light-draught monitors, or whether they had given
up the project altogether. Mr. Fox said, " No, not at all." But he said
they had been going on here, acting independently of the bureaus of construction and engineering. 'fhe first monitors were built under the direction of
Admiral Joseph Smith, who was chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, not
of Construction. The contracts for the Passaic class were given out by him,
but were afterwards transferred to the chief of the Bureau of Construction. I
think there was some delay about the confirmations of the chiefs of the bnreaus
of construction and engineering by the Senate, which caused some delny in
this matter. But it was partly because those two officers did not belin·c in
iron-clads, and especially in the monitors, in Ericsson, and all that; they were
opposed to the whole thing, and lent no assistance to it. The Secretary and
Assistant Secretary, advised by Admiral Smith, brought these things out independently of the bureau. Mr. Fox said: "Now that our heads of bureaus
are confirmed in their places, they must do their work. We have taken all the
responsibility thus far, but now these men must take their responsibility. I
have therefore sent the plans down to the Bureau of Construction. Mr. Lenthall says that he does not see anything in his part of the ship which is at all
out of the way, and he does not advise any changes. I have also sent the
plans to the Bureau of Engineering, to see if the chief of that bureau has any
objection to the arrangement of the machinery. He says he thinks th ere ought
to be some modifications; but he is out of town, and you must wait until tomorrow to see him, and then you will find out his views. You have Captain
Ericsson's views about the machinery; if you find that the chief of the Bureau
of EngiueE;)ring has views to which Captain Ericsson will not agree, try to get
the two together, so that we. can get a plan on which both will agree, because
we want these vessels to meet Captain Ericsson's views, and the views of our
bureau. If you cannot bring them together s·o that they will be reconciled,
then we will build one on Ericsson's plan, and one on the plan of the bureau;
and if you have a plan, we will build one on your plan also." Said I, "No,
sir, I have no plan; I have more to do than ever.''
'fhe next day I saw Mr. Isherwood, the chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, and I found that he wanted the coal-bunkers arranged in a different
way-he wanted entirely different boilers-he wanted different engines. Instead of their being athwart engines, connected directly with the screw-shaft,
he wanted them connected with bevel gearing. Not to go through the whole
matter, he had changed everything-coal-bunkers, boilers, engines, and propellers. I discussed these matters with him, and brought him to consent to some
modifications, which I thought perhaps Captain Ericsson would agree to. He
gave me some sketches, plans, &c., and it was decided th:tt as I had draughtsmen, I should take them to New York, and if Captain Ericsson agreed to them,
I should embody them in a new plan and send it on again toWashington. I went
to Captain Ericsson, and he did not like any of the proposed changes at all.
He thought each one injurious to the vessel-that it made the plan less excellent than his was. "But," said he, "if they will not build more than one of
these vessels unless I give way. of course I think the government ought to
have them; they will be very useful indeed, and I think they ought to build
more than one right away. The chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering
knows how to work engines, and drive the vessel along, of course; so I think
we better consent "-with the exception, however, that he would not listen to
gear-engines at all. He said they would certainly fail if placed in such limber
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vessels as these would be. As the chief of the bureau had given me these plans,
and these directions to work them into a general plan if I found I could do it,
with the understanding that I was to retain the original type if the bevel-gear
arrangement would not work so well, I withdrew that part, and Captain
Ericsson assented to all the rest. I afterwards reported to the chief of the
Bureau of Steam Engineering that I found I could not work in the bevel-gear
plans.. I do not remember that I told him why I could not work them in, but
I told him that I could not, and he _gave his approval to the plans which I did
work in. The diameter of the cylinders, however, was reduced from the design
of Captain Ericsson, who had :fixed upon thirty-six inches. The chief of the
bureau thought eighteen inches large enough, but consented to my making them
twenty-two inches. I took the plans to my office, and placed them in charge
of a second assistant engineer who had been an apprentice in the Novelty Iron
Works for several years, and was acquainted with drawing, calculating, &c.
Question. What was his name 1
Answer. Theodore Allen. He was quite a young man, but the ablest engineer that I had under my control, except the local inspectors, whom I could
not employ for that purpose. I placed these plans in his charge, and detailed
certain draughtsmen to work for him. I had in this office a superintendent of
the draughtsmen, whom I took upon the recommendation of Captain Ericsson;
in fact who came out of his house. I chose him because he could always have
the entree of Ericsson's house; could take the drawings to him, and talk to him
about them, &c. He was an old engineer, and was an apprentice at the same
time and place with our oldest engineers in the navy. His name was Cral}bs.
I gave this in charge to this young engineer, with directions to superintend the
draughtsmen who were to assist him; and I gave them the directions which I
had agreed upon with the chief of the bureau, and also such other directions
about the matter as I could present. I ought perhaps to state that when I
found I had to re-draw the plans, I consulted l\tlr. Harlan, of the firm of Harlan,
Hollingsworth & Co., of Wilmington, Delaware, who may be termed with propriety light-draught iron ship-builders, upon some of the details of iron hulls.
When I informed Captain Ericsson of this, I told him that I had done it because
they were the most experienced and most successful builders of light iron seagoing vessels in the world. He did not appear to like this appeal from hims8lf
to others on my .p art, and asked if I really thought they deserved that I should
claim for them such distinction. I challenged him to name another, either in
this country or in Europe, who could rival them in that peculiar branch. After
reflecting a moment, he acknowledged that I was probably .correct.
You will observe that although I have never looked upon myself as the designer of any of these vessels, [ was the general inspector of them all. All
the plans, both generally and in detail, as well as the Ulaterials and the workmanship, had to be approved by me. When 1 therefore, plans were drawn in my
office, instead of by Captain Ericsson himself, I took advantage of the opportunity to improve them, and to throw upon him the onus of proving that my
amendments were not good. This he sometimes did, both with this and the
Saugus class of vessels. In al'l such cases the drawings were modified to meet
his approval. After the vessels were commenced, aud we were all committed to
their construction, the contracts having been given out, Captain Ericsson became angry about something in connexion with them, and wrote a letter to the
Secretary of the Navy, in which he declared he would have nothing furtb.er to
do with them-that his plans had been modi:fie~ so extensively that he did not
any longer recognize them as his own, &c., &c. UP. to t~is time, however, he
had accepted each of the proposed modifications as it was made; and he even
continued afterwards to examine, and approve or condemn the drawings taken
to him by my superintendent of draughtsmen, whose ·orders from me were, from
first to last, to go himself with every drawing which was not an exact copy of
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some draving of Captain Ericsson, and ascertain whether he accepted it as his
design, and if not, to learn the modifications required. In such cases I examined the modifications demanded; if I approved of them they were made,
and the drawings issued to the builders; otherwise, I would go personally and
confer with Captain Ericsson, and we would agree upon the plans to be used.
Captain Ericsson made three sets of plans in all their details, as follows: First,
the original Monitor; second, the Passaic class of monitors, of which ten were
built; third, the Dictator and Puritan, ocean monitors, of which only those two
were built. In my office there were made four set~ of p~ans in the manner
which I have already described: First, the Saug1.1s class of harbor and river
monitors, of which nine were built; second, the Hght-draught monitvrs, of
which there w~re twenty; third, turrets, pilot-houses, and impregnable smokepipes for wooden monitors of the Monadnock class, of which there were four
built, with two turrets on each; fourth, the same for wooden monitors of the
Kalamazoo class, of which there were also four built, with two turrets eachthe turrets being larger and thicker, and with different detailed arrangements
from the others. Of all this work it was held that Captain Ericsson was the
designer, and I the general inspector, until the light-draught monitors were accounted failures, when it was published throughout the country that I was the
designer of them. I corrected the statement to that effect in the New York
Times soon after the monitors were commenced, and when it was considered by
every one that such a statement was highly complimentary to me. Since they
have been considered failures as they were first built, I have not before this made
any public denial of the charge of being their designer, as I believed that the
truth would finally come to light, and that my abilities and my arduous industry
would eventually be fully appreciated as effectually as if I entered upon a
newspaper controversy wHh those who• are determined, if possible, to make me
the scapegoat for their shortcomings. I had to visit Boston, Philadelphia,
Chester, Pennsylvania~ and Wilmington, Delaware, besides a great many places
about New York. There were new vessels aLo being built in Cincinnati and
Pittsburg, although I did not visit there until some time after that; but there
was a great deal of correspondence growing up, making out all the8e new contracts, teaching civilian inspectors what their duties were, and learning what
were the views of the Navy Department, and of Captain Ericsson. I was consequently occupied pretty closely.
When we came to arrange this machinery in tl1e new way they came to me
and said that they did not know whether the ships would balance in that way.
It will be understood that these vessels were designed to draw the same amount
of water at one end as the other. Now, if you move the weights in the ship
you of course affect the draught of water, and it is necessary to make calculations about the displacement of the vessel in all its length, and then regulate
the weights in such a way that she would lie nearly level on the water. They
made tht>ir calculations, and reported to me that the vessel was not large enough
to hold the weights to be put upon it-that it did not displace water enoug·h.
I said, "How do you mean-does it draw more than six feet of water?"
They replied, "It draws not only six feet of water, but all the vessel above the
water will not sustain the weight to be put upon it." In the ordinary course of
things I would go and consult with Captain Ericsson upon such a matter. I
do not remember whether I did or not; if not, it was because I did not have
time. The remedy was obvious, which was to mak.e the vessel larger. I
directed that to be done, and the vessel was increased in size. They then came
to me and said, "Now we have it all right." In getting such a thing they mak.e
it by trial in error, taking the dimP-nsions and making the calculations afterward8. They say, "We have a vessel which will draw six feet and four inches;
the side armor will be fifteen inches out of the water, and it will carry all the
weight." I said, "Have you calculated for contingencies 1" "Yes, sir," was
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the reply, "we have fig;ured it all out." Then I said, "If you are certain, we
better go at it."
Before this, I had employed on this very class of vessels, which had to be
changed in their dimensions to get them to float properly, a naval architect of
considerable ability, to make the calculations, and I put them beside the calculations of this young engineer. This other man, whom I had employed on the
recommendation of Captain Ericsson, had been taken away, and I could get no
other in his place. Mr. Allen was the only one to whom I could trust anything of this kind; I had no time to make the calculations myself; therefore,
so far as I was concerned, I had to trust to him, and then send the plans on to
"\V ashington. I took a schedule of his calculations of the weights because I
knew that such a thing should not be trusted to any one man, :J,nd particularly
to one so young. I carried this to Mr. Fox, and he sent me down to Mr. Lenthall, chief of the Bureau of Construction. I said to Mr. Lenthall, "Here is
the calculation of the weights; in the first column is the quantity in cubic feet
of iron and wood; here is the description, and the first item is the coal placed
under the engines ; next comes the thickness of the iron, next the wood, the
number of cubic feet, which we use in arriving at the weights; next comes the
weight of the iron, and the final column gives the total." .After going through
the detail in that way, describing each part, then came the calculations for the
draught. I then said, "Mr. Lenthall, here are these weights; you know better
than I how such things are done, and how much such materials weigh, and you
have people in your employ who understand it. I have not calculated these
matters myself at all, and it has only been done by a young second assistant
engineer jn my office--a very competent young man. rl'here they are, any
way." When I did that I considered 1hat I had transferred my responsibility
for these weights to Mr. Lenthall, he being the chief of the Bureau of Construction for the navy.
Question. Did that schedule of weights that you furnished correspond to the
usual way of making these naval estimates 1
.Answer. So far as I know, it did; but there is one item which I will mention to show one of the errors, of which I have since learned. While this was
going on, durine; another visit to Washington, I asked Mr. Lenthall, "How
many pounds per cubic foot would you allow in such calculations for white oak,
such as would probably be used in sueh vessels 1" The answer which he gave
me was characteristic of the man. ".Ah! well," said he, "you see now, live
oak, for instance, will not float in water; we have to put pine with it to make a
raft to float; then white oak is not so heavy as live oak ; pine floats." I said,
"Now, how many pounds to the cubic foot would you allow 1" "Well," said
he, "some is heavier than others; and, if you take the same stick, one end will
be heavier than the other." The amount of it is, if I had not known the man
for a great many years I should have supposed that he did not know.
Question. Was that all the answer you got in regard to the allowance you
should make for weight 1
.Answer. Yes, sir. Then I went to Boston. We were building there a wooden
monitor, and the constructor took me on board of her. She was then well in
train. He showed her to me, and I said to him, "I see that your tim her here
is about as green as we probably will use in the light-draught vessels, where
there is to be a great deal of oak." He said, "Yes; you cannot get seasoned
timber sufficient for the purpose." I said to him, "How many pounds per cubic
foot do you allow in calculating for your displacement 1" He gave me the number of pounds and the decimals ; I think it was 52 6, or something of that kind.
Whatever it was, it was one or two pounds less than fifty-five pounds. I told
this young man to allow fifty-five pounds per cubic foot, thus allowing a little
margin. I find by these calculations that there were 4 70,000 pounds allowed
for the weight of the live oak. Since these vessels were built I have taken
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pains to have some of the oak weighed, and I find that it weighs seventy pounds
to the cubic foot. That would make a difference in the draught of the vessel of
three inches just for the white oak alone.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Depending entirely upon the condition of the oak as to seasoning 1
Answer. l es, sir. I do not doubt but that Mr. Hanscom, the constructor in
Boston, answered me correctly. He had prouably been weighing his timber.
He was building his own vessel in the navy yard, where he had all the facilities, and could arrive at this thing. I suppose he gave me what his timber did
weigh, but I had no such facilities myself. I then brought these plans back to
·vvashington, as I have said, and they were again submitted to the bureau, who
approved of the plans ap.d thought they were all satisfactory. Admiral Smith
also saw them; he had always felt an interest in these vessels. He said, "Why
do you have so much wood on the outside of them 1 That is more than you
want for armor backing." I replied that it was a part of the plan of Captain
Ericsson. He said, "There is such a fine opportunity to put a water tank right
around there, so that when you are navigating new waters of unknown depth,
or new channels, when you get aground you can pump out the water and raise
your vessel off; and then, when you are free, you qan let the water in again
anCP go on again." I said, "Admiral, that is a point that was first suggested
by Mr. Stevens, of Hoboken, in his battery. It has been discussed a great deal
by our naval officers, and they all appear to think it to be a good plan. I am
asked on every hand in the navy why we do not have these tanks in the monitors.'' The reason why we did not have it was because Captain Ericsson did
not put it in. Here was a case where we were permitting the bureaus of the
Navy Department to interfere with his plans. I said to the admiral, ''Now that
an officer of your rank and abilities-a man that has looked into these matters
as much as you have-suggests this thing, and recommends it, if you will say
that you are in earnest in your recommendation I will speak of it." He said,
"Certainly I am.'' I told Mr. Fox what the admiral had said, and he saiJ,
"Take it down to Mr. Lenthall and find out from him whether there is any objection on his part to the introduction of such an arrangement in the vessel." I
went down and saw him; but, instead of answering the question whether there
was any objection to the construction of it, he objected to it, but applied his objection to having any such arrangement in the vessel any way; that is, he said it
was not necessary. I finally wormed out of him his views as to whether it was
objectionable as a piece of construction. He said, "No; y()u can build that in
without any difficulty at all. So far as the construction goes, there is no objection whatever." I went back and told l\lr. }-,ox what Mr. Lenthall had said. I
said to l\1r. Fox, "You yourself are a naval officer; you are an expert in these
things, and you onght to be a good judge of whether a thing is useful or not to
an officer commanding a ship.'' He said, "I think it would be." I said,
"Then there are you and Admiral Smith who think it would be a good thing."
He replied, " In that case I think you better have it. You better take your
plans back to New York and have them so far modified as to introduce thi:::."
I did so, and came back again. Just about this time the Navy Department, or
at least the government, expected to make an attack on Charleston; and as several mon~tors were to be employed down there, it was thought advisable that I
should go down and report to the admiral commanding the fleet for duty in connexion with it. It was expected that I would explain them to him, and to the officers
and crew, and that I would assist in making any repairs if they should receive injury, and lend a band generally in regard to them. 'rhat took me away fro1.:1
the north for some two months. While I was away, these had all been advertised
and bid upon, and a great many contracts given out, so that when I cn.me back
Part I V - - 7
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I found everything in a great deal of confusion, because all my general im~pec
tion had been going on a8 it best could. When the head one is away you can
understand that things will get into confusion. I was not the head of the whole
system, because Admiral Gregory was the head; but I was the bead of inspection. I came back and found that when the engines came to be drawn out in
detail they were not approved by Captain Ericsson. He had not only disapproved the engines, but he did not like the man, and I had to turn him away
and hire another man to design the engines. He was a man who had bad a
great deal of experience in such work. Captain Ericsson liked the man, and
told me to send him in to him; he talked with him, and said he would do. " He
has a good bead on him," Baid be. I gave thought to the matter when I had
an opportunity. I still retained the same young man in general charge of these
matters as long as I remained there.
In this Charleston fight, when they went in and made their attack, we found
a great many points there which needed improvement. That was the next experience which we had after the fight between the Monitor and the Merrimack.
'rhat afforded us a great fund of new experience. When I came back, it was
decided that that information should be all used in improving the monitors that
were then being built, so that when we did get the vessels they should be good
ones. It was decided to add these improvements to these light-draught monitors, and we improved them in such a way that it added to the draught of,he
vessels six inches. The deck of these vessels was very peculiar; it rounded up
in the m1ddle with a crown of twenty-three inches, so that when the side was
nine inches out of water, the middle would be thirty-two inches. They had
much more displacement above water than the other vessels, so that we considered it rather a good thing than otherwise to have this side armor down in the
water out of the reach of shot. When we came to finish the first vessel, I went
on to Boston and attended to it personally. I put everything in-p.led on everything according to the original intention-although 1 saw she was going down
pretty wellj but I wanted to ascertain just where we did stand in regard to these
matters. I therefore put on everything that was to be put on the vessel. I
found that the side of the vessel would be, on an average, two inches out of
:·water, It would float very even. The disposition of the weights was very
good-a little up by the stern, as every naval officer likes to have it. At this
point Captain Ericsson was very much afraid that tl:iese vessels would break in
two; he had expressed such fear£ before, because of the anangement of the
boilers. He said Lhat ·in his arrangement of the boilers he had diagonal stays
going down over the boilers, whereas in the new arrangement you could not
get in the stays at all, and the vessel's back would break when she got into a
sea. I did not concur in that opinion, but thought these vessels would pass from
one port to another in perfect safety, and I expected to go from Boston to New
York in that vessel. But Mr. Fox, as I understood, went on to the north to see
Captain Ericsson, who impressed upon him the danger of sending that vessel to
sea, stating that it might founder in passing from Boston to New York, and advised him not to build the other vessels in that way. Captain Ericsson is one
of those strong men who will influence people very much by his manner and his
abilities. I think he· impressed the Navy Department fully with the idea that
it was dangerous to send these vessels to sea. I was then removed from the position of general inspector, and the department decided to raise several. of these
vessels up, and to make them torpedo boats, not requiring turrets. In regard
to some fifteen of them they decided to raise up the sides twenty-two inches;
that would add some six inches to the draught of water, but would leave the
vessel eighteen inches out of water; and I think they are going on now and
building the vessels with these changes. I do not know what other detail
changes tl1ey are making, for I have been at sea. I have every reason to think
that they are very good vessels, and they will certainly be an advantage to the
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service in many respects, which have impressed themselves upon me more than
ever before since I have been out in this fleet of Admiral Porter's. I have been
in the frigate Wabash, down in the fleet which has been attacking Fort Fisher,
where we had several monitors.
Question. Describe the classes of ml)nitors you had down there.
Answer. We had three of the river and harbor monitors that were built from
drawings which were issued from my office, made in the same way and upon
the same general plan as the light-draught monitors. We then had the Monadnock, a vessel built in the Boston navy yard by Mr. Hanscom. All these vessels there drew more water than was at first intended. 1:!-,or instance, it was
intended that the Monadnock should be three feet out of wate:t: at the side ;
she was two feet six inches. These other vessels were expected to be eighteen
inches full; they are twelve inches: And all except the first monitor draw
more water than was at first intended. We always find, in approaching completion, that we gain new experience during the progress of construction; and
we have added and added weight here and there. I had, from my position on
the Wabash, a better opportunity to watch these vessels in gales of wind, and
to observe the difference between a vessel two feet and a half out of water, and
one which was only one foot. I would say now that I would not build a vessel of that class. I would make very sure, indeed, that she would be at least
two feet out of water, and I would make my design for three. feet. I found
that every naval officer felt much more secure in a vessel high out of waterfelt that he had much more leeway when the vessel was leaking badly, before
the vessel would sink. In calculating upon the matter, we find that we can
build a vessel with the sides three feet out of water, and still retain all the good
qualities .
By the chairman :
Question. The vessel is more exposed to the enemy's fire 1
Answer. Yes, sir; and it requires much more weight and more machinery,
&c.; but it is worth that much more when you get it, because of the additional
safety of the vessel. It is more roomy inside. It is easier to ventilate such a
vessel.
Question. Were you in the fleet at the time of the bombardment of Fort
],isher 1
Answer. Yes, sir; during both attacks; I was in a wooden frigate, the W abash.
Question. Do you consider these light-draught monitors of any use as they
were first built, before the sides were built up. Could they be put to any use
as war vessels 1
Answer. The Chimo, which was finished and· tried, had one serious fault,
aside from the great draught of water; that was the want of speed. This want
of speed was due to the very fact of the incl'eased draught of water. It\ order
to protect the propellers from shot, they were covered over. in the monitor vessels by an overhang aft. To build a vessel to draw only six feet of water, and
then have an overhang go down into the water, and almost be closed in ovet the
propeller, you require the propeller to be of a larger diameter than six fee\·, or
you would not get any speed at all. This propeller was made nine feet in dia.neter. It was not expected in the original design that there would be water c m-.
fined in there, but it turned out to be so, in consequence of the increased d~raugh1\
If you consider the action of a screw propeJ.ler, you will observe that in the
revolution the angular blade, as the vessel is advancing, presses the water backwards. Engineers say that such a propeller slips twenty per cent., for instance.
'_llhe water comes between a solid and a vacuum in this action of the screw. If
the water in this box, made by the overhang, had been a solid, you could not
have revolved the propeller at all; and with the vessel having that increased
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draught the water is carried along in the vessel, and the propeller, in its action,
does nothing but churn the water, with one hundred per cent. slip ; and to that
extent you retard the velocity of the vessel, for if you do not make revolutions,
you can make no speed.
Question. The overhang kept the screw from having any foothold, as you
might say7
Answer. It was just like a dead weight hanging on it-a great friction; and
the boilers were limited to a pressure of fifty pounds to the square inch. I
considered at that time that if we should cut away this overhang, in such a way
as to provide for the increased draught of water-and it was a small affair to
do that-free these propellers and permit them to revolve properly, we should
have a very fair speed, such as was expected in the first place, with the exception that it requires more power to drive a vessel deep in the water than one
that is light.
Question. What was the expected speed of these vessels 1
Answer. The chief of the Bureau of Engineering made calculations upon the
subject, and said they would go nine knots an hour. I never calculated the speed.
Question. What do you suppose they would do as finally made, with overhang and all?
Answer. We tried this vessel, and it went three knots and a half. The people
were walking about the decks, taking observations. The pilot, taking his points .
from the light-house here and something there, declared that the vessel' was
going six knots; but I borrowed a chip log of a Rm::sian frigate which was in
the harbor, and hove it. They reported at one time four knots, and at anotht>r
time three knots and a half. My belief was that the speed was three knots and
a half, and I so reported. It is a common thing, upon such vessels and upon such
occasions, to report the highest that any one will name.
Question. Would she be able to go up a river, or stem a strong tide 1
Answer. No, sir; three and a half knots is not fast enough; but I still consider that if we cut away the overhang so as to clear the propellers, we might
get seven knots, which is about what the others would do.
Question. Were the engines and boilers correct 1
Answer. They worked admirably. I was very much surprised to fi nd the
machinery work so well in that particulttr vessel as it did. I went to Boston
on the 1st of May with the intention of completing that vessel in one month.
I did do .it in six weeks, very much to the astonishment of all people who understand these matters ; but the government gave me unlimited power to do
'things as I wished-allowed me to spend some extra money, because we wanted
the vessel in the waters of North Carolina for a special purpose.
Question. Do you or not believe that iron-clads for light-draught purposes,
such as are built on the plan of the ironsides, are better than those of the monitor form 7
Answ,er. No, sir, I do not, for a reason which I have partially explained;
you have to carry so much more weight above the water. If you take a giveu
draught and dimensions of vessel you can certainly carry only a given weight
of iron fur armor above water. The s·tudy should then be to put on the armor
in such a form that it will have as great thickness as possible. If you have
large area, then you have small thickness, and the shot goes through. In the
monitor arrangement of vessel the hull is low, and the turret which surrounds
the guns is the smallest armature you can put around a gun and have it operate.
Question. rrhat is, you can m"ake it equally strong with less weight of iron
than in any other form 7
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Because you do not have so large a surface to cover?
Answer. Yes, sir; and then, again, you can handle your heavy guns with a
ess number of men, because a large portion of the work is done by steam
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The turning around of the turret, and the taking aim of the gun, is all done
by steam.
Question. Do you believe these large 15-inch guns are more destructive
of the enemy's works or ships, than the same amount of metal distributed
through more guns 1
Answer. I think they are more destructive against iron-clads, or almost anywhere that you wish to destroy a very strong structure. There might be cases
where a greater number of guns would have more effect than the large 15-.
inch guns; for instance, where there are a great number of people, and you
wish to keep up a very rapid fire in order to keep them away from their guns.
That might be better done with a larger number of smaller guns; but I think
for naval fighting, for sea fighting, or rather for fighting ships, the 15-inch
guu is far preferable to any other which has been made.
Que:;;tion. How many of these guns failed in the fight at Fort Fisher 1
Answer. I understood there were three.
Question. Were they on these monitors 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did these monitors have a 9-inch gun with the 15-inch gun 1
Answer. In the. Passaic class we put in an 11-inch gun with the 15-inch gun,
because we did not ha:ve enongh of the 15-inch guns made.
Question. Did any of the 11-inch guns fail 1
Answer. No, sir; I never heard of an 11-inch gun failing.
Question. How many of the 15-inch guns do you suppose you had in that
fight?
Answer. I think there were ten. One of them failed because a shell exploded
in it, which, I believe, it is understood will burst any ordinary gun we have;
ana that might have been the cause of the other failures; I do not know. The
officers of the vessel on which that gun failed told me that they had the same
confidence in the gun as before. The engineer of the ship, who had no occasion
to go into the turret, says he will go there now as readily as before.
Question. What do you know of the Parrott gun failing 1
Answer. I know that several of the 100-pounders failed . I visited one ship
to see a big shot that came into the boiler, and one of these guns had failed on
that ship. I examined the gun, and found that it failed in a very peculiar way,
one that I never heard of before. This Parrott gun was made with a wroughtiron band shrunk on the breech. This band extends forward partly over the
hollow part of the gun. r.rhis gun had broken transversely, immediately at the
base of the cylindrical part of the bore, and the breech had then blown out. I
~aw the fracture of that gun, and it was as true and correct as anything could
be made, except it was absolutely cut with a knife. I saw it a day or two after
it occurred, before it got rusted, and I came to the conclusion that the band
which bali been shmnk on was too tight. There was a tension of the band and
compression of the iron. If the gun had never been fired it never would have
broken ; but every time you fired it this ten~ion of the outer band affected the
cast-iron within it as if it had been struck with the blow of a sledge. '.rhe part
which was hollow would be affected in a way that the part whieh was solid
would not. r.rhis band, with its compression, acted as a shear to cut off the
cast-iron from the circumference to the~ centre all around. When you had fired
it a sufficient number of times to loosen the metal, it would blow out. r.rhat was
merely my view of the matter.
Question. How much additional expense did the extra work upon these vessels,
from time to time, amount to-that it:, exp.cnse that was not contemplated in the
original contract before you commenced ~o alter them?
Answer. When you come to speak of expense in such matters, of dollars and
cents, I would refer to a certain time in August or September, 1863, when I
made estimates of how much it would be for this extra expense. My estimates
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then amounted to some thirty-two or thirty-thr~e thousand dollars. There were
afterwards more things put on, which would make it cost two or three thousand
dollars more. Many of these things had to be paid for by the contractors afterwards, when prices had risen. I do not think these things have been paid for
by the government yet, and I think they will cost the government more than I
estimated.
Question. You finally abandoned this tank arrangement on the sides 7
Answer. That was in operation in the Chimo.
Question. Has it been retained there 1
Answer. I do not know. I have heard people say they were going to abolish
it, but I do not know whether they have or not.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. If I understand you correctly, so far as the estimates of weights
are concerned, they were never, to your knowledge, reviewed by anybody 1
Answer. I do not know whether they were or not.
Question. And these twenty vessels were built upon the estimates of this
young and inexperienced engineer, Allen, of whom you have spoken 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I do not like the term "inexperienced," as applied to
him, except relatively, for he had done, to my knowledge, a great deal of the
estimating of weights for the Novelty Works while he was an apprentice
there. While I was assistant engineer, I was waiting orders for more than a
year, and, with the consent of the Secretary of theN avy, I went to the Novelty
Iron Works, and was employed as a draughtsm,an there. The Secretary thought
it would be of great advantage to me as an engineer, and that the government
would some day get the benefit of it. During the time I was there this young
man was there. He was the nephew of the president of the works; and 'his
uncle told me that if I could advance the young man in any way he would be
obliged to me. I therefore .employed him as assist11nt in the work I was doing.
And I know that after that he had to do a great deal of calculating and estimating of weights. And I will say that in these first vessels that he calculated-those of the Saugus class-when we came to launch them, they corresponded
very nearly with his calculations ; the draught of water did not vary half an
inch from his estimate.
Question. What was his age 1
Answer. About twenty-four years old, I should think. He went to the
Novelty Works when he was sixteen. I never did consider him an old experienced engineer, but then he had had a peculiar experience beyond what men
generally get at his age.
By the chairman:
Question. Did you expect Mr. Lenthall to review this work, so as to correct
it if he found anything wrong 1
Answer. I thought that if I had been chief of a bureau, giving out contracts
for which I was responsible, I should have done it.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. In your judgment, was it the duty of the chief of the bureau to
have verified 'these estimates 1
Answer. Decidedly so.
.
Question. Was it not possible-was it not a practicable thing-to have determined exactly the amount of displacement by the application:of well-known
rules, or the weighing of portions of the material of which the weight was uot
exactly known 1
Answer. I do not think you could hmre arrived at the weight in a case of this
kind with the accuracy that you could in ordinary vessels. 'l'he constructor in
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a navy yard knows his timber; he knows what house he is going to take it out
of. The merchant builder knows his timber, and can weigh it; but here were
twenty vessels being built all over the country, from Maine to Missouri. You
did not know where the timber which you got grew, you did not know where
you were to get it, oranything about it. Youcould, therefore, only make a general estimate.
Question . .As the draught of water in these vessels could vary so little without destroying their efficiency, was it not of the very greatest importance that
every test should be applied to determine exactly the weight of the materials 1
.Answer. Yes, sir; I think we all committed errors in that respect. But these
two bureaus were always inimical to these vessels. I always had the feeling
that they would naturally oppose anything which I proposed, because I was
connected with them. For instance, when I asked the chief of the Bureau of
Steam Engineering for engineers to inspect the work, he said, "I have nothing
to do with them. These vessels are not being built under the bureau, and you
cannot have naval engineers for that purpose." I answered, " These are naval
vessels; they are built for the Navy Department, and the navy will be injured
or benefited as they are bad or good ; therefore, I think we ought to have a system of inspection which will insure their excellence." He said, "I am not going
to order good inspectors to watch the riveting of a lot of old boiler iron, and
that is the end of it.'' I went to him again ; I tried to come over his feelings
by calling to mind our old friendships and old associations. I said to him," My
dear fellow, I will be able some of these days to do you as much of a favor as ·
this will be for you to do me" -puttilJg it upon the gro~nd of a personal favor.
He said, " I intend that you shall do everything for me that I ask of you, and
that I shall do nothing for you that you ask of me." Of course there was
nothing more to be said.
.
Question. Then there was not that co-operation which there should have been
upon the part of the Bureaus of Engineering and of Construction in relation
to these monitors 1
.Answer. No, sir; I always felt that it was a regular fight-that we bad to
conquer them before we could get them to do anything On the one side it was
a fight··with the bureaus, and on the other side jt was a fight with the contractors, to make them do anything right. It was a very unpleasant position which
I held.
By the chairman:
Question. Had the Navy Department any knowledge of this want of co-operation on the part of the bureaus 1
.Answer. It never appeared to me that the Navy Department appreciated the
animus of these men. It always seemed to me, when I complained to Mr. Fox,
that he did not quite believe I gave the right tone to it-he thought perhaps
that I was partly at fault. But I think-in fact, I know-that the Navy Department knew they were not giving much assistance. I consider that the Secretary and the .Assistant Secretary and .Admiral Smith deserve the greatest
credit for the production of the monitors, assuming that the monitors are creditable.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Was there a good understanding between you and Captain Ericsson during the progress of the construction of these monitors 1
.Answer. Yes, sir, until after all the plans were out and had been issued.
About a year ago we had a difference, which still remains, and I have felt that
it was in part his personal feeling towards me that has governed his action in
regard to these light-draught vessels. First, he represented that I was the designer, and therefore entirely responsible for everything connected with them.
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Then he represented that the plans were very poor indeed ; he denied some
things that be was the author of.
Question. What was the exact condition of the work when this rupture between yourself and Captain Ericsson took place 1
Answer. The plans were nearly all issued to the contractors for building.
The rupture took place in reference to this harbor and river class of monitors.
I think that perhaps there were a few drawings sent out afterwards, because,
although there was a rupture between us, and I did not visit him personally,
there was constant communication between my office and his, and I thought
that one of my assistants was very officious in making this breach as wide as
possible; however, that did not prevent my sending the dtawings to Captain
Ericsson for his approval. I remember. now particularly, that the drawing for
the gun-carriages for the light-draught monitors went down to him for his approval after we had our difficulty-that is, the modifications of the gun-carriages
which were necessary.
·
Question. Who do you say is the author or designer of the light-draught
iron-clad monitors 1 ·
Answer. Captain E:t;icsson 'first designed the vessel ; the Bureau of Engineering modified the machinery, and then the water tank was added, as I have explained. I was obliged to have these drawings made in my office, and I had to
decide a great many points about the details. Captain Eri~sson, therefore, says
that I was the designer of the vessel. I might as well turn around and say
that such a man who drew it had designed it, because he did a great deal.
By the chairman:
Question. Did not Captain Ericsson furnish a plan of these light-draught
monitors for the department 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you also exhibit one 1
Answer. Not then.
Question. Did you at any time 1
Answer. No, sir; only the modifications directed by the bureau.
Question. rrheu you did not furnish the department with any draught of a
monitor on your own plan 1
Answer. No, sir; I put in modifications according to the direction of the
heads of the bureaus here.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Did Captain Ericsson submit full plans and specifications in relation to the monitors which he proposed to build 1
Answer. He presented similar plans to these, 'Yith rather fuller specifications.
Question. Were those plans and specifications accompanied by full estimates
made in relation to weights and displacements 1
Answer. I do not know.
·
Qnestion. Then you do not know whether a monitor built precisely as he proposed would have drawn more water than was contemplated or not 1
Answer. No, sir; except that this young engineer calculated this vessel with
Captain Ericsson, and said that with that arrangement it would sink.
Question. Without any weights other than those contemplated by Captain
Ericsson 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
By the hcairman :
Question. Do you profess to be a designer yourself1
·
Answer. I have designed works. I feel myself competent to design an ironclad vessel, including hull, armature, and machinery. It has been my special
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study, ever since I commenced to learn the profession of engineering, to become
a constructing engineer. I regard my services in the navy as a sea-going engineer as tributary to my profession as a constructing engineer. My main studies
have been 'to ascertain how ships and machinery should be constructed. In
regard to ships, I have confined myself to the construction of iron ships. Preparatory to that, it is necessary to study naval architecture, which I commenced
to do as early as 185.2. I do not profess to know how to build a wooden ship,
but I do profess to know how an iron ship should be built, in all of its details .

..

WASHING'rON,

February 17, .1865·.

Mr. B. F. IsHERwoop sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
,·.
Question. What is your official connexion with the Navy Department 1
Answer. I am the chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering.
Question. What knowledge of, and what connexion with, the construction of
the twenty light-draught monitors lately constructed by the order of tbe government, did you have at any time 1
Answer. I have never had any connexion with them in any way or manner.
Question. Have you ever been brought into such relations to them in any
way as to know anything about their construction 1 And if there have been
any faults or errors about their construction, do you know what they are 1
Answer. As I never saw either the drawings or the specifications of those
vessels, I have really no knowledge upon the subject except from mere rumor
and hearsay.
Question. Did you ever have any conversation with Engjneer Stimers with
regard to their construction 1
Answer. None at all, with the exception, I think, that he once spoke to me
about the boilers to be put in them. I made some suggestions witll regard to
the boilers, which were not followed, huwever. That is the only conversation
or communication I ever had with him on the subject.
Question. Do you know anything about their engines ?
Answer. No, sir; I never saw either the drawings or specifications of those
vessels; and consequently, of my own knowledge, I could say really nothing
about it. Since they have been completed I have been on board one of them.
Question. ,Which one was that 1
Answer. The Ohimo, at Boston; I happened accidentally to be in Boston
near where she was lying at the dock, and, as a matter of curiosity, I wet1t on
board and looked at it.
Q~wstion. Did you inspect her enginet~1
.Answer. No, sir; I gave merely a cursory glance at the vessel.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Did Mr. Stimers ever seek to obtain from you any info~mation in
relation to the engines or boilers of these monitors 1
Answer. No, sir, except what I have stated. I made a little sketch of a
boiler-suggested an idea of a boiler, which was not followed.
Question. No application was ever made to you by Mr. Stimers, or anybody
else, for any instruction or information in relation to the boilers or engines of
these monitors 1
Answer. Nothing but what I have just stated. Some time after all the plans
had been adopted, I believe, I was asked for an estimate of how fast a certain
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quantity of boiler ought 'to drive a certain amid-ship section, and I made the
estimate; that was all. I bad no plans, or anything of the kind, before me; I
had merely so many square ' feet of amid-ship section, to tell how a certain
amount of boiler could drive that.
Question. Do you know whether those boilers and engines were built after
the plans of any boilers or engines of yours used in other monitors 1
Answer. At that time I had never made any drawings for boilers for other
monitors. Since then I have made drawings for machinery for the wooden
monitors we built, and in those I used what is known as the modern boiler, an
entirely different boiler from what is in these light monitors.
Question. Have you given such examination or attention to these monitors
that you have formed any opinion as to the caus.es of their faih1re 1
Answer. I have certainly formed an opinion with regard to the causes of their
failure. I think the failure is entirely due to the errors of detail; not to the
general design ?f the vessel, but to errors of detail made by the engineer who
hacl the designing of the work.
Question. Whom do you mean 1
Answer. Chief Engineer Stimers. The work was put entirely into his hands.
By the chairman :
Question. -Did you make such an inspection of the Chima that you can give
a confident opinion upon that subject 1
Answer. Merely such a general inspection that an expert would make in
looking over a thing of that kind; that is all. I do not see anything in the
general design of those vessels which would prevent their being very good vessels.
Question. Of course you would not know from a general inspection but what
they would float with their turrets on 1
Answer. I could not tell that from a general inspection. It would require
considerable time and labor to go into the whole matter.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. It is represented that the speed of these light-draught monitors is
only about one-half what it was contemplated or designed it would be. Did you
form any opinion as to the causes of this defect in speed 1
Answer. In the fixst place the draught of water is very much greater than it
was intended to have been. It was intended to have been six feet, but it is very
much greater than that. In the second place, as I observed the position and
arrangement of the screw on board the Uhimo, it seemed to me to be so extremely
faulty that I did not see how a screw arranged as that was could properly apply
the power. To the two causes I think is due the deficiency in speed.
Question. What was the fault in the arrangement of the screw 1
Answer. A large portion of it was boxed up in the overhang, a thing which
r:;truck my attention instantly upon looking at the vessel from the dock. It was
impossible for the screw to properly transmit the power to the water; an immense amount of power was wasted. I think, according to the quantity of boiler
put in those vessels, recollecting the amount of aniid-ship section given to me,
there was power enough in those vessels, if properly applied, to have made the
required speed.

WASHINGTON, JYfarch 14, 18G5.
Mr. JoHN LENTHALL recalled and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. I understand that you wish to add something to youi· testimony
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in relation to the light-draught monitors. I suppose it is in connexion with the
testimony of Engineer Stimers.
Answer. Yes, sir. 'l'he chairman permitted me to look at that portion of it
which referred to me.
Question. You have examined that portion of it 1
Auswer. Yes, sir.
Question. You can go on and make such additional statement as you deRire.
Answer. Having seen portions of the testimony of Chief Engineer Stimers,
taken under oath by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in which he
refers particularly to me in the case of the light-draught monitors, I would ask
that my statement on the same subject may accompany his. I would repeat,
that the first I knew of these vessels was from the outline plan shown me by
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, in which Mr. Ericsson proposed a "monitor vessel to have a draught of water of six feet."
I saw no details or specifications, but my recollection is that there was an
offer from him to contract to build such vessels at a specified price. This plan,
executed with the experience acquired by JVIr. Ericsson in vessels of that class,
it was f1ir to presume would answer the purpose proposed, but from the want
of details it was impossible for me or any other p ~rson to test that presumption
by figures.
'I'he next I saw or knew of the plan was that it, or one closely resembling
it, was in the hands of Chief Engineer Stimers, who stated that it had been
confided to him for execution.
Chief Engineer Stimers, selected by the department for this particular service, had been engaged on all the monitor vessels from their commencement,
and they were uuder his exclusive control and superintendence ; he had an independent office in New York, with numerous engineers, clerks and draughtsmen under his orders; he had been associated with l'Ir. Ericsson, and had had
opportunities of instruction by ,him, and, it seemed fair to presume, was quite
familiar with all his views in the construction of monitor vessels, and well acquainted with the nature and qualities of the materials UE!ed in them.
In the interview with Chief Engineer Stimers, he informed me that he proposed to add a water chamber to JVIr. Ericsson's plan, which he said had been
recommended by Admiral Smith, and, though I did not understand him as
seeking information from me, this addition struck me as so obviously unnecessary aud very injudicious, that I expressed that opinion strongly to him.
rrhe reason for this opinion is very apparent, for' as Mr. Ericsson's intention
was to have a vessel of the monitor class of the smallest practicable draught
of water, there could be no advantage, but a certain detriment, in adding any
unnecessary thing to the weight of the vessel, which could only act to increase
its draught of water. Mr. Ericsson, as I afterwards learned, protested against it.
The interviews with Chief Engineer Stimers were but oh !few minutes' duration, and the remarks were purely conversational, nothing baing referred to me
for an opinion, nor anything being said from which I could infer one was desired, and I had no further communication with him on the subject.
At a subsequent period, Chief Engineer Rtimers brought to the bureau, by
order of the department, as he stated, an outline trace plan of the light-draught
monitors, with some general specifications and a detailed estimate of all the
weights, showing the load draught of water to be six feet five and one-half
inches ( 6 Jt. 5-2-) in fresh water. 'l'he originals of all these, he stated, were in
his office in New York.
This drawing or outline of the hull showed the water-chambers which he
said he had been authorized to add. He stated that the calculation of the
weights had been carefully made, and that in the previous contracts for monitor vessels the bidders had not been furnished with this information, which they
should have had.

-108

LIGHT-DRAUGHT MONITORS.

In looking down this list of materials I perceived that the weight of the timber
per cubic foot was fully what we find in the books and tables which all engineers
possess, and is known to every man who either is, or pret~nds to be, a mechanie,
and that the whole of the white oak was much less than the one-fifth part
of the total weight of the vessel complete. Besides this, in all the monitor vessels built and building under Chief Engineer Stimers's immediate control, a
very large quantity of timber of the same kind was used in their construction,
and no person had better opportunities of knowing their weights.
With regard to the weight of the iron of the hull, the water-chambers and
pipes, the steam machinery, the turret and gear, and the equipments, embracing
nearly the whole of the remaining weight, there were no plans or details from
which I, or any one else, could verify an estimate, and to this day I have not
.
seen any of the details.
When Chief Engineer Stimers handed me the specifications and estimate of
weights, for the information of bidders, he seemed to do it with a great deal of
self. satisfaction-took the entire credit of it to himself, and did not name any other
person as having made them, or say a single word to throw the shadow of a doubt
on their accuracy. He made no statement that he had not made them, and was
not responsible for them, but, on the contrary, seemed much inflated with his
having shown how such things ought to be done.
If the Assistant Secretary of the Navy knew that Chief Engineer Stimers did
not make these calculations, he did not name it to me; and such a confession
from him would inevitably have impaired the confidence reposed in him.
Chief Engineer Stimers also furnished to the department an estimate of what
he considered should be the contract price, which could only be based on an
estimate of the materials and the labor.
As the department was only waiting for Chief Engineer Stimers's plans, as
soon as they were handed in I was instructed to draw up an advertisement for
bidder8, which was published forthwith, and a copy is herewith handed in.
During the four weeks the advertisement was running, several persons examined the plans, &c., deposited by Chief Engineer Stimers in the bureau, and
made copies of his estimates of weights, on which to base their bids; but all
stated that it would be necessary for them to visit Chief Engineer Stimers at
his New York office to obtain proper and necessary explanations before they
could make an offer. In fact, the plans and specifications deposited in the
bureau were too meagre to base a bid on, unless supplemented verbally by the
designer of the work.
The statement of the offers and of the awards will be found on pages 967
and 969 of the message of the President and accompanying documents
the
1st session of the 38th Congress.
I was not asked to examine or approve these plans, nor had I reason to suppose any such action was expectecl of me in this case any more than iri' those
of the preceding uine monitor vessels, or of the Dictator and Puritan, for which
I had been directed to ex8cute the contracts.
I was never requested by Chief Engineer Stimers, or any one e~se, to examine
his specification!:\ or estimates in any stage of their progress, for there were no
detailed drawings from which it could be done, and jt could only be the originator of them, who had predetermined how they we'r e to be filled up, who could
make an estimate at all.
r_t'hesep lans, it was understood, were to be submitted to Mr. Ericsson, and the
details carried out according to his idea. His knowledge of vessels of the
monitor class required no approval from any one, and the insertion of the waterchamber, in opposition to my expressed judgment, shows how little I had to do
with the design.
Had the weights estimated by Chief Engineer Stimers been correct, or had
they been even approximately adhered to, it would not have been found neces ·
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Sary after the completion to have deepened the vessels, and that necessity was
caused by his errors of calculation, and by his subsequent additions and alterations after the contracts were made, and among other things this water-chamber
did much to load the vessels to such an extent as to bring their decks awash.
With the most careful estimate of timber there may be a variation of 3 to 4
per cent. in the weight, making for the white oak about one inch difference in
the draught of water; but I have never known white oak to reach 70 pounds
per cubic foot, as Chief Engineer Stimers stated with regard to the timber
used in these vessels. Lve oak bas that weight; none of that was used.
r.rhe execution of these contracts by the Bureau of Construction was purely
a ministerial duty, in the same way that it made those of the nine vessels of
the Tecumseh class of monitors, and the Dictator and Puritan, so that the contract should be in the same Lureau through which the bills of payment were to
pass.
Within about a month after the first contracts were made, I was directed by
the department to give an order that any changes and modifications in those
vessels that might be thought necessary or advantageous should be submitted
to Mr. Ericsson, and have his sanction, before being carried out. This, it appears, was not done; but Chief Engineer Stimers, on his own respon sibility,
without the know ledge of the bureau or sanction of Mr. Ericsson, made changes
involving large expenditures of money and much delay in the completion of
the work. This fact was first learned from the contractors, who also complained
that after they bad completed part of the work from one set of drawings, another set w:as substituted, and the work already completed bad to be pulled
down ·and rebuilt. So far was Mr. Ericsson from approving these alterations,
that as soon as he learned them unofficially, he disavowed, in writing, any responsibility for them.
When this was ascertained, and the large sums required to meet the extra
bills of the contractors thus incurred by the not only unauthorized action of
Chief Engineer Stimers, but by his action in direct disregard of the instructions
of the department, the latter directed the bureau to give an unqualified order
to make no more changes or modifications, and Chief Engineer Stimers was
finally only restrained when each of the contractors was notified not to make
any alterations or additions without authority of the bureau, and on a determined price.
Had Chief Engineer Stimers, to whom the department had solely confided
the execution of the work, carried out the original programme of Mr. Ericsson
with ordinary ability, according to the intent of the department, these vessels
wou1d have required no enlargement.
In preparing the detailed plans of the machinery Chief Engineer Stimers
permitted his subordinates to insert their patents, and the .contractors have been
called on by them to pay patent fees, and to which they have demurred.
It has been stated that a reason why this work was placed in Chief Engineer
Stimers's hands, and be provided with a separate office in New York, with
numerous clerks, draughtsmen, &c., was owing to my opposition to iron and
iron-clad vessels, particularly to those of the monitor type. This is so far from
being the fact that the very reverse is the truth, for in October and November
of 1861, in conjunction with the present chief of the Bureau of Stearn Engineering, B. F. Isherwood, I prepared•drawings and specifications for vessels to
be built of wood, armored with thick ironplates, propelled by two screws, ancl
to have two revolving towers of thick ironplates, differing from the usual
monitor vessels as regards bull in not having wings or overhangs at the sides, in
being propelled by two screws instead of one, and as regards the towers, in
having two instead of one, and of being snpported and revolving them on their
circumference instead of on a central spindle. The drawings of the hull were
completed ; those of the machinery were made in detail and photographed, and
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the specifications for H, for the armor, towers, hull, &c., were printed and ready
to be placed in the contractors' hands so that the work could have gone forward
without interruption or delay.
The directions for blJilding these vessels were countermanded; but lately
there have bl3en constructed, and are in progress of construction, at the navy
yards, eight vessels of this type, with the exception that the turrets are according to Mr. Ericsson's system, with a central spindle, and that they were made
larger to cari·y heavier armor and thicker turrets. Of these vessels the Monadnock has been for a sufficient length of time in service .of varied description,
and is acknowledged a successful iron-clad vessel.
·
We also, in March, 1862, made a report to the department on the subject of
iron-clad sea-going vessels, and to the opinions of which we still adhere, and a
copy of it is submitted. We prepared, with great labl)r, complete specifications
and drawings of the largest class of sea going iron-armored vessels, as it was
understood at the time the department contemplated to build such vessels, and
for which, indeed, advertisements were issued for offers, and bids received; but
the policy of Congress not being to construct a navy of this class, further action was suspended on them.
,'
NAVY DEPARTMENT,

Bureau qf Construction, JI!Iarch 17, 1862.
SIR: 1'he subject of the design and construction of naval vessels-of-war under the new conditions which recent progress has imposed having for some time
occupied our attention, we take the liberty of briefly submitting the following
considerations in relation thereto :
After the preparation of drawings and specifications for iron-plated steambatteries we were brought into communication, during the last few months, in
~nsequence of submitting them for proposals to construct, with the principal
establishments engaged in the manufacture of iron. We found there was but
little reason to suppose that such plates as it was desirable to have could be
obtained in the quantity and time required. There were but few forges prepared to undertake them, and the rolling-mills would need new and expen sive
machinery before they could produce a plate, as such masses of rolled iron are
not used in private business. Indeed, although we found both forges and mills
willing to undertake portions of the work, and hopeful of success, yet doubtless
great di8appointment and delay would have resulted. No meat,s of bending
were in existence, and many of the details of manufacture have still to be con·
trived. Some forged plates could have been commenced at once, but, after the
rolling-mills were once prepared, would obviously require more time and money
for their l!roduction than the rolled ones; and it appears, judging from our own
and foreign experience, that rolled plates, in consequence of their greater cheapness and rapidity of production, must be mainly relied on for such c1mstructions.
r_rhe propositions of the principal rolling-mills embodied the conditions of a
large order a long time, and the advance of a very considerable sum of money.
1'hese terms, in effect, were, that the government should be at all the expense
of the necessary machinery, but have no right to the final o_wnership; thus
assuming the risk of a large loan, and establishing a monopoly for the benefit
of individuals. Nor could the mills, with s;1 fety, accept a less objectionable
arrangement; for the appHances and machinery sufficient for the manufacture
of the plates used in the construction of ordinary iron vessels are wholly inadequate to the production of those necessary for iron-plated ships-of-war, and no
private establishment can be expected to provide them unless aosured of constant employment by the government.
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Considering these facts in connexion with the state of transition in which
the methods of naval war now are, and with the inevitable tendency to the substitution of iron in place of wood for the hulls. of armed vessels, and the certainty that iron plating must be used on all such vessels, whether of wood or
iron, we are led to respectfully suggest the advantage, if not the absolute necessity, of the gover·nment at onct> preparing a factory to make for itself the most
important and costly parts, both for the iron hulls and for the armature.
Having an efficient establishment of its own of this kind, it can, in an emergency, receive much aid in those parts which are similar to what are used in
merchant iron steamers from private parties, without diverting them from their
usual course of manufacture, and thus moderate prices only will be charged.
'l'he establishment that we suggest ought to contain all the tools, fd.cilities,
and machinery for the complete preparation of the materials for iron ships of
the largest size, and. for their construction; ah:o for the rolling and bending of
their armor plates, and for the building of the steam mach inery for their propulsion. It should be altogether a storehouse and workshop, and not a military
establishment. It should be situated upon deep water, and have a large water
front; and the location should be convenient for coal and iron, and secure from
the possibility of attack by foreign foes.
We do not consider any of the navy yards suitable for this purpose, and the
whole of their resources will be required for some years to come for the current
wants of the present navy. 'The necessity and importance of an establi::;hment
that is to provide a future navy sufficient for securing a country like ours from
foreign aggression-for, owing to our trans-oceanic position to the great powers
of the world, our security must be sought in a navy-is, we respectfully submit,
a national question, second to none, and as such we strongly urge it for consideration. No time could be more favorable than the present for the creation
of such an establishment. 'The recent change in the construction of naval vessels has rendered nearly useless the formidable wooden ships composing the
navies of Europe, and the few we rossess will soon be worn out.
Under such circumstances we shall, with an establishment in operation of the
magnitude and efficiency we propose, start equal with the first powers of the
world in a new race for the supremacy of the ocean.
'Ve shall start with the ad vantage of no loss of old stock and workshops ;
with matured plans, embodying·all the improvements and appliances of modern
science, gained at the expense of the dear-bought experience of our competitors. Every dollar will be fruitfully spent, and a few years will, and at the
least practicable cost, put the nation in possession of a fleet of first-class, invincible ocean ships, which will prove not only the efficient protector.of its honor
and interests, but the best prevention against their being assailed.
There seems no doubt that this country must hereafter maintain not only a
larger navy than it has heretofore done, but of an essentially different character,
and we are of opinion that the cruising vessels on which alone reliance must be
placed for offensive war, and the preservation of our ports from the losses and
inconveniences of blockades, should be frigate-built iron steamships of sufficient strength to be used as rams, clad with invulnerable armor plates, furnished with maximum steam-power, and of a size larger than any vessel we
now possess.
.
Such a vessel could be aaapted to, and carry, any armament deemed the most
efficient. Subordinate to these should be a class of corvettes, of tbe same character, but having a less draught of water.
The first maritime nations of Europe have for some years past been gradually
initiating this system, and if their experience is to profit us, now is the time to
introducB it. It is obviously cheaper, more effective, and more sustaining of the
national honor to preserve our coasts from the presence of an enemy's naval
force by keeping the command of the open sea, with all the power it gives of
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aggression upon his own shores and commerce, than to rely on any system of
harbor defence which requires every point to be protected that may be assailed
by any enemy, having, in that case, the choice of time and place, and the advantage of perfect security for his own ports and commerce. In addition to
these considerations a clear coast is manifestly essential to any effective system
of privateering. Though harbor defences might prevent the enemy's entrance
to a port, they could not drive him from its gatefi ; and if blockaded by his large
iron-plated steamships, no privateer could either get out himself, or send in a
prize.
'I'he harbor defences are indeed valuable adjuncts, and should not be neglected,
but they cannot constitute a navy. or perform its proper functions.
Wealth, victory, and empire are to those who command the ocean, the tollgate as well as the highway of nationR, and if ever assailed by a powerful maritime foe, we shall find to our prosperity, if ready, how much better it is to fight
at the tQ.reshold than upon the hearthstone.
With great respect, we have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servants,
JOHN LEN'l'HALL,
B. F. ISHERWOOD.
Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretm·y if the Navy.

[ A.d vertisemen t.]
liGHT-DRAUGHT VESSELS FOR RIVERS AND BAYS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, February 10, 1863.
The Navy Department will receive proposals for the construction and com·
pletion in every respect, (except guns, ordnance stores, fuel, provisions, and
nautical instruments,) for Armored Steamers, of about seven hundred tons, of
wood and iron combined, having a single revolving turret.
On personal application at the Navy Department in Washington or to RearAdmiral Gregory, No. 413 Broadway, New York, parties intendingtooffercan
examine the plans and specifications, which will be furnished to the contractors
by the department.
No offer will be considered unless from parties who are prepared to execut
work of this kind, having suitable shops and tools, of which, if not known to the
department, they must present evidence with their bid.
The act of Congress approved July 17, 1862, prohibits the transfer of any
contract, or order, or interest therein.
The bidders will state the price and the time within which they will agree to
complete the vessel or vessels, and the bid must be accompanied by the guarantee
required by law, that if awarded to them they will promptly execute the contract.
Propositions will be received until the 24th day of February, and they must
be indorsed "Proposals for vessels for river · defence," to distinguish them from
other business letters.
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B. F. Isherwood.

WASHINGTON, .April 25, 1865.
Mr. B. F. IsHERWOOD, chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, appeared
.
before the committee and submitted the following statement:
Having understood that Chief Engineer Stimers, in his evidence before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, made statements referring to me in connexion with the designing and constructing o£ the vessels popularly known as
light-draught mon itors, I addressed the committee a note asking for a copy of
those parts of his evidence, and received from it the following extracts, which I
presume contain all in which reference is made to me:
" Mr. :E'ox said : Now that our heads of bureaus are confirmed in their
places, they must do their work. We have taken all the responsibility thus
far, but now ~hese men must take their responsibility. I have, therefore, sent
the plans down to the Bureau of Construction. Mr. Lenthall says that he does
not see anything in his part of the ship which is at all out of the way, and he
does not advise any changes. I have all5o sent the plans to the Bureau of Engineering, to see if the chief of that bureau has any objection to the arrangement of the machinery. He says he thinks there ought to be some modifications; but he is out of town, and you must wait until to-morrow to see him, and
then you will find out his views. You have Captain Ericsson's views about
the machinery; if you find that the chief of the Bureau of Engineering has
views to which Captain Ericsson will not agree, try to get the two together, ~o
that we can get a plan on which both will agree, because we want these vessels to meet Captain Ericsson's views and the views of our bureau. If you
cannot bring them t~gether so that they will be reconciled, then we will build
one on Ericsson's plan, and one on the plan of the bureau; and if you have a
plan, we will build one on your plan also. Said I, 'No, sir, I have no plan;
I have more to do than ever.'
" 'rhe next day I saw Mr. Isherwood, the chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, and I found that he wanted the coal-bunkers arranged in a different
way-he wanted entirely different boilers-he wanted .different engines. Instead of their being athwart engines, connected directly with the screw-shaft,
he wanted them connected with bevel gearing. Not to go through the whole
matter, he had changed everything-coal-bunkers, ,boilers, engines, and propellers. I diElcussed these matters with him, and brought him to consent to
some modifi~ations which I thought perhaps Captain Ericflson would agree to.
He gave me some sketches, plans, &c., and it was decided that as I had
draughtsmen I should take them to New York, and if Captain Ericsson agreed
to them, I should embody them in a new plan and send it on again to Washington. I went to Captain Ericsson, and he ',did not like any of the proposed
changes at all. He thought each one injurious to the vessel-that it made the
plan less excellent than his was. 'But,' said he, 'if they will not build more
than one of these vessels unless I give way, of course I think the government
ought to have them; they will be very useful indeed, and I think they ought
to buHd more than one right away. The chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering knows how to work engines and drive the vessel along, of course; so I
think we better consent,' with the exception, however, that he would not listen
to gear engines at all. He said they would certainly fail if placed in such limber vessels as these would be. As the chief of the bureau had given me these
plans and these directions to work them into a general plan if I found I could
do it, with the understanding that I was to retain the original type if the bevelgear arrangement would ' not work so well, I withdrew that part, and Captain
Ericsson assented to all the rest. I afterwards reported to the. chief of the
Part I V - - 8
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Bureau of Steam Engineering that I found I could not work in the bevel-gear
plans. I do not remember that I told him why I could not work them in, but
I told him that I could not, and he gave his approval to the plans which I did
work in."
*
*
*
*
*
*
" Question. As the draught of water in these vessels could vary so little
without destroying their efficiency, was it not of the very greatest importance
that every test should be applied to determine exactly the weight of the materials?
"Answer. Yes, sir; I think we all committed errors in that respect. But
these two bureau.5 were always inimical to these vessels. I always had the
feeling that they would naturally oppose anything which I proposed, because
I was connected with them. For instance, when I asked the chief of the
Bureau of Steam Engineering for engineers to inspect the work, he said, 'I
have nothing to do with them. These vBssels are not being built under the
bureau, and you cannot have naval engineers for that purpose.' I answered,
'these are naval vessels; they are built for the N"avy Department, and the
navy will be injured or benefited as they are bad or good .; therefore, I think
we ought to have a system of inspection which will insure their excellence.'
He said, ' I am not going to order good inspectors to watch the riveting of a
lot of old boilt r iron, and that is the end of it.' I went to him again; I tried
to come over his feelings by calling to mind our old friendships and old associations. I said to him, 'My dear fellow, I will be able some of these days to do
you as much of a favor- as this will be for you to do me,' putting it upon the
ground of a personal favor. He said, 'I intend that you shall do everything
for me that l ask of you, and that I shall ,do nothing for you that you ask of
me.' Of course there was nothing more te be said.
"Question. Then there was not that co-operation which there should have
been upon the part of the Bureaus of Engineering and of Construction in relation to these monitors 1
"Answer. No, sir; I always felt that it was a regular fight-that we had to
conquer them before we could get them to do anything. On the one side it
was a fight with the burflaus, and on the other side it was a fight with the contractors to make them do anything right. It was a very unpleasant position
which I held.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"Question. Who do yqu say is the author or designer of the light-draught
iron-clad monitors 1
"Answer, Captain Ericsson first _designed the vessel; the Bureau of Engineering modified the machinery, and then the water-tank was added, as I have
explained. l was obliged to have these drawings made in my office, and I had
to decide a great many points about the details. Captain Ericsson, therefore,
says that I was the designer of the vessel. I might as well turn around and
say that such a man who drew it had designed it, because he did a great deal.
" By the chairman:
"Question. Did not Captain Ericsson furnish a plan of these light-draught
monitors for the department 1
''Answer. Yes sir.
" Question. Did you also exhibit one 1
"Answer. Not then.
" Question. Did you at any time 1
"Answer. No, sir; only the modifications directed by the bureau.
" Question. Then you did not furnish the department with any draught of
monitor on -your own plan 1
" Answer. No, sir ; I put in modifications according to the direction of the
heads of the bureaus here."
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The statements in the above extracts, so far as I have kn'owledge, are falsehoods, and the whole tenor of the evidence is of the same nature.' The true
facts are as follow :
In the construction of the large number of monitors previously to these lightdraughts, all of which were under the control of Chief Engineer S timers, I had
never been called on for an opinion ; nor had any reference to me ever been
made of the smallest detail in connexion with them, nor is it pretended to the
contrary by any one. They had been wholly confided to Mr. Ericsson and
Chief Engineer Stimers; the latter was detailed for that duty by the department itself, and not on my recommendation, as he falsely asserts in a letter of
the 15th March, 1865, published in the Army and Navy Journal of March 18.
I had the opinion then, which after experience has confirmed, that he was
utterly incompetent to the duties assigned him. All the recommendations for
detail made by this bureau are made in writing, so there can be no question as
to this fact. The matter is not important further than as evidence of that
reckless want of veracity which vitiates all the statements of Chief Engineer
Stimers. He was furnished with a suite of offices in New York, and had under
him some forty draughtsmen and clerks-all employed by himself-besides a
number of naval engineers. His employes were nearly as numerous as all in
all the Bureaus of the Navy Department, antl to all intents and purposes he
was at the head of an independent bureau of the largest magnitude located in
New York for the construction of monitor vessels. He had no conespondence
with the Bureau of Stearn Engineering, either direct or indirect; referred no·
thing to it, and received no instructions or orders from it. In fact, that bureau
had no knowledge eve_n of the number of monitor vessels he was building, and
he was not even nominally under its authority. I presumed his communications to the department were made direct, the same as from any bureau.
With the designing and construction of the light-draught monitors I had as
.little to do as with the previous monitors, or with the Dictator, and presumed,
as I had every reason to, that they were to be controlled by the same agency,
and that no interference was expected from me any more than with them. The
department never referred them, or anything connected with them. to me-such
reference is always made in writing-nor had I any knowledge that sueh vessels were to be built, or were in contemplation, until Chief Engineer Stime.rs
entered my office with a sketch which had been made for them by Mr. Ericsson,
as he then informed me. He did not state the department had sent him to me,
nor did I understand from him that he came to submit it to me for approval.
On the contrary, the impression he gave me was that his visit was simply a
formal call, the possession of the sketch an accidental occurrence, and its exhibition made merely to show me what he was then engaged in. Our very brief
conversation-certainly less than half an hour-was confined to the machinery
alone, the hull and remainder of the vessel not coming within my province. In
the course of this conversation, which was the only one I ever had with him or
any other person on the subject, I suggested that a better arrangement of boiler
could be made, and a better type employed, giving him a sketch of one which I
had formerly used in some gunboats of my own desig·n. I further suggested
that the two screws by which the vessel was to be propelled had better be
separated far enough to prevent their actions from interfering, as Mr. Eric~son's
sketch showed them considerably overlapping. I might also have said it would
be found difficult to manage the single screw engines promptly enough in starting and backing, but that this objection could be avoided by connecting them
with a particular arrangement of bevel gear, (not to multiply the speed,) as had
been very successfully practiced on some light-draught iron-clads built for
the Mississippi river and its tributaries. As before stated, the interview was
very brief, and certainly a stranger witnessing it would have inferred from the
manner and language of Chief Engineer Stimers that he was a superior conde-
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scending to explain his plans to an inferior, in order that he might receive his
admiration. Nothing was said in it about Mr. Fox or Mr. Ericsson, nor about
the detailing of naval engineers for the inspection of these vessels while being
constructed. The whole of Chief Engineer Stimers's account of his appeal to
"my feelings" and asking "as a personal favor" that such details might be
made, is a pure invention, which will be easily believed when you are informed
that at that very time he was endeavoring, by the basest arts, the vilest calumnies, and the most dishonest practices, to supplant me as chief of the Bureau of
Steam Engineering, which facts he knew at the time I was well aware of.
Further, at the very moment when he says he was asking for "engineers to
inspect the work," he already had a large number detailed to him and under his
exclusive orders, and could have had as many more by simply asking the
department, which never, so far as I know, refused any request of his. He
selected whichever engineers he wished, and they were ordered direct by the
department, without going through even the formality of a detail by the Bureau
of Steam Engineering; and the first knowledge I had of who were detailed
was after the orders were issued. Many engineers whose services were really
' of great value at sea on board their respective vessels were thus transferred to
a duty which could have been as well done by others without their rare sea
experience.
•
..A long time after the interview referred to, and the work had bP-en contracted
for and commenced, the department required me to give an estimate of the
probable speed of these light-draught monitors, furnishing· me for data a memorandum in Chief Engineer Stimers's handwriting, of which the following is a
copy:
"Midship section, 250 square feet. Grate surface, 150 square feet. Diameter
of cylinders, 22 inches. Stroke, 30 inches. 2 cylinders. Screws, (two,) 9 feet
diameter, 12 feet pitch, 4 blades; dip of screws, 5 feet 9 inches. Maximum
steam pressure, 60 pounds; cut off, { 0 . Height of openings in dry pipe above
top of water, 18 inches."
These figures were the whole data given. I replied in writing-and I will
take occasion here to state that all transactions of such nature between the
department and bureau have been in writing-stating I had made the calculation on the assumptions that the resistance of the vessel per square foot of
greatest immersed transverse section was the same as that of ordinarily modelled
naval vessels, and that the machinery was properly designed in its details.
Thus it will still be seen that the department asked no approval or disapproval
from me of the plans. ..All it ever required, and that after the plans were
adopted and the work commenced, was an estimate of the speed from the section
of the vessel and the quantity of machinery to be used, and this, it will be
observed, was required in writing. Had an opinion of the vessel or its
machinery ever been asked, it would have been required, in like manner, in
writing.
I never knew, until I read it in Chief Engineer Stimers's evidence, that he
bad repeated my suggestions to Mr. Ericsson, who bad dissented from them;
be that as it may, however, the fact is that but one of mine was followed,
namely, the mere spreading apart of the screws until they did not overlap,
which dia not require the slightest change of hnll or machin(fry. Neither the
boiler I suggested, nor the mode of connecting the single engines by bevel-gear,
were accepted; but instead of this boiler, Chief Engineer Stimers put in the
vessel one afterwards patented by himself~ and which, as he must have sworn
when he took out the patent, he believed to be original with himself, be could
not possibly intend, without the most shocking moral obliquity, to attribute to
me. I knew, however, nothing of these things at the time, nor for a long while
afterwards. I believe it is not pretended by any one that any portions of the
vessel other than its motive machinery was ever the subject of even a casual
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conversation with me. The only plan I ever saw, namely, the sketch by Mr.
Ericsson, was so meagre, being merely.an outline of the hull with the position
of the machinery indicated, but no details given, that neither I nor any other
person could have formed an opinion on it; the data necessary for that was
wholly wanting.
I believe the truth is, that, after . the vessels were commenced, most of the
features and detail, both of hull and machinery, were changed by Chief Engineer Stimers, without the authority or knowledge of any one, from the original
plan devised by Mr. Ericsson, which was the only one I ever saw or heard bf.
These changes were so far from being submitted to me, that I never even knew
of them. I never saw, and to this day have never seen, any of the drawings
from which the work was executed, all of which were fu,rnished directly by him
to the contractors, and signed with his name. They were not examined by
any other person, and the whole responsibility of their errors rests on him
alone. So far was Mr. Ericsson from approving them, that I have since learned
he addressed a protest in writing against them as soon as he became aware of
the facts. The entire designing and superintending of this work was left in
the hands of Chief Engineer Stimers alone, the department, with the greatest
liberality, furnishing him with everything he asked, either in material or personnel. So little was the Bureau of Steam Engineering concerned in the matter, that not even a copy of the specifications written and printed by Chief
Engineer Stimers, and distributed largely over the country to promote his fame,
was ever sent to it, any more than the expensive engravings made and distributed for the same purpose.
If any snch conversation occurred between Mr. Fox and Chief Engineer
Stimers as the latter relates, in regard to anticipated disagreement of views between
Mr. Ericsson and myself on the subject of those light-draught monitors, I can
only say I never had any knowledge of it, nor any intimation of the kind from
Mr. Fox.
In relation to Chief Engineer Stimers's statement that he did not furnish the
department with any draught of a monitor on his own plan, and that he only
"put in modifications to Mr. Eri-csson's plan according to the directions of the
.heads of the bureaus here," I can only say that I do not know whether or not
he presented a plan of his own, but most certainly none of the modifications he
made to Mr. Ericsson's were either suggested, or approved, or known to the
bureaus referred to.
The most astonishing part of the whole is that, with the facts above stated, so
well known to scores of people, and capable of being supported both by documentary proof, and not less so by its absence, Chief Engineer Stimers should
have the matchless effrontery to attempt throwing the responsibility of the
parentage of his wretched abortions upon the two mechanical bureaus of the
navy. He has said these bureaus were inimical to these vessels; if this was
true they could not have approved them or assisted in designing them; but this
allegation has as little truth as all the others made by him. They simply had
nothing to do with them whatever, and were neither friendly nor unfriendly.
Their construction had been confided to other persons and a separate organization; the result is before the world. Chief Engineer Stimers had no occasion
"to fight these bureaus and to conquer them," as he says. The department
gave him direct all he asked, and there was nothing to fight them about .
.Further corroborations of these views will be found in the following letters,
published over the names of the chiefs of these bureaus, and written in the :firt:t
moments of surprise when they found themselves accused of things of which
they only derived knowledge from the accusation itself.
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"WASHINGTO.V, March 1, 1865.
'' To the Editors if the Boston Daily Advertiser :
"In your issue of the 20th ultmo, I find a letter from Chief Engineer A. C.
Stimers, United States Navy, in relation to what are popularly known as the
G< light-draught monitors," which contains statements so utterly at variance with
the truth, and SQ calculated to convey erroneous impressions, that I must ask a
small po1-tion of your space to correct them.
"rl'he original design of these vessels was made by Mr. Ericsson, who furnished, so far as I am aware, merely an outline plan, no details and no specifications; and had this sketch been filled up with ordinary ability, the vessels
would probably have had the contemplated draught of water.
"But Chief Engineer Stimers, to whom the immediate supervision of their construction was committed by the department, not content with carrying out Mr.
Ericsson's ideas and furnishing working drawings upon his plan, undertook
many and expensive alterations. Neither the working drawing::: containing
these departures from the original plan, nor any other working plan, were ever
submitted to either of the mechanical bureaus of the Navy Department, and
they first learned of the alterations through the contractors, who cvmplained
that after they had completed portions of their work, the plans had been withdrawn and others widely different substituted.
" On the discovery of this system, or rather want of system, Chief Engineer
Stimers was informed that these alterations, involving large expense, must not
be made; but he still persisted in them, and it was only when a letter was written to each of the builders directing them not to make further alterations without the consent of the bureaus and an agreement beforehand as to the cost, that
the department was enabled in the least degree to control the comtruction of
the vessels. It is these unauthorized, and at the time unknown, changes and
additions, more than anything else, that necessitated the enlargement of the
vessels.
"So far was this carried, that patented inventions were inserted in the drawings, with the knowledge of Chief Engineer Stimers, by persons employed in
his office, and claims were afterwards made for pa:tent fees upon the contractors.
"When the advertisement was issued, in order to place the work under contract, Chief Engineer Stimers deposited in the Bureau of Construction an outline plan and some general specifications, accompanied by his estimate of the
weights of the vessel and machinery, which weights, he stated in it, corresponded to a draught of water 6 feet 5~ inches. Most, if not all of the contractors, have a copy of his paper containing these weights, and on them they
based their bids. Had these weights been adhered to by him, the vessel would
not have required enlargement.
" I was never asked to make any calculations of the weight or draught of
water of the light-draught, or any other of the monitor vessels. I never approved plans, as Chief Engineer Stimers states, in relation to them, and was
never asked to do so; and the statements in my letter to the Ron. Mr. Grimes,
read by him in the Senate, are strictly true in every respect, both in the spirit
and the letter.
"rrhere were never any plans submitted to me of which I, or any other person, could give an opinion or make a calculation, and Chief Engineer Stimers's
assertion that 'when the plans were finally completed, they were examined and
approved by the two Bureaus of Construction and Engineering,' is without the
slightest color of truth.
" Chief Engineer Stimers further states that ' his superintendent of draughtsmen, Mr. Crabb, had orders from him, from first to last, to take all drawings to
Captain Ericsson for approval'-conveyingthe impression that Captain Ericsson
did approve them; whereas it appears he protested against them in writing.
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" During the progress of the construction of the light-draught monitors, Chief
Engineer Stimers assumed the entire credit of them, and it is a ludicrous surprise to the hundreds 9f persons who recollected his pretensions then, that he is
now endeavoring to shift the responsibility of his errors to others. He seems
to shrink as abjectly from accepting the results of his own acts when failures,
as he was eager and bold to assume credit for labors not his own when he
thought they would render him famous.
"So far from submitting to be instructed by Mr. Ericsson, he assumed to be
his rival, and in the endeavor to imitate him underwent the fate of the frog who
attempted to expand himself to the bulk of the ox.
''All the facts herein stated, and much more, are well known to hnndreds,
and, in the endeavor to avoid the responsibility which belongs to him, and him
alone, he forfeits the charity which might be extended to his ignorance as an
engineer.
"JOHN LENTHALL."

"NAVY DEPAR'rMENT,

"Bureau qf Steam Enginee1·ing, Jlllarch 2, 1865.
" To the Editors qf the Bo,<(ton Daily Advertiser:
"My attention has been called to a letter in your issue, of the 20th ultimo,
on the subject of the 'light-draught monitors,' signed by Chief Engineer A. C.
Stimers, United States navy, and containing assertions in relation to my connexion with the same, so opposed to the truth as to require a flat denial, with
such statements as will enable the public to justly judge between us.
"My letter to the Hon. Mr. Grimes, chairman of the Committee on Naval
Affairs of the Senate, read to that body and referred to by Chief Engineer
Stimers, is strictly correct in every particular; and the tenor of its statements,
as quoted by Chief Engineer Stimers, 'that I have had nothing to with the construction of the iron-clads in question,' is known to be true by every one of the
hundreds of persons having connexion with them, and by none so well as by
Chief Engineer Stimers himself. The real facts are as follows:
"'l,he :first knowledge I had of any intent to build such vessels was from
Chief Engineer Stimers, who entered my office with a sketch-and it was hardly
complete enough to deserve that name-by Mr. Ericsson for a monitor vessel
of six feet draught of water. His purpose was to show me the machinery alone
for the hull, turrets, &c., and the making of the contracts did not lie within my
province. On this sketch no detail of machinery was given, its position only
was indicated, and a few general dimensions expressed, together with the type
of boiler. I was not asked to approve anything in relation to it, nor was I
consulted about it; and the only suggestions I offered were, :first, that the two
screws by which the vessel was to be propelled ought to be separated so as to
prevent their actions interfering-the sketch showed them overlapping greatly;
second, that if the boilers were arranged with a fore-and-aft :fire-room, as almost
universally adopted in steamers, it would be a better distribution of them for
space and convenience than the one shown on the sketch, which had two
athwartship :fire-rooms, one at each end of the boilers; and I further suggested
the use of vertical water-tubes by the sides of the furnaces. In place of this,
however, another arrangement of tubes, as I since learned, was used, devised by
Chief Engineer Stimers, for which he applied for a patent, and on which one
contractor informed me in presence of a third person he had paid a fee. A long
time after the interview referred to, which waf! the only one that ever took
place on the subject, I was required to give an estimate of the probable speed,
the data submitted to me being the number of square feet of grate and heating
_ surface in the boiler, the capacity of the cylinder5, and the immersed amidship
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section in square feet of the vessel at six feet draught of water. These :figurPs
were the whole data; and I replied, stating I had made the calculation on the
assumptions that the resistance of the vessel per square foot of section· was the
same as that of ordinarily modelled naval vessels, and that the machinery was
properly proportioned.
"The whole designing and superintending of this work was placed in the
hands of Chief Engineer .Stimers. I had no further communication with him on
the subject, gave no directions in regard to it either directly or indirectly, and
had not the slightest knowledge concerning it. I never saw, and to this day have
never seen, any of the drawings from which the work was executed, all of which
were furnished by him directly to the coutractors, and signed with his name,
nor have 1 ever seen a copy of the specifications, which were made by him after
the contracts were executed, though they were, as I have since learned, printed
and distributed all over the country; but not a copy was sent to me. During
the progress of the work, Chief Engineer Stimers claimed all the merit of it,
and its whole responsibility, asserting in the presence of dozens that he andhe
alone was the author of every part and parcel of it, a claim which no thorough
engineer would have dreamed of disputing with him, after examining its character.
It now appears, indeed, that the plans of machinery and of vessel designed by
Chief Engineer Stimers, including his water-chamber, which contributed so
much to overload her, were so completely the opposite of those intended by Mr.
Ericsson, and indicated in his original sketch, that he protested in writing against
them. Chief Engineer Stimers's sta~ement, therefore, that 'when the plans
were :finally completed they were examined and approved by the two Bureaus 9f
Construction and Steam Engineering,' is not only an untruth, but made the
more contemptible by its intent to throw on others the responsibility of his own
utter incompetency. r_rhat a person should not have ability equal to the performance of a task which his self-conceit makes him undertake, is not uncommon; but it is very uncommon to find so little manhood as not only to shrink
from the responsibility of the failure when it comes, but the baseness to attempt
screening himself by falsely charging it upon the well-won reputation of others.
"B. F. ISHERWOOD."

MASSACRE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS.
THIRTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.
IN THE HoUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, January

10, 1865.

On motion of Mr. Orth,
• Resolved, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be required to inquire into and
report all the facts connected with the late attack of the third regiment of Colorado volunteers, under Colonel Chivington, on a village of the Cheyenne tribe of Indians, near
Fort Lyon.
Attest:
- - - - , Clerk.

•

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War submit the following report :
In the summer of 1864 Governor Evans, of Colorado Territory,
as acting superintendent of Indian affairs, sent notice to the various
bands and tribes of Indians within his jurisdiction that such as desired to be considered friendly to the whites should at once repair to
the nearest military post in order to be protected from the soldiers
who were to take the field against the hostile Indians.
About the close of the summer, some Cheyenne Indians, in the
neighborhood of the Smoke Hills, sent word to Major vVynkoop, the
commandant of the post of Fort Lyon, that they had in their possession, and were willing to deliver up, some white captives they had
purchased of other Indians. Major Wynkoop, with a force of over
100 men, visited those Indians and received the white captives. On
his return he was accompanied by a number of tt ~ chief8 and leading
men of the Indians, whom he had invited to visit Denver for the
purpose of conferring with the authorities there in regard to keeping
peace. Among them were Black Kettle and White Antelope of the
Cheyennes, and some chiefs of the Arapahoes. The council was
held, and these chiefs stated that they were friendly to the whites,
and always had been, and that they desired peace. Governor Evans
and Colonel Chivington, the commander of that military district, advised them to repair to Fort Lyon and submit to whatever terms the
military commander there should impose. This was done by the
Indians, who were treated some,vhat as prisoners of war, receiving
rations, and being obliged to remain within certain bounds.
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All the testimony goes to show that the Indians, under the imme·
diate control of Black Kettle and White Antelope of the Cheyennes,
and Left Hand of the Arapahoes, were and had been friendly to the
whites, and had not been gnil t.y of any acts of hostility or depredatidn. The Indian agents, the Indian interpreter and others examined
by your committee, all testify to the good character of those Indians.
Even Governor Evans and Major Anthony, though evidently willing
to convey to your committee a false impression of the character of
those Indians, were forced, in spite of their prevarication, to admit
that they knew of nothing they had done which rendered them deserving of punishment.
A northern band of the Cheyennes, known as the Dog Soldiers,
bad been guilty of acts of hostility ; bnt all the testimony goes to
prove that they had no connexion with Black Kettle's band, but acted
in despite of his authority and influence. Black Kettle and his band
denied all connexion with or responsibility for the Dog Soldiers, and
·Left Hand and his band of Arapahoes were equally friendly.
These Indians, at the suggestion of Governor Evans and Colonel
Chivington, repaired to Fort Lyon and placed themselves under the
protection of Major Wynkoop. They were led to believe that they
were regarded in the light of friendly Indians, and would be treated
as such so long as they conducted themselves quietly.
The treatment extended to those Indians by Major Wynkoop does
not seem to have satisfied those in authority there, and for some
cause, which does not appear, he was removed, and Major Scott J.
Anthony was assigned to the command of Fort Lyon ; but even Major Anthony seems to have found it difficult at first to pursue any
different course towards the Indians he found there. They were entirely within the power of the military. Major Antlwrq having demanded their arms, which they surrendered to him, they conducted
themselves quietly, and in every way manifested a disposition to remain at peace with the whites. For a time even he continued issuing rations to them as Major Wynkoop had done ; but it was determined by Major Anthony (whether upon his own motion or at the suggestion of others does not appear) to punme a different course towards these friendly Indians. They \vere called together and told
that rations could no longer be issued to them, and they had better
go where they could obtain subsistence by hunting. At the suggestion of Major Anthony (and from one in his position a suggestion
was equivalent to a command) these Indians went to a place on Sand
creek, about thirty-five miles from Fort Lyon, and there established
their camp, their arms being restored to them. He told them that
he then had no authority to make peace with them ; but in case he
received such authority he would inform them of it. In his testimony
he says:
"I told them they might go back on Sand creek, or between there
and the headwaters of the Smoky Hill, and remain there until I received instructions from the department headquarters, from General
Curtis ; and that in case I did receive any authority to make peace
with them I would go right over and let them know it. I did
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not state to them that I would give thern notice in case we intended to attack them. They went away with that understanding, that in case I"
received instructions from department headquarters I was to let them
know it.''
And in order, as it were, to render these Indians less apprehensive
of any danger, One Eye, a Cheyenne chief, was allowed to reipain
with them to obtain information for the use of the military authorities. He was employed at $125 a month, and several times brought
to Major Anthony, at Fort Lyon, information of proposed movements of other and hostile bands. Jack Smith, a half-breed son of
John S. Smith, an Indian interpreter, employed by the government,
was also there for the same purpose. A United States soldier was
allowed to remain there, and two days before the massacre Mr. Smith,
the interpreter, was permitted to go there with goods to trade
with the Indians. Everything seems to have been done to remove
from the minds of these Indians any fear of approaching danger ;
and when Colonel Chivington commenced his movement he took
all the precautions in his power to prevent these Indians learning
of his approach. For some days all travel on that route was forcibly
stopped by him, not even the mail being allowed to pass. On the
morning of the 28th of November he appeared at Fort Lyon with
over 700 mounted men and two pieces of artillery. One of his first acts
was to throw a guard around the post to prevent any one leaving it.
At this place Major .Anthony joined him with 125 men and two
pieces of artlllery.
.
On the night of the 28th the entire party started from Fort Lyon,
and, by a forced march, arrived at the Indian camp, on Sand creek,
shortly after daybreak. rrhis Indian camp consisted of about 100
lodges of Cheyennes, under Black Kettle, and from 8 to 10 lodges of
.Arapahoes under Left Hand. It is estimated that each lodge contained five or more persons, and that more than one-half were women
and children.
Upon observing the approach of the soldiers, Black-Kettle, the
head chief, ran up to the top of his lodge an American flag, which
had been presented to him some years before by Commissioner
Greenwood, with a small white flag under it, as he bad been advised to do in case he met with any troops on the prairies. Mr. ·
Smith, the interpreter, supposing they might be strange troops,
unaware of the character of the Indians encamped there, advanced
from his lodge to meet them, but was fired upon, and returned to his
loClge .
.And then the scene of murder and barbarity began-men, women,
and children ware indiscriminately slaughtered. In a few minutes
all the Indians were flying over the plain in terror and confusion.
A fevv who endeavored to hide themselves under the bank of the
creek were surrounded and shot down in cold blood, offering but
feeble resistance. From the sucking babe to the old warrior, all who
were overtaken were deliLerately murdered. Not content with killing,
women and children, who were incapable of offering any resista.n ce,
the soldiers indulged in acts of barbarity of the most revolting char_ .
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acter; such, it is to be hoped, as never before disgraced the acts of
men claiming to be civilized. No attempt was made by the officers
to restrain the savage cruelty of the men under their command, but
they stood by and v;ritnessed these acts without one word of reproof,
if they did not incite their commission. For more than two hours the
work of murder and barbarity was continued, until more than one
hundred dead bodies, three-fourths of them of women and children, lay
on the plain as evidences of the fiendish malignity and cruelty of th.e
officers who had so sedulously and carefully plotted the massacre, and
of the soldiers who had so faithfully acted out the spirit of their
officers.
It is difficult to believe that beings in the form of men, and disgracing
the uniform of United States soldiers and officers, could commit or
countenance the commission of such acts of cruelty and barbarity as
are detailed in the testimony, but which your committee will not
specify in their report. It is true that there seems to have existed
among the people inhabiting that region of country a hostile feeling
towards the Indians. Some of the Indians had committed acts of
hostility towards the whites ; but no effort seems to have been made
by the authorities there to prevent these hostilities, other than by
the commission of even worse acts. 'rue hatred of the whites to the
Indians would seem to have been inflamed and excited to the utmost;
the bodies of persons killed at a great distance-whether by Indians
or not, is not certain-were brought to the capital of the Territory
and exposed to the public gaze for the purpose of inflaming still more
the already excited feeling of the people. Their cupidity was appealed to, for the governor in a proclamation calls upon all, ''either
individually or in such parties as they may organize," 'to kil1 and
destroy as enemies of the country, wherever they may be found, all
such hostile Indians,'' authorizing them to ''I: old to their own private
use and benefit all the property of said hostile Indians that they
may capture." What Indians he would ever term friendly it is
impossible to tell. His testimony before your committee was characterized by such prevarication and shuffiing as has been shown by
no witness they have examined during the four years they have been
engaged in their investigations; and for the evident purpose of
avoiding the admission that he was fully aware that the Indians massacred so brutally at Sand creek: were then, and had been, actuated
by the most friendly feelings towards the whites, and had done all
in their power to restrain those less friendly disposed.
The testimony of Major Anthony, who succeeded an officer disposed
to treat these Indians with justice and humanity, is sufficient of itself
to show how unprovoked and unwarranted was this massaare. He
testifies that he found these Indians in the neighborhood of Fort Lyon
when he assumed command of that post; that they professed their
friendliness to the whites, and their willingness to do whatever he demanded of them; that they delivered their arms up to him; that they
went. to and encamped upon the place designated by him; that they
gave him information from time to time of acts of hostility which were
meditated by other and hostile bands, and in every way conducted
L
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tl1emselves properly and peaceably, and yet he says it was fear and
not principle which prevented his killing them while they were completely in his power. And when Colonel Chivington appeared at
Fort Lyon, on his misRion of murder and barbarity, Major Anthony
made haste to accompany him with men and artillery, although Colonel
Chivington had no authority whatever over him.
As to Colonel Chivington, your committee can hardly find fitting
terms to describe his conduct. Wearing the uniform of the United
States, which should be the emblem of justice and humanity; holding
the important position of commander of a milit~ry district, and therefore having the honor of the government to that extent in his keep
ing, he deliberately planned and executed a foul and dastardly massacre which would have disgraced the veriest savage among those
who were the victims of his cruelty. Having full knowledge of their
friendly character, having himself been instrumental to some extent
in placing them in their position of fancied security, he took advantage of their inapprehension and defenceless condition to gratify the
worst passions that ever cursed the heart of man. It is thought by
some that desire for political preferment prompted him to this cowardly act; that he supposed that by pandering to the inflamed passions of an excited population he could recommend himself to their
regard and consideration. Others think it was to avoid the being sent
where there was more of danger and hard service to be performed;
that he was \"l'illing to get np a show of hostility on the part of the
Indians by committing himself acts which savages themselves would
never premeditate. Whatever may have bee!:! his motive, it is to be
hoped that the authority of this government will never again be disgraced by acts such as he and those acting with him have been guilty
of committing.
There were hostile Indians not far distant, against which Colonel
Chivington could have led the force under his command. Major Anthony testifies that but three or four days' march from his post were
several hundreds of Indians, generally believed to be engaged in
acts of hostility towards the whites. And he deliberately testifies
that only the fear of them prevented him from killing those who were
friendly and entirely within his reach and control. It is true that to
reach them required some days of hard marching. It was not to be
· expeeted that they could be surprised as easily as those on Sand
creek; and the warriorR among them were almost, if not quite, as
numerous as the soldiers under the control of Colonel Chivington.
Whatever influence this may have had upon Colonel Chivington, the
truth is that he surprised and murdered, in cold blood, the unsuspecting men, women, and children on Sand creek, who had every
reason to believe they were under the protection of the United States
authorities, and then returned to Denver and boasted of the brave
deeds he and the men under his command had performed.
The Congress of the United States, at its last session, authorized
the appointment of a commission to investigate all matters relating
to the administration of Indian affairs within the limits of the United
States. Your committee most sincerely trust that the result of their
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inquiry will be the adoption of measures which will render impossible
the employment of officers, civil and military, such as have heretofore
made the administration of Indian affairs in this country a byword and
reproach.
In conclusion, your committee are of the opinion that for the purpose of vindicating the cause of justice and upholding the honor of
the nation, prompt and energetic measures should be at once taken
to remove from office those who have thus disgraced the government
by whom they are employed. and to punish, as their crimes deserve,
those who have been guilty of these brutal and cowardly acts.
Respectfully submitted.
B. F. W A.DE, Chairman.
NOTE.-See journal of committee, May 4, 1865.
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Testimony of Mr. Jesse H

Learenwo'J"tl~.

WASHINGTON, Marcl~ 13, 1865.
:Mr .•JESSE H. LEAVENWORTH sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. Where do you reside 1
Answer. :My l10me is in the city of :Milwaukee, 1Visconsin; but I am the
Indian agent of the Kiowas, Camanches, and Apache Indians, who roam over
the plains between ]'ort Larned, on the Sante Fe road, and the borders of
Mexico, throu!rh the western part of Texas.
Question. What do you know about the band of Indians said to have been
massacred by a force of troops under Colonel Chivington, of Colorado 1
Answer. I am perfectly acquainted with them. I have known them intimately
since 1862. Being in command of that southwestern frontier, I have constantly
had occasion to come in contact with them.
Question. What is that band called 1
Answer. That band is called the Cheyennes; but there were also ten lodges
of Arapahoes with them. Their reservation is on the Arkansas river, commencing at the Big Timbers and extending up the river ninety mile::;, and
bounded on the north by the Big Sanely. Fort Lyon is situated upon their
reservation.
Question. Is this in the 'l'erritory of Colorado 1
Answer. Yes, sir. Fort Lyon was my headquarters for nearly two years,
and I had occasion to meet these Indians almost daily. The chiefs Black
Kettle, \Vhite Antelope, and Big Jake have travelled with me hundreds and
hundreds of miles. Left Hanel, the second chief of the Arapahoes, and Little
Raven, the first chief of the Arapahoes, have been with me on scouts and in
my camps for months together. Left Hand was killed by Chivington; so I am
told by the agent and by others. His lodge happened to be one of the ten. A
year ago Little Raven reqnested me to try and get the military removed from
his reservation, which I did, through Mr. H. P. Bennet. You will see the correspondence in the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864. I
can say that they were always friendly. They have often stated to me that
they would not fight the whites under any circumstances. Left Hand particularly has saic1 that th<: whites might murder their men and do anything they
pleased to them, but they would never fight the whites.
Question. \Vhat cftused our troops to make this attack upon them 1
Answer. I do not know the immediate cause of Colonel Chivington attacking
this village. I know that a year ago this spring Major ~r aller, of the regular
army, crosseu the plains an·l p'tssetl the reservation of the Cheyennes and
Arapahoes; aud he communicated to the Indian department that if Colonel
Chivington was not stopped in his course of hunting down these Indians it
would get us into a war that would cost us millions of dollars. I also saw from
the reports in the papers that Lientrnant Ayres was bunting these Indians from
camp to camp. Knowing their disposition, and knowing Lieutenant Ayres, having
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appointed him myself as a lieutenant, I stated to the Indian department that
if Colonel Chivington was not stoppPd in his course of sending Lieutenant
.Ayres after these Indians we should get into a general Indian war on the
Jrontier.
Question. What was their object in hunting these Indians 1 what cause was
there for it 1
Answer. I could tell you the ostensible cause, but the real cause is beyond
my knowledge. Colonel Chivington was ordered by General Curtis to rendezvous his forces last spring in the southeast part of Colorado for the ostensible
purpose of making a raid into Texas. But, as they claimed, the Indian difficulties prevented him from iloing so, and he kept his troops there hunting these
Indians.
Question. You say that these Indians were of a remarkably friendly disposition 1
.Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And inoffensive towards our people 1
Answer. There never were two bands of Indians more friendly to the whites
than Black Kettle's band and White Antelope's band, and One Eye, who was
~h~o killed in this massacre.
~"~uestion. Where were you when this massacre took place1
Answer. I was between Fort Leavenworth and the Camanche country, trying to meet the wild tribes of which I was appointed the agent. I found it
very difficult to get to them. Little Raven had escaped from the massacre and
got into the Camanche country. He was half a Camanche himself, speaking
their language well, and is now with the Camanches with his band, and is one
of the best men there. I am begging protection for him, if I can get to him.
Question. Can you state anything more in regard to this massacre 1
Answer. I do not know anything positively, because I was not there; but I
have my information from persons who were present. One of them, Captain
Smith, is in this city now. He was there trading under the authority of Major
Anthony ; and I think Major Anthony is also in this city. He was second in
command in that expedition. l!-,rom them you can get more reliable information
than I can give you, for mine is hearsay. I only know that these Indians were
of a most friendly disposition. Mr. D. D. Colley is also here; he bas been a
t.rader in their camp for two years. His fath er, Major Colley, is their agent,
and knows them intimately; better, if anything, than I do.
Question. D o you know whether th ese Indians had ever committed any
depredations upon the whites 1
Answer. I ·was not aware that they had; not this particular band.

Testimony
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Mr. Jolm S. Smitlt.
vVASHINGTON, Ma?'Ch 14, 1865.

Mr. JoHN S. SMITH sworn an.d examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Where is your place of residence 1
Answer. Fort Lyon, Colorado.
Que:;;tion. What is yonr occupation 1
Answer. United States Indian interpreter and special Indian agent.
Question. Will you state to the committee all that you know in relation to
the attack of Colonel Chivington upon the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians in
November last?
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Answer. Major Anthony was in command at Fort Lyon at the time. r:rhose
Indians had been induced to remain in the vicinity of Fort Lyon, and were
promised protection by the commanding officer at l!""'ort Lyon. r:rhe commanding officer saw proper to keep them some thirty or forty miles distant from the
fort, for fear of some conflict between them and the soldiers or the travelling population, for Fort Lyon is on a great thoroughfare. He advised them to go out
on what is called Sand creek, about forty miles, a little east of north from Fort
Lyon. Some days after they had left Fort Lyon, when I had just recovered
from a long spell of sickness, I was called on by Major S. G. Colley, who
asked me if I was able and wllling to go out and pay a visit to these Indians,
ascertain their numbers, their general disposition toward the whites, and the
points where other bands might be located in the interior.
Question. What was the necessity for obtaining that information 1
Answer. Because there were different bands which were supposed to be at
war; in fact, we knew at the time that they were at war with the white population in that country; but this band had been in and left the post perfectly
satisfied. I left to go to this village of Indians on the 26th of November last.
I arrived there on the 27th and Temained there the 28th. On the morning of
the 29th, between daylight and sunrise-nearer sunrise than daybreak-a large
number of troops were discovered from three-quarters of a mile to a mile below
the village. The Indians, who discovered them, ran to my camp, called me out,
and wanted me to go and see what troops they were, and what they wanted.
The head chief of the nation, Black Kettle, and head chief of the Cheyennes,
was encamped there with us. Some years previous he had been presented with a
fine Americ.an flag by Colonel Greenwood, a commissioner, who had been sent
out there. Black Kettle ran this American flag up to the top of his lodge, with
a small white flag tied right under it, as he bad been advised to do in case he
should meet with any troops out on the prairies. I then left my own camp and
started for that portion of the troops that was nearest the village, supposing I
could go up to them. I did not know but they might be strange troops, and
thought my presence and explanations could reconcile matters. Lieutenant
Wilson was in command of the detachment to which I tried to make my approach; but they fired several volleys at me, and I returned back to my camp
and entered my lodge.
Question. Did these troops know you to be a white man 1
Answer. Yes, sir; and the troops that went there knew I was in the vHlage.
Question. Did you see Lieutenant Wilson, or were you seen by him 1
Answer. I cannot say I was seen by him; but his troops were the first to
fire at me.
Question. Did they know you to be a white man 1
Answer. r:l'hey could not help knowing it. I had on pants, a soldier's overcoat, and a hat such as I am wearing now. I was dressed differently from any
Indian in the country. On my return I entered my lodge, not expecting to get
out of it alive. I had two other men there with me : one ·was David Louderbach, a soldier, belonging to company G, 1st Colorado cavalry ; the other, a
man by the name of Watson, who was a hired hand of Mr. D. D. Colley, the
son of Major Colley, the agent.
After I had left my lodge to go out and see what was going on, Colonel
Chivington rode up to within fifty or sixty yards of where I was camped; he
recognized me at once. They all call me Uncle J obn in that country. He
said, "Run here, Uncle J obn; you are all right." I went to him as fa.st as I
could. He told me to get in between him and his troops, who were then coming
up very fast; I did so; directly another officer who knew me-Lieutenant Baldwin, in command of a battery-tried to assist me to get a horse; but there was
no loose horse there at the time. He said, "Catch hold of the caisson, and keep
up with us."
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By this time the Indians had fled; had scattered in every direction. The
troops were some on one side of the river and s0me on the other, following up
the Indians. We had been encamped on the north side of the river; I followed
along, holding on the caisson, sometimes running, sometimes walking. Finally,
about a mile above the village, the troops had got a parcel of the Indians
hemmed in under the bank of the river; as soon as the troops overtook them,
they commenced firing on them; some troops had got above them, so that they
were completely surrounded. There were probably a hundred Indians hemmed
in there, men, women, and children; the most of the men in the village escaped.
By the time I got up with the battery to the place where these Indians were
surrounded there had been some considerable firing. Four or five soldiers had
been killed, some with arrows and some with bullets. The soldiers continued
firing on these Indians, who numbered about a hundred, until they had almost
completely destroyed them. I think I saw alto~ethcr some seventy dead
bodies lying there; the greater portion women and children. There may have
been thirty warriors, old and young; the rest were women and small children
of different ages and sizes.
'l'he troops at that time were very much scattered. There were not over
two hundred troops in the main fight, engaged in killing this body of Indians
under the bank. The balance of the troops were scattered in different directions, running after small parties of Indians who were trying to make their
escape. I did not go to see how many they might have killed outside of this
party under the bank of the river. Being still quite weak from my last sickness, I returned with the first body of troops that went back to the camp.
The Indians had left their lodges and property; everything they owned. I
do not think more than one-half of the Indians left their lodges with their arms.
I think there were between 800 and 1,000 men in this command of Un ited
States troops. There was a part of three companies of the 1st Colorado, and the
balance were what were called 100-days men of the 3d regiment_ I am not able
to say which party did the most execution on the Indians, because it was very
much mixed up at the time.
We remained there that day after the fight. By 11 o'clock, I think, the
entire nnmber of soldiers had returned back to the camp where Colonel Chivington had returned. On their return he ordered the soldiers to destroy all
the Indian property there, which they did, with the exception of what plunder
they took away with them, which was considerable.
Question. How many Indians were there there 1
Answer. There were 100 families of Cheyennes, and some six or eight lodges
of Arapahoes.
Question. How many persons in all, should you say 1
Answer. About 500; we estimate them at five to ~lodge.
Question. 500 men, women, and children 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know the reason for that attack on the India.ns 1
Ans-wer. I do not know any exact reason. I have heard a great many reasons given. I have heard that that whole Indian war had been brought on for
selfish purposes. Colonel Chivington was running for Congress in Colorado,
and there were other things of that kind ; and last spring a year ago he was
looking for an order to go to the front, and I unclen~tand be had this Indian
war in view to retain himself and his troops in that country, to carry out his
electioneering purposee.
Question. In what way did this attack on th e Indians further the purpose of
Colonel Chivington 1
Answer. It was said-I did not hear him say it myself, but it was said that he
would do something; he had this regiment of three-months men, and did not
want them to go out without doing some service. Now he had been told re-
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peatedly by different persons-by myself, as well as others-where he could find
the hostile bands.
The same chiefs who were killed in this village of Cheyennes had been up
to see Colonel Chivington in Denver but a short time previous to this attack.
He himself told them that he had no power to treat with them; that he had
received telegrams from General Curtis directing him to fight all Indians he met
with in that country. Still he would advise them, if they wanted any assistance from the whites, to go to their nearest military post in their country, give
up their arms and the stolen property, if they had any, and then they would
receive directions in what way to act. This was told them by Colonel Chivington and by Governor Evans, of Colorado. I myself interpreted for them and
for the Indians.
Question. Did Colonel Chivington hold any communication with these Indians, or any of them, before making the attack upon them 1
Answer. No, sir, not then. He had some time previously held a council
with them at Denver city. When we first recovered the white prisoi1ers from
the Indians, we invited some of the chiefs to go to Denver, inasmuch as they
had sued for peace, and were willing to give up these white prisoners. We promised to take the chiefs to Denver, where they bad an interview with men who
had more power than Major vVynkoop had, who was the officer in command of
. the detachment that went out to recover these white prisoners. Governor Evans
and Culonel Chiviug~on were in Denver, and were present at this council. rl'hey
told the Indians to return with Major Wynkoop, and whatever he agreed on
doing with them would be recognized by them.
I returned with the Indians to Fort Lyon. There we let them go out to
their villages to bring in their families, as they had been invited through the
proclamation or circular of the governor during the month of Jnne, I think.
They were gone some twelve or fifteen days from l!.,ort Lyon, and then they returned with their families. Major Wynkoop had made them one or two issues
of provisions previous to the arrival of Major Anthony there to assume command. 'l'heu Major vVynkoop, who is now in command at Fort Lyon, was ordered to Fort Leavenworth on some business with General Curtis, I think.
'l'hen Major Anthony, through me, told the Indians that he did not have it
in his power to issue rations to them, as Major Wynkoop had done. He said
that be had assumed command at Fort Lyon, and his orders were positive from
headquarters to fight th e Indians in the vicinity of Fort Lyon, or at any other
point in the Territory where they could find them. He said that he had understood that they had been behaving very badly. But on seeing Major Wynkoop
and others there at Fort Lyon, he was happy to say that things were not as had
been represented, and be could not pursue any other course than that of Major Wynkoop, except the issuing rations to them. He then advised them to go
out to ~orne near point, where there was buffalo, not too far from Fort Lyon, or they
might meet with troops from the Platte, who would not know them from the
hostile bands. This was the southern band of Cheyennes ; there js another
band called the northern band. They had no apprehensions in the world of
any trouble with the whites at the time this at.tack was made.
Question. Had there been, to your knowledge, any hostile act or demonstration on the part of these Indians, or any of them 1
Answer. Not in this band. But the northern band, the band knowu by the
name of Dog soldiers of Cheyennes, bad committed many depredations on the
Platte.
Question. Do you know whether or not Colonel Ohivington knew the friendly
cl1aracter of these Indians before he made the attack upc n them 1
AnRwer. It is my opinion that he did.
Question. On what is that opinion based 1
Answer. On this fact, that he stopped all persons from going on ahead of him.
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He stopped the mail, and would not allow any person to go on ahead of him at
the time he was on his way from Denver city to }~ort Lyon. He placed a guard
around old Colonel Bent, the former ag@t there; he stopped a Mr. Hagues
and many men who were on their way to }-,ort Lyon. He took the fort by surprise, and as soon as he got there he posted pickets all around the fort, and
then left at 8 o'clock that night for this Indian camp.
Question. Was that anything more than the exercise of ordinary precaution
in following Indians 1 ·
Answer. Well, sir, he was told that there were no Indians in the vicinity of
Fort Lyon, except Black Kettle's band of Cheyennes and Left Hand's band of
Arapahoes.
Question. How do you know that ?
Answer. I was told so.
By Mr. Buckalew :
Question. Do you know it of your own knowledge 1
Answer. I cannot say I do.
Question. You did not talk with him abuut it before the attack 1
Answer. No, sir.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. When you went out to him, you had no opportunity to hold intercourse with him 1
Answer. None whatever; he had just commenced his fire against the Indians.
Question. Did you have any communication with him at any time while there 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was it 1
Answer. He asked me many questions about a son of mine, who was killed
there afterwards. He asked me what Indians were there, what chiefs ; and I
told him as fully as I knew.
By Mr. Buckalew :
Question. When did you talk with him 1
Answer. On the day of the attack. He asked me many questions about the
chiefs who were there, and if I could recognize them if I saw them. I told him
it was possible I might recollect the principal chiefs. They were terribly mutilated, lying there in the water and sand; most of them in the bed of the creek,
dead and dying, making many struggles. 'rhey were so badly mutilated and
covered with sand and water that it was very hard for me to tell one from another. However, I recognized some of them-among them the chief One Eye,
who was employed by our government at $125 a month and rations to remain
in the village as a spy. There was another called War Bonnet, who was here
two years ago with me. There was another by the name of Standing-in-theWater, and I supposed Black Kettle was among them, but it was not Black
Kettle. 'rhere was one there of his size and dimensions in every way, but so
tremendously mutilated that I was mistaken in him. I went out with Lieutenant Colonel Bowen, to see how many I could recognize.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Did you tell Colonel Ohivington the character and disposition of
these Indians at any time during your interviews on this day 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What did he say in reply 1
Answer. He said he could not help it; that his orders were positive to attack
the Indians.
Question. From whom did he receive theE'e orders 1
Answer. I do not know; I presume from General Curtis.
Question. Did he tell you 1
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Answer. Not to my recollection.
Question. Were the women and children slaughtered indiscriminately, or only
so far as they were with the warriors 1
Answer. Indiscriminately.
Question. Were there any acts of barbarity perpetrated there that came under your own observation 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I saw the bodies of those lying there cut all to pieces,
worse mutilated than any I ever saw before; the women cut all to pieces.
By Mr. Buckalew:
Question. How cut 1
Answer. With knives; scalped; their brains knocked out; children two or
three months old; all ages lying there, from sucking infants up to warriors.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Did you see it done 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I saw them fall.
Question. Fall when they were .killed 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you see them when they were mutilated 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. By whom were they mutilated 1
Answer. By the United States tr0ops.
Question. Do you know whether or not it was done by the direction or consent of any of the officers 1
Answer. I do not; I hardly think it was.
By Mr. Buckalew:
Question. What was the date of that massacre 1
Answer. On the 29th of November last.
Question. Did you speak of these barbarities to Colonel Chivington 1
Answer. No, sir; I had nothing at all to say about it, because at that time
they were hostile towards me, from the fact of my being there. 'rhey probably
supposed that I might be compromised with them in some way or other.
Question. Who called on you to designate the bodies of those who were killed 1
Answer. Colonel Chivington himself asked me if I would ride out with
Lieutenant Colonel Bowen, and see how many chiefs or principal men I could
recognize.
Question. Can you state how many Indians were killed-how many women
and how many children 1
Answer. Perhaps one-half were men, and the balance were women and chil·
dren. I do not think that I saw more than 70 lying dead then, as far as I went.
But I saw parties of men scattered in every direction, pursuing little bands of
Indians.
Question. What time of day or night was this attack made?
Answer. The attack commenced about sunrise, and lasted until between 10
and 11 o'clock.
Question. How large a body of troops 1
Answer. From 800 to 1,000 men.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What amount of resistance did the Indians make 1
Answer. I think that probably there may have been about 60 or 70 warriors
who were armed and stood their ground and fought. 'J1hose that were unarmed
got out of the way as they best could.
Question. How many of our troops were killed, and how many wounded 1
Answer. There were ten killed on the ground, and thirty-eight wounded;
four of the wounded died at Fort Lyon before I came on east.
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Question. Were there any other barbarities or atrocities committed there
other than those you have mentioned, that you saw?
Answer. Yes, sir; I had a half-breed son there, who gave himEelf up. He
started at the time the Indians fled; being a half-breed he had but little hope
of being spared, and seeing them fire at me, he ran away with the Indians for
the distance of about a mile. During the fight up there he walked back to
my camp and went into the lodge. It was surrounded by soldiers at the time.
He came in quietly and sat down ; he remained there that day, that night, and
the next clay in the afternoon; about four o'clock in the evening, as I was sitting
inside the camp, a soldier came up outside of the lodge and called me by name.
I got up and went out; he took me by the arm and walked towards Colonel
Chivington's camp, which was about sixty yards from my camp. Said he,
"I am sorry to tell yon, but they are going to kill your son Jack." I knew
the feeling towards the whole camp of Indians, and that there was no use to
make any resistance. I said, "I can't help it." I then walked on towards
where Colonel Chivington was standing by his camp-fire; when I had got within
a few feet of him I heard a gun fired, and saw a crowd run to my lodge, and
they told me that Jack was dead.
Question. What action did Colonel Chivington take in regard to that matter 1
Answer. Major Anthony, who was present, told Colonel Chivington that he
had heard some remarks made, indicating that they were desirous of killing·
Jack; and that he (Colonel Chivington) had it in his power to save him, and
that by saving him he might make him a very useful man, ·as he was well acquainted with all the Cheyenne and Arapahoe country, and he could be used
as a guide or interpreter. Colonel Chivington replied to Major Anthony, as the
Major himself told me, that he had no orders to receive and no advice to give.
Major Anthony is now in this city.
By lVIr. Buckalew:
Question. Did Chivington say anything to you, or you to him, about the firing?
Answer. Nothing directly; there were a number of officers sitting around
the fire, with the most of whom I was acquainted.
Question. Was there any business to transact at Chivingtou's camp when
you were brought there 1
Answer. None with me; except that I was invited to go there and remain in
that camp, as I might be considered in danger of losing my life if I was away
from there.

By lVIr. Gooch :
Question. vVere there any other Indians or half-breeds there at that time 1
Answer. Yes, sir; lVIr. Bent had three sons there; one employed as a guide
for these troops at the time, and two others living there in the village with the
Indians; and a :M:r. Gerry had a son there.
Question. Were there any other murders after the first day's massacre 1
Answer. There was none, except of my son.
Question. Were there any other atrocities which you have not mentioned?
Answer. None that I saw myself. There were two women that white men
had families by; they were saved from th8 fact of being in my lodge at the
time. One ran to my lodge; the other was taken prisoner by a soldier who
knew her and brought her to my lodge for safety. 'l'hey both had children.
'l'here were some small children, six or seven years old, who were taken prisoners
near the camp. I think there were three of them taken to Denver with these
troops.
Question. Were the women and children that were killed, killed during the
figl1t with the Indians 1
Answer. During the fight, or during the time of tho attack.
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Question. Did you see any women or children killed after the fight was oved
Answer. None.
Question. Did you see any Indians killed after the fight was over?
Answer. No, sir.
By l\fr. Buckalew :
Question. Were the warriors and women and children all huddled together
when they were attacked 1
Answer. They started and left the village altogether, in a body, trying to
escape.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Do you know anything as to the amount of property that those Indians had there 1
Answer. Nothing more than their horse'3. They were supposed to own ten
horses and mules to a lodge ; that would make about a thousand head of horses
and mules in that camp. The soldiers drove off about six hundred head.
Question. Had they any money?
Answer. I understood that some of the soldiers found some money, but I did
not see it. Mr. D. D. Colley had some provisions and goods in the village at
the time, and Mr. Louderback and l\fr. Watson were employed by him to trade
there. I was to interpret for them, direct them, a~1d see that they were cared
for in the village. They had traded for one hundred and four buffalo robes, one
fine mule, and two horses. This was all taken away from them. Colonel
Ohivington came to me and told me I might rest assured that he would see the
goods paid for. He had confiscated these buffalo robes for the dead and wounded;
and there was also some sugar and coffee and tea taken for the same purpose.
I would state that in his report Colonel Chivington states that after this raid
on Sand creek against the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians he travelled northeast some eighty miles in the direction of some hostile bands of Sioux Indians.
Now that is very incorrect, according to my knowledge of matters; I remained with
Colonel Chivington's camp, and returned on his trail towards Fort Lyon from
the camp where he made this raid. I went down with him to what is called the
forks of the Sandy. He then took a due south course for the Arkansas river,
and I went to Fort Lyon with the killed and wounded, and an escort to take us
in. Colonel Chivington proceeded down the Arkansas river, and got within
eleven miles of another band of Arapahoe Indians, but did not succeed in overtaking them. He then returned to Fort Lyon, re-equipped, and started immediately for Denver.
·
Question. Have you spent any consid~rable portion of your life with the Indians 1
Answer. The most of it.
Qu~tion. How many years have you been with the Indians?
Answer. I have been twenty seven successive years with the Cheyennes and
Arapahoes. Before that I wa3 in the country as a trapper and hunter in the
Rocky mountains.
Question. For how long time have you acted as Indian interpreter?
Answer. For some fifteen or eighteen years.
Question. By whom have you been so employed?
Answer. By l\'Iajor Fitzpatrick, Colonel Bent, Major Colley, Colonel J. W.
Whitfield, and a great deal of the time for thE military as guide and interpreter 1
By Mr. Buckalew :
Question. How many v\'arriors were estimated iu Colonel Chivington's report
as having been in this Indian camp?
Answer. About nine hundred.
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Question. How many were there 1
Answer. About two hundred warriors; they average about two warriors to a
lodge, and _there were about one hunch·ed lodges.

Testimony qf Captain S. M. Robbins.
WASHINGTON,

Captain S. M.

RoB BIN S

lHarclt 14, 1865.

sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch :
Question. \Vhat is your position in the army 1
Answer. I am a captain of the 1st Colorado eavalry.
Question. Were you with Colonel Chivington at the time of the attack on the
Cheyenne Indians, in November last 1
Answer. I was not.
Question. Have you any knowledge relating to that attack 1
Answer. I have no personal knowlege of anything that transpired at Sand
creek.
Question. Have you any knowledge in relation to matters connected with
that massacre 1
,.
Answer. I know about the Indian difficulties in that country, but nothing
with regard to that particular difficulty.
Question. What do you know about that campaign 1
Answer. I only know that a campaign was organized against the Indians.
By Mr. Loan:
Question. What Indians 1
Answer. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and all others that were hostile,
or were supposed to be hostile.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Do you know under what orders Colonel Chivington was acting 1
Answer. No, sir. I never saw any orders. I suppose that he acted under
t.he authority of the department commander, General Curtis; but I know nothing
positively about that.
Question. \Vhere were you a,t the time of this attack 1
Answer. In the city of Denver, Colorado.
·
By Mr. Loan:
Question. Who was the district commander at Denver1
Answer. Colonel Ohivington was.
Question. You were on his staff?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. In what capacity 1
Answer. Chief of cavalry.
Question. What was the character of these Cheyenne Indians on Sand creek 1
Answer. I do not know.
Question. Do you know whether they were hostile or friendly 1
Answer. I saw a portion of their chiefs in the city of Denver, some two
months before this action, or massacre, or assault took place. They came there
under an escort furnished by Major Wynkoop. 'rhey carne for the purpose of
holding a consultation with the governor, who I believe is acting superintendent
of Indian affairs there. They were all the tribe I ever saw.
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Question. What bands were killed there 1
Answer. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes 1
Question. What particular bands of these Indians 1
Answer. I merely know from hearsay the names of those chiefs.
Question. As chief of cavalry, on Colonel Chivington's staff, do you know
anything of the orders General Curtis sent him in regard to this matter 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Do you know anything about the organization of the force that
went out under Colonel Chivington 1
.Answer. I do.
Question. State it.
Answer. It was organized by direction of the Secretary of War, for the purpose of operating in that country against the Indians. It was a hundred-days
regiment.
Question. Was Colonel Chivington the colonel of it?
Answer. No, sir; Colonel George H. Shoup was the colonel of it. There was
great difficulty in furnishing the horses and ordnance stores necessary to mount
and equip the regiment. 'I'wo months of their time bad expired before they
were ready to move. 'rhey moved from that point about the first of N ovember. .And on the 29th of November, I think, this action was fought, or this
massacre was made, at Sand creek.
Question. At what time did Colonel Cbivington join this command, and what
other troops had he with him?
· .Answer. He joined the command in person, I should think about the 15th
of November, and had with him part of six companies of the 1st regiment of
Colorado volunteers.
Question. What was his whole force ?
Answer. I should judge about 700 men.
Question. The regiment of hundred-days men, and the battalion of 1st Colorado -volunteers 1
Answer. The whole of the hundred-days regiment were not there. 'rhey were
not all mounted.
Question. Will you state a little further about the I nclians that came into
Denver with :Major \Vynkoop 1 What was the object of their coming in?
Answer. For some time previous there had been massacres of whites, in the
vicinity of Denver, by Indians, as we supposed, and prisoners were taken.
Some time in .August or September Major vVynloop, commanding at Fort
Lyon, received information from the Indians in the vicinity of Smoky Hill that
they had some white prisoners whom they were anxious to give up, or exchange
for two Indians that were with one of our companies as scouts. .At all events,
this communication from the Indians induced Major Wynkoop to take 1!50 men
and two or three pieces of artillery and go out there. He went out there, and,
as I understood, when he came back he brought the white prisoners the Indians
had held, and a number of their principal chiefs came with him to Denver-out
of the district in which :M:ajor vVynkoop was serving into the district of Colorado. There they had a consultation with Governor Evans, of Colorado,
Colonel Chivington, and other prominent and leading men. The Indians made
statements, which I heard interpreted by M:r. Smith, in regard to their friendly
feeliugs towards the 'vhitcs. Whether their acts justified them or not was
rather an open question. They stated their desire for peace. :My recollection
is that the governor told them they had levied war against the United States,
or what amounts to that, and that soon the white soldiers would cover the plains.
He said that if they were friendly, as they had said, they must seek the protection
of the military posts, for the whites could not discriminate between Indians on the
plains. That their going on the military reservations would afford the best evidence of their fi·iendly feelings towards the whites_; and my understanding is
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that a portion of those Indians, if not all of them, sought the military reservation at Ji-,ort Lyon with that understanding.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Were they on that military reservation when this attack was made
on them?
Answer. No, sir. I suppose it was found inconvenient to have so many of
them in the vicinity of the post, on account of their natural thieving propensities, and they were ordered off on this Sand creek, about thirty-five miles from
the fort, on their own reservation, where they could hunt.
Question. They were where they had been directed, by the military authorities, to go?
Answer. So I understand. Major Anthony, who is here, was a portion of
the time in command at Fort Lyon, and he could tell about that.
For the information of the committee, I should like to say a friendly word, under the circumstances, in the Chivington interest. For a year and a half past
there has been a state of war existing between the Indians and the w bites, as
far as the opinion of the Indians was concerned; whether by the authority of
the head chiefs or not we cannot tell. At all events, the interruption of communication on the Arkansas route and on the Platte route raised the price of
everything consumed by the people out here. And the people emphatically demanded that something should be done. 1'he point I wish tu make is, that perhaps Colonel Chivington might have been forced into this by the sentiment of
the people.
Question. Would the sentiment of the people lead a man to attack Indians
who were known to be ti·iendly, and who were known to be trying to avert
hostilities ?
Answer. I should say it would. They wanted some Indians killed ; whether
friendly or not they did not stop long to inquire.

Testimony

if

ll1r. D. D. Colley.

WASHINGTON, Marek 14, 1865.
Mr. D. D. CoLLEY sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Where is your place of residence ?
Anlilwer. At Fort Lyon.
Question. What is your occupation 1
Answer. I have been trading with the Indians more or less for the last three
years.
Question. vVill you state what you know in relation to the attack on the
Cheyenne Indians by Colonel Chivington, on the 29th of November last?
Answer. I was in St. Louis at that time. But I was at Fort Lyon when two
Indians came in and told l\'lajor Wynkoop that they had some white prisoners.
'l'hey rode in and rode up to the major's headquart.ers. The major, as well as
the balance of us, felt like using them a little rough, for we were all feeling a
little hard towards the Indians. I went out and saw they were two Indians with
whom I was well acquainted, and who I knew had been trying to keep peace
between the Indians and the whites. Just as I went up to them the m11jor
came up and spoke very harsh to them, and told them to get down off their
horses. I tuld the major that I knew them, and that they were both friendly.
'.rhey then got down off tlJCir horses and went into the major's room, and told
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him that they had some white prisoners, and that he could get them by going
after them.
'l'he major took his command of 125 or 150 men, and was gone about two
weeks, and brought the white prisoners. Some Indians, I do not know how many,
20 or 30 of them, came back with him, and went to Denver with him. I went
there also. Th.ere they had a council with Colonel Chivington and Goveruor
Evans, and promises were made to them. There was also a council held with
them by Major Wynkoop. Major Anthony, after he took command at Fort
Lyon, also held a council with them. It was thought best to have them come
in at Fort Lyon. .Major Wynkoop promised them protection if they would come
in, and they came in on the strength of those promises. 1 talked with them
several times after they had brought their families in. 'l.,he major promised them
protection until he could hear from General Curtis. rrhen if they proposed to
make a treaty, all right; if not, he would let them go in time to get out of the
country.
Shortly after that, Major Anthony took command of Fort Lyon by order of
General Curtis. He said he was ordered to kill these Indians and drive them
away. I told. him what promises had been made them. They were called
together, and they told him that they considered themselves prisoners of war,
and that they would not fight under any circumstances. I know that anumber of the chiefs present there had been laboring over a year to keep peace between the Indians and whites. They told Major Anthony that he could take
them out and kill them if he saw fit. He told them he was sent there to fight
Indians. But be would ask them to give up their arms, and some stock they
bad which belonged to the government; and if they did so be would issue to
them prisoners' rations until such time as he had other orders. And they were
living there and getting these rations until I left Fort Lyon to come to St. Louis.
Question. Did they comply with the terms proposed by Major Anthony 1
Answer. Yes, sir .
.
Question. Do you know whether Colonel Chivington was informed of this
arrangement 1
Answer. I know that he was.
Question. How do you know that 1
Answer. Because the Indian agent told me he had informed him.
Question. Informed him before be made his attack 1
Answer. Yes, sir. \if hen he came down there to make the attack he was
. told that the Indians were out there under promise of protection. They had
been at the post until a short time before, when they had moved out on the Big
Sandy at the request of Major Anthony. The Sioux, and a party of Cheyennes
called the Dog soldiers, were at war with the whites. And these Indians on
the Big Sandy would come in occasionally and report what the other Indians
were doing.
Quet~tion. Do you know what induced Colonel Chivington to attack these
Indians 1
Answer. I do not know; I have my opinion.
Question. Can you think of any reason which induced him to make the attack 1
Answer. I have thought for more than a year that he was determined to have
a war with these Indians. 'l'hat has been the general belief of men in our part
of the country. I was acquainted with all the chiefs who were there, and I
know they had aU tried hard to keep peace between the Indians and whites.
I was with a portion of this same village a year ago last winter, when the first
talk of an outbreak commenced. All the chiefH who were killed by Colonel
Ohivington have labored as hard as men could to keep peace between the whites
and Indians. They could not control the band called Dog soldiers, who had
undoubtedly committed depredations.
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Question. Do you know anything else in connexion with this matter that is
important, which you have not stated 1
Answer. I do not know that I do.
By Mr. Loan:
Question. What is the distinguishing name of this band of Indian~ upon
which the attack was made 1
Answer. 'rhey were known as Black Kettle's band. Black Kettle was the
chief of the whole Cheyenne nation; but this was the band that was always
with him. The other chiefs that were there were also with him.
Question. 'l'here must have been a chief to have led the hostile Indians 1
Answer. Yes, sir. But this band was the one always with Black Kettle.
Question. About what number do you suppose were killed on Sand creek?
Answer. I should judge there were between 100 and 150. What I judge
from is this : the inspector of the district went with me to 1!-,ort Lyon, and he
went out to the battle.field. 'l,he bodies were lying there then. They spent
half a day on the battle-field, and f~mnd 69 bodies.
Question. Were there any women and children killed 1
Answer. The inspector told me that about three-fourths of them were women
and children.
Testimony

if

Major Scott J. Anthony.

W A~HINGTON, J.l!IaTch 14, 1865.
Major ScoT'l' J. ANTHONY sworn and examined.
By Mr. Loan:
Question. vVhat is your place of residence 1
Answer. Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory.
Question. Do you hold any position in the military or civil service of the
government 1
Answer. None at present.
Question. Have you held any at any time 1
Answer. I was major of the 1st Colorado cavalry from the 1st of November,
1862, until the 21st of January, 1865.
Question. vVere you present at the killing of the Cheyenne Indians, on their
reserve, not far from Fort Lyon, on Sand creek ?
Answer. It was not an Indian reserve. I was present at the time.
Question. State what force was organized, under what orders it acted, under
whose command it was, and what was done.
Answer. 'l,he command reached Fort Lyon on the morning of the 28th of November last, under command of Colonel Chivington. It consi::;ted of a portion of
the 1st regiment of Colorado cavalry, and about 600 men of the 3d regiment of
Colorado cavalry; numbering in all in the neighborhood of 700 men, with two
pieces of artillery. I joined them there with 125 men and two pieces of artillery.
We left on the night of the 28th, for Sand creek, and reached there on the morning of the 29th at daybreak. We found an Indian camp of about 130 lodges, consisting mostly of Cheyennes; there were a small band of Arapahoe Indians with
tl1em. The Indians were attacked by us, under command of Colonel Chivington,
about sunrise in the morning. Detachments from the command took position on
two sides of their camp. 'l,here had been a little firing before that. When I
first came up with my commar1d, the Indians, men, women, and children, were
in a group together, and there was firing from our command upon them. 'l,he
Indians attempted to escape, the women and children, and our artillery opened
on them while they were running. Quite a party of Indians took position under
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the bank, in the bed of the creek, and returned fire upon us. We fought them
about seven hours, I should think, there being firing on both sides. 'rhe loss on
our side was 49 men killed and wounded; on theirs I suppo~:~e it was about 125.
Question. Under what chief was that band of Indians 1
Auswer. Black Ketrle, I think, was the principal chief. There were several
chiefs in the camp, but Black Kettle, I think, was the head chief.
Question. vVere there any warriors in that camp 1
Answer. There were.
Question. What number, do you suppose 1
Answer. I would not be able to tell very accurately. There were a great
many men who fought us; I should think there were in the neighborhood of a
hundred men who were fighting us while we were there. Perhaps there were
not quite so many as that, but a::> near as I could judge there were from 75 to
100 lndians returning our fire. I wa!'l in command at ~,ort Lyon, and had held
a council with these Indians before; had talked with them, and had recognized
Black Kettle as their head chief.
Que~tion. What was the result of the conference you had with them 1
Answer. 'l'he circumstances were about these: I was in command at Fort
Larned, 240 miles eaBt of Fort Lyon, which place the Indians had attacked in
the S!Jring, stealing all the stock at the post, burning the bridges, and damagiug
the po::>t considerably. Major Wynkoop, who had been in command at Fort
Lyon, had had some difficulty with the Indians at that point. He had proposect
terms of peace with the Indians, which action was not approved at the headquarters of the department or district.
Question. Were there any military orders issued disapproving his arrangements 1
AnBwer. There were.
Question. Can you give the numbers of these orders, and by whom issued 1
Answer. I have copies of them, I think. One was Special Order No. 4, paragraph No. 7, from headquarters of the district of Upper Kansas. '!'here were
several orders in regard to the same matter.
Questiou. ""What 1 want. is the order of department headquarters disapproving
of what Major Wynkoop had done, and al~o the order of district headquarters.
An~wer. I do not think I have those onlers in the city.
Question. Do you know who has them 1
Answer. I do not. General Curtis was the commander of the department
at the time this difficulty took place between Major Wynkoop and the Indians
at Smoky Hill, and Major General Blunt was in command of the district. I
was out with Major General Blunt in a campaign against the Indians.
Question. Did you ever see those orders from the department headquarters
disapproving of Major Wynkoop's action in regard to that matter 1
An~wer. Only so far as it related to his unmilitary conduct.
Qne~tion. I mean his attempt to pacify the Indiaus 1
Auswer. I have never seen those orders; 1 have heard of them.
Question. Now, to return to the point when you were in command at Fort
Lyon.
An8wer. I took command there on the second day of November.
Qntstion. You say you held a conference with the Indians 1 State what
occurred.
Answer. At the time I took command at the post there was a band of
Arapahoe Indians encamped about a mile from the post, numbering, in men,
women, and children, 65J. 'rhey were visiting the post almost every day. I
met them and had a talk with them. Among them was Left Hand, who was a
chief among the Arapahoes. He with his band was with the party at that
time. I talked with then•, and they proposed to do whatever I said; whatever
IJart VI--~
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I said for them to do they would do. I told them that I could not feed them;
that I could not give them anything to eat; that there were positive orders forbidding that; and that I ct,uld not permit them to come within · the limits of
the post. At the same time they might remain where they were, and I would
treat them as prisoners of war if they remained; that they would have to surrender to me all their arms and turn over to me all stolen property they had
taken from the government or citizens. r.rhese terms they accepted. They
turned over to me some twenty head of stock, mules, and horses, and a few
arms, but not a quarter of the arms that report stated they had in their possession. The arms they turned over to me were almost useless. I fed them
for some ten days. At the end of that time I told them I could not feed them
any more; that they better go out to the buffalo country where they could kill
game to subsist upon. I returned their arms to them, and they left the post.
But before leaving they sent word out to the Cheyennes that I was not very
friendly towards them.
Question. How do you know that 1
Answer. Through several of their chiefs; Neva, an Arapahoe chief; Left
Hand, of the Arapahoes; then Black Kettle and War Bonnet, of the Cheyennes.
A delegation of the Cheyennes, numbering, I suppose, fifty or sixty men, came
in just before the Arapahoes left the post. I met them outside of the post and
talked with them. They said they wanted to make peace; that they had no
desire to fight against us any longer; that there had been difficulty between the
whites and Indians there, and they had no desire to fight any longer. I told
them I had no authority from department headquarters to make peace with
them; that I could not permit them to visit the post and come within the
lines; that when they had been permitted to do so· at Fort Larned, while the
squaws and children of the different tribes that ~isited that post were dancing
in front of the officers' quarters and on the parade ground, the Indians had made
an attack on the post, fired on the guard, and run off the stock, and I was
afraid the same thing might occur at Fort Lyon. I would not permit them to
visit the post at all. I told them I could make no offers of peace to them until
I heard from district headquarters. I told them, however, that they might go
out and camp on Sand creek, n,nd remain there jf they chose to do so; but they
should not camp in the vicinity of the post; and if I had authority to make
peace with them I would go out and let them know of it.
In the mean time I was writing to district headquarters constantly, stating to
them that there was a band of Indians within forty miles of the post-a small
band-while a very large band was about 100 mile~::~ from the post. That I was
strong enough with the force I had with me to fight the Indians on Sand creek,
but not strong enough to fight the main band. rrhat I should try to keep the
Indians quiet until such time as I received re-enforcements; and that as soon as
re-enforcements did arrive we should go further and find the main party.
But before the re-enforcements came from district headquarters, Colonel Chivington came to Fort Lyon with his command, and I joined him and went out on
that expedition to Sand creek. I never made any offer to the Indians. It was
the understanding that I was not in favor of peace with them. They so understood me, I suppose; at least I intended they should. In fact, I often heard of
it through their interpreters that they did not suppose we were friendly towards
them.
Question. What number of men did you have at Fort Lyon 1
Answer. I had about 280 men.
Question. What was the number of Indians around Fort Lyon at any one
time when you were talking to them 1
Answer. I do not think there were over 725 Indians-men, women and
chiidren--within the vicinity of the post.
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Question. At the time you held the conference with the Arapahoes, Left
Hand, and others, how many men were present above the age of eighteen 1
Answer. I should suppose from 80 to 100.
Question. Why did you not capture those Indians at that time 1
Answer. I might say I did. I did not take them because I had instructions
from district headquarters, as I construed them, to go and fight them wherever
I met them. While they were there at the post I did intend to open fire upon
them, in accordance with my instructions.
Question. Why did you not do it 1
Answer. They were willing to accede to any request I might make. They
turned over to me their arms and the property they had stolen from the governmeRt and citizens.
Question. What property did they turn over 1
Answer. Fourteen head of mules and six head of horses.
Question. Was it property purporting to have been stolen by them 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. From whom 1
Answer. r_{_'hey did not say. Yet some of it was recognized; some of it was
branded" U. 8." Some was recognized as being stock that belonged to citizens.
It was generally understood afterwards-I did not know it at that time-that the
son of the head chief of the Arapahoes, Little Raven,and I think another, had
attacked a small government train and killed one man.
Question. What had Little Raven to do with Black Kettle's band 1
Answer. He was not with them at the time; Left Hand was.
Question. r_{_,hese Indians . surrendered to you, and you took their arms from
them 1
Answer. Yes, sir. ·
Question. Did you issue rations to them 1
Answer. I did.
Question. What authority had you for returning their arms to them and ordering them off 1
Answer. I had no orders in the matter. My instructions were to act upon .
my own judgment. At the same time there were orders issued that they should
not be fed or clothed at the post.
Question. -who issued those orders 1
Answer. General Curtis.
Question. Were those orders is.med after you had received the arms of the
Indians 1
Answer. Before that.
Question. r_t,hen why did you receive those arms, and feed those Indians in
violation of General Curtis's orders 1
Answer. I received the arms and told the Indians I could only issue them
rations as prisoners! I fed them while there as prisoners, but afterwards released them.
Question. That is what I want to get at. Where did you get authority for
releasing the prisoners that were captured 1
Answer. I had no written authority for it.
Question. You did it upon your own judgment.
Answer. Yes, sir. That was my instructions, to act upon my own judgment
in the matter. I thought we could not afford to feed them at the post; and
they were in the buffalo country where they could subsist themselves.
Question. If they were dangerous to the government, why did you release
them 1
Answer. I did not so consider them then. They were most all women and
children, this Arapahoe band.
Question. Who was the chief of that band 1
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Answer. Little Raven was the cl1ief of those I held as prisoners.
Question. Was Black Kettle with his band at the fort at any time you were
·
in command 1
Answer. No, sir, not at the fort ; they passed by it.
Question. Did you ever hold any conference with them 1
Answer. I did.
Question. At what place 1
Answer. At the commissary building, about a half a mile from the fort.
Question. What number of men were with Black Kettle at that time 1
Answer. I should think not far from sixty.
Question. State what passed at that conference, so far as you can remember.
Answer. They came in and inquired of me whether I had any authority to
make peace with them. They said that they had heard through the Arapahoes
that "things looked dark"-that was the term they used--that we were at war
with them ; that they had come in to ascertain whether these bad reports they
had received were correct or not. I stated to them that I had no authority to
make peace with them. That their young men were then out in the field fighting against us, and that I had no authority and no instructions to make any
peace with them. I told them they might go back on Sand creek, or between
there and the headquarters of the Smoky Hills, and remain there until I received
instructions from the department headquarters, from General Curtis; and that
in case I did receive any authority to make peace with them I would go right
over and let them know it. I did not state to them that I would give them
notice in case we intended to attack them. 'l_lhey went away with that understanding, thatin case I received instructions from department headquarters I
was to let them know it. But before I did receive any such instructions
Colonel Chivington arrived there, and this affair on Sand creek took place.
Question. Why did you not arrest Black Kettle and his band there, or attack
them when you had them at your mercy 1
Answer. I did not do it, because I did not consider it a matter of policy to
do it.
Question. Why not ?
Answer. Because within 100 miles of us was a party of 2,500 or 3,000 Indians. Black Kettle's band belonged to the same tribe of Indians, and I believed that so soon as I made any attack upon Black Kettle's party, this wh0le
tribe of Indians would rise and cut off our communication on both routes.
Question. How did you know that that party of 3,000 Indians were within
100 miles 1
Answer. Black Kettle told me so himself. Jack Smith, the son of the Indian
interpreter there, a half-breed, told me the same. One Eye, a Cheyenne chief,
t0ld me the same. On two different occasions One Eye told me when small
raiding parties were going to start out from the main Sioux and Cheyenne camp
to commit depredations on the road, and depredations were committed just about
the time they saicl they would be, yet too soon for us to prevent it. I was satisfied in my own mind that if I had attacked Black Kettle them, although I
might have taken his entire camp at any time, it would be the cause of opening
up a general Indian war, and I was not strong enough to defend the settlements
in case they commenced again.
Question. I understood you to ·say that the Indians were already at war with
the whites.
Answer. Yes, sir. That is, they were sending out their raiding parties.
Their men came there on Smoke Hill, and every little while a raiding party
would make an attack on some train or some ranch, yet there was no large
party at that particular time.
Question. Were there any other Indians at Sand creek, except Black Kettle's
band and the Arapahoes of whom you have spoken 1
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Answer. There were none but Black Kettle's band, and, as I have since ascertained, a few lodges of Arapahoes, under Left Hand.
Question. Little Raven's band was not there 1
Answer. No, sir. There was but a small portion of Black Kettle's band
there. He was the chief of all the Cheyennes.
Question. There was a particular band that went with him, of which he was
the immediate chief, notwithstanding he was also the chief of the whole nation 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And it was the subordinate chiefs who were at war with the
whites.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Black Kettle had a band which were always with him 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Now, what I want to know is, what other Indians were at Sand
creek when you advised Black Kettle and his band to go over there 1
Answer. I think there were only a very few Arapahoes under Left Hand.
Question. Did they have their women and chHd.ren with them 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How long were they at Sand creek before Colonel Chivington came
along with his force 1
Answer. I should think about twelve days.
· Question. Did you receive any communication from those Indians on Sand
creek during those twelve days 1 Did they furnish you with information of
any kind 1
Answer. I received some information; I do not know that it came from that
band. I had employed at that time, on a salary of $125 a month and a ration,
One Eye, who was a chief of the Cheyennes. He was to remain in this Cheyenne camp as a spy, and give me information from time to time of the movements of this particular band, and also to go over to the head of the Smoke
Hill to the Sioux and Cheyenne camp th~re, and notify me whenever any
movement was made by those Indians ; but he had gone only as far as Sand
creek when Colonel Chivington made this attack on the Indians at Sand creek,
ana he was killed there.
Question. Then you cannot tell whether you had any communications during
tho.se twelve days from the Indians on Sand creek 1
Answer. 'rhey would send in to the post frequently. General Curtis had
issued an order that no Indian should be permitted to visit the post. I had
ordered them away, and the guard had :fired upon them when they refused to
obey that order-fired upon them several times. I told them they could not
come in, and that if they had any communication to make with me I would
meet them outside of the post and talk with them. 'rhey sent to me several
times, but they were always begging parties.
Question. Did they give you any information whatever of the movements of
any of the hostile Indians 1
Answer. Yes, sir; One Eye did, and I think Jack Smith did. He came in
at one time and stated that a party of Indians were going to make an attack on
the settlements down in the vicinity of the mouth of Walnut creek. I reported
the matter to the district headquarters, stating that there would be an attack
made about such a day. The attack was made at about that time, so that the
information he gave was correct.
Question. Were the women and children of this band of Black Kettle in
camp with him 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. About what nmrbcr of souls were in that camp when you attacked it 1
Answer. I thought at the time there were a thousand or more; but, from in-
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formation I have received since, I am satisfied that there were not so. many as
that.; probably in the neighborhood of 700 men, women, and children.
Question. Did you send any word to Black Kettle that you intended to
attack him or his band at any time 1
.Answer. None, whatever. It was a surprise, made without any notice whatever to them.
Question. What number of women and children were killed there 1
.Answer. I do not know. I made a report to Colonel Chivington the next
day. I made it partly upon information I had received through the men who
were with me, and partly from observation. I stated to him that there were
300 Indians killed, including women and children. I have ascertained since
that there were not so many killed; at least I am satisfied that there were not
over 125 killed. .At one time I sent out a scouting party and told them to look
over the ground. 1'hey came back and reported to me that they had counted
69 dead bodies there. About two-thirds of those were women and children.
Question. Was your command a mounted command 1
.Answer. Yes, sir.
'
Question. How did the remainder of the Indians escape 1
.Answer. On foot.
Question. What kind of country was it 1
.Answer. Prairie country, slightly rolling; grass very short.
Question. Do you say that Colonel Chivington's command of 700 mounted
men allowed 500 of these Indians to escape 1
.Answer. Yes, sir; and we ourselves lost 49 in killed and wounded.
Question. Why did you not pursue the flying Indians and kill them ?
.Answer. I do not know; that was the fault I found with Colonel Chi.vington
at the time.
Question. Did he call off the troops 1
Answer. No, sir. The Indians took a position in the bed of the creek, which
was from 2,00 to 500 yards wide . . 'l'be banks upon the side of the creek were
two or three feet high, in some places as high as ten feet; the bed of the creek
was of sand, and perfectly level. The Indian warriors took their position right
along the bank, dug holes in the sand in which to secrete themselves, and fired
upon our men in that way. We fought them there. While the women and
children were escaping, the men stood under the bank and fought us all day.
Question. How many pieces of artillery did you have 1
.Answer. We had four pieces.
Question . .And the Indians held you in check there for seven hours 1
Answer. I think fully seven hours. I was ordered back eighteen miles on
the road before the firing ceased.
Question. Did you capture any prisoners 1
.Answer. Before I left I saw two prisoners in the Indian lodges, in their
camp, where our men were quartered.Question. Did you ever see those prisoners after Colonel Chivington returned 1
Answer. Only one of them, Charles Bent.
Question. What became of the other 1
Answer. I only ascertained from common report. I went to Colonel Chivington and told him that Jack Smith was a man be might make very useful to
him; that he could be made a good guid e or scout for us; "but," said I to him,
"unless you give your men to understand that you want the man saved, he is
going to be killed. He will be killed before to-morrow morning, unl ess you
give your men to understand that you don't want him killed." Colonel Chivington replied, "I have given my instructions; have told my men not to take
any prisoners. I have no further instructions to give." I replied to him
that he could make that man very useful, and I thought that perhaps
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he had better give the men to understand that he did not want him killed.
'rhe colonel replied again, "I said at the start that I did not want any prisoners
taken, and I have no further instructions to give." I then left him. I learned
afterwards that Jack Smith was killed in the camp, in an Indian lodge.
Question. Jack Smith was a half-breed 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
'
Question. And an interpreted
Answer. I had never met him but once. He spoke English and Indian.
Question. Where was Jack Smith's father at that time?
Answer. He was in the Indian camp, trading with the Indians by my permission; and at the same time I had sent him there partly as a spy upon the
camp. I wanted to know what movements they were going to make. When I
was about to send him out there he said he wanted to take some goods out there
to trade with the Indians, and I gave my permission.
Question. What property was captured there 1
Answer. About 700 horses, I should think ; quite a large number of buffalo
robes. I do not know how many, though I think I saw 150 buffalo robes. There
were a great many lodges, which were all burned. There were a great many
blankets ; some few bows and arrows, and I saw some few guns. However,
outside of horses, the value to the white man of the whole would be very little.
By Mr. Buckalew :
Question. Were there any mules 1
Answer. Yes 1 sir, there were some mules; I saw a few mules branded "U.
s.," that were being driven away.
By M1:. Loan :
Question. What was ·done with that property 1
Am.wer. I have never learned since.
Question. Did you have possession or control of any of that property 1
Answer. Colonel Chivington instructed m~ to order my quartermaster to receive the stock, and feed them full rations of corn and hay while they remained
at Fort Lyon. But there were only 407 head received at Fort Lyon, as I afterwatds ascertained. As to the balance, I received information that led me to believe
that 225 head of the stock was run off into New Mexico by a portion of Colonel Chivington's command; 60 more driven up the river nearly 100 miles,
were there met by an officer who was coming down, and he brought them back
to Fort Lyon. When Colonel Chivington's command left Fort Lyon he took
away all of this stock that was there, and I have never heard of it since.
Question. Who issued the order to your quartermaster directing him to deliver this property over to Colonel <Jhivington 1
Answer. There was no written order. A verbal order was given me by
Colonel Chivington, which I turned over to the quartermaster.
Question. '.ro whom was that stuck delivered 1
Answer. To Colonel Shoup.
Question. What position did he hold as an accounting officer 1
Answer. There was no quartermaster, I think, that ever had it in charge,
with the exception of the acting assistant quartermaster at Fort Lyon, who took
it in charge for a few days, by verbal order from Colonel Chivington, and
turned it over again in the same manner.
Question. Do you know of any acts of hostility committed by Black Kettle
or any of his band that were· encamped on Sand creek?
Answer. I do not, except this: l was out with Major General Blunt in an
engagement with the Indians on Pawnee fork. r:rhere was one man there at
that time whom I afterwards recognized as being of Black Kettle's party, and
who fought us at Pawnee fork; that was War Bonnet. He was at Pawnee
fork, and was very active there. He apparently had charge of a small band
of Indians. It was on the 26th of .August that we fought them there.
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Question. How long had you been acquainted with War Bonnet 7
Answer. I had met him but twice, with the exception of that fight I had
with him on Pawnee fork.
Question. You had met him twice previous to that 7
Answer. Since that.
Question. Where did you first meet him after that 7
Answer. At Fort Lyon.
Question. Why did you not then arrest him and punish him for fighting at
Pawnee fork?
Answer. I thought if I did so it would enrage the balance of the Indians,
who were then encamped at Smoke Hill, and I was trying to keep them quiet,
until such time as a sufficient number of troops had arrived to enable us to go
out and fight the whole party.
Question. If you had reasoR to think that Black Kettle, or any of his party,
intended to fight against the United States, or the whites, state what that
reason was.
Answer. I had no reason to suppose it further than my general knowledge of
the Indian character. I have been there for upwards of two years, and duri11g
that time it has been the constant complaint of travellers upon the road that
the Indians were annoying their trains, even when they did not profess to be
at war at all. It had always been a source of constant annoyflnce to us there.
Trains carne into the post and complained that the Indians were takiug their
property from them.
Question. How far from Fort Lyon were Black Kettle and his people encamped when you made the attack 7
Answer. Between 30 and 40 miles.
Question. Why was not Mr. Smith, the trader, also killed 7
Answer. As I came up with my command, my men formed in line very clos~
to the Indian camp; -among the first persons I saw was John Smith. I had not
given any instructions to my men. to fire. Firing was going on on both side.:~
of me, a portion of Colonel Chivington's command on the right and another
portion on the left were firing. I did not give any instructions to my men to
fire. I saw John Smith, who appeared to be frightened, and I rode out in front
of my men and called out to him to come to me. I held up my hands, called him
by name, and swung my hat at him. He started towards me, and as he started,
I supposed he imagined some one was firing at him. Whether they were or not I
do not know ; I did not see any shots fired at him. I am sure no man of mine
fired. At that time all the command, with the exception of my men, were firing.
As I was calling out to him to come to me, he turned and started to rnn the
other way. Just at that time one of my men rode out and said, " Major, let
me bring him out." The man rode past me, and as he rode around Smith, to
take hold of him and lead him out of the Indian camp, he was shot; at least
I thought so from his motions in the saddle. He passed on by again, and his
horse was shot down. After his horse was shot down he attempted to get up,
and some Indian ran up to him, snatched his gun from him, and beat him over
the head and killed him. That was the first man of our command I saw killed.
'l'he Indians at that time commen'ced firing upon me, and then my men commenced firing.
By Mr. Buckalew :
Question. What became of Smith 7
Answer. I did not know what became of him; I did not see him for three or
four hours afterwards. The next I saw of him he was corning down the bank
of the river, with some of our soldiers.
By Mr. Loan:
Question. What became of the buffalo robes that were taken there 1
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Answer. I do not know. I had some buffalo robes, my own bedding, which
went at the same time, and we have never been able to ascertain what became of
them. I went to Colonel Chivington and reported to him that John Smith had
lost all his buffalo robes; I wanted them recovered. He said to me, "You go to
John Smith and tell him that he need have no fear at all about the matter; I
will give au order confiilcating that property for the use of the hospital." I
afterwards ascertained that I had lost all my own bedding and buffalo robes,
and also provision for ten men for thirty days, that I had taken out there. The
colonel said, ''Well, we will give you an order confiscating that for the use of the
hospital, and you can be reimbursed; you shall not lose a cent." However,
the order never was issued, confiscating the property.
Question. Do you know by what authority the 225 head of stock were taken
off to New Mexico 1
Am:~wer. I do not. Captain Cook told me he knew how many men there
were, and he knew who bad them in charge; but he never gave me the names.
T,his is the way in which we have been situated out there. I have been in command of a body of troops at Fort Larned or Fort Lyon for upwards of two years.
About two years ago in September the Indians were professing to be perfectly
friendly. 'l'hese were the Cheyennes, the Camanches, the Apaches, the Arapahoes, the Kiowas, encamped at different points on the Arkansas river between
Fort Larned and Fort Lyon:. Trains were going up to Fort Lyon frequently.
and scarcely a train came in but had some complaint to make about the Indians.
I recollect that one particular day three trains came in to the post and reported
to me that the Indians had robbed them of their provisions. · We at the post
had to issue provisions to them constantly. Trains that were carrying government freight to New Mexico would stop there and get their supplies replenished
on account of the Indians having taken theirs on the road.
At one time I took two pieces of artillery and 125 men, and went down to meet
the Indians. As soon as I got there they were apparently friendly. A Kiowa chief perhaps would say to me that his men were perfectly friendly, and
felt all Tight towards the whites, but the Arapahoes were very bad Indians.
Go to the Arapahoe camp, they would perhaps charge everything upon theCamanches, while the Camanches would charge it upon the Cheyennes; yet each
band there was professing friendship towards us.
These troubles have been going on for some time, until the settlers in that
part of the country, and all through western Kansas and Colorado do not think
they can bear it. When these troubles commenced upwards of a year ago I
received information that led me to believe that the Indians were going to make a
general war this last spring. I supposed so at the time. They were endeavoring
by every means to purchase arms and amrnuni tion. They would offer the best horse
they had for a revolver, or a musket, or a little ammunition.
'l'his last spring it seemed to have commenced; I do not know how. I know,
however, that at the different posts they were professing friendship. They were
encamped in pretty large numbers in the vicinity of the posts, and while their
women and children were dancing right alongside the officers' quarters, the
Indians secreted themselves in a ravine in the neighborhood of the post, and at
a sig11al jumped out and run off the stock, firing at the guards; at the same time
the women and children jumped on their ponies, and away they went. They
burned down the bridges, and almost held the post under their control for three
or four days. About the same time they commenced depredations on the road.
The mails could not pass without a pretty large escort. At least, whenever we
sent them without an escort the Indians attacked them, and the people considered it very unsafe to travel the roads.
,
When the Indians took their prisoners (in fact, however, they generally took
no prisoners) near Simmering spring, they killed ten men. I was told by
Captain Davis, of the California volunteers, that the Indians cut off the heads
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of the men after they had scalped them, and piled them in a pile on the ground,
and danced around them, and kicked their bodies around over the ground, &c.
It is the general impression among the people of that country that the only way
to :fight Indians is to fight them as they fight us ; if they scalp and mutilate the
bodies we must do the same.
I recollect one occasion, when I had a :fight on Pawnee fork with the Indians there, I had fifty-nine men with me, and the Indians numbered several
hundred. I was retreating, and they had followed me then about five miles.
I had eleven men of my party shot at that time. I had with my party then a
few Delaware Indians, and one Captain Fall-Leaf, of the Delaware tribe, had
his horse shot; we had to stop every few minutes, dismount and fire upon the
Indians to keep them off. They formed a circle right around us. Finally we
shot down one Indian very close to us. I saw Fall-Leaf make a movement as
though he wanted to scalp the Indian. I asked him if he wanted that Indian's
scalp, and be said he did. We kept up a fire to keep the Indians off, while he
went down and took off his scalp, and gave his Delaware war-whoop. That
seemed to strike more terror into those Indians than anything else we had done
that day. And I do think,. that if it had not been for that one thing, we should
have lost a great many more of my men. I think it struck a terror to them, so
that they kept away from us.
It is the general impression of the people of that country that the only way
to fight them is to fight as they fight; kill their women and children and kill
them. At the same time, of course, we consider it a barbarous practice.
Question. Did the troops mutilate the Indians killed at Sand creek 1
Answer. '.rhey did in some instances that I know of; but I saw nothing
to the extent I have since heard stated.
Question. State what you saw.
Answer. I saw one man dismount from his horse; he was standing by the
side of Colonel Chiviugton. '.rhere was a dead squaw there who had apparently
been killed some little time before. The man got down off his horse, took hold
of the squaw, took out his knife and tried to cut off her scalp. I thought the
squaw had been scalped before; a spot on the side of the head had evidently
been cut off before with a knife; it might possibly have been done by a gr~pe-shot,
or something of that kipd. I saw a great many Indians and squaws that had
been scalped; I do not know how many, but several. '.rhere have been different
reports about these matters. I heard a report some twenty days after the
fight-! saw a i:wtice in Colonel Ohivington's report-that a scalp three days
old, a white woman's scalp, wa8 found in the Cheyenne camp. I did not hear
anything about that until after Colonel Ohivington had reached Denver. I was
with him for ten days after the fight, and never heard a word about a white
woman's scalp being found in the camp until afterwards.
On the other hand, on the day I left Fort Lyon to come east, on the 30th of
January, I saw an official report from Major Wynkoop, together with affidavits
from different men; among them was one man who was my adjutant at that
time; he speaks in his affidavit about the bodiee of the Indians having been so
badly mutilated, their privates cut off, and all that kind of thing. I never saw
anything of that; and I never heard it until I saw it in those affidavits at Fort
Lyon, two months after the fight. Yet it wa.s a matter of daily conversation
between us at the posts. I, however, did myself see some bodies on the ground
that were mutilated.
Question. Anything further than you have stated 1
Answer. No, sir. I saw what convinced me that, in attempting to escape
with two children, one squaw had been mortally wounded, and had drawn her
knife, gathered her two children near her, and cut both of their throats. ~That
was not done by our men. I did not see any one mutilating any Indian, with
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the exception of the one man I have spoken of, while Colonel Chivington was
standing by the side of him.
I saw one instance, however. There was one little child, probably three
years old, just big enough to walk through the sand. The Indians had gone
ahead, and this little child was behind following after them. The little fellow
was perfectly naked, travelling on the sand. I saw one man get off his horse,
at a distance of about seventy-five yards, and draw up his rifle and fire-he
missed the child. Another man came up and said, "Let me try the son of a
bitch ; I can hit him." He got down off his horse, kneeled down and fired at
the little child, but he missed him. A third man came up and made a similar
remark, and fired, and the little fellow dropped.
By Mr. Buckalew:
Question. Those were men of your command 1
Answer. Of .Colonel Chivington's command.
By Mr. Loan:
Question. Had the officers control of their men at that time 1
Answer. There did not seem to be any control.
Question. Could the officers have controlled their men, or were the men acting in defiance of the orders of their officers 1
Answer. I did not hear any orders given but what were obeyed. As a general thing the officers and men were doing just what they saw fit to do.
By Mr. Gooch:
Q.uestion. Did you communicate to Colonel Chivington, when he came to
Fort Lyon, the relations you had had with those Indians 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you, under the circumstances, approve of this attack upon
those Inqians 7
Answer. I did not.
Question. Did you not feel that you were bound in good faith not to attack
tlwse Indians after they had surrendered to you, and after they had taken up a
position which you yourself had indicated 7
Answer. I did not consider that they had surrendered to me ; I never would
consent that they should surrender to me. My instructions were such that I
felt in duty bound to fight them wherever I found them; provided I considered
it good policy 'to do so. I did not consider it good policy to attack this party
of Indians on Sand creek unless I was strong enough to go on and fight the
main band at the Smoke Hills, some seventy miles further. If I had had that
force I should have gone out and fought this band on Sand creek.
Question. rrhe Arapahoes had surrendered to you 1
Answer. I considered them differently from the Cheyennes.
Question. They were with the Cheyennes, or a part of them were 1
Answer. I understood afterwards that some six or eight or ten lodges of the
Arapahoes were there.
Question. Did you not know at the time you made this attack that those
Arapahoes were there with the Cheyennes 1
Answer. I did not. A part of the Cheyennes had left; a part of th em said
they did not believe we at the post felt friendly towards them; and I have since
learned that a part of them had left.
Question. These very Indians had come in and held communication with
you, and had taken up the position you had directed them to take 1
Answer. No, sir; I told them they should not remain on the road, but they
might go back on Sand creek, or some place where they could kill game.
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Question. You advised them to go there 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you not suppose that they understood from you that if they
went there and behaved themselves they would not be attacked by you 1
Answer. I do not thillk they thought so. I think they were afraid I was
going to attack them. I judge so from words that came to me like this : " rrhat
they did not like that red-eyed chief; that they believed he wanted to fight
them."
Question. You say you did not approve of the attack upon them by Colonel
Chivington. Did you remonstrate with Colonel Ohivington against making that
attack 1
·
Answer. I did.
Quefltion. You felt that you ought not to make the attack under the circumstances 1
Answer. I did. I made a great many harsh remarks in regard to it. At the
same time I did not so much object to the killing of the Indians, as a matter
of principle-merely as a matter of policy. I considered it a very bad policy,
as it would open up the war in that whole country again, which was quiet for
the time. I am very well satisfied the Indians intended a general outbreak as
soon as the weather would permit.
QueRtion. You think the attack made upon those Indians there, in addition to
the other characteristics which it possesses, was impolitic 1
Answer. I do, verymuch so. I think it was the occasion of what has occurred
on the Platte since that time. I have so stated in my report to the headquarters
of the district and of the department. I stated before Colonel Chivington arrived
there that the Indians were encamped at this point; that I had a force with me
sufficiently strong to go out and fight them; but I did not think it policy to do
so, for I was not strong enough to fight the main band. If I fought this band,
the main band would immediately sLrike the settlements. But so soon as the
party should be strong enough to fight the main band, I should be iri favor of
making the war general against the Indians. I stated to them also that I did
not believe we could fight one band without fighting them all; that in case we
fought one party of Indians and whipped them, those that escaped would go
into another band that was apparently friendly, and that band would secrete
those who bad been committing depredations before. As it was with Little
Raven's band ; his own sons attacked a train a short distance above Fort Lyon,
killed one soldier, took a government w::~gon and mules, some horses, and took
some women prisoners. One woman they afterwards outraged, and she hung
herself; the other one, I think, they still bold. Sume of the Indians have
married her, as they call it, and she is still held in their camp, as I have understood; not now in the camp of those who took her prisoner, but she has been
sold to the Sioux and Cheyennes. The instructions we constantly received
from the headquarters, both of the district and the department, were that we
should show as little mercy to the Indians as possible.
By Mr. Loan :
Question. Could. you furnish us copies of those instructions 1
Answer. I have in the city some private letters, and I think I have also
some confidential communications, that go to show something of that nature.
Question. I should be glad to have copies of some of t.hem.
Answer. I think I have some of them. I have copies of some letters I wrote
to department and district headquarters. My reports were always approved;
they sent back word every time that my reports were approved. I stated that
I would hold on to those Indians; let them remain dormant until such time as
troops enongh arrived to fight the main baud. They always approved my
action in the matter. When Colonel Chivil1gton arrived there with his command, I immediately reported to headquarters that he had arrived.
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Question. Who was the district commander 1
Answer. Major Henniqg.
Question. How did a major command a colonel 1
Answer. Colonel Chivington was in entirely another district .. The district I
was in was in upper Arkansas, and was commanded by Major Henning. Colonel
Chivington commanded the district of Colorado.
Question. Then Fort Lyon was not in Colonel.Chivington's district 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. By what authority did you act in concert with Colonel Chivington 1
Answer. By the authority of the instructions I had received from my own
district commander, that I should fight the Indi~ns wherever I met them. When
Colonel Chivington came down I talked with him; he told me where he was
going, and asked me if I wanted to go with him. I told him if he was going
to ;make a general war with the Indians I did. He gave m<;) to understand that
he was going to make it general.
Question. Can you furnish us a copy of those instructions that authorized you
to go under Colonel Chivington when he was out" of his district 1
Answer. I had no instructions to go under him at all. I have, however, some
papers to show the feeling in regard to the district. I told Colonel Chivington,
several times on that march to Sand creek, that Une Eye was there, employed
by me; that Black Kettle was there, and that I considered Black Kettle friendly
towards us; that Left Hand was there; that, probably, John Smith was there
by my permission; that there was a soldier there with Smith whom I had sent
off as a sort of .spy, too; and that I wai1ted, if he did fight those Indian~, by aU
means to save those parties; that if he did fight them he should give notice
beforehand in order to get them out. I advised him to surround the camp, and
not let one escape, and then push right forward and fight the main band; that
he was strong enough for them. I believed at the Lime that if we should attack
the main band, it would put an end to all our Indian troubles there. And I
f5upposed he was going to do it; that was the understanding at the time we left
Fort Lyon. I took twenty· three days' )'ations for my men, with the understanding that we were to be gone at least that length of time.

Testimony qf MajorS. G. Colley.
WASHINGTON, Marek 14, 1865.
MajorS. G. CoLLEY sworn and examined.
By Mr. Loan:
.·
Question. Where do you reside 1
Answer. At Fort Lyon.
Question. Do you hold any official position, civil or military 1
Answer. I am an Indian agent.
Question. Will you state what you know of the Indians out there, their disposition towards the whites, &c., and what you know about the massacre at
Sand creek 1
Answer. I was not present at that fight.
Question. How long have you been agent for those Indians 1
Answer . .My appointment was in July, 1861.
Question. Were you intimately acquainted with the character and conduct of
Black Kettle and his band of Indians 1
·
Answer. I think I was.
.
Question. · What do you know about Left Hand's band of the Arapahoes 1
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Answer. I know nothing bad about them. I have been with them hundreds
of times.
Question. What has been their general character for peace and good conduct
towards the whites 1 Have they been guilty of any acts of hostility, theft, or
anything of the kind 1
Answer. Nearly a year ago I heard of some troubles on the Platte with some
Cheyenne Indians. When the treaty was made with those Indians in 1860,
before I went out there, there was claimed to be two bands of Cheyennes and
Arapahoes ; tl1e one of the North Platte, and the one of the South Platte.
This North Platte band was not a party to that treaty, and were dissatisfied
with it. There was an effort made to get those Indians to join the southern
band, as it was called, but the effort was never successful. 'rhe governor, myself, and another man met the northern Indians to see if we could not get them
to unite with the southern Indians, and all go on a reservation. But we failed
in that. Early in the spring of last year I understood from Denver, perhaps
from Governor Evans himself, that there had been a collision between the soldiers and Indians. I did not know what effect it would have upon our Indians
below. I immediately went out and found all the Indians I could, and communicated with them, and told them there had been trouble on the Platte, and
asked them if they knew anything about it. They said they had heard of it,
but supposed it was some of the Dog Soldiers over there, as this northern band
is called. They said they themselves did not want to have any trouble, but if
the soldiers followed them up they supposed they would have to fight. I told
them I wished they would come in on the Arkansas as clo.:~e as they could and
stay there, and be out of trouble. Previous to this, for two years, we have been
satisfied that there was an effort being made by the Sioux Indians to induce
these Indians 1o join them and make war upon the whites. We have labored
for two years to keep it down. The Sioux Indians, many of them from Minnesota, are there in that country, and have been endeavoring to unite these
Indians for the purpose of making a general war upon the whites. These
Indians said the Sioux had been there with the war-pipe, but they did not
mean to go to war with the whites·.
'There were a great many depredations committed below our place, at Larned,
by some Indians. It was sometimes reported that all the bands wete engaged
in them; then it was reported that they were committed by the Sioux. It was
impossible to ascertain what Indians were engaged. But so far as I met
the Cheyennes and the Arapahoes on the Arkansas, they disclaimed it, and
pretended to be friendly.
In June last I received a circular from Governor Evans, requesting me to
invite any of the Indians that had not been at war with the whites to Fort
Lyon; the Cheyenn~s and Arapahoes of the North Platte to Fort Collins ; the
Cheyennes and Arapahoes of the Arkansas at Fort Lyon; the Kiowas and
Camanches at Larned, and tell them if they would come in and behave themselves, they should be fed and cared for. I immediately sent Mr. Smith, Jack
Smith, who was killed, anJ Colonel Ben~, to all these Indians to carry them this
information. During this time occurred this trouble at Fort Larned, by the
Kiowas running off the stock. Orders were then issued that no Indians should
come to that post, as I understood it. ~t\..fter One Eye had come back and said
he had seen Black Kettle, who said he would bring in his Indians, I sent him
out again to see what was going on.
·
During this time orders were issued, I understood from General Curtis, that
no Indians should visit a military post; but it was a long while before One Eye
got in; he did not get in until the 4th day of September, and he got in then by
accident. .If he had been met by a soldier he would have been shot; but he
happened to meet some other soldiers, who took him prisoner and .brought him
in then. Major Wynkoop took him and kept him in the guard-house that day.
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He told us that there were some white prisoners with the Cheyennes whom
they had brought, and whom they were willing to deliver up, if we would go
out for them. Major W ynko0p went out with one hundred men, had a conversation with the Indians, and brought in four prisoners, one girl and three
children.
Black Kettle and his principal men, some twenty or thirty of them, came in
with Major Wynkoop, and went to Denver and had a conference with Governor
Evans. The governor declined to make any peace with them, but turned them
over to the military. Black Kettle went out and brought in quite a number of
lodges, and the young men came in to the post.
Before this time, General Curtis, through representations from some quarter,
was apparently led to believe that the Indians were behaving very badly at
:E'ort Lyon; and Major Wynkoop was relieved of his command by Major
Anthony. At that time the Arapahoes were there, being fed by Major Wynkoop.
When Major Anthony came, he said he was ordered to fight those Indians; but
he found things different f~·om what he expected, and he did not think it policy
then to fight them; that there was no danger from those Indians; they could
be kept there, and kille'd at any time it was necessary. He told them that he
did not feel authorized to give them any rations, and that they better go out
a piece where they could kill buffalo.
After Major Wynkoop had brought those Indians in, and until aftet' this
fight, I do not know of any depredat~ons having been committed in our country.
rrhere may have been some committed below in the vicinity of Fort Larned;
but during that time, two months or over, the Indians in our country did not
commit any depredations.
Question. Have you any means of knowing the number of Indians in that
camp on Sand creek 1
Answer. I have no personal knowledge of the number of lodges there. But
there were about one hundred lodges of the Arapahoes at the post at the time
Major Anthony took the command there. Left Hand's band had gone out
to Sand creek, and Black Kettle's band of the Cheyennes.
Question. How many were in Left Hand's band?
Answer. Abo,ut eight lodges.
Question. How many to a lodge 1
Answer. About five.
Question. About how strong was Black Kettle's band 1
Answer. I do not know of my own knowledge. I only know from what
men told me who had counted them. At one time when One Eye was out, we
did suppose, from what we had heard, that the Indians were all going to unite
against us.
Question. Judging from all your information as Indian agent, have you any
reason to believe that Black Kettle or Left Hand had been guilty of or intended
any hostility towards us 1
Answer. I have no reaf:lon to believe that of either of them.
Question. Have you any reason to know that they desired to remain at peace,
and wefe opposed to fighting the people of the Vnited States 1
Answer. Left Hand, who speaks English, told me that he never would fight
the whites. He said that some of his boys got mad after he was fired at at Fort
Larned. Left Hand had come in there and offered to assist in the recovery ot
some stock that had been stampeded there. He was fired on by the soldiers at Fort
Larned. He said, "I was not much mad; but my boys were mad, and I could
not control them. But as for me, I will not fight the whites, and you cannot
make me do it. You may imprison me or kill me i but I will not fight the
whites."
Question. What was the feeling of Black Kettle 1
Answer. He himself always appeared to be friendly.
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Question. Did you ever know of his committing any act of hostility towards
the whites, or sanctioning it in others 1
Answer. I never did.
Question. What relation did he bear to the Cheyenne tdbe of Indiaas 1
Answer. He was acknowledged as the head chief of the south'ern bands of
Cheyennes. There were subordinate chiefs w:ho were heads of bands.
By Mr. Buckalew :
Question. What has become of Black Kettle 1
Answer. I have seen a half-breed who was there with Mr. Smith, and could
not get back to the soldiers, and ran off with the Indians, and was with them for
fourteen days after they got over to the Sioux Indians. From what he told 'meand I could rely upon it-Black Kettle wa~ not killed, but I.eftHand was wounded,
and died after he got over there.
Question. Of the fight itself you know nothing 1
Answer. No, sir; I was not there; I was at .F'ort Lyon at the time. ,
Question. The Jack Smith who was killed there was the son of a white man7
Answer. Yes, sir; of John Smith.
Question: He was an interpreter 1
Answer. He interpreted for me; he spoke both English and Indian.
Question. Had you any reason to think that Mr. Smith or his son entertained
any hostility to the whites 1
Answer. The old gentleman was always our main man there, communicating
with the Indians, for he had lived with them so long. Nobody doubted his
fidelity to the government.
Question. Was there any reason to doubt that of the son 1
Answer. Captain Hardee informed me, when he went out there on the stage,
that ~e thought Jack Smith was one of the party that attacked the stage. When
Jack came I told him what I had heard. He said he had rode up to the stage
and wanted to know if his father was in the coaeh; and he wanted to know w~at
the trouble was that he had heard of in the east; that they 'then fired upon
them, and then the Indians returned the fire.
Question. Was there any other act of Jack denoting hostility 1
Answer. I never heard of any. He was at Fort Lyon at work haying there
for some men. In July last, I think, Colonel Cbivington was at Fort Lyon . .
This One Eye was near about the fort, and wanted to go out and see the Indians,
but was afraid of the soldiers. Colonel Chivington wrote out a certificate of his
good character, stating that be was a friendly Indian, and then told him if he came
across any soldiers to show that to them; if they shot before he got to them to
show a white flag, and that would protect him. He was an Indian we relied
upon a great deal for information. He was killed at Sand creek. I as~ed
Colonel Chivington if there was any way these Indians, Black Kettle, Left Hand,
and some others, could be treated with. He said his orders from General Curtis
were that it could be done on these conditions: that they must give up their stolen
property, make restitution for any damage they had done, &c., and I supposed
he was going to do that.
Testimony qf Governor John E1mns.
WASHINGTON, Marek 15, 1865.
Governor JoHN EVANS sworn and examined.
By Mr. Loan:
Question. What is your present official position 1
Answer. Governor of Colorado Ten:itory, and superintel':~dent of Indian affairs.
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Question. Do you know anything of a band of Indians under the lead of a
chief of the name of Black Kettle 1
Answer. There is a band c.f Cheyenne Indians under a chief of that name,
roaming over the plains.
Question. In what part of the country were they located, relative to the other
bands of Indians 1
Answer. 'l'he Indians that were with Black Kettle-I do not know that he
was the leader of them entirely, but the Indians he went with, and was the chief
among, were mainly roaming in the neighborhood of the Smoke Hill and Republican fork, and down on the south Arkansas: Sometimes they went up as far as
the Platte.
Question. How many other bands were there?
Answer. There is a band up in the neighborhood of Fort Laramie, some of
w4ose chiefs, the Shield and $potted H01:se, were with them.
Question. Was there any other band of the trjbe of Cheyenne Indians than
those on the Platte and those on the Arkansas 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I think so. How far they were divided into bands it is
rather difficult to say; and where each band is located is very difficult to say,
because they range from away below the Arkansas to above Fort Laramie, or to
Powder river. For years they have been in the habit of roaming ba~k and forth
over the plains.
Question. Will you give us the names of the head chiefs of the Cheyennes
that you, as superintendent o,f Indian affairs, recognized 1
Answer. There was Black Kettle, White .Antelope, and Bull Bear among them.
Question. Having the supreme control of the Cheyenne nation 1
Answer. No, sir; I do not think there was any such chief recognized. They
had a party of about forty young men, called the Dog soldiers, who several years
ago ~ook the control of the tribe mainly out of the hands of the chiefs. They
were clubbed together as a band of braves, and the chiefs could not control them.
Question. What part of the country did Black Kettle and the lndians with
him occupy during last summer 1
·
Answer. From information which I have received I think they were mainly
on the head of the Smoke Hill.
Question. How far from Fort Lyon 1
.Answer. Sometimes nearer, sometimes farther off. As I stated before, they
are entirely notoadic, and they pass from one part of the country to another.
The most precise information I have of their preciseiocality, at any particular
time, is the report of Major Wynkoop, who went out and saw their camp, in the
latter part of .August, or in the early part of September last.
Question. Where were they then?
Answer. At what is called Big Timbers, on the head of Smoke Hill.
Question. Have you any knowledge that they were north of Denver at any
time during last summer 1 If so, state at what places they were.
Answer. I have the information from the chiefs that during the summer they
were on the Platte, in the neighborhood of Plum creek, a little west of Fort
Kearney; and on the Blue, east of Fort Kearney. They ranged away down into
Kansas and Nebraska there during the summer.
Question. l!'rom whom did you derive this information 1
Answer. It was either Black Kettle or White Antelope who told me so.
< Question. At what time 1
·
.
Answer. At the time of the depredations on the trains that were perpetrated
in August last.
Question. I mean at what time did they tell you this 1
Answer. They told me so on the 28th of September.
Part
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Question. You say they were down on Plum creek at the time these depredations were committed 1
Answer. They said the Cheyennes committed them.
Question. What I want to know is whether you have,information that Black
Kettle, or any of the band that travel with him, had been north of Denver last
summer. Did Black Kettle tell you that either he himself, or any of the band
under his immediate control, had-been there 1
Answer. I inferred they had from his saying that the Cheyennes had committed those depredations. As a matter of course I told him they had committed
them, because they had some white prisoners who had been captured there, and
whom they claimed as theirs. He did not answer to that proposition. He said
tbe Cheyennes committed the depredations east of Kearney. He did not say
directly that they had been on the Blue. They gave up to Major Wynkoop
the prisoners that were captured on the Little Blue, and then he said that the
Cheyennes committed the depredations.
Question. Did Black Kettle say that his band had done it 1
Answer. He did not say which band of Cheyennes. I inferred that they
were his band because they did not speak of any other bands. These Cheyennes
that range on the head of the Smoke Hill and Republican seem all to band together.
Question. What is the distance from their location about Fort Lyon to Fort
K~arney, and from there to Little Blue 1
Answer. I should have to guess at the distance.
Question. Yon have trayell~d that country fi·eque-ntly, have you not 1
Answer. Not across in that direction.
Question. You have a generar knowledge of that country and the bearing of
it, and can estimate it from the route you h51ve travelled 1
Answer. From the Big r.rimbcrs on the head of the Smoke Hill.
Question. Or about Fort Lyon 1
Answer. It is at least from ninety to one hundred' :miles from Fort Lyon, and
from Big Timbers to Fort Kearney would probably be 150 miles. I may be mistaken as to that.
Question. How far east of Denver is Fort Lyon 1
Answer. It is southeast.
Queetion. How far east 1
Auswer. Something like 100 miles.
Question. What distance is Fort Lyon from Denver by a right line 1
Answer. I suppose about 200 miles. It is about 250 miles the way they
travel. It must be quite 200 miles on an air line.
Q.uestion. Where was it that Black Kettle was telling you about this 1
An~wer. At Denver.
Question. Statl:l the circumstances under which that conversation arose.
Answer. He with other chiefs and headmen-Question. Please name them'.
1
Answer. I cannot give all their names.
Q:uestion. State as many as you can remember.
Answer. Black Kettle, White Antelope, and Bull Bear, of the Cheyennes;
N evy and two or three others of_ the Arapahoes. They were brought to Denver
for the purpose of council by Major Wynkoop, after he had been out to their
camp, brought there for the purpose of making a treaty of peace.
Question. You were acting as superintendent of Indian affairs 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
,
Question. What propositionjl did you make to them, and what was the conclusion of that conference 1
'
Answer. Major Wynkoop's report is published in my report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
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Question. That may be; but you can state it 1
Answer. In brief, he reported that he had been out to their camp, and found
them drawn up in line of battle. He sent in an Indian he had with him j,o get
them to . council instead of to fight; and he held a council in the presence of
their warriors with their bows and arrows drawn. 1.,hey agreed to allow these
. men to come to see me in reference to making peace, with the assurance that he
would see them safe back again to their camp, as he states in his report or letter
to me in regard to it.
Question. '\Vhen you saw the Indians, what occurred?
Answer. The Indians made their statement, that they had come in through
great fear and tribulation to see me, and proposed that I should make peace
with them; or they said to me that they desired me to make peace. To which
I replied that I was not the proper authority, as they were at war and had been
fighting, and had made an alliance with the Sioux, Kiowas, and Comanches to go
to war; that they should make their terms of peace with the military authorities.
I also told them that they should make such arrangements, or I ad vised them
to make such arrangements as they could, and submit to whatever terms were
imposed by th~ military authorities as their best course.
Question. What reply did they make to that 1
Answer. They proposed that that would be s~tisfactory, and that they would
make terms of peace. "'!'he next ·day I got a despatch from Major General
Curtis, commanding the department, approving my course, although he did not
know what it was. But the despatch contained an orde\' that no peace should
be made with the Indians without his assent and authority; dictating some
terms for them to be governed by in making the peace.
Question. Have you a copy of that despatch with you 1
Answer. It is published in my annual report.
Question. Did you communicate that fact to the Indians 1
Answer. It was after the Indians had left that I received a despatch. The
despatch came to the commander of the district; and a copy was sent to me
for the purpose of giving me notice.
.
Question. Was anything further ~aid in that conference with the Indians 1
Answer. I took occasion to g::J.ther as much information as I could in regard
to the extent of hostile feelings among the Indians, and especinlly in regard
to what bands had been committing the depredations along the line and through
the settlements, which had been very extensive.
Question. What did Black Kettle say in regard to his band; and what did
the other Indians say in regard to their bands 1
Answer. Black Kettle said he and '\¥bite Antelope had been opposed all the
time to going to war, but they could not control their young ;men-these Dog
soldiers ; they have been very bad.
Question. These Dog soldiers were on the Blue 1
Answer. They were in his camp ; they were his young men ; Black Kettle
was an old man.
Q,uestion. Where was his camp 1
· Answer'. At the Big 1.,imbers.
Question. Where Major Wynkoop found them 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How do you know that fact 1
Answer. By the statement that their warriors were there.
Question. Did Major Wynkoop make that statement to you 1
Answer. Yes, sir; in his letter to me giving the circumstances under which
he brought these Indians to me.
Question. Did Major Wynkoop report to you that the Dog soldiers, of the
Cheyennes, were in Black Kettl~'s camp 1
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Answer. He did not mention the Dog soldiers; but the Dog soldiers are
warriors of the Cheyenne tribe.
Question. I undetstand that; but you say there is no head chief that you
recognized as such. I wanted to know if these Dog soldiers belonged to the
band under the lead of Black Kettle 7
Answer . .The Dog soldiers belonged to the bands commanded by Blacl~
Kettle, White Antelope, and Bull Bear, which all run together. There is no
known separation among them.
Question. Do I understand you, then, to say that the Indians indiscriminately
occupy that country from below the Arkansas to the North Platte 1
Answer. The Cheyenne Indians, the Sioux Inaians, the Arapahoe Indians,
roam indiscriminateJy through there.
Question. Then there was no particular band that made their homes about
the head of the Smoky fork ?
Answer. There were a. number of bands and tribes that hunted through there
indiscriminately.
Question. What I want to know is the usual locality of Black Kettle's band 1
AnRwer. It was like all the rest. He goes where he thinks there is the best
hunting; he ranges from one part of the country to the other.
Question. Do you know that the Indians known as Dog soldiers ever were
in Black Kettle's camp; and if so, at what time, and how do you know the
fact 1
Answer. I will not name them as Dog soldiers.
Question. I mean the warriors known as the Dog soldiers of the Cheyennes
Indians. Have they ever been in his camp at any time that you know of 1
Answer. Bull Bear, who was to see me, was the head of the Dog soldiers
himself, the head one of that band, a sub-chief. They said they left nearly
all their warriors at this bunch of timbers.
Question. Where Black Kettle's camp was 1
Answer. Black Kettle was in the camp. You have the idea that Black
Kettle had some particular camp. r.I'he distinction between White An,telope
and Black Kettle, as an authority among the tribes, has varied at different
times. The government has never recognized eitber of them as head chief that
I know of.
Question. You have omitted to answer the question whether you know of
these Dog soldiers, at any time or at any place, being in Black Kettle's camp
or under his control?
Answer. I know the answer that Bull Bear gave when he carne to Denver.
He was recognized as the leader -of the Dog soldiers. He, with Black Kettle
and . White Antelope, said that they left their warriors down at the bunch of
timbers; and Major Wynkoop reports the same thing.
Question. You inferred that the war):iors referred to were the Dog soldiers ?
Answer. I did.
Question. At this conference, when Bull Bear told you this, what did he say
in regard to war and peace 1
Answer. He said he was ready to make peace. They spoke of some of their
warriors bemg out. r.I'heir war is a guerilla warfm·e. r.I'hey go off in Httle
bands of twenty or thirty together and commit these depredations, so that there
is scarcely ever more than that many seen in any of these attacks. They reported that some of their young men were out upon the war-path, or bad been
out, and they did not know whether they were in at the time. That, I think,
was stated at that time, or in a communication that came from them a short
time before this. I got a letter from Black Kettle through Bent i it was sent
up to me. Upon which :Major Wynkoop went out to their camp, and either
that or their statement at the conference gave me the information that a portion
of their warriors were still out.
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Question. How did Major Wynkoop know in regard to this letter or its contents 1
Answer. lL was brought'in to Major Colley, at Fort Lyon, where Major W ynkoop was in command, by two or three Indians; and immediately upon their
coming in Major vVynkoop took these Indians, and went with them, as guides.
Question. That was before you saw the letter 1
Answer. Yes, sir; and they immediately sent me a copy of the letter.
Q,uestion. Did these Indians propose to do anything that you, as their superintendent, directed them to do in this matter, for the purpose of keeping peace 1
Answer. They did not suggest about keeping peace; they proposed to make
peace. They acknowledged that they were at war, and ltad been at war during
the spring. They expressed themselves as satisfied with the references I gave
them to the military authorities ; and they went back, as I understood, .with the
expectation of making peace with "the soldiers," as they termed them-with
the military authorities.
Question. Why did you permit those Indians to go back, under the circums tances, when you knew they w~re at war ,with ,the whites 1
Answer. Because they were under the -control and authority of the military,
over which I, as superintendent of Indian affairs, had no control.
Q.uestion.' Did you make application to the district commander there to detain
those Indians 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Why did ' you not do it 1
Answer. Because the military commander was at the council.
Question. What was his name 1
Answer. Colonel OhivingtoTL I told the. Indians he was present and could
specik in reference to those matters we had been spea,king about.
Question. Were any orders given to Major Wynkoop, either by yourself or
by Colonel Ohivington, in regard to his action towards those Indians 1
Answer. I · gave no orders, because I had no authority to give any.
Question. Dicl Colonel Ohivington give any 1
Answer. He made these remarks in the presence of the council : that he was
c,omman,d er of the district; that his rule of fighting white men and Indians was
to fight them until they laid down their arms ; if they were ready to do that,
th en 1\tlajor Wynkoop was nearer to them than he was, and they could go to
him.

Question. Do you know whether he issued any orders to Major Wynkoop to
govern his conduct in the matter 1
Answer. I do not. Major Wynkoop was not under his command, however.
I understood that Fort Lyon was not iu the command that Colonel Chivington
was exercit:ing at thA time. It was a separate command, under General Blunt,
of the military district of the Arkansas, as I understood it.
Question. Were the Indian chiefs sent back to their homes in put·suance of
any orders given to M~~or Wynkoop, that you know of1
Answer. No, sir. I will say further, in regard to my course, that it was reported to the Indian bureau, and approved by the Indian bureau :J.S proper, not
to interfere with the military, which will appear in my annual Ieport. I have
no official knowledge of what transpired after· this council, so far as these
Indians are concerned, except that [ notified the agent that they were under
the military authority, and I supposed they would be treated as prisoners.
Question. How long have you been superintendent of Indian affairs there 1
Answer. Since the spring of 1862.
Question. Have you any knowledge of any acts committed by either of those
chiefs, or by the bands immediately under their control--.-any personal knowledge?
Answer. In 1862, a party of these Dog soldiers-- ;~
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Question. I am not asking about the Dcg soldiers, but about Black Kettle's
band.
Answer. They are the same Indians. The Dog soldiers were a sort, of vigilance committee under those old chiefs.
/
Question. I understood you to say, a few minutes ago, that the Dog soldiers
threw off the authority of the old chiefs, and were independen~ of them 1
Answer. That they managed the tribe instead of the chiefs.
Question. What act of hostility was oommitted by the" Dog soldiers, in pursuance of the authority of any of the chiefs of the nation 1
Answer. 'I'hat I could not say, for I have no way of ascertaining wh at authority they have-only what I gather from the agent, who was intimate with
them.
Question. What is the name of that agent 1
Answer. Colley. He is familiar with those Indians, and said that the Dog
soldiers were to blame for their ugly conduct.
Question. rrhat is what I understand; and I wanted you, as superintenden t
of Indian affairs, to tell us if these Dog soldiers were under the command of any
chief that had control of them, and the name of that chief, if you know it.
Answer. The identification of the chief that commands them is what I am
not able to do, because they have in that band, or tribe, the chiefs that I have
mentioned. Which of them is superior in authority I am not advised.
Question. What was the general reputation of Black Kettle, as a hostile or a
friendly Indian, during your control there as -superintendent of Indian affairs 1
Answer. Black Kettle has had the reputation of being himself a good Indian.
Question. Peaceably inclined, and , well disposed towards the whites 1
Answer. Yes, sir; and White Antelope more particularly. But I was goi ng
on to state in reg·ard to their conduct. In the summer of 1862 a party of warriors of the Cheyennes came to Denver and called on me, and wanted something to e:-_· t.
'
Question. Can you designate what particu1ar band they belonged to 1
Answer. 'rhey were of the same band we are fighting about the Blue-Black
Kettle, White Antelope, and Bull Bear's Indians, tha~ range mainly down in
the neighborhood of Smoke Hill. 1.'hey came to Denver on a war expedition
against the Utes. I advised them to cease their hostilities. vVhen I went
there I had an idea of trying to get,everybody to live without fighting, the I ndians among the rest. The Indians on the mountains and on the plains spent
their time in chasing one another. I was in this delicate position: the Uto- s,
who are a very warlike and dangerotls tribe, had got a jealousy of the Indian s
on the plains, and the whites who live on the plains also. 'The whites were constantly giving presents to the begging portion of the plains Indians. The snperintendency and the agency were constantly giving goods to them; and the
Utes complained that the whitett were fitting out the plains Indians in their
war parties against the Utes, which wa8 true 'to some extent. The Utes said
that when they chased the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, which run •together
almost constantly, and the Sioux-there are parties of Sioux with the Arapahoes and Cheyennes in nearly all their war parties-when the Utes would
chase them down into the plains, they had to stop because the whit·-'s interfered ,
and they did not dare to go down into the plains. They were of the opini on
that the whites were taking the side of the Indians of the plains; and they
were on the point of going to war with us.
I suggested to these Indians that it was better for them to make peace. I
went with Colonel Leavenworth down to the camp of the Sioux, Arapahoes,
and Cheyennes, at a subsequent period, and tried to arrange with them. I had
a Ute agent with me .to make the arrangement to _quit fighting .. When thi s
party carne, in 1862, · I mentioned these things, showing the advantages, and
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they promised me they wolfld go back; I gave them some bacon and flour, and
other things, for subsistel)ce. 'rhey started under a promise that they would
go back, and not go up to the Utes, and jeopard our safety with them. Instead of that, they started for the South Park, the Ute .battle-ground, where
they usually fight, and the next ~ay or two afterwards messengers came in
from the settlers on the road, saying that the Indians were committing depredations; that they had cleaned out and outraged one landlord; had insulted a
woman; had gone in and taken possession of several of these sparsely settled
places; had made one woman cook for the whole party, and I think they had sent
in for protection. Some six soldiers went up to protect the neighborhood; but
when they got there, these Indians had gone back on the plains by another
route.
Question. What was the name of the chief in command of that party 1
Answer. I do not know; that was their first visit.
Question. Was it Black Kettle, or White Antelope, or Bull Bear 1
Answer. I could not say it was not them, nor that it was. It was a party
of warriors from the same party that Black Kettle, White Antelope and Bull
Bear ranged with.
Question. Although you had a conversation with them, and furnished them
with supplies, and induced them to return, you do not know the name of the
chief 1
Answer. There were several chiefs.
. 1
Question. Can y.ou name any one of th~m 1
•
Answer. I cannot give the ni:tmP-; I might get it if I were in my office.
Question. As governor of Colorado r_rerritory, did you have any troops organized there last summer 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I organized a regiment.
Question. For what term of service 1
Answer. For one hund1·ed days.
Question. Who was the colonel of that regiment 1
Answer. George L. Shoup.
Question. Did you ever issue any order;3 to that regiment, or to any part of
it 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Were they organiz.ed as United States troops 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. vVere they placed under the control of the district commander as
soon as organized 1
Answer. Before they were organized, for thi& reason: while the regiment was
being raised, there was information come in of a camp of about 800 of these Indians; a report of which will be found in my annual report to the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs. It came in in this way: Little Geary, a grandson of the
signer of the Declaration of Independence, lives· on the Platte, sixt.y miles south
of Denver. In the night bvo Cheyenne chiefs came to him.
'
Question. What were their names 1
Answer. It seems to me one of them was Crooked Neck. The statement I
was going to make was this : these Indians came in and potified Geary to get
out of the way. He waf' living on ranch with a large amount of stock, and
with a Cheyenne wife. He bad Spotted Horse there with him under protection. Spotted Horse, a Cheyenne Ind1an of Fort Laramie, had been friendly
all the time, and was there under protection. These Indians made these statements to him, as you will see in the printed copy of my rPport to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
I think about 800 Indians were camped at the head of. Beaver, at the Point
of Rocks on the Beaver, which is about 120 miles east of Denver, composed of
Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Sioux, Kiowas, Camanches and Apashes. 'l'hcy said
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that their plan was, in two or three nights, to divid<! into small parties of about
200, going in the neighborhood of---, which was about 40 miles below
Geary's; 100 going just above Geary's to Fort Lumpton; about 250 to the head
of Cherry creek, which is 25 or 30 miles south of Denver; and the remainder
of them to go to the Arkansas, at Fountaine que Bonille. That these parties
were to be divided into little bands, and each take a farm-house, clean it out
and steal the stock, and in this way cor;nmit the mast wholesale and extensive
massacre that has ever been known. I have no doubt it would have been so,
but for the vigilance that was taken to prevent it.
Geary, who is an educated and sensible man, immediately took Spotted
Horse, who heard these Indians give their account; it was done confidentially
by them. Geary, who bas been in my employ as a spy over the Indians, who
has been out among them as a messenger, started the next morning-they
got to his house about midnight, or 2 o'clock. Geary started immediately in
the morning with Spotted Horse, and got to my house at 11 o'clock; riding
bet;wcen 60 and 70 miles during the day, for the :e.urpose of giving me this information. I immediately notified the district commander, and put the recruits
whic:h were supposed to be subject to my command under his command, by
an order; and any militia that might be organized was subject to his command
for the purposes of defence. He sent express in every direction to notify the
settlers. I telegraphed, and also sent messengers. It so happened th~t a militia ·company bad gone down there, and were near that, and that a militia company bad gone to Fort Lumpton, or near there.
.
'l'he Indians came in at these different point.;; on the second night, skulking
along under the bluffs, where their trails were seen. r.rhey found the settlements all alarmed, and went back again, except at the head of Cherry creek,
where they killed two or three and took quite a large nu.mber of cattle i and at
Fort Lumpton they killed one man. And before Geary got back they stole some
of his horses and the horaes of one or two of his neighbors, and ran them off.
Question. At what time was this 1
Answer. It must have been early in August.
Question. At what time was this hundred-days regiment organized 1
Answer. Early in September.
Question. At what time was it mounted 1
Answer. Some companies were mounted before the regiment was full; others
were mounted subsequently, as they could get horses.
Question. Hdw were horses obtained, and from whom 1
Answer. r.rhe quartermaster of the department.
Question. Do you know anything further than you have stated in connexion
with this attack upbn Black Kettle and his band on Sand c.reek 1 Did you
issue any orders, or take any part in· any transaction having in view any such
attack 1
Answer. I did not know anything about it. After I got here, I got letter
from the secretary of the territory, s~:tying it was rumored they were going
there.
Question. Whom did " they " refer to 1
Answer. Colonel Chivington and his force. I think he said it was surmised
that they were going to Fort Lyon. It is proper for me to say that I understood they were going to roake an expedition against the Ind:ans. But I had
no knowledge ofwhere they were going.
,
Question. After Major Wynkoop left you in September, do you know what
was done with these Indians 1
Answer. I do not.
Question. Do you know what action the Indians took afterwards 1
Answer. I do not.
Question. Do you know where they were encamped 1
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Answer. I accidentally heard-! had no official knowledge of the fact-that
there were several hundred of them at Fort Lyon. The next day after this
council I started for a place about 300 miles off, to hold a treaty with the
Utes down on the Rio Grande, and was gone. nearly a month.
Question. At what time did you start .to come east 1
Answer. I think I started on the 15th qf November.
Question. Is Colonel Slwup yet in service 1
Answer. No, sir; when I came away be was encamped at Bijou Basin, about
75 miles east of Denver, where they had been. for a considerable length ofjime.
Question. How did he get out of the service 1
Answer. His time expired, and he was regularly mustered out, so I understand.
.
·
'
Question. You have not been back since 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Was there any property accounted for to you, or to any officer of
the government, so far as you know, that was taken at Black Kettle'o camp 1
Answer. Not any. I would say, however, that any property the army captured they would not be likely to turn over to Ill(l.
I was asked if I knew of any depredations committed by these Indians, and
I stated what was done. in 18G2. Before going further, I will say, that Black
Kettle told me in that council that he and yYhite Antelope had been opposed
to clepr~dations all the time, but could not control their tribes. They admitted that tbeir tribes, that the Arapahoes and Sioux, bad made a laTge number
of attacks, ana JOld me where each depredation I inquired about had been
committed by the different tribes.
I gave to the committee of investigation on Indian affairs, the other day, a
sketch of the minutes kept of that council. There was quite a large number
of these depredations referred to and inquired of in that council, but not by
any means all the depredations that were committed last summ-er.
'l'he Cheyennes commenced their depredations early in the spring with the
Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches, and Sioux. Agreeably to a previous treaty
or council held by them in the winter of 1863 and. 1864-which treaty was the
consummation of an arrangement that the Sioux tried to make with our Indians
in 1863, whioh I reported to the Indian bureau, and they sent me out authority
to treat with them-I went to the head of the Republican, and spent about a
month there trying to get them together, having my messengers out. Little
Geary went to the camp of Bull Bear, Black Kettle 1 White Antelope, and a
large number of others. The report of this attempt is published in my annual
report for 1'863.
'l'he result of that failure was, that they told :Mr. Geary, after agreeing first
to come and see me, that they had made up their minds to have nothing more
to do with us ; that they did uot want any more of our goods ; that they might
as well be killed as starved to death ; that they were being driYen out of their
country by the whites ; that they repudiated the treaty of Fort Wise, under
which we were making preparations to settle them, as you will see by looking
into my report, in which I give Geary's sworn statement.
After cuming back a portion of these Indians ran together. You will observe that they made the treaty of 1861 together. A portion of them commenced committing depredations that fall. 'l'hey stole a lot of horses, a portion of which we recovered in the autumn. A man who was present at their
"big medicine" on the Arkansas, by the name of North, came to me privately
and secretly hom this band of Indians that committed depredations in November, 1863, within about twenty miles of Denver ; he came to me from
their camp, and made a statement which I forwarded to the War Department
and to the Indian bureau, which is also in my annual report for this year.
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North told me that the Kiowas, Comanches, Apaches, Cheyennes, a portion
of the Arapahoes, and the Sioux, had held a council, at which he was present,
and shook hands over it. That they would pretend to be friendly with the
whites until they could get sufficient ammunition ; then in the spring they
would divide into little parties and ~ommence a war on the whites. Early last
spring the first depredation they committed was to steal one hundred and seventyfive head of cattle, which was done by the Cheyennes, from Irwin & Jackman,
government contractors, for transportation across the plains. Irwin & Jackman's men followed them about twenty miles down Sand creek, until they struck
off to the head of the Republican. 'rhey then came to Denver and reported to
the military commauder, Colonel Chivington, and requested a force to go with
them to l'ecover their cattle. That fmce was sent out, and after being gone a
we.ek or two they returned, having recovered about a dozen of the cattle, one
soldier having been wounded. He returned for the want of 13ubsistence, and was
sent again, and went through to :Fort" Larned op the route. That was Lieutenant Ayres, and during the time he was gone· he had a battle with the Indians,
in which they drove him. They attacked him as he was passing through with
his battery to Fort Larned, which is in Kansas. At that battle one of the Indians, who was said to be a very friendly Indian to the whites, was killed. He
was said to be in fctvor of making peace, and preventing the battle, and was in
the act of trying to pacify the Indians when he was shot. But Lieutenant
Ayres's report has never been furnished to me, and .consequently I cannot give
the details of it; but this was the statement the lieutenant made when he got
back. He got away from the Indians without being captured. 'J.1hey were in
very large force. He got away and got to Fort Larned. 'l1 hat i~ the end of the
effort to get back these cattle. He and the rest 'of his battery-he had a section of a battm'Y, I think, two guns-was at Fort Larned for some time.
But the commander there, who was said to be an intemperate man, w:;ts not on
the alert; and the Kiowas and some other Indians, mainly Kiowas, captured
the whole of the battery's horses, one hundred and forty, and ran them off right
from the fort. 'Vhile Satant, the commander of the Indians, was talking with
the officer in command, making great professions of friendship at the time,
they made this raid upop the battery's horses and got away with them.
I would say still further, that to give a description of all the depredations
that were committed during the summer, and fall, and this '!'inter, would require a statement which wou!d be very extensive. I would like this, as there
is an impression in the minds of people here that the Indian war out there has
not amounted to much-I would like this, that this committee, for the purpose
of ascertaiping, would deputize somebody to gather the reports of the attacks,
the number of people killed, and the amount of property destroyed during the
past year.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. With all the knowledge you have in relation to these attacks and
depredations by the Indians, do you t~ink t~1ey afford any justification for the
attack maile by Colonel Chivington on these friendly Indians, under the circum·
stances under which it was made 1
Answer. As a matter of course, no one eould justify an attack ~n Indians
while under the protection of the flag. If those Indians were there under tbe
p'rotection of the flag, it would be a questioi1 that would be scarcely worth asking, because nobody could say anything in favor of the att~ck. I have heard,
lwwever-that is only a report-that there was a statement on the part of
Colonel Chivington and his friends that these Indians had assumed a hostile attitude before he attacked them. I do not know whether that is so or not I
have said all I have had to do with them. I supposed they were being treated
as prisoners of war in some way or other.
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I had a letter from General Curtis, after I got here, saying he was troubled
to know what to do with so many nominal prisoners of war, as they were so
expensive to feed there. rrhe subsistence of the fort was short, and it was a
long way to get subsistence, and through a hostile country, and he was troubled
to know what' to do with them.
Question. But from all the circumstances which you know, all the facts in
relation to that matter, do you deem that Colonel Chivington had any justification for that attack 1
Answer. So far as giving an opinion is concerned, I would . say this: That
the reports that have been made here, a great many of them, have come through
persons whom I know to be personal enemies of Colonel Chivington for a long
time. And I would rather not give an opinion on the subject until I have heard
the other side of the question, which I have not heard yet.
Question. I do not ask for an opinion. Do you know of any circumstance
which would justify that attack 1
.Answer. I do not know of any circumstance connected with it subsequent to
the time those Indians left me and I started for another part of the country. It
is proper for me to say, that these attacks during the sumll?-er, and up to the time
I came away, were of very frequent occurrence. The destruction of property
was very great. Our people suffered wonderfully, especially in their property,
and in their loss of life. 'l'hey murdered a family some twenty-odd miles east
of Denver. The attacks by hostile Indians, about the time, I came away, were
very numerous along the Platte. ;]'here was an attack ·as I came in, about the
month of November. , It was in the evening, about sundown, and I passed over
the ground in the night in the stage with my family, and a few days afterwards
a party of emigrants, returning from Colorado, were murdered near the same
ground, which was near Plum cteek; and for a considerable length of time,
immediately after I came in, the attacks were very numerous and very violent,
until the stage was interrupted so that it has not been running since, until within
a few days.
·
I started hom~ and could not get there because there was no transportation.
I carne back here and shall return in a few days again. I mention this in order
to do away with the impression that might exist that hostilities had ceased, and
that this attack of Colonel Chivington had excited the recent hostilities.
These Indiai!s told me, when they were there, that the Sioux were in large
force on the head of the Republican, and would make an attack about the time
I expected to come in. I delayed my coming in a short time on account of
what they told me, and when I did come in I found some Indians commencing
their depredations, which they continued about the month following, both before and after the attack made by Colonel Chivington. General Curtis wrote
to me than he did not think Chivington's attack was the instigation of the
hostilities perpetrated along the Platte.
•

Testimony

if Mr.

A. C. Hunt.
WASHJ~GTON, ~Iarch

15, 1865.

Mr. A. C. HuNT sworn and examined.
By Mr. Loan:
Question. Where do you reside 1
Answer. I reside at Denver, Colorado.
Question. "What is your official position 1 ·
Answer. I am United States marshal for the district of Colorado. I have
been in Denver since 1859.
Question. Do you know anything in connexion with the killing of the Indians at Sand creek, about the last of November, 1864?
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Answer. I do not suppose I know anything that would be admissible as
evidence. All I know is from general rumor, not being on the ground at all.
I was in Denver when the regiment returned.
Question. Did you hear anything about it from Colonel Chivington, or any
one of his command 1 ,
Answer. I heard an immense sight from soldiers in his command.
Question. State what they told you.
Answer. I also talked a long time with the guide, James Beck with, after they
returned.
Q.uestion. State anything that was said by any one connected with that
transaction in regard to what was done.
Answer. I talked longer with Melrose, a private in Captain Baxtor's company, under Colonel Shoup. He gave me quite a history of the fight, and
everything pertaining to it. He enlisted from the Arkansas. There is a general disposition, on the part of those who enlisted from that neighborhood, to
cry down the whole transaction as being very badly managed, and very murderous. 'J.1h ey made no secret of telling what had been done, but made no
boast of it at all. 'rhey said they were heartily ashamed of it.
Question. State what they said was done.
Answer. According to their understanding, when they started out, they were
enlisted for the purpose of fighting hostile Indians, there being any quantity
of them on the plains. They knew nothing of their whereabouts. They went
under the orders of Colonel Cbivington, who led the· command. They came
within 80 miles of Fort Lyon, where they were halted for some days, and all
communication stopped. No person, not even the United States mail, was
permitted to go down the road for quite a length of time, until the forces which
had been straggling back had all been collected together. When they did
march to Fort Lyon they went very rapidly, taking every person about the
fort by surprise, no person anticipating their coming at all. 'J.1beir first movement was to throw a guard around the fort. 'l'hat surprised the soldiers very
much; they said they did not know the object of it. That night they were
ordered to march again in a northeast direction. I think that and perhaps the
next night they m~rched some 35 miles to fall upon tb~s camp of Indians on
Sand creek. None of the soldiers were posted as to what Indians they were
fighting, or anything about it, until they'" got an explanation, after the attack
was Il1ade, from various white men in the camp. Those white men told the
soldiers that they were Black Kettle's band, who had been there for some time;
a part of the time had been drawing rations from the fort-were, to all intents
and purposes, friendly Indians. Beyond that I know that the colonel, as soon
as the fight was over, came back to Denver. I met him the day he came in.
The command afterwards returned in marching time. 'l'hey had evidences of
what they had been doing-among tpe rest, White Antelope's medal; I thi~1k
they had about 20 of Black K ettle's scalps-quite that many, I think, were
exhibited; they had White Antelope's commission, or something like' that,
from Commissioner- Dole-something· like a recommend; they bad a thousand
and one trophies in the way of finely worked buffalo robes, spurs, and bits,
and things of that kind; all of which, I suppose, was contraband of , warthey were taken on the fi·eld of battle.
Question. Did they say anything about how the attack was made, at what
time, and under what circumstances 1
Answer. I understood them to say it was made just at daylight. 'l'he Indians that were not armed almost all fled and escaped. The impression of the
men I talked with was that they bad killed over 100 of them; the impression
of some others was that they had killed 400 or 500.
Question. Was anything said about killing women and children 1
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.Answer. Yes, sir; they killed everything alive in the camp that they could
get at. I believe that was part of the understanding, that none should be
spared. I believe it is generally the understanding that you fight Indians in
that way.
Question. What were those ornameJlted buffalo robes worth in the market 1
Answer. They are very valuable-worth from $20 to $50 each.
Question. I:t;J. whose possession did you see them 1
Answer. They were most ~ y in private hands-in the hands of the men who
were in the fight; by permission, I suppose. I do not suppose there was any
demand made for them by any person. I suppose each man who had one of
them thought he was entitle,d to it.
Question. Is that the rule out there, that the soldiers of the United States
are entitled to all they capture 1
_
Answer. That is the only battle they have ever had; so that I do not know
as there is any particular rule about that matter.
Question. How long did they say the fight continued 1
Answer. I am under the impression now that they said it continued some
two or three hours. That .is my impression from the representations made by
the parties engaged in the fight.
Question. How many Indians did they say were engagea in the fight 1
Answer. It has been estimated that there were from 500 to 3,000 there. I
suppose the agent knows almost exactly how many there were of them. They
judge from the lodges, and there are from five to six in a lodge, so far as my
experience goes. From the best information I could get there were from 100
to 120 lodges there.
Question. Was there anything said about the number that escaped 1
Answer. A large proportion of them escaped; that was the supposition of
the soldiers I talked with.
Question. In what way, on horseback or on foot 1
Answer. Those of the warriors who had horses that they could get hold of
escaped on horseback. The women and young ones, who had no horses, went
on foot.
Question. Did they take any prisoners in that fight 1
Answer. I never heard of any prisoners being taken th~t were brought in.
Question. Do you know whether they captured any property from the Indians 1
·
Answer. I think they '\-Vere possessed of no property except what I have
mentioned.
Question. Did they have no horses, ponies, and mules 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I saw a great many ponies. A New Mexican company
was mostly mounted on ponies that they had captured. I saw them come in
on Indian horses.; they were poor, thin horses.
Question. Did you hear Colonel Chivington himself say anything about that
transaction 1
Answer. No, sir, except in a public speech he made afterwards, and in that
he did not say much about it.
Question. Did he assign any reason why, under the circumstances, he attacked that band of Indians 1
Answer. He said all the time that they were hostile Indians, and was very
wroth with any of the community who knew anything about the Indians, who
had been in the country a long while, who knew something about Black Kettle
and W'hite Antelope, and who denominated them friendly Indians, and who
differed with him as to the policy of bringing those Indians down upon us at
that time. He was very wroth with me particularly, and one or two others ;
and I suppose that was what brought forth the remarks that he made.
Question. What was his policy 1

46

MASSACRE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS.

Answer. To exterminate the Indians.
Question. To kill them all ?
Answer. Yes, sir, I should judge so ; and that seemed to be quite a popular
notion too.
Question. Did you have any means of knowing the reputation of Black
K ettle and White Antelope 1
Answer. We have always regarded Black Kettle and White Antelope as
the special friends of the white man ever since I have been in the country.
Question. Do you know of any acts of hostility committed by them, or with
their consent 1
Answer. No, sir; I do not.
Question. Did you ever hear any acts of hostility attributed to them by any
one?
Answer. No, sir.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Is there a general feeling among the whites there in favor of the
extermination of the Indians 1
Answer. 'l'hat feeling prevails in all new countries where the Indians have
committed any depredations. And most especially will people fly off the handle
in that way when you exhibit the corpse of some one who has been murdered
by the Indians. When they come to their sober senses they reflect that the
I:1dians have feelings as well as we have, and are entitled to certain rights;
which, by the by, they never get.
Question. Had there been any such acts committed by the Indians at that
time 1
Answer. No, sir; not for months. But last summer there were exhibitions
that were horrid to tell, and there were terrible imprudences in consequence.
Persons killed thirty or forty miles off were brought into Denver and exhibited
there.
Question. There had been nothing of that kind for some time previous to
this attack by Colonel Ohivington 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Do you know of any motive which actuated Colonel Chivington in
making this attack 1
Answer. It may be invidious in me to give my idea of his motive. I was
entirely satisfied that his motive was not a good and virtuous one-so much so,
that when I was where he stopped his command I wrote a letter to Judge Bennett, giving him my views about the matter, and telling him what I thought was
his object. We regarded those Indians on the reservation as safe, and ought
not to be attacked. 'l'hat· opinion, perhaps, was not shared by the community,
though I ptesume the great majority of the command were aware of the Indians
they were going to kill.
Question. If you have no objection, I would like you to state what you
think was his motive.
•
Answer. I think it was hope of promotion. He had read of Kit Carson,
General Harney, and others, who had become noted for their Indian fighting. I
have no objection to state that.
Mr. Gooch. The reason why I ask these questions is, that this attack seems
to us to be of such a character that we are anxious to ascertain, if possible,
what could have been the motive which actuated an officer to make such an
attack under the circumstances.
The witness. I have no doubt that what I have stated was one motive.
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Papers submitted by Ron. H P. Bennet, delegate in Congress from Colorado
Ten·itory.
WASHIN~TC>N CITY, ll-Iarch 20, 1865.
SIR: I am compelled to leave to-night for New York, to be gone several days,
and it will likely be impossible for me to appear before the committee at all.
But, as you requested, I will furnish the committee with such official and unofficial documents as I have touching upon the " Sand creek affair."
Herewith enclosed please find the official reports of all the principal officers
engaged in the transaction; also, a copy of Governor Evans's proclamation, after
whi<>:h the one~hundred-day regiment was raised; also, some slips cut from the
"Rocky Mountain News," the organ of Governor Evans, and edited by the
postmaster at Denver; also, find an extract from Secretary Elbert's message
made to the legislature and publjshed in the "Rocky Mountain News." All
the foregoing papers I believe to be genuine copies of what they purport to be.
Very respectfully,
H. P. BENNET.
Hon. Mr. GoocH.

Proclam.ation by Governor Evans, qf Colorado Territm·y.
PROCLAMATION.

Having sent special messengers to the Indians of the plains, directing the
friendly to rendez.vous at Fort Lyon, Fort Larned, Fort Laramie, and Camp
Collins for safety and protection, warning them that all hostile Indians would
be pursued and destroyed, and the last of said messengers having now returned,
and the evidence being conclusive that most of the Indian tribes of the plains
are at war and hostile to the w bites, and having to the utmost of my ability
endeavored to induce all of the Indians of the plains to come to said places
of rendezvous, promising them subsistence and protection, which, with a few
exceptions, they have refusedto do:
Now, therefore, I, John Evans, governor of Colorado Territory, do issue this
my proclamation, authorizing all citizens of Colorado, either individually or in
such parties as they may organize, to go in pursuit of all hostile Indians on the
plains, scrupulously avoiding those who have resporided to my said call to
rendezvous at the points indicated; also, to kill and destroy, as enemies of the
country, wherever they may be found, all such hostile Indians. And further, as
the only reward I am authorized to offer for such services, I hereby empower
such citizens, or parties of citizens, to take captive, and hold to their own private
use and benefit, all the property of said hostile Indians that they may capture,
and to receive for all stolen property recpvered from said Indians such reward
as may be deemed proper and just therefor.
I further offer to all such parties as will organize under the militia law of the
Territory for the purpose to furnish them arms and ammunition, and to present
their accounts for pay as regular soldiers for themselves, their horses, their subsistence, and transportation, to Congres;;, under the assurance of tiie department
commander that they will be paid.
The conflict is upon us, and all good citizens are called upon to do their duty
for the defence of their homes and families.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the g~eat seal
of the Territory of Colorado to be affixed this 11th day of August, A. D. 1864.
(sEAL.]
·JOHN EVANS.
By the governor:
S. H. ELBERT, Secretary qf Colorado Territory.
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OFFICIAL REPORTS OF OFFICERS ENGAGED IN THE AFFAIR OF SANDY
CREEK, PUBLISHED IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS.

First report qf Colonel Gkivington.
HEADQUARTERS DiSTRICT oF CoLoRADO,
In the field, on Big Bend of Sandy Creek, Col. Ter., Nov. 29, 1864.
SIR : I have not the time to give you a detailed history of our engagement of
to-day, or to mention those officers and men who distinguished themselves in
one of the most bloody lp.dian battles ever fought on these plains. You will
find enclosed the report of my surgeon in charge, :which will bring to many
anxious friends the sad fate of loved ones who are and have been risking
everything to avenge the horrid deeds of those savages we have so severely
handled. We made a forced march of forty miles, and surprised, at break of
day, one of the most powerful villages of the Cheyenne nation, and captured
over five hundred animals; killing the celebrated chiefs One Eye, White .Antelope, Knock Kno, Black Kettle, and Little Robe, with about five hundred of
their people, destroying all their lodges and equipage, making almost an annihilation of the entire tribe.
I shall leave here, as soon as I can see our wounded safely on the way to the
hospital at Fort Lyon, for the villages of the Sioux, which are reported about
eighty miles from here, on the Smoky Hill, and three thousand strong; so look
out for more fighting. I will state, for the consideration of gentlemen who are
opl?osed to fighting these red scoundrels, that I was shown, by my chief surgeon,
the scalp of a white man taken from the lodge of one of the chiefs, which could
not have been more than two or three days taken; and I could mentio~ many
more things to show how these Indians, who have been drawing government
rations at Fort Lyon, are and have been acting. ·
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. :M:. QHIVING'rON,
Col. Comd'g Colorado Expedition against Indians on Plains.
CHAS. WHEELER, .A . .A . .A. G.,
HeadquaTters District qf Colorado, Denver.

Second rr>port qf Colonel CMvington.
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF COLORA DO,
Denver, C. T., December 16, 1864.
GENERAL: I have the honor to transmit the following report of operations of
the Indian expedition under my command, of which brief notice was given you
by my telegram of November 29, 1864:
Having ascertained that ·the hostile Indians had proceeded south from the
Platte, and were almost within striking distance of Fort Lyon, I ordered Colonel
Geo. L. Shoup, 3d regiment Colorado volunteer cavalry, (100-day service,)
to proceed with the mounted men of his regiment in that direction.
On the 20th of November I left Denver and Booneville, C. T.; on the 24th of
November joined ana took command in person of the expedition which had
been increased by a battalion of the lst cavalry of Colorado, consisting of detachments of companies C, E and H. I proceeded with the utmost caution
down the .Arkansas river, and on the morning of the 28th instant arrived at Fort
Lyon, to the surprise of the garrison of that post. On the same· morning I resumed my march, being joined by Major Scott J . .Anthony, 1st caval:cy of Colorado, with one hundred and twenty-five men of said regiment, consisting of
detachments of companies D G and H, with two howitzers. The command
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then proceeded in a northeasterly direction, travelli.ng all night, and at daylight
of the 29th November striking Sand creek about forty ( 40) miles. fi·om· Fort
Lyon.
Here was discovered an Indian village of one hundred an_d thirty (130)lodges,
composed of Black Kettle's band of Cheyennes and eight (8) lodges of Arapahoes,
with Left Hanel. My line of battle was formed with Lieutenant Wilson's battalion of the 1st regiment, numbering about 125 men, on the right, Colonel
Shoup's 3d regiment, numbering about 450 men, in the centre, and ..Major Anthony's battalion, numbering 125 men, 1st regiment, on the left.
'l'he attack was immediately made upon the Indian's camp by Lieutenant
Wilson, who dashed forward, cutting the enemy off from their herd, and driving them out of their camp, which was subsequently destroyed.
The Indians, numbering from 900 to 1,000, though taken by surprise, speedily rallied and formed a line of battle across the creek, about three-fourths of a
mile above the village, stu~bornly contesting every inch of ground.
The commands of Colonel Shoup and Major Anthony pressed rapidly forward
and attacked the enemy sharply, and the engagement became general, we constantly driving the Indians, who fell back from one position to another for five
miles, and finally abandoned resistance and dispersed in all directions and were
pursued by my troops until nightfall.
It may, perhaps, be unnecessary for me to state that I captured no prisoners.
Between five and six hundred Indians were left dead upon the field. About
five hundred and fifty ponies, mules and horses were captured, and all their
1odges were destroyed, the contents of which has served to supply the command
with an abundance of trophies, comprising the paraphernalia of Indian warfare
and life. My loss was eight (8) killed on the field and forty ( 40) wounded, of
which two have since died. Of the conduct of the 3d regin1ent (100-d.ay service) I have to say that they well sutttained the reputation of our Colorado
troops for bravery and effectiveness; were well commanded by their gallant
young Colonel, Geo. L. Shoup, ably assisted by Lieutenant Colonel L. L. Bowen, J\-hjor Hal Sayr and Captain rl'heodore G. Cree, commanding· 1st, 2d and 3d
battalions of that regiment
Of the conduct of the two battalions of the 1st regiment I have but to remark
that they sustained their reputation as second to none, and were ably handled
by their commanders, Major Anthony, Lieutenant WHson and Lieut~nant Clark
Dunn, upon whom the command devolved after the disability of Lieutenant
Wilson froni wounds received.
Night coming on, the pursuit of the flying Indians was of necessity abandoned,
and my command encamped within sight of the field.
On the 1st instant, having sent the wounc1ed and dead to :F ort Lyon, the first
to be cared for, and the latter to be buried upon our own soil.' I resumed the
pursuit in the direction of Camp Wynkoop on the Arkansa$ river, marching all
night of the 3d and 4th int~tant, in hopes of overtaking a large encampment of
. Arapahoes and Cheyen11es, under Little Raven, but the enemy had been apprized
of my advance, and on the morning of the 5th instant, at 3 o'clock, precipitately
broke camp and fled. My stock was exhausted. For one hundred miles the
snow had been two feet deep, and for the previous fifteen days-excepting on
November 29 and 30-the marches had been forced and incessant.
Under these circumstances, and the fact of the time of the 3d regiment being
m;arly out, I determined for the present to relinquish the pursuit.
Of the effect of the punishment sustained by the Indians you will be the judge.
Their chiefs Black Kettle, White.Antelope, One Eye, Knock Knee, and Little
Robe, were numbered w1th the killed and their bands almost annihilated. I was
shown the scalp of a white man, found in one of the lodges, which could not
have been taken more than two or three days previous. :b"'or full particulars and
reports of the several commanders I respectfully refer you to the following copies
Part VI--4
_
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herewith enclosed, of Colonel GeorgeL. Shoup, 3d regiment, :Qecember 6, 1864;
Colonel Shoup, 3d regiment, December 7, 1864; Colonel L. L. Bowen, 3d regiment, November 30, 1864; Major Hal Sayr, 3d regiment, December 6, 1864;
Captain Theodore G. Cree, 3d regiment, December 6, 1864; Major Scott J.
Anthony, 1st regiment, December 1, 1864; Lieutenant Clark Dunn, 1st regiment, November 30, 1864; Lieutenant J. J. Kennedy, November RO, 1864.
If all the companies of the 1st cavalry of Uolorado and the 11th Ohio volunteer cavalry, stationed at camps and posts near here, were ordered to report
to me, I could organize a campaign, which, in my judgment, would effectually
rid the country between the Platte and Arkansas rivers of these red rebels.
I would respectfully request to be informed, if another campaign l;'hould be
authorized from here, whether I could employ one or two hundred friendly Utes,
(Indians,). furnishing them subsistence, arms and ammunition for the campaign.

*

*

*

•

•

*

*

•

•

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. M. CHIVINGTON, ·
Col. 1.st Cavalry qf Colorado, Commanding District qf Colorado.

First report qf Colone~ Shoup.
HEADQUARTERS THIRD CoLORADO CAVALRY,
Infield, 100 miles below Fort Lyon, December 6, 1864.
CAPTAIN: In answer to your communication of this date, asking me to consult with the officers of my regiment, and report their opinion as to the propriety
and willingness of themselves and the enlisted men under my command to continue this expedition against the Indians to the Smoky Hill and Republican, I
have to say.
My "officers and men" will obey orders and go to the Smoky Hill and Republican, if the colonel commanding, after due deliberation, will so order. However, they are nearly all of the opinion, (the o:fficers 1) that an expedition to the
above named streams at present must fail. This opinion is bas-ed upon the
fact that their horses are worn out, and in an unserviceable condition; most of
the animals would fail on the first forced march.
They are of the further opinion that many of these men will re-enlist to ·prosecute this campaign if we meet with no reverse and the men are not worn out
and disheartened in a fruitless march just before the expiration of their term of
enlistment.
All the above is fully indorsed by me; and while I am more than eager to
duplicate the great victory of November 29, I think an expedition to the Smoky
Hill and Republican, considering the worn-out condition of my horses, would
prove more of a disaster than a success, at present; the failure of which would
so dishearten my men, that no inducement could be held out that would
cause them to re-enlist. All of which is most respectfully submitted.
GEORGE L'. SHOUP,
Colonel 3d Colorado Cavalry.
Captain J. S. MAYNARD,
.A.. A. A. General, District of Colorado, in tlte field:

Second report qf Colonel Shoup.
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT oF CoLoRADO,
In the field, Decembe'r' 7, 1864.
DEAR SIR!': I have the honor to report the part taken by my regiment; 3d
Colorado cavalry, in the engagement with the IndianH on Sand creek, forty ( 40)
miles north of Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory, November 29, 1864.
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1 brought my regiment into action at sunrise. The first order given was to
Captain John 'McCannon, company I, to cut off the Indians from their ponies
on the south side of the village; this order was obeyed with great celerity and
success. Captain McUannon captured about two hundred (200) ponies at the
first dash, but being closely pressed by hund1·eds of Indians, sent the ponies to
the rear, and opened a terrible ana withering :fire on the Indians, completely
checking them, killing many, and causing th.em to retteat up Sand creek.
Captain 0. H. P. Baxter, with his company G. was sent to re-enforce
Captain McCannon. The two companies then fought the Indians up the south
side of the creek for about two (2) miles, and at this point ~any of the Indians
took refuge in the banks of the creek, where they had prepared rifle-pits.
Captain McCannon, with his company, remained at that place until late in the
afternoon, and was the last to leave the field of battle. His brave company
killed twenty-six (26) Indians in one pit, and must have killed fifty (50) or
more during the e:ogagement. Company G, led by Captain Baxter and Lieutenant Templeton, pursued the demoralized and flying savages to the south and
west, killing upwards of twenty Indians. Lieutenant W. E. Grinnell, with a
detachment of 21 men of company K, fought during part of the engagement
on the southwest side of the battle-field. This brave little detachment deserve
honorable mention for their g~llant conduct on the field. They lost one-fifth of
their number, killed and woundeil. At the opening of the engagement I led
about four hundred ( 400) of my men up the north side of the creek and engaged
the main body of the Indians, who were retreating to the west. I dismounted
my men and fought them for some time on foot.
.
At this point Captain Talbott, of company M, fell severely wounded, while
bravely leading his men in a charge on a body of Indians who had taken refuge
on the banks on the north side of the creek. Here. a terrible hand-to-hand encounter ensued between the Indians and Captain Talbott's men and others who
had rushed forward to their aid-the Indians trying to secure the scalp of Captain Talbott. I think the hardest fighting of the day occurred at that point,
some of our men fighting with club muskets; the 1st and 3d Coloradoans
fighting side by side, each trying to excel in bravery, and each ambitious to kill
at least one Indian. Many valuable lives of officers and men were saved by the
bravery of others just as the fatal knife was raised to perform its work of death.
Early in the engagement, Captain Nickols, with his company D, pursued a
band of Indians that were trying to escape to the northeast ; he overtook and
punishe<i them severely, killing twenty-five or thirty and captured some ponies.
Other companies of my regiment fought with zeal and bravery, but after 10
o'clock a. m. the battle became so general and covered so wide a field that it
became necessary to divide my command into small detachments, sending them ,
in all directions to pursue the flying Indians.
I am told by my officers and men that some of their comrades engaged the .
Indians in close combat. I am satisfied, from my own observation, that the
historian will search in vain fo~: braver deeds than were committed on that field
of battle.
·
My loss is nine ,(9) men killed, one missing, supposed to be killed, and forty--·
four ( 44) wounded.
Captain Presley Talbott and Lieutenant C. li. Hawley are the only .officers
wounded of my regiment; Captain 'l'albott iu left side, and Lieutenant Hawley
in shoulder.
·
Enclosed herewith you will find copy of the reports of my battalion commanders to me. Aell of which is most respectful~y submit~eo.
I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,
GEORGE L. SHOUP, .
Colonel 3d Coloraao Cavalry.
Colonel J. M. CHIVINGTON, 'Commanding District of Colorado.
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Report of Lieutenant Colonel Bowen.
SANDY CREEK, November 30, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to enclose you the reports of the company commanders
of the first battalion, commanded by myself, in the action of yesterday. I fully
indorse all contained in these r€ports; all behaved well, each vieing with tbe other
as to who could do the, enemy the most injury. 1 1 his, I think, can truly be said
of the whole regiment. I was in position during the action to see most of the
regiment, and did not see one coward. Permit me·to congratulate you upon
the signal punishment meted out to the savages on yesterday, "who so ruthlessly have murdered our women and children," in the language of the colonel
commanding, although I regret th~ loss of so many brave men. The third
regiment cannot any longer be called the "bloodless third."
From the most reliable information, from actual count and positions occupied,
I .have no doubt that at least one hundred and fifty Indians were killed by
my battalion.
,
I cannot speak in terms of too high praise of all the officers and men under
my command.
rr,he war flag of this band of Cheyennes is in my possession, presented by '
Stephen Decatur, commissary sergeant of company C, who acted as my
battalion adjutant.
Very respectfully,
LEAVITT L. BOWEN,
Lieut. Col. 3d Colorado Cavalry, Commanding 1st Battalion.
Colonel GEORGE L. SHOUP,
Third Regiment Colorado .Cavalry.

Report of Major Sayr.
December 6, 1864:

CAMP - - - ,

Sn~: I have the honor to submit tl:Ie following repo~·t of the part taken by
my battalion in the action of November 29, on Sand creek. ·The battalion
consisted of company B, Captain H. M. Orahood, First Lieutenant Charles H.
Hawley1 Second Lieutenant Harry Richmond, and sixty-four men; company I,
Captain.Tohn McCannon, First Lieutenant Thomas J. Davis, and fifty-three men;
company G, Captain 0. H~ P. Baxter, Second Lieutenant A. J. Templeton, and
forty men; company K, Lieutenant W. E. Grinnell, and twenty-one men ;
rr.aking a total of 178 men. Company I was sent at the beginning of the
action to the west of the field, where they remained during the day, much of
the time sustaining a heavy fire from the enemy, who were secreted under a
high bank, on the south side of Sand creek.. 1,his company did good servic~
in preventing the escape of the Indians to the west. Companies B, G, and
K, moved across the creek and went into the action on the north side of the
creek and west of the Indian town, where they remained for several hours,
doing good service, while under a heavy fire from the enemy, who were concealed in rifle: pits in the bed of the preek.
'l,he action became general, and lasted from 6.30 a. m. until 1 p.m., when the
companies divided into small squads and went in ·pursuit of the lndians, who
were now flying in every direction ac-ross the plains, and were pursued until
du~

·

Both officers and men conducted themselves bravely. The number of Indians
killed by the battalion, as estimated by company commanders, is about 17 5 to
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200. Company B, Lieutenant Hawley, wounded in shoulder; private Marrion
wounded in thigh; company I, three killed and three wounded; company G,
none killed or wounded; company K, two killed and two wounded ; making a
total of five killed and seven wounded.
Hoping the above will meet your approval, I am, colonel, very respectfully, &c.,

HAL. SAYR,
Major Commanding 2d Battalion, 3d Colorado Cavalry.
Colonel GEORGE L. SHOUP,
Commanding Tkird Colorado Cavalry.

~epo1·t

of

Captain Cree.

CAMP SKEDADDL~, December 6, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to report to you the part taken by the third battalion
in the fight of the 29th of November. They first formed on the left of the regiment, in the rear of the village, then removed upon the right bank of the creek,
near one-half mile; there dismounted and fought the red-skins about an hour,
where the boys behaved like veterans.
After finding that we had done all the good that we could do there, removed
companies D and E, (company F having gone with Colonel Bowen's battalion,)
and. moved to the right, across the hill, for the purpose of killing Indians that
were making their escape to the right of the command, in which movement we
succeeded in killing many. I then made a detail from company D, of fifteen (15)
men, and sent them to c':Lpture some twenty (20) ponies, which I could see some
four (4) miles to the right of the village; but before they reached the ponies
some twenty Indians attacked them, when a fierce fight ensued, in which private
McFarland was killed in a hand-to-hand engagement; but, like true soldiers,
they stood their ground, killing five (5) Indians, and wounding several others.
'rhe Indians finding it rather warm to be healthy, left. The boys pursued
them some eight or ten miles, and finding that they could not overtake them,
returned, bringing with them the ponies they were sent for. I then returned
with the command to the village to take care of their killed and wounded companions.
Company E lost one killed and one wounded; company D, two killed and
one wounded.
As for the bravery displayed by any one in particular, I have no distinctions
to make. All I can say for officers and men is, that they all behavrd well, and
won for themselves a name that will be remembered for ages to come.
The number of Indians killed by my battalion is sixty (60.)
I am, colonel, yours truly,

T. G. CREE,
Captain Commanding 3d Battalion, 3d Colorado Cavalry.
Colonel GEORGE L. SHOUP.
Report

cif Major Antlwny.

HEADQUARTERS, IN THE FIELD,
Battalion First Colorado Cavalry, December I, 1864.
SIR : I have the honor to report that I left l!,ort Lyon, Colorado Territory,
with detachments from companies D, G, and H, 1st Colorado cavalry, numbering one hundred and twenty-five men, and two howitzers, and joined Colonel
Chivington's brigade one mile below Fort Lyon, at 8 o'clock p.m., November
28, and proceeded with his command, on Indian expedition, in a northeasterly
direction, striking Sand creek at daylight of the 29th November, forty miles from
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Fort Lyon, when we carne upon a herd of Indian horses, and I was sent forward with my battalion to capture stock. After proceeding about one mile we
came in sight of an Indian camp, some two miles further. I immediately sent
word to the colonel commanding that an·lndian camp was in sight, and proceeded with my command in 'the direction of the camp, ·which I reached just
before sunrise. I found Lieutenant Wilson, with a detachment of'lst Colorado
cavalry, upoil the right and south of the camp, and Lieutenant Dunn, with
a detachment of the ht Colorado cavalry, posted upon fthe west bank of
Sand creek, and opposite the camp, both commands keeping up a brisk fire
upon the camp. Upon my nearing the camp upon the west side I was attacked
by a small force of Indians posted behind the -bank of the creek, who commenced
firing upon me with arrows, and who had collected on the opposite sirle of camp.
Colonel Chivington coming up at this time with Colonel Shoup's regiment, 3d
Colorado cavalry, and two howitzers, charged through the camp, drivi~g the
Indians completely out of their camp and into the creek, in . holes or rifle-pite
dug in the sand. The fighting now became general. The Indians fought
desperately, ~pparently resolved to die upon that ground, but to injure us as
much as possible before being killed. We fought them for about six hours,
along the creek for five miles.
Th~ loss to my command was one killed ana three wounded. The loss to
the entire command, ten killed and forty wounded. Lieutenant Baldwin, comm&nding the section of howitzers, attached to my battalion, had a fine private
horse shot from under him. Seven horses were killed from my command. The
loss to the Indians wal! about three hundred killed, some six hundred ponies,
and one hundred and thirty lodges, with a large quantity of buffalo robes, and
their entire camp equipage.
The camp proved to be Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians, and numbered
about 1,100 persons, under the leadership of Black Kettle~ head chief of the
Cheyenne tribe. Black Kettle and three other chiefs were killed.
All the command fought well, and observed all orders given them. "'i;Ve
camped· upon the ground occupied by the Indians the day before, destroyed
the entire camp of the Indians, and then pushed rapidly in a southeasterly
direction, in 'pursuit of Little Raven's camp of Arapahoes, reported to be on the
Arkansas river.
r
I am, sir, with much respect, your obedient serv.ant,.
SCOTT J. ANTHONY,
Major First · Colorado Cavalry, Commanding Battalion;
A. A. A. General Colonel CHIVINGTON's
Brigade, Indian Expedition.

RPport

if Lieutenant . Kennedy.

HEADQUARTERS Co. C, FIRsT Co~oRADO CAVALRY,
Camp, South Bend if B1:g Sandy, November 30, 1864.
CoLONEL: I have the honor to make the following report of company C,
1st cavalry of Coiorado, on the expedition against the Cheyenne Indians, in
pursuance of special orders from headquarters, district of Colorado, No. 132, of
November 13, 1864.
I left camp Wheeler, Colorado Territory, on the 20th of November, 1864,
with forty-two men of company C, 1st cavalry of Colorado, en route for Fort
Lyon, Colorado Territory, a distance of two hundred and forty miles, at which
place I arrived on the 28th of November, 1864. I left Fort Lyon at eight (8)
o'clock p. m the same day, with thirty-five (35) tnen of C company, under
command of First Lieutenant Luther Wilson, commanding battalion 1st cavalry
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of Colorado, made a march of forty miles to South Bend of Big Sandy, Colorado
Territory, at which place I arrived a little after daybreak on the morning of
the 29th, where we came upon a large village of hostile Cheyenne Indians,
numbering from nine hundre9- to one thousand, which we immedjately a1jacked;
after which a general engagement ensued, which lasted until 3 o'clock if. m., jn
which the Indians were defeE!>ted and nearly annihilated; after which we returned to the Indian village, which we helped to destroy, and then went into
camp. .
'
I had one private, Oliver Pierson, mortally wounded, (who has since died;)
two privates, August lVIettze and John B. Calhoun, severely wounded; Sergeant
M. H. Linnell, saddler Elias South, and privates C. J. Ballou and William Boyls,
slightly wounded. And I would m9st respectfully acknowledge to the colonel
commanding the services rendered by my platoon commanders, sergeant J olm
C. Turner and M. H. Linnell, and recommend them for their bravery during
the entire engagement.
·'
l am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. J. KENNEDY,
Second Lieut. 1st Colorado Ca·valry, Commanding Co. C.
Colonel J. _M. CHIVING'PON,
Commanding Indian Expedition.

Report

if

Lieutenant Dunn.

HEADQUARTERS Co. E, FIRST CoLORADO CAVALRY,
Camp South Bend qf Big Sandy, C. T., Novemb.er 30, 1864.
CoLONEL : I have the honor to make the following report of company E, 1st
cavalry of Colorado, on an expedition against Indians.
On the 25th instant I left Camp Fillmore with my company, pursuant to
Special Order No. 3, headquarters, District of Colorado, dated in the field November 23, 18-64. I joined the column then in the field the same evening at
Spring Bottom, thirty miles distant. I continued the march the next day under
command of Lieutenant Wilson, commanding battalion of the 1st cavalry of
Colorado. We reached l!,ort Lyon, seventy miles further down the Arkansas,
on the 28th instant, about noon. About 7 o'clock the same evening I started
from that place with eighteen men of my company, taking three days' cooked
rations on our horses, and travelled in a northeasterly course. At daylight we
came in sight of a large village of hostile Indians, Cheyennes. and Arap~hoes,
numbering nine hundred or one thousand, nearly two miles north of us. We
immediately proceeded to the attack by moving down a small ravine and
making a charge on the village from the north side, taking the Indians completely by surprise. They rallied immediately and the engagement became
general, and lasted till afternoon, when they were utterly routed and half their
number left dead on the field.
,
We continued the pursuit till 3 o'clock p. m., when our horses being much
fatigued, and our ammunition nearly exhausted, we returned to the villagE>,
which we helped to destroy, and then went into camp f-or the night.
I lost no men killed, and but two wounded. Sergeant Jackson had his hip
broken, and private Mull was shot through the leg.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CLARK DUNN,
Second Lieut. 1st Golotado Cavalry, Commandi~g Co. E.
Colonel CHIVINGTO~,
First Colorado Cavalry.
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Editor:ial articles from tke Rocky JJ!fountain News, tke organ qf Governor
Eva/(ts, and edited by Mr. William N. Byers, P.M. at Denver.
.

•

'l'HE BATTLE OF SAND CREEK.

Among the brilliant feats of arms in Indian warfare, the recent campaign of
our Colorado volunteers will stand in history with few rivals, and none to
exceed it in finall~esults. we are not prepared to write its history, which can
only be done by some one who accompanied the expedition, but we have gathered from thos.e who participated in it, and from others who were in that part of
the country, some facts which will doubtless interest many of our readers,
The people of Colorado are well aware of the situation occupied by the third
regiment during the great snow-storm which set in the last of October. Their
rendezvous was in Bijou Basin, about eighty miles southeast of this city,, and
close up unaer the foot of the Divide. That point had been selected as the base
for an Indian campaign. Many of the companies reached it after the storm set
in ; marching for days through the driving, blinding clouds of snow and deep
drifts. Once there, they were exposed for weeks to an Arctic climate, surrounded
by a treeless plain covered three feet deep with snow. 'J.1heir animal~ suffered
for food and with cold, and the men fared but little better. They were insufficiently supplied with tents and blankets, and their sufferings were intense. At
the end of a month the snow had settled to the depth of two feet, and the command ..set out upon its long contemplated march. The rear guard left the Basin
on the 23d of November. 'J.1heir course was southeast, crossing the Divide and
thence heading for Fort Lyon. For one hundred miles the snow was quite
two feet in depth, and for the next hundred it ranged from six to .twelve inches.
Beyond that the ground was almost bare and the snow no long~r impeded their
m~~.
'
On the afternoon of the 28th the entire command reached Fort Lyon, a distance of two ltundr-ed and sixty miles, in less than six days, and so quietly and
expeditiously had the march been made that the command at the fort was ta~en
entirely by surprise. When the vanguard appeared in sight it waf;! reported
that a body of Indians were approaching, and precautions were taken for their
reception. No one upon the route was permitted to go in advance of the colu1nn,
and persons who it was SQ.spected would spread the news of the advance were
kept under surveillance until all danger from that source was past.
At Fort Lyon the force was strengthened by about two hundred and fifty men
of the first regiment, and at nine o'clock ~n -t he evening the command set out
for the Indian village. 'J.1he course was due north, and their guide was the
Polar star. As day l!ght dawned they came in sight of the Indian camp, after a
forced midnight march of forty-two miles, in eight hours, across the rough, unbroken plain. But little time was required for preparation. The forces had
been divided and arranged for battle on the march, and just as the sun rose
they dashed upon the enemy with yells that, would put a Comanche army to
blush. Although utterly surprised, the savages were not-unprepared, and for a
time their ·defence told terribly against our ranks. '~rheir main force rallied and
formed in line of battle on the bluffs beyond the creek, where they were protected by rudely constructed rifle-pits, from which they maintained a steady
fire until the shells from company C's (third regiment) howitzers began dropping among them, when they scattered and fought each for himself ~n genuine
Indian fashion. As the battle progressed the field of carnage ':idened: until it
extended over not less than twelve miles of territory. 'J.1he Indians who could,
escaped or secreted themselves, and by three o'clock in the afternoon the earnage
had ceased. It was estimated that between three and four hundred of the
savages got away with their lives. Of the balance there were neither wouned
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nor prisoners. Their strength at the beginning of the action was estimated at
nine hundred.
Their village consisted of one hundred and thirty Cheyenne and eight Arapahoe lodges. These, with their contents, were totally destroyed. ··Among
their effects were large supplies of flour, sugar, coffee, tea, &c.. Women's and
children's clothing were found; also books and many other articles which must
have been taken from captured trains or'bouses. One white man's scalp was
found which had evidently been taken but a few days before. The chiefs
fought with unparallele·d bravery, falling in front of their men. One of them
charged alone against a force of two or three hundred, and fell pierced with
balls far in advance of his braves.
Our attack was made by five battalions. The first regiment, Colonel Chivington, part of companies C, D, E, G, H and K, numbering altogether about
two hundred and fifty men, was divided into 'two battalions; the first under
command of Major Anthony, and the second under Lieutenant Wilson, until the
latter was disabled, when the command devolved upon Lieutenant Dunn. The
three battalions of the tJiird, Colonel Shoup, were led, respectively, by Lieutenant Colonel Bowen, Major Sayr, and Captain Cree. The action was begun by
the battalion of LieutenaRt Wilson, who occupied the right, and by a quick and
bold movement cut off the enemy from their herd of stock. }'rom this circumstance we gained our great advantage. A fe.w Indians secured horses, but the
great majority of them had to fight or fly on foot. Major Anthony was on the
left, and the third in the centre.
.,
Among the killed were aU the Cheyenne chie£~, l3lack Kettle, White Antelope, Little Robe, Left Hand, Knock Knee, One Eye, and another, name unknown. Not a single prominent man of the tribe remains, and the tribe ita elf
is almost annihilated. The Arapahoes probably suffered but little. It has
been reported that the chief Left Hand, of that tribe, was killed, but Colonel
Chivington is of the opinion that he was not. Among the stock captured were
a number of government horses and mules, including the twenty or thirty
stolen from the command of Lieutenant Chase at Jimmy's camp last summer.
'rhe Indian camp was well supplied with defensive works. ]'or half a mile
along the creek there was an almost continuous chain of rifle-pits, and another
similar line of works crowned th.e adjacent bluff. Pits had been dug at all the
salient points for miles. After the battle twenty-three dead Indians were taken
from one of these pits and twenty-seven from another.
Whether viewed as a march or as a battle, the exploit has few, if any, parallels. A march of 260 n1iles in but a fraction more than five days,_with deep
snow, scanty forage, and no road, is a remarkable feat, whilst the utter surprise
of a large Indian village is unprecedented. In no single battle in North
America, we believe, have so many Indians been slain.
It is said that a short time before the command reached the scene of battle
an old squaw partially alarmed the village by reporting that a great heard of
buffalo were coming. She heard the rumbling of the artillery and tramp of the
moving s-quadrons, but her people doubted. In a little time the doubt was dispelled, but not by buffaloes.
.
A thousand incidents of individual daring and the passing events of the day
might be told, but space forbids. We leave the task for eye-witnesses to
chronicle. All acquitted themselves well, and Colorado soldiers have again
covered themselves with glory.
, .
THE FOI.!T LYON A.FF AIR.

'l'he issue of yesterday's News, containing the following despatch, created
considerable of a sensation in this city, particularly among the Thirdsters and
others who participated in the recent campaign and the battle on Sand creek:
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"WASHINGTO~. December 20, 1864.
"The affair at Fort Lyon, Colorado, in which Colonel Chivington destroyed
a large Indian village, and all its inhabitants, is to be made the subject of congressional inv.estigation. Letters received from high officials in Colorado say
that the Indians ·were killed after surrendering, and that a large proportion of
them were women and children."

Indignation was loudly and unequivocally expressed, and some less ~onsid
erate of the boys were very persistent in their inq,uiries as to who those "high
officials" were, with a mild intimation that they had half a mind to ''go for
them." This talk about "friendly Indians" and a " .surrendered" village will
do to "tell to ma.rines," but to us out here it is all bosh.
The corifessed murderers of the Hungate family-a man and wife and their
two little babes, whose scalped and mutilated remains were .seen by all our
citizens-were "friendly Iudians," we suppose, in the eyes of these '•' high
officials." They fell in the Sand creek battle.
The confessed participants in a score of other murders of peaceful settlers
and inoffensive travellers upon our borders and along our roads in the past six
months must have been friendly, or else the "high officials'' wouldn't say so.
rrhe band of marauders in whose possession were found scares of horses and
mules stolen from government a'lld from individuals; wagon loads of flour,
coffee, sugar and tea, and rolls of broad cloth, calico, books, &c, robbed from
freighters and emigrants on the plains; underclothes of white women and
children, stripped from their murdered victims, were probably peaceably' disposed toward some of those " high officials," but the mass of our people "can't
see it."
Probably those scalps of white men, wotnen and children, one qf tlwm fresh,
not three days taken, found drying in their lodges, were taken in a friendly,
playful manner; or possibly those Indian saddle-blankets trimmed with the scalps
of white women, and with braids and fringes of their hair, were kept simply as
mementoes of their owners' high affection for the pale face. At any rate, these
delicate and tasteful ornaments could not have been taken from the heads of the
wives, sisters or daughters of these "high officials.''
That "surrendering" must have. been the happy thought of an exceedingly
vivid imagination, for we can hear of nothing of the kind from any of those who
were engaged in the battle. On the contrary, the savages fought like devils to
the end, and one of our pickets was killed and scalped by them the next day
after the battle, and a number of others ·were fired ·upon. In one instance a
party of the vidette pic~ets were compelled to beat a hasty retreat to save their
lives, full twenty-four hours after the battle closed. This does not look much
like the Indians had surrendered.
'
But we are not sure that an investigation may not be a good thing. It 8hould
go back of the "affair at Fort Lyon," as they are pleased to term it down east,
however, and let the world know who were making money by keeping those
Indians under the sheltering protection of Fort Lyon; learn who was interested
in systematically representing that the Indians were friendly and wanted peace.
It is unquestioned and undenied that the site of the Sand creek battle was the
rendezvous of the thieving and marauding bands of savages who roamed over
this country last summer and fall, and it is shrewdly suspected that somebody
was all the time making a very good thing out of it. By all means let there be
an investigation, but we advise the honorable congressional committee, who may
be appointed to conduct it, to get theh· scalps insured before they pass Plum
creek on their way out.
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Extract from the message qf Han. S. H. E1bert, act,i ng governor of' Colorado
Territory.
INDIAN WAR.

The before unbroken peace of our Territory has been disturbed, since the last
spring, by an Indian war. Allied and hostile tribes have attacked our frontier
settlements, driven in our s~ttlers, destroyed their homes, attacked, burned, and
plundered our freight and emigrant trains, and thus suspended 'a gricultural pursuits in portions of our country, and interrupted our trade and commerce with
the States. This has for the time seriously retarded the prosperity of our Territory.
At the commencement of the war the general government, taxed to the utmost
in subduing the rebellion, was unable to help us, and it bec.,ame necessary to
look to our own citizens for protection. They everywhere responded with patriotism and alacrity. Militia companies were organized in the frontier counties,
and secured local protection. Much credit is due to Captain Tyler's company
of militia for the important service they rendered in opening and protecting our
line of communication with the States.
In response to the call of the governor for a regiment of cavalry for hundredday service, over a thousand of our citizens-the large majority of them leaving
lucrative employment--rapidly volunteered, and in that short time, despite the
greatest difficulties in securing proper equipments, organized, armed, made a
long and severe campaign amid the snows and storms of winter, and visited upon
these merciless murderers of the plains a chastisement smiting· and deserved.
The gratitude of the country is due to the men who thus sacrificed so largely
their personal interests for the public good, and rendered such important service
to the Territory; and their work, if it can be followed up with a vigorous winter
campaign, would result in a permanent peace.
The necessity of such a campaign, and the imperative demand for immediate
and complete protection for our line of communication with the States, has been,
and is now being, earnestly urged on the government at Washington, and with
a prospect of success. These efforts should be seconded by your honorable
body with whatever influence there may be in resolution or memorial, setting
forth the facts and necessities of our situation.

PAPERS FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT.
WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFICE.

Waskington, March 28, 1865.
SIR : In reply to your letter of the 15th instant, ll!ddressed to the Secretary
of War, I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of the orders and reports
called for in relation to Indian affairs in the department of Kansas, when commanded by Major General Curtis.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
.
E. D. TOWNSEND,
·
'
Assistant Adjutant General.
Ron. D. W. GoocH,
Acting Chairman Committee on Conduct of the War.
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CoLORADo SuPERINTE~DENCY, _
Denver, C. T., June 16, 1864.
SIR : You will immediately make necessary arrangements for the feeding and
support of all the friendly Indians of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians at
:Fort Lyon, and direct the friendly Comanches and Kiowas, if any, td remaip. at
Fort Larned. You will make a requisition on the military commander of the
post for subsistence for the friendly Indians of his neighboxllQOd.
If no agent ~here to attend to this, deputize some .one to do it. These friendly
bands must be collected at places of rendezvous, and all intercourse between,them
and tribes or individuals engaged in warfare with us prohibited; this arrangement will tend to withdraw from the conflict all who are not thoroughly identified with the hostile movement, and, by affording a safe refuge, will gradually
collect those who may become tired of war and desire peace.
The war is opened in earnest, and upon your efforts to keep quiet the friendly,
as nucleus for peace, will depend its duration to some extent at least. Yon can
send word to all these to come as directed above, but do not allow the families
of those at war to be introduced into the camp. I have established a camp for
our northern friendly bands on Cache-la-Pondre, and as soon as my plan is· approved by the military I will issue a proclamation to the Indians; please spare
no effort to carry out this instruction, and keep me advised by every mail of
the situation.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN EVANS,
Governor and Ex- Officio Superintendent Indian Affa-irs.
Major S. G. CoLBY, Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory.

A true copy:
W. W. DENISON,
Second Lieutenant 1st Colorado Veteran Cavalry, and
Acting Regimental Adjutant.

U. S. MILITt\RY TELEGRAPH.
I

•

[By Telegraph f r o m - - - - - - - - - - , 186-.J

To--------.
George Evans to MaJor Colby, at ].,ort Lyon, instructing him to make arrangements for feeding friendly Indi:ms near Fort Lyon. General instructions
about collecting together all friendly Indians at places of rendezvous, as a measure to stop the war with the red skins. Thinks by affording refuge of this
kind that those at war now may become tired, and collect at those places, and
sue for peace, &c.
·
ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFICE, Marek-, 1865.
Official:

--------,
Assistant Adjutant General.

ExEcUTIVE DEPARTMENT, CoLORADO TERRITORY,
Dent•er, June 29, 1864.
DEAR SIR : I enclose a circular to the Indians of the plains. You will, by
every means you can, get the contents to all these Indians, as many that are
now hostile may come to the friendly camp, and when they all do, the war will

"
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be ended. Use the utmost economy in providing for those who come in, as the
Secretary of the Interior confines me to the amount of our appropriations, and
they may be exhausted before the summer is out.
You will arrange to carry out the plan of the circular at Lyon and Larned.
You will use your utmost vigilance to ascertain how many of your Indians
are hostile, where they are, and what plans they propose, and report to me by
every mail at least. For this purpose you will enlist the active aid of Mr. John
Smith aJ;lrt his son, and of such other parties as you may judge can be of essential service. Mr. C. A. Cook reports to me that Mr. Bent has given you important information in regard to the plans and strength of the hostile combinations
on the plains.
Please be careful and report to me in detail all the reliable information you
can get promptly, as above directed.
I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient se·r vant,
JNO. EVANS,
Governor Colorado Territory and Superintendent Indian Affairs.
Major S. G. CoLBY,
U. S. Indian Agent, Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory.

A true copy:

.

\

,
W. W. DENISON,
Second .Lieutenant, 1st Colorado Veteran Ca·v alry,
Acting Regimental Adjutant.

CoLoRADO SuPERINTENDENCY, INDIA~ AFFA£RS,
Denver, June 27, 1864.
To the frien.d ly ·Indians o/ tke plains :
,Agents, 'interpreters, and traders will inform the friendly Indians of the plains
that some members of their tribes have gone to war with the white people; they
steal stock and run it off, hoping io escape detection and punishment.
In some instances they have attacked and killed soldiers and mu;rdered
peaceable citizens. For this the Great Father is angry, and will certainly hunt
them out and punish them; but he does not want to injure those who remain
friendly to the whites. He desires to protect and take care of them. For this
purpose I direct that all friendly Indians keep aw~y from those who are at
war, and go to places of safety.
Friendly Arapahoes and Cheyennes belonging on the Arkansas river will go
to Major Colby, United States Indian agent, at Fort Lyon, who will give them
provisions, and show them a place of safety. Friendly Kiowas and Comanches
will go to J!"""~ort Larned, where they will be cared for in the same way.
Friendly Sioux will go to their agent at Fort Laramie for {iirections. Friendly
Arapahoes and Cheyennes of the Upper Platte will go to Camp Collins, on the
Cache·la-Poudre, where they will- be assigned a place of safety, and provisions
will be given them.
The object of this is to prevent friendly Indians from being killed through
mistake; none but those who intend to be friendly .with the whites must come
to these places. The .families of those who have gone to war with the whites
must be kept away from among the friendly Indians.

•
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.The war on hostile Indians will be continued until they are all effectually
subdued.

Governor

if Colorado and

JOHN EVANS,
Superintendent if l1;dian Ajjairs.

A true copy:

W. W. DENISON,
Second Lieutenant 1st Colorado Veteran Cavalry,
Aet~ng Regimental Adjutant.
AIJJUTANT GENERAL's 0FFIOE, Marek-, 1865.
Official:

----- - - - - - - ,

Assistant Adjutant General.

FoRT RILEY, July 23, 1864.
Major General H. W. HALLECK:
The Indian difficulties west of this point are serious, and I have come here to
rally a force oii the borders to repress the mischief. Th.e stages not coming
through, we have not definite intelligence. We only ~now that they have run
off our stock from Larned and Walnut creek, murdering some men. Small
parties of Indians have come within thirty miles of this place. I have ordered
the quartermaster to buy horses to mount dismoum.ted cavalry, and requested
militia colonels to call out Reven hundred militia to join me. In this way I
hope to raiRe a thousand men. I go on to Saline to-morrow. I think stealing
is the main object of the Indians.
S. R. CUR'riS, Major General.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Marek 18, 1865.
official:

. D. C. WAGER,A.A.G.

SALI:.VE, KANSAS, July 26, 1864, via Leaven'Wo'rtk.
General H. W. HALLECK:
The stage has just arrived from Laramie. 'rhe damage done by Indians
amounts to ten t~amsters killed, five wounded, two of them scalped, and the
stealing of about three hundred cattle. Our posts are safe.
S. R. UURTIS, Major General.
HEA!JQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Marek 18, 1865.
Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.
FoRT LEAVENWORTH, August 8, 186.4.
Major General HALLECK, Chiif if Staff:
I have returned from Upper Arka:nsas. At Larned afvided my force in all
directions, going myself with those scouting southward towards Red river.
Could not overtake Indians, but scared them away fro~ Santa l!'e route, where
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stages and trains ~ove regularly. Have made district of Upper Arkansas, assigning General Blunt to command. Have increased a:nd improved the organization of troops, giving stringent orders against allowing Indians inside of our
line. Discharged militia, and directed continual caution. The Kiowas, Comanches and Big Mouth Arapahoes are evidently determined to do all the mischief
they can. I hope no favor will be offered them by authorities at Washington
till they make ample remuneration for their outrages.
S. R. CURTIS,
Major General.
Official:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, Marc!?.. 18, 1865.
D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

FoRT LEAVENWORTH, August 10, 1864.
Major General HALLECK, Chiifof Staff:
Indians have attacked and kjlled inhabitants on Little .Blue, this side Fort
Kearney, on overland stage route. Stage just arrived at Atchison without passengers. I have requested governor to send militia after them, and telegraphed
commander of Kearney to come dow~ on them if he has force, but forces are
scarce in that region. Cannot some of Gen~ral Sully's command move to N ebraska 1
S. R. CURTIS,
.MaJor General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY, March 18, 1865.
Official:
D. C. yYAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. 0., August 13, 1864.
Major General CuRTIS, Fort Leavenworth:
The contractor of the overland mail line has represented through the Post
Office Department that more protection against Indians is required along the
line, and that two armed men should accompany each coach. He also asks
· that orders be given_to the military not to use the _grain, forage, and stores of
the line.
Please see that these requests are carried out as far as you are able.
H. W. HALLECK,
Major General and C'!iiifqf Staff.
HEADQUAR,TERS OF THE ARMY, March 18, 1865.
Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.
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FoRT LEAVENWORTH, .August 13, 1864,.
General HALLECK :
Your despatch just received, and telegraphed to General Curtis, at Omaha.
The following has just been received ftom General Mitchell, commanding district of Nebraska~ to General Curtis, Fort Leavenworth:
"Just heard from a company of militia sent up the Little Blue from Kearney.
They scoured the CQuntry for forty miles up and down the stream; found no
Indians. I have parties out in every direction from each post chasing Indians.
Everything will be done that I can do with my present force. I am raising
militia as fast as I can ; the governor has authorized the raising of twelve companies. I have received to-day - - toward one company in this vicihi~, Qf
staunch men.
"B. B. MITCHELL, Brigadier General."
C. S. CHARLOTTE,
Major, A. A. G., Department qf Kansas.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY,

March 18, 1865.

Official:
D. C. WAGER, A . .A. G.

OMAHA, .August 16, 1864.
.Major General H. W. HALLECK, Chiif qf Staff:
Yours of the 13th, concerning the furnishing of escorts for overland mail line
to defend it against Indians, will be complied with. I am here to look after
Indian troubles tpat are quite extensive on the line and against the border settlements. I have troops arriving on the Blue, where the mischief was greatest.
General Mitchell telegraphs from fort Kearney that he thinks that region is
threatened by a large force of Indians collecting on the Republican. I am
sending out militia in small parties to join forces which 1I have gathered below,
and will soon be upon them, be they many or few.
S. R. CURTIS, Major General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY,

March 18, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

OMAHA, August 18, 1864.
Major General H. W., HALLECK:
General Mitchell telegraphs from Fort Kearney that Captain Mussey encountered five hundred well-armed Indians on Elk creek, near Republican; had a
fight; killed ten Indians, and lost two soldiers ; drove India:t;J.S ten miles, but
had to fall back, pursued by Indians, thirty miles.
S. R. CURTIS, Major General.

H~ADQUARTERS ARMY,

March 18, 1865.

Official
D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.
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DENYER, August 18, 1864.
Hon. Enwi~ M. STANTON, Secretm·y qf 1Var:
Extensive Indian depredations, with murder of families, occurred yesterday
thirty miles south of D~nver. Our lines of communication are cut, and our
crops, om· sole dependence, are all in exposed localitie;:;, and cannot be gathered
by our scattered population. Luge bodies of Indian::; are undoubtedly near to
Denver, and we are in danger of destruction both from attack of Indians and
starvation. I earne~tly request th<tt Colonel Ford'i! regiment of 2d Colorado
volunteers be immediately sent to our relief. It is impo:3sible to exaggerate our
danger. We are doing all we can for our defence.
JNO. EVANS, Governor.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY,

Mard 18, 1865.

Official:

D. C. \V AGER, A. A. G.

DENVER, August 22, 1864.
Secretary of TVar:
No government saddles withiu seven hundred miles from here; no government horses to mount hundred-days regiment of cavalry, nearly full. Unlimited information of contemplated attack by a large body of Indians, in a few
days, along the entire line of our settlements. Order Captain Mullin, quartermaster here, to purchase hor~es, and Lieutenant Hawley, district ordnance
officer, to pun:hase hor;:;e equipments. Necessity imperative.
JNO. EVANS,
Governor qf Colo'rado Territory.

E. M.

STANTON,

'l'his application should be granted at once.

J. M:. CHIVIXG'rON,
Colonel Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY,

Marcl1, 18, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQLTARTERS OP THg ARMY,

TVasllingtnn, D. C., August 2B, 1864.
Governor JOHN EvANS, Denver, Colorado Te'r ritory:
'l'he Secretary of War directs me to say that a recent law requires aJl cavalry horses to be purchHsed under directions of Colonel Ekin, of the q uartermp,~
tcr's department. If there is such a pressing necessity that purchases cannot
be made in time, the military authorities can resort to impressment. General
Curtis is the proper judge of such necessity in his department.
H. W. HALLECK,
Major General, CMif qf Staff.
H.EAUQVARTERS ARMY,

Ma,rcA 18, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.
Part
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DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS,

Fort ]{earney, August 28, 1864.
Major GE>neral HALLECK, Chief of Staff:
Indian)'! in small bands continue to commit depredations, but seem more cautious moving westward. Have effectually scoured the country east of 99th
mPridian. Indians going west of settlements. Overland mail agents l1ave
withdrawn stock and gone east. I think they can run through with such escorts as I can furnish. Militia very tardy in coming forward, many tuming
back before reaching this point.
Some fifty murders have been committed by Indians on this Hne,_and considerable private stock stolen, but government has lost but little.
S. R. CURTIS, Major General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY, Marclt 18, 1865.
Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
1Vash£ngton, 1). C., September 3, 1864.
Major General CuRTIS, Fort Kearney:
The civil officers of Montaua have asked for military escort to that Territory.
The Secretary of War authorizes you to give such escort, if, in your opinion,
you can spare troops for that purpose; but, first of all, the overland mail route
and the frontier posts require protection from the Indians.
'I' he Secretary of War authorizes you to raise hundred-days men inN ebraska,
without bounties.
H. W. HALLECK,
jlfajor Genc/ral, Chief of Stoff.
HEADUUARTERS ARMY, Marek 18, 1865.
Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.
DENVER,

Sfptember 7, 1864.

Ron. EDWIN 1\L STANTON, Secretary of War:
:Pray give positive orders for our second Colorado cavalry to come out.
Have notice published that they will come in detachments to escort trains up
the Platte on certain days. Unless escorts are sent thus we will inevitably have
a famine in addition to this gigantic Indian war. Flour is forty-five dollars a
barrel, and the supply growing scarce, with none on the way. 'l'hrough spies
we got knowledge of the plan of about one thousand warriors in camp to strike
our frontier settlements, in small bands, simultaneously in the night, for an extent of 300 miles. It was frustrated at the time, but we have to fear another
such attempt soon. 11 ray give the order for our troops to come, as requested, at
once, as it will be too late tor trains to come this season.
JOHN EVANS, Governor.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY,

Marc!~

18, 1865.

Official :

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.
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CAMP oF SoLoMoN's RIVER,
Via Lawrence, Kansas, September 16, 1864.
Major General HALLECK, Cldef qf Stoff:
I struck this river near 100th parallel ; sent scouts south to head of Saline,
find ing no large body of Indians. Divided command ; sent large portion up
valley, to strike Ofallon's bluff; with remaiude\·, two hundred and eighty-five,
came down, scouring the country on all sides. Buffalo plenty. Indians only
in small parties, escaping sou1h. Shall reach settlements on Smoky Hill river
to-morrow. No signs of great concentration of Indians. Bands of hunters
steal and scalp, but can be routed by small armed force. Stage stations, ranches,
and settlements must have enclosures for themselves and stock, and a few troops,
carefully distributed, can protect settlements and lines of commerce.
S. R. CURTIS, Major Gene1·al.
liEADQVARTERS ARMY, Marclt 18, 1865.
Official:
D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DF.PARTMENT OF KANSAS,
Fo1·t Leavenworth, September 19, 1864.
I am in receipt of a copy of letters from the honorable Secretary of the
Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs, with your indorsement to take
such action a.s I may "deem best." It is stated that I have ordered the Indians not to make their usual hunt. This is erroneous. I may have suggested
that it would be dangerous for our friendly Indiaus to go, but I have desired
the Pawnees to follow and opl'rate when I had driven away the hostile bands.
Yet I see great difficulty in discriminations, and alsu fear that some bands of
our friendly Indians might mingle with foes if they come in proximity. If the
friendly Indians could be united for the purpose of huuting and fighting with
our troops, it would be easy to organize and so equip them as to avoid difficulty.
In my recent reconnaissance I took ~bout seventy-five Pawnees with me as
scouts, and, to avoid mistakes, dressed them with a blowse and hats. It gave
them a distinctive and graphic appearance, which could not be mistaken. Any
other than an associate arrangement seems almost impossible.
I appreciate the importance of allowing or aiding the fl'iendly Indians to hunt
buffalo; but any general movement Ly them would lead to confusion and difficulty, not ouly with my troops, but with the border settlements; for the people,
being terribly alarmed, would make very little difference in their resentment
and raids.
I will do all I can to favor the frienuly Indians in any rational arrangement
to hunt the buffalo, and believe, with the honorable Secretary, that, properly
associated with the troops, they would strengthen our efforts to suppress the
hostile tribes.
I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,
S. R. CURTIS,
Major General.
Major General H. W. HALLECK, Clziif of Staff, Wasl~ington.
HEADQUAUTERS ARMY, JYiarch 18, 1865.
Official copy :
~C. KELTO~A.~G.
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DENVER, September 19, 1864.
Hon. E. M. STANTON, Eer:retm·y rif War:
Train with ordnance and ordnance stores en route to New Mexico, with mules,
stolen by Indians at Fort Lyon, Colorado. We need such stores for 3d regiment Colorado volunteers, cavalry, one hundred-day men, now full. Authorize
me by telegraph to take them. •wm not be used, if reach New Mexico, before
next year. Indian wardors congregated eighty miles from Lyon, three thousand
strong.
J. M. CIDVINGTON,
Colonel Commanding, District Colorado.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY,

ltiarch 18, 1865.

Official:
D. C. W A_GER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

Washington, D. C., September 20, 1864.
Colonel CHIVINGTON, Denver City:
The cl1if'f of ordnance objects to the diversion of the train sent to New
Mexico. You must make requisition for your wants in the usual way.
H. W. HALLECK,
Major General, Chiif of Staff.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY,

Mm·ch 18, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.
I

•

DENVER CITY, September 22, 1864.
Major General HALLECK, CMif rif Staff:
Have regjment 100 days men ready for field. Train on the way from Fort
Leavenworth, but cannot get here in time because of the Indian troubles on the
Platte route. Are four hundred miles back, and laid up. The time of this
regiment will expire and Indians will still hold road. '!'his is no ordinary case.
J. M. CHlVINGTON,
Colonel Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY,

March 18, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.
HEADQUARTERS OF TI-)B ARMY,

Washington, D. C., September 23, 1864.
Colonel CHinNGTON, Dern·er City:
You will communicate~ your wants to your superior officer, General Curti-s,
at .Fo1 t Leavenworth.
,.
H. W. HALLECK,
11-Iajor GeneTal, Chief of Staff.

.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY,

March 18, 1865.

Official: ·
D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.
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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., Scptembe1· 24, 1864.
Major General CGRTIS, Fort Leavenworth:
General Rosecrans has been directed to give you the regiment of Colorado
-cavalry at or near Kansas city. All your available forces, not required against
wei'tern Indians, should be thrown south on the ].,ort Scott rpute. Large reenforcements have been sent to the Arkansas river to cut off the enemy's retreat.
H. W. HALLECK,
Niajor General, Cltiif rtf Staff.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY, March 18, 1865.
Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

FoRT LEAVENWORTH, September 26, 1864.
Major General HA!.LECK:
Despatch received. Had already begun moving troops and supporting my
southeast. But a full regiment of hundred-days men and part of the 1st
Colorado going out this week. My main dependence must be in militia. If
Price's forces come westward th,e m.litia are notified to be ready.
S. R. CURTIS, 1Vlnjm· GeneTal.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY, Marclt 18, 1865.
Official:
D. C. WAGER, ·A. A. G.

FoRT LEAVENWORTH, Octobe1· 7, 1864 .
.Major General HALLECK, Clliif rtf Staff:
General Blunt came upon a party of Arapahoes ancl other hostile Indians,
supposed to be four thousand, with fifteen hundred warriors, on the twenty-fifth
ultimo. This was about one hundred miles west of Larnfd, in Pawnee fork.
The Indians overpowered the advance, but the main force coming up routed
and pursued them.. Ninety-one dead Indians were left, and we lost two killed
and seven wounded. General Blunt's force was less than five hundred. He
pursued for .s everal days.
S. R. CURTIS, Major General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY,

Marc!~

18, 1865.

Official ·:
D. C. vVAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., October 16, 1864 .
.Brigadier General GoNNRR, S'alt Lake City:
Give all the ;protection in your power to the overland route between you and
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Fort Kearney, without regard to department lines. General Curtis's forces have
been diverted by rebel raids from Arkansas.
H. W. HALLECK,
Major General, Ckiif of Staff.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY, Marek 18, 1865.
Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, Fort Lyon, C. T., November 6, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to report that I arrived at this post and assumed
command November 2, in obedience to Special Orders No. 4, headquarters of
'district, October 17, 1864. Major E. W. Wynkoop, 1st cavalry of Colorado,
was in command of the post. One hundred and thirteen lodges of Arapahoe
Indians, under their chiefd Little Raven, Left Hand, Nervah, Storms, and
Knock Knee, and numbering, in men, women and children, 652 persons, were
encamped in a body about two miles from the post, and were daHy visiting the
post, and receiving supplies from the commissary department, the supplies being
issued by Lieutenant C. M. Copett, assistant commissary of supplies, under
orders from Major E. W. Wynkoop, commanding post.
I immediately gave instructions to arrest all Indians coming within the post,
until I could learn something more about them. Went down and met their head
chiefs, half way between the post and their camp, and demanded of them by
what authority and for what purpose they were encamped here. They replied
that they had always been on peaceable terms with the whites, had never desired any other than peace, and could not be induced to fight. That other
tribes were at war, and, therefore, they had come into the vicinity of a post, in
order to show that they desired peace, and to be where the travelling public
would not be frightened by them, or the Indians be harmed by travellers or
soldiers on the road.
I informed them that I could not permit any body of armed men to camp in
the vicinity of the post, nor Indians visit the post, except as prisoners of war.
They replied thft they had but very few arms and but few horses, but were
here to accept any terms that I proposed. I then told them that I should demand their arms and all the stock they had in their possession which had ever
belonged to white men; they at once accepted these terms. I then proceeded
with a company of cavalry to the vicinity of their camp, leaving my men secreted, and crossed to their camp, received their arms from them, and sent out
men to look through their herd for United States or citizens' stock, and to take
all stock except Indian ponies; found ten mules and four horses, which have
been turned over to the acting· assistant quartermaster. Their arms arG in very
poor condition, and but few, with little ammunition. Their horses far below
the averag·e grade of Indian horses. In fact, these that are here could make
but a feeble fight if they desired war. I have permitted them to remain enC:"imped near the post, unarmed, as prisoners, until your wishes can be h·eard in
the matter; in the interval, if I can learn that any of their warriors have been
enJaged in any depredations that have been committed, shall arrest them, and
place all such in close confinement.
I am of opinion that the warriors of the Arapahoes, who have been engaged
in war, are all now on the Smoky Hill, or with the Sioux Indians, and have all
tlie serviceable arms and horses belonging to the tribe, ;while these here are too
poor to fight, even though they desired war.
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Nine Cheyenne Indians to-day sent in, wishing to see me. r:rhey state that
600 of that tribe are now 35 miles north of here, coming towards the post, and
2,000 about 75 miles away, waiting for better weather to enable them to come
in. I shall not permit them to come in, even as prisoners, for the reason that if
I do, I shall have to subsist them upon a prisoner's rations. I shall, however,
demand their arms, all stolen stock, and the perpetrators of all depredations. I
ttm of the opinion that they will not accept this proposition, but that they will
return to the Smoky Hill. They pretend that they want peace, and I think
they do now, as they cannot fight during the winter, except where a small band
of them can find an unprotected train or frontier settlement. I do not think it
is policy to make peace with them now, until all perpetrators of depredations
are surrendered up to be dealt with as we may propose.
'rhe force effective for the field at the post is only about 100, and one com~
pany, (K, New Mexico volunteers,) sent here by order of General Carlton, commanding department of New Mexico, were sent with orders to remain sixty
days, and then report back to Fort Union. Their sixty days will expire on
the 10th of November (instant.) Shall I keep them here for a longer period, or
permit them to return?
The Kiowas and Comanches, who have all the ~tock stolen upon the Arkansas route, are reported south of the Arkansas river and toirards the Red river.
The Cheyennes are between here and the Smoky Hill; part of the Arapahoes
are near this post ; the remainder north of the Platte. With the bands divided in
this way, one thousand cavalry could now overtake them and punish some of
them severely, I think, but with the force here it can only be made available to
protect the fort. I shall not permit the Cheyennes to camp here, but will permit the Arapahoes now here to remain in their present camp as prisoners until
your action is had in the matter.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
SCOTT I. ANTHONY,
Major 1st Cavalry of Uolorado, Commanding Post.
To
,
A. A. A. G. District of Upper Arkan:.sas, Fort Riley, Kansas.

llndorsed.]
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF UPPER ARKANSAS,

Fort Riley, November 22, 1864.
Respectfully forwarded for the information of the g~neral commanding, respectfully asking for instruction in regard to the Arapahoe Indians kept and
fed as prisoners at ]Tort Lyon. Major Anthony has been instructed to carry out
general field order No. 2, July 31, 1864, fully, until further instn1ctions from
department headquarter:'!. I would also state that I have learned, 'unofficially,
that on Saturday, the 12th instant, two white men ·were killed and five wagons
destroyed near Fort Larned by a party of Indians numbering about thirty.
Have written to commanding officer at Fort Larned in reference to it, and instructed him to report all cases of Indian depredations that may come to his
knowledge.
B. I. HENNING,
JYiajor 3d fVisconsin Cavalry, Commanding District.
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FoRT LEAVENWORTH, Der:embe'r 1, 1864.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,,.. C/u"if qf Staff:
I am informed by telegraph from Neosho crossing, abont one ht~ndrcd and
twenty miles below Fort Scott, that th'e train carrying supplies to Fort Gibson
is halted because of a large rebel force in front. This is beyond my department lines, and I am unable to do much, but have ordered a regiment of my
troops under Colonel Moonlight to support the escort commanded by Major
Phillips in going forward or back as circumstances seem to require. Indian
troubles now demand all my force, and large numbers are crowding into Fort
Lyon as prisoners of war, while others in small bands are attacking stages and
trains. Under these circumstances, I cannot furnish escorts to carry provisions
for Indians and troops beyond my department lines; and your attention is called
to the necessity of furnishing General Steele with forces sufficient and in position to guard the lines to Fort Gibson and Ji'ort Scott, or have the troops · and
Indians now there to fall back where they get provisions.
S. R. CUR TIS, Major General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY, Marc!~

18, 1865.

Official:

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

1:!-,oRT LEAVENWORTH, December 8, 1864.
Major General H. W. HALLECK, Ckiif qf Sta.ff;
Colonel Chivington, after a march of three hundred miles in ten days, on the
29th returned. He came upon a Cheyenne camp of one hundred and thirty
lodges at the south bend of Big Sandy, Cheyenne county, Colorado. He attacked at day light, killing over fonr hundred Indians and capturing the same
number of ponies. Among the killed are chiefs Black Kettle, White Antelope,
and Little Robe. Our loss is nine killed and thirty-eight wounded. Our· troops
encountered snow two feet deep. ·
S. R. GURTIS,
Major General, Commanding.

,

HEADQUARTERS ARMY,

Official:

Mm·ck 18, 1865.

D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS,

Fort Lea·venwortlt, December 30, 1864~
Several papers have been referred to me concerning irregularities charged on
General Blunt and others before I came in this command, and entirely outside.
Yet, as some of the parties are in my command, I may do something if I can
get men disconnected with Kansas affairs and worthy of credence. 'l'here is so
much political and personal strife in our service, it is almost impossible to get
an honest, impartial determination of facts.
A t:~hift of troops, so as to put officers and men out of their own home localities,
wou~d greatly improve my command, and I wish especially that some of my
Kansas regimenttl may be sent to the front and troops of other States sent to me.
I have ordered the 11th Kansas to Colorado, far enough from their homes, but
the 15th and 16th Kansas might well be changed.
'l,he 1st Colorado, the 3d Colorado, and many companies of other regiments,
.have to be mustered out under the provisions of Circular No. 36.
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I am also informed that Fort Smith and Fayetteville, in the department of
Arkansas, are being evacuated. :Fort Gibson, in the same department, is garrisoned with dismounted Indian troops, so that my southern border is more exposed than formerly.
The Indians on the plains continue to act in bands of fifty or one hundred at
various points, and I desire to make new efforts to crush them during the latter
part of winter. Under these circumstances, I feel it my duty to urge the sending
of more troops of other States to aid in keeping open the overland lines, escort
trains, put down the Inilians, and strengthen the defences which overlook the
enemy's approaches from Texas.
I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,
S. R. CURTIS, Majm· General.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
Chiif of Staff, Washington, D. C.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY, March 18, 1865.
Official copy:
J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Waslu"ngton, D. C., January 3, 1865.
GENERAL: Your communications proposing a winter's campaign against the
Indians, and asking for more troops, were sent to General Grant immediately
on their receipt. lf he has acted on the matter, his orders have gone directly
to you, as nothing on the subject has been received here.
I write this to inform you that the matter was duly attended to by me.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,
Major General, CMif t:f Stoff.
Major General CuRTis,
Fort Leavenwortl~, Kansas.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY, March 18, 1865.
Official copy :
J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

[Dated Denver, Ja.nuary 8, 1865 .-Received January

~.

3 p. m]

J. B. CHAFFEE, 45 Wilham:
Urge the government to send troops on Platte route. Indians burning trains
and slaying emigrants.
GEO. E. CLARK,
CHAS. A. COOK.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY, March 18, 1865.
Official copy:
J. C. KELTON,A.A.Q

NEw YoRK, January 10, 1865.
DEAR JuDGE: I received the enclosed despatch this a.m. You cannot be
too urgent with the Secretary of War, or the President, about our Indian troubles.
Unless something is done to settle this trouble, we are virtually killed as a
Territory. You can hardly realize, without seeing it, the large amount of machinery en route for our Territory to work the mines with. Everything in the
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way of supplies is exorbitantly high, all on account of the hazard Df transportation. Emigration is limited on account of the danger of tl·ave~. It is peculiarly disastrous to us now because so many eastern capitalists have been and
are investing ·in our mines, and are preparing to open and develop them.
I am inclined to the opinion that our administration, both civil and military,
l1ave failed to comprehend the situta,tion. I mean Evans and Ohivington. I
think this whole difHculty could have been arrested; but this is nothing to the
case now. 'rhis must be attended to immediately, or our prospects are blasted
for some time to come, and the development of a 1·ich mining country indefinitely
postponed. For Gqd's sake, urge some action. I can't come over just now, or
I would give you my views regarding what action ought to be taken ; but
anything, so that some steps are taken to protect the line of travel.
There is no use to depend on General Curtis, Evans, Chivington, or any other
politician.
Yours of the 9th received this morning.
'rruly, &c.,
J. B. CHAFFEE.
HEADQUARTI!:RS ARMY, Marcl~

18, 1865.

Official copy:
J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.

Hl!:ADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

Wasl~ington, D. C., Janua1·y 11, 1865.
Major General CuRTIS, Fort Leavenwortl~:
Statements from respectable sources have been received here that the conduct
of Colonel Chivington's command towards the friendly Indians has been a 'series
of outrages calculated to make them all hostile. You will inquire into and report on th~s matter, and will take measures to have preserved and accounted for
all plunder taken from the Indians at Fort Lyons and other places.
H. W. HALLECK,
JJ;Iajor General, Chief if Staff.
HHADQUARTERS ARMY,

March 18, l86b.

· Official:
D. C. WAGER, A. A. G.

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 11, 1865.
Judge Bennet, delegate from Colorado Territory, presents a letter and telegram from J. B. Chaffee relative to the Indian depredations on the mail route to
Colorado, and the general unsettled condition of the country, owing to the active
hostility of the Indians, incited mainly by the recent attack of Colonel Ohivington at Fort Lyons. The attention of the government is called to the immediate
necessity of sending additional troops to that region to protect the route.
Respectfully referred to General Halleck.
By order of the Secretary of War.
JAS. A. HARDIE,
Colonel and Inspector General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY,

Marek 18, 1865.

·Official copy :
J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.
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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS,
Fort Leavemoorth, January 12, 1865.
GENERAL: Your despatch of yesterday, directing me to investigate Colonel
Chivington's conduct towards the Indians, is received, and will be obeyed.
Colonel Chivington has been relieved by Colonel Moonlight, and is })robably out
of the service, undel' provisions of Circular No. 36, War Department.
Although the colonel may have transgreBsed my field orders concerning Indian
warfare, (a copy of which is here enclosed,) and otherwise acted very much
against my views of propriety in his assault at Sand creek, still it is not true,
as Indian agents and Indian traders are representing, that such extra severity
is increasing Indian war. On the contrary, it tends to reduce their numbers, and
bring them to terms. Their bands are more united, perhaps, at this time than
during the summer, but this results from their necessities and surroundings.
They are in a destitute condition, and must, at this s~ason of the year, resort to
desperate measures to procure horses and provisions ; hence we see a continual
effort to overpower our little posts, or our trains and stages. Their lodges are
now between the Arkansas and Platte, and they shift their assaults so as to
attack to the best advantage. I am collecting and arranging troops near Fort
Riley, but need more force to make another effort to destroy them. I will be
glad to save the few honest and kindly disposed, and protest against the slaughter
of women and children ; although, since General Harney's attack of the Sioux
many years ago at Ash Hollow, the popular cry of settlers and soldiers on the
frontier favors an indiocriminate slaughter, which is very difficult to restrain. I
abhor this style, but so it goes from Minnesota to Texas. I fear that Colonel
Chivington's assault at Sand creek was upon Indians wbo had received some
encouragement to camp in that vicinity under . some erroneous supposition of the
commanding officer at Lyon that he could make a sort of " city of refuge" at
such a point. However wrong that may have been, it should haYe been respected,
and any Yiolat.ion of known arrangements of that sort should be severely rebuked.
But there is no doubt a portion of the tribe assembled were occupied in making
assaults on our stages and trains, and the tribes well know that we have to hold
the whole community responsible for acts they could restrain, if they would
properly exert their efforts in that way. It is almost impossible to properly try
officers in my command, if they have . a high rank, my troops all being widely
scattered and much employed.
I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
S. R. CURTIS, ~fajor G:encraJ~
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, ~fa·rch 18? 186fJ.
Official copy :

- - - , A. A. G.

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS No. 1.
[Extract.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS,
In the Field, Fort Ellsworth, July 27, 1864-.

*

*

*

*

*

II. Hunters will be detailed for kil1ing game, but the troops must not scatter
and break down stock to chase buffalo. Indians at war with us will be,the
object of our pursuit and distinction, but women and chlldren must be spared ..
All horses, ponies, and property taken will be placed in charge of Quartermas-
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ter P. C. Taylor, who will have it properly collected. or sent bnck to safe place
for future disposition; this is necessary to prevent the accumulation of useless
baggage.

*

*

*

By OJ;der of Major General Curtis.

*

*

*

*

JOHN WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant Genn·al.
Official copy :

Official copy :

JOHN

WILLIAMS~

A. G. A.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Wasl~ington, Marek 18, 1865.
- - - - , A . A. G.
GENERAL FIELD ORDERS No. 2 .

. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTM~NT OF KANSAS,
In the Field, Fort La·rned, July 31, 1864.
I. At all military posts or stations west of the Kansas and Nebraska settlements in this department, stockades or abatis enclosures must be made for the •
troops and stock, and animals must be kept in such enclosures at night, and
. never herded during the day without distant and careful pickets, who can give
warning of approaching enemies in time to preserve the stock from surprise.
II. Indians and their allies or associates will not be allowed within the forts
·€X~ept blindfolded, and then they must be kept totally ignorant of the character
and number of our forces. Neglect of this concealment w11l be followed by
.t he most severe and summary punishment.
Commanders of forts and stations will furnish escorts according to their
best judgments, keeping in view the safety of their own posts, the stage or
public property to be guarded, and the preservation of the horses.
'.rhese precautions must not be relaxed without permission of the commander
·<>f the department, and all officers, of whatever grade, will report promptly to
the nearest and most available assistance, and to district and department headquarters, any patent neglect of this order, or any palpable danger to a command.
11 he industry and skill displayed by Lieutenant Ellsworth, and the troops
.under his command, in the erection of a blockhouse and other protection for
hiE~ troops and animals at Smoky Hill crossing, deserve special commendation,
while the negligence exhibited elsewhere, especially at this post, while under
·its former commander, is deprecated and denounced.
By command of Major General S. R. Curtis.
JOHN WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant General.
Official:
JOHN WILLIAMS, A A. G.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
TVaskington, Marek 18, 1865.
Official copy:

- - - - - - , A. A. G.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS,
Fort Leavenworth, January 30, 1865.
GovERN,OR : Yours of the 20th is just received, and I telegraph the latest
news. I was provoked at the course taken by the commanding officer at
.Julesburg, who took his entire force to escort prisoners through) leaving that
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post for a few days entirely vacated. I have telegraphed a pr0per rebuke, and
trust this will not again occur. None of my military stations have been distm·bed. 1'hey are all intact, and generally too strong to be taken by a::;sault.
All we need L three or four regiments, which it seems to me will be sufficient.
Most of these I would keep moving in the country infested by foes. I fear
your Interior Department will make me trouble, by p10posing military evolutions
wl!ich conflict with my own. After traversing most of the plains last summer,
up the Arkansas, up the Platte, and near the head of every stream between
these rivers, my personal knowledge, coupled with that obtained from my
officers, is abundant to enable me to understand the matter, and I am only desirous of doiug what I consider necessary to make a fiuish, as near as may be,
of these troubles. But I cannot carry on war on otl~r people's plans. I want
no fancy movements, 8uch as occurred last summer, when one of your militia
companies marched down the line, passing my troops, and claiming to have
"opened the overland route," as though others had not been over most of the
places on the Blue, and on Plum creek and elsewhere, where most of the losses
had transpired. This move of Chivington against the bands that had been
congregated on Sand creek, at the instance of Major Wynkoop, was abo an
inspiration of over-zeal which did not emanate from my headquarters. I name
these things, governor, to secure unity of action, not to find fault.
On every occasion last summer I took the field promptly, and, although I
did not get to Denver, I was at the slaughter-ground near Larned on the
Arkansas, and on the Plum and Blue on the Platte, making overland journeys
between, with active~ efficient forces extending over two thousand miles; so
that my zeal and energy cannot be doubted. I protest my desire to pursue
and punish the enemy everywhere, in his lodges especially; lmt I do not believe in killing women and children who can be taken, and, if need be, camped
ea::;t of the Mississippi, where they can be kept and cared for. I always did
and do consider the Ash Hollow massacre a monstrous outrage, but the promotion and laudation that followed that transaction should excuse the iudiscretion and cruelty of excited and outraged frontier soldiers, who have always heard
Ash Hollow warfare extolled as the very brilliant point of glot ious Indian wa1 fare.
In my first movement last summer, when in pursuit of the ] ndians, I tried
to restrain this plan of warfare, by issuing an order against the massacre of
women and children, believing that taking such captive and bringing them
away would ju::lt as effectually mortify and annoy the Indian robbers and warriors. Let me say, too, that I see nothing new in all this Indian movement
sir{ce the Chivington affair, except that Indians are more frightened and keep
further away. By pushing them hard this next month, before grass Tecruits
their ponies, they will be better satisfied with making war and robbery a Lusiness. I would send into 1heir lines some fi-iendly, reliable Arapahoes and
Cheyennes, and separate tJ ibes, so as to save such as may be willing to make
peace and fight the bad Indians.
Such are my views. I am not anxious to have the job of operating matters;
but while I have command, I want unity of action, or no cross or counter currents. I have written this, because I see by telegraph that matters are spoken
of as being organized at Washington, where I fear less is known of details.
I am, governor, yours truly,
S. R. CURTIS, Major General.
His Excellency Governor J NO. EVANS, 1Vashington, D C.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

"'

Wasllington, Marclz, 18, 186b.

Official copy:

-. - - - - , A. A.. G.
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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS,

Fort Leat'enwor th, January 30, 1865.
Governor Evans writes me, that he fears Ohivington's conduct
at Sand creek may embarrass military matters on the plains. I have written
him. fully, and enclose you a copy of my letter.
rl'here is no new feature in these Indian troubles, except that Indians seem
more frightened. More forces and more prudence will keep the lines open and
subdue the hostile tribes. Some accounts of great combinations go the rounds;
but I put no confidence in such stories.
The Indians of the plains are generally robbers and murderers, and act only
from motives of hunger "-nd avarice in their assaults, and by fear in their forbearance.
Settlements have mcreased, and ou~· lines of communication have become
more convenient for their assaults, till they become more troublesome and venturesome. 1'he carelessness of emigration invited their assaults. It is folly to
attribute the Indian troubles to the wrongs committed by white men. While
we may condemn these, it is really more indulgence than cruelty that endured
and continues their warfare. 1,hey have no great armies; they are not combined ; their action is in separate bands of separate tribes. A thousand men
with light artillery can whip their greatest possible combinations; but it is desirable to have three or four more regiments, so that a movable force of say
two thousand can take a shifting attitude, going to a central point and throwing out detachments as circumstances seem to require. Such a force must follow the buffalo, as the Indians do, and must not go beyond reasonable proximity to the lines of travel, but remain near enough to the little posts that guard
the travel and trains that follow the routes up the Platte and up the Arkansas.
I send you a map of the overland route to the mountains with stations marked.
I have required our troops to erect defences againet Iudian assaults, and a few
men can in this way hold position, and a few more accompany the stage or
train to adjacent stations. Such forts cost nothing of conse·_iuence, and have
already saved men and stores in several instances.
Forces are necessary on these lines and in the edge of settlements; but a
movable force generally stationed between the Platte and Arkansas, as I have
suggested, and nearest the eastern settlements where it can be moBt economically supplied, will, in my judgment, be the proper organization for the country. I have in a former Jetter expressed my purpose to do all I can to continue the campaign duriug the winter.
I specially urge the extension of the telegraph at least to Riley. 1 1 he advantage will, in my judgment, .greatly exceed the cost. I need connexion with
the lndian and buffalo range, so I can direct matters on the .Platte to correspond with intelligence arriving from the Santa Fe route. Our telegraph company can extend the line with only a cost of about ten thousand dollars; but
it is proper to say my request last season was disapproved by the honorable
the Secretary of vV ar, and this is a renewal of the request.
I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,
'
S. R. OUR1,IS,
Major General.
.Major General H. W. HALLECK,
Cltief of Staff; rVasl~ington, D. C.
GENERAL:

P. S.-Februa·r y 2.-I delayed this for the map, which does not satisfy me,
and will be delayed a few days for revision. I have ordered all possible force
to Julesburg, wberc Indian difficulties continue. I have information, also, that
a council of the chiefs have determined to try to draw off troops from the Ar-
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I have to act in view of their shiftS. R. CURTIS, Major General.

>

·

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
TVaskington, Marc!~ 18, 1865.

Official copy :

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. G., February 1, 1865.
GENERAL: I transmit herewith a copy of a letter from General Conner in
regard to the defence of the overland mail route, and also several papers fi·om
Gen eral Curtis on this subject.
These papers and others were, on their receipt, forwarded to Lieutenant General Grant, and have been returned without any instructions from him, so far
as I am informed.
It is therefore presumed that he ileems the large cavalry force in the department of Kansas as sufficient for present purposes, without taking others from
active duty in the field.
It is proper to state in this connexion, that others report these stories of Indian hostilities as greatly exaggerated, if not mostly gotten up for purposes of
speculation; and respectable authorities assert that they are encouraged by the
agents of the Overland Mail Company, in order to cover their frequent failure
to transport the mails according to contract.
Be this as it may, it is highly important that the roads to New Mexico, Colorado, Utah and Idaho should be properly protected from Indian ho1$tilities, so
that there may be no interruption in the transmissien of supplies and the mails.
You will transmit these papers, with the necessary instructions, to General
Dodge, who will give the whole matter his imm(~ diate care and attention.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,
lVIajor General, Cltief of Staff.
Major General JOHN PoPE,
St, Louis, Missouri.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY, Atiarch 18, 1865.
Official copy :
J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.
SENATE CHAMBER,
February 13, 1865.
SIR: We are appointed by the Committee on Indian .Affairs of the Senate a
sub-committ(' e to confer with the President and yourself on the subject of transferring the Indian country, with one tier of counties of western Arkansas, to
the Missouri-Kansas Department. We refrain from giving reasons or argu
ment, believi11g you are already of opinion the change should be promptly made,
and merely submit the request.
Yours, &c.,
JAMES HARLAN,
.J. H. LANE.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secrctal'y if 1Var.
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N. B.-I saw General Grant Saturday night, who informed me he had no
objection to the change.

J. H. LANE.
We earnestly recommend that the Indian troops now in the service in the
Indian country be mustered out of the service with their arms in time to raise a
crop for their destitute families this season, if other troops are substituted.
'
JAME::; HARLAN,
J. R. DOOLI'l'TLE,

l\L S. WILKINSON,
B. GRATZ BHOWN,
C. R. BUCKALEW,
Comm·ittee on Indian Affairs.
I-lEADQtJARTERS ARMY,

JY[arch 18, 1865.

Official copy :

J. C. KELTON, A. A. G.
Y\T AR

DEPARTMENT,

January 23, 1865.
Case of application of Ben Holladay that General Curtis may be ordered to
re-enforce Julesburg ( cros~jng of the Platte) immediately.
Referred to Major General Halleck, chief of staff.
By order of the Secretary of War.
JAMES A. HARDIE,
Colonel and Inspector General.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

Marek 18, 1865.
Official copy :

J. C. KELTON,
Colonel and Assistant Adjutant General.
[From Julesburg, dated 14.-Received January 16, 1865.]
BEN HoLLADAY:

I arrived here to-day with fifteen (15) men; shall try and hold station; soldiers all gone; only the wounded; station badly torn up; messenger robbed;
great deal of property destroyed.
R. R. THOMAS,,
Division Adjutant.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

March 18, 1865.
Official copy :

J. C. KELTON,
Colonel and Assistant Adjutant Genentl.
[Dated New York 21, 1865.-Received Washington, January 21, 1865.]

(Care of Senator PoMEROY, 15th and F ' sts.)
Reuben 'l'homas telegraphs cannot hold Julesburg'.

If he does not the In-
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dians have conquered the country, from Kearney to Denver, beyond hope this
winter.
·
BEN HOLLADAY.
l '

HEADQUARTERS OF 'fHE ARMY,
Marek 18, 1865.

Official copy :
J. C. KELTON,
Colonel and Assistant Adjutant General.
[Dated New York 21, 1865, 11 o'clock.-Received Washington, January 21, 1865.]

To GEORGE B. JoLTS, care of Senator PoMEROY:
Try to have order sent to Curtis or Mitchell to help them at Julesburg, or he
will abandon.
B. HOLLADAY.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
· Marek 18, 1865.
Official ~OPJ: :
J. C. KEVrON,
Colonel and Assistant Adjutant General.

FoRT LYoN, CoLORADO TERRITORY,
January 15, 1865.
Sm: In pursuance of Special Order No. 43, headquarters, district of Upper
Arkansas, directing me to assume command of Fort Lyon, as well as to investigate and immediately report in regard to late Indian proceedings in this vicinity,
I have the honor to state that I arrived at this post on the evening of the 14th
of January, 1865, assumed command on the morning of the 15th of January,
1865, and the result of my investigation is as follows :
'
As explanatory, I beg respectfully to state that, while formerly in command
of this post, on the 4th day of September, 1864, and after certain hostilities on
the part of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians, induced, as I have had ample
proof, by the overt acts of white men, three Indians (Cheyennes) were brought
as prisoners .to me, who had been found coming toward the post, and who had
in their possession a letter written, as I aecertained afterwards, by a half-breed
in the Cheyenne camp, as coming from Black Kettle and other prominent chiefs
of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe nations, the purport of which was th~t they desired peace, had never desired to be at war with the whites, &c., as well as stating, that they had in their possession some white prisoners, women and children,
whom they were willing to deliver up providing that peace was granted them.
Knowing that it was not in my power to insure and offer thetn the peace for
which they sued, but at the same time anxious, if possible, to accomplish the
rescue of the white prisoners in their possession, I finally concluded to risk an
expedition with the command I could raise, numbering one hundred and twentyseven men, to their rendezvous, wh~re I was informed they were congregated
to the number of two thousand, and endeavor by some means to procure the
aforesaid white prisoners, and to be governed in my course in accomplishing. the
same entirely by circumstances. Having formerly made lengthy reports in regard to the details of my expedition, I have but to say that I succeeded, proPart VI--6
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cured four white captives from the hands of these Indians, simply giving them
in return a pledge that I would endeavor to procure for them th~ peace for which
they so anxiously sued, feeling that, under the proclamation issued by John
Evans, governor. of Colorado and superintendent of Indian affairs, a copy of
which becomes a portion of this report, even if not by virtue of my position as a
United States officer, highest in authority in the country included within the
bo-unds prescribed as the country of -the Arapahoe a~d Cheyenne nations, I
could offer them protection until such time as some measures might be taken
by those higher in authority than myself in regard to them. I took with me
seven of the principal chiefs, including Black Kettle, to Denver city, for the
purpose of allowing them an interview with the governor of Colorado, by that
means making a mistake of which I have since become painfully aware-that of
proceeding with the chiefs to the governor of Colorado Territory, instead of to
the headquarters of my district, to my commanding officer. In the consultation
with Governor Evans, the rr.atter was referred entirely to the military authorities.
Colonel J. M. Chivington, at that time commander of the district of Colorado,
was present at the council held with these Indian chiefs, and told them that the
whole matter was referred to myself, who would act toward them according to
the best of my judgment, until such time as I could receive instructions from
the proper authorities. Returning to Fort Lyon, I allowed the Indians t() bring
their villag.:;s to the vicinity of the post, includiug their squaws and pappooses,
and in such a position that I could at any moment, with the garrison I had,
have annihilated them, had they given any evidence of hostility of any kind, in
any quarter.
·
I then immediately despatched my adjutant, Lieutenant W. W. Denison,
with a full statement, to the commanding general of the department, asking for
instructions ; but in the mean while various false rumors having reached district
headquarters in regard to my course, I was relieved from the command of Fort
Lyon, and ordered to report at headquarters. Major Scott J. Anthony, 1st
cavalry of Colorado, who had been ordered to as.sume command of Fort Lyon,
previou1) to my departure held a consultation with the chiefs, in my presence,
and told them that though acting under strict orders, under the circumstances,
he could not materially differ from the course which I had ~dopted, and allowed
them to remain in the vicinity of the post, with their families, assuring them
perfect safety until such time as positive orders should be received from headquarters in regard to them. I left the post on the 25th day of November, for
the purpose of reporting at district headquarters. On the second day after leaving Fort Lyon, while ou the plains, I was approached by three Indians, one of
whom stated to me that he had been sent- by Black Kettle to warn me that
about two hundred Sioux warriors had proceeded down the road between where
I was and Fort Larned, to make war, and desired that I should be careful;
another evidence of these Indians good faith. All of his statement proved afterwards to be correct. Having an escort of twenty-eight men, I proceeded on .my
way, but did not happen to fall in with them .
.From evidence of officers at this post, I understand that on the 27th day of
November, 18(34, Colonel J. M. Chiviugton, with the 3d regiment of Colorado
cavalry (one-hundred-days men) and a battalion of the 1st Colorado cavalry.
arrived at Fmt Lyon, ordered a portion of the garrison to join him; under the
corQmand of Major Scott J. Anthony, and again~t the remonstrance of the
officers of the post, who stated to him the circumstances of which he was well
aware, attacked the camp of friendly Indians, the major portion of which were
composed of women and children. The affidavits which become a portion of
this report will show, more particularly than I can state, the full particulars of
that massacre. Every one whom I have. spoken to, either officer or soldier,
agrees in the relation that the most fearful atrocities were committed that ever
were heard of. Women and children were killed and scalped, children shot at
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their mothers' breasts, and all the bodies mutilated in the most horrible manner.
Numerous eye-witnesses have described scenes to me, coming under the eye of
Colonel Chivington, of the most disgusting and horrible character; the dead bodies
of females profaned in such a manner that the recital is sickening; Colonel J. M.
Chivington all the time inciting his troops to these diabolical outrages. Previous to the slaughter commencing he addressed his command, arousing in them,
by his language, all their worst passions, urging them on to the work of committing all these atrocities. Knowing himself all the circumstances of these Indians resting on the assurances of protection from the government, given them
by myself and Major Scott J. Anthony, he kept his command in entire ignorance of the same; and when it was suggested that such might be the case he
denied it, positively stating that they wer.e still continuing their depredations,
and laid there threatening the fort. I beg leave to draw the attention of the
colonel commanding to the fact established by the enclosed affidavits, that twothirds or more of that Indian village were women and children, and he is aware
whether or not the Indians go to war taking with them their women and children. I desire also to state that Colonel J. M. Chivington is not my superior
officer, but is a citizen mustered out of the United States service; and also,
that at the time this inhuman monster committed this unprecedented atrocity
he was a citizen, by reason of his term of service having expired, he having
lost his regulation command some months previous.
Colop.el Chivington reports officially that between five and six hundred Indians were left dend upon the field. I have been informed by Captain Booth,
district 'inspector, that he visited the field and counted but sixty-nine bodies, and
by others who were present that but a few, if any, over that number were killed,
and that two-thirds of them were women and children. I beg leave to further
state, for the information of the colonel commanding, that I have talked to every
officer in Fort Lyon, and many enlisted men, and that they unanimously agree
that all the statements I have made in this repm:t are correct.
In conclusion, allow me to say that from the time I held the consultation with
the Indian chiefs on the head-waters of Smoky Hill, up to the date of the massacre by Colonel Chivington, not one single depredation had been committed by
the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians. The settlers of the Arkansas valley
had returned to their ranches from which they had fled, had taken in their crops,
and had been resting in perfect security under assurances from myself that they
would be in no danger for the present, by that means saving the country from
what must inevitably become almost a famine were they to lose their crops; the
lines of communicatio:n were opened and travel across the plains rendered perfectly safe through the Cheyenne and Arapahoe country. Since this last horrible murder by Colonel Chivington the country presents a scene of desolation.
All communication is cut off with the States except by sending large bodies of
troops, and already over a hundred whites have fallen as victims to the fearful
vengeance of these betrayed Indians. All this country is ruined. '.rhere can
be no such thing as peace in the future but by the total annihilation of all
the Indians on the plains. I have the most reliable information to the effect
that the Cheyennes and Arapahoes have allied themselves with the Kiowas
Comanches, and Sioux, and are congregated to the number of five or six thousand on the Smoky Hill.
·
Let me also draw the atten.tion of the colonel commanding to the fact stated
by affidavit, that John Smith, United States interpreter, a soldier, and a citizen, were present in the Indian camp, by permission of the commanding officer
of this post-another evidence to the fact of these same Indians being regarded
as friendly; also, that Colonel Chivington states, in his official report, that he
fought from nine hundred to one thousand Indians, and left from five to six
hundred dead upon the field, the sworn evidence being that there were but five
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hundred souls in the village, two-thirds of them being women and children, and
that there were but from sixty to seventy killed, the major portion of whom
were women and children.
It will take many more troops to give security to travellers and settlers in this
country, and to make any kind of successful warfare against these Indians. I
am at work placing Fort Lyon in a state of defence, having all, both citizens
and soldiers, located here employed upon the works, and expect soon to have
them completed, and of such a nature that a comparatively small garrison can
hold the fort against any attack by Indians.
Hoping that my report may receive the particular attention of the colonel
comman'ding, I respectfully submit the same.
Your obedient servant,
E. W. WYNKOOP,
Major Com'g 1st Colorado Cat•alry and Fort Lyon.
Lieutenant J. E. TAPPAN,
Act'g Ass't Adj't General, District of Upper Arkansas.
ADJUTANT GE:\'ERAL's

OFFICE,

Jl;!arch, 1865.

Official:

------,
Assistant Adjutant General.

FoRT LYoN, CoLORADO TERRITORY,
January 15, 1865.
Personally appeared before me John Smith, United States Indian interpreter,
who, after being duly sworn, says:
'I'hat on the 4th day of September, 1864, he was appointed Indian interpreter
for the post of Fort Lyon, and has continued to serve i'n that capacity up to the
present date; that on the 4th day of September, 1864, by order of Major E. W.
Wynkoop, command'i ng post of Fort Lyon, he was called upon to hold a conversation with thre'e 'Cheyenne Indians, viz: One Eye, and two others, who
had been brought in to the post that day; that the result of the interview was
as follows : One Eye, Cheyenne; stated that the principal chiefs and subchiefs of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe nations had l1eld a consultation and
agreed to a man, of the chiefs and snb-chiefs, to come or send some one who was
well acquainted with the parties at the post, and finally agreed to send himself,
One Eye, with a paper written by G-eorge B-ent, half-breed, to the effect
that they, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, had and did agree to turn over to
Major E. W. Wynkoop, or any other military authority; all the w'h ite prisoners
they had in their possession, as they were all anxious to make peace with the
whites, and never desired to be at war. Major E. W. Wynkoop then asked
One Eye, he having lived among whites, and known to have always been
friendly disposed towards them, whether he thought the Indians were sincert~,
and whether they would deliver the white prisoners into his (Major Wynkoop's)
hands. His reply was, that at the risk of his life he would guarantee their sincerity. Major Wynkoop then told him that he would detain him as a prisoner
for the time, and if he concluded to proceed to the Indian camp he would take
him with him and hold him as a hostage for their (the Indian's) good faith.
One Eye also stated that the Cheyenne and Arapahoe nations were congregated, to the number of two thousa;nd, on the head-waters of the Smoky Hill,
including some forty lodges of Sioux; that they had rendezvoused there, and
brought in their war parties for the purpose of hearing what would be the result
of their message by which they had sued for peace, and would remain until they
heard ~omething definite. Major Wynkoop told One Eye that he would pro-
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ceed to the Indian camp and take him with him. One Eye replied that he was
perfectly willing to be detained a prisoner, as well as to remain a hostage for the
good faith of the Indians, but desired the major to start as soon as possible, for
fear the Indians might separate.
On the 6th day of September I was ordered to proceed with Major Wynkoop
and his command in the direction of the Indian encampment. After a four days'
march, came in sight of the Indians, and one of the three Indians before mentioned was sent to acquaint the chiefs with whJ.t was the object of the
expedition, with the statement that Major Wynkoop desired to hold a consultation with the chitfs. On the lOth day ·of September, 1864, the consultation
was held between Major Wynkoop and his officers, and the principal chiefs of
the Cheyenne and Arapahoe nations. Major Wynkoop stated through me,
to the chiefs, that he had received their message; that acting on that, he had
come to talk with them; asked them whether they all agreed to and indorsed
the contents of the letter which he had in his possession, and which had been
brought in by One Eye. Receiving au answer in the affirmative, he then told
the chiefs that he had not the authority to conclude terms of peace with them,
but that he desired to make a proposition to them to the effect that if they would
give him e\--idence of their good faith hy delivering into his hands the white
prisoners they had in their possession, he would endeavor to procure for them
peace, which would be subject to conditions that he would take with him what
priucipal chiefs they might select, and conduct them in safety to the governor
of Colorado, and whatev.er might be the result of their interview with him, return
them in safety to their tribe.
Black Kettle, the head chief of the Cheyenne nation, replied as follows:
That the Cheyenne and Arapahoe nations had always endeavored to observe
the terms of their treaty with the United States government; that some years
previously, when the white emigration first commenced coming to what is now
the Territory of Colorado, the country which was in possession of the Cheyenne
and Arapahoe nations, they could have successfully made war against them,
the whites. They did not desire to do so-had invaria.bly treated them with
kindness, and had never, to their knowledge, committed any destruction whatever; that until the lal'lt few months they had gotten along in perfect peace. and
harmony with their white brethren, bnt while a hunting party of their young
men we:re proceeding north, in the llf~ighborhood of the South Platte river, having found some loose stock belonging to white men, which they•were taking to
a ranch to deliver them up, they were suddenly confronted by a party Of United
States soldiers and ordered to deliver up their arms. A dHliculty immediately
ensued, which resulted in the killing and wounding several on both sides. ,
A short time after this occurrence took place, a village of pappooses, squaws
and old men, located on what is known as the Cedar calion, a short distance
north of the South Platte river, who were perfectly unaware of any difficulty
having occurred between any portion of their tribe, Cheyenne, and the whites,
were attacked by a large party of soldiers, and some of them killed and their
ponies driven off. After this, while a body of United States troops were proceeding from the Smoky Rill to the Arkansas river, th(ly reached the neighborhood of Sean Bears' band of the Cheyenne nation. Sean Bea~·s', second
chief of the Cheyennes, approached the column of troops alone, his warriors remaining off some distance, he not dreaming that there was any hostility between
his nation and the whites. He was immediately shot down, and fire opened upon
his band; the result of which was a fight between the two parties. Presuming
from all these circumstances that war was inevitable, the young men of the Cheyenne nation commen~ea to retaliate by committing various depredations all the
time, which he, Black Kettle, and other principal chiefs of the Cheyenne
nation, was opposed to, and endeavored by all means in their power to restora
pacific relations between that tribe and their white brethren, but at various
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times, when endeavoring to approach the military post for the purpose of accomplishing the same, were fired upon and driven off. In the mean time, while their
brothers and allies, the Arapahoes, were on perfectly friendly terms with the
whites, and Left Hand's band of that nation were camped in close vicinity
to Fort Larned, Left Hand, one of the principal chiefs of the Arapahoe nation, learning that it was the intention of the Kiowas on a certain day to
drive off the stock from Fort Larned, proceeded to the commanding officer of
that post and informed him of the fact. No attention was paid to the information he gave, and on the day indicated the Kiowas run off the stock. Left
Hand again approached the post with a portion of his warriors, for the purpose of offering his services to the commanding officer there to pursue and endeavor to regain the stock from the Kiowa Indians, when he was fired upon
a'nd was obliged hastily to leave.
The young men of the Arapahoe nation, supposing it was the intention of the
whites to make war upon them as well as the Cheyennes, also commenced retaliating as they ,were able, and against the desire of most of their principal chiefs,
who, as well as Black Kettle and other chiefs of the Cheyennes, were bitterly
opposed to hostility with the whites.
.
He then said that he had lately heard of a proclamation issued by the govemor of Colorado, inviting all friendly disposed Indians to come in to the different military posts, and that they would be protected by the government. Under these circumstances, although he thought the whites had been the aggressors and forced. the trouble upon the Indians, and anxious for the welfare of his
people, he had made this last effort to communicate again with the military authority, and he was glad he succeeded.
He then arose, shook hands with lVIajor Wynkoop and his officers, stating
that he was still, as he always had been, a friend to the whites, and, as 'far as
he was concerned, he was willing to deliver up the white prisoners, or anything
that was required of him, to procure peace, knowing it to be for the good of his
pr.ople, but that there were other chiefs who still thought that they were badly
treated by the "white brethren," who were willing to make peace, but who felt
unwilling to deliver up the prisoners simply on the promise o( Major Wynkoop
that he would endeavor to procure them peace. They desired that the delivering up the white prisoners should be an assurance of peace. He also went on
to state that even if Major Wynkoop's proposition was nqt accepted there by
the chiefs assembled, and although they had sufficient force to entirely overpower lVIajor Wynkoop's small command, from the fact that he had come
in good faith to hold this consultation, he should return unmolested to Fort
Lyon.
,
The expressions of other chiefs were to the effect that they insisted upon
peace as the conditions of their delivering up the white prisoners.
Major Wynkoop finally replied that he repeated what be had said before,
that it was not in his power to insure them peace, and that all, he had to say
in closing was that they might think about his proposition, that he would march
to a cert~in locality, distant twelve miles, and there await the result of their
consultation for two days, advising them at the same time to accede to his proposition as the best means of procuring that peace for which they were anxious.
The white prisoners were prought in and turned over to Major Wynkoop
before the time had expired set by him, and Black Kettle, White Antelope, and
Bull Bear, of the Cheyenne nation, as well as Nevah Nattanee, Boren, and Heap
Buffalo, of the Arapahoe nation, all chiefs, delivered themselves over to
Major Wynkoop. We then proceeded to Fort Lyon, and from there to Denver,
Colorado Territory, at which place Governor Evaus held a consultation with
these chiefs, the result of which was as follows:
He told them he had nothing to do with them; that they would return with
Major Wynkoop, who would reconduct them in safety, and they would have to
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await the action of military authorities. Colonel Chivington, then in command
of the district, also told them that they would remain at the disposal of Major
Wynkoop until higher authority had acted in their case. The Indians appeared
to be perfectly satisfied, presuming that they would eventually be all right as
soon as these authorities conld be heard from, and expressed themselves so.
Black Kettle embraced the governor and Major Wynkoop, and shook hands
with all the other officials present, perfectly contented, deeming that the matter
was settled. On our return to Fort Lyon I was told by Major Wynkoop to say
to th.e chief,s that they could bring their different bands, including their families,
to the vicinity of the post until he had heard from the big chief; that he preferred to have them under his eye and away from other quarters, where they
were likely to get into difficulties with the whites.
The chiefs replied that they were willing tp do anything Major Wynkoop
might choose to dictate, as they had perfect confidence in him. Accordingly,
the chiefs went after their families and villages and brought them in ; they appeared satisfied that they were in perfect security and safety after their villages
were located, and Major Wynkoop had sent an officer to headquarters for int:tructions. He, Major Wynkoop, was relieved from command of the post by
Major Scott J. Anthony, and I was ordered to interpret for him, Major
Anthony, in a consultation he desired to hold with these Indians. The consultation that then took place between Major Anthony and' these Indians was
as follows:
Major Anthony told them that he had been sent here to relieve Major WynkQop, and that he would fTom that time be in command of this post ; that he
had come here under ordms from the commanders of all the troops in this
country, and that he had orders to have nothing to do with Indians whatever,
for they heard at headquarters that the Indians had lately been committing
depredations, &c., in the very neighborhood of thls post, but that since his
arrival he had learned that these reports were all falde ;. that he would write to
headquarters himself and correct the rumor in regard to them, and that he
would have no objection to their remaining in the vicinity of Sand C11eek, where
they were then located, until such a time as word might be received from the
commander of the department; that he himself would forward a complete stat~
ment of all that he had seen or heard in regard to them, and that he was in
hopes that he would have some good news for the Indians upon receiving ·an
answer, but that he was sorry that his orders -were such as to render it impossible for him to make them any issues whatever.
The Indians then replied that it would be impossible for them to remain any
great length of time, as they were short of provisions. Major Anthony then
told them that they could let their villages remain where they were and send
their young men out to hunt buffalo, as he understood that the buffaloes had
lately come close in. The I11dians appeared to be a little dissatisfied with the
change in the commanders of the post, fearing that it boded them no good ; but
having received assurances of safety from Major Anthony, they still had no fears
of their families being disturbed.
.
'On the 26th of November I received permission from Major Scott J. Anthony,
commanding post, to proceed to the Indian village on Sand creek for the purpose
of trading with the Indians, and started, accompanied by a soldier named David
Louderback, and a citizen, Watson Clark. I reached the village and commenced
to trade with them. On the morning of the 29th of November the village was
attacked by Colonel J. M. Chivington with a command of from nine hundred to
one thousand men. The Indian village numbered about one hundred lodges,
counting altog~ther five hundred souls, two-thirds of whom were women and
children. From my observation, I do not think there were over sixty Indians
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that made any defence. I rode over the field after the slaughter wat~ over and
counted from sixty to seventy dead bodies, a large majority of which were
women and children, all of whose bodies had been mutilated in the most horrible
manner. When the troops first approached~ I endeavored to join them, but was
repeatedly fired upon, as also the soldier and the citizen with me.
When the troops began approaching, I saw Black Kettle,, the head chief,
hoist the American flag over his lodge, -as well as a white flag,' fearing there
might be some mistak~ as to who they were. After the fight Colonel Chivington returned with his command in the direction of Fort Lyon, and then proceeded down the Arkansas river.
JOHN S. SMITH,
U. S. Interpreter.
Sworn and subscribed to at Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory, this 27th day o'f
January, 1865.
.
W. P. MINTON,
Second Lieut. 1st New Mexico Vols., Post Adjutant.
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,

Marek - , 1865.
Official:

- - - - , A . A. G.
\.

FoRT LYoN, CoLORADo TERRITORY,

January 16, 1865.
Personally appeare'd •"befQre me Lieutena~t Jame'S D. Cannan, 1st New
Mexico volunteer infantry,, who, after being duly sworn, says:
That on the 28th day of November, 1864, I was ordered by 'Major Scott J.
Anthony to accompany 'h im on an Indian expedition as his battalion adjutant.
The object of that expedition was to be a thorough campaign against hqstile Indians, as I was led to understand. I referred to the fact of there being a friendly
camp of Indians in the immediate neighborhood, and remonstrated against
simply attacking that camp; as I :was aware that they wer€1 resting there in
fancied security, under promises held out to them of safety from Major G. W.
Wynkoop, from commander ?f the post of Fort Lyon, as well as by MajorS. J.
Anthony, then in command. Our battalion was attached to the command of
Colonel J. M. Chivington, and left Fort Lyon on the night of the 28th of November, 1864. About daybreak on the morning of the 29th of November we
came in sight of the camp of the fHe~dly Indians aforementioned, and was ordered by Colonel Chivington to attack the same, which was accordingly done.
The command of Colonel Chivington was composed of abou.t one thousand
men. 'l'he village of the Indians consisted of from one hundred to one hundred and thirty lodges, and, as far ·as I am able to judge, of from five hundred
to six hundred souls, the majority of whom were' worn:en and children.
In going over the battle-ground the next day, I did not see a body of man,
woman, or child but was scalped; · and in many instances their bodies were
mutilated in the most horrible mannet, men, women, and children-privates
cut out, &c. I heard one man say that he had cut a woman's privatfl parts
out, and had them for exhibition on a stick ; I heard another man 8ay that he
had cut the finge-rs off of an Indian to get the rings on the hand. According
to the best of my knowledge and belief, these atrocities that were committed
were with the knowledge of J. M. Chivington, a~d I do not know of his taking any measures to prevent them. I heard of one instance of a child a few
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months old being thrown in the fee9-box of a wagon, and after being carried
some distance, left on the ground to perish. I also heard of numerotfs instances
in which men had cut out the private parts of females, and stretched them over
the saddle-bows, and wore them over their hats, while riding in the ranks. All
these matters were a subject of general conversation, and could not help being
known by Colonel J. M. Chivington.
JAMES D. CANNAN,
First Lieutenant lst lnfantr1j, New Mexico Volu,nteers.
Sworn and subscribed to before me this 27th day of January, 1865, at Fort
Lyon, Colorado Territory.
W. P. MINTON,
Se•ond Lieut., 1st New Mexico Vols., Post Adjutant.

Deposition rif Lieutena_nt Cannan, 1st N ew Mexico Volunteers.
Was ordered by Major Anthony to accompany him as his adjutant on an
Indian expedition-object, thorough campaign. States that he referred to the
camp of friendly Indians, and remonstrated against attacking that camp.
About daybreak, November 29, Colonel Chivington ordered the attack; gives
particulars of the barbarities of our men, Cl.ltting out privates, ~·
ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFICE·, March_;-, 1865.
Official:

.-------- - - - - - - ,
.;1 ssisiant Adjutant General.
''

FoRT LYoN, CoLORADO 'l,ERRITORY,
January 16, 1865.
Personally appeared before me Captain R. A. Hill, 1st New Mexico volunteer
infantry, who, after being duly sworn, says:
That, as an officer in the service of the United States, he was on duty at
Fort' Lyon, Oolorado Territory; at the time there was an understanding between
the chiefs of the Arapahoe and Cheyenne nations and Major E. W. Wynkoop
with regard to their resting in safety with their villages in the vicinity of Fort
Lyon until such time as orders in regard to them could be received from the
commanding general of the department; that after Major Wynkoop being relieved fi·om the command of Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory, the same understanding existed between Major Scott J. Anthony and the aforesaid Indians;
that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the village of Indians massacred
by Colonel J. M. Chivington on the 29th day of November, 1864, were the same
frieudly Indians heretofore referred to.
R. A. HILL,
Captain 1st Irifantry, New Mexico Volunteers.
Sworn and subscribed to before me this 27th day of January, 1865.
.
W. P. MINTON,
Second Lieut. lsl Infantry, New Mexico Vols. Post Adjutant.
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Deposition

if

Captain R. A. Hill, 1st J..Tew Mexico irifantry.

Was on duty at Fort Lyon at time these Indians were camping near said fort;
that' they were then, by permisEJion of Major vVynkoop and Major Anthony,
waiting until instructions could be received ftom headquarters how to act m
their case.
To the best of his knowledge, these Indians were the same massacred by
Colonel Chivington November 29.
ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFICE, Marek-, 186f>.
Official:

------------,
Assistant Adjutant General
FoRT LYoN, CoLORADO TERRITORY,
January 27, 1865.
Personally appeared before me Second Lieutenant W. P. Minton, first regiment,
New Mexico infantry volunteers, and Lieutenant C. M. Cossitt, first cavalry of
Colorado, who, after being duly sworn, say:
That on the 28th day of November, 1864, Colonel J. M. Chivington, with the
third regiment of Colorado cavalry (one-hundred-days men) and a battalion of
the first cavalry of Colorado, arrived at this post, and on the 29th of November
attacked a village of friendly Indians in this vicinity, and, according to representations made by others in our presence, murdered their women and children, and
committed the most horrible outrages upon the dead bodies of the same; that
the aforesaid Indians were recognized as friendly by all parties at this post,
under the following circumstances, viz:
'rhat Major E. W. Wynkoop, formerly commander of the post, had given
them assurances of safety until such t~me as he could hear from the commanding general of the department in consequence of their having sued for peace,
and given every evidence of their sincerity by delivering up the white prisoners
they had in their possession, by congregating their families together and leaving
them at the mercy of the garrison of Fort Lyon, who could have massacred
them at any moment they felt so disposed; that upon Major Wynkoop being
relieved from the command of Fort Lyon and Major Scott J. Anthony assuming
command of the same, it was still the understanding between Major Anthony
and the Indians that they could rest in the security guaranteed them by Major
Wynkoop.
Also, that Colonel J. M. Chivington, on his arrival at the post of Fort Lyon,
was aware of the circumstances in regard to these Indians, from the fact that
different officers remonstrated with him, and stated to him how these Indians
were looked upon by the entire garrison; that, notwithstanding these remonstrances, and in the face of all these facts, he committed the massacre
aforementioned.
W. P. MINTON,
Second Lieut. 1st Irifantry, New Mexico Volun(eers.
C. M. COSSIT'r,
First L-ieutenant 1st Cavalry if Colorado.
Sworn and subscribed to before me this 27th day of January, 1865.
W. W. DENISON,
Second Lieutenant 1st Colm·ado Veteran Cavalr,y,
Acting RPgimental Adjutant.
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, March-, 1865.
Official:

------------,
Assistant Adjutant General.
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FoRT LYON, CoLORADO, January 27, 1865.
Personally appeared before me Samuel G. Colley, who, being duly sworn, on
oath deposes and says:
r.rhat he is now, and has been for the past three years, United States agent
for the Arapahoe and Cheyenne Indians.
That in the month of June laat he received instructions from Ron. J dhn
Evans, governor and ex-officio superintendent Indian affairs for Colorado Territory, directing him to send out persons into Lhe Indian country to distribute
printed proclamations, (which he was furnished with,) inviting all friendly Indians to come in to the different places designated in said proclamation, and
they would be protected and fed. That he caused the terms of said proclamation to be widely disseminated among the differe.n t tribes of Indians under his
charge, and that in accordance therewith a large number of Arapahoes and
Cheyennes came into this post, and provisions were issued to them by Major E.
W. Wynkoop, commanding, and myself.
rrhat on the 4th day of September last two Cheyenne Indians (One Eye arid
Manimick) came into this post with information that the Arapahoes and Cheyennes had several white prisoners among them that they had purchased, and
were desirous of giving them up and making peace with the whites.
That on the 6th day of September following Major E. W. Wynkoop left this
post with a detachment of troops to rescue said prisoners, and that after an absence
of several days ,he returned, bringing with him four white prisoners which he
·received from the Arapahoe and Cheyenne Indians. He was accompanied on
his return by a number of the most influential men of both tribes, who were
unanimously opposed to war with the whites, and desired peace at almost any
terms that the whites might dictate.
That immediately upon the arrival of Major Wynkoop at this post large
numbers of Arapahoes and Cheyennes came in and camped near the post.
Major Wynkoop selected several of the most prominent chiefs of both nations and proceeded to Denver to council with Superintendent Evans; after his
return he held frequent councils with the Indians, and at all of them distinctly
stated that he was not empowered to treat with them, but that he had despatched a messenger to the headquarters of the department, stating their
wishes in the matter, and that as soon as he received advices from there he
would inform them of the decision of General Curtis respecting them.
That until that time, if they placed themselves under his protection, they
should not be molested. That the Indians remained quietly near the post until
the arrival of Major Anthony, who relieved Major Wynkoop.
Major Anthony held a council with the Indians, and informed them that he
was instructed not to allow any Indians in or near the post, but that he had
fouud matters here much better than he had expected, and advised them to go
out and camp on Sand creek until he could hear from General Curtis. He
wished them to keep him fully advised of all the movements of the Sioux,
which they promptly did.
He also promised them that as soon as he heard from General Curtis he
would advise them of his decision.
From the time that Major Wynkoop left this post to go out to rescue the
white prisoners until the arrival of Colonel Ohivington here, which took place
on the 28th of November last, no depredations of any kind had been committed
by the Indians within two hundred miles of this post.
That upon Colonel Chivington's arrival •here with a large body of troops he
was informed where these Indians were encamped, and was fully advised under
what circumstances they had come in to this post, and why they were then on
Sand creek. · That he was remonstrated with both by officers and civilians at
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this post against making war upon those Indians. r_rhat he was informed and
fully advised that there was a large number of friendly Indians there, together
with several white men who were there at the request of himself (Colley) and
by permission of Major Anthony. rrhat notwithstanding his knowledge of the
facts as above set forth, he is informed that Colonel Chivington did, on the
morning of the 29th of November last, surprise and attack said camp of friendly
Indians, and massacre a large number of them, (mostly women .and children,)
and did allow the troops under his co~mand to mangle and mutilate them in
the most horrible manner.
S. G. COLLEY,
United States Indian Agent..
Sworn and subscribed to before me this '28th day of January, 1865, at Fort
Lyon, Colorado Territory.
W. P. MINTON,
Second Lieut. 1st Infantry, New Mexico Vols., Post .Adjutant.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMEN'l' OF THE MISSOURI ,

St. Louis, - - - - , 186-.
Deposition of Samuel G. Colley, United States agent for the Arapahoe and
Cheyenne Indians, says that in June last, obedient to instructions from Governor
Evans, Colorctdo Territory, he distributed printed proclamations through the Indian country, inviting all friendly Indians to come to the different places designated in said proclamation. That the Indians in question came to :Fort Lyon;
provisions were issued to them by Major Wynkoop. That two of the chiefs reported. they had several white prisoners which they purchased, and which they
wished to give up. That Major Wynkoop, on the 6th of September, went and
rescued the prisoners. On his return, was accompanied by influential men of
both tribes unanimously for peace at any terms almost the whites might dictate.
Major Wynkoop proceeded with the chiefs to council with Governor Evans.
Major Wynkoop repeatedly stated that he had not the powet to treat with them,
but was waiting instructions from General Curtis, and until that time be wonld
protect them. These Indians kept the comrn,ander of the post fully advised of
the movements of the Sioux. No depredations were committed within two
hundred miles of the post while these Indians were in the vicinity of the post.
Upon Colonel Chivington's arrival he was informed where the Indians were
and advised of the circumstances that brought them. He was remonstrated
with by officers and civilians against making war. Notwithstanding Colonel
Chivington's knowledge of these facts, on the 29th November he surprised
all(i attacked said camp of friendly Indians, killed a large number, mostly
women, and allowed his troops to mangle and mutilate bodies.

Deposition

of Lieutenants

Minton and Cossitt.

Colonel Cbivington, with 3d Colorado cavalry and battalion of 1st Colorado
eavalry, attacked, on the 29th November, a village of friendly •Indians, and,
a(ecording to representlltion, murdered women and children in horrible manl)er.
India.ns were recognized friendly. They were there and on assurance from
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Major Wynkoop of safety. Indians earned the friendship by giving up white
prisoners. , Colonel Chivington was acquainted with circumstances, and was
remonstrated .with against, &c.
ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFICE, ~Iarrclt - , 1865.
Official:
----~-----

----------,

Assistant Adjutant General. ·

:FoRT LvoN, Coi.ORADo TERRITORY,
January 27, 1865.
Personally appeared before me Private David Louderback, 1st cavalry of
Colorado, and R. W. Clark, citizen, who, after being duly sworn, say:
That they accompanied John Smith, United States .Indian interpreter, on
the 26th day of November, 1864, by permission of Major Scott J. Anthony,
commanding post of Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory, to the village of the
friendly Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians, on Sand creek, close to Fort Lyon,
Colorado Territory, he, John Smith, having received permission to trade
with the afore~aid friendly I.ndians; that on the morning of the 29th day of
November, 1864, the said Indian vill~ge was attacked, while deponents were
in the same, by Colonel J. M. Chivington, with a command of about 1,000
men; that, according to their best knowledge and belief, the eutire Indian village was composed of not more than 500 souls, two-thirds of which were
women and children; that the dead bodies of women and ohildren were afterwards mutilated in the most horrible manner ; that it was the understanding
of the deponents, and the general understanding of the garrison of :Fort Lyon,
that this village were friendly Indians ; that they had been allowed to remain
in the locality they were then in by permission of Major Wynkoop, former
commander of the post~ and by Major Anthony, then in command, as well as
from the fact that permission had been given John Smith and the deponents to
visit the said camp for the purpose of trading.
R. W. CLARK,
DAVID H. LOUDERBACK.
Sworn and subscribed to before me this 27th day of January, 1865.
W. P. MINTON,
Second Lieut. New Mexico Vols., Post Adjutant.

if

David Louderback, 1st Colorado cavalry, and R. W. Clm·k,
citizen.
They were in camp of Indians with John Smith, interpreter, who had permission to trade with the Indians. On the moruing of 29th November camp
was attacked by Colonel Chivington's command of 1,000 men, while they were
in camp; dead bodies of women and children were horribly mutilated ; tha~ it
was their understanding, and general understanding of garrison Fort Lyon,
that these Indians were friendly; that they were allowed to remain there by
Major Wynkoop and Major Anthony. ·
Deposition

ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFICE, Marek - , 1865.
Official:

------- ------,

Assistant Adjutant Genera1.

,
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WAR DEPARTMENT, February 14, 18()5.
Resolutions of Kansas legislature, requesting the Secretary of War to place
a sufficient force under General Curtis to enable him to protect the Kansas
frontier and the overland and Santa Fe routes.
Referred to General HALLECK, chief of staff, February 14, 1865.
Copy sent to General GRANT some days ago. '
H. W. HALLECK,
JYlajor General, and Chiif o/ Staff.
HEADQUARTERS

OF

THE ARMY,
Marclt 18, 1865.

Official:

J. C. KELTON, Colonel, A. A. G.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS in relation to the overland travel and the settlers upon
the frontier.

Whereas the Indian massacres which occurred upon the border of our State
during the summer and fall of 1864, and which are now being re-enac,t ed by
the hostile tribes of Indians upon the overland route to California, Nevada, and
New Mexico, and the 'I'erritories of Colorado and Idaho, interfere and retard
the settlement and development of the mineral resources of these Territories,
and interrupt the overland communication to and from the Pacific and the
Territories of Colorado and Idaho; and whereas the military force on said route
is entirely inadequate and insufficient to chastise the hostile tribes of Indians,
and to keep them from committing their murderous attacks upon emigrants to
those Territories and Pacific States, and to keep the line of communication
open from the Missouri river, in the State of Kansas, to said States of California and N e~ada, and Territories of Colorado and Idaho and New Mexico;
and whereas it is necessary to the settlement of the northern and western por- .
tion of our State that the hostile tribes of Indians be prevented, if possible,
from committing their murderous attacks upon our frontier settlers and the
overland mail: 'Therefore
Be it resolved by tl~e house qf representatives o/ the State qf Kansas, (the
senate concurring therein,) That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby,
requested to place a !'Ufficient military force in the hands of Major General
Curtis, commanding this department, to enable him to give sufficient and ample
protection to the frontier of Kansas and the overlan~ and Santa Fe routes.
Resolved, '!'hat the secretary of state be instructed to forward copies of this
preamble and resolution to the Secretary of War and our senators and representatives in Congress.
Passed by both houses.
D. :.\L EMMERT, Chiif Clerk.
I, R. A. Barker, secretary of state, do hereby certify that the above is a true
and correct copy of a concurrent resolution, the original of which is on file in
my office.
'
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In testimony whereof, I have set my hand and affixed the official seal of my
.office this 21st day of January, A. D. 1865.

R. A. BARKER,
Secretary

if State.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, March 18, 1865.

0 fficial copy :
J. C. KELTON,
Colonel and Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT oF CoLORADo,
Denver, February 13, 1865.
GENERAL: The condition of military affairs in this Territory for the la3t
three months has caused quite a stir at home, and a very great commotion
abroad, and justly so. To enable yo'u to properly appreciate the wants and
necessities of this people, so as to apply a remedy; to arrive at a desirable conclusion as to the cause of existing hostilities on the part of the Indians ; to
define my position a;s district commander, and to lay before you the many difficulties and embarrassments which I have had to contend against since assuming
command, as well as to inform you of the steps taken, and the means provided
for carrying out the behests of the government and protection of this Territory,
I deem it my duty,jirst duty, to give you a concise history of events which
may be relied ~pon for present information and future guidance. Had I been
possessed of certain facts from reliable sources when I assumed command of this
district, on the 4th of January, but a little over a month ago, it might have
been possible to arrange matters so as to have fended off part, at least, of the
present troubles, which will have (if not, indeed, already) one good effect, viz:
to change the policy of the government respecting the treatment of the Indians
on the plains. Whatever may have been the origin of the present difficultie8,
whether the white men or the red were the aggressors, matters not now. We
·are in every respect the superior of the Indians, and can afford to wage a war
of their own choosing, even to extermination.
When I assumed command of this district there were but about two hundred (200) men all told, and they were scattered over an area of three hundred
(300) miles, and yet with this command, I was expected to protect the route
from Denver to Julesburg, a distance of one hundred and ninety (190) miles,
while only forty ( 40) of the two hundred ( 200) soldiers were on that line?
stationed forty ('tO) miles from Denver. The balance were on the Arkansas
river and at ~~ort Garland. My district extends about sixty ( 60) miles on the
overland route from Denver, and yet I am called upon to protect as far as
Julesburg, in the northeast corner of Colorado Territory, with no troops at
my command, while on the north there are plenty, as also from Julesburg to
Kearney, which, in my opinion, from what I have seen of them, and heard hom
reliable sources, had better be sent to some new field of operations. I have
special reference to the stations from Kearney to Julesburg. I cannot say who
is to blame for this, but it is not the less true. I see every reason why the
district of Colorado should embrace the Territory, and none for it being as it now
stands defined. ~~ort Lyon was not in my command when I arrived here, and
has but lately been added, which gives me about two hundred and fifty (250)
more effective men in the district, but not for operations on the overland route,
as they are needed in the southern portion of the Territory to protect the Santa
Fe route.
About the end of December, 1864, the 3d regiment Colorado cavalry (one-
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hundred-days men) were mustered out of the service, thus denuding the district of
troops, and at a time, too, when the Indians had suffered an overwhelming defeat,
{If been subjected to a wholesale massacre at the hands of Colone1 Chivington,
then commanding district; (I give you these distinctions, ·as the people here
are divided on the question;) at a time when the Indians were burning for revenge
on the white men, women, and children, in retaliation for the killed by Colonel
Chivington, commanding, for it is useless to deny this fact; at a time when the
severity of the winter prevented the making of a campaign with any hope of
success on our side, even had the troops been at my command. In view of these
facts, and knowing, as he did, that the Territory would be exposed to Indian
assaults and depredations, while denuded of troops. I question much the policy
and propriety of" the Sand creek battle fought by Colonel Chivington on the
29th of November, 1864. · This matter is now under investigation; by a commission appointed under instructions from .Major General Curtis, so that in course
of time it will speak for itself.
After having become possessed of all these facts, I looked around to see what
could be done in the premises to save the country. I first made a statement to
Major General Curtis, which, by the way, has never been acknowledged, and
impressed upon him the necessity for making certain changes and of hurrying
out re-enforcements. Finding no response or relief from that quarter, I next
called upon the governor regarding the turning out of the militia, which was
deemed impracticable, owing to the fact that the law has so many defections.
I then suggested to the legislature, which was in session, the propriety of
amending the militia law, but no answer came or action taken. In consultation with the governor and other prominent men of the TeiTitory, it was deemed
most expedient and best to urge the passage of a bill i8suing territorial bonds,
which could be cashed at par by moneyed men, and the same used to pay volunteers a bounty for three (3) months' service, and purchase horses on which to
mount them, (for there are none in the quartermaster's hands, nor any money
to purchase them with;) and these men were to be placed under my command,
and used in opening and keeping ,open the overland stage route. The . house
and council could not agree on this bill; so after over two weeks' delay, ana no
good resulted from their action, I was compelled to proclaim martial law, shut
up all houses of business, stop all labor and traffic, and keep matters so until
they furnished me three hundred and sixty (360) mounted men, which I would
arm and equip. rrhese men are now being raised, and I expect by the 20th
to have the most of them in the field. My position has been, and is, anything
but a pleasant one-isolated from all support, a stranger in the land, cut off from
all communication, threatened a,nd attacked by hostile Indians, being in a community divided against itself, and ' compelled to proclaim martial law, with not
a man at my back t9 enforce obedience to the same; yet I have succeeded by
first stirring up the public mind, and preparing it for the result which had to
follow, unless I chose to back down, and yield my authority, which no living
soldier will do.
I enclose, for your information on- this subject, copies of a correspondence between myself, the governor, and ,the legislature on these troubles, also an article
from the Journal, a newspaper published in the mountains, which will define
to you my position, and show you what I have had to contend with. I made
it my business to visit the mountains officially on the very day when excitement was at the highest pitch. On the day but one after that article was written I addressed a meeting of about fifteen hundred (1,500) citizens, in which I
pointed out to them at whose door the blame lay, the duties they owed themselves and the government, and my reasons for proclaiming martial law. I
was unanimously sustained, and that night one hundred and twenty (120) men
were sworn in for three months. rrhis was the quota required by the governor
to fill my call.
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I enclose you a copy of the order establishing martial law, as also the governor's call in accordance therewith. 'ro assert your authority l1.ere, in trying
cases, is very different from asserting it in any other portion of the Union.
Men of influence and wealth in the east are interested to a very great amount
in the miniJ?-g companies, so that they readily obtain an official ear in Washington to a one-sided story, which invariably works injustice to those in authority
and responsible. I therefore respectfully ask, general, that you forward this,
or a copy, to Washington, that I may stand right on the record.
· I am not afraid to assume any responsibility commensurate with the surrounding circumstances; and which is for the good of the service; but I am
afraid of the snake-like winding of hypocrisy, backed by a grovelling, sensual
desire. If men will adhere to truth, I will cheerfully abide every issue.
In the hope this w,ill prove satisfactory and of use to you in your administration, and satisfy your mind regarding my position and the steps I have
taken in the premises,
I have the honor to remain, very respectfullyt your obedient servant,
T. MOONLIGHT,
Colonel 11tl~ J(ansas Cavalry, Commanding.
Major General G. M. DoDGE,
Commanding Department qf the Missouri,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

HEADQUARTERS DrsTRICT OF CoLORADo,
Denver, January 7, 1865.
SIR : As matters now stand in this district (having in a manner no troops)
there is great danger of being overrun by the Indians. Troops could at the
present time be raised better than at any other time, and now is the time we
require them. Will you, as acting governor, communicate with the authorities
on the subject (the governor being in Washington) to obtain this anthority1 It
is of immense importance to the Territory, and the only way to receive speedy
relief from the danger surrounding, and prevent starvation.
I submit this for your consideration and action, and my name may be used by
you in this connexion on your despatches.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
'r. MOONLIGHT,
Colonel1ltl~ J(ansas Cavalry, Commanding.
Hon. SAMUEL H. ELBERT.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT oF CoLORADo,
Denver, C. T., January 8, 1865.
SIR : Owing to the depredations of Indians, we are, at present, shut up from
telegrapl1~ communications with the east, and, therefore, beyond the -reach of
immediate support from any quarter, leaving us to ourselves to act in the premises. Should the troubles continue, I will be constrained to call on the ablebodied men to muster for the protection of the line of transportation. If you
have any special views on the subject, I would be pleased to have them.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. MOONLIGHT,
Colonel1ltl~ J(ansas Cavalry, Commanding.
Hon. S. H. ELBERT,
Secretary and Acting Gournor.
Part VI...,.---7
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HEADQUARTERS DisTRicT oF CoLORADO,
Denver, January 9, 1E65.
GENTLEMEN : Learning that the legislative body of Colorado r.rerritory is
now in session, I respectfully suggest for your consideration the propriety of imme~iately reorganizing the militia law. Your country is in a manner isolated
from the balance of the federal government, on which you depend for supplies
Your line of transportation is now inoperative, and it devolves upon you, th ·
8
representatives of the people, to take a step in a direction that wm insme you
at least, an active and efficient militia force to guard over your interests. As•
matters now stand, the militia· must be called out sooner or later, and I make
these suggestions that there may be no misunderstanding between the civil and
military.
Gentlemen, pardon my intrusion, I mean it for your good.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. MOONLIGHr.r,
Colonel 11th Kansas Ca~Jalry, Cornma7jding.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OJ,<' REPRESENTATIVES,
Colorado City, Colm·ado Territory.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT oF CoLORADo,
Denver, January 17, 1866.
SIR : By reason of the scarcity of troops in this district, our natural enemies
the Indians, have possessed themselves of our Jines of communication. They
have burned ranches, killed innocent women and children, destroyed government
property wherever it was found, driven off the stage stock, killed the drivers and
passengers travelling on the coaches; in short, they are making it a war of extermination. We may look in vain for such timely military assistance as will
protect the lives and property of settlers ; nor can we hope for an easte~n communication this winter, unless the citizens of the Territory band themselves
together in a military organization, and. spring to arms at your call as chief
executive. The blood of the innocent and unoffending martyrs cries aloud for
vengeance, and starvation stares in the face the Jiving. You nor I cannot longer
remain inactive, and be considered guiltless. It devolves upon the militia, as
matters now stand to open the overland route, and keep it open until troops can
be had from the east to make war on these savages of the plains, until there
remains not a vestige of their originality. On behalf of the general government, and on my own responsibility, (trusting to the justice of the cause for my
own protection,) I will furnish carbines to the first mounted and accepted company, and rifled weapons of improved pattern to all the balance; also, rations for
the same as United States troops, and forage for the animals, with the proper
allowance of transportation, and also horse equipments. My scouts inform me
that the Indian spies are now prowling around the very skirts 0f this place, so
that, in addition to your call for militia for field service, the city ·companies
should at once be placed on a war footing, having daily drills, with appointed
places of rendezvous, that we may not be caught napping.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. MOONLIGHT,
Colonellltl~ Kansas Ca·v alry, Commanding.
Ron. S. H. ELBERT,
Acting Governor, Colorado Territ01·y.
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HEADQUARTERS DrsTRICT oF CoLORADo,

Denver, January 25, 1865.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge ~the receipt of your communication of
yesterday, from Golden City, making inquiries as to the number of troops in this
district, and the disposition made of them. I will cheerfully give you the desired
information.
At Fort Lyon, which has lately been placed in my district, there are about
300 men. The mustering officer, Captain J. C. Anderson, has but returned
after completing the organization of the 1st regiment, by consolidating it into
six maximum companies. About forty men are at l!,ort Garland, but these now
will be increased to 100. About forty men are at Camp Fillmore, but these will
be increased to 100 also, as companies will be stationed together at posts so
remote. One company will be stationed here of 100 men in place of the stragglers now doing duty. One company will be divided and stationed at Bijou
Basin and Living Springs. rrhis leaves only two companies at Fort Lyon. In
addition to these, there are about seventy-five (75) recruits of the 2d Colorado;
part of them are now at or near Junction, and the balance will join in a few days.
There are about sixty men now at Valley Station, but these must be changed,
owing to the new organization. There are about 500 men, all told, for duty,
scattered from Fort Lyon, via Garland, Fillmore, Denver, and on route to Valley
Station, a distance of about 450 miles.
The committee will see from this that so widely spread are the troops, that,
even in a case of emergency, jt would not be possible to get together more than
200 men in thirty-six hours.
Trusting this may be of service to you in yonr proceed.ings, I remain, very
respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. MOONLIGHT,
Colonel 11th J(ansas Cavalry, Commanding.
D. H. NICHOLS,

Clwirman qf Committee on Militm·y Affairs.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT oF CoLoRADo,

Denver, January 31, 1865.
SIR: I have been looking eagerly and waiting patiently for the passage of the
bill which was designed to relieve the people of this Territory from the ravages of the Indians. rrhat bill was introduced at my suggestion, as the most
feasible of all plans to raise troops rapidly and voluntarily for the opening of
the overland route, and the keeping of it open until succor could arrive from the
States. The Indians are every day becoming more desperate, and to-day there
stands not a ranch, out of the many that were between Valley Station and
Julesburg, and but very few on this side, and all since the introduction of that
bill. I trusted implicitly in the patriotism and fidelity of the legislature, and
that their wisclom and judgment would at once foresee the necessity of taking
steps to defend their homes, their little ones, and the property of the people whom
they 1.·epresent. Am I mistaken 1 God forbid ! Yet every indication of late
seems to blight my fondest hopes. I cannot longer await the action of your
honorable body, for this night'~ despatches from Junction inform me that about
three thousand ( 3,000) Indians are marching up the Platte on both sides.
Unless the legislature, within forty-eight hours, does something to relieve suffering humanity, and save this country from ruin and devastation, I will be compelled, much against my will, to proclaim martial law, shut up all houses of
business, and force every man able to bear arms into the ranks, and send them
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out to protect their brethren, kill off the Indians, and establish permanent
communication with the east. I cannot quietly look on and perform my duty
to this people, my country, and my God.
I have weighed this matter well in my own mind, and what I have stated is
my firm resolve, with a lingering hope that your honorable body will yet, and
immediately, save this Territory from destruction, and themselves from the indignation of an infuriated people.
I have the honor to 1·emain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. MOONLIGHT,
Colonel 11th Kansas Cavalry, Commanding.
SPEAKER OF THE HousE OF REPRESBNTATIVES, Golden City.

HEADQUARTERS DisTRICT oF CoLORADo,
Denver, February 4, 1865.
DEAR Sm: I send this communication by special messenger, and respectfully
ask that an answer to this, as well as that of January 31, ultimo, be returned.
'rime passes, and the danger increases-hence the urgency of my request.
I have been informed from various sources that a portion of the house took
exceptions to my letter of 'the 31st of January, as being threatening and coercive in its tone. Permit me to say that nothing was further from my mind or
intention. Liberty is a boon I prize too highly to wilfully deprive others of its
blessing, and the course that I fear I must pursue for the salvation of this people is forced upon me by a combination of circumstances which, in my humble
opinion, the legislature might, within the past two weeks, have scattered to the
winds. This they have not done; therefore I must do something.
On invitation of your honorable body, and on the speaker's stand, in their
presence, did I make known my feelings on the Indian question. There I
urged the passage of that bill, and there I told them that I was opposed to
martial law. My acts have not belied my words; but the time has come when
" patience ceases to be a virtue," and when inactivity is a wilful "dereliction
of duty." So far, I have been patient in the extreme, though not inactive. I
have nothing to retract in my letter of January 31, but will adhere closely to
my decision. I may err in addressing the house, and not the council. Should
such be the case, it must be attributed to my ignorance of parliamentary rules,
for I suppose that a measure of this kind would be acted upon in joint ballot.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient se1·vant,
T. MOONLIGHT,
Colonel 11th Kansas Cavalry, Commanding.
Hon. SPEAKER OF HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Golden City, Colorado Territm·y.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT oF CoLORADO,
• Denver, Colorado Territory, February 6, 1865.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of
the 4th instant, (in behalf of the house of which you are an honorable member,)
in which I am informed that the bill authorizing the issuing of $200,000 bonds for
t~e purpose of mounting the militia called for, paying the bounty, &c., was not
h~ely to pass; and also that a bill was likely to pass, (super~:~eding the bond
bill,) giving bounties to men who would enlist in the two Colorado regiments
now in the field, and also that it had been represented to the house, as coming
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from me, that a sufficient number of men could be obtained in this way, so as.
to avoid the necessity of proclaiming martial law.
In reply, I would state that I am very sorry the bond bill did not pass over
two weeks ago, for, to my mind, it was the surest and most honorable way that
men could be raised and horses procured. I have never stated that a sufficient
number of men could be enlisted for the old regiments, so as to meet the e:x;igencies of the case; and even could these men be persuaded to enlist, I have
not at present the horses on which to mount them. I should be pleased to see
a bill pas.s authorizing the payment of a liberal bounty to recruits for the 1st and
2d Colorado regiments, for I think the regiments might be recruited up to the
maximum; but I am sorry to say that such a bill at this late hour would not
meet the necessities of the times. Men and horses must be had immediately,
or else we must yield ourselves living sacrifices to inhum::m savages; and who
of us all are ·p repared to do this? I beg of you not to defeat the bounty bill because of the lateness of the hour whieh gave it birth, for, in my estimation, it
will be of great assistance and good. I am more than sorry that I have now
no other alternat1ve but to proclaim martial law and suspend all business until
a sufficient number of men (mounted) are had to open the overland road and
protect the frontier settlers of the Territory. When I modified martial law, as
it existed under the former district commander, I never expected to be compelled to recreate it with renewed severity.
Accept my thanks for your courtesy, and believe me, with esteem and respect, your obedient servant,
T. MOONLIGHT,
Colonel llth. Kansas Cavalry, Commanding.
Hon. E. T. HoLLAND,
Chairman of Military Committee.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMEXT OF THB MISSOURI,
St. Louis, Missouri, March. 9, 1865.
A true copy :
J. F. BENNETT, A. A. G.
ADJUTANT GENERAL's OFFICE, Marcil-, 1865.
Of!icial:
- - - , A.A.G.

Testimony qf Colonel J. M. Ch.ivington.
Interrogatories propounded to John M. Chivington by the Joint Committee
on the Conduct of the War, and answers thereto given by said Ohivington reduced to writing, and subscribed and sworn to before Alexander W. Atkins,
notary public,. at Denver, in the Territory of Colorado.
1st question. What is your place of residence, your age and profession 1
Answer. My place of residem:e is Denver, Colorado; my age, forty-five years;
I have been colonel of 1st Uolorado cavalry, and was mustered out of the
service on or about the eighth day of January last, and have not been engaged
in any businesB since that time.
2d question. '\Vere you in November, 1864, in any employment, civil or
military, under the authority of the United States; and if so, what was that
employment, and what position did you hold 1
Answer. Iu November, 1864, I was colonel of 1st Colorado cavalry, and in
command of the district of Colorado.
3d(question. Did you, as colonel in commam1 of Colorado troops, alJout the 29th
ofN ovember, 1864, make an attack on an Indian village or camp at a place known
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as Sand creek 1 If so, state particularly the number of men under your command; how armed and equipped; whether mounted or not; and if you had any
artillery, state the number of guns, and the batteries to which they belonged.
Answer. On the 29th day of November, 1864, the troops under my command attacked a camp of Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians at a place known
as Big Bend of Sandy, about forty miles north of Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory. There were in my command at that time about (500) five hundred men of
the 3d regiment Colorado cavalry, under the immediate command of Colonel
George L. Shoup, of said 3d regiment, and about (250) two hundred and fifty
men of the 1st Colorado cavalry; Major Scott J. Anthony commanded one battalion of said 1st regiment, and Lieutenant Luther Wilson commanded another
battalion of said 1st regiment. The 3d regiment was armed with rifled
muskets, and Star's and Sharp's carbines. A few of the men of that regiment
had revolvers. The men of the 1st regiment were armed with Star's and
Sharp's carbines and revolvers. The men of the 3d regiment were poorly
equipped ; the supply of blankets, boots, hats, and caps was deficient. 'l'he
men of the 1st regiment were well equipped; all these troops were mounted.
I had four 12-pound mountain howitzers, manned by detachments from cavalry
companies; they did not belong to any battery company.
4th question. State as nearly as you can the number of Indians that were
in the village or camp at the time the attack w~s made ; how many of them
were warriors; how many of them were old men, how mauy of them were
women, and how many of them were children 1
Answer. From the best and most reliable information I could obtain, there
were in the Indian camp, at the time of the attack, about eleven ( 11) or twelve
(12) hundred Indians; of these about seven hundred were warriors, and the
remainder were women and children. I am not aware that there were any old
men among them. There was an unusual number of males among them, for the
reason that the war chiefs of both nations were assembled there evidently for
some special purpose.
5th question. At what time of the day or night was the attack made 1 Was
it a surprise to the Indians 1 What preparation, if any, had they made for defence or offence 1
Answer. The attack was made about sunrise. In my opinion the Indians were
surprised; they began, as soon as the attack was made, to oppose my troops, however, and were soon fighting desperately. Many of the Indians were armed
with rifles and many with revolvers; I think all had bows and arrows. They
had excavated trenches under the bank of Sand creek, which in the vicinity
of the Indian camp is high, and in many places precipitous. 'l,hese trenches
were two to three feet deep, and, in connexion with the banks, were evidently de'signed to protect the occupants from the fire of an enemy. They were found
at various points extending along the banks of the creek for several miles
from the camp; there were marks of the pick and shovel used in excavating
them ; and the fact that snow was seen in the bottoms of some of the trenches,
while all snow had disappeared from the surface of the country generally,
·sufficiently proved that they had been constructed some time previously.
The Indians took shelter in these trenches as soon as the attack was made,
and from thence resisted the advance of my troops.
6th question. What number did you lose in killed, what number in wounded,
.and what number in missing ?
Answer. There were seven men killed, forty-seven wounded, and one was
missing.
7th question. What number of Indians were killed; and what number of
the killed were women, and what number were children 1
Answer. From the best information I could obtain, I judge there were five
hundred or six hundred Indians killed ; I cannot state positively the number
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killed, nor can I state positively the number of women and children killed.
Officers who passed over the field, by my orders, after the battle, for the purpose of ascertaining the number of Indians killed, report that they saw but
few women or children dead, no more than would certainly fall in an attack
upon a camp in which they were. I myself passed over some portions of the
field after the fight, and I saw but one woman who had been killed, and one
who had hanged herself; I saw no dead children. From all I could learn, I
arrived at the conclusion that but few women or children had been slain. I am
of the opinion that when the attack was made on the Indian camp the greater
number of squaws and children made their escape, while the warriors remained
to fight my troops.
8th question. State, as nearly as yon can, the number of Indians that were
wounded, giving the number of women and the number of children among
the wounded.
Answer. I do not know that any Indians were wounded that were not killed;
if there were any wounded, I do not think they could have been made prisoners without endangering the lives of soldiers ; Indians usually fight as long
as they have strength to resist. Eight Indians fell into the hands of the troops
alive, to my knowledge; these, with one exception~ were sent to Fort Lyon and
properly cared for.
9th question. What property was captured by the forces under your command 1 State the number of horses, mules and poneys, buffalo robes, blankets,
and also all other property taken, specifying particularly the kinds, quality, and
value thereof.
•
Answer. 'rhere were horses, mules, and poneys captured to the number of
about six hundred. 'rhere were about one hundred buffalo robes taken. Some
of this stock had been stolen by the Indians from the government during last
spring, summer and fall, and some of the stock was · the property of private
citizens from whom they had been stolen during the same period. The horses
that belonged to the government were returned to the officers responsible for
them; as nearly as could be learned, the horses and mules that were owned by private citizens were returned to them on proof of ownership being furnished;
such were my orders at least. 'l'he poneys, horses, and mules for which no owner
could be found, were put into the hands of my provost marshal in the field,
Captain J. J. Johnson, of company E, 3d Colorado cavalry, with instructions
to drive them to Denver and turn them over to the acting quartermaster as
captured stock, taking his receipt therefor. After I arrived in Denver I again
directed Captain Johnson to turn these animals over to Captain Gorton, assistant quartermaster, as captured stock, which I presume he did. Colonel Thos.
Moonlight relieved me of the command of the district soon after I arrived in
Denver, that is to say, on the - - day o f - - - , A. D. 186-, and I was
mustered out of the service, the term of service of my regiment having expired.
My troops were not fully supplied with hospital equipage, having been on forced
marches. The weather was exceedingly cold, and additional covering for the
wounded became necessary; I ordered the buffalo robes to be used for that purpose. I know of no other property of value"being captured. It is alleged that
groceries were taken from John Smith, United States Indian interpreter for Upper
Arkansas agency, who was in the Indian camp at the time of the attack, trading
goods, powder, lead, caps, &c., to the Indians. Smith told me that these groceries belonged to Samuel G. Colby, United States Indian agent. I am not
aware that these things were taken; I am aware that Smith and D. D. Colby,
son of the Indian agent, have each presented claims against the government
for these articles. 'l'he buffalo robes mentioned above were also claimed by
Samuel G. Colby, D. D. Colby and John Smith. One bale of buffalo robes
was marked S. S. Soule, 1st Colorado cavalry, and I am informed that one
bale was marked Anthony, Major Anthony being in command of :E'ort Lyon at •
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that time. I cannot say what has been done with the property since I was relieved of the command and mustered out of service. There was a large quantity of Indian trinkets taken at the Indian camp which were of no value. The
soldiers retained a few of these as trophies ; the remainder with the Indian
lodges were destroyed.
lOth question. What reason had you for making the attack 1 What reasons,
if any, had you to believe that Black Kettle or any other Indian or Indians in
the camp entertained feelings of hostility towards the whites 1 Give in detail
the names of all Indians so believed to be hostile, with the dates and places of
their hostile acts, so far as you may be able to do so.
Answer. My reason for making the attack on the Indian camp was, that I
believed the Indians in the camp were hostile to the whites. That they were of
the same tribes with those who had murdered many persons and destroyed much
valuable property on the Platte and Arkansas rivers during the previous spring,
summer and fall was beyond a doubt. When a tribe of Indians is at war with
the whites it is impossible to determine what party or band of the tribe or the
name of the Indian or Indians belonging to the tribe so at war are guilty of
the acts of hostility. The most that can be ascertained is that Indians of
the tribe have performed the acts. During the spring, summer and fall of the
year 1864, the Arapaho and Cheyenne Indians, in sqme instancee assisted or led
on by Sioux, Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches, had committed many acts of hostility in the country lying between the Little Blue and the Rocky mountains
and the Platte and Arkansas rivers. They had murdered many of the whites
and taken others prisoners, and had des ~!toyed valuable property, probably amounting to $:d00,000 or $300,000. Their rendezvous was on the headwaters of the
Republican, probably one hundred miles from where the Indian camp was located. I had every reason to believe that these Indians were either directly
or indirectly concerned in the outrages which had been committed upon the
whites. I had no means of ascertaining what were the names of the Indians
who had committed these outrages other than the declarations of the Indians
themselves ; and the character of Indians in the western country for truth and
veracity, like their respect for the chastity of women who may become prisoners in their hands, is not of that ora er which is calculated to inspire confidence
in what they may say. In this view I was supported . by Major Anthony, 1st
Colorado cavalry, commanding at Fort Lyon, and Samuel G. Colby, United States
Indian agent, who, as they had been in communication with these Indians, were
more competent to judge of their disposition towards the whites than myself.
Previous to the battle they expressed to me the opinion that the Indians should
be punished. We found in the camp the scalps of nineteen (19) white persons.
One of the surgeons informed me that one of these scalps had been taken from
the victim's head not more than four days previously. I can furnish a child
captured at the camp ornamented with six white women's scalps; these scalps
must have been taken by these Indians or furnished to them for their gratification
and amusement by some of their brethren, who, like themselves, were in amity
with the whites.
11th qnestion. Had you any, and if so. what reason, to believe that Black
Kettle and the Indians with him, at the time of your attack, were at peace with
the whites, and desired to remain at peace with them 1
Answer. I had no rea8on to believe that Black Kettle and the Indians with
him were in good faith at peace with the whites. The day before the attack
Major Scott J. Anthony, 1st Colorado cavalry, then in command at Fort Lyon,
told me that these Indians were hostile ; that he had ordered his sentinels to
fire on them if they attempted to come into the post, and that the sentinels had
fired on them ; that he was apprehensive of an attack from these Indians, and
had taken every precaution to prevent a surprise. Major Samuel G. Colby,
United States Indian agent for these Indians, told me on the same day that he
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had done everything in his power to make them behave themselves, and that
for the last six ruonths he could do nothing with them; that nothing but a
sound whipping would bring a lasting peace with them. These statements were
made to me in the presencA of the officers of my staff whose statements can be
obtained to corroborate the foregoing.
12th question. Had you reason to know or believe that these Indians had
sent their chief and leading men at any time to Denver city, in order to take
measure in connection with the superintendent of Indian afl'airs there, or with
any other person having authority, to secure friendly relations with the whites 1
Answer. I was present at an interview between Governor Evans on the part
of the whites, and Black Kettle and six other Indians, at Camp Weldmar,
Denver, about the 27th of September, 1864, in which tl1e Indians desired peace,
but did not propose terms. General Curtis, by telegraph to me, declined to
make peace with them, and said that there could be no peace without his consent. Governor Evans declined to treat with them, ani! as General Curtis was
then in command of the department, and, of course, I could not disobey his instructions. General Curtis's terms of peace were to require all bad Indians to
be given up, all stock stolen by the Indians to be delivered up, and hostages
given by the Indians for their good conduct. 'l'he Indians never complied with
these terms.
13th question. Were 1hose Indians, to your knowledge, referred by the superintendent of Indian affahs to the military authorities, as the only power under
the government to afford them protection 't
Answer. Governor Evans, in the conference mentioned in my last answer, did
not refer the Indians to the military authorities for protection, but for terms of
peace. He told the Indians "that he was the peace chief~ that they had gone
to war, and, therefore, must deal with the war chiefs." It was at this time. I
gave them the terms of General Curtis, and they said they had not received
power to make peace on such terms, that they would report to their young men
and see what they would say to it; they would like to do it, but if their young
men continued the war they would have to go with them. They said there
were three or four small war parties of their young men out on the war path
agains t the whites at that tim e. This ended the talk.
14th question. Did the officer in command of Fort Lyon, to your knowledget
at any time extend the protection of our fiag to Black Kettle and the Indians
with him, and direct them to encamp upon the reservation of the fort 1
Answer. Major E. W. Wynkoop, 1st cavalry, Colorado, did, as I have been
informed, allow some of these Indians to camp at or near Fort Lyon, and did
promise them the protection of our fiag. Subsequently he was relieved of the
command of Fort Lyon, and Major Anthony plaeed in command at that post,
who required the Indians to comply with General Curtis's terms, which they
failed to do, and. thereupon Major Anthony drove them away from the post.
15th question. Were rations ever issued to those Indians either as prisoners
of war or otherwise 1
Answer. I have been informed that Major Wynkoop issued rations to the
Indians encamped near }""ort Lyon while he ·was in command, but whether as prisoners of war I do not know. I think that Major Anthony did not issue any rations.
16th question. And did those Indians remove, in pnrsuance of the directions,
instructions, or suggestions of the commandant at }""ort Lyon, to the place on
Sand creek, where they were attacked by you 1
Answer. I have been informed that Major Anthony, commandant at Fort
Lyon, did order the Indians to remove from that post, but I am not aware that
they were ordered to go to the place where the battle was fought, or to any other
place.
17th question. "Vhat measures were taken by you, at any time, to render the
attack on those Indians a surprise 1
Part VI---8
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A~"!swer. I took every precaution to render the attack upon the Indian~ a
surprise, for the reason that we had been chasing small parties of them all the
summer and f:1ll without being able to catch them, and it appeared to me that
the only way to deal with them was to surprise them in their place of rendezvous.
General Curtis, in his campaign against them, had failed to catch them; General
Mitchel had met with no better success; General Blunt had been surprised by
them, and his command nearly cut to pieces.
18th question. State in detail the disposition made of the various articles of
property, horses, mules, ponies, buffalo robes, &c., captured by you at the time
of this attack, and by what authority was such disposition made 1
Answer. The horses and mules that had been stolen from the government
were turned over to the officer who had been responsible for the same; and the
animals belo11ging to Atzins was returned to them upon proof being made of
such ownership. The animals not disposed of in this way were turned over to
Captain S. J. Johnson, 3d regiment Colorado cavalry, with instructions to proceed with the same to Denver, and turn them into the quartermaster's department.
After the command arrived in DenvPr, I again directed Captain Johnson to turn
over the stock to Captain C. L. Gorton, assistant quartermaster, at that pl8ce. The
buffalo robes were turned into the hospital for use of the wounded as before stated.
19th question. Make such further statement as you may desire, or which may
be necessary to a full understanding of all matters relating to the attack upon
the Indians at Sand creek.
Answer. Since August, 18G3, I had been in possession of the most conclusive
evidence of the alliance, for the purposes of hostility against the whites, of the
Sioux, Cheyennes, Arapahoes. Camanche river, and Apache Indians. '.rheir
plan was to interrupt, or, if possible, entirely prevent all travel on the routes
along the Arkansas and Platte rivers ftom the States to the Rocky mountains,
and thereby depopulate this country. Rebel emissaries were long since sent
among the Indians to incite them against the whites, and afford a medium of
communication between the rebels and the Indians; among whom was Gerry
Bent, a half'-breed Cheyenne Indian, but educated, and to all appearances a
white man, who, having served under Price in Missouri, and afterwards becoming
a bushwhacker, being taken prisoner, took the oath of allegiance, and ·was
paroled, after which be immediately joined the Indians, and has ever since been
one of their most prominent leaclcrs in all depredations upon the whites. I have
been reliably informed that this half-breed, Bent, in order to incite the Indians
against the whites, told them that the Great Father at Washington having all
he could do to fight his children at the south, they conld now regain their country.
When John Evans, governor of Colorado Territory, and ex officio superintendent of indian affairs, visited by appointment the Cheyenne Indians on the
Republican fork of the Kansas river, to talk with them in regard to their relations with the govemment, the Indians would have nothing to say to him, nor
would they receive tho presents sent them by the govemment, but immediately
on his arrival at the said point the Indians moved to a great distance, all their
villages appearing determined not to have any intercourse with him individually
or as the agent of the goverument.
This state of affairs continued for a number of months, durin?; which time
white men who had been trading with the Indians informed me that the Indians
had determined to make war upon the whites as soon as the. grass was green,
and that they were making preparations for such an event by the large number
of arrows they were making and the quantity of arms and ammunition they
were collecting; that the settlers along the Platte and Arkansas rivers should
iJe warned of the approaching danger; that .the Indians had cleclarecl their
intention to prosecute the war vigorously when they commenced. vVith very
few troops at my command I could do but little to protect the settlers except to
collect the latest intelligence from the Indians' country, communicate it to
General Ourtis, commanding department of Missouri, and warn the settlers of
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the relatioue existing between the Indians and the whites, and the probability
of trouble, all of which I did.
:
Last April, 1864, the Indians, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and others, commenced their depredations upon the whites by entering their isolated habitations in the distant parts of this territory, taking therefrom everything they
desired, and destroying the balance; driving off their stock, horses, mules and
'cattle. I sent a detachment of troops after the Indians to recover the stolen
property, when the stock, &c., being demanded of them they (the Indians)
refused to surrender the property so taken from the whites, and stated that they
wanted to fight the troops. Again, when a few weeks after the country along·
the Platte river, near Fremont's orchard, became the theatre of their depredations, one Ripley, a ranchman, living on the Bijon creek, near camp Sanborn,
came into camp and informed Captain Sanborn, commanding, that his stock had
all been stolen by the Indians, requesting assistance to recover it. Captain Sanborn ordered Lieutenant Clark Dunn, with a detachment of troops, to pursue
the Indians and recover the stuck ; but, if possible, to avoid a collision with
them. Upon approaching the Indians, Lieutenant Dunn dismounted, walked
forward alone about fifty paces from his command, and requested the Indians
to return the stock, which .M:r. Ripley had recognized as his ; but the Indians
treated him with contempt, and commenced firing upon him, which resulted in
four of the troops being wounded and about fifteen Indians being killed and
wounded, Lieutenant Dunn narrowly escaping with his life. Again, about one
hnnclred and seventy-five head of cartle were stolen from Messrs. Irwin and
Jackman, government freighters, when troops were sent in pursuit toward the
headwaters of the Republican. 1'hey were fired upon by the Indians miles
from where the Indians \Vere camped. In lhis encounter the Indians killed one
soldier and wounded another. Again, when the troops were near the Smoky
Hill, after stock, while passing through a canon, about eighty m1les from l!..,ort
Larned, they were attacked by these same Cheyenne Indians, and others, and
almost cut to pieces, there being about fifteen hundred Indians. Again, when
on a Sunday morning tho Kiowas ancl Camanches were at Fort Larned, to
obtain the rations that the commanding officer, on behalf of the government,
was issuing to them, they, at a precoucerted signal, fired upon the sentinels at
the fort, making a general attack upon the unsuspecting garrison, while the
balance of the Indians were driving off the stock belonging to the government,
and then as suddenly departed, leaving the garrison afoot excepting about
thirty artillery horses that were saved; thus obtaining in all about two hundred
and eighty l1ead of stock,:including a small herd taken from the suttler at that post.
Again, a few days after this, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes Indians, with
whom I had the fight at Sand creek, meeting a government train bound for New
Mexico, thirty miles east of Fort Ln,rned, at Walnut creek, who, after manifesting a great deal of friendship by shaking hands, &c., with every person in the
train, suddenly attacked them, killing fourteen anu wounding a number more,
scalping and mutilating in the most inhuman manner those they killed, while
they scalped two of this party alive, one a boy about fourteen years of age 1
who has since become an imbecile. The two persons that were scalped alive I
saw a few days after this occurred. Though it occurred within sight of Fort
Zarah, the officer commanding considered his command entirely inadequate to
render any assistance. But we think we have related enough to satisfy the
most inCI~dulous of the determined hostility of these Indians; suffice it to say
that during the spring, summer, and fall such atrocious acts were of almost
daily occurrence along· the Platte and Arkansas routes, till the Indians becoming so bold that a family, consisting of a man, 'voman, and two children, by the
name of Hungate, were brutally murdered and scalped within fifteen miles of
Denver, the bodies being brought to Denver for interment. After seeing which, any
person who could for a moment believe that these Indians were friendly, to say the
least, must have strange ideas ~f their habits. We could not see it in that light.
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This last atrocious act was referred to by Governor Evans iu Ills talk with
the Cheyennes and Arapahoes Indians on about the 27th day of September,
1864, at Denver, Colorado Territory. The Indians then stated that it had been
done by members of their tribe, and that they never denied it. All these things
were promptly reported to Major General S. R. Curtis, commanding department,
who repeatedly ordered me, regardlesR of district lines, to appropriately chastis~
the Indians, which I always endeavored to do. Major General S. R. Curtis
himself and Brigadear General R. B. Mitchell made campaigns against the
Indians, but could not find them; the Indians succeeded in keeping entirely
from their view. Again, Major General J.P. Blunt made a campaign against the
Indians; was surprised by them, and a portion of his command nearly cutto pieces.
Commanding only a district with very few troops under my control, with
hundreds of miles between my headquarters and rendezvous of tho Indians,
with a large portion of the Sante Ji'e and Platte routes, besid6s the sparsely
settled and distant settlements of this T'erritory, to protect, I could not do anything till the 3d regiment was organized and equipped, when I determined to
strike a blow against this savage and determined foe. \Vhen I reached lfort
Lyon, after passing over from three to five feet of snow, and greatly suffering
from the intAnsity of the cold, the thermometer ranging from 28 to :jO degrees
below zero, I questioned Major Anthony in regard to the whereabouts of hostile Indians. He said there was a camp of Cheyennes and Arapahoes abo11t
fifty miles distant; that he would have attacked before, but did not consider his
force sufficient; that these Indians had threatened to attack the post, &c., and
ought to be whipped, all of which was concurred in by J\iajor Colley, Indian
agent for the district of the Arkansas, which information, with the positive
orders from M11jor General Curtis, commanding the department, to punish these
Indians, decided my course, and resulted in the battle of Sand Creek, which
has created sueh a sensation in Congress through the lying reports of interested
and malicious parties.
On my arrival at J!'~ort Lyon, in all my conversatious with Major Anthony,
commanding the post, and Major Colley, Indian agent, I heard nothing of this
recent statement that the Indians were under the protection of the government,
&c.; but Mn;ior Anthony repeatedly stated to me that he had at difl'erent times
fired upon these Indians, and that they were hostile, and, during my stay at
Fort Lyon, urged the neceesity of my immediately attacking the Indians before
they could learn of the number of troops at Fort Lyon, and so desirous wa;;;
Major Colly, Indian agent, that I should find and also attack the Arapahoe::,
that he sent a messenger after the fight at Sand creek, nearly forty miles, to
inform me wher_e I could find the Arapahoes and Kiowas; yet, strange to say,
I have learned recently that these men, Anthony and Colly, are the most bitter
in their denunciations of the attack upon the lndians at Sand creek. T'hereforc, I ·would, in conclusion, most respectfully demand, as an act of justice to
myself and the brave men whom I have had the honor to command in one of
the hardest campaigns ever made 111 this country, whether against white men
or red, that we be allowed that right guarranteed to every American citizen, 'of
introducing evidence in our behalf to sustain us in what we believe to have
been an act of duty to ourselves and to civilization.
We simply ask to introduce as witnesses men that were present during the
campaign and know all the facts.
J. l'L CHIVINGTON,
Licu't Col. 1st C(walry qf Colcrado, Com'd'g Dist.IJf Co1eradr>.
Sworn and subscribed to before me this 26th day of April, 1865.
ALEXANDER vV. ATKINS,
Notary Public.

ICE CONTRACTS.

Testimony

of Mr. Addison Gage.

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1864.
Mr. ADDISON GAGE sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Where is your place of residence 1
Answer. Boston, Massachusetts.
Question. What is your occupation? How long have you been engaged in
your present business, and to what extent 1
Answer. I have been twenty-five years in the ice business, and that is my
business now. I think the average amount of my business for twenty years
past would reach 75,000 tons of ice a year. The business of Addison Gage &
Co. is confined to the city of Boston, and shipping ice from Boston. I have
been interested :for a great many years, in connexion with others, in supplying
the cities of Charleston, South Carolina, Savannah, Georgia, Mobile, Alabama,
and New Orleans with ice.
Question. Have you supplied any ice to the · government at New Orleans
since its recapture by our forces 1
Answer. From some time in June, 1862, to about the first of April, 1863, I
supplied the hospitals in New Orleans under written contract with the Surgeon
General.
Question. Do you recollect what you received per ton for your ice 1
Answer. I had $1 50 per hundred pounds, delivered daily, as they required.
Question. Delivered to the hospitals, or delivered to them to be taken to the
hospitals 1
Answer. Sometimes it was delivered by us at the hospitals, and sometimes
delivered at the ice-house. • We delivered it at the hospitals immediately in the
city. Those outside of the city would send their ambulances or wagons to the
ice-house for it.
Question. You delivered it at $1 50 per hundred pounds at the hospitals
within the city proper, where it was wanted, and it was carried by the government from the ice-house to the hospitals outside of the city 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know the amount of ice you delivered, or the amount .of
your bills for ice during that period 1
Answer. I cannot now give the exact amount. But the whole amount Ireceived from the government for ice during that time was inside of $2,000.
Question. Did you supply all the ice the government required during that
time 1
Answer. I think I supplied all the ice that was required for the hospitals
there, with the exception of perhaps some eight days that I was out of ice, and I
cannot say now that I, or my partner there, did not bring the ice during that time
and deliver it to the hospitals; at least, with that exception, I delivered all the
ice that was required.
Question. Have you been supplying the government with ice during the past
year at New Orleans 1
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Answer. Not to the government, but I supplied ice in New Orleans.
Question. At what rate did you deliver ice in New Orleans during last year ?
Answer. The price of ice during the last year varied considerably. During
1863 the price was $2 per hundred pounds. But at one time, in consequence
of vessels making v:ery long passages, the price went up very high. I think
ice was sold as high as $100 a ton, delivered in New Orleans. But that was
only for a short time-for two or three weeks.
Question. Was your contract with the government an open contract 1 Were
you continuing to supply them without limit as to time 1
Answer. I think so; I think it merely stated that I was to supply them.
Either party, I think, could dissolve the contract at any time by giving notice.
Question. When did that contract terminate, and under what circumstances 1
Answer. We were notified about the first of April, I think, that the government had ice of their own, and did not wish us to furnish it to them any longer.
Question. Did you know, prior to that time, that the government had advertised for ice for New Orleans 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Tell us all you know in relation to that.
Answer. Some time in February, 1863, a gentleman calling himself Major
Tiffany, representing that he had been connected with the government, and
was a sort of agent for the government, called at our office in Boston and asked
if I was going to put in any bid for supplying ice, under the proposals then
out to supply the government with ice. I informed him that I did not think I
should; that, with the exception of New Orleans, I did not care to supply ice,
and as I was already supplying the government there as low as I could afford
to do it, I' did not think I would put in any bid at ' all, for I did not suppose
the government would give a higher price for ice without first ascertaining
whether I would continue to supply at the rates for which I was then supplying ice. He stated that he should have the giving out of those contracts, as
he had got up the advertisements, and if I wanted any of them I must get
them through him, as he had the management of that business. I declined to
put in any bid, and never did.
Question. Do you know who did supply the government with ice at New
Orleans 1
Answer. This Major Tiffany.
Question. Do you know at what rate and in what manner 1
Answer. He informed me that he supplied it at the rate of $22 50 per ton,
putting it in at invoice weight, less 15 per cent. wastage on the passage.
Question. Where delivered, and how ?
Answer. He delivered it on board the vessels alongside the levee in New Orleans, charging for the quantity invoiced as put in when the vessels were loaded,
less 15 per cent. ,
Question. Did' the government discharge the vessels, or did he discharge them 1
Answer. The government discharged the vessels, and paid demurrage, allowing four days to discharge each vessel.
Question. What would be the ordinary wastage of ice in shipping it as that
was shipped, and from the points where that was shipped1
Answer. That is a question I cannot answer accurately, for this reason: ice
cannot be well loaded where these parties loaded that ice. Ordinarily for vessels
loading ice in Boston and taking it to New Orleans the wastage during the
winter months would probably be 15 per cent., and during the summer months
30 per cent. But the wastag·e upon cargoes shipped as those were would, in
the ordinary course of business during the year, be more than three times that,
probably, and I do not know but what more, in consequence of their being
loaded by inexperienced men, not acquainted with the proper manner of pack-
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1ng ice on board vessels, and the inconvenience of getting proper packing material where those ves:>els were loaded in the .,tate of Maine.
Question. Do you know what was done with this ice after it was delivered
at the levee at New Orleans 1
,
Answer. It was put into one 0 f my ice-houses.
Question. Have you any knowledge of the vessels in which that ice was
shipped-the amount they carried 1
. Answer. I have not, except of one. There was one-I cannot give the name
of it now, because I did not bring my memorandum with me-whose invoice
was nearly, if not quite, double the amount she could carry, as I was informed
in New Orleans by the officer who discharged her. But that can be very easily
ascertained, because a man experienced in loading vessels with ice can tell the
tonnage within a very few tons ; he can measure it almost as accurately as the
ice could be weighed.
Question. Do you know anything about the time required to discharge any
of those vessels 1
Answer. Not of my own knowledge ; I only know from report.
Question. What would have been a fair price for furni:shing ice under that
contract according to its terms 1
Answer. I should have been willing to have taken the contract at the time he took
it, and delivered the ice there at invoice weight, as he delivered it, for~ l1 or $12
a ton, and I would have had the quantity certified to which I should put on
board the vessels at Boston. The fi·eight would have been about $8 a ton, and
the ice from $3 to $4 a ton; and I would have conducted the business as I usually do it, have had good ice and shipped it in good order ; and as I should
have put up that ice, the loss by wastage on the passage to New Orleans would
not have been over 15 per cent. during the winter months, and not over 30 per cent.
during the summer months.
Question. I find, from evidence furnished this committee by the War Department, that it cost the government $91, lOS 30 to supply ice to the hospitals in
New Orleans during the year 1863. You say you supplied ice to the hospitals
there from J nne, 1862, to April, 1863, and the whole amount of your bills with
the government for that was less than $2,0001
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Can you explain to the committee how it is that there is such a
remarkable difference in the cost of ice for those hospitals during the time in
which you supplied it, and during the time in which it was supplied by this contractor, Tiffany 1
Answer. In the first place, the ice never was properly shipped; the quantity
that the government paid for probably never was put on board the vessels. In
the next place, they took an ice-house and opened it just as often to furnish
what little a hospital wanted as it would have been to furnish four times as
much, or any large quantity. And the wastage in opening au ice-house is relatively the same to take out a very small quantity as to take <-mt a large quantity.
The percentage of waste is much less in delivering a large quantity of ice than
in delivering a small quantity. The manner in which the government has done
their business is not the same that individuals would follow. As ice dissolves
into water very rapidly when the thermometer stands at 90°, it generally goes
very quick if it is not taken care of. I have no other knowledge of my own in
regard to the matter. There are probably various other causes which tended
to increase the cost.
Question. Do you know whether the ice delivered there under that contract
was treated as free ice-delivered very freely to everybody who wanted it 1
Answer. I was informed so when I was down there, but I do not know how
reliable that information was.
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Question. What would have been the b~st and most economical way for the
to have supplied ice to its hospitals in New Orleans 1
.Answer. To have bought it of the dealers, day by day, as they did in 1862.
There were plenty of dealers there .who would have contracted to keep ice on
hand.
Question. At what rate could the government have been supplied with ice
there 1 ·
Answer. I should have continued to have supplied ice to the hospitals during
the year 1863 for the same that I supplied it in 1862, if they had not stopped
me. If I had had to make a new contract for 1863, I think I should not have
agreed to supply ice at less than $40 a ton.
Question. Deliver it as you were then _delivering it 1
.Answer, .As I delivered it in 1862.
gover~ment

By Mr. Odell :
Question. Do you count 'by the long or short ton 1
.Answer. 'rhe short ton-2,000 pounds.
By the chairman:
Question. What, in your judgment, would it have cost the government for
ice there had you supplied them during 1863 upon the terms at which you supplied it in 1862 1
Answer. From the knowledge I have of the number of hospitals in New
Orleans I do not believe it would have cost the government over $5,000 for
the year 1863; at any rate, it could not possibly have been $10,000.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Do you mean to say that what cost the government $91,108 30,
under the contract with Tiffany, could have been furnished by you for from
$5,000 to $10,000 1
Answer. That is what I mean to say; and allow me to say that the amount
stated to have been paid to Major Tiffany does not include the rent of -the icehouEte, the expense of discharging the ice from the vessels, and the expense of
men to take care of the ice-house and deliver the ice.
Question. Could you, or not, in your opinion, have supplied the government
with all the ice they needed in New Orleans last year for what it cost the government to take care of and deliver ice after it was deliYered to them under
this contract 1
.Answer. I would have been willing to furnish them with all the ice they
wanted there, delivered daily, for what it cost the government beyond the
amount paid the contractor; that is, $3,000 for the ice-house, which the government have to pay me ; tl1en discharging the ice-it costs me a dollar a ton,
invoice weight, to get the ice from the vessel into the ice-house; and then the
expense of the men to take care of the ice-house and deliver the ice. That
last item depends upon the amount delivered. He keeps four men in the icehouse to deliver this year, and if he does not deliver more than 200 or 300
pounds a day it comes higher.
Question. Why did you not put in a bid for that contract 1
Answer. Because when Major Tiffany called upon me he represented him-,
self as an agent of the government, and as having this in his control, so that
no bid could be received except through him.
By Mr. Harding:
Question. He was the man who finally got the contract 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
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By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Do you know whether he called on other ice dealers in New
England 1
.Answer. He told me that he had.
Question. Did any dealer you know of bid for this contract 1
.Answer. I think not.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Did you see the advertised proposals 1
.Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Why did you not bid 1
.Answer. }.,or the reasons I have already given. I supposed at the time that
the government would not alter the contract in New Orleans and pay a higher
price without first taking some steps to find out whether I would continue to
furnish it as I was then doing it. He represented that no contract could be
given out except with his sanction. I therefore determined to have nothing to
do with it.
Question. Did you understand him to be in the employ of the government at
that time 1
.Answer. Yes, sir, from his representations.
Question. By whom were these 'advertisements for ice signed 1
.Answer. By Surg~on General Hammond, I think ; they may have been
signed by Mr. Smith as acting Surgeon General.
Question. Did Mr. Tiffany'!!! name appear at all in the advertisement 1
Answer. No, sir. He brought the advertisement into my office when he
came in, and wanted to know if I had seen it. I told him I had.
Question. And the result of that interview with Major Tiffany induced you
not to bid for the contract 1
.Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you suppose there was no use in bidding 1
Answer. It was that, taken in connexion with the situation that I held in
New Orleans in supplying ice. I told him that there was no other point I cared
about, and I would let the matter rest and see how it would come out. I think
if I had not been supplying the government in New Orleans, and had wished
to do so, I should have put in a bid; but having things represented to me as
they were, and not being exactly satisfied with the man, I concluded not to
mix myself up with it in any way.
Question. Was the advertisement for any other points than New Orleans 1
Answer. Yes, sir; the whole coast, clear down, I think.
Question. During the time you supplied ice to the government, did you fail
·
to comply with any of its requirements 1
.Answer. Only for the few days I have referred to.
Question. Was that a time when there was a pressure upon the hospitals 1
Answer. No, sir; and I do not know but my man there furnished it all the
time; but I would not like to state that positively.
Question. W &.S the government induced to make other arrangements from
any failure on your part 1
'
.Answer. No, sir; after the eight days were out my ice arrived, and I had
plenty of ice from that time, and continued to supply it to the government all
the time.
Question. Were you complained of to the government at any time during
the time of your contract 1
.Answer. Not at all.
Question. So far as you know, your manner of conducting business with the
government was entirely satisfactory to the parties who had knowledge of it 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
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By the chairman :
Question. Did the Surgeon General give any reason for taking the contract
from you and giving it to other parties 1
Answer. No, sir. The medical purveyor, or the man who had charge there,
said that the government had their own ice, or that their own ice had arrived,
and they would take no more from me after that time.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Did they take your ice-hom~e by agreement with you 1
Answer. No, sir; they said that military necessity required them to take
the ice-house. I had two or three there, and had not used this one to put ice in
since I built it.
·
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Do you know what would have been a fair price for ice supplied
to the hospitals in New York and vicinity during the last year 1
Answer. 1,he only knowledge I have of deliveting ice in New York is at
David's island, where I think is the largest hospital. It would cost about five
dollars a ton, invoice weight, there.
Question. Was there anything during the last season to cause any variation
in the price of ice purchased in open ma'rket in New York 1
Answer. Yes, sir; the price of ice varied very much last season in consequence
of the government using or wasting so much, and of there not being an overstock of ice. The price during the summer went up to a high rate-higher than
I have ever known before.
Question. What was the maximum price in Boston, where you were familiar
with it 1
Answer. In the month of August I sold it as high as fifteen dollars a ton on
board the vessel.
•
Question. For how long a time did that rate continue 1
Answer. For only two or three weeks.
Question. What would have been a fair price during the last year to have
delivered, say, eighty tons of ice at Annapolis, Maryland 1
Answet:. The way I have generally delivered there, it would be about five
dollars a ton. I am basing these prices upon th1e idea that the contracts were
made at the time the proposals advertised they should be made-not at a time
during the summer, because there was a gn~at change in the price.
Question. What would have been a fair price for, say, 3,500 tons of ice delivered here in Washington during the last year-! mean delivered in the vessel at the wharf, and taken out by the government 1
Answer. Between six and seven dollars a ton.
Question. What would it have cost per ton to have got it into the ice-house 1
Answer. I could not state, because, though I know where the government
ice-house is here, I do not know the facilities for discharging vessels there.
Question. Properly stored and taken care of, how many people would 3,500
tons of ice have supplied in the city of Washington last year 1
Answer. I should not want to state that, because I have no data to go upon.
Question. What would have been a fair price for delivering 1,428 tons of ice
at }"'ortress Monroe during last year according to the terms of the advertisement you have already referred to 1
Answer. 'I'hese contracts were not given out according to the terms of the
advertisement; if I recollect now, the advertiseJUent was for delivering so much
ice at these places. After making the contract, it was changed so as to take the
ice at invoice weight. The way we understood the advertisement, it was to deliver ice at those place at so much, weighed there; whereas the contracts, after
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they were awarded, were changed to taking the ice at invoice weight, with certain percentage allowed for wastage from places of loading to the places of discharging, so that there was no chance for anybody to bid understandingly, the
advertisement was so ambiguous. According to the terms of the proposal ice
would be worth about the same at Fortress Monroe as at W ashirigton-perhaps
a little less.
Question. Did the government suffer much by this difference between the
terms of the contracts and the terms of the proposals ?
Answer. Yes, sir, very much.
Question. What would have been a fair price for delivering ice at Newbern
last year? Understand that in all these cases the ice is to be taken from the
vessels by the government.
Answer. Between eight and nlne dollars a ton, I should think.
Question. What would have been a fair price, under the terms of this pr~
posal, for delivering say 1,762 tons of ice last year at Hilton Head 1
Answer. About the same price as at Newbern. The freight would have been
about the same. The ice would have cost no more when invoiced.
Question. What would have been a fair price for the delivery of three hundred and twelve tons of ice at Key West last year 1
Answer. About eleven dollars a ton; about the same as at New Orleans, because the freight would have been about the same, and the ice would have been
worth about the same on board the vessel.
Question. What would have been a fair price for the delivery of four hundred
tons at Pensacola, Florida 1
·
Answer. About the same as at New Orleans-from eleven to twelve dollars a
ton. It is the freight that makes the difference; the ice is worth no more on
.:.
the vessel.
Question. Do you know anything about what was done with the ice at Pensacola last year 1
Answer. The medical purveyor, who has charge now of the ice-houses at New
Orleans, told me that he was at Pensacola last year when that cargo of ice arrived there. The government had no place in which to put it, and they dug a
hole in the sand and buried it up, and in four days the ice was all gone.
By Mr. Harding:
Question. How long could the ice have been kept in the vessel 1
Answer.•Ice can be packed in a vessel so as to stay six months; but packed
as that was it probably would not have lasted very long.
By the chairman:
Question. Would an ice merchant, who had contracted to be paid for what
was put on board, be likely to take much pains in packing or storing the ice ?
Answer. That would depend somewhat upon the character of the man.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Are you familiar with the delivery of ice at Baton Rouge 1
Answer. I am constantly sending ice, by the hogshead, from New Orleans to
Baton Rouge.
Question. What would ice cost per ton delivered at Baton Rouge-say a cargo
of 325 tons 1
Answer. When we are selling ice in New Orleans at $2 per 100, we charge
packed to go up the river, to any of those points, half a cent .a pound extrathat is, $2 50 per 100 pounds. The men who take it. up there to sell again
usually add about fifty per cent. to that, in order to make their profit in retailing
in those places. A cargo of 325 tons, towed to Baton Rouge by the government,
could be delivered there at about $300 more the cargo than it would cost at New
Orleans.

10

ICE CONTRACTS.

Question. Have you any information as to whether this cargo of ice was
towed up by the government 1
Answer. I do not know of my own knowledge. I was told that it was.
Q,uestion. Are you familiar with the price of ice at St. Louis, Cairo, Louisville,
Nashville, Memphis, or Vicksburg 1
Answer. I am not.
Question. Can you inform the committee whether or not this J. C. Tiffany
·
has been known in the ice trade 1
Answer. He never has until the last year.
Question. Has A. T. Edgerton been known to the ice trade 1
Answer. Never until the last year. Question. Do you know what the business of these men has been heretofore1
Answer. Not of my own knowledge. Mr. Tiffany said he had been connected
with the army.
Question. Did he say in what capacity 1
.Answer. He remarked that in so many months he had had so many millions of
dollars of government money pass through his hands. I supposed from what
he said that he was a paymaster, though he did not use that word.
Question. Have you any knowledge at all of Mr. Edgerton 1
Answer. From information that I received from himself-nothing very definite-! think he has ' been a speculator following the army; a sutler, or something of that kind.
Question. Is there any connexion between Edgerton and Tiffany that you
know on
.Answer. Mr. Edgerton told me that he was interested in all contracts taken
with Tiffany.
Question. Have you any knowledge of any recent contracts made, or proposed
to be made, by the War Department for the supplying of ice for this year1 If
so, state all that you know about it.
•
Answer. I have. On the 31st day of December last, my son and partner
made a contract with J. W. Parrish & Co., of St. Louis. The person they made
the contract with was George C. Hadley, who signs himself" for Parrish & Co.' 1
He represented that he had made a contract with the government-though the
contract had not then been completed-to put 3,000 tons of ice into the icehouse at New Orleans at $25 a ton, measured in the house inNew Orleans. My
son took that contract from him at $18 75 per ton; the ice to be puttin between
now and the 1st of May next, measured and paid for as soon as put into the
house. The house is to be furnished by me, and the government is to take the
ice with the free use of the house.
Question. What have Parrish & Co. to do with the ice after you have put it
into your ice-house, and it is ready .fQr delivery 1
.Answer. Nothing at all.
Question. Does the government accept the ice as you store it in your icehouse, or is it to be delivered by Parrish & Co.1
Answer. rl'he government receives the ice in the ice-house; and it is their ice
and ice-house as long as the ice lasts.
By the chairman:
Question. So that the difference between what the government contra~ted to
pay, and what you have agreed to deliver it for, is so much clear gain to Parrish & Co.1
Answer. Yes, sir; $18,7 50.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. In fulfilling this ,contract have Parrish & Co. any expenditure to
make?
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.Answer. None at all.
vertisement.
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I should have bid for this contract had I seen the ad-

By Mr. Gooch:
'Question. How did it happen that you did not see the advertisement 1
Answer. It was only advertised in the western papers.
Question. In your judgment, for what amount can the government hospitals
in New Orleans and vicinity be supplied with ice from the New Orleans market
for the present year 1
Answer. Not to exceed $10,000.
Question. That includes all the ice that would be necessary 1
.Answer. Yes, sir.
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By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What is your residence; your present business; and how long have
you been engaged in it 1
Answer. My place of residence is this city. My business is dealing in ice;
and this is the ninth year, I think, that I have been engaged in it.
Question. Can you tell me about what quantity of ice you dispose of in a
year in this place-that is, how much do you deliver to your customers 1
Answer. We buy in the neighborhood of 10,000 tons; we do not sell more
than half of it, or very little more.
Question. What proportion of the population in this city do you supply 1
.Answer. I really cannot tell.
Question. Do you and Mr. Godey supply the city of Washington 1
Answer. I believe we do pretty much. I do not think that for the last two
or three years there has been anybody but Mr. Godey and myself in the business.
Question, At what season of the year do you contract for your ice, and
where 1
Answer. We contract as soon as the ice-cutting is over; about this time of the
year generally. We generally purchase our ice in Boston, sometimes in Maine;
but we generally purchase in Boston, because the ice is packed better, and the
freight is a little lower in Boston, and more easily obtained.
·
Question. Where is the quantity of your ice determined 1 That is, do you
take it by the amount put on board the vessels in Boston 1
Answer. We suppose it to be weighed in Boston; we know nothing about
that part of it. We generally deal with men whom we can rely upon. '.rhey
say: We have sent you, per bill of lading, so inany tons of ice, and we take
it for granted that it is so. Of course when we weigh it here we do not find so
much, on account of the loss.
Question. Is there any difference between ice packed in Boston and ice
packed in Maine 1
Answer. I think we get more from the ice packed in Boston. In ::t\faine the
ice does not sometimes come out in good shape ; some pieces are six feet, some
three, and some two feet long; there is no regular shape to it. In Boston it is
gauged to about twenty-two inches, and.it packs much better in the vessel.
And it is packed more nicely in Boston; in Maine they do not take that trouble.
As to weighing it, I do not know how it is done in Maine; I do not know that
it is ·done at all; it is measured, perhaps.
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Q.uestion. Do you remember what your ice cost you last year, here in your
ice-house 1
Answer. Under the first contract that we made it cost us about $6 a ton here.
· Question. Could you have contracted at that time for all that you wanted 1
Answer. Yes, sir. The cost of ice here depends upon the freights; they
vary sometimes, but at that time freight was from $2 aO to $3 a ton.
Question. Do you remember what you paid for ice in Boston last year under
your contract 1
Answer. The contract price was $2 50 a ton from January until May, $3 a
ton from May to July, and $3 50 a ton after July for the balance of the contract. The freights varied from $2 50 to $5 a ton, but not often as high as
$5. It averaged, I suppose, about $3.
Question. Can you tell me what would be the average percentage of waste
during the year between Boston and this place, when the ice is delivered and
put into your ice-house in this city 1
Answer. I have never made an exact calculation, but it is supposed that the
waste between Boston and here is 10 per cent. It depends very much upon the
time the vessel stays out; they sometimes stay out ·a month, and when you
get into the river, where the water is warm, it wastes a great deal. If 'you
make a quick passage the waste is not so much. We have estimated it to be in
the neighborhood of 10 per cent. on an average.
Question. At what rate per pound did you deliver ice here during last year 1
Answer. We sold it last year, in the beginning, to the government hospitals
at 7 5 cents per 100 pounds, before this contractor commenced ; the ice weighed
and delivered at my office. We sold it to our regular customers for about the
same price, delivered about in the city. We had to raise it, because our contractor in Boston failed to perform his part, and we were compelled to buy elsewhere, and charged a cent a pound.
Question. At what rate could you have supplied the hospitals from your
ice-house during the last season 1
_
Answer. I proposed to do it for 75 cents per 100 pounds, or $10 a ton, put
up in my ice-house, and the key of the ho11se handed to the medical purveyor.
Question. Weighed as it was put into the ice-house 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I will say that I am very glad I did not get the contract,
for I should have lost money by it. Still I should have carried it out if I had
got it.
Question. Do you know why your proposal to supply at 75 cents per 100
pounds and deliver as wanted was not accepted by the government 1
Answer. I do not. I put in my proposal about half an hour before the time
for opening the bids. I did not remain to see them opened ; but I called upon
Dr. Smith the next day and asked if he could tell me who was the successful
bidder. He said it had been given to Mr. Godey by the medical purveyor, but
the bid was not exactly acceptable. I did not learn why it was not acceptable.
He said he thought the contest was between· a Mr. 'riffany and myself. I told
him that if I got the contract:! should comply with it, and do everything I
could to give satisfaction. He told me that the bids had to be re-examined;
that there was some difficulty about them, but I should know .the next day.
I called upon Dr. Smith the next day, and said that I wanted to know about
the matter in order to make my arrangements in time. He said he would let
me know in the afternoon. I received a note from him that afternoon, stating
that Mr. Tiffany's bid was so far below mine that he should be obliged to give
it to him.
Question. Have you a copy of your proposal under that advertisement?
.A:nswer. Yes, sir. This is it.
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"WASHINGTON, D. C., February 23, 1863.
"We, the undersigned, propose to furnish the medical and hospital department of the army, until the first day of January, 1864, with all the ice required
at Washington, District of Oolqmbia, stored in suitable ice-houses, for $10 per
ton of 2,000 pounds; the ice gathered. in Massachusetts and Maine, and of the
best quality.
" Or we propose to deliver it to the hospitals and other places to be supplied
within the limits of Washington and Georgetown, and in the immediate vicinity,
the amount required at 75 cents per 10.0 weight.
"L. J. MIDDLETON,
"WILLIAM W. RUSSELL,
''Firm of L. J. Middleton~ Co.
"We have ample facilities for st?ring 10,000 tons."

Question. There was to be no charge to the government for the use of the
ice-house 1
Answer. No, sir. I had a house that would hold from 2,000 to 2,500 tons,
which I presumed would be sufficient, at any one time, to supply all that the
government would want. I do not now recollect whether the government got
any ice from us at a dollar the 100 pounds. But our prices were put up after
the difficulty with our folks in Boston, who had a short allowance of ice, and
therefore failed to perform their contract. The government ran out of ice, and
sent to me. I told them I would charge them $1 a hundred-weight, or, if they
wished, I would run them a cargo. They preferred to borrow a cargo, which
they returned.
Question. Mr. Tiffany received the contract?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know what arrangements were made by Mr. Tiffany, or
where the ice was stored here 1
Answer. It was deposited in the government ice-house, as I understood it; the
way was this: I called upon Dr. Smith to know about the matter; he said the government would have a house of its own very shortly, and they intended to allow
Mr. Tiffany $2 a ton more for the ice, and the house would belong to the government after the contract ended. I asked how much ice was wanted ; he said he
did not know-2,000 or 3,000 tons. I said if they allowed $2 a ton for the
house it would ·cost a great deal of money. He said the government would
want an ice-house. I have been near enough to the house to see through it.
It is at the foot of 11th street. It was not made very tight; but I have not examined it very closely.
Question. From the examination that you have given it, are you of the opin ·
ion that it was a suitable plaee in which to store ice 1
,
Answer. No, sir. I do not think it was tight enough to secure ice, for unless
ice is kept.from the air, you might as well keep it out of doors, perhaps better;
for the wind would cut it all to pieces, and there would be no telling but what
it would melt in twenty-four hours.
Question. Will you describe that ice-house as nearly as you can 1
Answer. I have never examined it very closely, and I should not like to
trust my eyes in regard to it. If I expected to get anything like the amount
out of a h ouse again that I put in it, I would put a house up as we do, in this
way: we usually build houses with two walls, three feet apart, filled in with
tan or sawdust to exclude the f!Un and air. Ldo not know what was the thickness of this house.
Question. What would an ice-house suitably built have cost, sufficiently large
to have held 3,000 tons of ice 1
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Answer. I built one on my wharf two years ago, a very nice one, one of the
best in the city-except, perhaps, that of Mr. Godey, who has put one up in
the best style-which cost from $1,800 to $2,000; it could contain from 1,800
to 2,000 tons of ice.
Question. How much would this ice-house contain that Mr. Tiffany built1
Answer. I have not examined it closely; perhaps a thousand tons or something like that.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Was it built on government land, or on private land 1
Answer. I cannot state; I have never made any inquiries about the matter.
It is down about the 11th street wharf. I have not been there since the house
was built but once, and that was an accidental visit.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. How is it-could you or not have supplied the government with
ice, delivered from your own ice-house, very much cheaper than they could obtain it from a house kept by themselves, taking out only what was wanted for
use1
Answer. Yes, sir; there is a gre~t differenc~ When we deliver it we sustain the loss, and the government does not.
Question. The taking out a large quantity of ice does not waste more than
taking out a small quantity 1
Answer. No, sir. We take all the loss from the time it leaves Boston until
we serve it out to our customers. We proposed to deliver it to the government
at 75 cents per 100 pounds, delivered at the hospitals in the city, weighed there,
of course, that they may be satisfied.
Question. Have you at any time supplied the hospitals here 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. During what period?
Answer. I supplied them in 1862, until the army left Harrison's landing. I
had an order from the Surgeon General to supply ice to the hospitals here. I
have forgotten the price, but I think it was 75 cents per 100 pounds; I .do not
know but what it may have been 60 cents; in fact, I believe it was. I saw a
copy of an order, when the ice was brought up from Harrison's landing, sent
to all the hospitals by the medical director, requiring them to purchase their ice
from Mr. Godey, or to get it from him; I do not know what auangement was
made exactly; it was govemment ice, though. l said nothing about it, but squared
up my books, made out my bills, &c., and settled up with the government, and
l had nothing more to do with the hospitals until last spring. I com)llenced
then again without any formal proposal; they came to me and asked if I would
sell them ice, and I said "Yes, at 75 cents per 100 pounds," and I did so until
June or July, but I did not supply them after that.
Question. Did you during that time supply all the hospitals1
Answer. No, sir; I think Mr. Godey had a part of them.
Question. Can you give us copies of your bills-the amounts of ice delivered
and the prices charged ?
Answer. I think so. The bills are on my books and I can copy them. You
mean for 1863, I believe 1
Question. Yes, sir. And I should like for you to state about the yea.r before.
State to us what you supplied to the hospitals for such and such a time, and at
what prices.
Answer. They settled up with me every month, and it would be an easy
matter to give that statement.
Question: Which is the most economical way in which the government can
supply itself with ice for hospitals in Washington and its vicinity 1
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Answer. I think the eheapest plan is to purchase tbe ice from the dealers,
and let contracts alone. We can furnish them with all the ice they want at a
specified rate. It would not cost half what it would for the government to buy
it and deliver it themselves.
Question. How is it that you can furnish it cheaper than the government can
supply itself1
Answer. Because the government takes the loss, and not the dealers. If you
contract it at $10 a ton at the ice-house, you will not get more than half of it
really. Now, we employ our own teams to supply it through the town, and
they can as well take the hospitals in their turn. We charge individuals a cent
a pound for 16, 18, or 20 pounds a day. We charge the government a cent a
pound and deliver it to the hospitals every day, giving them 600, 800 or 1,000
pounds a day, and we take the loss, and not the government.
Question. You are acquainted with all the principal ice dealers of the country 1
Answer. Ye~, sir; with most of them.
Question. Are you acquainted with Goslow & Scott as ice dealers 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Do you know J. C. Tiffany as an ice dealer 1
Answer. No, sir; I never heard of him until last year. .
Question. Do you know A. Tracy Edgerton or J. W. Parrish & Co. as ice
dealers f
Answer. No, sir.
WASHINGTON, February 10, 1864.

Mr: L. J. MIDDLETON recalled and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Have you prepared the statement asked for by the committee showing the amount of ice furnished to the hospitals in Washington and vicinity by
you during the years 1862 and 18631
Answer. Yes, sir; this is the statement:

Ice furnished t'he following hospitals in 1862 and 1863 by L. J. Middleton o/ Co.
1862.
Clifburn Hospital, 6,400 pounds of ice from May 23 to June 31, at
75 cents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • • • . . • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •
$40 50
Douglas Hospital, 65,800 pounds of ice from July 1 to September
30, at 50 cents .....•...•.•.......•.•.. ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
279 89
Eckington Hospital, 35,400 pounds of ice from May 26 to N ovember 18 ..... , ............•.' ..•.•....•.............. ~ . . . .
177 00
Patent Office Hospital, 9,800 pounds of ice from l\fay 26 to June
26, at 50 cents. This bill vras not collected. Surgeon in charge
left and never heard from .....••.........•...............•
Eruptive Fever Hospital, 11,900 pounds of ice from May 26 to Sep- ,
tember 30, at 50 cents ........ : . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .
89 25
St. Elizabeth Hospital, 10,087 pounds of ice from June 7 to August
30, at 75 cents..................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
75 65
Insane Hospital, 9,242 pounds of ice from July 7 to· October 27; at
75 cents...............................................
69 31
Casparis Hospital, 11,700 pounds of ice from July 6 to August 30,
at 75 cents...................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
87 25
Ascension Hospital, 4,000 pounds of ice from June 18 to August
18, at 60 cents. . . . . • • . • . . . . • • • . . • • . . . . . . • • • . • • • • • • . . . . . .
24 00
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Ninth Street Church Hospital, 3,200 pounds of ice from July 5 to
August 8, at 75 cents .................•..................
Epiphany Church Hospital, 17,700 pounds of ice from June 20 to
August 31, at 60 cents ... . ............................. .
13th Street Baptist Ohurch Hospital, 15,500 pounds of ice from June
28 to August 31, at 50 cents . . . ....••.•..................
Unitarian Churcp Hospital, 5,300 pounds of ice from July 1 to
August 15, at 50 cents ................................. . .
Judiciary Square Hospital, 54,200 pounds of ice from July 1 to
August 31, at 50 cents .................................. .
Union Chapel Hospital, 4,800 pounds of ice from July 7 to August 31, at 50 cents .................................... .
Armory Square Hospital, 73,850 pounds of ice from July 1 to September 30, at 50 cents. . . • . . . . . . . . . . . ................... .
Columbia College Hospital, 26,949 pounds of ice from August 12,
to September 30, at 50 cents .....•........................
Small hospitals: Providence; Ebinezer Church; Odd-Fellows'
Hall; Trinity Church; Capitol; about .••..•......••.••••.•

$21 20
106 20
75 00
26 00
271 00
24 00
369 25
134 75
200 00
2,070 25

1863.
Judiciary Square Hospital, 3,200 pounds of ice from June 1 to June
8, at 75 cents .... . ............................. . ....... .
Kalorama Hospital, 1,035 pounds of ice from June 1 to June 13,
at 75 cents. . . . . . . ...............•.....................
Post Hospital, (Camp Barry,) 9,100 pounds of ice from June 1 to
October 31, at $1 ...................................... .
Mount Pleasant Hospital, 4,630 pounds of ice from May 15 to June
1 0, at 7 5 cents ..... ..................................... .
Campbell Hospital, 9,340 pounds of ice from Mayl2 to June 8, at
7 5 cents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...•. _ ...........•........
Harewood Hospital, 20,800 pounds of ic~ from May 12 to June 11,
at 75 cents .......................•.....................
Finley Hospital, 10,275 pounds of ice from May 11 to June 11, at
75 cents .............................................. .
Emory Hospital, 12,464 pounds of ice from May 5 to June 10, at
75 cents .............................................. .
St. Aloysius Hospital, 5,800 pounds of ice from May 2 to June 7, at
75 cents ................ ·...................... . ....... .
Stanton Hospital, 14,566 pounds of ice from June 1 to June ·s, at
7 5 cents ..................... . ......................... ,

$24 00

7 76
91 00
34 72
68 55
156 00

77 05
124 62
43 50
109 24
736 49

Question. About what percentage of the year's snpply of ice would be used
during the months of May, (the last seven, days of ,May,) June, July, and
August1
Answer. I could not tell exactly. But we generally call the ice season five
months; that is about as much as we can get out of the year. 'J.1he rest of the
year is scarcely profitable at all, unless it happens to be a very warm fall. I
think we delivered two-thirds and more of our whole year's work in that time.
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Testimony of Mr. TValter Godey.
W ASHINGTOX, February 9, 1864.
Mr. WALTER GoDEY sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What is your prcJsent business, how long have you been engaged
in it, and where is it carried on 1
Answer. My business is the ice business; I h~ve been in it five years last
October; my place is in Georgetown, in this District.
Question. You carry on the ice business in Georgetown and Washington 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you see the government advertisement for ice last year 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
• Question. Have you a copy of your bid?
Answer. I did not bring it with me.
Question. Do you remember the terms of your bid for supplying ice ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Will you state them?
Answer. I agreed to furnish all the ice they would want in the hospitals in
the District, they hauling it, at $14 a ton, weighed to them every morninP' as
they got it.
·
Question. Did you make any other offer 1
Answer. No, sir; not for the hospital::~ here. I agreed to furnish ice at Alexandria and· :E'ortress Monroe at $13 a ton, by bill of lading, the government
to take charge of the ice as it waR delivered.
Question. Were you to be paid for the amount put on board the vessels
where you purchased the ice?
Answer. I think I agreed to give it to them at that price, weighed at thP
different points.
Question. Did you agree to deliver it as they wanted day by day, or wt-re
·
you to deliver it by the cargo?
An swer. I was to deliver it here in Washington day by day as it was wanted.
Question. How at other points 1
Answer. At the other points they were to take the cargo that I ordered ·to them.
Question. Will you furnish the committee with a copy of your proposal '/
Answer. I think l have it at home; I may have left it at the medical purveyor's office. I had two as good men as there are in our town for securities.
'rhe contract was at first awarded to me by Mr. Johnson. An estimate was
made under the proposals submitted by Mr. Tiffany, Middleton, and myself,
and it was shown by the calculation that my proposal was some $8,000 to
$10,000 better than that of Mr. Tiffany. I fought the matter with Dr. Smith for
a month. He said, ''Mr. Godey, I know you, and I know Mr. Middleton; but
this Tiffany I do not know. But we have given Tiffany the contract, and we
do not like to take things back." I said, "Doctor, I will bring you a statement from the office, of your own clerks, showing that you will save $8,000 or
$10,000 to the government by taking my bid." Said he, "We will investigate
the whole matter." I went there from time to time to see about it. I went to
the office and got a statement of the saving to the governn;J.ent under my bid
and showed it to him. He said, " We do not do business haphazard; we have
compete!lt clerks here to attend to it, and there is no such loss in ice.'' I then ·
said, "Doctor, I do not suppose it is worth while form~ to come in very often
here.'' He said, "I will have the thing investigated." After & time I went
there again, and he went into the Surgeon General's office, and said a few words,
and came out again, and said to me, "We have thoroughly investigated the
matter, and I do not see that there is any cheating in it." I bade him "good
morning," and catne away.
Part v--2
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Question. Were the t~rms on which you proposed to furnish the ice better
than those of any other bidder 1
Answer. I do not know what Mr. Middleton's bid was. But the contract
was at first awarded to me.
Question. Were you present when the bids were opened.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Where were they opened 1
Answer. At the medical purveyor's office.
Question. By whom were they opened 1
Answer. By lVIr. Henry Johnson, then acting medical pu,rveyor.
Question. And was it declared by him that the contract was yours 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And it was then refused to you by Dr. Smith, and this conversation
subsequently occurred as you have stated.
Answer. Yes, sir. If you will look at the books of the office where the ac-"
counts of the hospitals are kept, and take the amount of ice delivered to the
hospitals, and the amount of ice shipped here, you will see for yourselves that
there would have been from $8,000 to $10,000 saved on my bid.
Question. For the hospitals in the city of Washington and vicinity 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I happened to be at the office about a month ago; the
clerk there is a very clever fellow, and I wanted to know what the ice cost
them. He told me that there was so much ice shipped, and so much ice delived to the hospitals. · My bid was $14 a ton weighed to them hP-re. They
paid $9 45 a ton by bill of lading. I made the difference to be about $10,000.
Tbeir own books will show that.
Question. Have you furnished ice to the hospitals here during any period;
and if so, when 1
Answer: I furnished ice, from the commencement of the hospitals here, for
the same time Mr. Middleton furnished.
Question. For how long a time 1
Answer. Up to this contract, except a year ago laf:lt fall, when they had some
come up here with the army from Harrison's landing.
Question. Can you give us the periods duririg which you furnished ice, and
the amount per I!!onth 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. At the time you were furnishing ice, was there anybody else but
Mr. Middleton furnishing ice to them 1
Answer. No, sir; I believe not.
Question. Did you and he furnish to the hospitals all the ice required 1
Answer. Yes, sir; and the stewards told me they were never better accommodated or better supplied.
By the chairman:
Where do you get your ice 1
Answer. }-,rom Boston and Maine; principally from Boston, when there is a
good supply there.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Do you know at what :rate yon could have contracted for ice,
making your contract as early in the season as 'F ebruary or March 1
Answer. I bought t>ome 1,600 tons of ice in February, shipped in March and
April, and it cost me $2 a ton in Boston. I contracted for 5,000 tons, but 'did
not get this contract. and therefore did not take but 1,600 tons.
, Question. What ~oes it cost you to ship ice from Boston to this place 1
Answer. From $2 to $3 and $3 50 .a ton.
Question. According to the season of the year in which it is shipped 1
Answ.er. Yes, sir. Later in the season ice got higher, and whep. my conQu~stion.

>
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tract run through I bought at higher prices. Of course, if I had got this contract I ~h( uld have got a larger ~upply.
Question. What would be the ordinary amount of waste between Boston and
here in ice 1
Answer. I l1ave weighed it in June, July, and August, and I always find
that I lose about 25 per centum.
Question. And to points further south the waste would be greater 1
Answer. I should think so. Get it on early in the season, it comes on dry,
and you do not lose so much.
,
Question. What, in your opinion, is the best and most economical way in
which the government can furnish ice to the hospitals in Washington and vicinity 1
Answer. }"'rom the dealers here, I think.
Question. Purchasing daily?
Answer. Yes, sir; you get your net weight then, and we have all the losses.
Question. The government can have what it wants, and pay for what it uses 1
· Answer. Yes, sir.
• Question. Which ice turns out best here, ice packed in Boston, or ice packed
in Maine 1
Answer. The Boston ice. I have been treated very badly in Maine ice.
Last year, when they got short, the firm I deal with in Boston bought ice in Maine
and shipped it to me. And, instead of their weighing their ice there, I understand they measure it. There were two cargoes came here, one said to be 300
tons, which I weighed and had but 102 tons; the other cargo of 250 tons, and
I did not get 90 tons out of it.
By the chairman:
Question. What was the occasion of such great waste 1
Answer. Well, they did not put it in the vessel.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Do yon know where the government kept its ice here last summer 1
Answer. They kept it on the 11th street wharf.
Question. Do you know the house that the ice was kept in 1
Answer. I have seen it
Question. By whom was it built 1
Answer. I understood that it was lmilt by Tiffany, and that he got more per
ton for his ice on that account.
Question. How much more 1
Answer. I understood it was $2 a ton until th{)thouse was paid for.
Question. was the house a suitable one, and properly built for storing ice
Answer. No, sir; I have been up to it. 'J1he house is built with scantling
or joists, about eight inches wide, and stuffed with sawdust, or hay, or any
trash. It was no house to keep ice in, that is certain. I would not put a
pound of ice in such a houBe as that. I looked at it a month ago when I was_
down by there, and the roof had sunk down considerably. I am myself a carpenter by trade, and know what kind of work it is. If you will look at the
houses built by me a1;1d Mr. Middleton, and then at the one Tiffany buitt, you
will see the difference at once.
Question. Oau you tell what that house ought to have cost 1
Amwer. 'l'hat house cost, I should judge, from $1,200 to $1,400; mine has
cost me nearly $3,DOO.

r

By Mr. Loan:
Question. Would you have lost money in furnishing ice to the government
under the contract you proposed 1
Answer. If we make a contract--

20

ICE CONTRACTS.

Question. That is not my question. vVould you have lost money under the
contract yon proposed 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. How can you make a profit .and furnish ice to the governl?ent
cheaper than it can furnish its own ice 1
Answer. We fill our ice-houses up, and are generally taking it out and putting
it in all the time. We keep our ice moving; our cargoes do not stand long,
not more than a week or so. If the government puts a large quantity of ice in
an i~e-house, and use but a small quantity daily, the ice is wasting all the time.
But our ice is constantly moving. It would not do for us to ke{'p a cargo on
hand more than a week or two, because we should lose our profits. The faster
we can push our ice out the better for us. If you put all your ice into an icehouse you will be subject to a dead waste there. If you put up a thousand tons
_and let it lay there two, or three, or four month~, you are losing all the time. We
put up a thousand tons and it lasts us three or four weeks; there is the difference.
Question. What is the percentage of loss by wastage in ice-houses. per month 1
Answer. I could not tell that.
Question. Are there any other advantages in favor of the de~1cr.......any other
reasons why you should make it profitable in preference to the government 1
Answer. Where we supply it, the government is not bothered with a check
against each hospital, or with men to handle the ice. We keep the men ourselves to attend to the business, and thus that much is saved to the government.
Que~tion. Are there any othet· means of saving that you can state ?
Answer. I do not think of any now.
By the chairman :
Question. Do not men who transact business for themselves generally do it
better and with less waste than government agents do 1
Answer. Yes, sir, cert.ainly . .
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Are you acquainted with the principal ice dealers in the country 1
Answer. I know a great many of them.
·
Question. Do .you know Gosner & f?cott, or J. C. Tiffany, or A. Tracy
Edgerton, or Pa;rrish & Co., as ice dealers ?
Answer. No, sir, I do not.

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1864.
Mr. WALTER GoDEY recalled and examined:
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Have you prepared the statement asked for by the committee, of
the amnunts of ice furnished by you to the hospitals in this city 1
Answer. Yes, sir, this is it :

lee delivered to different lwspitals in lVashington and vicinity in 1862 by
lValter Godey.
Pounas.

Seminary hospital ...................................... _..
Clifford hospital ......................... : ............... ~
Carver ho~pital .......................................... .
Mount Pleasant hospital .................................. .
Colnmbian College .................•....•................

28,9l5
121,450
149,690
102, 560
30,490

,.

.
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Stone hospital. ....... : ................... : . ............. .
Ryland Chapel ... . ...................................... .
Camp Sprague ........... ~ .............................. .

~~~!h~~~1:~r~ ~ ~ :~ ~ ~: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~::::: ~ ~ ~- ~ ~ ~: ~ ~: ~ ~: ~ ~:: ~ ~ :~ ~ ~ ::
8th Street hospitaL .. . ................................ -.- ..
Ascension Church, 9th street ............................... .
lOth street ................ ·...... ~ ........ .
Corner 6ih and E streets ................•..................
Corner 6th and D streets ............. . ....... . ............ .
Georgetown College .....................•.................
Waters's W arehous·e ..................................... .
Presbyterian Church .. ~ ..... .- ............................ .

.

'

'

19,800

7,795
43,955
62,529
23,382
3,060

5,250
5,300
3, 180
3,285

5,760
3, 57lj
1,132

rrotal - _·_ - - .. - :·. - _:.. - ...... : - . -. -·_ - ... - - .......... .

621, 108

Tons ....... : .. . ............................... - .. .

310~ffi

.,

.

By Mr. Loan : '
Question. What price did you charge the government for this ice?
Answer. I charged sixty cents per 100 pounds, or twelve dollars a ton.
Question. What quantityof ice was brought up with the army of the Potomac
an,d stoJed in your'ice-house at the time you have mentioned 1
Answer. I cannot state positively now; but I think it was between 600 and
700 tons. It was not weighed ; that is merely my judgment, for I would not
weigh the ice at my own expense. I made rather a,. loose bargain. I paid for
discharging the ice, and gave my house to store it in, for . which I was to receive
one ton of ice out of every two tons.
•

I

'

By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Did you take one ton of ice out of every two tons for the use of
your ice-house 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did the balance of the ice supply the hospitals for the rest of the
season 1
Answer. Yes, sir, until the spring.
Question. Do you concur with Mr. Middleton in what he has said about the
length of the ice seasQn 1
Answer. Yes, sir.

'I'estimony <if Mr. RobeJ't A. Payne.
WASHINGTON, February 10, 1864.
Mr. RoBERT A. PAYNE sworn and examined.
By Mr. Loan:
Question. What is your place of residence 1
Answer. Georgetown, Diatrict of Columbia.
Question. In what capacity were you engaged in March, 1863 1
Answer. Chief clerk to the medical purveyor.
Question. Will you examine this contract (contract with J. C. Tiffany) and
.state if you were in the otlice at the time that contract was made 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I was.
Question. Will you state what you know about the advertisement for this
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contract, and the bids in relation to it, and everything attending it, up to the
final consummation of that contract, so fa,r as you remember 1
Auswer. All that I can state is, that proposals were advertised for in due
form for furnishing ice. There were some five or six bidders for the places
embraced in 'I'iffa,ny's contract.
Question. State who they were.
Answer. Mr. Godey, of Georgetown, was the princip:tl bidrJer for Washington, Georgetown, AquiJ. Creek, and Fortress Monroe. Mr. Middleton was
a bidder for Washington, but I have no recollection whether he made any
further bids. I think there were several other bidders for Washington, but I
do not recollect their names now.
Question. Were you present when the bids were opened ?
Answer. Yes, sir; upon opening the bid1:1 we at the office decided that Mr.
Walter Godey, of Georgetown, was the lowest bidder for "\Y ashington. I
think Mr. 'I'iffimy was in the office at the time, but be immediately went out;
where he went I do not know. But after the notice from our office was sent
down to the Surgeon General's office that the bids had been opened and we had
awarded to Mr. Godey the contract for furnishing ice to Washington, and I
do not know but what of Aquia Creek and the other points, the thing was
afterwards changed at the Surgeon General's office and the contract given to
Mr. 'I'iffany.
Question. Do you know what reasons induced this change 1
Answer. I understood that Dr. Smith, the Assistant Surgeon General at the
time, said that he thought that Mr. Tiffany's bid was the lowest. But we were
universally of the opinion-and I made out several statements myself that
would convince any youngst~r of 12 or 13 years of age-that Mr. Godey's
proposition was the cheapest for the government by some $15,000 or $20,000.
And the result has proved it to be so, as I have understood since Mr. 'l'iffany
furnished the ice. Mr. Godey's proposition, I think, was to furnish the ice and
deliver it at $13 or $14 a ton. I do not recollect what Mr. 'l'iffany's proposition was; but this contract will show. (Reads:)
"That for each and every ton of ice delivered at Washington, D. C., and
accepted by the medical officer in charge, the said J. C. 'I.'iffany shall receive
the sum of $10 50."
'I'hen there was an arrangement that he should be paid per bill of lading,
and also paid for building an ice-house, and also paid for wagoning this ice. All
this made a difference, so that under this contract the loss to the government
was some $10,000 or $15,000, and I do not know but more. As I said before, I made out several statements showing the whole cost under the different
proposals. .And I think that at the time there was also a, bid for New Orleans
lower than the one put in by Mr. Tiffan·y ; in fact, I am almost confident of it.
Que1:1tion. Can you state who the party was who submitted a lower bid for
New O!leans 1
Answer. I cannot. We made out a written statement for the Surgeon General,
setting forth who were the bidders and what were their bids.
Question. What do you know in regard to the ice-house that was built by
Mr. Tiffany 1
Answer. I do not kr,ww much about it; I know that it was a long time in
being built, and that we had to purchase ice from dealers here-from Mr. Middleton and Mr. Godey-for some two or three months after the contract was
given out to Mr. 'l'iffany. I have understood that the ice-house was very poorly
put up.
.
Question. Have you any knowleage upon that matter 1
,
Answer. No, sir; I was down there while it was being built, but I have no
been there since it was built.
Question. Do you know the capacity of that house 1
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Answer. I do not.
Question. You do not know why this change was made, and the contract
given to l\fr. rl'iffany 1
Answer. No sir; I do not know the reasons for changing it, further than I
understood at the time that Dr. Smith conceived Mr. 'riffany's bid to be the
lowest.
Question. The paper you sent to the Surgeon General's office was not referred back to your office for further exp~anation 1
Answer. No, sir; after we had given them the. list of bidders, they sent for
the proposals, and we sent them.
Question. \'Vas it the usual practice for the Surgeon General's office to act upon
your decisions upon these questions, or was it usual for them to review your
decisions 1
!
Answer. As far as I can recollect, this was the only contract ever given out
at that office.
Question. Do you know of any reason why the quantity of jce should have
been increased in Washington at th~t time over what it had been prior to that
time-you had been 'purchasing but a very small q u~ntity . of ice previously ?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What necessity, if any, was there for increasing the quantity 1
Answer. I do not think there was any; and I do not know that the quantity
of ice delivered' and used was actually increased. I think, from what I understood· at the time, that ice was brought here by Mr. Tiffa:py without orders
from any person. As I understood, no orders came from Mr. Johnson, or the
medical director, for so much ice. I think the contract says the ice i8 to be
furnished from time to time in such quantities as required. I know of no reason
for the increase, further than I believe there was some ice shipped to the army
of the Potomac. I know that the year previous we occasionally sent ice to the
army of the Potomac while I was there in the office.
Question. Under Tiffany's contract 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Do you know of any reason why the quantity of ice required
should be increased under Tiffany's contract 1
Answer. K o, sir, further than 1 imagine, if there was an increase, it was because of ice being shipped to the army of the Potomac, as we had been in the
habit of doing the season before; but I do not know that that was done. One
reason why the consumption of ice the year before was smaller was; I think,
that when General McClellan came up from the Peninsula with the army of
the Potomac they brought up some ice, which was all turned over to Doctor
Lamb.
Question. What quantity was brought up 1
Answer. I cannot tell you. I only know that there was a great discrepancy
between the bills of lading and the amount of ice turned over'to us from the army
of the Potomac. We understood from the captains of vessels that the ice had
laid there a long time and had lost by melting. In fact, D octor Lamb has never
receipted for any of the iee yet, and says he will not because there was such a
discrepancy.
Question. Were there any orders given to Mr. Tiffany under his contract to
furnish ice for any parties that yon know of1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Who received the ice from l\fr. Tiffany under this contract 1
Answer. It is made the duty of the medical director to receive the ice under
the contract.
Question. Who did .receive it, in fact 1 Do you know ?
Answer. That I do not know.
Question. You have no means of knowing what quantity was delivered1
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Answer. No, sir; I have not. I only know that a great many hospitals were
complaining about the quautity of ice delivered; that it was smaller than the
quantity proposed to be delivered by Mr. Tiffany's man who had charge of
the ice-house. The whole arrangement was very blundering. The government
paid for their ice, put it in their own ice-house, and :Mr. 'l'iffany sent it out in
his own wagon, by his own man. The hospitals Complained that they received
their ice at unseasonable hours; instead .of getting it at eight or nine o'clock in
the morning, they got it in the afternoon, at four or five o'clock. I think the
medical director receipted for the icc as it was received here on the vessels.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Did he receive the ice 1
Answer. He must have received it if he receipted for it.
Question. Who is responsible for the amount of ice received 1
Answer. '.rhe medical director is responsible for receiving as many tons as the
bill of lading called for. It· is his duty.
.
By Mr. Loan:
Question. Is he the man who did receiv.e it, and receipt for it 1
Answer. I think so.
Question. Who was he 1
Answer. It was Doctor R. 0. Abbott.
Question. Do you know what quantity of ice was actually received?
Answer. No, sir, I do not.
Question. You were not connected with that part of the business 1
,
Answer. No, sir. The whole arrangement was at first intended by the Surgeon General to have been turned over to the medical director. And at all the
other posts further down south I believe that is done.

..

\

By the chairman :
Question. Is this contract of 'l,iffany's made according to usage and custom
in such matters 1
,
Answer. I do not know. I am not very conversant with making contracts.
By Mr. Loan:
~·
Question. "\Vhere are you now 1
Answer. In the Provost Marshal General's office.
Question. How came you there 1
Answer. I left the medical director's office, nnd then went in under Colonel
Fry.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Is tllis a copy of the advertised propoRals under which bids were
received for ice last year at the time to which you have referred 1
Answer. Yes, Rir.
The following is the copy referred to :
PROPOSALS FOR ICE.
MEDICAL PURVEYOR'S OFFICE,

TVashington, January :22, 1863.
Sealed proposals will be received at this office until Monday, the 23d day
of February, 1863, at twelve ( 12) o'clock m., for furnishing the medical hospita1
department until the 1st day of January, 1864, with a supply of pure ice, to be
delivered at the following places, viz :
Hilton Head, So'nth Carolina; Newbern, North Carolina; Fortress Monroe,
Virginia; Pensacola, Florida; 1\ ashville, 1'ennessee; New Orleans, Louisia11a ~
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St. Louis, Missouri ; Cairo, Illinois; Washington, District of Columbia; Memphis, Tennessee.
As the quantity required at the respective posts is not precisely known, bidders will state the q uautity of ice they can furnish, where it is gathered, price
per ton of 2,000 pounds, and within what period they can furnish the amount
of their bids; although it is desirable that bidders should propose to furnish
the whole amount required at any one of the places proposed to be supplied.
Bidders will state what facilities they possess, if any, for storing the ice at
the posts they propose to supply.
'l'he ice must be of the best quality, subject to the inspection and approval of
the officer in charge of the post where it is delivered. The full name and post
'office address of the bidder must appear in the proposal.
If a bid is made in the name of a firm the names of all the parties must appear, or the b:d will be eonsidered as the individual proposal of the party sign.
ing it.
Proposals from disloyal parties will not be considered, and an oath of allegi-·
ance must accompany each proposition.
I>roposals must be addressed to Henry .Johnson, M. S. K., U. S. A., and
Acting Meuical Purveyor, Washington, D. C., and should be plainly marked
"Proposals for Ice."
'l'he ability of the bidder to fill the contract, should it be awarded to him,
must be guaranteed by two responsible persons, whose signatures are to be appended to the guarantee, and said guarantee must accompany the bid.
'.rhe responsibiLity of the guarantors must be shown by the official certificate
of the clerk of the nearest district court, or of the United. States district attorney.
Bonds in the sum of five thousand dollars, signed by the contractor and both
his guarantors, will be l'equired of the successful bidder upon signing the contl'act.
Form qf guarantee.
We, - - , of the county of--, and state of--, and - - , of the county
of--, and State of - - , do hereby guarantee that - - - - is able to fulfil
the contract, in accordance with the tet'ms of his proposition, and that, should
his proposition be accepted, he will at once enter into contract in accordance
therewith.
Should the contxact be awarded him we are prepared to become his securities.
('l1 o this guarantee must be appended the official certificate above mentioned.}
The Surgeon General reserves· to himself the right to reject any or all bids.
that he may deem too high or unfluitable.
HENRY JOHNSON, M. S. K., U. S. A.,
Acting Medical Pu'rveyor .

Testimony rif JYfr. Mancheste?· Eldridge.
WASHINGTON, FebruaTy 10, 1864.
Mr. MA:.XCHESTER ELDRIDGB sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What is your present business, and how long have you been engaged. in it, and where 1
Answer. I have been in Alexandria about ten years. I have been engaged
in what is generally termed the commission and shipping business ; but owing
to the war I was compelled to change my business somewhat,· and two years.
ago I went into the ice business, and have followed it until the present time.
I was in it season before last anC!. last seaspn, and am now engaged in it, in
connexion with my other business.

26

ICE CONTRACTS.

Q.ueRtion. Have you furnished any ice to the ·government or governmeu
hospitals during thia period 1 If so, how much have you furni~hed, and for
what periods 1
Answer. Season before last I furnished ice to all the hospitals in Alexandria.
I also furnished a great deal to the army; at one time I sent out some thirty
odd tons, at the time of the defeat of General Pope.
Question. Can you give the committee the accounts from your books?
Answer. Yes, sir, I can do so ; but I came away in a great hurry this
morning and did not have time to prepare myself.
Question. Will you prepare for the committee a statement of all the ice delivered by you to the government or to government hospitals, and the months
in which it was delivered?
Answer. I think I can give such a statement very nearly, and will do so.
Question. Who supplied the ice last year to the government hospitals and
for government purposes in Alexandria 1
Answer. I supplied them, I think, up to abQut the 20th of June; it might
have been to nearly the first of July. I do not now remember the exact date
at which I ceased to supply the government. After that it was supplied by
the contraotor.
,
Question. By what contractor?
Answer. I cannot answer that positively. I had supplied the hospitals the
year before, and the surgeons seemed all to be very well satisfied with the
manner in which I had done it. Several times I had been called upon at 10
or 11 o'clock at night for ice when there had been wounded brought in, and I
had gone to the ice house and delivered to them what ice they wanted. 'I'hey
took no more ice from day to day than they wanted; when it would be weighed
-out to them on the pavement, :where they could see it weighed if they wished.
Last year I made application to supply ice again to the hospitals. 'rhey
said that so far as they were concerned they had been perfectly satisfied with
me, and hoped I would get the order to do it again. But they said there had
been an intimation that there would be a contract, and told me that if I desired
to supply them, I better see the Surgeon General or the medical purveyor about
it. I came to Washington and went to the Surgeon General's office, but I must
say I did not have much opportunity to speak with him. He merely said there
was going to be a contract. I also made au application to the medical purveyor,
and he told me the same thing-that there was to be a contract, and that the
-contractor would supply Alexandria; that is, that they had given out a contract for Washington to supply all the ice necessary for the army and the hospitalR around Washington, and Alexandria would be included and supplied by
the same contractor. I therefore gave the matter up, and did not pretend to
try any further.
Question. At what price per 100 pounds did you ~ell ice to the government
year before last 1
Answer. I think I supplied the hospitals for 75 cents a 100 ponnds for the
whole season.
Question. And at what price did you supply the government with ice last
year, so far as you supplied any ?
Answer. At the same price I think, I am under the impression that I did
not raise on them at all, up to the time they quit getting ice of me.
Question. At what price would you have continued to supply ice to the government last year ?
Answer. 'I'he probability is that I would have taken a contract to supply
the hospitals during the season at $1 per 100 pounds.
Question. Delivered where 1
Answer. Delivered at the hospitals as they wanted it. vVe got more than
that for our ice during the season.
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QuP-stion. Do you know in wl1at manner ice was taken from Washington to
Alexandria to be supplied there 1
Answer. 'rhe surgeons told me that they received it at very great inconvenience sometimes. At times it was brought down on a tug-boat and put out
on the wharf. Afterwards, I think it was delivered from their own wagons.
Question. Would there necessarily be a great amount of wastage in takillg ice
from "'\Vashington to Alexandria 1
Answer. I should suppose there would b~. I have on several occasions been
compelled to call on Washington for ice in order to keep going. I would sometimes have a cargo out over time. In one instance I came to Washington and
got ice, and took it down to Alexandria at very great inconvenience and extra
expense~ in order that th e hOl~pitals should not be short of ice, and I have generally found that not much less than fifty per cent. ran away between Washington 'and Alexandria in transporting it. Probably a smaH amount put on
board a tug-boat and run right down would not waste so much. And l generally calculate on about twenty-five per cent. loss in distributing ftom the icehouse around to the in habitants. But what we got from vVashington from time
to time g·enerally turned out with not much less than fifty pel' cent. loss.
Question. vVhen you supplied the hospitals did you deliver the ice <tt your
ice-house, or at the hospitals 1
Answer. It is weighed out at each hospital, and it is charged with what it
weighs there.
·
Question. Do you know anything about the manner ill which ice. was supplied to the government by the contract last year '1
AnRwer. I heard something about it from other parties. I bought a cargo of
ice loaded at Gardiner, Maine, and when it arrived here I went on board the
vessel, the schooner Marshall Perrin, Captain Gibbs. I said to the captain:
" Did you see this ice weighed in 1'' Said he, "I did." I asked: " Do you
think I got good weig;ht 1" He replied, "I think you did, very good weight,
indeed." I said : "It is important, when I am paying so high a price for ice,
and such high freight, that I should get all I pay for." He said: " I think you
have. The man who loaded this ice seems to be a very fair man. But'if you
had to pay as much freight on YC!Ur ice as government is paying other parties,
you might have cause to complain." I asked him why he said that. He said:
"'rhe vess<:;ls that were trading there for the government told me they carried
more ice than they ever had carried or poHsibly could carry coal." N.ow, generally, so far as my knowledge goes, a vessel cannot carry much more ~han .twothirds as many tons of ice as they can carry tons of coal. 'The ice ·wonld fill
the vessel long before she had loaded her full number of tons. Ice does not
load a vessel heavy at all.
.
Question. In your opinion, in what way can the government supply itself
with ice most economically for hospital use 1
Answer. I think there is no better way than for the government--to make a
contract with somebody on the spot already in the ice business, or t!'lke it at the
ruling prices during the season from the dealers in the vicinity.
·
Question. During the time you were supplying ice to the governr!}en.t' did you
furnish all that was wanted-all that was required at the hospitals-f
.
Answer. Yes, sir. 'l'here was once or twice that I run out of iee on account·
of the vessels having extremely long passages; but, notwithstanding that, I
went to great expense and great trouble to get it elsewhere, in ;order that the
hospitals should not fall short. And I had letters from the head sprgeons of the
three departments in Alexandria last year giving me very high rec6mmendations;
and I also bad one this year.
Question. Will you explain why an ice dealer in the vicinity ,can supply the
government with ice cheaper than it can be supplied in any other way 1
Answer. From the fact that he is already in the business, has made all his
preparations for supplying ice to the citizens, and it comes right in in connexion

28

ICE CONTRACTS.

with his regular business to supply the hospitals. I ~upplied the government
with ice year before last at less prices than I supplied the inhabitantR; and so I
did last year, so fur as I did supply the hospitals. It does not make much differenee to me whether I get two or three cargoes more or less. I can get it a
little cheaper, perhaps, by taking two or thrPe cargoes more. But the outfit and
every arrangement for supplying ice qre already prepared by ice dealers in the
bnsineEs, and all the expense attending the ice business is partially paid by
distributing jce to the inhabitants.

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1864.
Mr. MANf'HESTER ELDRIDGE Tecalled and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Have you brought with you the accounts which the committee
asked of you when you were here before 1
.Answer. I have brought the account of the ice furnished the hospitals in 1862
as near as I can get it. I find that one oT two memorandum books have been
lost; the accounts were kept in little memorandum books. I presume the
account will not be faT eithet way from the amount furnished for that year. I
have also made it up for the year 1863 to the time we quit furnishing ice, in
June. For 1862 the amount of ice furnished the hospitals in .Alexandria. was
about 320,000 pounds, which, at three-quarters of a cent per pound, would
amount to $2,400. For the year 1863, until July 20, it was about 60,00v
pounds, amounting to $450. I have calculated it at three-quarters of a cent per
pound, though for some of it we charged a cent a pound.
Question. When did you commence to furnish ice to the hospitals in Alexandria 1
.Answet. In .June, 1862, and furnished it all that season, and up to July 20, 1863.
Question. During that period did you furnish to the hospitals all the ice t~at
they required 1
·•
.Answer. I did. Here are some c.ertificqtes from the surgeons there-all ex- •
cept one, who has left-in relation to the manner in which I supplied the hos·
pitah! with ice :
"HEADQUARTERs 2o D1v1swN, u. s..GENERAL HosPITAL,
" Alexandria, Virg1:nia, January 0, 1864.
"Sm: It affords me pleasure to state that Messrs. Eldridge & Co. supplied
this hospital with ice during the season of 1862 and a portion of 18<13 in a manner entirely satisfactory; indeed, much more. so than by the system adopted
afterwards.
"Very respectfully,

"T. RUSH SPENCER,
"Eurgeon United States Volunteers, in Cltm-ge.
"HENRY JoHNSON,
"JYI. S. ](., Ac'£ng Medical P.u1·veyrYr, TVasltington, D. C."
"1sT DJvrswN GE~ERAL HosPITAL,
'' Alexandn'a, Virginia, February 12, 18G4.
"This is to certify that Mr. :M:. Eldridge supplied this hospital last summer
with ice until about the 20th of July, and that his supply was regular, of good
quality, and every way satisfactory.

"CHARLES PAGE,
" Surgeon United States Voluntee1·s, in Cha1ge."
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"3D DIVISION UNITED STATEs GENERAL HosPITAL,

"Alexandria, Virginia, February 12, 1864.
"I cheerfully represent that Mr. M. Eldridge's supply uf ice and dealings
with the hospital have always been honorable and satiRfactory.

"EDWIN BENTLEY,

I

"Surgeon United States Volunteers, in Clwrge."
The witness. During 1862 the hospitals were constantly full of sick and
wounded. 'l'here never has been, since I have be.en there, such a number of
wounded and sick men in the hospitals fl.S there was in 1862.
Testimony

of Dr.

R. 0. Abbott.

WASHINGTON, February 11, 1864.
Dr. R. 0. ABBOTT sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What is your present rank and position in the army 1
Answer. I am a surgeon in the army of the United States, and medical director for the department of Washington, at present.
Question. Have you any knowledge iu, relation to the manuel· in which the
governl!lent has been supplied with ice for hospital purposes, &c., since this
war began 1
.
Answer. Only so far as this department is concerned.
Question. Over what period of time does your knowledge extend in regard
to this department 1
Answer. }..,rom about June, 1863, until the present time.
Question. Only. that portion of time covered by the contracts made las I year1
Answer. 'That ·is all.
Question. Will you state to the committee all the knowledge you have in
relation to that matter 1
Answer. A contract was made with Mr. Tiffany, of Maine, at $10 50 per
tf ton, less 10 per cent., to be delivered here-making about $9 45 per ton. He
, w.as to have $3 a ton for freight. The ice was to be loaded in Maine, and the
bill of lading sworn to was to be the voucher upon which it was to be receipted
for here. I think the cal·goes 1 received, in all, amounted to nearly 4,000 tons,
which arrived here in eight or ten different schooners; and, upon ascertaining
that tl1ey had arrived, and that the ice had been didcharged into the government ice-house, I always receipted the bill upon this sworn invoice and affidavit.
Mr. 'l'iffany contracted to build an ice-house and to put the ice in it, and then
deliver it from there to the hospitals at 50 cents a ton ,upon requisitions approved by me. That arrangement went on until about September, when I
found that he could not well deliver the ice to the hospitals, and that part of
the agreement was broken by common consent, and, the surgeons sent to the icehouse for their ice. 1'hey made requisitions for the amount of ice needed for
each month, which I approved. 1'bose requisitions were then taken to the icehouse and deposited with Mr. Hull, Mr. Tiffany's agent, and. with a hospital
steward that 1 had down there; and the· ice was given out on those requil:litions
from time to time until they were filled. Out of 4,000 tons deliver8d in that
way, I suppose I did not get over 1,600 tons, owiug to the want of knowledge
in the parties who managed the ice. The1·e still remains in the government
ic~-house about 400 tons. But 1 knew nothing of the contract untill was
called. upon to receive the first cargo.
Question. Why could not Mr. 'l'iffany carry out his contl'act and deliver the
ice to the hospitals 1
Answer. There was nothing said about his delivering it at certain hours,
and the hospitals were so far apart that, during the long summer days espe-
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cia1ly, it was very late before he made his rounds; and it was found t be more
convenient to seud our own wagous for the ice.
Question. You only received the bill of lading 1
Answer. I received the bill of lading and ascertained that the icc had arrived and been put into the governmeut "ice-house. The bill of lading was
sworn to.
Question. You had no knowledge of the amount that the vessels actually discharged here 1
Answer. No, sir, except in one instance. Mr. Middleton, of this city, was
very anxious to exchange a cargo of ice; he was expe~ting !'orne which had not
arrived, and the government ice-houses were full. I agreed to let him have a
cargo, weight for weight; and I know that in weighing that one cargo it fell
short considerably over 10 per cent.
·
Question. How much over?
Answer. '!'he cargo, I think, was 350 tons, and I do no t think I gqt over 300
tons.
Question. Do you remember what you did get 1
Answer. I got about 300 tons, I think.
·,

By Mr. Odell:
Question. How many tons of that cargo did you pay for 1
Answer. I must have receipted for the full amount, 350 tons, less ten per
cent. I took the bill of lading as it was sworn to, without inquiry.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Who has those bills of lading 1
Answer. I retained copies of them in my office; the originals were given to
Mr. Tiffany to be enclosed with his vouchers.
Question. Can you fm~nish this committee with copies of those bills of ladin~
and will you do so 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
·
Question. Do you know of any person who has any knowledge of the actual
amount of ice that was received under this contract?
Answer. It is known at t'Qe Surgeon Generars office.
Question. I mean any one who has personal knowledge of the amount of ice
Mr. Tiffany really delivered .here; not the amount he contracted to deliver, or
the amount the bills of lading called for, but the actual amount delivered here.
Answer. Nobody but myself.
Question. The ice was not weighed here when received 1
Answer. No, sir, except in the one instance I have mentioned. The waste
was so very great in the ice-house that it was impossible to get at anything like
a correct estimate. It was weighed only when given out to the hospitals.

By Mr. Odell:
Question. Do you know whether there was any agent at the point of shipment to ascertain the quantity put on board the vessels 1
Ansv.rer. I do not know. I knew nothing about it until it arrived here. In
fact, I did not know I was to receipt for· the ice until the first cargo arrived. I
was not previously notified.
Question. You took no meattures yoiwself, either at the point of embarcation
or the point of delivery, to ascertain if the quantities agreed with the quantities
called for by the bills of lading 1
Answer. I did not, as the contract stated the,vouch.er was to be sworn .to, and
I was to receipt accordingly.
Question. Where were tho:3e bills of lading sworn to 1
Answer. In Maine, the place of shipment.
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Quef'ltion. By whom 1
Answer. By Mr. Tiffany himself.
Question. Did the captain of the vessel swear to them 1
Answer. I am not so certain about that.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Did you have in your possession a copy of the contract with
Tiffany 1
Answer. I did not. I read the copy of the contract in the Surgeon General's
office.
Question. Here is an e~tract from the contract:
"All the ice delivered under this contract to be subject to the inspection and
approval of the medical officer in charge of the post where it is delivered, and
such as does not cd;nform to the specifications set forth in this contract shall be
rejected."
Was it not your duty under that article to see that this ice was inspected 1
Answer. I sent officers down from my office several times to inspect it, and
the surgeons universally reported to me that the quality of the ice was very
good indeed. 'l'hey said that it was very fine clear ice, and I had no reason to
believe that it was not.
By Mr. Julian:
Question. T.hat relates to the quality only 1
Answer. Yes, sir; the quality was to be determined by .the sworn vouchers.
By lVIr. Gooch:
Question. What. in your judgment, is the best manner for the government to supply itself with ice?
Answer. To make contracts for ice to be delivered at the hospitals where
needed, not at the goverument ice-house.
Question. Do you mean at each hospital?
Answer. Contract that each hospital shall make requisition for the amount of
ice they want; the requisition for each month to be left with the contractor; the
ice to be called for day by day, delivered and weighed at each hospital until
the requisition is filled.
By Mr. Julian:
Question. Get the ice from the dealers in the city here 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Do you arrive at the conclusion that that is the best way from any
experience that you have had 1
Answer. From the experience of the past season, for the work is too great in
putting it in the hands of parties who are not acquainted with ice. ·
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. '¥by was the change made last year from the previous practice 1
Answer. I understood that contracts had been given out for ,many points
where there were no dealers, :md where the government took the ice by the
cargo and furnished the ice-houses, and it was made a sort of general rule. But
I am convinced that in places where there are dealers it is better to buy of the
dealers.
Question. Was there any necessity for blending this city, and Baltimore and
New York, &c., with those remote places where there are no dealers in ice 1
Answer. I cannot say. I think the Surgeon General will not contract again
except in the way I recommended.
Question. Has there been any failure on the part of dealers here to supply
any quantity and quality required for the use of the hospital81
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Answer. None that I am a ware of. I recollect that when I first came to this
city as medical director I found that the ho::>-pital1:l were in the habit of buying
ice where they could get it cheapest, and paying for it out of the ho~pital fund.
But provisions rose in price so rapidly, and became so expensive, that they had
to do away, as far as possible, with purchasing ice with the hospital fund. I had
nothing to do with that at all. They bought ice just as they bought anything
else that was needed.
Question. How did the number of patients in the hospitals in 18G2 compare
with the number in 18631
Answer. In the fall of 1862, and early in 1863, ihere were more patients
here than there have been at any other time. I think there were then 22,000
. sick and wounded in this city. I could give the statistics of the number of
patients from the time 1 took hold of the office here, but not before.
Question. The gre~test number of · patients that 4ave ever been in the
hospitals here in any year was prior to 1863, in June1
Answer. Yes, sir; I think so; there were a great many patients brought in
here after the second Bull Run battle.
Question. Do you know when the delivery of ice under this contract of
Tiftan y commenced 1
Answer. I think it commenced in April, 1863, if my memory serves me.
Question. When did the government require the greatest amount of ice in
this department; prior to April, 1863, or since that time 1
•
Answer. Since that time, I think. During the cold season, of course, we do
not use much ice. Last summer was an exceedingly hot summer, and they
used a great deal of ice.
QueE~tion. Was not the number of patients in the hospitals here in 1862
greater than at any other period 1
Answer. I cannot speak as to that, for I was not here in the summer of 1862,
but the number of patients would not be a criterion by which to judge the
amount of ice required, except you take it in counexion with the season. The
season is the criterion. During the warm months, of course, th~ most ice is
consumed, while during the winter months comparatively little is ·required. I
have found that in the summer months it was necessary to take from 2 to 22pounds of ice from the ice-house in order to give a pound or so to the hospitals.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. And before this contract system all that loss was saved to the
government 1
,
Answer. Yes, sir; and that was the reason I reported against the contract system.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Would not any man of ordinary intelligence know that ice delivered
at the hospitals day by day, as requred, at 75 cents per 100 pounds, would be
very much cheaper for the government than to purchase it by the cargo at
$10 50 a ton invoice weight at place of shipment in .Maine, with 10 per cent.
discount for wastage in transporting it here 1
Answer. It"would seem that any one who had ever thought upon the subject
and knew anything about ice would see that.
Question. Were there any. complaints from the hospitals while Tiffany was
delivering ice under his contract 1
.
Answer. 1'here were complaints, particularly from the hospitals in Alexandria,
who complained that they never got half the ice they ought to have got.
It was put on a boat and carried down there, and exposed a great deal. By
mutual consent that part of the contract was set aside.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Were the hospitals, generally, satisfied. with Mr. Tiffany's manner
of supplying ice, as to time, quantity, &c.?
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Answer. They were not; the most of them, I think, preferred to send for the
ice themselves.
The bills of lading referred to in the foregoing testimony were transmitted to
the committee, with the following indorsement:
MEDICAL DIRECTOR'S 0FFIC,E,
February 12, 1864.
Respectfully forwarded, as requested.
These bills of lading comprise all received from Mr. J. C. Tiffany, except
the bill of lading of the schooner Richmond, whereof N. T. Dill wa.3 master,
which has been mislaid. The Richmond was freighted with 140 tons of ice,
one of the first cargoes received.
R. 0. ABBOTT, Surgeon U.S. A.,
Medical Director, Department of Washi~gton.
Six days' time was allowed for discharging cargo, and after that 122- cents
per registered ton allowed for demurrage.

Abstract
Date.

if supply if ice for

Washington, D. C., furnished under c_ontract
with J. C. Tiffany.

Place of shipment.

N arne of vessel.

No. oftons
per invoice.

1863.
June 1 Gardiner, Me .. .
3 . • • • . . do .... _.. .
3 ..• _.. do_ ... ~ .. .
3 ... - .. do .....•..
6 ...... do ....... .
8 ...•.. do ....... .
8 ...... do ....... .
17 ...... do •.......
18 ..•••. do •.......
20 .. - - .. do ....... .
Aug.13 ...•.. do ....... .
19 .. ----do ....•...
21 ...... do ....... .
26 .. . ... do ....... .

Schr. Thomas C. Bartlett. _.
Schr. October ........•• - •.
Schr. Golden Rod ...... _..
Schr. Exeter ...•.•..•. __ .
Schr. Olivia Buxton ...... .
Schr. Abbott Lawrence ... .
Schr. Martha ............ .
Brig Whitaker ........ ·- _..
Schr. Hudson ............ .
Schr. Hannah Matilda .... .
Brig Forrester ..•••...•.•.
Schr. Mary Ella .........•.
Schr. Jennie Morton ..•.•..
Brig Isadora ...... ____ ... .
28 . • • •• . do .••• ___ . Schr. Thomas Martin ..... .
Sept. 5 . . - - - . do .... - ... Schr. Louie F. Smith ..... .
9 . • . - •. do .•...... Schr. H. N. Farnham .... ..

Winchester Card • _..
Bartlett Morse ... - ..
Norman Bishop ..•..
Abram Snow ..... - ..
SamuelJ. Williams ..
Cyrus T. Fuller .... .
Alpheus Baxter .... .
Joseph W. Handy ..
Charles S. Brown .. .
John Price __ ..... ..
James Murray ... _..
Charles W. Talpey ..
J. G. Hufnagel.--.-G. B. Hussey ....••.
Jabez Lyon ....... .
E. W. Cobb ....... .
D. W. Smith.---- ..

*127ll
40
"156
*llS
"148
*130

t265
t230

t262
:j:257
§355-ft
11180/-oViJ

~186t

if"¥413

tt264
H176
:j:j:372
:j:t300

*Invoice sworn to by the captain, and John McCartney, agent, before Barker A. Neal, for J. C. Tiffany.

t Invoice sworn to by the captairi, and John McCartney, agent, before William T. Hall, for J. C. Tiffany.

t Invoice sworn to by the captain, and John McCartney, agent, before Barker A. N.eal, for J. C. Tiffany.

\}Invoice sworn to by the captain, and John McCartney, agent, before Jacob Smith, for J. C. Tiffany.
II Invoice sworn to by the captain, and John McCartney, agent, before Nutting and J. T. Robinson, for J.
C. Tiffany.
~Invoice sworn to by the captain, aud John McCartney, agent, before Barker A. Neal, for J. C. Tiffany,
**Invoice sworn to by the captain, and John McCartney, agent, before George C. Morren and J. T. Robin·
son, for J. C. Tiffany.
tt Invoice sworn to by the captain, and John McCartney, ageJ:J.t, before George C. Morrell, for J. C. Tiffany.

Testimony

if

Mr. Henry Johnson.

WASHINGTbN, February 11, 1864.
Mr. HENRY JOHNSON sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Will you state if you are now in the employ of the government,
and how long you have been so employed, and in what capacity 1
Part v--3
·
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Answer. I have been employed in the capacHy of medical storekeeper since
about the 1st of November, 1862. I was assigned to duty as acting medical purveyor of Washington about the lOth of November, 1862, and have been so
employed since that time.
Question. Have you any knowledge of the mann~r in which the government
has been supplied with ice since you have held your present position 1
~nswer. Yes, sir. Proposals were advertised for, bids received, and contracts
drawn up under the bids according to the proposals.
Question. Will you state fully to the committee all the knowledge you have'
in relation to that matter 1
Answer. Advertisements were given out, a_nd the proposals were received and
opened by myself, and contracts were awarded, according to our decisions, to
the lowest bidders. It then rested for the final decision of the Surgeon General,
who had the approval or disapproval of our awards. In this city, for the last
year, the proposals were forwarded to the Surgeon General's office for his decisi'on, and he awarded the contract to Mr. J. C. Tiffany, instead of to the one
I had decided to be the lowest bidder, as he said, because he thought Mr. Tiffany's bid the cheapest. I afterwards went to Dr. Smith, who was the representative of the Surgeon General, and stated that I thought my award for Washington city was lower than the one he had made in reference to Mr. Tiffany,
and I stated my reasons. Mr. Godey, to whom I awarded it, had agreed to
weigh the ice at the ice-house for the hospitals at $13 a ton. I told Dr. Smith
that I thought the wastage on the ice would be probably so great that the proposition of Mr. Godey was the cheaper one, and . I endeavored to show him
why I thought so. That in shipping ice there was considerable loss, 25 or 30
per cent.; and that the government would have to pay for the ice-house; while
Mr. Godey had an ice-house of his own, and submitted to all this loss himself,
delivering and being paid for just the amount of ice required. He replied that
he had good calculators in his office, and seemed to think that Mr. Tiffany's
proposal was the cheapest.
Question. Do you remember the amount of Mr. Tiffany's bid 1
Answer. His bid was, I think, $10 50 per ton shipped, with 10 per cent. off
for wastage.
Question. Do you know what Mr. Tiffany was to have for building an icehouse 1·
Answer. He was to have a dollar and a half per ton in vVashington.
Question. So that he was to receive about $9 45 a ton; then the price of the
ice-house added would make it $10 95 per ton.
Answer. Yes, sir; but that would depend upon how much ice was required
for the season.
Question. Could there, in your judgment, be an honest diff~rence of opinion
as to which of those two bids was the more advantageous to the governm'e nt at
that time 1
.~: :·'
Answer. It was a matter. I knew nothing about. I merely took the word pf
Mr. Godey, and of disinterested parties who wrote to me at the time, stating
that the loss of ice in shipping and transporting would be 25 or 30 per cent. I
mentioned that to Dr. Smith, and he said that he could not consider those things ;
that the parties were probably interested. ·
Question. Did you have more than one conversation with Dr. Smith, or the
Surgeon General, about that matter 1
Answer. I .do not think I went to see him more than once. As they had
made the decision I did not think it worth while to go there again about it.
Question. Had they decided the matter peremptorily when you saw them,
rejecting the bid of Mr. Godey 1
Answer. They had. decided, stating that they had made a calculation in
their office, and had come to the conclusion that Mr. Tiffany's bid was lowest.
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Question. Is this the advertisement issued by you, and under which proposals were received 1 (Showi~g witness the advertisement at close of testimony
of Mr. Robert A. Payne.)
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know whether the terms were ch:tnged in making the contract with Mr. Tiffany 1
Answer. I do not know that they were.
Question. In the fourth item of the contract with Mr. Tiffany I find this:
" All the ice delivered under this contract to be received and paid for as per
bill of lading, fifteen per cent. being deducted from the face of bill of lading
for wastage on ice delivered at Pensacola, Florida, and New Orleans, Louisiana,
and ten per cent. deducted on ice delivered at Washin.gton, D. 0.''
Is that in accordance with your advettised proposals 1 If so, point out
where, in the advertisement, that is suggested or provided for 1
Answer. The propositions were not all in conformity to the advertisement;
but then they were taken in reference to the lowest bidders.
Question. Have you the various propositions that were submitted 1
Answer. I have not.
Question. Who bas them 1
Answer. 'rhey were withdrawn from my office by order of the Surgeon General, and forwarded to the War Department. I made a request that they may
be returned to me in order to be filed.
·
Question. 'l,his provision in the contract was not specially provided for in your
advertisement 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Do you know whether there was any such suggestion as tha,t, or any
provision for that article, in Mr. 'l,iffany's proposal?
Answer. I really forget all about the forms of his proposals.
Question. By whom was that contract drawn 1
Answer. It was drawn by my clerk, in my office.
Question. Between whom were the terms of the contract agreed upon 1
Answer. The contract was based upon the proposals of Mr. Tiffany, after
they had been accepted at thea Surgeon General's office. We were ordered to
make the contract with Mr. Tiffany.
Question. Is this contract drawn precisely in accordance with the terms of
his proposals 1
Answer. I think so.
Question. Are you positive on that point 1
Answer. I think it was as near as we could possibly get it.
Question. Had you any knowledge in relation to the ice business 1
Answer. No, sir; I have had no experience in it.
Question. Then how did you know what would be a proper percentage for
waste?
Answer. I knew nothing about it. I had to go according to the proposals.
Question. How could you tell which proposition was b'est if you knew nothing
of the rate of wastage of ice in being transported and delivered 1
Answer. The matter was left to me to decide in drawing up the proposals,
and I had to do the best I could. I had no judgment in the matter of the contracts. As I said before, that was left entirely to t\le decision of the Surgeon
Gt:Jnei.·al; and his decision was final. I recommended Mr. Godey's -bid, because
he took upon himself the whole matter of loss and wastage in shipping and putting the ice into the ice-house.
Question. Then are we to understand that you made this contract with Mr.
Tiffany in compliance with the order of the Surgeon General?
Answer. Yes, sir.
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Question. You did not make it because, in yout: opinion, it was the best for
the government 1
Ans'Yer. No, sir.
Question. You did not make it because you believed that particular contract
to be best, but because you were ordered to make it 1
Answer. Because I was ordered to do so.
Question. Did you receive any instructions from the Surgeon General in relation to the terms of the contract 1
Answer. No, sir; we had to take just such terms as he had proposed in his
bid. Upon those terms the contract was based.
Question. Do you remember whether any of the other bids contained terms
similar to that 1
Answer. There was a p:1rty of the name of Cheeseman, I think-I will not
be positive about the name-who made a proposal similar to that, offering to
supply ice at so much for New Orleans.
Question. Do you remember what percentage he proposed to allow fOr wastage1
Answer. I do not think he allowed any wastage at all.
Question. Then it was not like this 1
Answer. It was similar to it in some respects.
Question. But in this respect of wastage it was not like it 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Did you know ~r. Tiffany1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Do you know whether he had ever been engaged in the ice business 1
Answer. I know nothing at all about him.
Question. Where did you first see him 1
Answer. He came in my office and asked some questions about this ice business. That is about the first I saw of him. ·
Question. Do you issue advertisements and receive proposals for other th~ngs
besides ice 1
.Answer. I have done so, but the matter has been cancelled by the Surgeon
General. I advertised for proposals to furnish hospital furniture. I teceived
proposals, and forwarded them to the Surgeon General's office; but it was decided
there to be inexpedient to act upon them. It was thought that the things could
be purchased to greater advantage in the open market. I also prepared the advertisement for ice this year.
Question. Did your agency in this ice matter cease when you had made out
the contract, or were you bound to receive it and superinten,d its delivery 1
Answer. I had nothing to do with that. It was left to the medical director
to receive the ice.
Question. Your agency terminated with the execution of the contract 1
.Answer. Yes, sir; that is, so far as this: The me.dical director received all
the ice, and was accountable for its quality, &c.; but I had a hospital steward
assigned to duty to take charge of the ice-house, and he reported ~o me and to
Dr. .Abbott; but I received none of the ice, and did not examine·any of it; it
was all receipted for by the medical director's department.
Question. Who made the contract for building the ice-house 1
Answer. That was included in Mr. Tiffany's proposition.
Question . .At whose suggestion was that item about the ice-house inserted 1
Answer. He inserted in his propt;>sition that he would build the ice-house at
a dollar and a half a ton.
•
Question. r_rhat was a part of his proposition 1
.Answer. Yes, sir.
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Question. Did you purchase any ice or make any arrangements for the purchase of ice before these contracts 1
Answer. No, sir.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Did the medical director unders't and the nature of this contract 1
Answer. I should suppose so.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Was a copy of this contract furnished to the medical director 1
Answer. I furnished none. I had a copy in my office, and a copy was furnished to the Surgeon General, and one to the Second Comptroller.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Did you in making this contract institute any means, through the
medical department or otherwise, to ascertain that the terms of the contract were
complied with as to quantity and quality 1
Answer. No, sir; that was left entirely to the medical director. It was his
duty to receive it, and it was for him, I suppose, to take the proper means to
ascertain that.
By Mr. Gooch:
.
Question. What was the name of the hospital steward you sent to take charge
of the ice-house 1
Answer. Ezra Holden, I think; he is still in charge of the ice-house.
Question. Did you make this contract (handing witness a copy) with A
Tracy Edgerton 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
·
Question. By whom was that contract awarded to him 1
Answer. That was awarded on my own decisjon, accepted and approved by
the Surgeon General.
Question. Were there any other proposals to furnish ice at the places embraced in this contract beside the proposal of Edgerton 1 '
Answer. I think there were.
QtJestion. Have you in your possession the proposals in this case 1
Answer. No, sir ; I have _no proposals at all. They were all withdrawn.
Question. Where do you understand those proposals now to be 1
Answer. In the office of the Secretary of War, I presume. I have a letter
here. in reference to ,that matter. I made a request that the proposals be returned to my office, in order that I might file them in the returns of my office
according to law. This is the answer I received :
SuRGEON GENERAL's OFFICE,

lVaskington City, D. C., August 17, 1863.
SIR: Your communication of the 14th instant, requesting that certain proposals for ice may be returned to your office, has been received.
You are respectfully iuformed that these proposals were sent to the Secretary
of War on the 28th of April last, and have not yet been returned.
Very respectfu~ly, your obedient servant,
JOSEPH R. SMI'rH,
Acting Surgeon General.
HENRY JoHNSON,

M.S. K., U.S. A.,

Wasl~ington,

D. C.

Question. Will you state to us what you understand to be the meaning of the
sixth item in this contract with A. Tracy Edgerton 1 " rrhat payment shall be
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made from time to time upon receipted bills of lading and duplicate accounts
certified to by the medical officer in charge of the post where it is delivered."
Answer. 'The bill of lading accompanied the account as evide.nce upon which
to base the correctness of the account. The account is made out in duplicate
and certified to by the medical officer in charge of the post where it is delivered.
Question. What was that certificate to be 1
Answer. Something in this form, I suppose : " I certify that the above account is correct and just, and that the ice was received as specified," or "as
stated," or "that the ice was received by me"-something to that effect, to be
attached below the account.
Question. Do you expect the bill of lading and certificate to agree in
amount 'l
Ans'wer. Yes, sir.
. Question. That the receipt shall be for just so many tons as the bill of lading
called for 1
Answer. This is a different form from the proposal of Mr. Tiffany; there is
no deduction for wastage; and the contractor agrees to deliver a certain amount
of ice to each of these points.
Question. 'Then the bill of lading and the certificate would not agree as to
quantity 1
Answer. 'That would depend upon the receipt of the medical officer. If he
received the amount on the bill of lading, of course he would have to acknowledge it to be correct.
Question. You understand that contract to call for the delivery of 2,000
pounds of ice per ton at each of these points 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. It is not sufficient that so many tons at 2,000 pounds per ton shall
be stated on the bill of lading 1
Answer. No, sir, it is that so much ice shall be delivered at the ice-house.
Question. W:hy did you put in the provision in relation t? the bill of lading ?
Answer. I presume the proposal read in that way-to take the r~ceipted bill
of lading.
Question. That would not prove anything, would it 1
Answer. Yes, sir; if the office1· received so many tons, at 2,000 pounds per
ton, according to the bill of lading, he should receipt for it.
Question. Have you not knowledge enough of the ice business to know that
no vessel can deliver in a southern port as many tons of ice as are put «e'l1 board
the vessel in New England 1
Answer. I know that very well. But Mr. Edgerton stated to me that, in
order to invoice the full quantity of ice at these points, he should put 2,240
pounds to the ton on board the vessel, and by the time it reached the point of
delivery he had no doubt that 2,000 pounds would be d~livered at the ice-house.
Still that was a matter that was to be decided by the receiving officer.
Question. Can you tell who suggested that particular clause of the contract 1
Answer. I presume it was suggested by the proposal.
Question. Do you understand by payment bei,ng made upon the receipt of
the medical officer, that so much ice has been received under that bill of lading 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
·
Question. 'l'bat there was receipted for on the \m of lading the amount
actually delivered 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; that, I presume, is it.
Question. 'l,hen why did you have yonr conversation with Mr. Edgerton in
relation t9 his putting on board 2,240 pounds to the ton, in the expectation that
it would hold out 2,000 pounds at the time of delivery, if it was to be then
weighed, and the exact amount received to be receipted for 1
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Answer. He merely made that remark in conversation. I toM him he would
have to deliver the actual quantity stated; and he said there would ·be no difficulty about that, because he could put the ice on by the long ton, and by the
time it reached the point of delivery the wastage would not make it less than
2,000 pounds to the ton. It was merely in converttation that that matter was
mentioned. I enjoined upon him that he was bound to deliver 2,000 pounds to
the ton.
Question. The amount of wastage would depend very much upon the post
at which it was delivered 1
An13wer. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Have you any knowledge of the principle upon which Mr. Edgerton's accounts were s~ttled; whether he was paid for the whole amount called
for by the bill of lading, or for the amount actu\lly delivered 1
Answer. I have no knowledge of that. I paid pretty much all the bills.
They were all audited in the Surgeon General's office, and sent to me with an
order on them to pay.
Question. Do you know upon what principle those bills were audited 1
Answer. I do not. They had the contract in the Surgeon General's office,
and they should have been audited according to the contract.
Question. You say you do not know whether the full amount called for by
the bill of lading was paid for, or only the amount actually delivered 1
Answer. I do not.
Question. Having made the contract yourself, and knowing the terms of it,
sh~mld you not, as a good business man, have seen whether you paid for more
ice than was actually delivered 1
.Answer. When an account has been examhted in the Surgeon General's office,
and comes to me with an order on it to pay it, I do not know that I have any
right to question the matter further. The Surgeon General is my superior officer, and I must obey his orders. It does not do for me to question his orders.
Question. I understand that you must obey his orders. But I understand
another thing: that, ·as you made the contract, if you thought it was not complied with, you should have called the attention of the Surgeon General to that
fact.
•
Answer. I should have done so if I had thought there was anything wrong
about the matter.
Question. Your answer is that you did not examine into that fact.
Answer. I have no doubt it was done by my clerk, who ha's my instructions
to audit every account that comes in.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Do you remember in what paper th'ese advertisements for proposals for ice were inserted 1
Answer. I could not recall them just now.
Question. In what portions of the country 1
Answer. All over the country: in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Ohio, Wisconsin, and, I think, in Illinois.
Question. Was this contract with Parrish & Co. [showing witness a copy]
made by you 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
·
Question. Were there any other contracts for ice made by you except with
'
·
Tiffany, Edgerton, and Parrish & Co.
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Do you know whether 'there were any other proposals to furnish
ice at the points covered by the contract with Parrish & Co. 1
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.Answer. I think there must have been; there were a great many proposab
in.
Question. Were any proposals, so far as you know, rejected merely for informality 1
.Answer. Yes, sir; I think the.re were several that were informal; probably
informal so far as the want of a certificate-some evidence to show the ability
of the party bidding to comply with the contract if awarded to him. There
were several informalities in many of the proposals~
Question. Did you have any conversation with any one in relation to the
terms of that advertisement before it was published 1
·•
Answer. Do you mean in relation to the form of the advertisement 1
Question. Yes, sir.
Answer. The matter was submitted to the Surgeon General's office for decision, and he ·ordered me to advertise; the advertisement was drawn up by
me.
1
Question. Was it changed in the Surgeon General's office 1
.Answer. I think not.
Question. Did any persons call on you, or have any interview with you, in
relation to that advertisement before it was sent by you to the Surgeon General's
office, or after?
Answer. No, sir. The Surgeon General directed me to draw up an advertisement for ice, and I did so, and immediately forwarded it to his office for approval, and it was returned after approval.
Question. When did you first see Mr. Tiffany 1 ·
·
Answer. About the first time I saw Mr. Tiffany-·Question. I want the first time you saw him, not about the first time.
Answer. It was some time between inserting the advertisement and receiving
the proposals.
.
·
Question. Had you not seen him before that time 1
.Answer. No, sir.
Question. When did you first see Mr. Edgerton 1
Answer. About the same time.
Question. Had you any conversation with either of them before is8uing the
advertisement 1
.Answer. No, sir.
•
Question. Nor with Mr. Parrish 1
.Answer. No, sir; I did not know either of the parties.
Question. Have you made any contracts for ice for the coming year 1
.Answer. No, sir.
Question. Have you issued any advertisements 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How many 1
Answer. I have inserted the same advertisement in 14 or 15 different papers.
The bids will be opened on the 25th of this month.
Question. Have you changed the terms of the advertisement in any way 1
.Answer. Yes, sir. The first one was withdrawn, and a second one inserted,
more in detail, and asking for more information.
Question. Why was the first withdrawn 1
Answer. I do not know. .An order was sent to me from the Surgl'lon General's office to withdraw it, without intimating any reason for it.
Question. Who prepared the second proposals novr issued 1
.Answer. I prepared them, based upon instructions given to me from the
Surgeon General's office.
,
Question. You changed the advertisement according to instructions given to
you by the Surgeon General ?
.Answer. Yes, sir.

•

ICE CONTRACTS.

41

Question. Were you not notified, in that connexion, that the advertisement
which you had issued was so indefinite that it would be impossible for any intelligent man to bid under it 1
Answer. No, sir; I received np notice of that kind. I was ordered to withdraw it, and I did so, according to orders, with_out asking ·any reason for it.
There were one or two parties who wanted to put in proposals who stated that .
the matter was indefinite; but at the same time the information called for by
the advertisement could be received from the medical officers at the different
points. It was impossible for me to know the amount req aired, or whether
there were ice-houses at the different points. That information could be obtained from the medical directors at the different points.
Question. Would it not have been very much more business-like for you to
advertise what facilities the government had, and to inform persons, who desired to bid, whether the ice .was tb be received by the cargo or by. the pound,
and. whether it was to be distributed by them or by the government 1
Answer. I think the better plan is that the ice should be distributed to the
various hospitals,as required, and the actual weight delivered there receipted
for. It appears to me that ,that would be the better plan. I think that by
that plan the government would save all the loss in shippbg and transporting
it, and the expense of storing it and taking care .of it, and make the party who
receives the contract responsible for all that thing. The ice-dealer knows what
the wastage would be, and can put in his proposals at such a price as would
be proper unde,r the circumstances.
Question. Have you made any such recommendation to the Surgeon General?
Answer. I made that recommendation when I drew up the first proposals. I
had a ' comultation with him about it, and suggested that plan, and he also
thought that would be the better plan, and I accordingly drew up the proposals.
Question. The second proposals 1
Answer. The first ones.
Question. It did not contain that.
Answer. It did not state the amount required.
Question. It did not state whether the ice was to be delivered at the hospitals or where.
Answer_. It was to be delivered at the hospitals at this point.
Question. Did your first advertisement so state 1
Answer. Yes, si'r.
Question. Have you a copy of it 1
Answer. Not with me.
Question. Did your first advertisement specify that the contractor was to
deliver the ice at each of the hospitals in the vicinity of .the several points
named 1
Answer. Yes, sir. r.rhe form of that advertisement was similar to the one I
now have in, except in regard to certain portions of the country north of this.
Question. Can you state, of your own knowledge, how the hospitals were
supplied with ice before these contra.cts 1
Answer. I cannot state positively.

Testimony

of Dr. Joseph R. Smith.
WASHINGTON, Feh1 uary 12, 1864.

Dr. JosEPH R. SMITH sworn and examined.
By J\rlr. Gooch:
Question. What is your rank and position in the army, and where have you
been stationed since the commencement of the war 1

•·
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Answer. I am a surgeon in the United States army; I w'as taken prisoner
in Texas at the begimdng of the war, and when I came north on parole I was
stationed in Georgetown in charge of the hospitals there, from July, 1861, untif
July, 1862, when I was put on duty in the Surgeon General's office as principal
assistant in that office; I remained there until September, 1863, when I was
ordered west; I ,have been serving since as medical direotor of the army of
Arkansas.
·
Question. Have you any knowledge of the manner in which the government
bas been supplied with ice for hospital purposes, &c.?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. State to the committee what knowledge you have in relation to it.
Answer. While I was in charge of the hospitals in this city, the ice was purchased from the hof';pital fund ; some time in the winter of 1862 and 1863, the
Surgeon General a_irected advertisements to be put in the paper for supplying
ice at different points in the country, where there were troops and hospitals. In
answer to those advertisements, bids were received and contracts were made
with several partieR 1 whose names I do not now recollect, with the exception
of three, Mr. Edgerton, Mr. Tiffany and Mr. Parrish.
Question. By whom, or under whose directions, were the contracts made with
those parties 1
Answer. Under direction of the Surgeon General.
Question. Who examined the proposals received in response to the advertisements, and who awarded the contracts 1
Answer. The proposals were fi.i-st taken, I think, to the medical purveyor in
this city, who examined them and made a decision in the matter. Then they
weTe brought by him to the Surveyor General's office and brought to me. I
happened to be busy at the time. I requested Dr. Alden, who was an assistant
in the office, and whose business it was to take charge of contracts, Tequisitions,
and things of that kind, to come down in the evening and look them over. He
came down in the evening and we looked them over ; after having decided
which we thought to be the che~.pest, they were presented the next day to the
Surgeon General, who directed the contracts to be made accordingly.
Question. Were any of the awards changed that ~ere made by the medical
purveyor, Mr. Johnson 1
Answer. I think three or four were.
Question. Will you state what awards you changed, and the reasons fo.r the
change 1
·
Answer. I do not recollect which were changed; they were changed because
it was thought in the office that the bids he took were not the most advanta·
geous ro the government.
Question. "\Vas there a change made awarding the contract to Mr. ~dgerton?
Answer. I Jo not now recollect.
Question. Was there a change made awarding the contract to Mr. 1'iffany 1
Answer. Ye~, sir.
Question. Was there a change made awarding the contract to Mr. Parrish 1
Answer. I do not recollect.
Question. Was there a change made awarding the contract to Gosnell and
Scott 1
·
Answer. I do not recollect. _
Question. Do you remember to whom Mr. Johnson awarded the contract
which was subsequently awarded to Mr. Tiffany 1
Answer. I do not.
Question. The change was made by you and Dr. Alden 1
Answer. The examination was made by us, and the next day the matter was
submitted to the Surgeon General, and he directed a contract to be as was deemed
most advantagecus.
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Question. In accordance with your recommendation 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Had you or Dr. Alden any knowledge in relation to the ice busi~
ness1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Then how could you determine wbich contract was the most advantageous, and why did you change the award made by the medical purveyor 1
Answer. We examined the terms of the proposals.
Question. Take for instance this department. If I remember rightly, Mr.
Tiffany offered to furnish ice for $10 50 per ton, invoi.ce weight, as per bill of
lading, delivered here by the cargo-that is, the weight at the point where it
was loaded into the vessels, with ten per cent. discount, was to be accepted
as the weight here. Do you remember that such were the terms of his contract1
Answer. I do not remember exactly; they were something of that character.
Question. Mr. Gorley, of this city, offered to furnish ice, weighed out every
morning at his ice-house, at $14 a ton, and Mr. Middleton, of this city, offered
to supply ice at seventy-five cents per hundred pounds, delivered at the hospit!ils every morning. Do you remembEr anything· about that 1
Answer. I do not recollect the exact prices; but I recollect that the ice-dealers here proposed to deliver ice at the hospitals, or from their ice-houses.
Question. Had you not sufficient knowledge of the ice business to know that
it was more advantageous to the government to have the ice delivered at the
hospital at 75 cents per 100 pounds than to take it at the invoice weight loaded
in Maine at $10 50 per ton, with only 10 per cent. off for wastage, the government having to take it from the vessel, put it into an ice-house built by themselves,
and deliver it here by themselves~ sum~ring all the loss?
Answer. The decision that was made was that which was supposed to be the
best for the government, after considering the matter.
.
· ·
Question. Did you consult anybody 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you consult any ice-men, or any person who had any knowledge of the ice-business 1
,
Answer. 1 talked with Mr. Godey about it for one. I know Mr. Godey
very well, for he had been supplying the hospitals when I was in charge of
them, and also supplied my own family with ice. I think I talked with Mr.
Middleton upon the subject.
Question. Did they not both tell you that it was more economical for the government tG take ice at the rate at which they offered it 1
Answer. They both tho~ght their bids were the best.
Question. 'rhen it was not in accordance with their advice that you changed
the award the medical purveyor had made to Mr. Godey, and gave the contract
to Mr. Tiffany 1
·
Answer. I did not ask their advice on the subject. I inquired of them in
reference to various points, among those concerning wastage in vessels. There
was great discrepancy in reference to the amount of wastage in the statements
of the different persons whom I asked.
'
Question. Did anybody fix it as low as 10 pel" cent.1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Any ice man 1
Answer. I forget who.
Question. Did you have any conference with Mr. Tiffany in relation to the
matter l
Answer. Yes, sir; Mr. Tiffany came to the office when the awards had been
made by Mr. Johnson, and represented what he considered the facts of the case.
Question. Had you known Mr. Tiffany before 1
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Answer. No, sir; I never bad any other conference with him.
Question. Was there any change made in the contract differing from the
proposals made by 1\fr. Tiffany 1 If so, state what was that change, and why
it was made .
Answer. I do not recollect any. If there was any, if I should bear it mentioned, I probably would remember it.
Question. Did his original proposition contain a clause providing that the ice
should be taken by the weight in Maine, at 10 per cent. discount 1
Answer. I do not remember the terms of his contract.
. [A copy of the contract with 1\fr. Tiffany was then shown to the witness,
upon examining which, he said-J
I do not recollect any change from the terms of the proposal.
Question. Had you not sufficient knowledge of the ice business to know that
it would be more economical to the government to have its ice delivered to it in
Washington in such quantities as it wanted, from an ice-dealer here, at $14 a
ton; or delivered at the hospitals in such quantities ·as were required day by
day, at $15 a ton, than it would be for the government to pay for it at the rate
of $9 45 a ton in 1\faine, and then suffer all the loss that would result by wastage in transporting it from l\faine to this place, then put it into an ice-house
here, and deliver it from the ice-house in such quantities as might be wanted
by the hospitals; adding thereto the expenses of building the ice-house, and
the taking the ice to the hospitals 1
·
Answer. It was my opinion after consultation - - - . I recollect now that
I consulted the medical storekeeper, 1\fr. Johnson, on the subject, after having sent for him, and told him the views of the office upon the subject, and he
agreed that the contract which was adopted by the Surgeon General's office was
the most advantageous one.
Question. I will state that we understand the testimony of 1\fr. Johnson to be
exactly the reverse; that he urged 1\fr. Godey's proposal in preference to that
of :Mr. Tiffany.
Answer. I do not recollect that he did that.
·
Question. Do you remember that he did assent to the contract with Tiffany 1
Aq_swer. I remember distinctly that he did, after talking the matter over.
Question. Where ie Dr. Alden, the gentleman with whom you consulted 1
Answer. I think he is in Philadelphia. He was assistant surgeon, on duty in
the Surgeon General's office.
Question. Do you know whether 1\fr. 'l'iffany was a man who had been in
the ice business prior to that time 1
Answer. I do not; I know nothing about that but what he said. He said
that he had delivered some ice previously to the army of the Potomac.
Question. Have you any knowledge in relation to the delivery of ice under
any of these contracts 1
Answer. No, sir. ·
Question. Have you any knowledge of the manner in which New Orleans
was being supplied with ice at the time this contract was made 1
Answer. I do not think it was being supplied; I do not know that it was.
Question. You have no knowledge on that point 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Have you any knowledge in relation to the manner in which ice
was being supplied at that time, or had been previously supplied, at the other
places covered by these contracts 1
Answer. I recollect now that some ice had been ordered to Hilton Head from
a firm in Boston, on au intimation being given to the office that ice was needed
there; I think that was under some previous contract, before I entered the Surgeon General's office; but I do not kno.w. I am under the impression that a
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majority of the hospitals throughout the country purchased their ice from the
hospital fund.
Question. From ice-dealers in the vicinity 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Is there anything else in connexion with this matter that you wish
to state?
·
Answer. I do not know; I wish to give the committee any information I have.
Mr. Gooch. I have asked you questions in relation to the points brought in
question.
'l'he witness. When bills were brought in, questions came up for discussion,
l!!Uch as demurrage, the number of working days, and such as are referred to the
office for decision.
Question. You mean, under these contracts 1
Answer. Yes, sir. !·understand that contracts are now being made to furnish ice to the hospitals in the west. ' I received a notification from the Assistant
Surgeon General's office, inquiring how much ice was needed at Little Rock,
where I was stationed.
By Mr. Loan:
Question Do you know where the proposals for this contract which Mr.
Tiftany took were drawn up and by whom 1
Answer. I think by Mr. Johnson, the medical purveyor; I am not certain
about that.
Question. By whose direction?
Answer. Under the general dire~tions which he received from the Surgeon
General's office to make out proposals.
Question. Do you know whether the terms of the advertisement were prescribed to Mr. Johnson by the Surgeon General, or any other person 1
Answer. As I recollect it, Mr. Johnson was directed to prepare an advertisement and put it in the papers. He made it out himself and brought it, or a
copy of it, to the Surgeon General's office, and it was approved.
Question. Do you know at whose suggestion the manner of furnishing ice
was changed from the daily supplies obtained from Mr. Godey and Mr. Mid. dleton to the system of obtaining it under contracts 1
Answer. I do not know. All these things were discussed from time to time
in the Surgeon General's office, and had been discussed a great many times; and
the Surgeon General directed the proposals to be issued.
Question. Can you tell about what quantity of ice was furnished monthly to
the hospitals in this city and Georgetown by Mr. Godey and Mr. Middleton
while they furnished it?
Answer. I do not know. When I was in charge of Seminary hospital, in
Gem:getown, we purchased about 200 pounds a day.
Question. I believe you have stated that you have no means of knowing the
motives for changing the manner of supplying ice 1
Answer. Congress had made an appropriati9n for ice which had not been done
previously. The hospital funds were believed to be unable to supply sufficient
ice for the hospitals, so that the Surgeon General determined to furnish it fi·om
the medical appropriation.
Question. Do you know that the Surgeon General assigned that as a reason
,
for the change 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I know that he said so. In talking the matter over that
was the reason given.
Question. Upon what basis was it that the quantity of ice w&3 so 1argely in·
creased under the contract with Mr. Tiffany 1
Answer. '.rhe medical director in this city, as elsewhere, in every other place
where ice was furnished, was required to report the probable amount needed for
the sick in his charge; and it was on that data that the quantity was ordered.
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Question. By whom was it ordered 1
Answer. By the medical purveyor, generally; or, in some cases, where letters,
calling for ice, came from the medical directors to the Surgeon General's office, it
was ordered from there.
Question. Do you remember to have seen any such orders 1
Ans·wer. I do not remember, certainly. I think I did, several.
Question. Could you state about what quantities were named in those orders 1
Answer. No, sir; that can be ascertained from the office. The orders and
letters are on file, about that time, calling for about that amount of ice.
Question. Did ,you have anything to do with originating this contract, in
prescribing its terms in any way, or in determini~g its acceptance 1 If so,
state precisely what part you took in the transaction.
Answer. All that I did was what I have already stated. When the contracts
were brought in for the scrutiny of the Surgeon General, I looked them all over
in conjunction with Dr. Alden.
Question. And recommended their acceptance by the Surgeon General?
Answer. No, sir; I selected those I deemed the most advantageous to the
government, and took them to the Surgeon GeneraL Question. Did you recommend the acceptance of those you reported to him 1
Answer. Yes, sir; that is, I recommended them as the best contracts.
Question. That is what I mean.
Answer. I deemed those that we selected the most advantageous to the government.
'
Question. And recommended them to the Surgeon General to be accepted 1
Answer. Well, I had nothing to do in any way with the matter of recommending at that time. The Surgeon General directed the contracts to be made.
Question. How came you in possession of these contracts 1
Answer. I was the principal assistant in the Surgeon General's office. All the
papers that came into the Surgeon General's office came to me.
Question. For what purpose 1
· Answer. To do what was proper in the case; to send such as required the
action of the Surgeon General to be presented to him; to send others to proper
officers for consideration.
Question. Why did you undertake to determine on the relative meritl! of
these bids 1
Answer. Because there were a great many people came into the office; every
ice-dealer who had made a bid came in, each advocating the merits of his own
proposal; and where there was ,so much dispute about it I deemed it worthy
the attention and consideration of the Surgeon General. I looked them over and
took them to him.
Question. You looked them over at your own suggestion, not because you
deemed it your duty to do so 1
Answer. I considered it my duty to do it.
Question. And having discharged that duty, you reported to the Surgeon
General those that you deemed it most advisable to accept 1
Answer. I took all the bids in to him.
Qt1estion. What was your recommendation, if any 1
Answer. I made no recommendation on the subject. I informed the Surgeon
General which contracts I deemed most advantageous to the,government. He
looked them over also, and directed them to be so awarded.
Question. By whom was the ice received which was delivered'by Mr. Tiffany 1
Answer. I think the medical purveyor, Mr. Johnson, did. I ao not know
It may possibly have been the medical director, Dr. Abbott. It was op.e of the
two.
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Question. What position does Dr. Abbott hold 1
Answer. He is the medical director of this department.
Question. Are you able to state the quantity of ice ordered from Mr. Tiffany
under this contract 1
Answer. I have not the slightest idea. It is on record, however. I would
state here that when I ordered ice I had no individual action in the matter. My
action was by order of the Surgeon General.
Question. You acted under his directions, I suppose. But I wanted to know
to what extent those orders were.
Answer. I do not know.
Question. Have you any means of knowing whether Mr. Tiffany advised the
form of this proposal, or the terms of the contract, or anything of that kind, in
advance of the time of the contract being completed 1
Answer. I do not know that he did.
Question. Had you seen him prior to the acceptance of this contract, or prior
to the time his bid was put in, and had any conversation with him in regard to
this matter 1
Answer. No special conversation.
Question. Did you have any conversation with him 1
Answer. M11• Tiffany had come into the office; all the ice-dealers had come
into the office and spoken upon the subject. I recollect that Mr. Tiffany came
into the office once and recommended that the date for the reception of the ice
be hastened, on ~ccount of the probabilities of the ice season being over; which
was not done, however.
Question. Is that the only conversation you remember to have had with Mr.
Tiffany 1
Answer. Yes, sir.

Testimony qf Dr. David L. Magruder.
WASHINGTON, February 15, 1864.
Dr. DAVID L. MAGUUDER sworn and examined.
'
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What is your position in the army 1
Answer. I am a surgeon of the United States army.
Question. Where are yon stationed 1
Answer. At Louisville, as medical director.
Question. Have you any knowledge of the manner iiJ.n which tlw government
has supplied itself with ice since the war began 1
Answer. 'rhe last year I knew there was a contract m.ade by the Surgeon
General with J. W. Parrish & Co., of St. Louis, to supply ice to the general
hospitals of the west, I believe; but as to the terms of that contract I could
not say. I was then medical director for St. Louis, that is, the department of
Missouri.
Question. Had you anything to do with that contract, or the making of it 1
Answer. No, sir, nothing at all. The contract was made and sent out, and I
had nothing to do with it but to sign the papers when received, and to prove the
receiving by the acting medical purveyor.
Question. Do you know when and where the contract was made 1
Answer. Here, in Washington.
Question. You have no knowledge of its terms 1
Answer. I have seen a copy of the contract of it, but I really did not notice
it. All I had to do was to see, as medical director of the department, that it
was not improperly issued.
•
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Question. Did you receive the ice under that contract 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Who did receive it 1
Answer. The man who did receive it was Mr. Robert T. Creamer, medical
storekeeper, and acting medical purveyor in St. Louis. '
Question. Have you any knowledge of any other contract 1
Answer. Yes, sir; the contract made this year was made by me, under instructions from the Acting Surgeon General.
Question. Who was the Acting Surgeon General at that time 1
Answer. Dr. Joseph K. Barnes.
Question. When did you receive instructions from him 1 ·
Answer. The instructions were dated November 27, and I received them a
few days afterwards, probably on the 1st or 2d of December. I will not be
positive as to the exact day; but on the 4th of December I advertised proposals
in the papers for bids.
Question. J1"'or the supply of what points did you advertise, and in what papers did you insert the advertisemeilt 1
Answer. This is a copy of the advertisement:
"ARMY MEDICAL PURVEYOR'S OFFICE,

"Louisville, Kentucky, December 4, 1863.
"Proposals will be received at this office until December 20, 1863, for furnishing ice to all the United States general hospitals at the west (those of the
division of the Mississippi, and of the department of the Gulf upon the Mississippi and its tributaries) in such quantities as may be required for the use of the
sick and wounded during the year 1864.
" In all cases the ice to be well packed and stored in properly constructed icehouses previous to the 15th of April, 1864, at such points nearest the hospitals
as may be designated from this office.
"The ice either to be delivered by actual weight of issuet~ to the hospitals by
the contractors, or by inspection and measurement by the issuing officer, (on or
before the 1st of May, 1864,) who will then receipt for actual contents of icehouses.
"D. ·L. MAGRUDER,
"Surgeon· United States Army, Medical Purveyor."
That advertisement was put into the Cincinnati Gazette, the Louisville
Journal,.the Chicago Tribune, the St. Louis Union, and the St. Louis Democrat.
Question. Who determined the papers in which the advertisement was inserted 1
Answer. A list of papers in which I might advertise was sent me from the
Surgeon General's office.
Question. And you selected from the list such papers as you thought advisable?
Answer. I selected what I thought the best papers in the list sent to me in
each city west. I supply the department of the west. I do riot advertise in
eastern papers, because there are medical purveyors in the cities of New York
and Philadelphia.
Question. Did you advertise for ice in any of the New England, New York,
or other eastern papers 1
Answer. No, sir; I advertised in none of them.
Question. Why did you not advertise in some of the eastern papers 1
Answer. I had no particular orders to do so. The fact is, the only articles
I supply are articles produced or manufactured in the west. All drugs and
articles of that kind, I get my requisitions on the purveyors of New York and
Philadelphia. AfteT putting this advertisement in the papers I have mentioned,
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I wrote a letter, December 7, to the Acting Surgeon General, stating what I had
done, specifying the papers in which I had put the advertisement, and stated
that I had limited the time of receiving proposals to the 20th of December, giving my reasons for doing so. I then asked whether what I bad done was correct; if any alteration was required in the advertisement; whether the time allowed was too short; and if anything else was required, I wished to be instructed
in regard to it.
Question. When was the advertisement first inserted 1
Answer. On the 4th of December.
Question. Why did you allow only sixteen days for receiving proposals 1
Answer. I gave my reasons in this letter of December 7, which is on file in
the Surgeon General's department and in the War Department. I have not a
copy of the letter with me. I did so because, as I understood, the crop of ice
in the west has to be gathered during the latter part of December and the early
part of January. After that time there is always a thaw, and ice gathered after
it has thawed and becomes porous is not so merchantable.
Question. You were not to receive the ice before the 20th of December, but
only the proposals 1
Answer. Only -the proposals.
Question. The ice was ·not to be received at that time 1
Answer. No, sir. The ic.e would have to be cut in the latter part of December and the early part of January.
Question. My question is, Why did you limit the time of re~eiving proposals
to the 20th of December, thereby allowing only sixteen days for proposals to
be sent in under this advertisement 1
Answer. I gave the reasons for that in my letter of the 7th of December.
Question. I do not care what reasons you gave the Surgeon General. I ask
you now what reasons you had for limiting the time in that way 1
Answer. I did so for the reason that I thought it would require some time
for the contractor, whoever he should be, to cut his crop of i~e, and get his
barges to put the ice in. As I understand from all the ice men in the west, the ice
is usually cut in the Upper Illinois river and in Lake Pepin, and has to be cut
in a particul:;tr portion of the year, and some time and preparation are required
by a man who has a large contract of this kind.
Question. Did it make any difference to the government whether it was supplied with ice that bad already been eut, or cut after the proposal~ were received 1
Answer. No, sir. I did not look upon it in that light. When the contract
was given out t,he weather was rather bad for ice. We had bids from Chicago,
St. Louis, and Louisville; I do not recollect tl~at we had any from Uincinnati.
Question. The weather being bad at that time, made the short time you alloweJ for proposals to come in the more unfavorable instead of favorable for
the government, did it not 1
.
Answer. The ice business was something I never bad had anything to do
with, and I did not wish to make the contract, and did not make it at that time.
I wrote and sent on this letter of Decem,ber 7, in reply to the instructions I had
got from my chief, and the best light I had.
Question. Have you given all the reasons 'you can for limiting the time for
receiving proposals to sixteen days; under t.hat heavy contract 1
Answer. 'l'hat was the only reason; I have forgotten the exact terms of my
letter.
Question. Did you confer with anybody in relation to this matted
Answer. No, sir; that was my own idea.
Question. You had no conversation with anyboov ~
Answer. No, sir; not on that point
Part v--4
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Question. You say you were ignorant of the ice business 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you determined this question without any consultation with
any one who had any knowledge of the subject 1
Answer. I had. talk,.d with persons in Louisville-ice men; and I had seen
ic-e men the year before in St. Louis, and some of them had been in Louisville
that year.
Question. With whom had you talked about these proposals 1
Answer. I did not talk with any one about these proposals; I only talked
with them about ice being cut in the early part of the year, and they all agreed
with me.
Question. Why did you not advertise in the eastern papers---"in New England and New York papers 1
Answer. I never advertise in eastern papers for anything I purchase;
Question. Did you not know that New Orleans, and -that vicinity, had always
been supplied with ice from New England 1
Answer. No, sir; I did not.
Question. Did you have any knowledge in relation to that subject 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Do you know from what point New Orleans has been supplied
with ice 1
Answer. No, sir; I am not aware of that.
Question, If you had known that New Orleans had always been supplied
with ice from New England, would you have deemed it proper to have confined
your advertising to the western papers 1
Answer. No, sir; probably not.
Question. Ought you not, before assuming to determine the papers in which
to advertise for ice, have ascertained the points from which the places could be
best supplied 1
Answer. All I can say is, that after I put the advertisement in these papers
I wrote to my chief for instructions as to whether there should be any change
in what I had done.
Question. Did you receive any reply 1
Answer. I· received a reply dated December 11, to the effect that what I
had done was satisfactory, and that nothing else was necessary.
Question. How many proposals did you receive in response to this advertisement?
Answer. I think there were eleven of them; I will not be certain.
Question. Can you tell us from whom they were received 1
, Answer. I could not now give their names. They are all on file in the office
of the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Dana.
Question. He has all the proposals 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Can you name the points covered by this advertisement 1
Answer. All the general hospitals in the west 1
Question. Yes, sir.
Answer. I could name the points where there are general hospitals. They
are Cincinnati and vicinity, Camp Denison, Camp Chase, Cleveland; Louisville and vicinity, embracing Jeffersonville and New Albany, Indiana; Madison
and Evansville, Indiana; NashvHle, Memphis, Cairo, Mound City, Jefferson Barracks, in St. Louis; Quincy, Illinois; Keokuk, Iowa; also New Orleans, Natchez,
Vicksburg, and Little Rock.
Question. Did your proposals cover all these points, or were these proposals
for each particular point 1
Answer. As I understood the instructions I had, the proposals covered every
place.
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Question. Do you mean by that that you were to award the contract to the
man whose proposal was the lowest for all the poin~s together?
Answer. Yes, sir ; that is the way I understood 1t.
Question. Would it not have been very much be:ter to have had a distinct
proposal for each point, and to have taken that whiCh was lowest for each par·
ticular place 1
' Answer. I presume it mjght have been.
Question. Did not the proposals show it would have been 1 That is, I mean
this: could you not have selected from the different proposals parties to have
supplied each particular point, and have obtained the supply for the government
cheaper than you now have done 1
Answer. 1 could not tell that unless I had the proposals before me, for I have
forgotten now what they were.
Question. The award was to Parrish & Co. 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You made the award?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know whether they were the lowest for supplying each
particular hospital?
Answer. They were a great deal the lowest for the whole together.
Question. Were they the lowest for each particular hospital?
Answer. That I could not state now. There was one lower bid fol' St. Louis,
and one lower bid for Mound City: I do not recollect any others.
Question. You recollect that there were lower bids for St. Louis and Mound
City 1
Answer. Yes, sir; for those particular places. But they were bids from men
whom I did not know. rrhey did not offer any bond; the bid was on a little
slip of paper, without any reference to anybody; and I did not know the men
at all.
Question. Did you r~ject those bids on account of informality 1
Answer. No. sir; I sent all the bids on to Washington; enclosed them all to
the Surgeon General, and asked for further instructions. I wrote that I did not
feel authorized, under the instructions I had, to make a contract where it was
for so large an amount, and therefore I did not care to assume the responsibility.
Question. Who made the award 1
,Answer. I made an .award, under the instructions of my chief. On the 21st
of December, after all the bids had come in, I enclosed all the bids to the Surgeon General. I stated that I did not think that the instructions were specific
enough to warrant me to make a contract for so large an amount of ice; I enclosed all the bids to him for his action, and for further instructions.
Question. Before making the award 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What instructions did you receive 1
.
Answer. The bidt> were all returned to me, and I was instructed to make a
contract which I should think the most advantageous for the government.
Question. Did your instructions confine you to t4e making of one contract for
all the points, or were you left at liberty to make contracts for the respective
points 1
·
Answer. The way I construed it was, that I should make a contract the most
advantageous for the government, which I did.
Question. The most advantageous contract for the . government would have
been to have let each man supply that point which he would supply the cheape.::t, would it not 1
Answer. I construed it as I made the award.
Question. I ask if it is not the fact that it would have been the most advan·
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tageous for the government to have let each man supply the point he would
have supplied the cheapest 1
Answer. It probably might have been, but I did not look at it so.
Question. Is it not a mathematical certainty that it would have been 1
Answer. (After a pause.) I made the contract, subject to the approval of my
chief. After I had drawn up the contract with the best light I had, I wrote to
my chief that I had made an agreement with J. W. Parrish & Co., but it would
not be binding on either party unless approved by himself.
Question. lf they were the lowest bidders, and if their bid was the most advantageous to the government, why did you hesitate to make the contraet, after
having received the instructions to do so 1
Answer. There was a great deal of trouble about ice last year, and I did not
want to have anything to do with the matter, if possible. I wanted to send the
matter on here and let the contract be made in Washington, so that I should not
be come upon for it. As medical purveyor, the supply of ice was not usually in
my province. My business is with drugs, hospital property, &c. ]"or that
reason I sent the matter back here for approval, because I knew that where one
man got the contract, every one else who bid would be disappointed and
feel sore on the subject, and I did not care about being held responsible for it,
and therefore the award I made was forwarded here to Washington. I sent all
the papers, everything r.onnected with it-all the bids, all my correspondence,
and all the correspondence of the Surgeon General, and enclosed them to the
Secretary of War.
Just before I left Louisville to come here I received a telegram from Mr.
Dana, the new Assistant Secretary of War, stating that in the place of the contract I had made with Parrish & Co., one would be drawn up by the solicitor of
the War Department. I had done the best I could, but they desired to close the
doors against all possible frauds by the use of technical terms that I had no
knowledge of. 'I' hat contract was drawn up. I have never seen it. It was
sent out to Louisville for my signature, to take the place of the one I had made,
and which had been .approved by the Surgeon General. Before that contract arrived I was ordered here as a witness before this court-martial. Since I have
been here I have been told unofficially that the contract sent out was, in substance, like the one I had m-ade.
Question. Yon have not executed that contract 1
Answer. No, sir; it still remains unexecuted. It may be now in Louisvill~,
or it may have been returned to the Secretary of War.
Question. It requires your signature to execute it 1
Answer. I do not know what it requites now. I act under instructions, and
until I get another telegram from the Secretary of War, or additional authority
from the Surgeon General, I shall take no further action.
Question. I see that your advertisement contains the following clause:
"The iee either to be delivered by actual weight of issues to the hospitals by
the contractors, or by inspection and measurement by the issuing officer, on or
before the 1st of May, 1864, who will then receipt for the actual contents of
i~e-houses."

Which of these conditions is executed in the contract 1
Answer. It is to be delivered in the ice-houses and taken by actual measure·
ment.
'
Question. Is the ice then to be delivered to the hospitals by the contractor
or by the government?
Answer. After the government has received the ice from the contractor, it
delivers it to its hospitals.
Question. 'The contractor has nothin~ to do with the ice after he has put it
n the ice-houses, had it measured, and delivered it to the government 1
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Answer. No, sir; those provisions in the advertisement are taken almost verbatim from my letter of instructions from the Surgeon General's office. My
letter of instructions was as follows:
"SuRGEON GENERAL's OFFICE,
"Washington City, D. 0., November 27, 1863.
"DocToR: You are instructed to advertise for proposals for furnishing ice
for all the United States general hospitals at the west, those o~ t~e ~iv~sions _of
the Mississippi and of the department of the ~nlf, upon the MISSISSIPPI_ and 1ts
tributaries, in such quantities as may be reqmred_ for the use of the s~ck and
wounded during the year 1864. In all cases the Ice to be w~ll packed m p~op
erlv constructed ice-houses (previous to the 15th of Apnl) at such pomts
ne~rest the hospitals as, upon consul~ation with medical disbursing officers at
St. Louis, Cairo, Cincinnati, Nashville, Memphis, Vicksburg, and elsewhere, you
may consider most advantageous.
,
''The ice to be delivered by actual weight of issues to hospitals by contractors, or by inspection and measurement by the issuing officer, on the 1st of May,
1864, who will then receipt for the actual contents of ice-houses.
"In those few cases where it may be found neceSsary to contract for delivery
from barges during the summer, you will carefully protect the United States by
s~ wording contracts that only the amount of ice actually delivered, as shown
by receipts of medical officer8, will be paid for.
"It is believed that an immense saving can thus be effected upon the ,expenditures for ice of past year, and your attention is particularly directed to the
importance of such a reduction. rrhe reports of Medical Storekeeper Stevens,
and propositions of Parrish & Co., and of Alger, are enclosed.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"C. H. CRANE,
"Surgeon United States Army.
"By order of the Acting Surgeon General.
"Surgeon D . L. MAGRUDER, U. S. A.,
"Medical Purveyor, Louisville, Ky.
The propositions referred to there were those which had nothing to do with
this contract.
Question. Propositions made before the advertisement?
Answer. Yes, sir; before there was any advertisement at all. They were sent
to me from Washington; they had nothing to do with the bids at all.
Question. " In all cases the ice to be well packed and stored in properly constructed ice-houses, prior to the 15th of April, 1864, at such points nearest the
hospitals as may be designated." Who provided the ice-houses 1
Answer. The contractor.
Question. Did not the government own ice-houses at some of these points 1
Answer. Not that I know of.
Question. Was the price of building the ice-houses to be a part of the price
of the ice 1
Answer. Of course the contractor had to furnish the ice-houses, and had to
build them.
Question. Then, as by the terms of your proposals, an ice-house was to be
built at every point where it was needed. What is meant by having ice deliv
ered from barges 1
Answer. That is, if it should be found necessary to do so. Last year ice was
taken to Vicksburg and other places on the river in barges and delivered from
them. That is what is meant by that; but there will probably be none of that
this year.
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· Question. There is no stipulation in your advertisement for proposals in relation to delivery of ice from barges 1
Answer. No, sir; not now, but, as it says there, it may be found necessary
during the summer.
Question. '!'here is nothing said about it in your proposal~;~ 1
Answer. I looked upon it that that could be advertised for afterwards. I could '
not make a contract at that time to deliver ice from barges during the summer,
because I did not then know of any place at which to deliver it. We are not
fighting on the Mississippi now anything like we were last year.
Question. That would not be provided for in any of the bids which you
would receive in response to that advertisement 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. So that without a separate, independent bargain it could not come
into the contract 1
Answer. No, sir; I construed that to · be a separate thing from the other,
according to my instructions, that it might be with any other contractor. For
that reason I did not embrace it in the advertisement.
Quet:tion. Left it to be made a separate contract if necessary 1
Answer. Yes, sir; if it should be needed. I did not think we should need
any such' thing. Last year they bought a great deal of ice, at a high price,
during the hot months, and took it dqwn in barges, and it all melted before
they got to use it.
·
Question. Can you furnish to us, or inform us where we can obtain, the correspondence between you and the Surgeon General in relation to this contract;
also copies of the proposals received by you in response to this advertisement,
and a copy of the .contract as made by you 1
Answer. I sent all those things to the Secretary of War from Louisville;
everything, I believe, that I had in my possession in connexion with that matter. I kept copies of all but the bids, and they are now on file in my office
in Louisville. But they are all on file in the Surgeon General's office, and the
office of Assistant Secretary Dana.
Question. Have you any knowledge of the time usually allowed in advertisements for ice in so large quantities as this callsfor 1
Answer. No, sir; I have not. As I have alre~dy told you, I was ignorant
on the subject of ice; it was a matter altogetller foreign to my business.
Question. Do you know what the contract you made with Parrish & Co.
would probably amount to 1
Answer. No, sir; that was one difficulty; I could get no data. I han to
issue that proposal, although I did not know what each hospital would want.
A circular has been sent out now, the responses to which will fix the amount
needed for each hospital. By them I can ascertain the number of bids in each
hospital; and north of a certain latitude a half a pound a day, and south of it
a pound a day of ice is allowed to each man. That is a circular letter which
has been addressed to me since I have been here. Before I came away I had
not received letters from all the general hosp!tals, although I had addressed
circular letters to them noting the quantity of ice they would need for the coming year.
Question. Did you receive any proposals in response to this advertisement
of the 20th of December 1
Answer. I think there were two which came in afterwards, which I forwarded
to the Secretary of War. I am certain there was one; it was a bid to supply
all the ports north of the Ohio for $16 a ton, while the bid of Parrish & Co.
was $10 a ton.
Question. Can you tell whether, under the terms of the Chicago Ice Co.,
the ice is to be taken after it has been delivered into the ice-houses, or whether
it is to be taken as weighed out at the hospitals 1
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Answer. I think it is to be taken by the load, and receiptPd for out of their
cars. They deliver at some places by cars. I think that is the way; however,
that is on file. I did not tax my memory with it, but sent all the papers to
Mr. Dana's office.
By Mr. Loan:
Question. At what time on the northern and northwestern waters is ice
usually gathered and secured 1
Answer. I am under the impreesion that it is during the latter part of December and the early part of January. I have lived up on the Upper
Mississippi, and that is the time we always gathered our ice there. I used to
have charge of a hospital there, and they usually allowed me to superintend
the cutting of the ice and putting it away, as tpe principal portion of it was
intended for the sick of the garrison; and we always cut the best ice at that
time.
Question. Where were you stationed then 1
Answer. I was at Fort Pierre Choteau and at Fort Randall for nearly six
years. From the 1st to the lOth of January was the time when we cut the best
ice; for in the latter part of January and in .l!..,ebruary we had a thaw which
made the ice porous.
Question. At what points must ice necessarily be procured for the supply of
all places north of Cairo 1
Answer. You can get good merchantable ice north of Quincy.
Question. Procured from the waters that empty into the Mississippi 1
Answer. From the tributaries of the Mississippi; yes, sir.
Question. In advertising for this ice, did you take )into consideration the
security of procuring the necessary means to obtain so large a supply of ice,
and was that one of the reasons that induced you to fix the time of receiving
the bids at as early a date as possible?
Answer. That is the very reason which I stated in my letter to the Surgeon
General; that the man who should take so large a contract as that must have
a great many hands in his employ, must have the means to cut his ice, and
must get the barges to ship it in.
Question. Is the period for gathering the crop of ice a limited one 1
Answer. I think merchantable ice is obtained from about the 20th of December to the 12th or 15th, perhaps the 20th of January.
Question. It ought to be received during that time 1
Answer. Yes, sir ; I think so.
Question. Were you instructed to let the contract for all the points to one
man, or were you to make several contracts 1
Answer. I construed it to mean the best contract for all the points.
Question. Did you receive special bids fur each point 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I received bids for each point.
Question. Were the points designated and known at the time the bids were
put in 1
Answer. Yes, sir; the bids mentioned them. 'l'here were three bids from
St. Louis firms; they all designated in their bids the different points-St.
Louis, Memphis, Nashville, Louisville, &c.; some of them designated more
and some less places. I think there were three bids for New Orleans.
Question. Separate bids 1
Answer. Yes, sir; of three firms; but the bid of Parrish & Co. was the
only one at $25 a ton.
Question. Do you remembf)r whether there were separate bids put in for
each of these places 1
Answer. I think there were only eleven bids in all.
Question. And how many points were to be supplied 1
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Answer. I think there were some 24 points in all to be supplied.
Question. How many of these bids covered the supply of all the points 1
Answer. No one covered them all except that of Parrish & Co.
Question. '.rhere were three bids for supplying New Orleans 1
Answer. I think so; two others, besides 1\fr. Parrish, from St. Louis.
Question. 1\fr. Parrish put in a bid to supply all the points ?
Answer. Yes, sir; including New Orleans.
Question. He made no separate bid for New Orleans, independent of his
general bid 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Did the other parties make separat~ bids for New Orleans 1
Answer. No, sir; they included other points.
Question. What other points 1
Answer. Vicksburg, Memphis, Nashville, Louisville, St. Louis, and other
places.
Question. Was there any special bid for any individual place, separate and
apart from the others 1 For instance, did any one put in just one bid for New
Orleans, or for any other one place 1
Answer. No, sir; nobody.
Q.uestion. All the bids included the furnishing ice to more than one point 1
Answer. There may have been one bid for supplying Louisville.
Question. Do you remember any other for any other point 1
Answer. No, sir, I do not.
·
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Did not the bidders specify the prices at which they would deliver
ice at each particular point 1
Answer. Yes, sir; all specified the prices at each point.
Question. Then if you felt bound, as I think you say you did, t'o give the
contract to the man who was the lowest bidder for all tbe points, and Parrish &
Co. being the only bidder for all the points, the contract went to them witho.u t
any competition 1
Answer. You might construe it in that way. But I gave it to them as the
most comprehensive bidder, and thought I was doing the best for the government. As he was the lowest bidder for nearly all the points, and the most comprehensive one, I awarded it to him, subject, of course, to the approval of my
chief. In my letter enclosing the contract to him I specifically stated that.
Question. Had there been a bid to supply New Orleans for $20 a ton, Mr.
Parrish's bid being for $2.5 a ton, would you have felt bound, under your instructions, to have awarded the contract to him 1
Answer. There was no bid of that kind.
Question. But there were other points for which there were bids lower than
the one of Mr. Parrish.
Answer. I construed it that I was to award the contract to the best bidderthat is, the most comprehensive one-the one under which I could do the best
for the government.
Question. The most comprehensive bid, from the very nature of the case,
would be the one that covered all the points 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And did not the fact that there were bids for particular points, uot
including all the points, show that they did not understand that the man who
bid honestly for all the points in the aggregate was to receive the contract, and
did understand that the honest bidder for each particular point was to receive
the contract for that point 1
Answer. I do not know what they understood. I think I should have referred particular bids to Washington, as I did the other bids. New Orleans id
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very far out of my province. There is a regular medical purveyor at New Orleans whom I do not supply with anything. I do not know where he gets his
supplies. However, the department of the Gulf is embraced in my instructions.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. You did not feel that you had authority, without reference and
further instructions, to accept a bid at $20 a ton for New Orleans alone 1
Answer. I can tell what I did. In the first place I sent all the bids toWashington. I did not want to make the contract, because it was something foreign
to my duties, and I knew there would be trouble about it, and I did not wish
to have myself involved in it in any way. I did the best I could, as I thought,
for the government.
Question. But were you competent, under your instructions, to have received
a bid proposing to supply New Orleans alone at a lower price than Mr. Parrish's bid, which covered the whole, and to have awarded the contract for New
Orleans on that liid 1
Answer. I do not know whether I would have awarded the contract; I think
it probable I should not have done it; I should most likely have sent it on to
Washington. All the bids were before the solicitor of the War Department
and Assistant Secretary Dana; and, as I have understood, they have drawn up
a new contract with Parrish & Co., the wording I used having been changed,
because I did no~ put in the legal technicalities. But the contract is for the
.same amount, and covers the same grounds that mine did, I understand. That
new contract was sent out to me for signature; but I have not yet signed it,
because, before it got there, I was called here for this court-martial ; and since
then, I understand, there has been a telegram sent out there to stop my signing
it; why, I do not know. But I shall have nothing to do with ice until I get
further instructions, which I hope I shall not get.

Testimony qf Hon. John A. Bingham.
WASHINGTON, February 16, 1864.
Ron. JoHN A. BINGHAM sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. The committee have called you here in reference to a certain order
from the Surgeon General's department relating to the purchase of hospital supplies from the Sanitary Commission.
Answer. I will state to the committee that I understood the memorandum
shown me by the Sergeant-at arms to ask me to bring with me a duces tecum
issued to Dr. R. 0. Abbott. I have not that in my possession or control at all;
but I am free to state to the committee that in the prrecipe for a subpama for
Mr. Abbott, who, I understand, bas some control at least over the hospitals in
and about Washington city-in that prrecipe I prayed the Adjutant General to
issue a subpama duces tecum to Abbott to bring all orders issued by him during
the month of June, 186:3, directing supplies for the hospitals to be purchased of
the Sanitary Commission.
Question. Has that been returned 1
Answer. I am not yet advised that it bas been retumed, nor have I seen it.
My orderly has said that it has been served, but I have not seen the writ, and
do not know.
Question. Has any order from the Surgeon General to Dr. Abbott, directing
him to purchase chickens, eggs, butter, and such things, from the Sanitary Commission, cume into your possession 1
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Answer. Nothing has come into my possession except what purports to be a
copy of a circular issued in June, 1863, by Abbott, which circular, among other
things, directs the persons to whom it is addressed to pttrchase eggs, poultry,
&c., of the Sanitary Commission; directing on what days, and at what places,
in or about Washington, to apply for the same. r.rhe circular concludes with
the statement that the Surgeon General directs that the purchase of those articles
shall be made only from the Sanitary Comi'1ission, or words to that effect. That
is all the information I have on that subject.
I will state that, in order to make my answer more complete, I will, when I
return to my room, abstract the exact language of that circular, in so far as it
refers to the Surgeon General and the supply of those articles, and send it to
the committee.
'l'hat is all the information I have on that subject, except the hearsay which
informed me of the fact that there was such a circular. which, of coq.rse, was
sought by myself and received confidentially.
Question. Have you any evidence of what has been done under that order 1
Answer. Not as yet; the witness has not appeared in court. ['I'he courtmartial in the case of Surgeon General Hammond, of which the witness is the
judge advocate.]
Question. Can you give us the names of witnesses who are supposed to know
anything about the proceedings under that order 1
Answer. I am not able now to do so, because I did not :Rush my inquiry
further than to ascertain who it was who issued the circular, in order to reach
·
him and make him tell me.
Question. From whom did the circular purport to emanate 1
Answer. From R. 0. Abbott.
Question. Addressed to whom 1
Answer. It did not name any person, but seems to be a circular; it is headed
"circular."
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. A printed circular 1
Answer. The copy I have is not printed.
By the chairman :
Question. YOl! have not the original circular 1
Answer. No, sir; that is what I have ordered Abbott to bring into court.
He has not answered yet; he will to-morrow, I suppose.
Subsequently the witness forwarded the following papers to the committee:
[Circular.]

DIREcToR's OFFICE,
Washington, June 23, 1863.
SIR : On and after Friday next the Sanitary Commission will be prepared
to furnish the hospital under your charge, at cost prices, with mutton, poultry,
milk, butter, eggs, vegetables, dried fruits, &c., &c.
These supplies will be delivered from the store-house of the Express Company, New Jersey avenue, opposite front of passenger station Baltimore railroad, at any time between sunrise and 11 a. m. You will accordingly send
your hospital wagon to this point with the order for delivery of such articles as
you may require-(see enclosed form)-signed by yourself.
The amount to be received on Friday and Saturday will be the amount
stated in your reply to the circular of June 9, from this office, as then required
for the use of your hospital.
MEDICAL
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The amount required for Sunday will be ordered on Friday morning, and
thereafter orders for supplies will always be given two days in advance of the
time the supplies are needed.
The Surgeon General directs that the purchase of such supplies will be made
from no other source except in cases of emergency.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. 0. ABBOTT,
Surgeon U.S. A., lYledical Director, Dep't Washington.

Copy

if form

riferred to in the foregoing circular.

The Sanitary Commission is requested to purchase the following supplies
for-- hospital, to be delivered at Adams' Express Company's office, corner
New Jersey avenue and C street, Washington, next - - day - - 1863.
Quantity.

Articles.
Butter, print. ...••....•.. pounds.
roll ...••...•... ___ . do_ ..
tub .............•.. do .. .
Mutton .....••••..•...•... do .. .
Lamb ...... --------------do .. .
Poultry ...... _. _.•....••.. do .. .
Veal ....•.......•...... _._do .. .
Lard ...... ____ . ____ ...... do .. .
Fish, fresh ...•..........•. do .. _
salt ..........•. _.... do. _.
Apples, dried .............. do .. .
'l'urkeys, dressed ........ _.. do .. _
Ducks,
"-----·-----do .. .
...••... __ . do .. .
Geese,
Pork, fre~<h ............ ___ .do .. .
Peaches, dried ........•••.. do. __
Eggs ......... --···· .... dozens.
Squash, Boston ...••.....•. do. __
Oranges ........•.....•.. boxes_
Lemons ...••...••.......... do ..
Rutabaga ...•.......... bushels.

Articles.

Quantity.

Carrots ...... _....•...• bushels.
Turnips .................. do .. .
Onions •.................. do .. .
Beets ...•................ do .. .
Apples ................•.. do .. .
Potatoes ................. do .. .
Parsnips _... . ...•....... do ... I·
Potatoes, sweet ........... do .. .
Herbs ................. bunches.
Celery .................•. do .. .
Oyster plant. ...•......... do .. .
Oysters ........... ___ .. gallons.
Cranberries ...•.....•... quarts.
Cabbage .... ------ ...•.. heads.
Mackerel, No. 1 ......... barrels.
No. 2 ...••...... do .. .
No.3 ....••..... do .. .
Chickens, live ..•.....•.•. pairs.
Geese, live .••••...••...... do ..
Ducks, live ...•.....••..... do.Turkeys, live .•••.•........ do ..

-------Surgeon in charge.
WASHINGTON, - - - - - ,

1863.

SURGEO~ GENERAL'S OFFICE,

Washington City, D. C, February 8, 1864.
SIR : In conformity to the request of the '' Joint Committee on the Conduct
and Expenditures of the War," forwarded by you on the 5th instant, I have
the honor to transmit herewith copies of all the contracts made by this department for ice since the 1st of January, 1862.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOS. K. BARNES,
.Acting Surgeon General.

Ron.

EDWIN

M.

STANTON,

Secretary qf Wm·.
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[Circular letter.]
SuRGEON GENERAL's OFFICE,

Washington, D. G., February 6, 1864.
Ice provided from the appropriation for the medical departmer1t is exclusively for the use of the sick in general and post hospitals, and will not, under
any circumstances, be issued, or otherwise disposed of, to officers or soldiers
not actually under treatment in them. 'rhe most rigid economy must be observed in the issue and use of ice so supplied. Issues to hospitals will be
made upon the estimate of one pound daily; per patient, at Washington and
points south of it; half a pound daily, per patient, at all points north of Washington, which, with proper care, will be found an ample allowance. Medical
directors will give such orders as will insure compliance with these instructions.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
By order of the Acting Surgeon General,
C. H. CRANE, Surgeon U. S. Army.

Articles of agreement made this twenty-fifth day of February, eighteen hundred
and sixty-three, between Henry Johnson, medical storekeeper United States
army, and acting medical purveyor, Washington, D. C., of the one part, and
A. Tracy Edgerton, of the city of New York, and State of New York, of the
other part,
Witnesseth: 'J1hat the said Henry Johnson, medical storekeeper United
States army, for and on behalf of the United States of America, and the said
A. Tracy Edgerton, for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, have
mutually agreed, and by these presents do mutually ~ovenant and agree, to and
with each other, in the manner following, viz:
First. That the said A. Tracy Edgerton shall deliver at Hilton Head, South
Carolina, Newbern, North Carolina, and Fortress Monroe, Virginia, the whole
amount of ice required to be consumed at each respective point and vicinity.
Ice to be in quality A No. 1, gathered in Maine, and delivered at two thousand (2,000) pounds to the ton.
Second. 'rhat for each and every ton delivered at Hilton Head, South Carolina,
and accepted by the medical officer in charge, the said A. Tracy Edgerton shall
receive the sum of $11.
Third. That for each and every ton of ice delivered at Newbern, North Carolina, and accepted by the medical officer in charge, the said A. Tracy Edgerton
shall receive the sum of ten dollars and :fifty cents ($10 50.)
Fourth. 'l'hat for each and every ton of ice delivered at Fortress Monroe,
Virginia, and accepted by the medical officer in charge, the said A. Tracy
Edgerton shall reeeive the sum of eight dollars and seventy-five cents ($8 7{).)
:Fifth. All the ice deli\·ered under this contract to be subject to the inspection
and approval of the medical officer in charge of the post where it is delivered,
and such as does not conform to the specifications set forth in this contract shall
be rejected.
Sixth. 'rhat payment shall be made from time to time upon receipted bills of
lading, and duplicate accounts certified to by the medical officer in charge of
the post where it is delivered.
Seventh. No member of Congress shall be admitted to any share herein, or
any benefits to arise therefrom.
Eighth. It is further agreed that the said A. Tracy Edgerton will allow three
working days for discharging each cargo at either one of the points before men-
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tioned, without extra charge; after that time, demurrage to be allowed by the said
Henry Johnson, medical storekeeper United States army as per charter-party
of the vessel or bill of lading.
In witness whereof, the undersigned have hereunto placed their hands and
seals the day and date above written.
HENRY JOHNSON.
[sEAL.]
A. TRACY EDGERTON. [sEAL.]
Witnesses:
WM. H. YEATON.
RoBERT A. PAYNE.
SuRGEON GENERAL's OFFICE, February, 1864.
A true copy from the records.
W. C. SPENCER,
Assistant Surgeon United States Army.
Articles of agreement made this fifth day of March, 18C3, between Henry Johnson, medical storekeeper United States army, and acting medical purveyor,
Washington, D. C., on the one part, and Joseph W. Parrish and WilUam S.
Ruse, comprising the firm of Joseph W. Parrish & Co., of the city of St. Louis,
State of Missouri, of the other part,
Witnesseth~ That the said Henry Johnson, medical storekeeper United States
army, for and on behalf of the United States of America, and the said Joseph
Parrish and WilliamS. Huse, comprising the firm of J. W. Parrish & Co., for
themselves, their heirs, executors and administrators, have mutually agreed, and
by these presents do mutually covenant and agree, to and with each other, in
the manner following, viz:
First. 'l'hat the said J. W. Parrish & Co. shall deliver at Memphis, Tennessee, Nashville, Tennessee, St. Louis, Missouri, and Cairo, Illinois, the whole
amount of ice required to be consumed at each respective point and vicinity
during the remainder of the year 1863. Ice to be in quality A No. 1, and
delivered at two thousand (2,000) pounds to the ton.
Second. 'rhat for each and every ton of ice delivered at Nashville, Tennessee,
and accepted by the medical officer in charge, the said J. W. Parrish & Co. shall
receive the sum of twenty-five dollars ($25.)
Third. That for each and every ton of ice delivered at St. Louis, Missouri,
and accepted by the medical officer in charge, the said J. W. Parrish & Co. shall
receive the sum of sixteen dollars ($16.)
Fourth. 'rhat for each and every ton of ice delivered at Cairo, Illinois, and
accepted by the medical officer in charge, the said J. W. Parrish & CJo. shall
receive the sum of twenty dollars ($20.)
Fifth. 'l'hat for each and every ton of ice delivered at Memphis, Tennessee,
and accepted by the medical officer in charge, the said J. W. Parrish & Co. shall
receive the sum of twenty dollars ($20.)
Sixth. All the ice delivered•under this contract to be subject to the inspection
and approval of the medical officer in charge of the post where it is delivered,
nnd such as does not conform to the specifications set forth in this contract shall
be rejected.
Seventh. That payment shall be made from time to time upon receipted bills
of lading, and duplicate accounts certified to by the medical officer in charge of
the post where it is delivered.
Eighth. No member of Congress shall be admitted to any share herein or any
benefit to arise therefrom. ·
Ninth. It is further agreed that the said J.
Parrish & Co. will allow three

vy.
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(3) working days for discharging each cargo at either one of the points before
mentioned; after that time demurrage to be allowed by the said Henry Johnsou, medical storekeeper United States army, as per charter-party or bill of
lading of the vessel.
In witness whereof, the undersigned have hereunto placed their hands~ and
seals the day and date above written.
HENRY JOHNSON,
[SEAL.]
Medical Storekeeper U. S. A., Act'g Med. Purveyor.
J. w. PARRISH & co.
[SEAL.]
Witnesses:
R. A. PAYNE.
FRANKL. SLADE.
SuRGEO~

GENERAL's OFFICE, February, 1864.

A true copy from the records.
W. C. SPENCER,
Assistant Surgeon United States Army.

Articles of agreement made this sixth day of March, eighteen hundred and
sixty-three, between Henry Johnson, medical storekeeper United States
army, and acting medical purveyor, Washington, D. C., of the one part, and
J. C. 'J.1iffany, city of New York, State of New Yorkr of the other part,
Witnesseth : That the said Henry Johnson, medical storekeeper United
States army, for and on behalf of the United States of America, and the said
J. C. Tiffany, for himself, his heirs, executors, and administrators, have mutually agreed, and by these presents do mutually covenant and agree, to and
with each other, in the manner following, viz :
Specijir.:ation.-'rhat the said J. C. '.riffany shall deliver at New Orleans,
La., Pensacola, Fla., and Washington, D. C., the whole quantity of ice required
to be consumed at each respective point and vicinity during the remainder of
the year eighteen hundred and sixty-three (1863 ;) ice to be in quality A No.
1., and delivered at two thousand (2,000) pounds to the ton; to be well stored in
the vessels at the point of shipment, according to the most approved method,
and subject while stowing to the inspection of an agent of this department.
First. 'J.1hat for each and every ton of ice delivered at New Orleans, Louisiana, and accepted by the medical officer in charge, the said J. C. Tiffany
shall receive the sum of twenty-two dollars and fifty cents ($22 50.)
Second. 'l'hat for each and ~very ton of ice delivered at Pensacola, Florida,
and accepted by the medical officer in charge, the said J. c. 'J.1iffany shall receive the sum of twenty-two dollars and fifty cents ($22 50.)
Third. That for each and every ton of ice delivered at Washington, District
of Columbia, and accepted by the medical officer in charge, the said J. C. Tiffany shall receive the snm of ten dollars and fi\ty cents ($10 50.)
Fourth. All the ice delivered under this contract to be received and paid for
as per bill of lading, fifteen (15) per cent. being deducted from the face of bill
of lading for wastage on ice delivered at Pensacola, Florida, and New Orleans,
Louisiana, and ten ( 10) per cent. deducted on ice delivered at Washington, District @f Columbia.
Fifth. Bill of lading of each cargo of ice to be sworn to before United States
district attorney, clerk of the district court, or notary public, at the point of shipment, by the said J. C. Tiffany and the captain of the vessel.
Sixth. All the ice delivered under this contract to be subject to the inspection and approval of the medical officer in charge of the post where it is deliv-
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ered, and such as does not conform to the specifications set forth in this contract shall be rejected.
Seventh. 'rhat payment shall be made from time to time upon receipted bills
of lading and duplicate accounts certified to by the medical officer in charge of
the post where it is delivered.
Eighth. It is further agreed that the said J. C. 'Tiffany will build ice-houses
on the plan herewith attached, (provided they shall be wanted,) charging therefor two dollars and fifty cents ($2 50) per ton according to the tonnage of the
house if built at Pensacola, ]'lorida, or New Orleans, Louisiana, and one dollar
and fifty cents ($1 50) per ton according to the tonnage if built at Washington,
District of Columbia, the United States furnishing the ground therefor.
Ninth. And the said J. C. Tiffany shall store the ice in the said ice-houses
and deliver therefrom daily at the various hospitals in Washington, District of
Columbia, and vicinity, the daily amount of ice required at such hospitals, and
shall receive therefor fifty cents per ton additional for each and every ton so
stored and delivered. The ice to be well stored in the ice-houses according to
the most approved method, subject at all times to the inspection of an agent of
this department.
Tenth. No demurrage to be allowed for any detention of vessels delivering
ice at Washington, District of Columbia.
Eleventh. No member of Congress shall be admitted to any share herein, or
any benefit to arise therefrom.
Twelfth. And it is further agreed that the said J. C. Tiffany will allow five
(5) working days for discharging cargo at Pensacola, El01·ida, New Orleans,
Louisiana; after that time demurrage to be allowed by the said Henry Johnson, medical storekeeper, as per charter-p::trty and bill of lading of the vessel.
In witness whereof, the undersigned have hereunto placed their hand and
seals the day and date above written.
HENRY JOHNSON,
[sEAL.]
Medical Btorekeeper U. S. A., Act'g . .lJ!Ied. Pu1·veyor.
J. c. TIFEANY.
fSEAL.]
Witness:

H. P A VNE.
L. SLADE.

RoBERT
FRANK

SuRGEON GE.VERAL's OFFICE,

February 8, 1864.

A true copy from the records.
W. C. SPENCER.,
Assistant Surgeon United States Army.

This contract entered into this third day of April, eighteen hundred and sixty·
three, between J. T. Head, surgeon United States army, an officer in the
service of the United States of America, of the one part, and Jarrett Gos·
nell and Samuel C. Scott, both of Louisville, in the State of Kentucky, of the
other part,
Witne"-seth: That the said Surgeon J. T. Head, for and on behalf of the
United States of America, and the said J. Gosnell and Samuel C. Scott, for
themselves, their heirs, executors, and administrators, have mutually agreed, and
by these presents do mutually covenant and agree, to and with each other, as
follows, viz:
That the said party of the second part shall deliver, properly packed in such
ice-houses at Louisville as shall be designated by the said Surgeon J. T. Head,
United States army, five hundred tons of good, firm, clear ice, on or bef(lre the
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fifteenth day of May, 1863, the unavoidable casualties of navigation only excepted.
That the said party of the first part shall pay or cause to be paid to the said
party of the second part fifteen dollars for each and every ton of two thoutland
pounds of ice so delivered, the weight to be determined by water-gauge at Louisville : provided, if the necessary barges for the conveyance of said ice from
Beaver, Pennsylvania, to Louisville, Kentucky, shall be furnished by the United
States of America, then the said party of the second part shall refund the hire
of said barges to an amount not to exceed two dollars for each and every ton
of ice so delivered. That in case of failure or deficiency in quantity or quality
of the ice stipulated to be delivered, then the said Surgeon J. T. Head, United
States army, or the medical director, shall have power to supply the deficiency
by purchase, and the said party of the second part shall pay the cost.
No member of Congress shall be admitted to any share he1ein, or any benefits to arise therefrom.
(The words "at Louisville" interlined before signing.)
J. T. HEAD,
(sEAL.)
Surgeon United States Army.
JARRET'r GOSNELL.
[sEAL.)
SAMUEL C. SCOTT.
[sEAL.]
Signed, sealed, and delivered, in presence ofELIJAH GLASSCOKE.
SAM'L L. EwiNG.
SuRGEON GENERAL'R 0FFit..E, February, 1864.
A true copy from the records.
W. C. SPENCER,
Assistant Surgeon United States Army.
[Proposal.]

CHICAGO ICE COMPANY TO UNITED STATES.
We will deliver on board cars at any railroad depot in that city, ice packed
as hereinafter described, in any quantity as may be required of us not to exceed in all four thousand tons, we to receive pay for the same at the rate of
five dollars per ton weighed here, payable monthly at Chicago. Or we will
deliver said ice or any part thereof, packed as hereinafter described, at any of
the following named places, viz: Cincinnati, Ohio; New Albany, Indiana;
Cairo, Illinois; East St. Louis, Illinois; we to receive pay for the same at the
following rates, viz: $10 50 (ten and a half dollars) per ton for full car-loads of
ten tons, weight at Chicago; $14 (fourteen dollars) per ton for shipments of
less than ten tons and over two tons, weight at Chicago; $17 (seventeen dollars) per ton, for shipments of less than two tons, weight at Ch_icago. (Memorandum.-The increase of price in the last two stipulations is occasioned by
difference in freight charged by railroad.) It being understood that we are to
receive pay for all ice delivered by us at the above named places monthly in
Chicago, and that we are to furnish a correct account monthly of all ice shipped
by us to the respective places above named.
We will pack said ice in cars as follows, viz : First spreading upon the floor
of car a layer of sawdust or fine shavings, six inches deep; next, and upon said
shavings, a layer of ice, leaving a space of six inches between the edges of said
layer of ice and the sides of the car; said space to be filled with sawdust or
fine shavings; next a second layer of sawdust or fine shavings six inches deep
on the top surface of said first layer of ice, and in like manner each successive
layer of ice in car, covering the whole with a layer of sawdust or shavings

ICE CONTRACTS.

65

eight inches deep. Ur we will pack said ice, or auy part thereof, if required, in
boxes or tierces, as follows, viz : first. spreading on the bottom of said boxes
or tierces a layer of sawdust or fine shavings; next, filling said boxes or tierces
with ice, leaving a space of four inches around the sides and top of ice; said
space to be filled with sawdust or fine shavings ; said boxes or tierces to be
properly closed and strongly hooped. vVe will deliver said ice at any time·or
times during the year 1862. All ice furnished by us to be lake ice, from
eleven to eighteen inches thick. Our Lake Michigan ice-houses adjoin the
Union depot of the Illinois Central railroad, Michigan Central railroad, and the
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy railroads; and our Crystal Lake ice-houses are
situated alongside tl1e track of the St. Louis, Alton and Chicago railroads ; and
the ice contained in either of these houses can be loaded direct upon the cars of
the said roads without delay of cartage, rehandling or breakage.
We have been engaged in shipping ice south and elsewhere for the last twelve
years.
Respectfully,
H. H. BLAKE, SecretaTy Cl~icugo Ice Compan'!:J.
CHICAGO, May 7, 1862.
This proposal was approved and accepted by the Surgeon General.-( See letter
to 1\ir. Blake, May 23, 1862.)
A true copy from the records.
W. C. SPENCER, Assistant Surgeon U S. A.
SuRGEON GENE.RAL's OI<FICE, Peb1·uaTy 8, 1864.
This contract, ·entered into this 31st day of May, 1862, between Surgeon
General William A. Hammond, of the United States army, and Messrs. Addison
Gage & Company, witnesseth : That, for the consideration hereafter mentioned,
the said Addison Gage & Company promise and agree to deliver to the agents
of the United States medical department at Charleston and Savannah (when in
possession of the authorities of the United States) a good and wholesome quality
of ice.
It is understood that the ice is to be delivered during the coming summer
months in such quantities as the agents of the United States medical department at the above-mentioned places may need and call for, and at such times
as they, the said agents, may designate.
'rhe said Addison Gage & Company further agree to deliver a good and
wholesome quality of ice at New Orleans and Mobile, (when in possession of
the authorities of the United States,) subject to the same stipulations hereinbefore mentioned as to quantity, quality, &c., and as to the delivery of ice at the
aforesaid Atlautic ports. And the said Surgeon General promises and agrees, on
behalf of the United States, to pay or cause to be paid to the said Addison
Gage & Company the sum of one dollar and twenty-five cents for each hundred pounds of good and wholesome ice delivered as aforesaid at Charleston
and Savannah; and the Surgeon General promises and agrees, on behalf of the
United States, to pay or cause to be paid to the said Addison Gage & Company the sum of one dollar and fifty cents for each and every hundred pounds
of good and wholesome ice delivered, as aforesaid, at New Orleans and Mobile.
WILLIAM A. HAMMOND,
Su1·geon Geneml.
ADDISON GAGE & CO.
Witness to signature of Addison Gage & Co., J. CARTER CuTTER.
A true copy from the records.
W. C. SPENCER, Assistant SuTgeon U S. A.
SuRGEON GENERAL's OFFICE, February, 1864.
Part v--5
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Statement qf ice used by tlw rnedzcal and lwspital department qf tke army during tke year 1863.

Quantity.

'Vhere delivered.

Price.

Ton.
New York ...........

1

2-/o'bqr tons,
187HPu tons,
31Hn~ tons,
tons,
314
203§bc,.~S tons,
tons,
20

at
at
at
at
at
at

........................
........................
................ _.. _ ....
........................
........................
........................

$4
4
6
7
10
12

00
50
00
00
00
00

---

I

Remarks.

Total.

Amount.

80 ------ ............ Open market.
75 . ....................... · Do.
Do.
72 .. .......................
Do.
00 -----------Do.
75 ---- ..................
Do.
00 .. ........................
- - - - - - $5,513 02
$8
844
183
2,198
2,037
240

761:.Poao5o

H

0

t;l

Annapolis, Md .......

1

80

tons, at ....... . ................

10 00

Washington, D. C ... 3, 310i1ofinoo tons, at ... -- ................... I 10 50
1 ice-house ............. .
For distributing ice to hospitals in and around
Washington ..... __ ... _,_.... - ..
l<'ortress Monroe, Va .. 1, 428'l~dto\r tons, at ... ---------.----- ... -. - j 8 75
Demurrage._ ................... .
Sundries ....... _....... .
1

Newbern, N.C ..... .

Key West, Fla ..... .
Pensacola, Fla .. _.. .

•

Contract with J. C. Tiffany, of New York.
Do .. __ ........ do. . . . . . . ..... do.

34,756 84
1,500 00
/ 525 00
12,

:~~ 3~

0

0

z

1-3
P:l

:>-

0
1-3
~

36,781 84

1:::::::::::: I Co~g~a_c_t_~!~~ -~~ ~-d~-d-~~1~t~~: -~~~~~York.

92 GO -. . . . • . . . . • .
Do ............ do ........ _... dq.
- - - - 13, 046 80
Do ............ do ............ do.
tons, at .... --.-_----------·------ ~ 10 50 I 7,339 50
G99
Do ...... _..... do ............ do.
Den unage .... _. _.. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
269- 00 ....... _... .
Do ............ do ............ do.
Sundries ......... _. _ . . . . . . . . . . . .
63 79 ........ _.. .
-----7, 672 25
Do
............ do ............ do.
19,382 00
1, 762 tons, at ........ -.-- . ----. --.- ----. -j 11 00
Do ........ __ .. do ............ do.
3,439 60
Demurrage .................... .
23,821 60
312!-ftBS tons, at .................. ------ ~ 22 50~----··------~
7,038 00 Contract with J. C. Tiffany, of New York.
Do ............ do ............. do.
399 /oVo tons, at ..... - . - - - .. - .. - - . . . . . . . 22 50
8, 982 49 - . - - ....... .
Do ............ do ............. do.
Demurrage ................ , ~ . . . .
63 15 ........... .
_\....._-- 9, 045 64

1

. . . . . . . . . . .

1

Hilton Head, 8. C ... I

I No contract.

800 00

-·----------

.

~

New Orleans, La ..... 3, 874:f-J'u%- ton::;, at .... ----------- .... -·...
Demurrage . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baton Rouge, La ....

328ld'f0 tons,

St. Louis, Mo ....... . 3, 629.Z%&-8- tons,
547
tons,
Cairo, Ill. .......... .
599
tons,
Louisville, Ky ..... - Nashville, Tenn .... · J 497
tons,
Memphis, Tenn ... --. 3, 667~-lHt & tons,
313~-8--8--8- tons,

22 50
... ....

87, 171 30 ........... .
3, 937 00 ........... .
- - - - 91,108 30
at . --- ------ ---- . . . . . . . . .
22 50
7, 401 14 ........... .
Demurrage............. . . . . . . .
1, 566 72 ........... .
---8, 967 86
16
00
.........
- .. 58, 071 00
at -.--- .. ---- ... -- ....... .
at ... -- .. ---- .......... _.. 20 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 940 00
8,985 00 ........... .
at .. - ...... - ........... __ . 15 00
600 00 ........... .
Minus barge-hire __.. __ ..
---7,385 00
\
oo
12,425 oo
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
25
at .......... _... __ .... __ ..
73, 356 66 .......... . .
at .............. ___ .. ____ . 20 00
at ....... .. ... _.......... . 60 00 1 18, 810 00 . - . -- - . - - - - .
- - - - 92, 166 66
I

Do ............ do ................ do.
Do ............ do ................ do.
Do ..... _....... do ............... do.
Do ............. do._ ............. do.
Contract with J. W. Par~·ish & Co., of St. Louis.
Do ............ do ................ do.
Contract with Gosnell & Scott, of Louisville.
Do ....... _ .... do ... _............ do.
Do ............ do ....... _. _ ...... do.
Contract with J. W. Parrish & Co., of St. Louis.
Do .... ____ . . .. do ................ do.
No contract.

3, 981 -f-u~fo tons.
Vicksburg, Miss .... -I 1, 072
345
1, 417

tons, at ............... _.. _.... .
tons, at . ...................... .

H

75 00
60 00

tons.

80,400 00 ~ - . .......... ·1Horace Holton.
20, 700 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . White & Co.
- - - - 101, 100 00

........... ·I

TotaL .. ~ ...... I 23, 625-H-H tons .... . .................... .
~ ---- ~

tr_j

0

0

z1-3
~

485, 882 97

p...

_!_
I -----

JOS. K. BARNES,
A cti11g Surgeon General U. S. A.
SURGEON GENERAL'fi OFFICE,

0

0

1-3

~

Fehuary 5, 1864.

0)
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Arrl\IY MEDICAL PuRVEYoR's OFFICE,
LouisDille, Ry., December 7, 1863.
CoLONEL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yom letter of
instructions in regard to advertising for proposals for ice to be furnished for the
general hospitals at the west for the year 1864; also the reports of Military
Storekeeper Stevens, and propositions of Parrish & Company. and Alger, for
furnishing ice.
On the 4th instant I caused an advertisement, as per enclosed iillip, to be inserted in five newspapers of the principal cities of the west, (viz : Louisville
Journal, Cincinnati Gazette, Chicago Tribune, and the Democrat and Uniun, of
St. Louis.)
I limited the time for the reception of bids to the 20th instant, for the reason
that the ice ::hould all be cut and storecl in barges during the latter days of
this month or in January, before the thaw of February, for ice cut after that
time will not keep well.
I thought it would be better, also, that the contract might be made as early
this month as possible, to allow the contractors, whomsoever they might be,
ample time to make their preparations for filling so large a contract with northern ice, the only kind, I think, merchantable in this climate.
Should you think any alteration in the advertisement necessary, or that the
t~me is too short, I respectfully request tl1at you will notify me as soon as practiCable.
V cry respectfully, yonr obedient servant,
D. L. MAGRUDER, U. S. A.,
Surgeon and Medical PuTveyor.
Colonel Jos. K. BARNES, U. S. A.,
~Ied·ical Inspector Genu·al and Acting Surgeon General,
Washington, D. C.
l\iEDICAL PuRVEYOR's OFFICE,
Louisville, Ky., January 9, 1864.
I certify that the above is a true copy.
D. S. MAGRUDER, U. S. A.
Surgeon and Medical Pun;eyoT.
SuJWEON GENERAL's OFFICE,
TVashington City, D. C., December 11, 1863.
Sm : I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the
7th instant, and, in reply, to inform you that your action in regard to the procurement of ice for the ensuing year is entirely satisfactory.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. H. CRANE,
Surgeon United States Anny.
By order of the Acting Surgeon General.
Surgeon D. L. MAGRUDER, U. S. ~·:
~Iedical Purveyor, Louuvtlle, J(entucky.
l\IEDICAL PuRVEYOR's OFFICE,
Louisville, Ky., JanuaTy 9, 1864.

I certify that the above is a true copy.

D. S. MAGRUDER,
Surgeon United 8tates Anny, Medical Purveyor.

SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE,
TVas!tington City, D. C., December 25, 1863.
SIR: In Teply to your letter of the 21st instant, enclosing "proposals for furnishing ice" for the. ensuing year, &c., I am instructed to return the "bids,"
and to dir~ct you to award the contract as may be deemed by you most advantageous to the service.
These offers are considered fa ir a·n d reasonable by the Acting Surgeon General.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. H. CRAN]J,
Surgeon United States Army.
By order of the Acting Surge?n General.
Surgeon D. L. MAGRUDER, U. S. A.,
Med£cal Purveyor, Louisv£lle, ](entucky.
MEDICAL PURVEYOR'S OFFICE,
Louisville, Kentucky, Janua'l'y 9, 1864.
I certify that the above is a true copy.
D. S. MAGRUDER,
Surgeon United States Army, Medical Purveyor.
ARMY MEDICAL PURVEYOR4s OFFICE,
Louisville, ](entucky, January 1, 1864.
CoLo~EL: I have the honor to enclose herewith a contract with J. W. Parrish & Co. for furnishing ice to all the general hospitals at the west ; the contract
subject to your approval in every part before it will be binding. I have inserted
a clause in the first article which requires the appointment of one or more competent persons as ice inspectors, who will inspect and measure the ice after it is
stored in the ice-houses, and report its condition, quality, and quantity to the
officer receiving it.
I was induced to do it for the reason that, at many of the points where ice
will be delivered, the officer receiving it may be ignorant of either the proper
mode of packing or measuring the ice. If you should see fit to make or suggest
any alteration, please inform me when you return the contract.
When approved, I will have a copy duly signed by both parties sent to your
office for file, as also to the Assistant Surgeon General in this city.
Very re·spectfully, your obedient servant,
D. L. MAGRUDER,
Su1-geon United States Army, Medical Purveyor.
Colonel J os. K. BARNES,
Acting Surgeon General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.
MEDICAL PunvEYOR's OFFICE,
Louisville, Kentucky, January 9, 1864.
I certify that the above is a true copy.
D. S. MAGRUDER, •
Surgeon Un£ted States Army, Medical Purveym·.

Sr R
date.

:

ARMY MEDICAL PURVEYOR'S OFFICE,
Louisville, Ke'lltucky, January 9, 1864.
I have the honor to enclose copy of telegram despatched to you of this
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. S. MAGRUDER,
Surgeon United States Army, Medical Purveyor.
Hon. EDWIN :M. STANTON,
·Secretary qf WaT, Was!~in,gto~, D. C.

70

ICE CONTRACTS.

J~OUISVILLE, Janua'r y 9, 1864.
Your telegram of yesterday relating to ice awards received. All papers connected therewith will be sent by mail to-clay.
D. L. :MAGRUDER,
Surgeon United States Army, IYiedical Purveyor.

Hon.

EDWIN

M.

Secreta?·y

STANTON,

if

War, Washington.

ARMY MEDICAL PURVEYOR'S OFFICE,
Louisville, J{entucky, JamtaTy 12, 1864.
SIR : I have the honor to enclose herewith contract with .T. W. Parrish & Co.,
of St. Louis, Missouri, made December 30, 1863, and approved and returned by
Acting Surgeon General January 7, 1864.
rrhis contract, which had not been returned before my letter of 9th instant,
was received at this office last night.
I enclose also copy of letter from Acting Surgeon General's office, approving
and returning it to this department.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. S. MAGRUDER,
Surgeon United States Army, JHedzcal Purveyor.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.
CHICAGO, January 26, 1864.
DEAR SIR: Your telegraph was received late Friday evening. Saturday
morning I instituted inquiries, but before inquiry COttld be made at their offices
the principal packers were off superintending their work. Memorandum was
left, asking of each the best terms upon which they would put up 1,500 tons, or
more, of best quality ice, to be taken by me at any time I chose previous to the
first of October, payment to be made immediately on my receiving satisfactory
certificates of storage. They furnish storage without charge. Y esterclay the
dealers sent in their bids. Wadhams & Co. have their ice-houses about six miles
from town, at Calumet, on the Illinois Central railroad. The ice is very pure
and clear, and they have one ice-house containing about 1,500 tons, well put
up, which they offered to sell to me at $2 a ton, with the liberty to let the ice
lie there till 1st of November. · They will furnish more at same rate, if desired.
The ice can be obtained from there with little more, if any, expense than if
housed in the city, and if wanted to go down the Mississippi, is as well located
as possible. 'rhe dealers all say that the wastage by 1st of September is never
less than half. The same firm offered to furnish it on board cars at any depot
in Chicago, if taken before the end of September, at $4 a ton, they to be paid
for what they deliver when placed by them on board of the cars. Or they will
sell it to the 1st June at $2 50 per ton; to 1st July, $3 50; to 1st August,
$4 ; dfterwards at $4 50 per ton. This last proposition seems to contradict
their first one, but was not intended to do so, as they will sell it at $4 during
September. In case you should prefer to buy it in the ice-house, they will load
it in cars to be furnished by you, well packed in shavings or sawdust, at fifty
cents per ton.
The Chicago City Ice Company offer to furnish the ice at any time before
the 1st of October, in any amount desired, well packed on board cars to be
furnished by you, at $4 a ton, at either the Illinois Central, Michigan Central, or Chicago, Alton and St. Louis depots in this city. Their ice is Crystal
Lake ice-considered the very best. The Michigan Central depot is the proper
place to have the ice loaded in case you want to send it to Cincinnati, Louis-
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ville, or any point on the Ohio river; the Illinois Central, in case you want to
send it to Cairo or down the Mississippi; the Chicago, Alton and St. Louis, the
proper place if yon want to send it to St. Louis. Payment to be made on satisfactory certificates of amounts when placed on board the cars. I consider this
offer desirable.
'l'hese terms were offered on the supposition that I was purchasing for the
Sanitary Commission, although no such representation was made. As president
of the Sanitary Commission, I bought very heavily from these dealers last year;
they, of course, inferred I was bargaining for the commission on the present
occasion. Had they supposed it was on government account, the charge undoubtedly would be heavier.
Command my services in this matter as you may require.
The offers of the other deale,rs were all higher.
Very respectfully, yours, &c.,
MARK SKINNER.

Ron. C. A. DANA,
Assistant Secretary qf ·war.
SuRGEON GENERAL's OFFICE,

TVasl~ington

City, D. C., February 8, 1864.
In conformity with the requeet of the Joint Committee on the Conduct
and Expenditures of the War, forwarded by you on the 5th instant, I have the
honor to transmit herewith copies of all the contracts made. by this department
for ice since the first of January, 1862.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOS. K. BARNES,
Acting Surgeon General.
Ron. EDWI~ M. STANTO~,
Seaetary of TVar.
SIR:
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SuRGEON GENERAL's OFFICE,
TVaskington City, D. C., February 13, 1864.
SIR : In reply to your communication of the 12th instant, I have the honor
to enclose a copy of the instructions given to Surgeon Magruder, U. S. A.,
November 27, 1863, to advertise for proposals for ice for all that section of
country, the absolute wants of which he, as senior medical purveyor stationed
at Louisville, in direct relation with the Assistant Surgeon General, would be
most conversant with. To economiz.e expenditure by controlling the estimates,
and to have the river depots available for any emergency, it was considered
advisable to include so much of the department of the Gulf as was upon the
Mississippi and its tributaries in one general system of supply, under the supervision of this officer.
That the advertisements were not inserted in the eastern papers arose from
this consolidation of the supply through Surgeon Magruder, who informs me
that he gave them the same publicity as his advertisements for other articles.
'I'here was no intention of confining the proposals to any section, nor was the
necessity for advertisement at the east anticipated.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. K. BARNES,
Acting Surgeon General.
Ron. C. A. DANA,
Assistant Secretary if TYar, TVar Department.
SuRGEON GENERAL's OFFICE,
Wash,ington City, D. C., No-vember 27, 1863.
DocTOU : You are instructed to advertise for proposals for furnishing ice for
all the United States genera] hospitals at the west, those of the division of the
Missiflsippi, and of the department of the Gulf upon the Mississippi and its
tributaries, in such quantities as may be· required for the use of the sick and
wounded during the year 1864.
In all cases the ice to be well packed in properly constructed ice-houses,
(previous to the 15th of April,) at ·such points nearest the hospitals as, upon
consultation with medical disbursing officers at St. Louis, Cairo, Cincinnati,
Nashville, Memphis, Vicksburg, and elsewhere, you may consider most advantageous.
The ice to he delivered by actual weight of issues to hospitals by contractors,
or by inspection and measurement by the issuing officer, on the 1st of May,
1864, who will then receipt for the actual contents of ice-houses. In those few
cases where it may be found necessary to contract for delivery from barges
during the summer, you will carefully protect the United States by so wording
contracts that only the amount of ice actually delivered, as shown by receipt
of medical officer, will be paid for. It is believed that an immense saving can
thus be effected upon the expenditures for ice of past year, and your attention
is particularly direc.ted to the importance of such a reduction.
The reports of Medical Storekeeper Stevens, and propositions of Parrish &
Co., and of Alger, are enclosed.
By order of Acting Surgeon General.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. H. CRANE, Surgeon U. S. A.
f?urgeon D. L. MAGRUDER, U. S. A.,
Medical Purveyor, Louisville, J(y.
SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE,
January 9, 1864.
A true copy:
C. H. CRANE, Surgeon U. S. A.
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Wculdngton Ct"ty, .D. 0., January 7, 1864.
StR : I am directed by tl1e Acting Surgeon General to return the contract
maue by you with J. W. Parrish for furnishing ice for all the United States
general hospitals in the west, for the year 1864, approved.
The insertion of clause for appointment of competent person or pen~ ons as ice
inspector or inspectors is deemed an excellent suggestion, and is highly approved ·
by the Acting Surgeon General.
By order of Acting Surgeon Generd.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. II. CRANE,
Surgeon U. S. A.
Surgeon D. L. MAGRUDER,
Medical Purveyor, Louisvil,'e, Ky.
MEDICAL PURVEYOR'S OFFICE,
Louin,ille, Ky., January 12, 1864.
I certify that the above is a true copy.
D. L. MAGRUDER,
Surgeon U. S. A., JJiedical Purveyor.
0FFICR

u.

OFFICE

u. s. :MILITARY TELEGRAPH,

S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
War DPpartment.
'l'he following 1elegram received at Washington 9.15 p. m., January 23,
1864, from Chicago, dated January 22, 1864:
Ron. C. A. DANA, Assistant S ecretary qf War:
On Monday I think I can furnish you with precise information. Your
despatch only reached me late last evening, and I cannot get the exact figures
to-day, owing to absence of partie~.
MARK SKINNER.
TVar D epm·tment.
The following telegram received at Washington 1.15 p. m., January 23,
1864, from Cleveland, Ohio, dated January 23, 1864:
Ron. C. A. DANA, .Assistant Secntm·y if War:
In Mr. Stone's absence have made inquiries. Ice can be furnished here well
covered and protected for three (3) dollars per ton.
If competition is created by advertising for proposals it could probably be
procured for less. One dealer offers to furnish fifteen hundred ( 1,500) tons
already stored at that price, on condition that it be measured and accepted by the
fifteenth of March, free of rent or storage.
W. E. CLARKE·,
P. JJ;J. SecTetaTy to C. E. Stone.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY,
JanuaTy _21, 18154.
In relation to the award of contract for furnishing ice to all the United
States general hospitals at the west and southwest for the use of the sick and
wounded during the year 1864.
December 4, 1863, Surgeon D. L. Magruder, medical purveyor at Louisville,
Kentucky, by order of the Acting Surgeon General, advertised for proposals as
follows:
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"Proposals will be received at my office until December 20, 1863, for furnishing ice to all the United States general hospitals at the west (those of the
division of the Mississippi and of the department of the Gulf upon the Mississippi, and its tributaries,) in such quantities as may be required for the use of
the sick and wounded during the year l 864.
"In all cases the icc to be well packed and stored in properly constructed
ice-houses previous to the 15th of April, 1864, at such points nearest the hospitals
as may be designated from this office.
"fJ.1 he ice eit11er to be delivered by actual weight of issues to the hospitals
by the contractors, or by inspection and meaeuremeut by the issuing officer (on
or before the l"st of May, 18G4,) who will then receipt for the actual contents
of ice-hOU'leS.
"D. L. MAGRUDER,
"Surgeon United States Army, JJ!Iedict:tl Purveyor."
Eleven bids were received, and the contract, with the consent of the Acting
Surgeon General, awarded to Parrish & Co., at the fo1lowing rates :
Per ton delivered at New Orleans ................... $25 00
Natchez. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 00
,,
Vicksburg ............... _..... 30 00
Helena
........................ 30 00
,,"
Memphis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 ,00
Columbus, Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 00
Nashville ...................... 30 00
Cairo ......................... 20 00
Paducah ....................... 20 00
Evansville. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~0 00
Louisville. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 00
Cincinnati. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 00
St. Louis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 00
Jefferson Barracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 00
,,
Quincy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 00
,,
Kc;okuk ....................... 10 00
Madison ....................... 10 00
Chicago. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 00
Columbus, Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 00
Cleveland ........ --------······ 10 00
This firm supplied the western and southwestern hospitals with ice during
last season, and appeared to have fulfilled their duties, under great disadvantages,
faithfully and honorably.
fJ.1heir facilities for furnishing the ice promptly are very superior; and as they
are the only bidders who offer to furnish all the hospitals with ice, it is supposed
that the medical purveyor awar<led them the contract as "most advantageous
to the service."
r.rhe following is a list of the bids presented at lower rates :
Josiah W. Bissell, of St. Louis, offers to deliver at Columbus, Kentucky, at
$24, and at St. Louis at $14, both bids $1 less than Parrish & Co.; bids of
deliveries at eight other points, all higher than Parrish & Co. Satisfactory
security offered.
John S. Andrews, of Waukegan, Illinois, offers to deliver at Memphis at $24,
$1 less than Parrish & Co.; bids of deliveries at eight other points, all higher
than Parrish & Co. Satisfactory security offered.
Goodell & Chappell, of Louisville, offers to deliver at Cairo at $18, ($2 less
than Parrish & Co.,) and at St. Louis at $8 50 ($6 50 less than Parrish & Co.)
Two other bids higher than Parrish & Co. No security offered.
J.D. Harman, of Chicago, offers to deliver at Uairo at $17 50, ($2 50 less than
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Parrish & Co.) One other bid higher than Parrish & Co. Will not deliver
later than fo1ty days from acceptance of contract. Security offf'red.
C. Stone, of New.York cit.y, offers to deliver at Memphis $20, ($5 less than
Parrish & Co.) Three other bids higher than Parrish & Co. No security offered.
Thomas Alger, of l\Iemphis, offers to deliver at Memphis $22 50, ( $2 50 less
than Parrish & Co.) Two other bids higher than Parrish & Co. No security
offered, but is recommended by responsible parties as an experienced and reliable ice dealer.
After the awarding of the contract two very advantageous offers were
received, viz:
Chicago Ice Company, who 'proposed to deliver at any time· between April
and December, 1864, from railroad cars at Cairo, at $16 per ton, or $4 less than
Parrish & Co.
Conrad & Stevens, at Nashville, who propose to deliver the ice required at
that post, at $20 per ton, or $10 less than Parrish & Co.
Both these parties offer satisfactory security.
OFFICE U.

s. .MILITARY TELEGRAPH,

WaT DepaTtmen·t.
'.rhe following telegram received at Washington 2.15 p. m., January 24,
1864, From Springfield, Illinois, dated January 23, 1864:
CHARLES A. DANA, Assistant Seaetm·y qf TVar:
Worth as you propose, one dollar and three quarters to two (2) dollars per
ton, contracted for now at Quincy.
JACKSON GRIMSHAW.
OFFICE

u. s. l\IILITARY '.rELEURAPH,

~Var Depa1·tmcnt.
The following telegram received at Washington 8 p. m., January 25, 1864,
from Columbus, Ohio, dated January 25, 1864:
Hon. C. A. DA~A; Assistant Secrctm·y if TVar:
Supply of ice here limited. Dealers offer it at from three (3) to four dollars
per ton in store.
GEO. B. \VRIGHT,
United States lVI. 01·d.

OFFicE

u. s. MILITAR·Y '.rELEGRAPH,

W m· DepaTtmcnt.
The follo\ving telegram received at vVashington 1.30 p. m., January 25,
1864, from Cleveland, Ohio, dated January 25, 1864:
Hon. C. A. DAXA, Assistant Secretary if Trm·:
The party who, as I informed you, offered to furnish ice for three dollars per
ton, has called and offered it at fifty cents less, or two (2) dollars and a half (1-)
per ton.
C. STONE.
OFFICE

u. s. MILITARY TELEGRAPH,

TVaT Department.
'rhe following telegramr eceived at vVasbington 9.10 p. m., January 25,
1864, from Chicago, dated January 25, 1864:
Hon. CHAS. A. DA~A, Assistant Sccrctm·y of TVm·:
Parties will furnish fifteen hundred ( 1,500) tons best quality ice, free of
storage until November, for two dollars a ton, payment to be made as soon as
satisfactory storage certificates are furnished.
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They will also furnish it on board cars at either the Illinois Central depot, the
Michigan Central depot, or the St. Louis Cl.epot, at any time before first October,
for four dollars a ton.
This last offer is the best, as the wastage in houses is full half by September.
I write by to-day's mail. It is not suspected that I inquire on government
acconnt.
l\fARK SKINNER.
ARMY .MEDICAL PuRVEYoR's OFFICE,

Louisville, Ky., January 9, 1864.
SIR: In compliance with instructions contained in your telegram received
this mQrning, I have the honor to enclose herewi.t h all the papers connected
with contracts for furnishing ice to the general hospitals at the west, marked
and de~ ignated as follows, viz :
A.-Letter of instructions from. Acting Surgeon General, received December
1, 1863.
B.-My letter of December 7, 1863, acknowledging receipt of instructionsreporting having put advertisement in certain papers ; also, giving reasons for
limiting time for receiving proposal to 20th December, 1863, ancl asking to be
notified as soon as pos~ible, should any alteration be thought necessary, or the
time too limited.
C.-Letter from Acting Surgeon General, approving my action.
D.-My letter of December, 21, 1863, to Acting Surgeon General, enclosing
all bids received previous to, and opened upon that day, deeming instructions received insufficient to warrant making contract; hence, referred them for decision and further instructions; also, adding some remarks in relation to bids,
and quantity of ice wanted at a few points.
E.-All the biqs put in on or before December 21, 1863, numbered respectively from one to eleven, ( 1-11.)
1!-,.-Bids which came to hand after those coming in on the 21st had been forwarded to Washington.
· G.-Letter from Surgeon General's office, December 25, 1863, returning bids,
and directing me to award the contracts as I might deem most advantageous to
the ser·vice; also, adding that the bids were considered fair and reasonable.
H.-My letter to Acting Surgeon General, January 1, 1864, enclosing draught
of contract with J. \V. Parrish & Co., of St. Louie, Mo., for furnishing ice for the
general hospitals of the west; said contract to be subject to approval of Surgeon General, in every part, before binding either party; also, giving reasons
for insm:ting clause in the first article, in relation to ice inspector, and asking its
approval, &c.
'The above are all the papers now in my hands, relating to ice contracts.
The draught of the contract with Parrish & Co., which was enclosed to the
Acting Surgeon General on the 1st of January, instant, has not been returned to
this office.
·
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. S. MAGRUDER,
Surgeon U. S. A., Medical Purveyor.
Hon. EDWIN 1\L STANTON,
Secretary if War, Wasltington, D. C.
.Messrs. Addison Gage & Co., extensive ice dealers in Boston, made a subc·o ntract with the St. Louis firm, to fill their contract for supplying New Orleans
with ice at $6 a ton less than the original government contract price; giving
an estimated profit to the St. Louis party of $25,000 for New Orleans alone.
The firm of Gage & Co. stands high in the mercantile community for honesty
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and fair dealing. They are the large8t ice-dealers in New England, and are
now desirous of contracting directly 'ljn'tlt the go'u?·nmcrd for supplying the department of the Gulf at the same price they were to supply New Orleans
"second-handed" for; and that price 1vas tlte lowest the St. Louis party could
get any responsible New E11gland dealer to contract for.
Messrs. G. & Co. have made arrangements to ship several cargoes to New
Orleans immediately.
Messrs. Gooch, Hooper, Rice, and other Massachusetts members of Congress,
know the firm well, and will vouch for its ability and high-toned honor.
WAR DEPARTMENT,

fVaskington City, January 27, 1864.
SIR: Ou December 5, 1863, Doctor D. L. Magruder, medical purveyor at
Louisville, Kentucky, under orders from the Surgeon General, advertised for pro·
posals to furnish ice to a1l the United States general hospitals in the military
division of the Mississippi and in the department of the Gulf, upon the Mississippi and its tributaries. This advertisement was answered by eleven bidders,
and on December 20, according to ihe terms of the advertisement, the contract
was awarded to J. 1V. Parrish & Co., of St. Louis, they being, on the whole,
the lowest bidders.
After the contract had been approved by tbe Surgeon General, and-signed by
both Doctor Magruder and the contractors, its execution was 8uspended and the
papers transferred to Washington.
I have carefully examined these papers, and have repeatedly conversed upon
the matter with 1\fr. J. \'V. Parrish, but have not discovered any evidence of
fraudulent design or dishonest practice in the making of the contract. It also
appears that Parrish & Co. were the contractors there last year, and faithfully
executed their contract at considerable loss.
It is true that the advertisements appear to have been ill-judged in requiring
all the hospitals to be furnished under one contract, and that better terms might,
perhaps, have been made had the vast territory in question been divided into
districts; but, on the other hand, it is indispensable that the contractors should
be men, in respect of whom there can be no fear of failure. 'I'o deal with one
contractor is also more convenient than to deal with many.
Since the papers have been in my hands, I have ascertained that ice can be
procured in the northwestern States, for use in the hospitals there, at about onehalf the prices 8tipulatecl in this contract; but it should be remembered that at
these places the quantities needed are very limited, and when the contract was
made, the amount of this season's ice crop was still uncertain. The contractors
who took the risk ought not to be deprived of their profits because their venture
proves fortunate.
A bid for the quantity needed at Nashville, at a price 33g- per cent. less than _
that of the contractors, was not considered by Doctor Magruder, for the reason
that it was offered after the time for receiving proposals had expired. For the
same reason he excluded a bid for supplying Cairo and Jeffersonville at a price
more favorable than that of the contract. This last bid, however, must have
been excluded, even had it been in season, for the reason that jt proposed to furnish ice in railway cars only, and not in ice-houses.
Messrs. Addison Gage & Co., of Boston, who represent that they have bargained with Parrish & Co. to Bupply the quantity contracted for at New Orleans, at $6 per ton less than the contracted price, (namely, at $19 per ton,
instead of $20 per ton,) now propose that the government shall ignore the
contract with Parrish & Co., 80 far as New Orleans is concerned, and make a
new contract with them at tl1e lower rate.
Being sati~::fied that the agreement with Parrish & Co. was honestly made,
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and that, considering the risk involved, the prices were not extravagant, I
reco.mmend that the contract be confirmed. But the stipulations in the papers
executed o not appear sufficiently precise and guarded to secure faithful fulfilJ;nent, and I therefore also recommend the execution of new and amended papers
for that object.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. A. DANA,
/
Assistant Secretary qf War.
Ron. ED\VIN M. STANTON,
Secretary qf War.

W" AR DEPARTMENT,
JVaslu:ngton, D. C., Feb1·uary 3, 1864.
DEAR SIR: I acknowledge with many thanks the receipt of your letter of
January 26, with regard to the price of ice at Chicago. rl'he contract which
had previously been made at• Louisville has been confirmeu, but the information afforded by your letter, as well as by your previous telegrams, has been of
very great value to us.
I remain yours, very resp ectfully,
C. A. DANA,
A ssistant Secre'ary qf TVar.
Ron. MARK SKI~NER,
Chicago, L'linozs.

Testimony qf Dr. R. 0. Abbott.
W ASHrNGTON, Februa1·y 18, 1864.
Dr. R. 0. ABBOTT sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Ques"'tion. What is your rank and position in the army 1
Answer. I am a surgeon in the U uited States army, and medical director of
Washington.
Question. Have you any relation to or connexion with the Sanitary Commission 1
Answer. Nothing whatever; I have no connexion with it in any way.
[The copy of the circular appended to the testimony of Ron. John A. Bingham was then read to the witness.]
Question. Was a circular to the effect of the one just read to you issued by
you at the time indicated 1
Answer. Yes, sir; and it was based on an order received by me from the
Surgeon General, very similar to the circular issued by me.
Question. What was the object of that order and circular?
Answer. '1.1 here was a great deal of difficulty at that time about supplying
the hospitals with vegetable food especially, so as to vary the uiet properly;
and I think this proposal was made to the Surgeon General that they should
run this car, and supply everything needeu at cost prir.es, lower than market
rates at that time, and delivered in the city. 'l_1hat, I believe, was the only
object at the time. We found great difficulty indeed, at that time, in procuring
vegetables here.
Question. One would have supposed that would have led you to seek the
open market everywhere.
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Answer. 'They certainly sold at that time cheaper than the market rates. I
have been lately inquiring into the matter, with a view to see if the arrangement should be continued; and I find that in many articles, such as poultry,
mutton, and one or two V{'getables, they are still below the rates of local dealers here. In some of the vegetables the local dealers are now selling somewhat
lower than the Sanitary Commission.
Question. What enables the Sanitary Commission to afford these things
cheaper than they can be found elsewhere 1
Answer. That I do not know. I know nothing whatever of their movements. I supposed at the time that it was for a charitable purpose that they
startetl this thing ; that they did not intend to make any profit, but it was one
of the outlets for spending their money for the soldiers.
·
Question. I will say that, without knowing much about it, I had supposed
the Sanitary Commission was a charitable institution for the purpose of receiving and distributing the things given them by the charitable from time to time.
Do you know whether that was so or not 1
Answer. It is a very much more extensive commission than that. They
employ a large 1:umber of paid Hgents and inspectors, and make a large number of suggestions and reports of every character. They do a little of everything; they do not limit themselves, so far as I understand, to any oue object,
but wherever they think they can do good they put in train their operations.
Question. On bow large a scale are they doing business; or ·what is the extent of their business, so far as you know 1
Answer. In this particular line 1
Question. I mean all their operations.
Answer. I am not prepared to say; I had hardly anything to do with the
commission. I did not at first like the manner in which they commenced ·
operations, because under their guise of charitable object I thought I recognized a disposition to grasp and assume control of everything. For that reason
I did not give them as hearty a support as I otherwise would have done; and
I have had little or no dealing with the institution in any way.
Question. As you understand it, they buy and sell all kinds of commodities
for the army 1
Answer. I know they do in this instance, and I think they have done so
elsewhere. At least I think so; but I am not certain of that. '.rhey have
their own reasons for it, I suppose.
Question. Do you know their manner of keeping accounts, so as to guarantee
to the public any assurance of the proper application of what they receive 1
Answer. I do not; I have never attended one of their meetings, or looked
ut any of their books.
Question. vVhat was the reason for the last clause of this circular, forbidding
the hospitals purchasing supplies from any other source than the Sanitary
Commission, except in case of emergency 1
Answer. That was the order to me ; I do not think the order contained any
reference to any emergency. As far as I now recollect, I think the order was
that purchases should be made from no other source. I put in the clause about
emergency myself, because I saw at once that if the supply car should be detained, or anything like that occur, there might an emergency arise requiring
supplies to be obtained elsewhere.
Question. You interpolated that becau8e you thought an exigency might
happen that would require it 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was the object of that restriction 1
.
Answer. I suppo::;e, in order that they should have sufficient support to enable them to carry on the scheme. I myself rather favored the plan at the time,
for the reason that the surgeons complained of the difficulty of procuring these
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things. I thought I had reason to suspect that the local dealers were bribing
the stewards of the hospitals to deal with them. I could not prove it, but from
indirect information that reached me I was inclined to believe that of them.
Question. Had you any conversation with the Surgeon General on the subject
of this plan of procuring supplies~
Answer. Very little; the conversation I had with him did not amount to
much. I think that I approved the plan when suggested to me, as far as I can
remember.
Question. Will you state what the plan was, as far as yo~ can remember 1
Answer. That the Sanitary Commission should purchase all the hospitals
needed in Philadelphia, where the market was good, and furnish them at rattfl
equally as low if not lower than the local dealers were furnishing the same
·articles to the hospitals. We could not, at that time, purchase the variety of
vegetables we wanted without paying enormously high for them.
Question. Are you sure the commission always furnished those articles cheaper
than they could be obtained from other sources 1
Answer. I think that, as a general rule, they have done so. Latterly I have
been inquiring into the matter again to see if I could modify it with advantage
in any way. I have had reports from some of the surgeons, and I find that in
some of the articles they are yet lower than the local dealers; in other articles
they are about equal to, and in some cases higher than, the local dealers. J!.,or
instance, I think you can purchase potatoes of the local dealers a few cents per
bushel cheaper than the commission furnishes them.
Question. Do you know what this Sanitary Commission does with the specific
articles furnished them by the benevolent of the country for charitable purposes 1
Answer. I believe they distribute a large portion of them to the hospitals. I
understand that they give very freely when asked. I think that, generally
speaking, they want money more than articles in kind.
Question. Do you understand that they convert these articles received in
kind into money and then purchase other articles 1
Answer. No, sir; I have no reason to think so.
Question. 'J.1hey make their purchases with money received from charitable
sources 1
Answer. Yes, sir. They receive a great many things in kind which they
distribute.
Question. You have no knowledge of the extent of their business, you have
said 1
Answer. None whatever. I have never mixed myself up with them in any
shape or way. I have never had any dealings with them except in this one
instance, and then by direction of the Surgeon General, and occasionally giving
them orders for transportation at the request of· other medical directors; that is,
under general order of the War Department.
Question. Was the Surgeon General authorized to designate the source from
which these things should be purchaE~ed to the exclusion of all other sources 1
Answer. I do notknow, except that he as sumed that authority, supposing it to
be best. I do not know any law upon the subject. I suppose he assumed it
from his general authority as Surgeon General.
Question. I think you say he never explained to you the reason for 'l'estrict~
ing these purchases to the Sanitary Commission 1
Answer. No, sir; he never did. But I assumed that the reason was in order
to give them sufficient encouragement and support to enable them to carry out
the scheme.
Question. Would not purchases be made to better advantage by taking the
competition of the open market 1
Part v--6
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Answer. I think not. I think that you will find that, on the whole, they
have sold below market rates here.
Question. Do you know any particular advantages that the Sanitary Commission had for making their purchases, or why they could afford· to supply
those articles cheaper 1
Answer. Only that they did not pretend to make any profit whatever on
them. They have their agents to buy and send here, and they sell for exactly
what the articles cost them. The dealers, of course, want to make their profit.
Question. They had their agents in the city of Philadelphia to make purchases
for them 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I sent the articles here every day.
Question. You say you do not know the extent of their dealings or purchases 1
Answer. I could very readily give it for the supply of the hospitals here by
taking the different orders of the surgeons from time to time. It varies continually according to the number of patients. On some one day there may be
200 patients transferred to the hospital, and five or six days afterwards they
may be removed. The rations of the hospital is a matter which is left entirely
with the surgeon.
Question. Did the Surgeon General have any dealings with ·this Sanitary
Commission any further than related to the supply of the hospitals 1
Answer. Not that I am aware of.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. When this circular was issued was it understood that there was
to be any concealment about it, or was it an open transaction 1
Answer. I think it was open.
Question. Was there any effort made to conceal it from the public, either on
the part of the Surgeon General or of the Sanitary Commission 1
Answer. Not at all, so far as I know. The local dealers knew it very soon.
Question. Did it become generally known 1
Answer. I think it must have been.
Question. The reason for it was that you could not get here exactly the
articles you needed, and therefore the Surgeon General made an arrangement
with the Sanitary Commission to supply those articles, they being able to do it
better than anybody else, and being willing to do so without making any profit
on the articles 1
Answer. That was my understanding of the matter at the time.
Question. And you give Hat. your opinion that the hospitals have been better
and more economically supplied by that arrangement than by any other 1
Answer. I think so from the time it was started to the present moment. I
think that is the general opinion, too, as expressed to me by the surgeons in
charge of the hospitals.
By the chairman:
Question. Did the War Department know of this order~
Answer. I do not know that they did.
Question. How long was business done under this circular or order 1
Answer. They are still doing it, and have done so since last June. Latterly
I have been making inquiry to see if it should be longer continued, and I find
that they still supply many articles, such as poultry, mutton, &c., cheaper than
the local dealers do. But I find that I can purchase from the local dealers some
of the vegetables cheaper than the Sanitary Commission can supply them. For
instance, I find I can purchase potatoes of local dealers four or five cents cheaper
er bushel than I can of the Sanitary Commission.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. On the whole, what is the result of your investigation?
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Answer. On the whole, the arrangement·with the Sanitary Commission has
been of advantage to the hospitals. And I have every reason to believe that
the whole thing was entered into in good faith on both sides, and for the advantage of the hospitals.

Testimony

of Mr.

E. T. Fowler.
WASHINGTON,

February 26, 1864.

Mr. E. T. FowLER sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What is your occupation and place of residence 1
Answer. I am an ice-dealer, and reside at Medford, Massachusetts.
Question. Do you know anything in relation to the manner in which the
government was supplied with ice last year 1
Answer. All I know was simply about the loading and measurement of the
vessels, which was the measurement of the entire hold of the vessel, without allowing anything for damage or for the projections of the deck. 'rhe amount
the ve·ssel would carry was determined by that measur~ment. They just went
to the ice-house and ran in the ice as it happened. I was shipping ice at the
same time, and at the same point. If Mr. '}_1i:ffany wanted a vessel, I could not
get one, because I was puttiug in my ice b.Y weight, and he had some 20 per
cent. more by his measurement than I did by mine. 'rhe parties who owned
the vessel stated at the time that that was the reason. A vessel rated at 200
tons could not possibly be made to hold more than 150 tons of ice.
· Question. At what place was this 1
Answer. Gardiner, Maine.
Question. Were you shipping ice from that place at the same time 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I was ~hipping to different parts of the south.
Question. Who made this measurement that you speak of1
Answer. D. C. Palmer, of Gardiner.
Question. What is his business 1
Answer. A surveyor of lumber; that is all I know.
Question. Had be any connexion with Mr. Tiffany 1
Answer. None that I know of. He was usually a fair man, but the only
surveyor in the place that would have anything to do with it, because it was a
fraud. I know one party who refused to measure in that way, and assigned
that as the reason, although afterwards he had some connexion with Mr. Tiffany.
Question. He refused because he considered it .a fraud?
Answer. Yes, sir, he so stated to me.
Question. Was Mr. Tiffany there at the time 1
Answer. He was there off and on; his agent was there all the time; there
and at Richmond.
Question. Knowing the registered tonnage of a vessel, can you determine
with accuracy the number of tons of ice she will carry 1
Answer. She will carry of ice about four-fifths of her registered tonnage; a
little more, perhaps. We ger:erally measure a vessel by taking the number of
tons of coal she will carry as the standard of measurement, and she will carry
20 per cent. more coal than anything else, and these bills of lading for ice (referring to bills of lading of Mr. Tiffany) would, all of them, I think, overrun
the tonnage in coal from 15 to 20 per cent.; whereas they should have fallen
short that amount; that is, the bills of lading for those vessels of Mr. Tiffany

84

ICE CONTRACTS.

call for at least 25 per cent. more ice than the vessels could possibly carry;
certainly more than I could get in by weighing the ice.
Question. Do you know anything about the manner in which this ice was
stowed in these vessels 1
Answer. I presume it was fairly stowed; I do not know anything to the
contrary.
Question. Of how many vessels or cargoes of ice did you have knowledge 1
Answer. Mr. Tiffany was shipping there all through the months of June and
July ; perhaps twenty vessels.
Question. Do you know whether the rule you have referred to was the rule
adopted in all the shipments of ice 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know who supplied W at~hington with ice last year 1
Answer. Yes, sir; Mr. Tiffany.
Question. Do you know where the ice was stowed here 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. State all you know in regard to that.
Answer. The examination of the ice-house which I made convinced me that
it was an entirely unfit place in which to store ice. The :filling between the
walls was such that air would be admitted freely, which, of course, would lead
to a waste of the ice.
Question. By whom was that ice-house built?
Answer. By Mr. Tiffany, as I understand.
Question. In which to store the ice he furnished the government 1
Answer. Yes, sir; Mr. r.riffany said that in draughting the bills oflading he had
his own way, and had them so draughted to suit his own purposes.
Question. Do you know whether the vessels which Tiffany loaded with ice
were :filled as full as they could be 1
Answer. I do not know; I did not see them, but I heard it reported that
they were not very particular about that.
Question. Can you tell what would be a fair price for ice delivered on board
a vessel to be supplied to this station, and to the various points along the coast,
for which ice has been advertised recently 1
Answer. At the other end of the route, at Boston, the price is about $2 50 a
ton; $2 25 is the very lowest it can be bought for.
Question. How is it in Maine 1
Answer. You can get it in Maine for about half a dollar a ton less.
Question. What would it cost for freight from Boston and from 1\faine 1
Answer. There is 30 per cent. difference in the freight between Boston and
Maine.
Question. What would it cost per ton from Boston to be delivered in Washington 1
Answer. The freight would be about $3 a ton from Maine, perhaps a little
more, and about $2 from Boston.
Question. r.rhen what would be the wastage in bringing the ice here, stowing
it in the ice-house, and delivering it to the hospitals 1
Answer. About one-half, 50 per cent.
Question. What would be the cost of cartage per ton to put it in the ice-house
here and deliver it to the hospitals 1
Answer. Somewhere from $2 50 to $3 a ton, as they might call for it.
Question. Then what would be the lowest price that ice could be furnished
here, delivered at the hospitals from time to time as required 1
.Answer. From $11 to $12 a ton would be the lowest.
Question. What would it be at Fortress Monroe 1
Answer. It would be a little cheaper there than here; by the cargo it would
cost about $9 a ton.
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Question. What at Norfolk 1
Answer. Very little difference; perhaps $10 a ton.
Question. What at Newbern, North Carolina?
Answer. From $15 to $16.
Question. And at Hilton Head1
Answer. About $11 or $12.
Question. What would be the cost of ice delivered in the ice-house here 1
Answer. About $7 a ton; the wastage would not be as much as in the other
cases.

Testimony of Mr. A. Tracy Edgerton.
WASHINGTON, February 26, 1864.
Mr. A. TRACY EDGERTON sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Where is your place of residence, and what is your occupation 1
Answer. My place of residence is Cypress avenue, I~ong Island; I have no
occupation at present.
. Question. What has been your occupation or business 1
Answer. Importing brandies and gins.
Question. Have you ever been in the ice business 1
Answer. I have.
Question. From what time to what time, and to what extent 1
Answer. In 1862 and 1863.
Question. Have you had anything to do with the ice business, excepting so
far as you were connected with supplying ice to the government 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I sold to outside parties last summer.
Question. Where, and to what extent 1
Answer. In Philadelphia and Baltimore, but to no great extent.
Question. To what extent 1
Answer. Two cargoes; one for Philadelphia, and one for Baltimore.
Question. Then you never had been in the ice business until you went into
it for the purpose of supplying the government 1
Answer. No, sir.
·
Question. When did you first furnish ice to the government 1
Answer. In the summer of 1862.
Question. To what extent 1
Answer. Two vessels.
Question. Where 1
Answer. One at Norfolk, and one on the Peninsula.
Question. What were the terms of your contract 1
Answer. There was not any contract. It was a private sale.
Question. You sold two cargoes to the government at private sale, and that
was all you sold to the government in 1862 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Was there any trouble in relation to that ice between you and any
officer of the government ? If so, state what it was.
Answer. I had some difficulty with Colonel Baker here, about the ice sold on
the Peninsula. It was said that I charged the government half a cent per
pound for the ice more than I agreed to sell it for. That was all the difficulty.
Question. How was it settled 1
Answer. It was settled by refunding a half a cent per pound; that is the
way it now remains.
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Question. From whom did you receive your money 1
.Answer. }..,rom the Surgeon General's department.
Question. To whom did you refund the money 1
.Answer. To Colonel Baker.
Question. With whom was the bargain made for the ice 1
.Answer. To Dr. Charles H. Tretler, medical director of the army of the Potomac.
Question. To whom was the ice delivered 1
.Answer. To the surgeons of the army corps and to the hospitals and transports.
Question. Was your bargain made in writing ?
.Answer. I think it was partly by telegraph and partly in writing. The
papers are all together.
Question. Have you the telegrams and the written contract 1
.Answer. I have not. I deposited them with my vouchers.
Question. Where did you deposit them 1
.Answer. In the Surgeon General's office.
Question. How happened it that Colonel Baker had anything to do with
your contract for ice 1
.
.Answer. It arose out of a dispute with other parties. D1·. Tretler was the
medical director of the army of the Potomac. I telegraphed to him-he was
at Savage Station at the time-if he wanted the ice, and he telegraphed back
he would take it; and it was distributed at different places, as ordered by the
medical directors of the different corps. I afterwards saw Dr. Tretler, and he
gave me a written order to send the balance of the cargo by cars to Savage
Station. That written order, the telegraphic communications, and everything
of the kind, were handed in with the vouchers .
.A. party whom I had taken out in the trip, because we did not agree in the
settlement of our business transactions, sent a person toW ashiugton to state that
I had charged half a cent a pound more for the ice than I had agreed to sell it
for. Now, there is everything in the papers to show the true state of the facts;
all the different receipts, vouchers, orders, and everything of the kind, are together. I have endeavored to get at the papers to find out what the charge was,
but have not been able to do so.
Question. From whom did you receive payment 1
.Answer. From the quartermaster's department; that is, I passed my claim to
Jay Cooke & Co., and they made the collection.
Question. How long was it after this money was paid over to you that you
were called upon to refund 1
.Answer. Within two or three months.
Question. State the particulars of the transaction .
.Answer. My brother-in-law, David S. W einbrenner, of Philadelphia, paid the
money over to Colonel Baker.
Question. Who made the demand for the money to be refunded, and when
and where 1
Answer. I was in Baltimore, and an officer came over to bring me to Washington.
Question. Who was that officer 1
.Answer. His name was Morris. He is now at Fortress Monroe, I believe.
Question. What office did he hold 1
.Answer. He was attached to Colonel Baker's department.
Question. Do you know his rank, or given name 1
Answer. They called him major. I do not know his given name. He
brought me on here, and took me to Colonel Baker's office.
Question. What took place there 1
.Answer. They took me into a back room, took my watch and my money out
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of. my pockets, took my ring off my finger, took every paper I had on my person, took off my boots, and sent me to Capitol prison.
Question. What was said at the time 1 Did they inform you what that was
done for 1
Answer. They asked me if I had charged the government a half a cent a
pound more than I had agreed to take for the ice, and I told them I had not.
They told me I would have an examination the next day, but I never had any
examination. My brother-in-law was telegraphed to come on. He came, and I
saw him twice at the Old Capitol prison, but only for a minute or two. The next
night after I was taken to the prison I was taken out and taken down to
Colonel Baker's office, and some questions asked me in regard to the same things
-questions of the same nature as before. I was then remanded to the Old Capitol. My brother-in-law paid to Colonel Baker the difference of half a cent a
pound, and some long time afterwards I was released without any examination
in the case in any manner, shape, or form.
Question. How long a time after 1
Answer. I was in the Old Capitol prison eight weeks.
Question. Do you know whether any body else but Colonel Baker and his
men had any knowledge of your arrest 1 I mean any other officer of the
government.
Answer. I do not know. There was an outsider, a man by the name of
Henry, said to me in Baltimore that if I would pay the money then and there
the thing would be settled. I told him I would not do it.
Question. What was thf' amount 1
Answer. I think it was about $1,500; I cannot tell exactly.
Question. What was the man's name 1
Answer. Edwin Henry; he is now a quartermaster.
Question. Had you had any personal connexion with him 1
Answer. Yes, sir; he had been a customer of mine years before, but had
failed and owed me money.
Question. Do you know how he happened to be present at your arrest 1
Answer. He said he had come down with officer Morris, if possible, to settle
the matter; that if I would settle up the matter of difficulty between another
party and myself, these things could all be settled.
Question. Settle up with whom 1
Answer. The party I went in with in this ice business. At one time when I
was in New York, the party said to me, "Will you advance half the money
and load a vessel with ice and send it down to the army 1" He persuaded me
into it. After the vessel was loaded, I had to make all the disbursements; and
after the party got down there, I found that he was an habitual drunkard, and
I had to take hold and do everything myself. There had been an agreement
that we should share the profits equally. After we returned I told him I
would not do that, because he had advanced no money and had done nothing;
that I would only pay him so much. From that arose all the trouble; a person was sent to Washington by him to make all this difficulty, because I would
not pay this outside party what he wanted.
Question. Do you mean to say that when Colonel Baker's officer, Major
· Morris, went to Baltimore to arrest you, there went with him a Mr. Henry,
then a civilian and now a quartermaster, who told you there, that if you would
pay to this man in partnership with you in this ice business the amount he
claimed, that would end the matter 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you refused to do that 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you were then brought here and put in prison 1
Answer. Yes, sir; the next day.
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Question. Was there any proposition of that kind made to you afterwards,
or any intimation made to you by any person that you could be let off by
settling up with your partner in the ice business?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Was Major Morris present when Henry made this proposition to
you 1
Answer. No, sir ; he was at the hotel. I met Henry in the street, and he
asked me to go and take a drink with him ; I did not care about it, but finally
consented. We went to the Fountain Inn hotel, on Light street, where he
introduced me to Major Morris. Then Henry took me one side up stairs, when
this conversation took place.
Question. Then what was done 1
Answer. I told him that I did not believe any such thing; I insisted that he
was humbugging me, and told him to go down and get his papers. He went
down, then came up again, and then went down again. I felt convinced he was
trifling with me, and I left the hotel by the back way. The next day I was in
a store on Gay street on some businese, and two officers came in there and arrested me.
Question. Who were t.hey 1
Answer. I do not know their names.
Question. Was either of them Major Morris 1
Answer. No, sir; they conducted me to the provost marshal's office, and
Major Morris came in there. Then one of the officers who arrested me, Major
Morris and myself came down to Washington together.
Question. After you got out of the Capitol prison, did you communicate the
fact of your arrest to any officer of the government in Washington 1
Answer. No, sir, not to a soul; because when I got out they had my papers, my watch and my ring, and it took me a long time to get them.
Question. When, where, and from whom did you get them 1
Answer. I got them through Judge Knox, of Philadelphia; I think Mr.
Wood, the superintendent of the prison, was the cause of the return of my watch
and ring. When I left the Old Oapitol, Mr. Wood said to me "There is the
order for your release." I asked "From what department 1" He said, "I
cannot show you; but you can go when you please, and where you please." I
said, " Mr. Wood, I have letters and papers in the hands of Colonel Baker, and
my watch, ring and money are there;" Eaid he" You better go straight home
now, and I will see that you get them." I saw Judge Knox with my brotherin-law, and he wrote for the return of those thing·s, and Colonel Baker wrote
back, so Judge Knox told me, that they had been returned. I wrote either to
Mr. Wood or to the clerk of the Cld Capitol, and he wrote back word that they
had called upon Colonel Baker, and Colonel Baker said they had been returned;
and I got them in the course of a week afterwards. I was told that if I went
up there after my watch and ring I would be locked up again.
Question. Who told you that 1
Answer. Parties in the Old Capitol-! cannot tell their names·; but parties
who had been under arrest there, and when they got out, had gone after their
property and been sent back again.
Question. Have you ever been to the Surgeon General, or to any other
officer, and requested to see your contract and telegrams, in order to determine
whether or not you had taken more for your ice than you were entitled to 1
Answer. I came on with my brother-in-law to Washington, and we went to
Judge Advocate Turner, and asked to see the order for arrest and the papers
in the case ; I think we called twice. The first day we were promised tV. t we
should see them the next day. We went the next day, but we did not see them.
I understood that there were no papers-that is, that there was no order for the
arr~st, or anything of that kind. My brother-in-law wrote to the judge advocate
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about it, and a letter came back with this indorsement on it: "Referred for information to the Secretary of War."
Question. Did you ever ask to see your contract and telegrams 1
Answer. I told Colonel Baker-Question. Did you ever satisfy yourself whether that money had been wrongfully taken from the government by you 1
Answer. It had not been.
Question. Did you ever examine the telegrams and contract so as to determine whether or not there was an error in the amount received by you from
the government 1
Answer. No, sir. I have had no chance to see them.
Question. Have you ever applied to the Surgeon General for them 1
Answer. I put them in some quartermaster's department, and I have not
seen them since.
Question. Did you furnish any ice to the government last year 1
Answer. I did ; to three different places.
Question. What places ?
Answer. Norfolk, Virginia; Newbern, North Carolina, and Hilton Head,
South Carolina.
Question. Was any one connected with you in your contracts last year 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. You had no connexion with Mr. Tiffany in those contracts 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Did you know Mr. Tiffany 1
Answer. I met him in Mr. Johnson's office prior to the contracts, and he
spoke to me, and I remembered having met him before.
Question. Had you auy acquaintance with the Surgeon General or any one
in his office 1
Answer. Not at the time I took the contract; nor with any one in the medical purveyor's department.
Question. You saw the advertisement for ice?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you hand in your proposal in response to that 1
Answer. Yes, sir; to Mr. Henry Johnson, medical purveyor.
Question. What were the terms of your proposition 1
Answer. I offered to furnish ice for $8 50 to Norfolk, $10 50 to Newbern,
and $11 to Hilton Head.
Question. To be delivered into the ice-houses there 1
Answer. No, sir; to be delivered by bill of lading.
Question. The weight to be taken as per bill of lading 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. At the point where it was loaded 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Was that your original proposition 1
Answer. It was so understood before the contract was given to me.
Question. Was that in your original proposition 1
Answer. That I cannot say; a copy of it is on file.
Question. Do you not now remember in relation to your original proposition ?
Answer. I do not think anything definite is stated in it, except that I proposed to furnish ice at those places at such and such prices.
Question. You proposed to deliver ice at those points at the prices you have
stated 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you expected your ice to l!e weighed there 1
Answer. No, sir; my understanding was that it was to be taken by bill of
lading; that was my expectation in making my figures.
Question. From what point or points did you ship your ice 1
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Answer. :E'rom Herring gut, Goose creek, and Soutl1port, Maine.
Question. Oan you tell in what VP.Ssels you shipped ice 1
Answer. I can name some of them.
Question. Give us the names.
Answer. The Means; two vessels called the :E'ish, the 0. N. Francis. I
do not think I could remember them all.
Question. Did you fulfil your contract 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you supply Newbern with all the ice required there 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Was not the government obliged to buy ice of an ice dealer in
Newbern 1
Answer. No, sir. The government took a cargo of my ice and used it for
private purposes, and I had to wait some two or three months before I got my
money.
Question. Did you ship ice to Newbern by the schooner Magnet 1
Answer. I did not.
Question. The statement has been made that you shipped ice to Newbern by
the schooner Magnet; that the bill of lading called for 93 tons, and that it was
surveyed when it got there, and only 17-:i~Po%- tons found in it.
Answer. I know nothing of that kind ever took place.
Question. And that there was another cargo by another vessel, the bill of
lading for 125 tons, and only 43 tons arrived.
Answer. There was nothing of that kind.
Question. What medical officer received your ice there 1
Answer. Dr. Snelling, the most of it.
Question. Did you hear any complaint from Dr. Snelling in relation to your
ice 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Did you hear any complaint from any officer of the government
authorized to reeeive your ice 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. How did you determine the quantity of ice put on board the
vessels 1
Answer. It was weighed on board.
Question. It was not determined by the measurement of the hold of the
vessels 1
Answer. No, sir. I never heard of measuring ice on board a vessel in that
way.
Question. Who superintended the loading of your ice 1
Answer. The parties from whom I bought it. The parties I bought it of
weighed it themselves, and I paid them in accordance to that weight.
Question. :E'rom what persons did you purchase ice 1
Answer. From Mr. Gore, of Boston; George W. Gilmore, of Southport,
Maine ; and Mr. Carleton, of Rockport, Goose creek, Maine.
Question. Did you pay for the same number of tons of ice that you charged
the government for 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Can you furnish us with the names of the vessels by which you
shipped your ice, the tonnage of each vessel, and the quantity of ice on board
each vessel?
Answer. I can do it, but it will take some time.
Question. Will you do so 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you take anything else in the holds of the vessels in which
you shipped ice 1

ICE CONTRACTS.

91

Answer. Two or three times I put some small packages of butter for the
hospitals in on top of the ice to keep it cool ; nothing else.
Question. Did you, at any time, purchase a cargo of ice, or a portion of a
cargo, at Hilton Head 1
Answer. Yes, sir; of Mr. Darling.
Question. What did you do with it 1
Answer. I sold it to the government.
Question. A.t what price, and on what terms 1
Answer. Just the same price as I contracted for. I asked the medical department if they wanted it; they said they did, and I sold it to them.
Question. It was taken by bill of lading 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Was any alteration or change made in the bill of lading 1
Answer. I took the bill of lading from the gentleman I bought it of.
Question. Was there any change or alteration made in that bill of lading 1
Answer. I cannot say. I do not think there was.
Question. Do you not know whether there was or not 1
Answer. I do not think there was. I do not know.
Question. Did you not make out a new bill of lading 1
Answm·. 'l'here was a bill of lading made out, because he had other stuff on
board the vessel; and I think he made out a separate bill of lading fo1· the ice.
Question. Who made it 1
Answer. It was made either by the captain or by Mr. D arling.
Question. Was Mr. Darling on board 1
Answer. He was out there on board the vessel at that time.
Que~tion. r_rhe government took that ice by bill of lading 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How did you get at the quantity of ice on board the vessel?
Answer. I took what they told me it was.
Question. What evidence did you furnish to the government of the quantity
of ice you furnished from that vessel?
.Answer. I do not know of any evidence furnished except the statement they
gave me.
Question. You were to deliver ice by bill of lading 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And the government took this ice from this vessel on your contract 1
Answer. · Yes, sir.
Question. How were you to detern;:tine the quantity of ice it had on board 1
Answer. From what they stated at the time.
Question. From what who stated 1
Answer. 'l'he parties who bad it tbere-Mr. Darling and the captain.
Question. Do you remember what evidence you furnished the government of
the quantity of ice on board that vessel?
Answer. I think the bill of lading was all.
Question. Did you furnish them that bill of lading 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Was it the original bill of lading 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. What was it 1
Answer. I bought it by bill of lading; the bill of lading given me there.
Question. It was not a bill of lading, was it, but a bill of the ice 1
Answer. I think it was a bill of lading.
Question. Did you have the original bill of lading 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Then what did you have 1

1
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.Answer. I had the bill of lading made for me ·there.
Question. Who made it 1
Answer. I cannot tell which of them made it.
Question. How long had the vessel been there 1
.Answer. I think I bought the ice the day the vessel got there.
Question. Do you know how long the vessel was there before the ice was
discharged 1
Answer. I do not know; some time.
Question. The icP, had wasted a great deal?
Answer. No, sir; I think not. It was very fine ice.

Testimony

of Mr. J. C. Tijfany.

WASHINGTON, Marc!~ 26, 1864.
Mr. J. C. r_riFFANY sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What was your business prior to 18621
Answer. I was an agent of the quartermaster's department, in this city. I
have been the president of a joint-stock company for putting up machines for
the saving of fllel; I have also been a farmer.
Question. What has been your business since that time 1
Answer. I have been engaged in shipping ice.
Question. When were you an agent for the quartermaster's department 1
Answer. I think it was in November, 1861, that I had charge of the Sixth
street government depot here in Washington.
Question. By whom were you engaged in that capacity 1
Answer. General Van Vliet sent me to Colonel Rucker, and Colonel Rucker
sent me down there.
Question. Have you at any time supplied ice to the government 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. When 1
Answer. In 1862, at the time the army was on the Peninsula, at Harrison's
landing.
Question. How did you supply it-under contract 1
Answer. The first ice was ordered.
Question. By whom?
Answer. The medical director of the army of the Potomac, approved by the
Surgeon General. 1'hat was the first ice furnished by me.
Question. Did you furnish any ice the next year under contract?
Answer. I did.
Question. State the circumstances under which the contract was made by you.
Answer. In the fall of 1862, when they were getting ice, I told them if they
would like to have it supplied by contract I would do so. I was referr-ed to
the Surgeon General. I believe I wrote out a contract. They afterwards informed
me that, by order of the Secretary of War, all contracts had to be advertised,
and that I might put in my proposition then. 1'hat was the first I heard of it.
I think the bids were opened on the 23d of February, 1863, and the contracts
for New Orleans, Pensacola, Key West, and Washington were awarded to me
as the lowest bidder.
Question. With whom did you have your conversation in the Surgeon General's
office in relation to the contract before the advertisement1
.
Answer. I think it was with Surgeon Smith, who had a room there next to
the Surgeon General's office.
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Question. Can you state to the committee the terms of the proposal you made
in response to the advertisement 1
Answer. The one that was executed 1
Question. Yes, sir.
.Answer. As near as I can recollect, I agreed to furnish the ice at New Orleans
and Pensecola, and anywhere thereabouts that it was taken, for $22 50 a ton,
with l 5 per cent. off for wastage; and at Washington for $10 50 a ton, with 12
or 15 per cent. off for wastage; I cannot tell positively the exact prices, but
the contract will show it.
Question. Were not the terms of your proposition changed after it was sent in 1
Answer. No, sir; not that I know of. They wanted the ice delivered in
Washington at the hospitals, arid I told them I would delivered it at 50 cents
a ton additional to the contract. 'l,hat was all the change that was made, as
far as I know. They wanted ap. ice-house pen, and I agreed to put it up at
such a price; all that had nothing to do with the supplying of the ice. There
was no alteration at all made in the terms for the delivery of the ice.
Question. Were you present when the proposals were opened by the medical
storekeeper, Mr. Johnson'?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Were you announced as the lowest bidder?
.Answer. No, sir; it was not announced at all then who was the lowest bidder.
Question. Was it not said by Mr. Johnson, when the bids were opened, that
the contract would be awarded to somebody else 1
.Answer. Yes, sir; it was awarded to Mr. Godey at a certain price.
Question. How happened it that that awarcl was· changed 1
.Answer. I bid lower than Mr. Godey did, and I felt that I had been wrongly
ruled out. I went over to the Surgeon General's office, where Mr. Johnson had
announced that his award would be submitted for approval.
Question. With whom had you any conversation at the Surgeon General's office1
Answer. With Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith ordered all the proposals to be sent
over to the office. I believe the Surgeon General ordered Mr. Smith to have
thc,rn all sent for. They were sent over for examination. They asked me then
if my proposal had been sent over. It was not there, and they sent again for all
of them, and asked me to come back at 2 or 3 o'clock, I think, and they would
look them over, and see whether the award was correct or not; I carne back, but
I really do not remember whether they gave me an answer then, or the next
day; I am under the impression that it was the next day, but I cannot state
positively about it.
Question. Do you remember the terms of Mr. Godey's bid 1
Answer. I believe it was thirteen dollars and something a ton.
Question. What was he to do 1 ·
Answer. To deliver it to the hospitals.
Question. What were you to do 1
.
Answer. I was to deliver it at the ice-house at $9 45 a ton, after the deduction for wastage, delivered on the wharf; and deliver it at the hospitals for 50
cents a ton additional.
Question. You were to deliver the ice on the wharf at $9 45 a ton 1
Answer. Yes, sir; with the wastage off.
Question. Do you consider that your proposal was lower than his-he to de
liver at the hospitals at $13 a ton, and you to deliver at the wharf at $9 451
Answer. I considered it certainly a great deal cheaper; I do not think it
would cost $2 50 a ton to deliver it at the hospitals.
Question. What would be the wastage to deliver the ice at the hospitals 1
Answer. That would depend a great deal upon circumstances.
Question. What was the wastage 1
Answer. It was pretty' large.
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Question. What was the actual percentage of wastage 7
Answer. The way things were managed, I judge the ice wasted pretty nearly
three-fourths.
Question. As you delivered it yourself 7
Answer. I delivered it as it was ordered; I had nothing to do but to draw
it. I suppose, when it went out in the morning, you might deliver 80 or 90
pounds out of a hundred; in the middle of the day you would not deliver
so much.
Question. You say the wastage was three-fourths 7
Answer. Yes, sir, altogether, for the ice-house was open almost all the time.
Question. Was the ice-house properly built-one suitable for ice 7
Answer. I believe it was.
Question. Who haq the control of the ice-house 7
Answer. There was an orderly sent down there by the medical director, or
somebody else; I do not know whom.
Question. You had the whole control of delivering while you carried on that
part of the business !
,
Answer. Yes, sir; I agreed to deliver it at the hospitals for 50 cents a ton;
a great many of them would not take the ice when carried there, but said they
would rather send their own teams for it.
.
Question. Is it your opinion, with the knowledge you have of the ice business, that it is for the interest of the government to pay $9 45 a ton for ice
delivered on the wharf in Washington, in preference to paying $13 a ton for ice
delivered at the hospitals ?
Answer. It would be better for them, if it was properly managed, to pay
that for its delivery on the wharf. I do not think the government has acted
very wisely in their contracts. I think they could do a great deal better. I
told Dr. Abbott here, even when I was delivering the ice, that it would be
better to have the regular dealers in the cities to supply them; and where they
wanted ice in places where there were no regular dealers, the government should
ship it for themselves. That is the only true way of doing business so far as
I know anything about it. I do not think any new man can go into a place
and deliver ice as well as those who are used to the place. I delivered all
that was called for. But when they came in the middle of the day for ice, you
must have the doors of the ice-house open, and the heat will get in so that you
might almost as well have your ice out of doors.
Question. Knowing these facts, how could you be of the opinion that it was
better for the government to accept of your proposals to furnish ice delivered
on the wharf here at $9 45 a ton, and then send it out to the hospitals, instead of paying $13 a ton for it deli-vered at the hospitals 7
Answer. I supposed the hospitals would draw their own ice, and that all
their ambulances, or whatever they sent for it, would be sent in the morning
and take the ice then, so that the ice-house would not be open except in the
morning. That was the way I advised them to do, and I finally got them to
adopt that in September, although I had been to a great expense in getting
horses and carts. I told them all along that they were wasting too much ice,
and that they should get down there before sunrise in the morning, get what
ice they wanted, and then shut the ice-house up; that by that means they
would save a great deal.
Question. Do you not think that the wastage of the ice from the time it is
delivered on the wharf until it is delivered to the consumer would be at least
25 per cent. 7
Answer. I could not tell you; I have not done anything more than ship it
here; I have not dealt in it here; I do not know what the wastage here is.
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Question. Do you know what considerations operated upon the mind of the
Surgeon General or his assistant to induce them to change the award that had
been made by Mr. Johnson 1
Answer. I do not know; I never had any conversation with them about that,
except to urge that my bid was the lowest. I never saw the Surgeon General
but twice that I know of; and I do not think I ever talked with him more
than twenty minutes.
Question. Did you have anything to do with preparing the advertisements
for ice 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Did you ever represent to any person that you had anything to
do with the preparation of the advertisement 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Did you call o.n Addison Gage & Co., in Boston, at any time 1
Answer. I did; twice.
Question. Did you represent to them that it was no use for them to bid for
ice; that whoever took contracts would have to get them through you 1
Answer. No, sir; I never told them any such thing. Some time last summer I received a letter from the Secretary of War, stating that Mr. Gage had
written a letter to some senator about that. I wrote, in reply, that nothing of
the kind had been said. .M:r. Gage said that he intended to put in a bid, and
refused to contract for ice wi th me at New Orleans for $35 a ton delivered. I
told him I had seen the advertisement, but I did not say I had anything to do
with giving the contracts.
Question. For what purpose did you call on Mr. Gage 1
Answer. To get ice.
Question. For what purpose did you want ice 1
Answer. To sell.
Question. rro whom 1
Answer. To any person who wanted to buy it. I had been supplying ice
the year before; but that year there was very little chance to supply ice.
Question. Had you supplied it to any one but the government '?
Answer. No, sir, not before 1863; but I had made contracts to supply ice
to others.
Question. What contracts 1
Answer. At New York, Newark, Philadelphia, and some in Baltimore.
Question. With whom 1
Ap.swer. I had made a contract to supply some ice to the Knickerbocker Ice
Co., with Freeman & Co., Newark, and I sent a load to Mr . .Barnum, of Baltimore.
Question. V'tT ere they private individuals, or connected with the government?
Answer. Private individuals.
Question. Had you made a contract prior to that time 1
Answer. I do not know that I had made any prior to that time. I was determined to go into the ice business, and wanted to get a supply of ice I could
control.
Question. Did you tell the ice-dealers in New England that you were to
have these contracts with the government 1
•
Answer. Not that I know of. I told them I was going to put in bids for the
contract; and they told me they were going to do so. I never made any repr~~entation to any one that I was going to have the contract any way, for I
never had any assurance from any person that I was going to get it.
Question. From what point or points did you ship your ice?
Answer. I shipped some from New York, some from Boston, and some from
the Kennebec river, in Maine.
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Question. Will an ordinary vessel carry as many tons of ice as her registered
tonnage 1
Answer. Yes, sir; generally a little more. Some vessels will carry a great
deal more, some not quite so much as their register. It depends upon how they
are built. A profitable ice vessel will carry more than her registered tonnage.
Question. Was the ice you shipped weighed or measured 1
Answer. Some was weighed and some was measured.
Question. At what points was it weighed and at what points measured 1
Answer. On the Kenneb~c river we weighed a great deal;. and we measured
some there. It depended upon the facilities whether the ice was weighed or
was measured. At some pla~es where we got ice, the houses where it was put
up were so arranged that w~ could weigh it as well as not ; at others the (acilities were not so great, and we measured it.
Question. You paid so much per ton, then, for the nurn ber of tons put on
board the vessels 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Who superintended the loading the ice into the vessels 1
. Answer. Mr. John McCartney superintended the most of it. I believe two
or three cargoes were superintended by a man named Charles F. Dodge, and
a Mr. Barker Neal superintended some of them.
Question. Where do those men reside 1
Answer. Mr. McCartney resided at Newton, or Newtown, Long Island. I do
not know where Mr. Dodge is now. He had been in the army as quartermaster of the 52d Pennsylvania regiment, but had left on account of his health, and
had been residing in Williamsburg, Pennsylvania, I believe. He talked about
going into the produce business, but I do not know whether he has or not. Mr.
Barker Neal resided at Gardiner.
Question. Did these three men superintend the loading of all your ice 1
Answer. I believe they did. I do not now remember that anybody else
superintended any.
Question. Did you superintend the loading of any yourself1
Answer. No, sir; I did not. I was in New York a great deal, but used to go
down there often.
Question. Was any ice weighed here that was received 1
Answer. I could not tell whether there was any weighed here or not.
Question. Was any weighed to your knowledge 1
Answer. I do not know that there was. The contract was that the loading
should be subject to the inspection of a government agent. I do not know
whether there was any there or not. When the government wanted ice they
ordered a load of it, and I went there and loaded it.
Question. When the government wanted ice they notified you to send it 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. You understood, by the terms of your contract, that a government
inspector was to superintend the loading of it 1
Answer. That it was subject to that inspection, if they choose to send an
agent 'there to do it.
Question. Was there any such inspection 1
Answer. No, sir, not to my knowledge. I have never heard that there was
any such inspection.
Question. The only evidence the government had that you shipped the
quantity of ice, for which you were paid, was the bill of lading, sworn to by
the captain of the vessel1
Answer. Yes, sir. I took the accounts of my agents for that. The captain
of the vessel knew what he had.
Question. You paid for the number of tons he ~wore to in the bill of lading 1
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Answer. I did, and was paid for the ice at the same rate.
Question. Of whom did you purchase this ice?
Answer. I purchased some ice in New York of the Knickerbocker Ice Company. All I purchased in Boston was purchased of Daniel Draper & Sons;
in Bath, I purchased of Colonel Harding; in Richmond, Maine, I bought of
Allen & Maxwell, or of their agent, H. S. Hagar; and I bought some in Gardiner of a man by the name of Stevens-Mr. Barker Neal, who measured the ice
for me, knows his first name-I do not; and I bought some of a man named
William Sturtevant, of Richmond, though I think he had his ice at Gardiner,
m on the river; and I bought some ice of a man by the name of Carhart, but
it afterwards turned out to belong to Addison Gage & Co., of Boston. It seems
that Carhart sold it to Gage, and I paid Gage for it.
Question. Have you named all the persons of whom you bought ice 1
Answer. As far as I now remember. That amounted to a great deal of ice.
Question. Whom were you supplying with ice besides the government 1
Answer. I sent some to the Knickerbocker Ice Company, of New Y~rk;
some to Freeman, of Newark, New Jersey; some to a man in New Brunswick,
New Jersey-! forget his name; some to Kershaw & Co., in Philadelphia,
somewhere from 4,000 to 5,000 tons; and then I sent off a lot to a man by the
name of Lloyd, who shipped it to Hilton Head and Charleston bar; I believe
he resides somewhere in Pennsylvania, but he came up from Beaufort then.
Question. Can you tell from your books the amount of ice you furnished to
each one of the parties you have named 1
Answer. I think I can.
Question. Have you your books with you 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Will you forward to us the amount of ice you furnished to each of
those parties 1
Answer. Yes, sir, if I can make it out. I think it would amount to about the
~arne that I sold to the government.
Question. What did you pay per ton for this ice 1
Answer. All the way from $2 50 to $4 a ton.
Question. What was the lowest you paid~
Answer. ,I think $2 50 was the lowest; I will not be positive about that;
but I can find out.
Question. What did you pay per ton for freight~
Answer. On an average from $3 to $3 ·50 to Washington. The vessels that
went to New Orlean·s I chartered by the month to go out and back.
Question. You paid no vessels by the ton except those that went to Washington~

Answer. No, sir ; because it was a short voyage. I would pay them so
much per ton to come out, and they would find their own freight back. But
there was so little freight to come back from New Orleans that I had to charter
the vessels by the month out and back, or else pay so much for freight per ton
that I would rather run the risk of getting freight back.
QuestiQn. Did you ship any ice to Pensacola~
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know what was done with the ice you shipped there 1
Answer. One of the vessels~ after she arrived there, was ordered to go to Niw
Orleans and discharge her ice there. Another vessel discharged her ice at Pensacola.
Question. Do you know what was done with the ice discharged at Pensacola 1
Answer~ I do not; they did not order me to put up any ice-house there. I
sent the ice down there, and I und.erstood that they;put it in Fort Pickens; bat
I do not know.
Part v--7
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Question . .Are you interested in any ice contracts with the government now 1
Answer. I have no contracts for ice with the government now.
Question. Are you interested in any contracts that other people haYe 1
Answer. Mr. Hull asked me to furnish him some ice to be sent to Annapolis.
He wanted to make a bid ; and I agreed to furnish him ice at so much per ton.
Question. When you were delivering ice in Washington, did you deliver it at
any other places, or to any other parties than the hospitals 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. ".ro whom 1
Answer. To seyeral parties; I sent some to Mr. Smith; some to Dr. Abbott's
place; some to the officers in the War Department; and, I believe, I sent some
to parties connected with Riggs & Co., bankers; only a few tons altogether.
Question. What ice was it you sent to Riggs & Co. 1
Answer. I made a request that I might be allowed to have 25 tons of ice,
which should be deducted from the bill of lading, that I might have it to use
as I wished, and the request was granted by the department, and I sent it
around to those parties.
Question. What was this ice sent for-as a matter of business, or as a
present?
Answer. I never charged them anything for the ice; there was no understanding about its being a present or anything of · the kind: I do not know
whether I sent any to the Surgeon General or not. I know the parties in the
medical department all insisted that they should pay for the ice. I think I
asked to have the control of 25 tons; 1 am not positive about the amount.
Question. That is, you were to take 25 tons, and have it deducted from
your bill?
Answer. Yes, sir; and for which the government never paia me.
Question. You have no knowledge of the amount of ice actually delivered at
any of the points to which you shipped it 1
Answer. No, sir; because I never heard of any of it being weighed after
delivery. It was a matter they could do just as they chose about. I should not
have objected to having the ice weighed at all. I know what I sent.
Question. Do you know what would be a fair percentage for wastage 1
Answer. There is a great deal of difference about that. I have sent ice down
to Matanzas, and when it got there and was unloaded, even the sap of the ice
was not melted off. Then again, I have sent ice which wasted very much. It
depends a great. deal upon the temperature of the water, the heat of the sun,
and the time of the year; in summer time it wastes the most, of course. It
wasted more last summer, than I ever knew it before.
Question. How much per cent. do you think it wasted last year in shipping it
to Washington 1
Answer. I do not know what it· wasted. We protected it pretty well by
putting lumber and hay on as a deck load. I should think it came very weU ; it
looked pretty well when it was opened. I got some of the persons here to inspect some vessels, for I wanted them to be satisfied that the ice they were
getting was good. I suppose it was all good. I agreed to furnish them first
quality ice, and I did send them last year the best ice in the United States. I
do not believe there was ever any better ice cut than I sent.
Question. If I have understood you correctly, you have stated that the government can supply itself with ice more economically by purchasing it from
the dealers in the neighborhood, if they got it at reasonable rates, than by shipping it and storing it for themselves?
Answer. l!...,or this reason, yes, sir; that the parties tlie government have to
take care of the ice know so little about it that the wastage amounts to a great
deal more than the difference in price; and my opinion now is, that if the gov-
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ern.ment had taken their ice from Mr. Godey, at $13 a ton, they would have
got it a little cheaper than it turned out as they got it from me. But, as a
general thing, I think, if they had gone out· into the market and bought it, instead of from Mr. Godey or me, it would have cost them more, for ice went up very
high last season. I sold it at my ice-house for the same price that I delivered
it here. I think, at the same time, the government can do better to have their
ice supplied from the dealers, in the large places where there are dealers.
Where there are no regular dealers, I think the government should buy their
own ice at so much a ton on board the vessel, load it for themselves, and attend
to it for themselves. I offered to supply the government this year at so much
a ton, put on board vessels, paying a government weigher five cents per ton for
weighing it; I would do that for $1 75 per ton, and I would then have made
mor~ money than by any other contract.
Question. At what place did you propose to load it in that way 1
Answer. At Richmond, Maine.
Statement
Date.

1863.
April 1
11
13
17
18
28
29
Mar. 24
May 23
29
June 1
3
3
3
5
6
6
8
10
20
30
30
Aug. ll
13
13
13
13
22
23

Name of vessel.

rif ice shipped to gm;ernment.
Destination.

Registered Tons ice.
tonnage.

503
Schr. R9bert CaldwelL ..• ---- New Orleans...........
447
455
Schr. Queen of the South . .•...... do .•.......... -----445
Ship Lisbon ..•••...••. ------ .... do .........•.. -· ---·
502~ ~
496H~~
Bark Scotland ..• _. _•. _·. . . . . . . ... do . .. __ . . • . . . . . . . . . .
384
38¥o-&i
515
Ship Flora Southard...... • . . . Pensacola . . . . • . . . . • • . . .
524
Brig Stephen Duncan, ....... New Orleans...........
287
328
Bark Argean . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... do...... . . • • • . . • . • . .
450
513
420
Ship Clara Ann .............. Pensacola.............
469QM S
Schr. Richmond . . . . • • . . . . . • . Washington . . . • • • . • . . . . .....•• _.
140
265
Brig Abbott Lawrence ............ do ........••• ·. -----200
Schr. T. C. Barlette .•••.......... do .........••..•••.....•......
1271-bSchr. Golden Rod ................ do ........•.•..••.....•••• ---118
Schr. Exeter ..••......•.••••..... do .••••...••...••••......•.• _.
148
Schr. October ...........••...... do ....•...•••....•... __ ....••.
156
Brig Almon Rowell .. . • . •. •• . Key West..............
280
368
Brig Whitaker . • . . • . . . . . . . . . Washington . • • • . . . . . . . . _..•.•••.
262
Schr. OliviaBuxton .......•...•.. do .....•.•.•...••.......••.••.
130
· Schr. Martha . . . • . . . . . . . • • . . . . ... do.... . . . . . . . . . • • • • . . ...•••• _.
230
Schr. Hudson ...........• - •..... do ...........•.•••... __ ...•...
257
Schr. Matilda.... . . . . . . . . • . . . . ... do.... . . . . • . . . . • • • • . . . _..••.•.
355-fr
Schr. L. F. Smith ...••...•••..... do .............• ~--- ......•••.
372
Ship May Flower.... . . . • . . • . New Orleans ...•• _..•. _ .. _....••. 1,233
Schr. Mary Ella ............. Washington...........
210
186Wo&
Brig Isadora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... do ................ _. . . _.•.. _•.
264
Brig Forrester .•.•••.•....•...... do...... . • • • • . . • . . • . . . _.•...•.
180io1?o
Schr. Jennie Morton .............. do ........................... .
413
Scht. H. N. Farnham ............ do..................
302
325
. Schr. Thomas Martin ............. do..................
145
176
Ship Lisbon .•••••••.....•.•. New Orleans----------502H
464
Total.- ••• - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •.••......••••••........ ~.... . . • . 9, 888tifti10

RICHMOND, February 23, 1864.
SIR : Above you have the class, name, and destination of the vessels, with the
registflred tonnage of those had on charter-party. Those not having registered
tonnage marked were taken on rates, or so much per ton, for amount actually put
on board, voyage to Washington being too short to take vessels by the month,
and-there being no return freights from Washington. The ship May Flower
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was sent out to a market, but the government wanted it, in fact took it, although
ice was bringing fifty dollars per ton in New Orleans at that time. The ship
registers about 1,000 tons, but I only took the hold for ten thousand dollars out
to New Orleans; but the owner, James Hagar, swore upon a suit that she carried
1,500 tons, and was under-registP.red, as is the case with most vessels. 'rhe ice
for New Orleans was loaded mostly in New York by the Knickerbocker Ice
Company; the Scotland and Lisbon in Boston by D. Draper & Sons. The
balance was loaded on the Kennebec river in Maine, and from ice I bought by
the house-full, and also put up myself, I paying for what I bought by the bill
of lading; the ice put in being weighed or measured by a regularly appointed
weigher. 'l'he government sent no one to inspect the loading that I know of;
but I took the medical director, Dr. R. 0. Abbott, to see some cargoes examined
and opened, with which he was satisfied. The ice was of the very first quality.
I do not think it the best plan for the government to buy ice delivered in icehouses, but in large places to buy ice deliver~d at the hospitals at so much per
hundred weight; and for all other points I should advise to buy the ice put on
board the vessel where they can get it the best and cheapest, furnish their own
vessels, or have them taken up for them; let the ice be inspected and weighed by
a weigher sworn before the United States district court, and the government will
save all that the contractors make.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. 0. TIFFANY
Ron. B. F. WADE.
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Answer. I did, and was paid for the ice at the same rate.
Question. Of whom did you purchase this ice ?
Answer. I purchased some ice in New York of the Knickerbocker Ice Company. All I purchased in Boston was purchased of Daniel Draper & Sons;
in Bath, I purchased of Colonel Harding ; in Richmond, Maine, I bought of
.Allen & Maxwell, or of their agent, H. S. Hagar; and I bought some in Gardi;ner of a man by the name of Stevens-Ur. Barker Neal, who measured the ice
for me, knows his first name-I do not; and I bought some of a man named
William Sturtevant, of Richmond, though I think he had his ice at Gardiner,
or on the river; and I bought some ice of a man by the name of Carhart, but
it afterwards turned out to belong to Addison Gage & Co., of Boston. It seems
that Carhart sold it to Gage, and I paid Gage for it.
Question. Have you named all the persons of whom you bought ice 1
Answer. As far as I now remember. That amounted to a great deal of ice.
Question. Whom were you supplying with ice besides the government 1
Answer. I sent some to the Knickerbocker Ice Company, of New York ;
some to Freeman, of Newark, New Jersey; some to a man in New Brunswick,
New J ersey-I forget his name; some to Kershaw & Co., in Philadelphia,
somewhere from 4,000 to 5,000 tons; and then I sent off a lot to a man by the
name of Lloyd, who shipped it to Hilton Head and Charleston bar; I believe
he resides somewhere in Pennsylvania, but he came up from Beaufort then.
Question. Can you tell from your books the amount of ice you furnished to
each one of the parties you have named 1
Answer. I think I can.
Question. Have you your books with you 1
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Will you forward to us the amount of ice you furnished to each of
those parties 1
Answer. Yes, sir, if I can make it out. I think it would amount to about the
s ame that I sold to the government.
Q~estion. What did you pay per ton for this ice 1
Answer. All the way from $2 50 to $4 a ton.
Question. What was the lowest you paid~
Answer. I think $2 50 was the lowest; I will not be positive about that ;
but I can find out.
Question. What did you pay per ton for freight!
Answer. On an average from $3 to $3 50 to Washington. The vessels that
went to New Orleans I chartered by the month to go out and back.
Question. You paid no vessels by the ton except those that went to Washington~

Answer. No, sir; because it was a short voyage. I would pay them so
much per ton to come out, ancl. they would find their own freight back. But
there was so little freight to come back from New Orleans that I had to charter
the vessels by the month out and back, or else pay so much for freight per ton
that I would rather run the risk of getting freight back.
Question. Did you ship any ice to Pensacola?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know what was done with the ice you shipped there 1
Answer. One of the vessels.1 after she arrived there, was ordered to go to New
Orleans and discharge her ice there. Another vessel discharged her ice at Pensacola.
Question. Do you know: what was done with the ice discharged at Pensacola 1
Answer. I do not; they did not order me to put up any ice-house there. I
sent the ice down there, and I und.erstood that they,put it in Fort Pickens; but
I do not know.
Part v--7

98

ICE CONTRACTS.

Question. Are you interested in any ice contracts with the government now 7
Answer. I have no contracts for ice with· the government now.
Question. Are you interested in any contracts that other people have 1
Answer. Mr. Hull asked me to furnish him some ice to be sent to Aimapolis.
He wanted to make a bid; and I agreed to furnish him ice at so much per ton.
Question. When you were delivering ice in Washington, did you deliver it at
any other places, or to any other parties than the hospitals 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. rro whom t
Answer. To several parties; I sent some to Mr. Smith; s.ome to Dr. Abbott's
place; some to the officers in the War Department; and, I believe, I sent some
to parties connected with Riggs & Co., bankers; only a few tons altogether.
Question. What ice was it you sent to Riggs & Co. 1
Answer. I made a request that I might be allowed to have 25 tons of ice,
which should be deducted from the bill of lading, that I might have it to 1;1se
as I wished, and the request was granted by the department, and I sent it
around to those parties.
Question. What was this ice sent for-as a matter of business, or a.s a
present?
Answer. I never charged them anything for the ice; there was no understanding about its being a pr,esent or anything of the kind. I do not know
whether I sent any to the Surgeon General or not. I know the parties in the
medical department all insisted that they should pay for the ice. I think I
asked to have the control of 25 tons; I am not positive about the amount.
Question. That is, you were to take 25 tons, and have it deducted from
your bil11
Answer. Yes, sir; and for which the government never paid me.
Question. You have no knowledge of the amount of ice actually delivered at
any of the points to which you shipped it 1
Answer. No, sir; because I never heard of any of it being weighed after
delivery. It was a matter they could do just as they chose about. I sh.ould not
have objected to having the ice weighed at all. I know what I sent.
Question. Do you know what would be a fair percentage for wastage 1
Answer. There is a great deal of difference about that. I have sent ice down
to Matanzas, and when it got there and was unloaded, even the sap of the ice·
was not melted off. Then again, I have sent ice which wasted very much. It
depends a great deal upon the temperature of the water, the heat of the sun,
and the time of the year; in summer time it wastes the most, of course. It
wasted more last summer than I ever knew it before.
Question. How much per cent. do you think it wasted last year in shipping it
to Washington 1
Answer. I do not know what it · wasted. We protected it pretty well by
putting lumber and hay on as a deck load. I should think it came very we1l; it
looked pretty well when it was opened. I got some of the persons here to inspect some vessels, for I wanted them to be satisfied that the ice they were
getting was good. I suppose it was all good. I agreed to furnish them first
quality ice, and I did send them last year the best ice in the United States. I
do not believe there was ever any better ice cut than I sent.
Question. If I have understood you correctly, you have stated that the government can supply itself with ice more economically by purchasing it from
the dealers in the neighborhood, if they got it at reasonable rates, than by shipping it and storing it for themselves 1
Answer. l!"or this reason, yes, sir; that the parties the government have to
t~ke care of the ice know so little about it that the wastage amounts to a great
neal more than the difference in price;.-and my opinion •now is, that if the gov-
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ernment had taken their ice from Mr. Godey, at $13 a ton, they would have
got it a little cheaper than it turned out as they got it from me. But, as a
general thing, I think, if they had gone out into the market and bought it, instead of from Mr. Godey or me, it would have cost them more, for ice went up very
high last season. I sold it at my ice-house for the same price that I delivered
it here. I think, at the same time, the government can do better to have their
ice supplied from the dealers, in the large places where there are dealers.
Where there are no regular dealers, I think the government should buy their
own ice at so much a ton on board the vessel, load it for themselves, and attend
to it for themselves. I offered to supply the government this year at so much
a ton, put on board vessels, paying a government weigher five cents per ton f01r
weighing it; I would do that for $1 75 per ton, and I would then have made
more money than by any other contract.
Question. At what place did you propose to load it in that way 1
Answer. At Richmond, Maine.
Statement
Date.

Name of vessel.

1863.
April 1
11

13
17
18
28

29
Mar. 24
May 23

29
June 1
3
3

3
5
6
6

8·
10
20
30
30
Aug.ll
13

13
13

13
22
23

rif ice sl~ipped to government.
Destination.

Registered Tons ice.
tonnage.

503
447
Schr. Rgbert Caldwell ...••... New Orleans ......•••• :
455
445
Schr. Queen of the South ..•...... do..................
Ship Lisbon ...••••......••...... do..................
502t~
496HMt
Bark Scotland ...••••.... ··-- .... do ....•......... ··-384
38¥o-6-&
515
Ship Flora Southard...... . • . . Pensacola _... . . . . • . • . . .
524
328
Brig Stephen Duncan, •...... New Orleans...........
287
513
BarkArgean ...•.........•...... do..................
450
420
Ship Clara Ann- ............ - Pensacola _. • . . . . . . . . . .
469~~il~
140
Schr. Richmond ..•.•..... -.. Washington ...•••.•....•....••• _
265
Brig Abbott Lawrence_. . . • • • . . ... do...... . . . . • . . . . . . .
200
Schr. T. C. Barlette .••...... _ .... do ........• _.........•• _...•..
127-H118
Schr. Golden Rod ................ do .......••.••..•••..••••.•••.
Schr. Exeter .. - •...•••••• - ••..•.. do ...••..••••..•.•...•.•. __ • _.
148
Schr. October ........... --- ..... do .. _...... __ ............. __ •.
156
368
Brig Almon Rowell ...••.• --. Key West. ...•....• _...
280
Brig Whitaker . . . • • . . . . . . . . . Washington . . • • • • . • . . . . .....•••.
262
Schr. Olivia Buxton ...........•.. do ....••.•.....••••....••••••.
130
230
Schr. Martha .......•.•..••...... do ....•.........•.........•••.
257
Schr. Hudson .. " ........••...... do ...............••....•..•.•.
Schr. Matilda .................... do ........••...••....•....•••.
355:lr
Schr. L. F. Smith ..••.....•...... do .............••••.........•.
372
Ship May Flower.... . . . • . . . . New Orleans . _.••.. _•. _ _•......•. 1 233
Schr. Mary Ella ............. Washington...........
210
'186¥o-{t%
Brig Isadora .................... do ......•...••..........•...•.
264
Brig Forrester ..••••.....•....... do ..•••........•.....•.....•..
180"2'Qo.i.o7o
Schr. Jennie Morton .............. do ........................... _
413
Schr. H. N. Parnham ............ do..................
302
325
Schr. Thomas Martin ........... __ do.... . .. . . .. . . • • • ..
· 145
176
Ship Lisbon................. New Orleans .• . .. .• • • . .
502n
464
Total...... • • . • . . . . . • • • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • • . • . • . • . • . . . . • • • • • . . . 9, 888:i-Jl-cfo

RICHMOND, February 23, 1864.
SIR : Above you have the class, name, and destination of the vessels, with the
registRred tonnage of those had on charter-party. Those not having registered
tonnage marked were taken on rates, or so much per ton, for amount actually put
on board, voyage to Washington bein'g too short to take vessels by the month,
and there being no return freights from Washington. The ship May Flower
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was sent out to a market, but the government wanted it, in fact took it, although
ice was bringing fifty dollars per ton in New Orleans at that time. The ship
registers about 1,000 tons, but I only took the hold for ten thousand dollars out
to New Orleans; but the owner, James Hagar, swore upon a suit that she carried
1,500 tons, and was under-registered, as is the case with most vessels. rrhe ice
for New Orleans was loaded mostly in New York by the Knickerbocker Ice
Company; the Scotland and Lisbon in Boston by D. Draper & Sons. The
balance was loaded on the Kennebec river in Maine, and from ice I bought by
the house-full, and also put up myself, I paying for what I bought by the bill
of lading; the ice put in being weighed or measured by a regularly appointed
weigher. r.l'he government sent no one to inspect the loading that I know of;
but I took the medical director, Dr. R. 0. Abbott, to see some cargoes examined
and opened, with which he was satisfied. The ice was of the very first quality.
I do not think it the best plan for the government to buy ice delivered in icehouses, but in large places to buy ice delivered at the hospitals at so much per
hundred weight; and for all other points I should advise to buy the ice put on
board the vessel where they can get it the best and cheapest, furnish their own
vessels, or have them taken up for them; let the ice be inspected and weighed by
a weigher sworn before the United States district court, and the government will
save all that the contractors make.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. C. TIFF ANY

Ron. B. F.

WADE.

ROSECRANS'S CAMPAIGNS.
IN TilE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, February 6, 1865.
On motion of Mr. GARFIELD.
Resolved, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be directed to make a fu ll investigation and report upon the military campaigns of Major General vV. S. R osecrans, from
the beginning of his service in Western Virginia to the conclusion of his recent campaign in
Missomi.
Attest:
EDWARD McPHERSON, Clerk.

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1865.
Major General W. S. RosECRANS sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your present rank and position in the army, and what
positions have you held in the army since the commencement of the rebellion ?
Answer. My firet military service in this war was as volunteer engineer and
acting aide-de-camp to G eneral McClellan, during which I laid out camp Dennison and visited Philadelphia to examine Justus's arm factory, and Washington
to urge that prompt provision be made for paying and clothing our Ohio troops,
many of the officers and men, from leaving home so promptly, being in great
destitution.
On my return from Washington I found awaiting me a commission as chief
engineer of the State of Ohio, under a special law then recently passed authorizing such an officer, with the rank, pay and emoluments of a United States
colonel of engineers.
I accepted, but explained to Governor Dennison that this office would keep
me fi·om active service at a time when my military training and information
would be of great service to our noble young men who were flying to arms and
would be subjected to numberless hardships and hazards arising solely from
ignorance and inexperience in the military service.
A few days after he sent me a commission as colonel of the 23d Ohio volunteer infantry, which I accepted, and repairing to Columbus, reported for duty
as commandant of the encampment of three years' volunteers, which I named
Camp Chase, and commanded until I was surprised by the receipt of an appointment, dated May 16, 1861, as brigadier general in the regular army; and almost
immediately thereafter of an order from General McClellan to report to him at
Cincinnati for further orders.
On my arrival in Cincinnati I found I was to accompany him into Western
Virginia, into which, after the defeat and dispersion of the rebels under Porterfield, at Philippi, General Robert S. Garnett had entered for the purpose of
teaching the loyal Union men proper deference to the will of their liege masters, .
the slaveholders, east of the Blue Ridge.
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I served in this grade long after colonels had been promoted to major generals
for camp service; and finally, the day after the l>attle of Iuka received au
appointment of major general of volunteers, to rank from the 16th day of September, 1862, the date of which was subsequently changed to March 21,
1862, probably to avoid the inconvenience in placing me in command of Buell's
army, in which were major generals of senior rank.
In this grade I have since served.
Question. You have read the resolution of the House of Representatives,
directing inquiry in relation to your campaigns. Will you give the committee a
statement embracing all that you may deem essential to a full understanding of
the subject-matter contained in the resolution 7
Answer. In reply to this interrogatory, I shall endeavor to narrate. from
memory, the principal events of my campaigns, referring as far as possible to
my official reports and correspondence with the general-in-chief and War Department for details, and omitting what is purely personal, or belongs to private
memoirs, so that my narrative, with those official documents, will give the narrative of those military movements with which I have been directly connected.
1!-,or clearness and convenience I will refer to my letter of April 5 to your
chairman, for the names of persons whose testimony would be likely to be
valuable in ascertaining the truth, and will quote or indicate what papers ought
to be before the committee for consideration and made a part of my testimony.
I now proceed to my campaigns.
Of the campaign in Western Virginia in 1861, I have to state that as soon as
Garnett entered West Virginia he moved, with his main column, to Laurel Hill,
011 the Beverly and Webster road, 17 miles north of Beverly ; while General
Pegram, with a considerable column-seizing the pass over Rich mountain, on
the Beverly and Ripley turnpike-covered Garnett's communications, with his
base at Staunton.
General McClellan, having ordered General Morris with all his available
force to confront Garnett, moved from Camp Dennison to Parkersburg 22d
June, 1861, whm·e be assembled three small brigades and two batteries. I was
ordered to accompany him, and at Parkersburg placed in command of a provisional brigade, consisting of the Sth and lOth Indiana and the 17th and 19th
Ohio volunteer infantry, three months' service. l\Ioving .1\IcCook's and
Schleick's brigades to GrJ.fton, he left me in command at Parkersburg, whence,
under his orders, I moved to Clarksburg on the 28th, and immediately advanced
to Duncan's farm, 15 miles distant on the road to Buckhannon, where I encamped and reported for orders.
General McClellan having determined that General Morris should watch the
motions of Garnett, while he, with the remainder of his available force, should
move by the way of Buckhannon and Rich mountain to Beverly, permitted me
to occupy Buckhannon, which I did by a night march; and on my arrival
found, contrary to our information and belief, that the citizens were mainly
loyal, and that the place had never been in the hands of the enemy for more
than a few hours.
As soon as General l\fcClel1an's troops had concentrated at this point and his
supplies came up, he moved, reaching Roaring creek, at the foot of the western
slope of Rich mountain, about 3 o'clock p_. m. of the second day, where the
command went into camp in a drenching rain. Reconnoitring the enemy, he
was found posted in a strong natural position on the turnpike near the foot of
the mountain-his right covered by an almost impenetrable laurel thicket-his
left resting high up on the spur of the mountain, and his front defended by a
log breast-work, in front of which was an abatis of fallen timber. As the
second in rank, the command of the camp devolved on me, and my first duty
was to know the locality. I soon learned that a young man named Hart, whose
father kept a tavern in the gap at the top of Rich mountain, was loyal, and had
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been seen in our camp ; and that, having herded cattle, he knew the mountains
thoroughly, which fact I reported to Lieutenant Poe, chief engineer at General
McClellan's headquarters, suggesting that search should be made for this young
man and his information obtained.
On the 9th July, General McClellan, having completed his preparations,
ordered a reconnaissance in force, which was made by McCook's brigade, supported by my own, and resulted in disclosing the great strength of the enemy's
position without ascertaining his numbers. On returning from this reconnaissance, General McClellan directed me to occupy the front with my brigade,
which was to lead in the attack he intended to make the next morning. Having made the necessary dispositions, on returning to my tent an offic,er of my
command informed me that he had found young Hart. Being brought to my
tent, the young man informed me that the enemy's camp was 2i miles west of
his father's house at the top of the mountain, where they had their hospital and
commissary stores ; that it was possible to reach the top of the mountain by a
circuitous route through the for:est around the enemy's left to a point within a
mile and a half of the gap, whence there was a practicable sled and cart road to
his father's house. He stated he had no doubt he could conduct a body of
troops to this point, even in the night, but that they could not take with them
any artillery. I immediately repaired to the tent of General McClellan with
this information, showed him a sketch, and explained it. I then asked him if
he desired to see young Hart, and at his request brought the young man to his
tent, where the general questioned him very carefully. I then sent Hart to
my tent to await orders, and said to the general : "Now, general, if you will
allow me to take my brigade I will take this guide and, by a night's mareh,
surprise the enemy at the gap, get possession of it, and thus hold his only line
of retreat. You can then take him on the front. If he gives way we shall
have him; if he fights obstinately I will leave a portion of the force at the gap
and with the remainder fall upon his rear." Colonel Marcy, chief of staff, at
once fell in with my suggestion, and the general, after an hour's deliberation,
assented, stating that as one of my regiments (the 17th Ohio) was absent, he
would give me the 13th Indiana, Colonel Jeremiah Sullivan; and then inquired
about what time I thought I could reach the point, which was a matter of importance to know, so as to time his attack. I said I supposed I might be able
to reach it by 10 o'clock on the morning of the lOth, and that I thought he
could safely begin his attack on that supposition. But it was finally decided
that, as unforeseen obstacles might arise to retard the time of my reaching the
gap, I should take Burdsall's cavalry and send a message back every ten
minutes, reporting progress, while he was to hold his troops in readiness to
commence the attack the moment he heard the noise of my firing. I then gave
him the following as my proposed arrangement: "The troops to be formed in
front of his quarters at 3 o'clock in the morning, and to enter the forest at the
front line of our pickets at daylight with one day's rations." To this arrangement he assented, and an invitation to Colonel Lauder to accompany me completed the programme.
The troops entered the forest in the morning in a terrible rain-storm. As it
was now daylight, and the enemy might discover 9ur movements, on consultation with the guide and Colonel Lander, who accompanied him, it was deemed
best to incline much further to the right than had been at first intended, which
lengthened the route. At 11 a. m., weary and wet, the column halted on the
brink of a deep valley, the opposite side of which was the last ascent, except a
small one, before reaching the road that would bring us to an open wood with
a gentle descent three-quarters of a mile to the object of our march. From thi::;
point I despatched to General McClellan stating this fact, and that, owing to
the excessive roughness of the road, almost impassable for horses, and to the
fatigue of the animals, I should not send another despatch until I had some-
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thing of importance to communicate. Down through this gorge, and toHing
slowly up the opposite ascent, the head of the column arrived at, within a short
distance of the top of the mountain, a cleared field, after eleven hours' marching,
at about 1 p.m., where, halting, the men were directed to rest and lunch, while,
with the guide and Colonel Lander, I reconnoitred our position.
'ro the east, though apparently near our feet, though seven miles distant, lay
Beverly. Cavalry horses were hitched in the streets; the end of a tented encampment appeared on the right, partly hidden by the mountain; wagons were
passing, all indicating the presence of a considerable force in Beverly. Beyond
the depression in the open ground in front of us was a low wooded crest which
we had to ascend, and thence it was but a short mile to Hart's tavern. At two
o'clock the column, closed in mass, was moved noiselessly and swiftly across the
open ground into the edge of the forest, and thence, after some difficulty in
finding the way, wound up the hill to the top of the crest, which it reached
about half past two o'clock, in a terrific shower, and was fired upon by the
enemy's advanced guard. The lOth Indiana rapidly advanced, inclining to the
right, along the crest of a steep declivity overlooking the Beverly road, halted
and formed in line of battle just out of range of the enemy's musketry. The
8th Indiana, under my orders, halted in column, while the 13th Indiana, following the lOth, formed on its left and occupied a spur of the mountain covered
by a thicket overlooking the field in front of the enemy's position. The 19th
Ohio halting faced towards the enemy's encampment in the direction of which
lay a broad well-trodden way.
The enemy, posted behind log breastworks nearly parallel to the road, opened
upon us with artillery from a point on each of his flanks, while the sharpshooters occupied the line of fence in front of his position. Owing to a mistake
in its movements the 13th Indiana took forty minutes to get into the proper
position and to occupy the thicket in front of our left; so that it was forty
minutes after three o'clock before our line of battle was ready to advance. All
this time the enemy was firing on us with his artillery, which, however, did us
but little damage, most of the shots going over the heads of the troops, while
we could do nothing but annoy them by our skirmishers. When the line was
ready to move, I brought down the 8th Indiana, and directed it, taking advantage
of the cover on the right of our line, to make its way to and capture the artillery
on the enemy's left. By mistake Colonel Benton took the direction of the
centre. He was then directed to take advantage of a roll in the ground and
charge another gun of the enemy's towards our left. Misunderstanding this, he
passed through an interval between the wings of the lOth, and began deploying
in front of its left. I directed him to remain in that position, and the colonel
of the lOth to form his left wing in column on the Jeft platoon, and be ready to
charge the enemy's line in due time. The whole line advanced. Colonel
Sullivan had been ordered to take a portion of the 13th, which had remained in
column for want of space, and moving around on the left of the field, to charge
the enemy's battery on the right. Comprehending the rawness of our troop;::,
and desirous of putting an end to the artillery fire as soon as possible, I placed
myself at the head of this charging column of the 13th Indiana and urged it
forwat d at a double-quick. Colonel Sam Beatty, of the 19th Ohio, conforming
the movement of his command to that of our advancing line, took advantage of
the first opening to form half of his regiment in line of battle, and delivered a
terrific volley opportunely-just as the charging column of the 13th had got
within about a hundred yards of the enemy's breastworks. At this the enemy
began to waver. A second volley from the 19th threw him into confusion,
whereon our whole line, charging with a terrific shout, leaped the enen'ly's breastworks and pursued his fugitive army into the woods. The battle was over.
The enemy's dead and wounded covered the ground. 'l'wo pieces, the only
artillery he had, fell into our hands. Flushed with success, our troops scattered
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very much through the woods, and it became a matter of critical importance to
reassemble them without delay. This was substantially accomplished by a
little after six o'clock. While the troops were reassembling, a quartermaster of
the 44th Virginia was captured down the road towards Beverly, who rep0rted
that his regiment had reached a point within three-quarters of a mile of the battle,
but did not dare to come up. rl'his, and what had been seen from the top of
the mountain, made it evident that our position was an isolated point between
the rebel intrenched camp on the west and another force of unknown strength
in the vicinity of Beverly. No firing was heard in the direction of the intrenched camp. No attack had therefore been made by General McClellan.
There was no assurance of succor from that quarter; nothing to prevent the
enemy taking his measures to overwhelm us without the possibility of prevention
from our main body. vVhat was to be done 1 We could not go to Beverly, for
we were already separated from our command by the enemy, whose strength
had been stated to me by - - - and McC. as probably from 5,000 to 8,000
men. It was too late to undertake an advance on the enemy's camp, distant
nearly three miles of a road skirted by almost impenetrable thickets of underbrush. In this emergency Captain Conklin was detailed to take charge of the
captured pieces of artillery, and the troops were placed in position to prevent a
surprise and to defend themselves from attack coming either from the enemy's
camp or from Beverly. By the time these dispositions were made it was dark.
Meanwhile a messenger had been sought among our cavalry, and none could be
found who would undertake to carry word to General McClellan. The night
was dark, cold, and rainy. The wounded of both sides filled all the outhouses,
and were huddled together in a tavern; in fact, every building was used to keep
them from the inclemency of the weather. The troops turned out six times
during the night, on account of the picket firing on the front, expecting an attack
of the enemy. At three o'clock in the morning a prisoner was brought in, from
whose answers I inferred that the enemy were attempting to evacuate, and
accordingly made disposition to move on them at daylight, which wa$ done.
On reaching the enemy's camp our advance discovered a white flag, and soon
it was surrendered with all that remained of Pegram's force, about a hundred
ancl seventy men, with all their artillery, transportation, camp and garrison
equipage, and quartermaster's stores. Pegram, with the remainder of his force,
had escaped during the night to the north of us with the intention of r~aching
General Garnett; but the news of the capture of the gap, which had been carried
to Beverly by the 44th Virginia, was despatched that night to Garnett, whose
position was, as I have before stated, seventeen miles north of Beverly. General
Morris was in his front to prevent his advance, and he could retreat only by
Beverly on the turnpike, or take an inferior road in a northeast direction through
a rough country down Cheat river and strike the northwest Virginia turnpike,
which leads from Clarksburg to Winchester, near the Maryland line. He chose
the latter, apprehensive that he would be intercepted by our force corning over
Rich mountain. On the next morning, at seven o'clock, General Morris began
to pursue him. This movement cut off the retreat of Pegram, who sent in a
flag of truce and surrendered to General McClellan, who, on the morning of the
11th, as soon as he had learned of the capture of the rebel camp, marched
through it to Beverly, and thence followed the 44th Virginia, and whatever other
rebels had retreated by the turnpike, towards Staunton, continuing the pursuit
to the top of Cheat mountain.
The committee will remember that General Morris overtook the rear guard at
Carrick's ford, where, during a sharp skirmish, Garnett fell, and his troops, continuing their retreat, fina1ly escaped to Winchester. Thus, by the capture of the
gap at Rich mountain, the keystone was knocked from the rebel arch of defence,
ancl they were driven from Western Virginia.
I forbear to take notice of the various reports and statements concerning this
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battle which have been privately and publicly circulated. The committee will
find the facts here stated substantially in my official report, which is of that of
the four rt>gimental commanders who accompanied me in that expeditionColonel Jerry Sullivan, 13th Indiana, now brigadier; Colonel Samuel Beatty,
19th Ohio, now brigadier; Colonel Benton, 8th Indiana, now brigadier; and
Colonel (afterwards brigadier general) Manson, and is hereby made a part of my
testimony.
As no explanation was ever, to my knowledge, given for the failure of our
main force to attack the enemy on the lOth, it is proper to say that while we
were seizing the gap, not only was the firing of the enemy's artillery heard, but
the musketry and cheers of our own men in the final charge on the enemy's line
were heard by the men in the camp, a mile and a half in reaT of our main
force.
It should also be added, that so strong was the impression that our column
had met with disaster in the conflict at the g·ap, that General McClellan sent his
chief of staff from the front ba<.:k to the camp to arm all the teamsters, lest the
enemy, after having destroyed my brigade, should fall upon and cut the main
body to pieces.
As it is probably known to some members of the committee that sundry reports of this battle, at variance in many material points with its true history as
here given, were in circulation in Washington cluing the latter end of 1861
and the early part of 1862, I have been careful to enter into details, giving all
the facts of importance in relation to the actions of the general commanding,
his staff officers, and those "who served with me in the affair.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Do you know any reason why General McClellan did not make an
attack, with the force immediately under him, in his front, as was contemplated
when you left him 1
Answer. I know of no reason why he did not, and of no reason why he should
not have done so.
Question. If he had made that attack, as was contemplated between you and
him, in your opinion what would have been the result 1
Answer. The enemy, having made no attack on his front, had despatched to
the gap one half of his artillery and a considerable force in addition to that
usually stationed there. 'l'he probabilities are that, had the attack in front been
made, we should have beaten the enemy and destroyed or captured nearly his
entire force that day, instead of allowing them to run away through the woods,
individually or in squads, during the night subsequent to the capture of the
gap, as they did. At all events General McClellan was bound, as a military
man, to have made the attack in his front, for the purpose of preventing the
enemy from falling on m~ with too heavy a force.
Question. Do you know whether General McClellan has ever assigned any
reason why he did not make the attack, as contemplated between you and him 1
Answer. The only reason I have ever seen assigned is contained in his official
report, published as a campaign document, and prefaced by the remark that he
had not, until recently, had in his possession the necessary papers to enable
him to write a report of the campaign of Western Virginia. In that report he
says:
"About half past two the firing which we had heard in the direction of thg
gap, and which apparently receded, ceased. Shortly afterwards an officer appeared in the rebel camp and made a speech. We could not hear the words, but
from the cheers which followed many supposed it had fared badly with our detachment. Immediately ordered roads to be cut and guns got into position,
intending to open the next morning, in order to relieve Rosecrans."
I am quoting from memory and may not give the words exactly, but I give the
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substance. General McClellan adds that he was delayed by accidents the next
morning in opening, until the arrival of a messenger announcing the capture of
the rebel camp. r.rhis is all I have ever seen or heard from him in reference to
the matter.
Question. If he had supposed that the enemy was getting the better of you,
why should he have delayed until the next morning before commencing the
attack 1
Answer. Such a mode of relieving me was the surest way to enable the
enemy to destroy me. The only sure relief he could have given would have
been to attack the enemy the instant he heard the first firing.
Question. I understand you to say you expected to reach the top of the
mountain by 10 o'clock in the morning. In reality you did not arrive there
until half past two o'clock in the afternoon. Why was that1
Answer. In reply to General McClellan's question about what time I thought
I could reach the top of the mountain I stated that I thought 10 o'clock would
be the latest. That was on the supposition that I should start as soon as
possible after our then conversation. But, as I have already stated, it was, on
the suggestion of General McClellan, determined that the head of the column
should not quit the main road and enter the forest at our front picket line until
daylight. A further cause of delay, which has been stated, was this: that,
owing to the fact that we were undertaking this march mainly in the day-time,
General Lander thought, on consultation with the guide, and I decided, that it
would be wiser to take a more circuitous route, passing further from the enemy.
This lengthened our march, making it over ten hours.
Question. How far distant from you were General McClellan and the main
body of our army at the time you were engaged with the enemy 1
Answer. In a straight line it was probably two miles; by road it was two
and three-quarter miles to the rebellineil, and our troops were formed in line of
battle in front of the rebel lines just out of the range of their fire.
Question. When he must have known from the sound of your guns, if in no
other way, when you commenced your attack upon the enemy and the continuance of the fight?
Answer. Certainly.
Question. How many men had General McClellan under his command, including the force which accompanied you 1
Answer. I do not know exactly, but believe at least between 6,000 and 7,000
effective men.
Question. How many men did you. take with you when you made your
movement to the top of the mountain 1
Answer. Either 1, 7 43 or 1,843 ; I forget which. 1\rfy official report shows
the number, and is made a part of my testimony.
On the 23d July, a gloomy, rainy day, I went to the tent of General McClellan, who read to me a despatch in nearly these words :
"We have been badly beaten; our army is in full retreat-a most wonderful
transformation of a well-appointed army into a rabble.
"WINFIELD SCOTT."
General McClellan then informed me that General Scott had ordered him to
Washington, directing him to turn over the command of his department to me.
Question. How many troops were there in the army of West Virginia at the
time General McClellan was called toW ashington and you were placed in command, and what was their condition 1
·
Answer. There were ten regiments of three-years troops in West Virginia,
east of the Kanawha valley. They were newly raised, and as a matter of
course without drill or experience. There was one battalion of cavalry and
two batteries of artillery, one of them mountain howitzers, manned by regulars.
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The strength of those regiments would average about eight hundred men. In the
Kanawha valley there were about 2, 700 men under General Cox. In all there
were probably 11,000 men scattered all over West Virginia.
The gloom of our late disaster was made deeper to me by the announcement
of this new and weighty responsibility which devolved on me. Imagination
pictured the swift and fierce pursuit of our helpless fugitives from Bull Run,
and the ferocious triumph of the enemies of our government. It was evident
to me that Western Virginia would soon feel the effects of their activity, to
meet which we then had but ten regiments of three-years men east of the Ka. nawha, the services of the three-months men having already expired or being
about to expire. General McClellan left me a memorandum of what he had
proposed to enable the troops to hold, acting on the defensive, Western Virginia. The main points of defence were to fortify and hold Gauley pass from the
Kanawha valley towards Lewisburg, Cheat Mountain pass, on the Beverly and
Staunton road, and Red House pass, on the north western Virginia turnpike, leading from Clarksburg to Winchester. I accompanied him to Grafton, and during
the ride he spoke appreciatingly of the difficult task devolved on me of defending a mountain country like this, where my troops must be scattered and isolated
from each other, and promised to send me as many instructed staff officers as
possible . I immec1iately addressed myself to the task of meeting the anticipated
corning invasion of the rebels. General Cox was instructed to proceed to the
north of Gauley and fortify that pass. To Brigadier General J. J. Reynolds
was confided the defence of the Cheat Mountain;ass, which included that of
the road leading from Huttonsville to Lewisburg, which was closed by a line of
field-works at a place called Elkwater, a few miles south of Huttonsville.
Colonel Lorin Andrews, with three and a half regiments, was posted on the
northwestern Virginia turnpike, near the point where it crossed the north branch
of the Potomac, where, under the direction of Captain Merrill, of the engineers,
he threw up some field-works.
Soon the news oozed through every pore of society that, acting on the defensive in front of Washing~on, the rebels intended to make an offensive campaign
to recover possession of Western Virginia ; that to General Lee was to be confided the accomplishment of this work. Dismay and alarm pervaded the State,
even reached Washington, and came to me in friendly warnings from more than
one of the departments of the government. Nor was it long before these
rumors received confirmation. General Lee, appearing in General Reynolds's
front with a flag of truce, proposed the exchange of some of our men captured
at Bull Run for the prisoners of war .captured by us at Rich mountain and
Beverly and paroled by order of General Scott. A heavy force appeared
menacing us in front at Cheat mountain, while another column, coming from
Warm Springs by the way of Huntersville, appeared in front of Elkwater.
Meanwhile General Cox, from the Kanawha valley, informed me that while
General Wise was advancing on his position at the mouth of the Gauley by the
Lewisburg and Kanawha turnpike with a force variously estimated at from five
to eight thousand men, he had information that General Floyd with another
column was l'ldvancing from Lewisburg with the intention of crossing Gauley
above him, and either attacking our depots at Weston and Clarksburg, or
making his rear on the Kanawha river in the vicinity of Charlestown.
I at once despatched General Cox instructions to remove his sick and ail
public property, not absolutely necessary, from the valley, and if compelled to
leave, to retire fighting towards the northwestern Virginia railroad, with a view to
concentration, in case of necessity, with General Reynolds and other troops
further east. The post at New Creek station was turned over to Colonel Biddle,
of General Burk's command, and that on the northwest road stripped of all save
a nominal force to re-enforce General Reynolds.
'I'he governor of Ohio, at this time apprehending disaster to us, sent us the
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28th, 47th, _and 30th, raw regiments of three-years troops. I also assembled
all the troops that could be spared, seven regiments and a half, three of which
had just received their arms, and marched from Clarksburg, by way of Weston,
Bulltown, and Sutton, to meet General Floyd, who, having crossed Gauley, had
attacked and overwhelmed Colonel Tyler, of the 7th Ohio, at Cross Lanes, a
distance from Clarksburg of 117 miles and about 20 miles above General Cox's
position at the mouth of the Gauley.
Our column crossing Big Birch mountain on the lOth September, 1861, encamped at its foot, ten miles above Somerville, on the ground from which we
had driven Floyd's outposts. Here the citizens reported that Floyd, with from
15,000 to 20,000 men, was encamped below Somerville, near Cross Lanes, on
the north side of the Gauley. We could not stop to count numbers. Our only
alternatives were to fight and whip or pass him and unite with General Cox.
Accordingly at 3 o'clock the next morning our column began to move, and by
1 o'clock p. m., after a march of fifteen miles, halted two miles from the enemy's
intrenched position, having thus far had only a little skirmishing. While
resting, cavalry, of which we had but two companies, and staff began to recou
noitre. Firing between the enemy's advanced guard and the head of our
column soon followed, and by half past two o'clock Colonel Lytle was in the
camp of the rebel Colonel Reynolds, who had retreated into the thick forest,
the entrance to which, marked with numerous paths leading from to the rear,
satisfied me that the citizens' reports of the enemy being intrenched were
probably correct. I therefore directed the leading brigade, (Benham's,) con(listing of three of my best regiments, to advance cautiously, but firmly, and to
teel the enemy's position. Unfortunately, its commander, excited and impressed
with the idea that the enemy was retreating, though emphatically cautioned to
beware of masked batteries, advanced through the forest, without deploying
skirmishers, until the head of the column emerged in front of an intrenched line,
and a battery of seven or eight pieces behind a parapet, where it received a terrific
artillery and musketry fire, which brought it to a stand. This sudden and
fierce fire caused the c0mmander to send for re-enforcements and artillery. Despatching orders for the other four regiments to follow and halt at the edge of
the woods, I proceeded to the front and reconnoitred to the enemy's position.
l\feanwhile Colonel Robert McCook, whose brigade followed next, sent a portion of the 9th Ohio to our right, ·where it also drew the enemy's artillery, accompanied by heavy volleys of musketry. His line was found to extend across
a bend in the Gauley river, its flanks resting upon almost inaccessible precipices
five or six hundred feet above the Gauley. I now prepared for the assault,
and to that end sent Colonel W. S. Smith, with the 13th Ohio, supported by
the 28th Ohio, under Colonel Mohr, to our left, where he reported he could find
cover from the enemy's musketry until within about fifty yards of his flank,
whence he thought he could ascend to the height on which their breastworks
were built, and, by a sudden rush, take them. It was sunset before the fier~e
firing at that point indicated that Smith's column wa~ at work. Meanwhile
ColonellVIcCook had formed the 9th and 47th Ohio as a storming column, to be
supported by the lOth Ohio, to attack the battery on the enemy's centre. The
troops were much jaded, and to inspire them with spirit I told them I would
lead them myself. At this time the firing on our left receded, showing our attack there had not succeeded. It was also dusk, and an officer brought the
report that our column, under Colonel Smith, had found it impracticable in the
darkness and depth of the ravine to accomplish its work. It therefore became
necessary to defer the attack until morning. ':l'aking good care to leave the
impression that we were immediately in their front, and ready for the attack,
the troops were quietly and carefully withdrawn to a good position, just out
of reach of the enemy's fire, where, exhausted with the marching and fighting
of the day, they lay down on their arms. At five o'clock next morning Colonel
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Ewiug, from the advance, brought in a contraband, who stated that during the
night the enemy had withdrawn across the Gauley, destroyed the foot-bridge
and sent the ferry-boats over the falls, leaving only a small portion of his troops
on the north side. Orders were immediately given to advance, and Colonel
Ewing took possession of the camp and the few prisoners he could find skulking
through the woods unable to make their escape. Orders were immediately
given to drive the enemy from the opposite side of the river, and hold the ferry,
which, under General Benham, was to be put in condition for crossing our troops
as rapidly as possible. The Gauley, for a distance of nearly twenty-five miles,
rushes through a chasm cut in the rocks from five to eight hundred feet deep,
with precipitous sides, the current, except at a very few places, being two swift
to cross, even with a skift. Carnifex ferry, at the mouth of Meadow river, a
southern tributary of the Gauley, is a level reach about two hundred and fifty
yards long and one hundred and twenty-five yards wide, above and below
which the water dashes over the rocks white with foam. The descent from
the north side is by a winding road about a mile and a half in length from the
line of the enemy's intrenchment. It was extremely difficult to obtain materials,
and it took twelve days to replace the ferry-boats the enemy had destroyed.
Meanwhile General Cox, from the mouth of the Gauley, despatched that after
Wise had skirmished heavily with his advanced guard, he retired towards
Lewisbur~, and that he, General Cox, should cross the Gauley in pursuit.
I replied that he should advance carefully, until we could get the means to cross
and join him. He obeyed the instructions, and so soon as a single small ferryboat was ready, General McCook, with two and a half regiments, by working
night and day for forty-eight hours, crossefi and joined hirn at the head of the
Sunday road. It was also our misfortune to have been compelled to move so
light that our ammunition and provisions were both nearly exhausted, and the
trains to replenish them, which had been directed to follow us, were so delayed
by the terrible rains which set in the night after the battle that they did not
reach us for nine days thereafter. And the country was unable to supply us,
which would have so long delayed, even had we not been hindered by want of
means of crossing the Gauley. 'rhe enemy having retreated towards Lewisburg, General Cox followed him, taking possession of one or two lines of intrenchments on his way, and reaching the top of Mount Sewell, where I joined
him on the 28th, leaving orders for the remainder of my troops to follow as
rapidly as possible. It was pending this movement, when General Lee, learning
that I was marching to attack Floyd, attempted to force Reynolds from his
position at Cheat mountain, but was badly beaten. From that time he seemed
to be in observation, awaiting the result of the operations under Floyd and
Wise. General Reynolds, with rare intelligence and sagacity, kept him perpetually harassed, until finally the battle of Carnifex ended the enemy's operations in the Kanawha valley.
General Lee next determined to concentrate all his forces on the Lewisburg
road to oppose the advdhce of our victorious troops. When, therefore, we reached
the top of l\Iount Sewell, we found him strongly posted in front of us, intrenched
with an army of about 14,000 men; we had in our advance on his front 5,300
men and four and a half regiments coming up from the rear. One of the most
terrible storms ever known in Western Virginia set in. Eighteen horses perished in one night atheadqnarters. The Gauley rose fifty feet. Forage, clothing,
and commissary stores at its mouth, down the Kanawha, in spite or our utmost
exertions, were damaged or swept away by the flood. The roads became' almost impassable. The country between the mouth of Gauley and Mount Sewell, a distance of thirty-eight miles, never abundantly supplied, was now almost
destitute of forage. It was evident that as, all told, we could not number to
exceed 8,500 e:ffcctives, we had no reasonable chance of driving Lee, with near
twice that number, from an intrenched position, nor could we have compelled Lee
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to retire. Would it have been advisable to advance any further at that season of
the year, when it was impossible to have subsisted either animals or men, and
when, moreover, we had nothing to accomplish by an advance of a small column
far into the interior, beyond support and in proximity to the enemy's great rail
communications. Having spent two or three days in examining the country
with a view to future operations, the troops were withdrawn to the vicinity of
the Gauley, where prompt measures were taken to supply them with clothing,
an imperative necessity, from the fact that the continual marching during the
past four months, and their remoteness from depots of supplies had rendered it
impracticable heretofore, and the troops were so naked that in one regiment I
counted one hundred and thirty-five men without pantaloons on parade. This
position was held because it covered all the country in its rear, and still threatened and compelled the enemy to watch us. While thus occupied I learned
from various sollllces that General Lee had determined to drive us from our posisition by sending a column thTough Raleigh Court House to strike the Kanawha
below us, and cut off our supplies, while he should take advantage to attack
us on our front, and desperately damage us in the retreat to which he expected
to force us. Knowing the country better than General Lee, I felt certain his
column west of the river would be obliged to take the ronte by Fayette Court
House over Cotton mountain, and strike the river opposite the mouth of the
Gauley, where our rear guard was posted, and took my measures accordingly.
Nor was I disappointed. On the 27th October the head of Floyd's column, passing through Fayetteville, seized the road opposite Miller's ferry, where lay
McCook's brigade, and the next day opened with his artillery from the top of
Cotton mountain, a distant and comparatively harmless fire on our position
and depots at the mouth of Gauley. Between our forces and Floyd's ran New
river, through a narrow chasm from seven hundred to a thousand feet deep, cut in
the rocks. rrhe water whirls and foams through this channel, with but two short
level reaches in twenty-five miles. One of these, at Miller's ferry, the enemy
watched. About four miles above was a small pool, known as Townsend's ferry,
to which there was a descent by a foot-path and' a small ascent leading from the
opposite side to the plateau, southeast of Fayetteville. Having satisfied myself
of the possibility of using this as a place of crossing by which to surprise the
enemy, I ordered the means therefor to be prepared, which consisted in sawing
down the trees to avoid noise, and lowering by ropes over the cliffs materials
for two ferries, cne formed of wagon boxes laid side by side across two parallel poles, to which they were bound by two others lying on the tops of the
boxes and secured to the lower ones by rope lashings. Over this was stretched
canvas paulin. The other was what is known in the west as a bull-boat,
covered with the paulin. These were to be passed to and fi·o by a rope stretched
across the river, wldch here was not too wide to admit of it. The work was
pushed with the utmost secrecy and despatch, under the direction of Major (now
Major General) Crawford, and during a continued rain of seventy hours. The
plan of operations was as follows: 'l'he brigade which lay next above General
Cox's, at the mouth of Gauley, passing down secretly to a point six miles below,
being re-enforced by troops brought np from Charlestown and other poiq.ts on the
river below, was secretly to cross the Kanawha at the mouth of Loup creek,
and lie concealed until our preparations as above described were made for the
crossing. When that was done, General Cox was to commence skirmishing
with the enemy, whose artillery had been driven from the front of Cotton hill.
The commander of the Loup creek force was to send a column of 1,000 men
across the mountain to Cassidy's mill, four miles west of the enemy's position,
and about tlle same distance from Fayetteville, which lay seven and a half miles
in his rear, and while this detachment was on its way was to march with the
remainder of his forces up the river, and, in conjunction with General Cox's
troops, to drive the enemy from Cotton hill, and prepare to attack him in his
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encampment on Latu~l creek at its southern base. As soon as his detachment
should have reached the mill this attack was to begin. While thus drawing
the enemy's attention, General Schenck was to move simultaneously to
cross New river with 2, 700 men at r.rownsend's ferry and seize the enemy's line
of retreat near FayettP.ville, announcing the success of this operation to the
command in the enemy's front. Thus Floyd's force would be hemmed in
beyond the possibility of escape. To be in readiness for any movement of
General Lee co-operating with Floyd by attacking us on the Lewisburg road,
thorough watch was to be kept on that road towards Mount Sewell, and McCook's
brigade with our artillery was to hold it, or a point near Hawk's Nest, which
offered such difficulties to the advance of an enemy as would have enabled him
to hold General Lee for at least twenty-four hours. Our troops on the west
side, having taken Floyd, were, in that case, to march to Bowyer's ferry, cross
New 1·iver seven miles south of Fayetteville, and place themselves, 6,000
strong, on the Lewisburg road in the rear of Lee's position, which would have
put him wholly in our power. The execution of this plan proceeded until the
ferry-boats were ready; but the exceedingly violent rains had raised New river
so that the small level reach at Townsend's ferry disappeared, and the river
there, as elsewhere, was but a torrent, over which it was impossible even to
ferry a skiff. When this became certain General Schenck's command was ordered
to move with all possible despatch to the mouth of Gauley, and cross the Kanawha at the falls, where means were in readiness.
On the morning of November 11, General Cox's troops attacked and drove
the enemy's advance guard from Cotton hill, where the head of the Loup creek
column arrived before noon, and pushed on over the mountain, attacked the
enemy's rear guard at Laurel creek, his main body having retired from his encampment there to Dickinson's farm, three miles further south. At 12 o'clock on
the same day the detachment, 1,300 instead of 1,000 strong, arrived at Cassidy's
mill, on the flank and rear of the enemy, and there waited for orders while
watching for the advance of Lee on the east side of the mill, and the movement
of our columns over the river, as well as that of General Schenck, who, by
marching all night, reached the mouth of Gauley on the morning of the 12th,
and began crossing. Our column on the enemy's front, on the side of the
mountain, lay on their arms from four o'clock in the afternoon of the 11th until
the next morning, though its commander had ample and explicit orders.
Hearing nothing from that front until late in the morning of the 12th, at 10 o'clock
I despatched Captain W. 1!-,. Rainolds, topographical engineers, aide-de-camp, to
ascertain what was the matter. At about 2 p.m. he found the command about
half a mile south of the foot of the mountain, lying on their arms, and after inquiry as to whatwasthematter,rode to thefront beyond our advanced skirmishers
to some hastily-built breastworks, thrown up by the enemy at Dickinson's farm,
opposite Miller's ferry, the day before, and found them deserted. Returning, he
informed our commander, who expressed surprise, and immediately set about
ordering a move. But the column only reached the enemy's deserted camp at
about 11 o'clock that night, when it halted. Meanwhile the detachment at Cas·
sidy's mill, instead of moving across to Fayetteville, only thl·ee or four miles distant, was ordered to march four miles clown the stream to join the rear of this
column, seven miles and a half north of Fayetteville, which it did. The enemy had
retreated about midnight of the 11th, an advanced guard hearing the movement, which was not more than three miles from the main body, and reporting
the same to the column headquarters as early as 2 a.m. of the 12th. 'l'his put
Floyd about twenty-four hours ahead. Our troops halted here, ancl the commander,
General Benham, sent me the following despatch, viz:
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"ONE MILE FROM DICKINSON's-112- p. m.
"General RosECRANS: I push forward with the chance of catching Floyd's
train. Do not let me be interfered with, although he bas a long start. Two
great blunders, made by my two best officers, have put me twelve hours behind
Floyd. I should have been only twelve hours bad it not been for this. I intend to take his train. It is safe for all to come on, as I am pushing to Raleigh.
"Respectfully, &c."
On the forenoon of the 14th our advance came up with the enemy's rear guard,
with which it bad a smart skirmish. Meanwhile General Schenck, with his
command, had followed as rapidly as possible, and, being senior in rank, was
ordered on to assume the command until my arrival on that side of the river.
General Schenck sent his adjutant general, Major Piatt, to the front to ascertain
the condition of affairs, and sent all the subsistence he could get forward on
unharnessed train animals to supply our hungry men, who were out of rations,
and to give such orders as might be deemed. prudent in the premises. The
major met a messenger from General Benham with despatches to General
Schenck, informing him that he had information which led him to believe Lee,
with a considerable force, was at Bowyer's, urging General Schenck to come
and meet him, and proposing that their united forces should proceed at once in
that direction. But, proceeding to the front, the major ascertained that our
troops were exhausted, out of rations, and in the then condition of the roads
could neither be supplied nor bad they much prospect of catching the enemy or
his trains, which, of course, were sent in advance of his retreating· forces. Moreover, a terrible snow and rain storm ca~e on; the roads became desperate, and
it was perfectly manifest that further pursuit would be much more likely to
damage us than the enemy. Under these circumstances General Schenck gave
orders to discontinue pursuit and return to Fayetteville, where supplies could
reach him, and whence, subsequently, I ordered all troops, except General
Schenck's, to return to their old positions. Thus Floyd escaped; but his column had retreated in a most demoralized condition, leaving some ammunition
and camp equipage behind.
General Lee did not carry out the plan of attack he had originally proposed
on the Lewisburg road, the condition of the roads between us and Mount Sewell having interposed almost insuperable obstacles; and, moreover, General Lee
himself having been called about that time east under orders for Charleston,
most of Lee's troops retiring from the position in front of Mount Sewell to an
'intrenched camp at Meadow Bluff; while Floyd's troops went to Dublin Station, on the Southwest Virginia and Tennessee railroad. Tl1us ended the enemy's campaign against us in Western Virginia-in defeat and failure-and the
people, during the winter, established an effective civil government, which has
ever since continued.
Question. Did you make the exchange of prisoners proposed by General Lee;
and if not, why not 1
Answer. When General Lee proposed the exchange on grounds of humanity,
I declined to make it, because I saw that be desired to get these mountaineers,
who knew that country, and which would immediately add so many men to his
available strength, in exchange for men captured at Bull Run, which would add
nothing to my strength, and, in fact, could not even serve with my command.
I stated to General Lee that unless he could remedy this inequality there could
be no exchange; and there was none.
It is due to history to state to the committee that the foregoing minutes of
the affair at Cotton hill against Floyd have been given because interested parties
have attempted, through various channels, directly and indirectly, to falsify
history, and conceal misbehavior which was reported in the form of charges
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to the Adjutant General of the army. While preparing to · make this statement my attention was directed to the "Rebellion Record," for dates which
had escaped my memory, where I observed, among others, a statement on
page 384, vol. III or IV, copied from theN ew York World, which I take occasion
here to pronounce a tissue of errors and fals~J~hoods. Soon after these closing
events of the campaign here executed, I received orders to send twelve regiments to
General Buell, and then repairing to Wheeling, established my headquarters
there for the winter. On the 6th of December, satisfied that the condition of
the roads over the Alleghanies into Western Virginia, as well as the scarcity
of subsistence and horse-feed, would preclude any serious operations of the
enemy against us until the opening of spring, I began quietly and secretly to
assemble all the spare troops of the department in the neighborhood of the
Baltimore and Ohio railroad, under cover of abont 5,000 men I had posted at
Romney, with the design of obtaining General McClellan's permission to
take nearly all these troops, and suddenly seize, fortify and hold Winchester,
whereby I should at once more effectually cover the northeastern and central
parts of Western Virginia, and at the same time threatening the left of the enemy's position at Manassas, compelling him to lengthen his line of defence in
front, the army of the Potomac and throw it furJh er south. That I might more
fully lay my views before the general commanding, I requested his permission to
visit hiin at Washington, whither I proceeded about the 28th of December, and
found General McClellan sick of typhoid fever. Before an interview conld be
had with him on the subject Stonewall Jackson, with a column of 10,000 men,
began an advance in the direction of Cumberland, which threatened such serious
consequences that, although ordered to send all my troops to General Lander,
and to remain personally idle, I was obliged to return to Wheeling for the
purpose of seeing this order executed and supplies and subsistence sent to
General Lauder. But before I left I had a conversation on the subject with
General Fitz J. Porter, who was regarded as the confidential adviser of General McClellan. I found that to my plan was opposed an old stereotyped idea, .
that it "would lead to changing the theatre of tf1e war," and that at least a portion of what I desired to have done on the eastern boundary of my department,
with nearly all my available troops, had been confided to General Lander. I directed my attention to perfecting the details for the execution of a cherished
plan of seizing and occupying or destroying the Southwest Virginia and Tennessee railroad between Lynchburg and Knoxville, for which I had begun to
prepare during the summer of 1861, until General Lee fumished me with
other occupation. To this end I completed an experimental train of three
hundred pack-mules, and by that demonstrated the fact that during winter I
could transport stores from Clarksburg to Huttonsville at one-third of the cost
per pound which it required to carry them in government wagons from Webster
to Beverly, a distance of sixteen miles less. The great difficulty of moving
through these mountainous regions, where subsistence for troops cannot be found,
being in transportation, I conceived the idea of using pack-trains instead of .
wagons, for many reasons, among others, that they are less cumbrous, are not
necessarily confined to the few wagon roads, and can carry their maximum load
as well over bad places as over good roads. One of the chief difficulties in organizing pack-trains being to procure packers, I directed the quartermasters to
employ one for each regiment, and the commanding officers to cause all their
teamsters to be drilled thoroughly in packing. I subsequently submitted to the
Secretary of War a plan of a campaign for the employment of my command
during the spring and summer of 1862, based on the supposed movement of the
army of the Potomac, which having been examined by him and by Gcneral1VlcClellan, was by both those officers, in autograph letters, highly complimented.
But on the 6th April, 1862, I was relieved from the command of the department by Major General John C. Fremont, and did not have the opportunity to

ROSECRANS'S CAMPAIGNS.

.15

carry it into execution. As the civil administration of a department commander
is an important element of duty, in closing the statement of my campaign in
Western Virginia it will be proper to say that the people of vV estern Virginia
gave testimony to their satisfaction with my administration by a unanimous
vote of thanks from both houses of the legislature, which was pa.ssed during the
session of 1861-'G2.
The Ohio legislature also testified its appreciation of my services in that cam·
paign by a unanimous vote of thanks.
Having turned over the command of the department to General Fremont, in
obedie11ce to orders, I repaired to Washington and reported to the Secretary of
War, who reiterated his compliments on the plan of campaign I had proposed,
and expressed his regret at not being able to confide to me its execution. On
the evening after my arrival the Secretary sent for me to come to his offica, and informed me that he desired to send me in search ofBlencker's division, wrote a letter
of instructions to that effect, and also directed me to visit the headquarters of Gen·
eral Banks and confer with him, reporting progress from each telegraph station
to the War Department. I mention this as a circumstance of significanoo in
what follows. I left the next morning for Harper's Ferry, and reached vVinchester the same evening, despatching messengers from two or three points
on my route in search of General Blencker's division. At Winchester I learned
that General Blencker, having arrived at Berry's ferry, in attempting to cross his
men by means of the old ferry-boat, had, unfnrtunately, by its careening and
sinking, lost some thirty-five men. I immediately wrote, informing him of my
orders and directing him to march to Snicker's ferry, lower down on the Shenandoah, where we had a flying bridge, anJ cross there. I arrived at Woodstock
the evening of the 18th April, and informed General R111ks of my mission. As
my instructions did not indicate any subject for conference, the general and
myself concluded that it was to be ad libitum, and therefore took up the military
situation. After considering the position and numbers of McDowell's, Banks's,
and Fremont's forces, I said to General Banks, " What force has the enemy in
front of you 1" He replied, "Between 8,000 and 13,000." I then said, "Our
entire forces under yourself, General McDowall and General Fremont are at present having no decided influence on the contest between General Me( Jlellan 's
forces and the rebels on the Peninsula. Yon are in the great valley which has
always been an abundant source of rebel supplies. Your line of communication
is covered by the Blue Ridge and the Shenandoah, and therefore comparalively safe. It seems to me Blencker's crossing the Shenandoah to go to General
Fremont, whence he will have to return, is a waste of time. \rYhat do you
think of the following : Blencker not to cross the Shenandoah, but to march
to Sperryville and seize Luray gap; McDowell to advance to Culpeper.
Jackson and Ewell will immediately retreat to Staunton or Rockfish and
Brown's gaps. You can then advance to Harrisonburg. General Fremont
can order Milroy to march from Beverly and meet his column moving from New
Creek station, on the Beverly and Staunton turnpike, whence the entire command of the three departments can be put in communication and concentrated :
yours and General Fremont's seizing Staunton, and making it your depot, can
move on Charlotte, at which point General McDowell can join you. This will
give a combined army of 46,000 men, with ample detachments-near 20,000
men-to cover your lines of communication. You will have the control of the
forage and beef of the great valley, and the remainder of your sup]Jlies and
your ammunition can be wagoned from Winchester. This army will be sufficient to take Gordonsville and compel the enemy to detach a large army of
observation to watch your movements and fight you, or to lose the line-the
defensive line of the James river and his connexion with Lynchburg. If he
detach an army of observation we have accomplished our purpose, and General
McClellan can beat the remainder of his forces and occupy Richmond. If he
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does not, you will compel him to evacuate Richmond. If he attempts to fall on
you with his entire force, he could not reach Gordonsville in less than four days,
which would give ample time to prepare for him; and as you will have the
control of the mountain passes, and of the great valley, your army could be
dislodged from it only by a long campaign. Thus all these troops, which at
present weigh not a feather in the great contest, will be brought to aid in bringing it to a successful conclusion."
General Banks having approved this plan, which it was thought proper to
lay before his division commanders, I left the next morning for Strasburg,
whence I telegraphed it in cipher to the Secretary of War, stating that General
Banks had requested me to say it met his entire approbation. To carry it out
it was necessary that Blencker's orders to cross the Shenandoah should be
promptly revoked. Receiving no order from the Srcretary of vVar, Blencker's
movement was continued across the Shenandoah. This command was found
in the most wretched condition-unfed, unclothed, unshod and unpaid-between
800 and 1,000 men barefooted, the cavalry and artillery horses unshod, and the
whole command requiring a new outfit to prepare it for a campaign. Its condition was promptly reported to the War Department, and orders were given to
forward the supplies; but a terrible flood in the Potomac, which swept away
the Harper's Ferry bridge and prevented the crossing of the river for eight
days, delayed their arrival. When finally prepared, I conducted them to General Fremont, and forthwith returned to Washington, about the 16th of ..l\fay,
where I received orders to join General Halleck, to whom I hastened, hoping
to arrive in time for the great battle, then thought to be impending in front of
Corinth. I arrived at his headquarters on the 22d May, and on the 23d was
directed to report to General Pope, who was then expecting General Jeff. Davis
and General Asboth's commands from Pea Ridge. They arrived, were consolidated into divisions, and placed under my orders. On the 26th and 27th I
was assigned to the command of Paine's and Stanley's divisions of the troops
under General Pope, which were known as the army of the Mississippi. At 1
o'clock on the morning of the 28th I was called to General Pope's headquarters,
who informed me that he had just received a despatch from General Halleck,
stating that the enemy was massing heavily on o:ur left, and would probably
attack us in the morning. He therefore desired that I should go to the front
and prepare, which I did. At 4 o'clock a.m. the discharge of a solitary heavy
gun from the direction of Corinth seemed to announce the beginning of the contest, but a succession of reports soon followed, which satisfied me the enemy
were blowing up their magazines. I immediately ordered General Stanley to
send two regiments towards Corinth by the road in his front, General Paine to
do the same on his, and despatched word to General Pope to this effect. Soon
came the announcement from Paine's front of the occupation by our troops of a
fort belonging to the enemy, with which we had a fierce cannonade the day
before. Both these advances from my command reached Corinth about a
quarter past 7 o'clock, where I soon after joined them. I found the place had
been evacuated during the night, the enemy having destroyed or carried away
most of his ammunition and provisions, but leaving a considerable quantity of
old tentage and wagons. At 9 o'clock I received orders to return my command
to camp for rations, and then immediately to start in pursuit of the enemy on
the Danville road. By 11 o'clock that night the head of my column halted at
the Tuscumbia, where our ca-valry had been checked by the enemy's rear
guard. 'l'he Tuscumbia at this point ran through a low swampy bottom, in a
narrow muddy channel, rendering the passage across it very difficult except at
the bridge, which they had burnt.
The next morning General Pope arrived to supervise the operations of forcing
a passage, which the enemy still held, and sent me with General McPherson to
reconnoitre the country for a camp-ground, in obedience, as he said, to the
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orders of General Halleck, who had directed him to pursue until he was satisfied
he could do the enemy no further damage, and then returning go into camp in
that vicinity. On my return, about 3 o'clock p. m., a fierce artillery and musketry fire at the Tuscumbia startled General Pope's headquarters. The general
directed me to go to the front and force the passage. I arrived there just before
sunset, and having reconnoitred the ground, made my arrangements to pass by
a surprise during the night. But the enemy having delayed us twenty-four
hours quietly decamped, and by daylight our troops were rebuilding the bridge,
which was ready for the crossing of our artillery before 12 o'clock m. M:y
infantry reached Rienzi the same evening. Our cavalry pushed on to Booneville, whence General Gordon Granger despatched me before daylight that the
enemy was still retreating, and shortly afterwards that he had taken possession of
Booneville, with a number of prisoners, and that the enemy had crossed 'l,wenty
Mile creek, the bridge over which they were destroying. I pushed on with my
command to Booneville, and thence made reconnaissances to the front at several
points over a front of twelve miles, finding the enemy in force at each point,
which results I reported to General Pope on his arrival the next morning, where
he was joined by General Buell, whose command (the army of the Ohio) arrived
during the afternoon and night and took position on our right, towards Blackland. In this position we lay until the 11th of June, when General Buell
marched to Alabama and Tennessee, and we returned to camp Olear Creek, six
miles below Corinth, where we arrived on the 12th or 13th of June.
General Pope receiving a leave of absence, the command of the army of the
Mississippi devolved on me, as the next in rank, whereupon I directed General
Sheridan, with a brigade of cavalry, to take post at Booneville, at which point
we had previously a battalion. A day or two after his arrival the rebel General
Chalmers, with eleven regiments and parts of regiments of cavalry, attacked
him ; hut such was the vigor and energy with which Sheridan handled his
troops, one regiment of which was armed with revolving rifles, that the enemy
were defeated, and this defeat gave our cavalry, consisting of only four regiments,
the mastery of country within the scope of its travel from that time forth, and
constituted an epoch in its history in that region.
The seven days' fight before Richmond caused General Halleck to be ordered
to vV ashington, and General Pope to be in command of the army in Virginia. I
then became permanent commander of the army of the Mississippi, which
remained in camp some weeks, during which I instituted the plan of constructing "i?iformation maps." This consisted in making a skeleton map from the
best map to be had of the country, and placing upon it the results of inquiries
and tlte irifm·mation obtained from scouts, spies, citizens, and all other sources.
This map was then photographed and distributed among our subordinate commanders, with instructions to complete and correct it, as well as for use in
directing their operations; and the more surely to aecomplish this, each brig·ade
was to detail an officer for topographical duty. This, I believe, originated that
system, which was subsequently carried to great perfection in the army of the
Oumberlaud, and has been one of the most useful agencies in the handling of
large bodies of troops in countries comparatively unknown to us, and of which
no accurate maps had been made.
About the 20th of August I received Mders to send two divisions of my command to Tennessee to re-enforce General Buell. Paine's, (afterwards Palmer's
aitd Davis's,) commanded by General Mitchell, were ordered; the latter crossing
the Tennessee at Eastport-the former at 'l,uscumbia. Stanley's division moved
from camp Olear Creek to protect the line of the railroad between Corinth and
'Tuscumbia, and the operation of crossing.
While I was at Tuscumbia a telegram reached me from General Grant, that
the rebels appeared to be moving north; that a heavy cavalry force had attacked
Bolivar and cut the line of the railroad between that and Jackson. The cross2 R
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ing of Paine's division now being completed, Stanley was directed to return at
once to Iuka, where out of the refugee contrabands I organized a detachment
of colored engineer troops into platoons of twenties and companies of a hundred,
each l~ir£ng officers. Things were now beginning to wear a threatening aspect.
It was evident, by the enemy's movements, that they were about to commence
an offensive campaign. I accordingly returned from Iuka to my old encampment at Olear creek, leaving a rear guard to protect the sending of the stores
which had been brought up from Eastport to Corinth. Colonel R. 0. Murphy,
8th Wisconsin, who was charged with this duty, learning that the rebels were
moving on Iuka, hastily abandoned the place, which was occupied by the
enemy's cavalry, followed soon after by General Price's entire command. 'J1he
precipitancy of Colonel Murphy's movements left it a matter of doubt whether
the enemy's infantry occupied the place. A reconnaissance in force was made
on it by Colonel (now Major General) Mower, who drove in the enemy's pickets
on his main force in line of battle at Iuka, and settled the question of the enemy's presence there with infantry, cavalry, and artillery; which information
having been sent to General Grant, the department commander, he determined
to attack, ordered General Ord to move to Burnsville, and Lrought all the
spare troops under Ross from Bolivar to re-enforce him.
Burnsville is a small town, seven and a half miles west of Iuka, on the Memphis and Charleston road near its crossing over Yellow creek. General Grant
thought my command should join General Ord's, and that, while the latter moved
towards Iuka on the north, mine should take the south side of the railroad. I
represented to him that as our chances of success lay in the celerity of our movements, and as one of my divisions was at Jacinto, nine miles south of Burnsville, on the r:ruscumbia road, and as the country along the railroad on the south
side, full of morasses and covered with brush, would be difficult to operate in, it
would probably be better that, with Stanley's diviE:ion, I should join Hamilton's at
Jacinto, and, moving with the two by the Tuscumbia road, should get poi:5session of
the rebels' line of retreat, south of Iuka, by seizing and holding both the Fulton and
Jacinto roads, which atiuka were only a mile and a half apart, and the ground there
being highly favorable for the operation, while General Ord's entire force should attack Price in front, and thus put him completely in our power. To this General Grant
assented, and on the 18th Stanley's division was concentrated at Jacinto, which
point it reached at 9 o'clock p. m., ready to bivouac. Immediately on my arrival
there I established a line of courier posts to General Grant's headquarters at
Burnsvi1le, to which point he had gone at 12 o'clock on the 18th, advising him
of our arrival and of the establishment of the line of courier posts. I also notified him that the troops being somewhat fatigued, and the distance to Iuka being
nineteen and a half miles, we would probably not reach that place the next day
before 21 o'clock, bm certainly would not be later than 42- p.m. At 3 o'clock
next morning the troops were called up, and began to move as soon thereafter
as possible, taking nothing but ammunition, ambulances, and the rations in their
haversacks. At seven in the morning I de8patched General Grant that the troops
were off in good spirits, the advance at least six miles on its way, and that we
should undoubtedly arrive at Iuka as early as 4 o'clock p. m. He was also informed that a line of courier posts would be continued every two or three miles,
to connect my headquarters with his, so as to afford certain and rapid intercommunication. At 12 o'clock the head of Hamilton's column reached the forks of
the Iuka and 'l'uscumbia roads, seven and a half miles from Iuka, having skirmished with the enemy's cavalry for the last two miles, when his division advanced, driving the enemy's skirmishers all before him. I here ascertained that
the Fulton road crossed the 'l'uscumbia four and a half miles east of this point,
and that there were no cross-roads between it and that leading hence to Iuka, by
which columns advancing on them separately could certainly and safely communicate with each other, and also that the enemy's strength was believed to be be-
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tween 20,000 and 30,000 strong. I therefore determined that it would be unsafe
to move Stanley's division up the Fulton road, whereby I should divide my
command, consisting of only four brigades, into two columns, not within supporting
distance of each other, and despatched General Grant our progress, condition,
and this my determination, with the reasons therefor. Here General Grant's
aids, Colonels Lagon ·and Dickey, joined me; asked the news; inquired if I believed the rebels were in Iuka in force-if I thought they would fight-if I intended to attack, and if I did not apprehend that unless we hurried up they
would retreat. I informed them that our information warranted the belief that the
enemy were in force and would fight; that, as a matter of course, I should attack
on my arrival, but that it was now near 1 o'clock; that we were within seven
miles of Iuka, and ought to hear the guns qf tlte other column, and I was surprised that we did not. Colonel Lagon suggested that" perhaps General Grant
expected me to attack first;" to which I replied that such was not the understanding, and, moreover, that it would be very bad policy to allow the enemy's attention to be first attracted towards his line of communication, to seize and secure
which was the object of my movement; that Hamilton's division was already
put1hing up-he could hear the firing of the skirmishers in the distance----t1nd Stanley's division would follow promptly. Receiving word that the way was open for
Stanley's division, we left this point, Colonels Lagon and Dickey accompanying us
to the front, where we arrived at about 4 o'clock, and the battle opened on a rough
brushy point, near the top of which was the coveted cross-road leading over to the
Fulton road, of which we wished to gain possession. Our troops moved rapidly
into line, lying down until the enemy's position could be ascertained. 'l'hey
opened on us in a few minutes with grape and canister. From that time till
nightfall the battle raged furiously. The enemy poured down upon us in overwhelming numbers. They could be seen moving across the fields from the railroad near the Inka and Burnsville road. Nothing in that quarter appeared to
attract their attention. Hamilton's division barely held. its ground, sometimes
gaining and sometimes losing a little. Mower's brigade of Stanley's division
was ordered in on the right of Hamilton's, while :E'uller's was held in reserve.
Just after sunset the enemy came down in a terrific attack on Mower, but was
driven back. A second and still more powerful assault was made-. The conflict
was short but terrible. In hal£' an hour their column was repulsed, after every
round of ammunition had been expended by Mower's men. Our troops, which
had c·eased fighting, lay down on the ground, the enemy within three hundred
yards of us. Out of sixteen, eleven of our regiments had be8n in nction. 'l'here
was no news from General Grant. The enemy had fought us with superior
numbers. What next was to be done? Quietly placing a brigade in the front
line, and withdrawing Hamilton's division to replenish their ammunition and take
position in reserve, I despatched General Grant an account of the conflict and
present condition of affairs, and at the same time sent a reconnoitring party to
our right to ascertain the mode of crossing the swampy ground which skirted the
field to the east of us, and to examine the heights beyond ~ith a view to
their occupation with our artillery, which, owing to the nature of the ground,
could not be brought into action with effect. By 11~ p. m. these dispositions were made. Going frequently to the front I heard the enemy cutting·, chopping, driving stakes, halting and aligning their men.
I also heard
the movement of the train in the distance towards the southeast, and artillery
moving apparently along the very heights I desired to occupy, and from
which my reconnoitring party had not returned. 'l'his gave me no little
uneasiness. Going to the front at 3 a. m. I heard the voices of drivers of artillery or ambulance trains, evidently anxious and in haste, and returning, gave
orders that our troops should be called and have their breakfast, so as to move
at daylight, which was done, Stanley's division leading. As our skirmishers
advanced the enemy fled. Their dead and wounded were lying on the ground
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in front of us. Our troops pushed forward, and the rebels retired towards Iuka,
into which Stanley soon sent a shot, causing the rebels there to move hastily.
What we at first suspected migltt be a change of position we now became satisfied was a retreat. All our cavalry, a regiment and a half, were immediately
ordered to move in on the flank of the Fulton road, and Stanley's division to
follow with all possible despatch. l;Iamilton's, instead of moving up to Iuka,
was ordered to face about, march back to the forks of the road, and, taking the
Tuscumbia road, if possible, to fall on the enemy's flank. These dispositions
concluded, and our troops having pas8ed through Iuka, I was suddenly startled
by the sound of music, and looking, beheld the head of General Grant's column
entering the place. No explanation was then or subsequently made of the
cause which prevented that column from attacking the enemy in front the day
before, save that they did not hear our guns. General Grant directed a brigade
of his troops to occupy Iuka, and take care of the hospital and public property,
and that I should pursue the enemy as far as I thought it likely to result in
any benefit to us or injury to them; and we accordingly pushed them till nightfall, when, overworked with the last two days' and nights' marching and fighting,
our troops halted for the night; satisfied that the enemy, by marching all night,
would probably reach Bay Springs, twenty-five miles south of the Tuscumbia
r oad, by next morning, and that they would thence move as rapidly as possible to
the l\Iobile and Ohio road, near 'I'upelo, all of which proved true. And our rations
being exhausted, and the country towards Bay Springs destitute, I was satisfied that further pursuit with our infantry would be utterly unavailing, and directed the cavalry to follow the enemy, and my co~mand to return the next
day to Jacinto, advising General Grant, who approved the movement.
On this day, the 20th of September, I received my appointment as major
general of volunteers. On the 23d, General Grant, having been made department commander, confided to me the command of the district of Corinth, with
my headquarters at that place, to which I immeliately repaired, and where I
found McKean's and Davies's divisions. During the summer I had made it a
point, whenever I visited General Grant's headquarters, to suggest that the
great line of fortifications ordered by General Halleck, about a mile and a half
in front of Cqrinth, in the construction of which our troops were employed
during the hot weather, was utterly useless to our small command, and urged the
construction of a line in the immediate vicinity of Corinth, which could be defended by a comparatively small force, to cover our depots, to which suggestion General Grant had finally acceded, giving Captain Prime orders at once
to begin it. To the completion of this line I directed my attention, increasing the
number of my contraband engineer laborers, who, under the efficient cummand
of Captain (now Colonel) Gaw, United States colored volunteers, repaired all
the bridges and roads in the vicinity of the town, and felled the timber in front
of the new line of intrenchments we had begun, looking westward. Rumors
8oon reached me that the enemy, under Van Dorn, whom Price had joined with
his discomfited ~ommand, were about to make a grand campaign to drive us out
of Mississippi, western Tennessee, and Kentucky, and thus co-operate with
Bragg's movement into Kentucky, in seizing, as they intended, the line of the
Ohio road. I accordingly ordered the troops from Jacinto to the vicinity of
Corinth, and they had but just arrived when these rumors ripened into certainty
by positive information that the enemy had reached Ripley, half way between the
Mobile and Ohio and the Mississippi Central roads, where they were encamped,
forty thousand strong. This information was communicated to General Grant.
On the 1st of October the head of the enemy's column made its appearance
at Pocahontas, twenty miles west of Corinth, on the lVlemphis and Charleston
road, where they seized Davis's bridge, across the Hatchie. From this point
they could move to Bolivar, and thence to Jackson, seventy miles north of
Corinth, or could strike the railroad from Corinth to Jackson, at Purdy or Bethel,
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about thirty miles north of Corinth. As Jackson was the headquarters of the
department and the depot for our ordnance stores, and the garrisons of Jackson
and Bolivar were neither of them equal to that at Corinth, which I knew had
a reputation with the enemy of being fortified, I thought it was their interest
to move at once on Bolivar and Jackson, an.d expected only a demonstration on
Corinth, which I prepared to meet, punish, and pursue. r:rhis same preparation
would equally secure us if their main attack should be Corinth. Instead of a
demonstration on us, it proved a real attack. On the night of the 2d the head
of the enemy's column rlrove our arlvance from Chewalla, ten miles di::>tant, and
followed it. In the morning, at 1 o'clock, orders were despatched to our troops
to move at 3 a.m. to their positions, as indicated in the orders, on the south and west
of Corinth, which they reached shortly after daylight. The enemy on the Chewalla read early began to pursue our troops, who were ordered to fall back
slowly and steadily. All the division commanders were informed that it was
desirable they should hold against the enemy's pressure until he had fully developed himself, in a favorable position for an offensive movement on our part.
The enemy pushed steadily in, and by 11 o'clock it became apparent that, instead
of a feint, the enemy was in full force. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon he had been
pressed mainly into the wooded angle between Memphis and Charleston and the
Corinth and Jackson railroads, and had advanced within range of the defensive line
under construction. The opportune moment appeared uow at hand, and I directed General Hamilton, whose division was on our right, beyond the range of
the enemy's operations, to face to the westward, and move on to the enemy's flank
and rear. Colonel Ducat, who carried the order and a sketch showing the mode
of the movement, returned from Hamilton's headquarters, a mile and a half distant,
stating that the general could not understand without further explanation. This
led to such a delay that it was 5 o'clock before his division was fairly in movement
on the enemy. Bnt no sooner had the movement begun to develop itself than its
effect became most obvious on the front of General Davies's division, which had
been heavily pressed, and on which the enemy immediately relaxed his efforts,
and appeared to be greatly disturbed, attempting to make dispositions to meet our
troops, the left brigade of which, under Sullivan, about dusk became sharply
engaged with them. It was now too late to carry out the operations. The
day's fighting bad developed the fact that we were vastly outnumbered. I
determin ed on a readjustment of our lines for a final battle, making use of
what was available in the new line of defence and dispositions to prevent the
enemy from turning our right. 11 his was accomplished by 3 a.m. of the 4th.
Between 3! and 4 o'clock the enemy opened his batteries furiously from a point
in front of battery Robinett, but in the course of an hour he was silenced and
driven from his position. Our troops, thus aroused from their brief l'Cst, which
could scarcely be called slnmber, nerved themselves forth~ coming fight, the
brunt of which came on about 10 o'clock, when the enemy charging our right
centre, Davies's division gave way, but speedily rallied, and with the aid of
Hamilton's division and a cross-fire from battery Robinett, poured in a fire so
destructive that the enemy were thrown into confusion and finally driven from
this part of the field; at the same time he also charged battery Robinett, but was
thoroughly repulsed, after two or three efforts, and retired to the woods. With
our inferior numbers of exhausted troops we stood on the defensive, sending
skirmishers to the front and expecting another charge from the enemy, till about
3 o'clock p. m., when, finding that their skirmishers yielded to ours, we began
to push them, and by 4 o'clock became satisfied that they intended to retire from
our immediate front; but so superior was their strength that I could not believe they would altogether abandon the operation. By 6 p. m. our skirmishers
had pushed theirs back five miles, but our troops, having now been marching
and fighting for nearly two days and nights, and the weather being excessively
hot, were nearly exhausted. I roc1e over the field and explained to them, in
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person, that the enemy had received a bloody repulse; that, except those on the
skirmish line, all ehould at once lie down to rest, wbile rations for five days
were being i~sued to them, and at the earliest hour of morning we would start
in pursuit. Just before sunset McPherson arrived with five fresh regiments,
sent dO'\vn by General Grant to re-enforce us. The following orders were given
for the pursuit:
"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MrssrssiPPI,
" 3d Divis~·on, District if TVest Tennessee, Corinth, October 4, 1862.
"GEI'<ERAL: The general commanding directs that you furnish your command
with three days' rations and one hundred rounds of ammunition. Let your
animals be well watered and supplied with forage or turned out to graze.
"Be prepared to move at daylight.
"H. G. KENNE'rT,
" Lieutenant Colonel and Chief qf Staff.
"Brigadier General McPHERSON."
Brigadier Generals McKean, Davies, Hamilton, and Stanley furnished with
copies of above.
Under this order McPherson moved the next morning and pushed the enemy,
with whose rear guard he soon came up and began fighting, but the roughness
of the country and narrowness of the roads made progress slow; the whole command, however, pressed up closely to our advance. The enemy attempted to
delay onr advance by flag of truce borne by a burial party of several hundred
men. McPherson directed this party to stand aside and wait orders, on the
ground that, as fighting was going on, it could not be suspended without direct
orders from me. I at once despatched that the burial party should remain until further orders, and to inform General Van Dorn that his wounded would
be cared for and his dead buried as humanity and the rules of war required.
Night found McPherson at a Jistance of fifteen miles from Corinth, where he
had a skirmish with the enemy about sunset, on the ascent to Davis's hill. At
3 o'clock on the next morning I visited his front, directed him to push the enemy as soon as it was light, and returned to visit the divisions along the road,
and to give direction for the return of one of the division trains, which, by misundeTstanding, had accompanied it, and was much in the way. About 7 o'clock
a s,taff officer from the front came back bearing a rebel stand of colors, and informed me that the enemy's attempt to force the passage of the Hatchie at
Davis's bridge had been completely foiled by General Ord. Despatches from
General Grant and General Ord also rAached me to the same effect. These facts
communicated to our troops filled them with enthusiasm, and they pushed on
after the enemy, who had crossed the Hatchie twelve miles south of Davis's
bridge, at Crum's mill, and afterwards fired the mill and bridge. Our advance,
on their arrival, began bridging the place, which, by the use of the dam, was
soon accomplished, and McPherson crossed; the other troops followed as closely
as possible. Ordering 30,000 rations to Chewalla, and eighty wagon-loads in
the direction of Ripley, covered by Hamilton's division, whieh, to save time,
was ordered to move south on the Blackland road east of the Hatchie, till he
reached the Ripley and Rienzi road, I despatched General Grant the condition
of affairs, and sent, also, a despateh to General Hurlbut, at Davis's bridge, informing him of the enemy's condition, and requesting him to inform General
Sherman what had happened. That night we pushed our infantry within three
miles of Ripley. The enemy was exhausted; his cavalry, eighteen regiments
strong, gave way everywhere to our four little regiments. Numbers of deserters and stragglers were scattered through the woods in all directions, and
were constantly being picked up by our men. Our cavalry went into Ripley,
while the enemy's infantry laid down within cannon-shot of it on the south,

ROSECRANS'S CAMPAIGNS.

23

without molesting it. These facts, and many others, showing that the enemy
considered himself thoroughly whipped, satisfied me he was in our power unless
be received large re-enforcements, which could only come from Bragg, or the
Atlantic seaboard. Mississippi was in our bands. The enemy bad concentrated
all his available force for an offensive movement, had been thoroughly beaten at
Uorinth, and had then retreated, blowing up his ammunition wagons and caissons,
their men throwing away their camp and garrison equipage in the flight. The
weather was cool; the roads were dry, and likely to be so for a month to come.
Corn was ripe, and, as yet, untouched. We had three millions of rations in
Corinth, and ammunition for six months. There was but one bridge injured on
the Mobile and Ohio road, and it could be put in running order by a regiment
in half a day. The enemy were so alarmed, when Hamilton sent a reconnoissance
to Blackland, they vacated Tupalo, burning even the bacon which they could
not take away on the first train. I had eighty wagon-loads of assorted rations
which bad reached me that night at Ripley, and had ordered the thirty thousand
from Chewalla to Hurlbut.
Impressed with these views, on receipt of General Grant's despatch of 8.30
p.m., October 7, at Jonesboro, declining to let Hurlbut move with me in the
pursuit because we were not strong enough, I despatched him as follows :
Miss.,
" October 7, 1862-midnight.

"HRADQUARTERS, JoNESBORo,

"Major General GRANT,
"Jackson, '1 ennessee:
"Yours, 8.30 p. m., received. Our troops occupy Ripley. I most deeply
dissent from your views as to the policy of pursuit. We have defeated, routed,
and demoralized the army which held the lower Mississippi valley. We have
the two railroads leading south to the Gulf, through the most populous parts of
this State, into which we can now pursue them by the Mississippi Central, or
Mobile and Ohio road. The effect of returning to our old position will be to give
them up the only corn they have in the country west of Alabama, including
Tuscumbia valley, and to permit them to recruit their forces, advance and reoccupy their old ground, reducing us to the occupation of a defensive position,
barren and worthless, on a long front, of which they can harass us until bad
weather precludes any effectual advance except along the railroads, where time,
fortifications, and rolling stock will render them superior to us.
"Our force, including what can be spared with Hurlbut, will garrison Corinth
and Jackson, and enable us to push them. Our advance will cover even Holly
Springs, which will be ours when we want it. All that is needful is, to combine,
push~ and whip them. We have whipped and should now push to the wall all the
forces in Mississippi, and capture the rolling stock of the railroads west of the
Alabama and Mobile. Bragg's army alone could repair the damage we have it
in our power to do them. But I beseech you to bend everything to push them
while they are broken, weary, hungry, and ill supplied. Draw everything from
Memphis to help move on Holly Springs. Let us concentrate and appeal to the
governors of the States to rush down some twenty or thirty new regiments to
hold in our rear, and we can make a triumph of our start.
"Respectfully and truly,
"W. A. ROSECRANS,
" Major General."
In reply to this I received an order from the general commanding, directing
ine to desist from pursuit, and return, with my command, cautiously, but
promptly, to Corinth, which I promptly acknowledged and obeyed, though I
stated that I most deeply dissented from the policy, for reasons given in my
despatch from Jonesboro. And, to carry out his orders to the letter my move-
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men•ts were conducted with such care and secrecy that the enemy did not know
for a week what we had been doing, or that we had retreated to Codnth.
Thus terminated the enemy's campaign against us between the 'l'ennessee and
Mississippi. In it we fought very superior numbers, as will appear from my
official report, wherein the provost marshal's list shows we had taken prisoners
from fifty-three regiments of infantry, eighteen regiments of cavalry, and sixteen
batteries of artillery. Our own force in the· fight was about 15,700 infantry
and artillery, and about 2,500 effective cavalry.
My official report of the battle of Corinth, which I hereby make a part of
my testimony, gives the details of the engagement.
Nine days after I returned from the pursuit of Price I was relieved from the
command of the army of the Mississippi, and directed to report at Cincinnati
for orders, where I found a despatch from the general-in-chief directing me to
proceed to the headquarters of Major General Buell, and, showing that order to
him, take command of his army. ""\Vithout inquiring the reasons for this unusual
mode of relieving an officer from so important a command, I proceeded to execute the order, and on the 27th of October, 1862, assumed command of the
army of the Ohio, and of the department of the Cumberland, which was to be
all of 'l'ennessee east of the Tennessee river.
I proceeded to Bowling Green, in the vicinity of which all the army had
been ordered to concentrate, except three divisions which had pursued Bragg
into the Cumberland mountains, and which, under Crittenden, halted at Glasgow. Instituting an inspection, and finding that the troops required shoes and
clothing, orders were promptly given to supply them, and further movement
delayed until that was accomplished. It was now about the 1st of November.
Many of the troops, raw regiments suddenly thrown into the field, had suffered
much in health and strength from losses incident to overwork and unaccustomed
exposure. The cavalry were badly armed, imperfectly equipped, and, as a body,
without experience or esprit de corps, having hitherto, for want of confidence
in them, been employed chiefly in picket, vidette, and escort duty, and regarded
as too weak to play any important part in an offensive campaign. The military
situation was as follows : Bragg, after the battle of Perryville, retreated to
Knoxville, his army suffering indeed from the hardships of the march and the
weather and from the demoralization incident to the failure to realize their hopes
of remaining in Kentucky, but still formidable.
Our garrison at Nashville, beleaguered by Forrest's cavalry, overwhelmingly
superior in numbers to ours, and supported by Breckinridge's command of infantry with six batteries of artniery, were reduced to stinted rations, and had
stripped the country within their control of its forage. 'l'he rl'.Lilroad between
Bowling Green and Nashville was badly broken. Both the tunnels, the roofs of
which had been supported by piles of cord-wood lying on the tops of trestleR, by
the burning of this wood, had been badly damaged and caved in nearly throughout the entire length. The entire transportation belonging to the army, on inspection, was found to be about sufficient, with good roads, to supply subsistence for
a distance, at the utmost, of forty or fifty miles fi·om its depots. What was to
be done 1 General Halleck, in a long letter of instructions, directed me to
march to East Tennessee, a distance of over two hundred and forty miles, over
mountains, traversed by but few roads. far separated from each other, and often
rough, narrow, and difficult, near the beginning of the inclement season of the
year, the country being substantially bare of forage and subsistence along the road
and East Tennessee itself having been stripped by the rebel army of most of its
forage and subsistence, either for transport by rail to Virginia, or in supplying
Bragg's and Buckner's troops with a cavalry force. Moreover, could we have
transported our army immediately into East Tennessee, and had our trains and
the roads been sufficient to transport its supplies, our cavalry was too weak in
numbers to protect these trains and keep open our communications. These,
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moreover, would have left open the route with a good railroad from Chattanooga
to Nashville, and thence on into Kentucky. Under these circumstances I
deemed the project of marching into East Tennessee impracticable, and accordingly determined to move at once to Nashvilll", relieve our garri:5on there, repair
the railroad, and establish and replenish a good depot of suppLes at that point,
whence, moreover, the route for an advance t0 East rrennessee would be better
than from Bowling Green. Accordingly, McCook, with three divisions, reached
Nashville on the 7th of November; 'l'homas followed, taking poRsession of the
line of railroad from Bowling Green to Gallatin, and charged to have it put
promptly in repair, while Crittenden, with three divisions, moved from Glasgow,
by Scottsville, across the Cumberland, to Lebanon, Tennessee. I immediately
put to work all the means of transportation at our disposal to haul supplies
from l\fitchellsville to Nashville while the road was being repaired, and by the
26th of November had succeeded in getting five day's supplies in advance for
our command, and bringing down ammunition enough to put all our troops, including the Nashville garrison, in fighting condition. I assembled the cavalry
within the infantry lines in a mass, appointed Major General Stanley its commander, and, having inspected, informed them it was my intention to procure
them first-class arms, and then to expect from them fighting worthy of our arms
and country;. and to infuse into them the cavalry spirit, I arranged to give
them an opportunity for combat where evident superiority would insure their
success, and had the pleasure soon to witness the happiest results. I communicated t o the general-in-chief the facts just stated; but before we could get the
railroad repaired, the first train over which came through on the 27th of November, I received an urgent letter pressing me to move forward. In reply, I
explained that it must be evident to him an advance at that time offered us no
advantages, because, with our present means of transportation, we could do
very little more than to subsist our troops at Nashville, distant one hundred and
eighty-three miles from our base at Louisville; that to advance would be to expose Nashville and what little we had there, as well as our line of communication, to interruption from the enemy's superior cavalry, and thus put us on
limited supplies; that the enemy was advancing towards Nashville-Bragg
with all his army and reported re-enforcements from Longstreet-and that every
mile these rebels travelled towards us, before reaching the point of conflict, was
to us an advantage and to them a disadvantage; and since our true objective,
the enemy's army, was approaching us, therefore, while we were obliged to wait
the completion of the railroad, we need not regret it, since it was increasing our
chances of succe'ss. From the 27th of November to the 25th of December the
Louisville and Nash ville road pushed down all the supplies which it could carry in
the then condition of its equipment and want of water-tanks. The general replied that there were urgent political reasons for my advance, and that he had
been requested by the President to designate my successor. 'l'o this I replied,
substantially restating the necessities of our situation, and reiterating my opinion that the country was gaining by the course I was pursuing; that my appointment to that command having been made without any solicitation from me
or my friends, if the President continued to have confidence in the propriety of
the selection he must permit me to use my judgment, and be responsible for
the results; but if he entertained doubts, he ought at once to appoint a commander
in whom he could confide, for the good of the service and of the country, without delay. 'l'his seemed satisfactory, for I received no further communication
on the subject.
As soon as we had twenty days' rations in advance in N ash;ville, I prepared
to move on the enemy, who, through representations which I had caused to be
made, had been induced to believe we dare not advance from Nashville, and
had gone into a slightly intrenched camp at Murfreesboro with his main force,
while Hardee's corps took post at Triune, 17 miles west of Murfreesboro, from

26

ROSECRANS'S CAMPAIGNS.

whence, by tl1e aid of his cavalry, he could control all the roads leading south
from N a~hville, and keep and hold all the foraging country outside of our
infantry lines from us, unless we gathered it by a formidable foraging party,
seldom, if ever, less than a brigade.
I had another object in persuading the enemy I did not intend to advance
until spring, which was to induce him to send off a portion of his cavalry. In
this I was successful. Morgan was sent to Kentucky to operate on my communications, and Forrest went to West Tennessee to operate on General Grant's,
who was on the march by land to Vicksburg.
Taking ad vantage of this large diminution of their cavalry force, on the 26th
of December the army began to move. 'l'he outline plans of the advance and
of the resulting battle of Stone river are briefly these:
Crittenden's corps to advance by the Murfreesboro turnpike to Lavergne;
McCook's, on the Nolansville turnpike, to Nolansville, and take the pass there
from Hardee, whose corps held it; ':rhomas to move by the Franklin turnpike,
and cross to N olansville, threatening Hardee's flank, which, with McCook's
movement, it was presumed would dislodge and cause Hardee to join the main
rebel forc e, which we expected to fight us either at Stewart's creek or in front
of Murfreesboro.
To provide for the former case, Thomas was to cross from N olansville to
Stewart's creek and meet Crittenden there; l\IcCook was to move to warns
Murfreesboro by the Wilkinson turnpike; while 'l'homas and Crittenden took
the main turnpike towards Murfreesboro.
.
Our movements were successful on the night of the 30th, after skirmishing
with the enemy's advance for six or seven miles on each road on the 29th and
all clay on the 30th. At the close of that day we were all in position on the
enemy's front, and h nd determined the general distribution of his troops.
The plan of the battle was, that our right should hold its position; Thomas,
the centre, with a division in reserve; and Crittenden, with two divisions, ~hould
cross Stone river, beat Breckinridge, and from his position enfilade or take in
reverse the enemy's centre and left. on wltich 'l'homas would press with crushing weight, and thus roll up his forces on the left, which would JeaYe them but
little chance of escaping total destruction. For details I refer to my official
report, which I hereby make a part of this testimony.
The official r eport states why, after thd pursuit, the army was halted at l\furfreesboro instead of being pushed further into the interior of the country.
'l'he committee's attention may, perhaps, well be directed to the following facts
bearing on the question of an advance at that time beyond Murfreesboro: Before the railroad could be opened from Nashville our troops were obliged to live
on short rations, and that the transportation, in the desperate condition of the
roads, was not sufficient fully to supply them. That, in addition to the enemy's
superior numbers of cavalry, he had been re-enforced, by General Van Dorn,
with six or seven thousand cavalry from Mississippi. With such a force it
would have been impossible for us to have maintained our communications at
any distance materially greater from our depots than 1\furfree~boro.
It will also appear from that report, and from the testimony of others, that
such is the nature of the soil from Murfreesboro south to the Tennessee river
that in winter grand movements are next to impossible.
Had we possessed a superior cavalry, with which to have beaten the enemy's,
and afterwards to have threatened his communications and asRnred the citizens
of Tennessee of our protection to our friends and condign punishm en t to our
enemies, we could undoubtedly have expelled Bragg from Middle T ennessee.
Fully conscious of this, I m::tde every effort to have the cavalry well mounted
and well armed, and the urgency of my solicitation was so great that I incurred
the displeasure of the War Department, which was manifested, as will appear,
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in the copies of correspondence which is herewith submitted and made a part of
my testimony.
During the winter, with our utmost endeavor, it became utterly impossible to
get an adequate supply of long forage, the consequence being that our team
and cavalry horses suffered badly, and nearly one-half of our cavalry-men were
dismounted. When spring arrived, and the roads had become settled, a movement, which the country expected, and which would have given the officers and
men of our command, including myself, pleasure and promi3ed renown, was proposed. I felt it my duty to sacrifice all personal gratification, and even to fall
in the estimation, temporarily, of the country and friends who had high hopes
and expectations of the army of the Cumberland, to secure General Grant, in
his operations before Vicksburg, from the consequences of compelling Bragg to
retire, when it would not be possible for us so to pur~me as to prevent him from
re-enforcing ,Johnston, whose relative numbers to our troops under General
Grant was deemed more formidable than I subsequently learned it to have
been. The confidence of the country in the army of the Cumberland seems to
have reconciled it to a delay, the cause for which the mass of its citizens could
not understand.
The propriety of this delay, if not its necessity, will appear from the copies of
my letters to the War Department and general-in-chief, herewith submitted and
made part vf my testimony.
I may add that General Burnside's co-operation promised by the general-inchief, and very desirable, failed us. The magnitude of the movement across
the barren mountains, and the destitution of the country into which we would
debouch, made it evident that we could not, with any reasonable hope of success, attempt to seize Chattanooga and East Tennessee until new corn came in
to furnish forage for at lt>ast cavalry and artillery horses, and until the railroad
could be completed to the Tennessee river. Such being the case, it is evident
that since we could not successfully pursue the enemy into Georgia, were we
to compel him to retire from Middle Tennessee, it was our interest, and offered
us the greatest chanees of safety against any use the enemy might in that case
make of his troops against General Grant, to keep him as far away from the
general, and as near to us, as possible; and, besides, it would increase our chances
of striking him a damaging blow when the time came. The motives General
Bragg had for remaining in Middle r.rennessee, in our immediate front, Shelbyville and 'I'ullahoma, were most influential. He had many Tennessee troops
who did not desire to quit the State; he was in a better country for forage and
subsistence than would be the country in the rear of his position at Chattanooga; he had the prestige of commanding a great advance, and the natural desire
of a commander to retain his prestige and the troops who gave him confidence
and the means of success; he was, moreover, flattering himself that he was doing
a most useful work in preventing re-enforcements from going to Grant from the
army of the Cumberland.
News of the favorable progress and probable speedy termination of the siege
of Vicksburg, and the arrival of our cavalry horses, decided the time for our
movement on Bragg's army, which held an intrenched camp at Shelbyville,
with another fortified position at Tullahoma, eighteen miles further south, on
the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. 'l1he plan was to seize the gap covering his front and right flank, turn Shelbyville by the way of Manchester, and,
moving on his communications in rear of Tullahoma, compel him to come out
and fight on our own ground, or retreat by a disadvantageous route.
The movement began about the 24th of June, and, despite one of the most
remarkable periods of rain which had been known at that season for many
years in Tennessee-such that a corps did not march more than five miles
per day-was eminently successful.
In nine days we drove the enemy from two fortified positions, which gaYe
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us possession of Middle Tennessee-a campaign conducted in one of the most
extraordinary rains ever known in Tennessee at ~hat period of the year, over a
soil that became almost a quicksand. Our operations were retarded thirty-six
hours at Hoover's gap, and sixty hours at and in front of Winchester, which
alone prevented our getting possession of the enemy's communicatious and forcing him to very disastrous battle.
Our losses were only 560 men killed, wounded, and missing.
'rhe enemy retreated across mountains and across the 'rennessee river at
Bridgeport, where he destroyed the railroad bridge and his pontoon bridge at
the mouth of Battle creek. For the details of this campaign, so decisive and
important in its results, I refer to my official report on file at the War Department, which is hereby made a part of this testimony. It will show that to
dislodge the enemy from Middle 'l'ennessee cost us only 560 men lwrs de combat. Every effort was immediately directed to the repairing of the railroad from
Murfreesboro to the Tennessee river, to which point we sent a small advance
of infantry and cavalry. By the 25th of July we were able to send through a
supply train, and General Sheridan was then directed to occupy Stevenson with
two brigades, and sent the third brigade of his division to Bridgeport. The
next object was to establish a depot at Stevenson and replenish it with supplies,
to repair the '£racy City road, a branch which runs up to the Sewanee coal mine in
the Cumberland mountains, so as to put supplies at that point in case the army
should operate by the Sequatchie valley. 'These preparations also were pushed
with the utmost vigor. We were now about to undertake what would have
been a great operation in any war-to move over a range of mountains, to cross
a great river, and then two other ranges of mountains, before reaching the
vital point of the enemy's position or seriously endangering his line of communication. To carry both provisions and forage for our animals in such an expedition was simply impossible. It was necessary either to move slowly and
complete the i·ailroad for hauling our supplies, or to wait until the new corn
should be fit to use. I chose the latter, as it gave us the advantage of being
able to operate so as to deceive the enemy, and, crossing the river, seize the
mountain passes by stratagem, instead of giving him an opportunity to oppose
us. It was also the dictate of military prudence to provide an adequate force
for keeping up our communications as the distance from our depots lengthened,
as well as to meet the concentration which it was the enemy's obvious interest
to make on our army in order to attack it at the remotest distance from its base,
and where it should have the greatest number of obstacles in case of disaster.
But about this time, 25th of July, the general-in-chief began to manifest
great impatience at the delay in the movement on Chattanooga, notwithstanding he was informed of the cause, ancl was, moreover, aware that General
Burnside, whose co-operation was justly expected, was not ready to co-operate
in the movement. About this time I also sent General Rousseau to Washington
with a letter to the Secretary of vVar, to the general-in-chief, and one to the
President, representing the importance of adequately supporting the advance
we were about to make. and of preparing the means for making it efficient in
damaging the enemy after we should reach Chattanooga, and suggesting, among
other modes, that of allowing General Rousseau to avail of the offers of the
governors of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and some others, to raise for him
veteran mounted troops to serve in the department of the Cumberland for the
purpose of relieving the troops otherwise necessary to secure the railroad bridges
and11 depots in the rear as we advanced. I received from the President, in reply,
a letter commending the wisdom of the suggestions in my letter; but the Secretary of \V ar not only gave them an unfavorable reception, but went so far as to
sayihe would be damned if he would give me another man. General Rousseau
said he was satisfied my official destruction was but a question of time and
opportunity ; the will to accomplish it existed, and that it was no use to hope
fo~any assistance from the War Department.
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Under these circumstances-having discharged my duty by stating the facts,
which called for ample provision to support the movement, to my military
superiors-! silently pushed, as I had previously been doing, preparations for
the advance on Chattanooga with the army of the Cumberland alone, stating
to the general-in-ehief what I was doing, and proposed to do, and that if this was
not satisfactory I wished to be relieved from the command of the army.
Accordingly, on the completion of the Tracy City road the army of the Cumberland began its movement for the possession of Chattanooga. The first thing
to be done was to deceive the enemy as to our real point of crossing, which had
to be selected in proximity with our depot of ammunition and supplies at Stevenson. Accordingly, by secret information, and by the open movement of
Crittenden's corps, and by the demonstrations made by detachments from it,
and from our cavalry, the whole extending from Blythe's ferry down to Decatur,
Alabama, 150 miles of front, as weU as by the concealment of the movement
of the main force to the vicinity of Stevenson and Battle creek, the enemy was
persuaded we intended to cross above Chattanooga, and made his dispositions
accordingly.
:For the details of the campaign by which we succeeded in crossing the Cumberland mountains, the Tennessee river, Sand mountains, and Lookont range,
in the face of an army whose business it was to oppose us, and, finally, in getting
possession of Chattanooga, the great objective point, notwithstanding the enemy
l1ad been re-enforced by ·a number of troops equal to that of our entire army, I
refer the committee to my official report of the battle of Chiekamauga, which
I hereby make a part of my testimony.
'rhe points to which I wish to direct the attention of the committee, in reference to this campaign, are.First. That I was fully aware of the magnitude and difficulties of the movement; that I made known, so far as I thought duty required and circumstances
permitted, these views to General Halleck, the Secretary of War, and even to
the President; that subsequent events-that is to say, the time necessarily consumed in the campaign-fully showed that it could not have been undertaken
with reasonable hopes of success earlier, on account of the necessity of having
forage for our animals, and the impossibility of transporting that forage and the
more necessary ammunition and subsistence, which we were compelled to carry
over these mountains, and that the necessity of supporting the movement by
additional forces, to which the attention of the general-in-chief and the War
Department had been directly and indirectly invited, was amply demonstrated
by the fact that the enemy did concentrate upon and attempt to crush the army
of the Cumberland, and that this attempt was anticipated by me, and ought to
have been expected by the general-in-chief and the War Department.
I would also call the attention of the committee to the fact that General
Burnside's co-operation was left on the footing of an independent movement, and
that in consequence of the want of unity between these movements the army
of the Cumberland and the interests of the nation were greatly and needlessly
imperilled at Chattanooga. I desire also to direct attention to the contrast in
the manner in .w hich our movement on Vicksburg and Missionary ridge were supported to show that the authorities at Washington by their action in these cases
recognized the principle which was violated in the case of this movement, and thus
bear testimony to the greatness of the mistake they made in not suitably supporting the movement of the army of the Cumberland in this great campaign.
In his annual report for 1863, the general-in-chief says :
" It seemed useless to send any more troops into East Tennessee and Georgia, on account of
the impossibility of supplying them in a country ·which the enemy had nearly exhausted.
General Burnside's army was on short rations, and that of the Cumberland inadequately
supplied. General Rosecrans had complained of his inadequate cavalry force, but the stables
of his depots were overcrowded with animals, and the horses of his artillery, cavalry, and
• trains were dying in large numbers fur want of forage."
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This statement is wholly untrue of any period after the 1st of May, and
therefore ought not to have been stated in the way it was. I was perfectly able
to feed all the cavalry horses needed in my movement on Chattanooga. It
conveys a very erroneous idea of the facts when applied to the previous period
from my arrival at Nashville until the campaign of Tullahoma; for the generalin-chief well knows, and the official correspondence submitted shows, that the
only reason we could not command adequate supplies of long forage for our
animals during that period was because our cavalry fone was too weak to go and
get it. Had we possessed a sufficient cavalry force, we should have had all
the forage of every description we wanted. Not only so, but my correspondence with the general shows the control of Middle Tennessee, and all its resourcet:, would have been ours, with adequate cavalry force to have driven the
rebel cavalry from it or put them behind their infantry lines.
I will also call the attention of the committee to the spirit of the report of
the general-in-chief, wherein he implies that the battle of Chickamauga was a
consequence of a wild scheme of advance into Georgia undertaken by me without just warrant of prudence or authority.
'J.1he general is very much mistaken in this matter. I well remember my
surprise on receiving the following from General Halleck, directing me to occupy D alton, and the passes to the west of it, at the moment when every nerve
was ten se with energy and anxiety to get my troops out of those passes and
concentrated on the Lafayette and Chattanooga road, twenty miles north qf
Dalton, in time to cover Chattanooga and prevent the enemy from falling on
and beating us in detail :
HEADQUARTERS OF 'l'Hi': ARMY,
Washington, D. C., September 11, 1863.
Major General RosECRANS, Chattanooga:
General Burnside telegraphs from Cumberland gap that he holds aU East Tennessee above
Loudon, and also the gaps of the North Carolina mountains. A cavalry force is moving
towards Athens to connect with you.
After holding the mountain passes on the west, and Dalton, or some other point on the
railroad, to prevent the return of Brag·g's army, it will be decided whether your army shall
move further south into Georgia and Alabama.
It is rep orted here by deserters that a part of Bragg's army is re-enforcing L ee. It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as possible.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in- Chief.

To meet controversy directly on this point, I will state that no "wild" or
other scheme of advance into Georgia was ever entertained by me, nor anything beyond the capture and firm possession of Chattanooga contemplated,
save a sharp pursuit moving lightly to injure the enemy should we find
kim hastily ret/r eating in a condition to be injured north of Oostenaula. To
show what an estimate was put upon the securing of Chattanooga as a base for
future operations, getting an opening into Georgia, and shutting out the enemy
from the coal1·egion and from East 'J.1ennessee, the committee will find that, before crossing the Tennessee on this march, I contracted with very respont:ible
parties, one, to complete the railroad bridge across the 'rennessee before the lst
day of October; the other, to complete the Running- liVater bridge by the 1st
day of November, and that the battle was fought on the 18th, 19th, and 20th
of September. Speaking from memory as to the dates of these contracts, but
the contracts are on file and will show the dates.
The committee will observe from my official report that we began to cross
the Tennessee on the 28th of August, and that, therefore, we were twenty-two
days out from our depots; our army having to carry in that campaign ammunition fur two great battles and twenty-five days' subsistence, which was done
and proDounced by General :Meigs to be not only the greatest operation in this
war, but a great thing in any war.
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My official report will. I think, sufficiently show, that it would have
been impossible for my command to have got possession of Chattanooga by
direct force. There is a bare possibility that by crossing the Tennessee above
Chattanooga at some suitable point where the enemy could not directly oppose us, and being re-enforced by Burnside's command, we might have captured the place by a battle; but when it is remembered that on much more
favorable ground, with greater relative superiority of force, our army was forty
two days in front of Vicksburg, it may well be doubted whether the army of the
Cumberland could have wrested Chattanooga from Bragg's force alone by any
other than the means adopted, namely, the powerful demonstration on his lines
of communication made at a time when yet he had not been joined by Johnston's and Longstreet's commands, which added between 40,000 and 50,000 to
his strength. At all events, it was my best judgment at the time that in that
way only could we succeed in dislodging Bragg from Chattanooga and obtaining possession of it; and General Garfield, if not other members of my staff,
will remember and bear witness that two of my most anxious and sleepless
nights were spent, one in Lookout valley, the other in Chattanooga, watching
Bragg, and hoping that his movements would permit the concentration of our army
east of Lookout, between him and Chattanooga. Fortunately for us, his re-enforcements were not up, and our possession of the two passes, over Lookout, at
Frick's and Cooper's gaps, and the position of McCook's corps, and the cavalry threatening to enter Broomtown valley, induced him to retire behind
Pigeon mountain, with headquarters at Lafayette.
It has been a popular impression, possibly encouraged if not believed in high
military quarters, that because a portion of our command, including myself,
entered Chattanooga, that we had possession of it with our army, in the sense of
being so established there, so that we could have retained it without a battle.
This is an error into which no good military mind cognizant of the facts
could for a moment fall. Bragg was compelled or induced to fall back from
Chattanooga by the menacing attitude of Thomas's corps at Frick's and
Cooper's Gap. twenty-six miles south, and of McCook's, wit !t the cavalry corps
at Valley Head, forty-two miles from Chattanooga. Crittenden's corps, a part
of which was employed in making the demonstration above Chattanooga, and
the remainder in watching and rqvcring the pass over the extremity of Lookout, passed into Chattanooga when Bragg fell back, and repaired at once to
that point to ascertain the movement of the enemy; and all that was done was
done promptly, and to that end only. And the instant these movements were
discovered, and the enemy was found to have retired slowly towards Laf~1yette,
not a moment was lost in making the necessary disposition, first, to secure our
troops against being cut up in detail; and, secondly, to effect a most expeditious
concentration at an eligible point between the enemy and Chattanooga, the goal
of our efforts. It was our good fortune to succeed in concentrating on the afternoon of the 18th, but the tardy arrival of McCook's corps came near being fatal
to us.
For the events which followed I refer the committee to my official report,
calling attention only to one point which is not therein sufficiently elaborated.
Forgetting my past record, and influenced by the calumnies put in circulation,
it bas been thought that I needlessly or languidly forsook the field of battle on
the 20th. ~l'he facts are as follows : Immediately on the arrival of McCook's
troops at the encampment of Thomas, at the foot of Frick's gap, all our spare
trains, including those of Crittenden's corps, were ordered into the valley of
Chattanooga creek, which lies at the eastern base of Lookout mountain, both
for safety and forage. The troops, infantry and artillery, as my official report
shows, were pushed with all possible vigor (marching all night) eastward to get
possession of the Lafayette road. Our cavalry was ordered to connect with our
right, and extend westward to cover those trains from the enemy's cavalry;
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and the guards were increased by Post's brigade of Davis's division, McCook's
corps, which had been left behind to conduct its train. When the breach on
the right of our lines occurred at midday of the 20th, this train, with all our
spare subsistence and other supplies lay along the valley of Chattanooga creek,
from near the front some four or five miles; and as the distance from the point
where the enemy had penetrated our infantry lines to the flank and rear of the
train was only three or four miles, they were in the most critical condition, and
it became a matter of the utmost importance to put it out of the enemy's reach.
When, therefore, I reached the vicinity of Rossville, and became satisfied that
though cut off from the main body of our army, which held the centre and left,
General Thomas with five brigades, three of Sheridan's and two of Davis's, we
still held the field in front of Thomas, two things were to be done: first, to
ascertain the condition of affairs at the front; the other, to have this train moved
to a place of security. This latter required that the orders should be given for
its being pushed and secured north of Chattanooga creek, the only passage over
which was by a very rickety bridge near a hundred feet long and thirty or forty
feet high, and to order the movement of the train to that place, and send orders
to General Mitchell, commanding the cavalry, advising him of the condition of
affairs, and directing him to make such dispositions as would most securely
effect the movement of the train and cover it from the enemy's enterprises;
while at the same time, as a part of the general dispositions for the continuance
of battle, he must be advised to put himself in connexion with our right in the
new po::;ition it had been compelled to take after its repulse from the field at the
widow Glen's house. Having explained this to General Garfield, my chief of
staff, it was determined that the movement to the front, being less complicated,
should be performed by him, wbile I made the dispositions and gave the orders
just spoken of. Nor was I unmindful of the consideration that, as the security
of Chattauooga was the essential thing, my duty as commanding general
required that I shou d look to the ground with a view to the eventualities of being
driven from the field of battle, where we were so vastly outnumbered, and that I
should make such dispositions as would enable us to hold that place and to
subsist our troops until we could be re-enforced. As it was possible that the
enemy's cavalry might penetrate the rough country on the right of onr line, and
cut telegraphic and other communications, south of the river, with Bridgeport
and the north, and in pursuance of a duty I have always imposed on myself,
to keep the government candidly informed of the exact posture of affairs, I
deemed it proper to telegraph to Washington the events of the day.
Out of the performance of these two duties, dictated by candor and a pure
desire to do the best for the country, unjust and sycophantic men have undertaken to construct the means of injuring my military reputation.
As my official report of the battle substantially closes with the firm possession of Chattanooga, I will here state what seems of importance:
That it was abundantly established by information gained before and during
the battle of Chickamauga, and confirmed by l:lubsequent information and events,
that we were outnumbered very nearly two to one in that battle. As my determination was to hold what we had gained, at all hazards and to the last extremity, all my dispositions were at once directed to that end. I concentrated
the forces within a defensive line sufficiently contracted to defy the enemy's
power, and fortified it without delay. I at the same time used every possible
effort to provide bridges by which our troops and trains could communieate
with the north side of the river, from which our liue of communication with
Bridgeport would be comparatively safe, while, against the superior numbers of
the enemy, its maintenance on the south side of the river was practically out of
the question.
General Halleck in his annual report says I abandoned the passes of Lookout mountain, leaving the public to imagine that these passages were within the
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possible control of my army, and their abandonment not justified as a military
measure. 1 call the attention of the committee to the fact that one of these
passes was 42 miles south of Chattanooga, and the next nearest 26 miles south
of Chattanooga, and the nearest at the extremity of Lookout mountain in front
of our lines. This latter may have been the one which gave rise to his report;
and if so, it ought to have been so stated. I was satisfied that 1 could not hold
even this pass and Chattanooga at the same time if the enemy did his duty,
and therefore withdrew my troops from it, but established batteries on the other
side of the river, which rendered it practically of little if any use to them.
Subsequent events amply justified the wisdom of this decision, for the enemy,
with a division and a half, were unable to bold it against General Hooker, and
it was their attempt to cover this point .which was one of tne causes of their
being beaten so easily at Missionary ridge. In General Grant's official report
of the battle of Missionary ridge, I think-for I have not the document-tl1ere
is an implication that when he assumed command there was great danger of my
abandoning Chattanooga. Nothing could be more mistaken or unjust to me
than such an impression. All my actions and sentiments were utterly at variance
with the idea of giving up that point, which I had won, and the possession of
which formed an epoch in the war. I mention facts on this subject, viz: as
early as the 4th of October, fourteen days after the battle, I called the attention
of General Thomas and General Garfield to the map of Chattanooga and vicinity,
and, pointing out to them the positions, stated that as soon as I could possibly
get the bridge materials for that purpose, I would take possession of Lookout
valley, opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain, and fortify it,
thus completely covering the road from there to Bridgeport, on the south side
as well as the river, and giving us practical possession and use of both, as well
as of Lookout valley; because, by means of a fortified tete-de-pont, after our
fortifications at Chattanooga were completed, we could easily concentrate our
whole force to fight the enemy if he entered Lookout valley, and that within
less than two hours' march, while he could not approach us in force with artillery without making a circuit over Lookout mountain, by way of Frick's and
Stevens's gaps, 26 miles southeast, which would take two or three days.
An interior line of fortifications was laid out and put in course of construction,
designed to cover our d~pots with a garrison of one or two divisions against all
the forces the enemy could bring. I had, moreover, ordered the construction of
small steamboats and barges at Bridgeport tu run thence to Chattanooga, two
of which were well advanced when the army crossed on its advance ido
Georgia; and, from the 2~d of September, my correspondence and my staff
officers will testify that I was urging the quartermaster, Captain Ed ward~, who
had the work in hand, to hasten its completion, which it was hoped would be
the case by the time we were ready to take and hold Lookout valley. rl'o
effect this General Hooker was directed to concentrate his troops at Stevenson
and Bridgeport, and advised that as soon as his train should arrive, or enough
of it to subsist his army ten or twelve miles from his depot, he would be directed
to move into Lookout valley to take possession of that ; and every effort was
made to complete the pontoons, &c., to connect that with our troops at Chattanooga. On the 19th of October I examined the river, and selected a point for
the crossing of the bridge at Ferry to connect Hooker's with the forces at
Chattanooga. I moreover directed General W. I!.,. Smith to reconnoitre the
shore above Chattanooga, with a view to that very movement on the enemy's
right flank which was afterwards made by General Sherman.
On the 19th of October, on my returning from selecting the position of the
pontoon bridge, I received orders to turn over the command of the army of the
Cumberland to Major General Thomas, repair to Cincinnati, and report from
there by letter to the Adjutant General for orders. Convinced that this would
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excite profonnd sorrow and discontent in the army of the Cumberland, which
my continued presence, after it became known, would increase, and that this·
would be detrimental to the public service in the presence, as we were, of the
enemy, I determined to forego the gratification of receiving the partir1g adieus
of those with whom I had shared so many toils and successes. I left the next
morning shortly after daylight, before the order was kno,vn. The committee
will probably desire to know what communication took place between me and
General Burnside during my movement on Chattanooga. I have before stated
that a co-operation between him and myself, arranged with a view to the Tullahoma campaign, was prevented by re-enforcements ordered from Burnside's
command to Vicksburg. When his troops were returned, he arranged to move
on East Tennessee, communicated to me his plan for a movement into East
Tennessee, but it was independent of mine, and though intended to be contemporary, was likely and actually proved to be unavailing to assist my movement for want of unity of object and command. It was from the first obvious
that the moment we seriously threatened Chattanooga all the forces in East Tennessee would probably abandon it and join General Bragg to oppose us. General
Burnside's as an independent command, as was to have been expected, was
little or no use, for the moment we threatened to cross the Tennessee above
Chattanooga Buckner began to retire from the north towards Loudon, and when
we threatened Bragg's communications south of Chattanooga, he precipitately
abandoned the whole of East Tennessee and joined General Bragg.
General Halleck, in his official report for that year, quotes at length orders
given on the 12th, 13th, and 14th of September to Burnside, at Knoxville, General
Hurlbut, at Memphis, and General Sherman, at Vicksburg, to re-enforce the
army of the Cumberland, but fails to state that on the 14th of September I
t elegr:1phed the general asking if he had reason to believe Bragg had been reenforced from Virginia, and that on the 15th he telegraphed in reply that no
re-enforcPments had gone south to Bragg, only a few regiments to Charleston.
More, the accompanying correspondence shows that an apprehension existed in
Washington even as late as the 11th of September that Bragg was re-enforcing
Lee. 'l'he committee will no doubt inquire how orders to troops at such distant
points at that date could have brought any support to the army of the Cumberland, which began its life and death struggle on the 18th, only six days from
the earliest of his orders. I will also state to the committee that Longstreet's
movement to support Bragg was known to General Pt'ck as early as the 6th,
and that Colonel Jacques, 73d Illinois, endeavored to communicate the fact
that Longstreet's corps was going to Bragg, to the authorities at Washington,
so long before the battle that he was able to wait ten days in vain iu Baltimore
for a hearing, and then to reach us and take part in the battle of Chickamauga.
As I have narrated the principal events n.ot prominently developed in my
official report, (a copy of which, and some official letters, I have made a part of
my testimony before the c0mmittee, in relation to the campaign of Chickamauga,)
I forbear to notice and reply to the variOJlS erroneous and diverse rumors and. statements which have found more or less publicity; but I think it due to justice and
the discipline of the army, as well as to the country, whose servants are thereby
implicated, to state that General Woods, who&e official report of his part in the
battle, comprising near seventy pages foolscap, was duly forwarded to Washington
by me, was, after I was relieved fi'Om command of the army of the Cumberland,
permitted access to my official report and allowed to send a letter to Washington
direct, without furnishing me a copy of it; and that his letter was received
without notice to me, and quoted by the general-in-chief, as to some extent, a
rival authority, and subsequently furnished from the War Department to the
press as an accompaniment to my official report of the battle; and that, when I
complained of it, no redress or apology was offered therefor, nor was my letter
of correction published until the lapse of some .two months thereafter.
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CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

Ma}or General Halleck to MaJor General Rosecrans.
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 14, 1863.
Burnside bas been frequently urged to move forward, and cover your left in entering
East Tennes£ce. I do not know wha.t he is doing. He seems tied fast to Cincinnati.
H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief.

For Ma}or General Rosecrans.
WASHINGTON, Augu.st 5, 1863.
The orders for the advance of your army, and that its progress be reported daily, are peremptory.
H. W. HALLECK.

Ma}nr General Halleck to Ma}or General Rosecrans.
WASHINGTON,

August 20, 1863.

It bas been reported for some days that some portion of Bragg's army has been sent ot
Richmond to re-enforce Lee. It is important that the truth of this report be ascertained

as early as possible.
H. W. HALLECK, Ma}or General,.

Ma}or General Halleck to Ma;jor General Rosecrans.?
WASHINGTON, August 25, 1863.
Burnside, when last heard from, was at Mount Vernon, moving towards Knoxville.
He is directed to move forward as rapidly as possible, aud to keep you posted in regard
to hio operations. Grant's movements at present have no connexion with you.
H. W. HALLECK.

MaJor General Halleck to MaJor General Rosecrans.
WASHINGTON, September 2, 1863.
Burnside is at Montgomery, moving on Kingston; the enemy expected to be concentrated
at Loudon.
HALLECK.

Ma;'or General Halleck to Ma;'or General Rosecrans.
WASHINGTON, September 6, 1863.
I have heard nothing from Burnside since his despatch of All~Ul'lt 31, the substance of
which was sent to you. His instructions were to advise you of his movements, and connect a.,; soon as pos:>ible with your left. There is no reason now to suppose that any of
Lee's troops have been detached, except, perhap::;, a small force at Charleston.
H. W. liALLECK, JJ1ajor General.

Jfa;'or General Halleck to Major General Rosecrans.
WASHINGTON, Septemb~r 6, 1863.
You give no information of the position of Bragg and Buckner; if they have united, it is
important that you and Burnside unite as quickly as possible, so that the enemy may not
attack you separately.
H. W. HALLECK, .Ma}or General.

Ma;"or General, Halleck to Ma;"or Gene1·al Rosecrans.
WASHINGTON, September 11, 1863.
Burnside telegraphs from Cumberland gap that he holds all East Tennessee above
Loudon, and also the gap of the North Carolina mountains. A cavalry force is moving
towards Atht:ns to conu.t:ct with you. After holding the mountain passes on the west and
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Dalton, or some other point on the railroad, to prevent the return of Bragg'::; army, it will
be decided whether your army shall move further south into Georgia and Alahama It is
reported here by deserters that a part of Bragg's army is re-enforcing Lee. It is important
that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as possible.
H. W. HALLECK, Commander in-Chief.
By order of Secretary of War to Ma}or General Rosecrans.
~

W ASHINGTON 1 September 12, 1863.
Following telegram is sent for your information, by order of Secretary , of War, from
Memphis, 5 p.m., September 9. A gentleman just in from Mobile reports th,tt a11 of Johnston's
force bas gone to join Bragg at and near Chattanooga. I think the reporthrue, from the
source I received it, and from the fact that the cou11try south of Corinth is full of regular
cavalry making some movement.
S. A. HURLBURT, Ma}or General.
" Major General Halleck to Major General Rosecrans.

"WASHINGTON, Septeml1er 13, 1863.
"There is no intention of sending Burnsid~ into North Carolina. He is ordered to move
down and connect with you.
" Should the enemy attempt to turn your right flank through Alabama, Chattanooga
should be turned over to Burnside and given away, or such part of it as may not be required there should move to prevent Brazg from re-entering Middle Tennessee. Hurlbut
will aid you all he can, but most of Grant's available force is west of the Uissi;;sippi.
" HALLECK."
Major Generalllalleck to Major General Rosecrans.

WASHINGTON, Stptember 21, 1863-3 p.m.
Nothing heard from Burnside since the 19th; he was then sending to your aid all his
available force. It is hoped that you will hold out till he can re-enforce you. He was
directed to connect with you ten days ngo, and the order bas been reported several days
since. I can get no reply from Hu tllmt or Sherman.
H. W. HALLECK, Mn}or General.
President Lincoln to Major; General Rosecrans.

WASHINGTON, September 23, 186~.
Below is Bragg's despatch, as found in the Richmond papers. You see be does not claim
so many prisoners or captured guns as you were inclined to concede. He also confesr;es to
heavy loss.
.
An exchanged general of ours, leaving Richmond yesterday, says two of Longstreet's
divisions and his entire artillery, and two of Pickett's brigades and Wise's legion have gone
to Tennessee. He mentions no other.
A. LI~COLN.
"CHICKAMAUGA RIVER, September 20, via Ringold, 218t.
Major General CooPER, A. Gen. :
11
After two days' hard fighting we have driven the enemy, after a desperate resistanc~
from several positions, and now hold the field, but he still confronts us. The losses are
heavy on both sides, especially on our officers. We have taken over 20 pieces of artillery
and some 2,500 prisoners.
I I BRAXTON BRAGG."
11

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 24, 1863-3 a. m.
¥ajor General RosECRANs,
Comd' 9 Dept. of Cumberland:
In addition to the expected a8sistance to you from Burnside, Hurlbut and Sherman,
with fourteen or fifteen thousand men from here, will be in Nashville in about s~ven dnys.
The government deems it very important that Chattanooga be held till re-enforcements
arrive.
H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief.
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WASHINGTON, D. C., September 30, 1863-10 a.m.
Major Gener<>1 RosECRANS,
Comd'g Army of Cumberland:
The advance of Grant's re-enforcements were on their way from Vicksburg to Memphis
on the 22d. Hurlbut was directed to report their movement from day to day, but he is
probably unable to do so, hwing no telegraphic communication. Moreover, it is probable
that all mail boats were sent to Vicksburg for troops. · I have no communication with
Burnside siuce he left Knoxville. Communicate to him directly what you wish him to do.
H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief.
WASHINGTON, D. C., September 24:, 1863-10 a. m.
Major General RosECRANS,
Comd' g Dept. of Cumberland. :
The corps of 14 to 15,000 men to be sent you from here bas the usual amount of artillery, but no cavalry; if the artillery is not deemed necessary, the railroad tranaportation
will be greatly diminished. Please answer.
H. W. HALLECK, Commander.in-Chief.
WASIIINGTON, D. C., October 12, 1863-10 a. m.
Major General RosECRANS,
Comd' g Dept. of Cumberland:
Captain Comstock is sick. Sherman is moving east of Corinth; where be now is I do
not ]mow ; no telegraphic communication with him. Have heard nothing of Burnside
since the 7th. If he is not moving down you must look to the passes of the Tennessee
river above Chattanooga. Lee's army is again moving northward.
H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chtef.
WASHINGTON, D. C., September 28, 1863-10.5 a. m.
Major General RosECRANS :
Grant's forces were ordered to move to Memphis, Corinth, Tuscumbia, to Decatur, and
thence, as might be necessary, to co-operate with you. fSupplies were to be collected at
Corinth before they arrived ; as tbe rolling stock is only sufficient to cany baggage and
supplies, the troops must march the whole dista.nce. The order was issued on the 18th,
and steamboats went to Vicksburg to bring up the troops; they calculated to be able to
communicate with you in fourteen days from that time. Since then nothing has been
heard of them, there being no telegraph lines. The troops from here will probably reach
you first.
H. W. HA.LLEOK, Commander-in-Chief.
MURFREESBORO, January 14:, 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington,
C.:
I mest have cavalry or mounted infantry. I could mount infantry had I horses and
saddles. The saddles I had ordered have been delivered so very slowly, that now, after
fonr months, I ha.ve only a few hundred more than have been required for the use of the
cavalry. With mounted infantry I can drive the rebel cavalry to the wall, and keep the
roads open in my rear. Not so now. I must also have some bullet-proof light-draught transports for the Cumberland. Will you authorize the purchase of saddles and horses for
mounting, when requisite, 5,000 more infantry?
W. S. ROSECRANS, MaJor General.

v:

MuRFREESBORO, February 1, 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Waehington, D. C.:
I have direct information that Joe Johnston arrived at Tullahoma on the 27th ultimo.
Van Dorn, who was sent in command of the rebel cavalry in Mississippi, has been ordered
over here to subsist on the country and interrupt our communication. To meet this
emergency we must bring down all the cavalry available, and add to it the mounting of a
brigarle of infantry for backing and expeditionary purposes If you will back me up, I am
determined to command the country, instead of giving it up to the enemy. I shall ask
you things as they are needed. General Wright thinks the 2d Ohio cavalry at Columbus,
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and the lOth at Cleveland, are not at his disposal. I advised him otherwise, but not having
beard from him, advise you of it. Our first want will be a.rms. Don't be weary at my
importunity. No economy can compare with that of furnishing revolving arms; no mode
of recruiting will so promptly and efficaciously strengthen us. I am about to establish n
elite battalion in each brigade, composed of the soldiers from each company. One commissioned and five non-commissioned officers from each regiment, and one field officer for
the brigade, to be selected for superior and soldierly bearing in battle and on duty. I
promise them the best. of arms, when I can· get them, and will mount them for rapid field
movements, like flying artillery. Will you please aid me to get the arms-even instalments, to show they will come some day, will answer. We muRt create military ardor.
W. S. ROSECRANS, 1l1ajor General.
MuRFREESBORO,

February 2, 1863.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Washington, D. 0.:
I telegraphed the commander-in-chief that 2, 000 carbines or revolving rifles were required
He replied as if he thought it a complaint. I telegraph you also t 0
prevent misunderstanding. I speak for the country when I say that 2,000 effective cavalr.Y
will cost the support of nearly four thousand, say five thousand dollars per day. But th lS
is the smallest part of our trouble. One rebel cavalryman takes, on an average, three of
our infantry to watch our communications, while our progress is made slow and cautiou, 1
and we command the forage of the country only by sending large train guards. It is o
prime necessity, in every point of view, to master their cavalry. I propose to do this, first
by so arming our cavalry as to give it its maximum strength ; second, by having animals
and saddles temporarily to mount infantry brigades for marches and enterprises. We have
now one thousand cavalrymen without horses, and two thousand without arms. We
don't want revolvers so much as light revolving rifles. This matter is so clearly, in my
mind, of paramount public interest, that I blush to think it necessary to seem to apologize
for it. I do hope the government will have confidence enough in me to know I never have
asked, and never will ask, anything to increase my personal command. Had this been
understood when I went with Blencker's division, this nation might have been spared millions
blood and treasure.
W. S. ROSECRANS,. Ma}or General.

to arm our cavalry.

MuRFREESBORO, February 2, 1863.
Major General H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. 0. :
I am surprised that you mistake my meaning. I do not complain. I point the way to
victory. I tell you how I think this force is to be created and maintained at slight expense.
This war demands such consideration, and many more, to save the waste of human life.
Already our thinned regiments testify to this, rmd show no substantial gain from recruiting.
I wish to be understood as makiog no complaints. The great point I make i:> that the
goverument pays costs of troops, without getting the benefit of their strength. The other
is, no matter what the government has done or left undone for this army, policy and duty
demand means to meet the coming emergency. Why should the rebels command the
country which, with its resources, would belong to our army, because it can muster the
small percentage of six or eight thousand more c:walry than we 7 I want superior arms to
supply the place of numbers. Give revolving rifles in place of pistols. We must have
cavalry arms, and the difference between best and worst is more than one hundred per cent.
on the daily cost of the troops . Excuse my earnestness in this matter; I probably see it
much more clearly than I can explain.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Ma}or General.

MuRFREESBORO, March 6, 1863.
GENERAL: Yours of the first instant, announcing the offer of a vacant major generalship
in the regular army to the general in the field who first wins an important and decisive
victory, is received. As an officer and a citizen, I feel degraded at such an auctioneering
of honors. Have we a general who would fight for his own personal benefit, when he
would not for honor and his country? He w::mld come by his commission basAly in that
case, and deserve to be despised by men of honor. But are all the brave and honorable
generals on an equality as to chances? If not, it is unjust to those who probably deserve
most.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,

Oommander-in-Ohiej, Washington, D. 0.
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MuRFREESBORO, March 20, 1863.
Brigadier General L THOMA.S,
Adjutant General U S Army, Washington, JJ. 0 :
Duty compels me to recall the attention of the War Department to the necessity of more
cavalry here. Let it be clearly under::;tood that the enemy have five to our one, and can
therefore command the resources of the country and the services of the inhabitants. To
supply in some measure our deficiency, I asked leave to mount some infantry ; it was
granted to the extent of five thousand. I have mounted about two thousand ; I now ask
authority to add to these two thousand a detail of one hundred and forty picked men
from each brigade, which will gh·e me the means of picketing all our ordinary lines, and
thus enable me to mass the cavalry for ~xpeditions. Early action is vitally important.
W. S. ROSECRANS, M11J'or General.

MuRFREESBORO, March 29, 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, JJ. C.:
General Rousseau would undertake to raise eight or ten thousand mounted infantry ;
thinks be could succteed in two months. I think the time very propitious, and that his influence would be healthful on butternuts and lukewarms If you ca~ arm, you can
doubtle~s mount th , ~m. and they would be of great avail in the future.
I recommend that
he be charged with raising these men, if deemed advisable, without rlelay.
W. S. RO::;ErJRANS, MaJ'or General.

MuRFREESBORO, April 24, 1863.
Ron. E M. STANTON, Secretary of War:
Cavalry horses are indispensable to our success here. We have always been without the
control of the country, except for a short rlistance beyond our infantry lines, and all the
forage and horses the country could furnish h~ve thus f::tllen into the hands of the enemy;
they subsist on the country by having five to our one of mounted force. Out of our nominal
cavalry force we have not more than forty per cent. available for want of horses; the fruits
of victory when gained will be lost for want of mounted force to pursue. This bas been
stated and reiterated to the department, but horses have not been obtained. No saving
of prices paid by the contracting system can compensate for the losses we have thus sustained and are sustaining. Prices should be paid that will give us good horses, and that
rapidly. Authority might wisely be given to your chief qn<trtermaster to purchase nt
reasonable prices wherever he can obtain them. General Stanley is now waiting in Louisville with twelve hundred (1,200) dismounted cavalry to bring down horses None there.
W. S. ROSECRANS.

MuRFREESBORO, April 26, 1863.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
Commander-in-Chief, Wa&hington, D. 0. :
GENERAL: Your letter of the 20th instant is received. If I have used the telegraph freely•
it has been through an anxious desire to do my duty, and insure that by no fault of mine
should things go unattended to, which my experience has shown may be the case, even
with the most able and zealous officers, without reminders. That I am very careful to inform the department of my successes, and of all captures from the enemy, is not true, as
the records of our office will show. That I have failed to inform the government of my
defeats and losses is equrttly untrue, both in letter and spirit. I regard the statement of
these two propositions of the War Department as a profound, grievous, cruel, and ungenerous official and personal wrong. If there is any one thing I despise and scorn it is an
(,fficer's blowing his own trumpet, or getting others to do it for him I had flattered
myself that no general officer in the service bad a clearer record on this point than I have.
I hhall here drop the subject, leaving to time and Providence the vindication of my condt.ct, and expect justice, kindness, and consideration only from those who are willing to
atcord them.
Accept for yourself, personally, my cordial thanks for your kindness, both personal and
ofLcial.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. S. ROSECRANS, Ma}or G£-neral, Commanding.
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MuRFREF.SBOltO, April 26, 1863.
Brigadier General THOMAS, Adjutant General, Washington:
Inform the general-in-chief I have from a letter of Colonel Hill, commnpfling a brigade
in the r ebel army, that Joe John;;ton has got 18 ,000 re-enforcements, of wi1ich 5,000 hacl
ahearly arrived on the 19th instant, and that he would have 30,000 in all by the 7th
proximo; he sa~ s it is the intention of the rebels to ad vance on us if we do n ot ad vance on
thtm; if we return into fortifi cations they will crosg into Kentucky and seize Columbus,
and so on. They intend to get there before Grant can arrive. Our expedition to cut the
Georgia railroad promises to succeed. Dodge took Tuscumbia on the 24th, and was to takP.
Florence on the 26th. Bragg has occupierl the line of Duck river; his re-enforcements huld
Tullahoma. My expedition to McMinnville succeeded. Report by mail, under late instructions to save expense.
W. S. ROSECRANS, M"Jor Ge ·. erul.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTi\IENT OF THE Cmm~<.RLAND, July 24:, 1863.
Major General HALLECX :
Yonr despatch received. All is very good. Your views accorrl vdth my own. All your
su g~egtions about baggage and rations have been anticipated ~~nd carried out from the
bejt.inuing of our movement, and are now being carried out with all tho ene1gy of which
we are capable. We never think of moving with any but minimum baggage, nor of takiug
anything but essential parts of rations. but to move our troops beyond uur means of supply
would break down and disable both mt'n and horses without resu lt. This I am sure you
do not desire. Any disippointment that may be felt at the apparent ~:>lowness of our
movement:; wuuld be readily removed uy a kn )Wle.-lge of the obstacle" aud true military
apprechtiun of the advantages of not moving immediately. I confess I should like to
avoid ::mch remarks and letters as I am receiving lately from Washington, if I could do so
without injury to the public service. You will, I think, find the officers of this army
as anxious f\lr success, and as willing to exert themselves to secure it, as any member of
the government can be. As to subsistence being drawn from the country over which we
are to travel to Chattanooga, it WJ.S always barren with but few frlrtile spots. 'fhese spot:;
have been gleaned and scraped by rebels with a powerful cavalry f<•rce ever since last
winter. We shall get some hay and cattle in the region of Fayetteville, Huntsville, a ... d
south of there ; none south or east of us.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
We sha]) move promptly, and endeavor not to go back.
afft d ns?

What move from Grant will

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THF. CUi\IBEllLAND,
Murfreesboro, ]}fay 10, 1863.
GENERAL: Your letter of the 1st instant, on the subject of cavalry horses, was yesterday
received, and can·fully conside1e<l. I thank you for taking pains to write so fully. I will
explain to you with equal care the true state of the case in this army, for I find you have
fallen into quite a nuruber of errors on the subject.
1st. It is a fact that up to the 1st instant our total supply of cavalry horses was as
follows:
Cavalry horses on hand _•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• - ••••
~ountedinfantrY-----------·-···-··--·--·---···-------------

6,537
1,938

Total • ___ • ___________ • _ •• _. __ • _______ •• __ ••••• ___ • _ •• _•••
Less, at least one-quarter, are not serviceable •••••••••••••••• .•••

8,475
2,119

Making cavalry mounted not over ___ ••••••••••••••••••••••• ---.

6,356

But when these troops are called out we have at no time been able to tum out more
than 5,000 for actual duty. 'l'he other cavalry horses, reported by Colonel Taylor, wereEscorts and orderlies_ •• __ •••••••••••••••••••••••••• _••• _. _• _• _
Unserviceable in Nashville--··············-···----------------

2,028
975
3,003
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You will thus see that we have not the ca,·a]ry you snppose. We are using tbe most
f;trenuous and unremitting effurts to increa:,e in ce~.re of horses, and the efficiency of ,this
arm
2d. Bnt I must call your attention to the fact, that this small cavalry force, effectively
not half that required for a permanent garriwn of infantry equal to that of this army, have
to furnish pickets, scouts, and couriers for Fort D::melson, Clarksville, Nashville, Gallatin,
Carthage, aud the front of tlli,; army from Franklin to this plAce, twenty-eight miles.
You may thus form some idea of the labor imposed on our ca airy, and how our horses are
worn out so rapidly.
3d As to the actual work of this arm, besides the routine labor. you will find it has had
some expedition or fight in mass nearly evt:>ry week, and RS yet without a single failure.
4th. As to expeditions, we have not a sufficiently strong cavalry force to drive that of the
enemy to the wall, or to rh;k detachmt>nts for the enterprises of which you speak to the
rear of the rebels. Th~ one which I did send out under Colonel Streight, in spite of our
precautions, waR captmed by the superior c;.~,valry force of the enemy detached from Granger's
front at Franklin, where Van Dorn has still left about four to our one.
5th As to forage, our want is for long forage, and is owing to the impos:dbility of getting
tramportation either by water or raiL You must remt-mber we are two hundred and twenty
mile,; from our base of supplier; at Louisville. You may rely on it, I am fully alive to all
you have sug~ested, and ask for nothing which I am not fully satisfied will be an ample
economy to the service. Had we a cavalry force equal to that of the enemy, we would
have ('Ommanded all the forage of the count1y-commanded information of its inhabitants,
upon whose fears we, instead of they, would thus be able to operate.
As to the comparative number of cavalry in our and othtr armies, I am sure you are
mistaken as to Russia, at least, which bas 80,000 regular cavalry, while all the outp.)st,
picket, anti courier duty is done by regular cavalry. But even were it otherwise, I know
what cavalry would do for us here, and am not misbken in S'1yiug that this great army
would gain more from 10,000 effective cavalry than from 20,000 infantry.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Ma;"or General, Commanding.
Brigadier General M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster General U S. Army, Washington, D. C.

MuBFRE•:sBORO,
GENERAL:

June 21, 1863.

In your favor of the 12th instant you say you do not see how the maxim of

not fighting two great battles at the same time aprlies to the case of this army and Grant's
Looking at the matter p1 actically, we and our opposing forces are so nearly separated tbat
fJr Bmgg materially to aid Johnston he must >~bandon our front substantially, and then we
can move to an ultimate work w ith more rapidity and le::s waste ,,f material or natuml
obstacles If General Grant is defeated, Loth forces will come here, and then we ought to
be near our base. The same maxim that forbids, as you take it, a single army fighting
two great battles at the same time t by the way a very awkward thing to do) would forbid
t !ds nation engaging all its forces in the g1 eat west at the same time, so as to leave
without a single resl•rve to stem the current of p<)ssible disaster This is, I think, f'nstai!JCd
by militrny and politica,l considerations We ought to fight here if we have a strong pros·
pect of winning a decisive victory over the opposing force, and upon this ground I shall
ad. I shall be carefnl not to ri:.;l;: our last reserve without strung ground to expect succetis.
Very re~pectfully, your ubedieut servant,
W. S. ROSECRANS, Ma;"or General.
Major General HALLECK,
Oommandn·-zn-0/mf, Washmgton, D. C.

WINCHESTER, July 26, 1863.
Stcretary qf War:
As you approve t1f Getwral Rons;:;ean's sng-p:estion and views as to the actvantage of rais~
ing all additional amount of force of ten thous:tnct men to operate ag>~.inst the rebels from
this direction, I have sent him to Washin ·~ton with letters to ynurself aud General H<dleck,
and di1ected him to lay before you the pltn which he bas of obtaining from the discipline:l
troops recently mustered out of the service in the east such a mouutt~d force ns would
enable m; to command the country south of us and control its rtsuurccs, cut off :ht• enemy's
means of drawing supplies from the country, df'stroy his linr·s of comnllluic,ttioll, and
restore law and order to the entire countr.v from which wt~ ha,ve cxpellt>d the insurgentsa thiug now impossiule, because no one de::,itet> to avow his sentiweLtt> fur ft:ar the rebel

Ron. E. M.
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cavalry or guerillas will wreak vengeance on him. At the expense of repeating wh1.t I
have so often laid before the War Department when urgiog the necessity of cavalry arms
for the force we actually had in pay, but badly armed and mounted, I beg ler.ve to sb.te:
1st. An adequate cavalry force would have given us control of all Middle Tennessee,
with all its forage, horses, cattle and mules, and driven the enemy from it, without the
battle of Stone river, and re-established civil order.
2d. It would save us five thousand infantry now guarding our lines of communication,
and the attendant expense.
3d. We could have destroyed the enemy's lines of communication and compelled him
to relinquish East Tennessee and Chattanooga and returned to Atlanta.
4th. We could have developed, by giving protection to the Union sentiment, which
does not manifest itself much beyond the limits of our infantry lines, for fear of calling
down the vengeance of the rebel cavalry and guerillas, whose superior numbers and
knowledge of the country have hitherto given almost exclusive control of it. As we
advance we shall have the same condition of things renewed on our front, and must take
with us a superior cavalry force to insure success. We should, moreover, require additiun'Ll
mounted force to control the country, protect the roads in our rear, exterminate guerillas,
and give confidence to the population, who will then readily furnish us with supplies and
give us information that will aid us to put down brigandage, and thus relieve us from the
necessities of detachments of infantry guards at many points where otherwise they will be
indispensbale. The importance of General Rousseau's mission may be inferred from the
value I attach to cavalry furce to operate in connexion with this army. To all these uses
of cavalry I will add another no less important. Should w~ succeed in disorganizing the
enemy's force, a powerful cavalry force will enable us to harass and destroy his communications, and thus make him an easy prey.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. S ROSECRANS, Major General.
WINCHESTER, July 26, 1863.
GENERAL: When General Rousseau was in Washington last winter he laid before the
War Department the immense advantage of having a large mounted fr1rce to operate
against the rebels in these regions. He says the plan was looked upon with favor, but as
speedy success anrl efficient service involved the taking one division of infantry from this
army, it was not deemed expedient to order it into execution. The losses and delays which
have attended the operattons of this army since I assumed command have been so frequently presented to you and the War Department that I deem it proper merely to allude
to them, and to say that the increasing area covered by our operations, the extension of
our lines of communication, as well as the great advantages to be reaped from the proper
use of cavalry on the enemy's lines of communication, his supply trains and foraging
parties, render an increase of our mounted force more than ever desirable. It is also
essential to en'tble us to command the forage and subsistence which the country can
furnish. Before we can expect the inhabitants of the country to show any disposition to
supply us, we must be able to give them reasonable assurance of protection against the
rebel cavalry and guerillas.
Had we bern able to do this, it would have changed entirely the military and political
aspects of Tennessee, and the rebels could have been driven from it last autumn without
a battle. General R0usseau, with the approval of G-eneral Thomas, suggestt:d that with
the large number of disciplined troops recently mustered out of service in the east it would
be ea~y to raise ten thous;~,nd men for mounted service. Deeming the attainment of such
a result of the highest moment, and believing that if the plan sh•mlJ be approved General
Rousseau would be able to rend<'r more effiuient service in carrying it out than in any other
possible way, I order him to Washington to lay the matter before you and the War Department for such Ac tion as m:.ty be deemed best.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. S. HOSECRA.NS, Major General, Commanding.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
Oomrrwnder-in-Ohiif.

WINCHESTER, August 4, 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
Your despatch ordering me to move forward without further delay, reporting t~e movement
of each corps until I cross the Tennessee, is received. As I have been determmed to cross
the river as soon as practicable, and have been making all preparations and getting such inforatwn as may enable me to do so, without being driven back like Hooker, I wish t~ know
if your order is intended to take away my discretion as to the time and manner of movmg my
troops.

W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
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WINCHESTER, TE:NN., August 7, 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
Your despatch rrcl'ived. I can only repeat the assurance given before the is suP of the order.
This army shall move with aU the despatch compatible with the successful execution yon
wish. We are prcs-<ing everything to bring up forage for our animals; the prei'<'nt rolling
stock of tbe road will hardly suffice to keep us day by day here, but I have bought fifty
more freight cars, which are arriving. "'Will advise you daily.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTl\fENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Stevenson, August 23, U:l63.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. :
Corps remain same. Crittenden's advance occupies Poe's tavern and a point six milrs
from Chattanooga. vVilder's report, received to-day, confirms last night's report; ho 1'n.y::; he
sunk one of tl•e steamboat;;, i!amao-ed the other. Our loss one wounded, fonr horses killed.
Rebels hold the fords and ferries f1':'om Washington, clown to Shell Mound, which we seized
last night. Mrans of cro:-;sing getting ready. \Yilder reports, saw enemy take away nine
engines in one train, two hauling the rest; thinks they are evacuating Chattanooga. I think
they are a little confused.
vV. S. ROSECRANS, llfajo1· General.
Official:
R. S. THOMS, A. D. C.
STEVENSON, August 24, 1863-ll.50 p. m.
:Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. ('. :
Nothing further from the left, except that enemy are reported as having moved up two brigades to Blythe's ferry, Tennessee. Have heard nothing hom Burnside. \Vonlcl like to
know if Grant is to do anything to occupy J ohuston's attention. No changes in my position
to-day.
\V. S. ROSECRANS, ~Major General.
Official;
R. S. THOMS, A. D. C.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TIIE CuMBERLAND,
Stevenson, August 29, J 863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
Pontoon bridge across at Caperton's ferry; two brigades over; cavalry forded at two placPs.
Brannan's advance crossed at Battle creek; Reynolds's advance at Shell Mound. Hcports
not in yet, but suppose we have one hundreu prisoners; no fighting to amount to anytl1ing.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
Official :
R. S. THOMS, A. D. C.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TilE CUl\IRERLAND,
Stevenson, .Alabarna, September 2, 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. :
Our trestle gave way at the Bridgeport bridge this afternoon, and seven hundred feet of
bridge fell into water; no loss, save one mule and damage to contents of a few wagons. All
Sheridan's division and his artillery had passed over before the accident. Crittenden's coqJs
is crossing in boats, and McCook's infantry advance has probably reached Valley Hearl.
The cavalry will reach Rawlinsville by to-morrow night. Burnside's position fi·om yon is
all we httve, save rebel rumors that he has Knoxville. If he is not much involved, I think
our move will wholly relieve him.
,V. S. ROSECRANS, Majo1· Gcne1'al.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Stevenson, Alabama, SepLmt./Jr..r ;>, 1863.
1\fajor General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. :
The bridge was rPpaired to-day at noon; trains have been passing over since that time;
most of the troops are now over. No report from General McCook, who probably reached
Valley Head v.-ith his head division to-day, and possibly has seized Winston's gap; none
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from the cavalry at Rawlinsville. Have you any news from Burnside; any reason to think
forces will be sent from Virginia to East Tennessee; any that Johnston has sent any force
up this way? Thomas will be at Trenton, McCook at Valley Head, and Crittenden between
Whiteside and Trenton, communicating with Thomas to-morrow night. We shall seize the
gaps in Lookout mountain at Frick's and Winston's, while we threaten Chattanooga by
the river road.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Majm· General
CAVE SPRINU, Septembe1· 5, 1863.
H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.:
Except one division, (opposite -chattanooga,) 14th, 20th, and 21st army corps, are now
across the river; by to-morrow night they will be in position in Lookout vallty, extending
from Rawlinsville to within six miles of Chattanooga. The rebels prepared a pontoon bridge
at Chattanoog·a last night, with the apparent intention of crossing. I have ordered General
Granger to bring up all the available reserves to Bridgeport and Stevenson, leaving
minimum garrison at all posts.
vV. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
Official:
J. A. GARFIELD, Brigadier General, Chief of Staff.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Trenton, Georgia, &ptember 6, 1863.
H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.:
I reached this place to-day. Crittenden bas pushed up, near the point of Lookout mountain; enemy still in force in Chattanooga, threatening to cross the river.. All reports concur
that Johnston and Breckinridge are with Bragg. Buckner is closing down, and has destroyed the bridge at Loudon. Enemy attempting to-day to obstruct passes of Lookout
mountain; some skirmishing at Davis's gap; twelve rebels captured. Lookout mountain
is a formidable mountain, even more so than Raccoon, (just crossed,) one thousand feet high,
and but three passes in forty miles. No word from Burnside.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
Offic1al:
J. A. GARFIELD, Brigadier General, Chief of Staff.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Trenton, Georgia, September 7, 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
Your despatch of yesterday received with surprise. You bavebeenoftenandfullyadvised
that the nature of the country makes it impossible for this army to prevent Johnston from
combining with Bragg. vVhen orders for an advance of the army were made, it must have
been known that those two rebel forces would combine against it, and to some extent choose
their place of fighting· us. This has doubtless been dona., and Buckner, Bragg and Johnston
are all near Chattanooga. The movement on East Tennessee was independent of mine.
Your apprehensions are just, and the legitimate consequences of your orders. The best that
can now be done is for Burnside to close his cavalry down on our left, supporting it with his
infantry, and, refusing his left, threaten the enemy without getting into his grasp, wlnle we
get him in our grip and strangle him or perish in the attempt.
vV. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
Official:
C. GODDARD, A. A. G.
TRENTON, GEORGIA, September 9, 1863.
:Major General HALLECK, General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.:
I did not in my last telegraph lay enough stress on uniting Burnside's cavalry with mine.
The two combined can control the eountry far into the interior and prevent the enemy from
gathering the crops. I would respectfully urge this upon your attention.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, September 12, 1863-12 m.
M::tjor General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
HLUlbut despatches that the country south of Corinth is full of regular cavalry. He is induced to believe that a general movement of all the available force of the enemy is being· made
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on this army. Hurlbut ought to cover that flank. It is reported from several sources that
even Loripg's division has been moved up and is at Atlanta. Burnside ought to seml his
infantry down in this direction. The enemy has concentrated at Lafayette and attacked one
of Thomas's columns in the Chickamauga valley, west of Dug gap, compelling it to fall back
to Stevens's gap.
W. S. ROSECRANS, .Major Genemt.
Official:
J. P. DROUILLARD, Captain and A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, September 12, 1863-12 m.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
I think it would be v:ery unwise in present attitude of affairs for General Burnside to make
any move in direction of North Carolina; it would leave my left flank entirely unprotected
and open the way into Kentucky; all forces should now be concentrated in this direction. I
trust I am sufficient for the enemy now in my fi·ont, but shoilld be fall back to the line of ibe
Coosa, the roads fi·om there are short and comparatively good to the Tennessee, where it is necessary for me to cross two ranges of mountains over very barren, rough and difficult roads to
reach the Tennessee, and then move from 30 to 50 miles to reach the flank of a column
moving from Gunter's landing or Whitesburg on Nashville. It is desirable to have that avenue shut up. Cannot you send a force from the army of Tennessee to do it.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Majo'r Gweral.
Official:
R. S. THOMS, Captain and A. D. C.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Near Gordon's Mill, Georgia, September Hi, 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
From information derived from various sources from my front, I have reason to believe
what you assert in your despatch of yesterday, 4. 30 p. m, is true, and that they have arrived
at Atlanta at last. Push Burnside down.
W. S. ROSECRANS.
Official:
F. S. BOND, Maj01· and A. D. C.
CRAWFISH SPRING,
September 18, 1863-1. ~0 p.m.
Major General HALLECK, Wasltington, D. C.:
Everything indicates that the enemy are determined to make every effort to overthrow
this army. What we need most is to have our flanks well covered. You do not say how
soon Hurlbut is to move. Please advise what orders he has received, and from whence he is
to draw subsistence. Even a movement in 1'uscumbia valley would be of great importance
at this time. Enemy demonstrating on our front now. We occupy line of \Vest Chickamauga; our cavalry on right covers Stevens's gap.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBELAND,
September 19, 1863-8 p. m.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
We have just concluded a terrific day's fighting and have another in prospect for to-morrow.
The enemy attempted to turn our left, but his design was anticipated, and sufficient force
placed there to render his attempt abortive. The number of our killed is considerable; that of
our wounded very heavy. The enemy was greatly our superior in numbers; among our
prisoners are men from some thirty regiments; we have taken two cannon and lost seven (7.)
'fhe army is in excellent condition and spi1its, and by the blessing of Providence tbe defeat of
the enemy will be total to morrow. The battle-ground was densely wooded, and its surface
irregular and difficult. We could make but little use of our artillery.
W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major General Comm_anding.
CHATTANOOGA, September 21, 1863.
To the PRESIDENT of the United States:
After two days of tbe severest fighting I ever witnessed, our right centre was beaten. The
left held its position until sunset. Our loss is heavy, and our troops worn down. The enemy
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received heavy re-enforcements. Every man of ours was in action on Sunday, and all but
one briga<1e on Saturday. Number of our wounded large, compared with that of the killed.
We took prisoners from two divisions of Longstreet. We have no certainty of holding our
position. If Burnside could come immediately, it would be well; otherwise he may not be
able to join us unless he comes on the west side of the river.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.

MoRRISTOWN,ISeptember 21, 1863.
General HALLECK:
Your despatch of the 20th received. Before I knew of the necessity of sending immediate
assistance to Rosecrans, I had sent a considerable portion of my force to capture or drive out
a large force of the enemy under General Sam Jones, stationed at the road from Bristol
to Jonesboro, which amounts to at least 1,000 men. I had an ample force on the way to
have, in all probability, accomplished this object quickly, when the urgent despatches from
Rosecrans and yourself caused me to send back Brigadier General Whicks's divisions and
Colonel Woolford's brigade of cavalry with orders to move as rapidly as possible until they
joined Rosecrans's left fiank. Colonel Byrd was ordered to Athens with his cavalry brigade;
soon after occupied Knoxville, and was afterwards ordered to send a portion of his force to
()Jeveland, whi!!h he did, but was driven out of there three days ago. Colonel Woolford's
Lrigade joining him will increase the force to over three thousand men, but they are now
ordered to move down at once and attack Forrest, who is said to be occupying Cleveland.
There is great difficulty in crossing forces above the Holston, as we have no pontoon bridge
really yet. One is being built at Loudon, which will be finished in a day or two, after which
troops can cross and recross rapidly. General White's infantry division will follow down to
support his cavalry as rapidly as possible. The advance of the 9th army corps will be here
to-night, and w1ll be at onee put in motion down the road. The force under Jones, at Zollicoffer, is over 6,000, and I have but about that number opposed to him. Nothing but provost
guards are left at Knoxville, Loudon, and this place. All the force at Cumberland gap will
be brought down; I have not left a single guard at my lines. When you remember the size
of our force, the amount of work which it has had to do, and the length of line occupied,
you will not be surprised that I have not helped Rosecrans; more particularly, as I was fully
impressed with the truth of the statement that Bragg was in full retreat. It has not seemed
possible for me successfully to withdraw my force from the presence of Jones until we
should be beaten back or captured; yet upon the receipt of your despatch, if it were possible
to get our force from there down to Rosecrans within three or four days, I would make the
attempt, and shall, at the risk of being too late, order every availttble man in that direction.
I am sure that I am disposed to give him every possible assistance. I sincerely hope he will
be able at least to check the enemy for seven or eight days, within which time I ·will be able
to make a eonsiderable diversion in his favor. I hope my action will meet with the approval
of the department.
A. E. BURNSIDE, lJfajor General.

CHATTANOOGA, September 21, 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington :
A man of company C, Tennessee artillery, deserted from Mobile September 1. When he
left, garrison was but - Alabama regiments and three batteries, one of six guns, two of four
gnns, and two hundred cavalry. Joe Johnston's army all came here, except one division.
Nineteen forts around city, mounting three siege guns each, 3~-pounders ami larger, besides
three fj.eld gnus two miles down bay fi·om city; three batteries heavy guns; two rams in bay,
six heavy guns each. On Pensacola side, three batteries heavy guns; forts all manned.
Saw colonel anLllteutenant colonel from Little Rock; said Arkansas army was very much
demoralized; they said Bragg would not hold Chattanooga, but draw Rosecrans across the
river and overwhelm him w1th numbers; said if rebels were successful at Chattanooga their
cause would be greatly encouraged; if whipped there and at Charleston, confederacy was
gone. Three tlwusanu home guards were at Mobile. Officers said they feared they would
turn against them if place were attacked ; home guards and Tennessee battery said they would
not fire a shot if they could help it; force at :Mobile fear advance by Banks ; one division of
Johnston's army between Meridian and Selma, ready to go to Mobile or Chattanooga, as re.quired; five thousand cavalry at Pollard, Alabama, to guard against raids ; no other force
beyond there between Atlanta and Montgomery. There are three floating batteries iu harbor
of Mobile, ''ell mannell: if necessary, they intend to sink them to obstruct the navigation;
new breech-loading Whitworth gun on point near Fort Morgan.
W S. HOSECRANS, Major General.
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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanoogrt, September 23, 1863.
A. LINCOLN, President :
We hold this point, and cannot be dislodged except by very superior numbers and after a
great battle. Immediate disposition should be made for covering our communication by
ordering down every available man from Kentucky to Bridgeport and Stevenson, and having
all re-enforcements you can send hurried up.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
Official:
FRANK S. BOND, A. D. C.
HEADQUAR'rERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, Septembe1· 27, 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington:
The enemy is in our front, out of cannon range, three corps, the fourth out towards Tyners ;
no news from Burnside; every effort being made to secure our communications. Report of
Roddy and Jesse Forrest, with four or five thousand cavalry, in vicinity of. Fort Dtmelson;
cannot the Corinth mounted force look after them? What are the orders of the troops fi·om
Grant; which way will they come ; cannot they push head of column to Athens, Alabama,
immediately? Please answer soon, stating what can be done to cover the flank of our railroad line from Roody and Forrest, and others in West Tennessee. No more.
W. S. ROSECRANS, ..._Wajor General.
CHATTANOOGA, September 29, 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington. D. C.:
I would not advise the withdrawal of our forces from East Tennessee. Kingston should
be strongly garrisoned, the bulk of the troops concentrated for movement in any direction,
and cavalry thrown this way to co-operate with us. If forces from Mississippi and Potomac
reach us soon, and with the expected strength, it will be sufficient for our success. It is now
too late for Burnside to do more than protect our flank, but his forces should be held in readiness to help us in case of emergency. Do not hear from Grant's troops.
W. S. ROSECRANS, J1Iaj01· Gene1·al.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, September 29, 1863.
General HALLECK :
Please send the infantry by brigade as fast as po'isible; let the artillery follow at leisure.
The gTeat point is to have troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport, to secure those points and the
railroad. We can hold this point if we can keep up communication and supplies. Hurlbut
must secure us from an advance from Rome by Governor Brown.
vV. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 1, 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
All quiet here. Enemy on our front. Our wounded coming in. Raining heavily. River
begins to rise. Roads will be awful. Enemy's cavalry forced passage at several points below Kingston; thought to be moving towards McMinnville. Another cavalry column crossed
below Gunter's landiug, reported at New Market yesterday; they will aim to destroy the
railroad communication. Our cavalry concentrated to oppose the column between us and
Kingston. As I often advised, more mounted force will be needful to cover an advance,
or even hold our own. I must have au able cavalry commandm\; Stanley is much disabled;
Mitchell also. Cannot you send me J olm Buford'! No news from Sherman. Despatches
from Burnside, dated yesterday afternoon at Knoxville ; no mention made of movement of
enemy now between us. HegTet he did not move his cavalry, as I suggested, between his
rigllt and our left; he says lle will soon move according to programme subjoined, but nothing subjoined came; says it has been submitted to yon.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF 'l'IIE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 8, 1do:J-11.:30 a. m.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
Despatch about Burnside received; no news received from him since the first. Rebel cav..
alry took McMinnville on fourth, crossed the railroad between Duck river and Murfrees~
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boro, and sacked Shelbyville on the 1st. General Hooker's dispoHition of infantry promises to secure most vital points of railroad. Rebels tore up rails near Wartrace and vicinity
and burned trestle-bridge of considerable magnitude. Mitchell, with the cavalry, overtook
rebels yesterday morning near Shelbyville. Reported killed, one hundre<l; captured, two
hundred, and three pieces of artillery, and in hot pursuit. En~.my has superior nuwbers and
better horses; our men the morale, aided by the fresh ca-valry b~ the railroad. Hope we shall
irreparably damage them; enemy still qn our front. No nPws from Sherman.
. W. S. ROSECRANS, Itlajor General.
Official:
R. S. THOMS, Captain and A. D. C.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
C:ltattanooga, October 4, Ul63-1 p.m.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. :
Following despatches were sent to Burnside: 3 div.-] 1; September :30-12; September
30; October 2. This morning I received the following, October 4, (book tel. rec'd.) What
more he could expect from 11le to induce him to move, or what I may hope fi-om him in covering
my left flauk, after all this, I cannot tell. By his failure hitherto to close to our left, we have
lost fout' humlred wagons and a large number of our mules, and the post of McMinnville, a
train of eleven cars, and what other mischief they will yet do. I fear he will not assist us in
pursuing the rebels, who are in heavy force, and doubtless mean to do all possible mischief to
the railroad, and sweep around on Burnside's corumunication and collle out in East Tennessee
or Virginia.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Majo1· General.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 1], 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
Our cavalry pushing rebels; have not heard from them for two days. Roddy with 1,000
mounted rebels attacked the tunnel guards near Cowan; succor from Stevenson repulsed
them; Hooker thinks they would try to join Wheeler. Rebel rumors are that the head of
Ewell's column reached Dalton yesterday; will know by to-morrow. Rebels deeply feel
the necessity of retaking this place. No news from Sherman; are his, or any other troops,
really coming to this army?
W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
Official.
R. S. THOMS, Captain and A. D. C.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattauooga, October 12, 1863-3 p. m.
' Hon. A. LINCOLN, President United States:
Line from here to Kingston is long : our side is barren mountain ; rebel side has railroad.
Our danger is subsistence; we cannot bring up Hooker to cover our left against a crossing
above us, for want of means to transport provisions and horse-fe~d. Enemy's side of valley
full of corn. Every exertion will be made to hold what we ]~ave and gain more, after which
we must put our trust in God, who neYer fails those who truly trust.
W. S. ROt;ECRANS, Major General.
.
HEADQlL\.RTERS DEPARTMEN'r OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, Octobe1' 12, 1863-:5 p. m.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
Despatches received. Reported enemy building pontoons near here. Jeff. Davis was here
on the lOth. We watch the river high up, but cannot extend to Kingston without great
danger. Burnside ought to hold Kingston with strong fortifications and substantial garrison-cavalry to cover the'river below. Kingston should be the last point of East Teunes·
see surrenJered, except the Cumberland gap. From there our forces can act in better concert than from any other point by the Cumberland. Mill Spring, when water is up, has a
good line of retreat., and commands Loudon. No time should be lost in this matter. No
further news from cavalry raid or uur cavalry.
W. S. ROSECRANS, jjfajor Geneml.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLANP,
('/zattanooga, October 13, 1863-7.30 p. m.
Major General HALLECK, Was!tington, D. C.:
Jeff. Davis was on our front Saturday and Sunday. He told the troops he would give
them :30,000 re-enforcements; he would sacrifice Richmond and Charleston before he would
lose this place, and bid them be of good cheer; they should be in Kentucky by November.
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Some re·enforcements are now arriving at Dalton, and one division of Vicksburg prisoners,
under Stevenson, is on our front. A deserter, one of the Jackson prisoners, had a paper
sending him to duty, alleging his parole to have been irregular. They are building pontoons.
Raining very steadily.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Majo1· General.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 15, 1863.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
It is of prime necessity that we should have an efficient and able chief of cavalry, and that
every possible exertion should be made to swell our mounted force. I fear that rebel cavalry
force has crossed the river west of us, and without serious damage. We must have moun ted
force to keep it in check, or it will paralyze this army, and compel it to retire from its position.
W. S. ROSECRANS.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 15, 1863-1 p. m.
Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:
If Sherman is to give us any real help, his force must not be more remote than .Athens.
All the rebel cavalry that can be spared from vidette duty is on that flank, and they will
overpower and wear ours out, unless we have increased mounted force soon.
W. S. ROSECRANS, ll1ajor General.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE .CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 16, 1863-5 ..30 p. m.
:Major General HALLECK, Washington, D. ('.:
Evidence increases that the enemy intend a desperate effort to destroy this army. They
are bringing up troops to our front. They have prepared pontoons and will probably operate
on our left flank, either to cross the river and force us to quit this place and fight them,
or lose our communication. They will thus separate us from Burnside. "\Ve cannot feed
Hooker's troops on our left, nor can we spare them from our right depots and communica·
tions; nor has he transportation. The rains have raised the river and interrupted our pontoon bridge; the roads are very heavy. Our future is not bright. Had we t~e railroad from
here to Bridgeport-the whole of Sherman's and Hooker's troops brought up, we should not
probably outnumber the enemy. This army, with its back to barren mountains, roads narrow and ~ifficult, while the enemy has the railroad and the corn in his rear, is at much disadvantage. To secure this position, at least, McMinnville should be made a strong
fortified depot; Kingston the same ; and for ulterior operations, twenty or thirty thousand
more troops put into Tennessee at easy points to cover the railroad and subsist until called to
the front for advance on the enemy. Additional cavalry force is indispensable to a good
future for this army. Burnside must be within supporting distance of us ; if we lose this
point his hold on East Tennessee is gone; if we hold it, the rebs cannot make much use of
the country above, and we shall dispossess them.
.
W. S. ROSECRANS, Major General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 17, 1863.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.:
The following despatch has just been received from Brigadier General Crook, commanding
2d cavalry division, dated Rogersville, Alabama:
"I have the honor to inform you that the chase is over. I wo-uld have despatched you
from the different points, but the rebels left concealed parties along to pick up any couriers
that I might send back, and my command was so small that I could not send large parties.
I have had three fights with the enemy since I left Sequatchie valley, whipping them very
badly each time. 'fhe last battle ended at Farmington, Tennessee, where I fought Wheeler's
entire command with only two brigades. I cut his force in two, scattering a large portion
of it, capturing four pieces of artillery, one thousand stand of small-arms, two hundred and
forty prisoners, besides the wounded. As I push on after the enemy immediately, I have
not been able to ascertain the number of their killed and wounded, but it was very heavy;
they were scattered over a distance of fifteen miles from this, on. Their retreat was a perfect
rout, their men deserting and straggling over the country. I pressed them with great vigor,
but their horses being better than mine I was only able to come up with a couple of regi-
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ments at Sugar creek, left to detain me. I made a charge on them, capturbJg some fifty of
them, and scattering the remainder in the mountains. When withi:r;t eight mil es of the river
I struck the gallop, but when I reached the river I found they had all crossed at a ford some
three miles above Lamb's ferry, where they could cross twelve abreast. I never saw troops
more demoralized than they were, and I am satisfied that their loss in the raid was not less
than 2,000. No fears need be entertained of their making another raid soon.

"GEORGE CROOK."
W. S. ROSECRANS.
Official:

C. GODDARD, A. A. G.

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1865.
General W. S. RosECRANs's examination continued.
By the chairman:
Question . .At what time did you assume command of the department of
Missouri 1
.Answer. I assumed command of the department of Missouri on the 28th of
January, 1864.
Question. Please give us an account, in your own way, of your administration there-all the facts that you deem material.
.Answer. Immediately on assuming command of the department, I addressed
myself to ascertaining its military and civil condition. I found that St. Louis
was the great depot for quartermaster and subsistence store~ for supplying our
armies on the Mississippi, Red river, in Kansas and the Indian territories, and
one of the depots for supplying the army in rrennessee. The troops of the
department consisted of four regiments of three-year volunteers, and ten regiments of Missouri State militia, so-called because, while mustered into the service of the United States and paid by the United States as three-year volunteers. they were not liable to be taken out of the State. There were also at
tbe cavalry depot some three or four regiments of three-year volunteer cavalry,
and it was made a stopping place for the veteran cavalry going home and returning from home to the field. There was also a part of a regiment of heavy
artillery. which was in process of organization, called the 2d Missou~ heavy
nrtillery. The Missouri State militia consisted of nine regiments of mounted
men, and one regiment of infantry. The mounted men smpplied th eir own
horses. Orders were given, soon after my arrival, that no more horses should
be purchased and supplied them. These troops were scattered over the State;
at Springfield and through that district; at Rolla and through that district;
at Pilot Knob, Cape Girardeau, J eflerson city, Sedalia, Macon city, and St.
Joseph, north of the Missouri river. 'I'here was also a force of Missouri militia
called "provisionally enrolled militia," about 2,800 in number, on duty in
nortawest Missouri. They were called by the Union men "pawpaw militia,"
because, as they alleged, it was composed of persons who had been in the brush
and lived upon pawpaws, until organized with other rebels to watch the Union
men.
Question. Were they considered disloya11
.Answer. They were composed in a great measure of disloyal people, or
people who had been disloyal, and quite a number of them had been in Price's
army and had returned. They had been armed by the State government, because it was alleg0d that the Union people of the region either perpetrated
outrages upon the property of peaceful secessionists, or permitted thieves and
rascals to do so ; and these men were armed in self- defence and pledged to
obey the laws of the State and of the United States. I found that the "pawpaw militia" was one of the great obj€cts of irritation. I found that ' 'the
radicals," as the ultra Union men were called, and the rebel sympathizers and
disloyalists at the back of the conservatives, and using the conservatives when
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they could as their mouth-piece, were very much excited against each other.
The principal question appeared to be whether this "pawpaw militia" was to
be disbanded, and, as the conservatives alleged, given up to violence and ontrage .
or whether they were to be trusted, and, as thfl Union men alleged, allowed to
domineer over the Union men and keep them in subjection. It was believed
by the Union men that they intended, the moment the opportunity offered, to
join the invading army, which was expected, and had been threatened and
promised before I arrived in Missouri, and was a constant matter of expectation from the time I arrived until the invasion was consummated. I heard
both sides very patiently, and satisfied myself that the apprehensions of the
Union men in regard to the ''pawpaw militia" were well founded. I therefore,
upon understanding the condition of affairs, immediately represented to the
government at Washington the condition of affairs, and that in order to pacify
this section of the State, which was in a state of great excitement, and to prevent murder and bloodshed, it was desirable that a regiment at least of troops
well disciplined and well officered, and corning from some other State, should
be sent to me. In the mean time I sent for the great friends and leaders of the
" pawpaws," to say that I would leave them until I could get troops of this
sort, provided their behavior warranted it, and I hoped they would endeavor to
prove that they could be trusted. The government did not assent to my views.
General Grant sent out General Hunt, under the impression that there were
many more troops in Missouri than we needed there. General Hunt having
gone over the State, expressed to me the belief that the inhabitants would behave themselves, and that there was no danger of any outbreak, and that he
did not think that even the troops there were needed. In the mean time, ascertaining that the Union men saw arms coming into north Missouri more plentifully
than for two or three years previous, and that among secessionists, and that
in consequence of that they began to suspect that there was some move on foot,
I took measures to ascertain what could be the cause of this purchasing of arms
by the rebels, and the secret movements into which the Union men said they
found it difficult to penetrate. It was not long before I found that there was
some secret organization going on in north Missouri, in the shape of lodges;
that the leaders of this organization were rebels, and that they met in Union settlements and in remote places, even in the brush and woods. I also found that
it was currently talked in the counties of Howard, Boone, Callo}Vay, Carroll,
and Ray, along the river, slave-holding counties, between citizens of loyal sentiments and disloyalists, that th6 loyalists had pretty nearly had their time,
and that it would soon come to an end, and then the disloyal men would have
their time. This, and a great many other circumstances of a similar nature,
satisfied me that it was somethiug more than appeared on the surface which
brought arms into north Missouri, and that these lodges had something more in
view than merely political organization opposed to the administration.
In order to reach the bottom of the matter I succeeded in obtaining a very
intelligent physician, who had been down south a great deal, to act as our agent,
and sent him with a roving commission to do as he pleased in north Missouri, directing his attention to the circumstances which I have just mentioned. In a short
time he made his way into one of their lodges, and from that time advanced, and
finally obtained a ritual from the grand commander of the State, which settled
the character of the organization, and at the same time showed that our men were
thoroughly in with them. 'I'he ferreting out of the organization and its purposes was then placed completely in the hand of the provost marshal, the late
Colonel Sanderson, who used to consult with me every night. lVIeans were organized to test the accuracy of our information in various ways. For this purpose we extended into Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky, and finally traced it to
New York. We sent an agent to Canada to attend a convention of grand com_manders which was to be held at Sandwich some time in April, 1864.

52

ROSECRANS'S CAMPAIGNS.

My official report, which is with the Judge Advocate General in Washington,
will show the history of this matter. This commission, and all the details of
which I have already made mention, as well as others subsequently resulting
from agencies which we put to work, in four or five weeks demonstrated that
the organization at in Missouri was called'' The Order of American Knights,"
or "Sons of Liberty," a name given to the association after Vallandigham was
elected supreme commander of the north, which election took placP. on the 22d
of February, 1864; that the organization had in view a grand conspiracy to overthrow the Union cause and secure the triumph of the rebels and their sympathizers, embracing the following points: First, the re-turn of V allandigham to
attend the democratic convention at Chicago, on the 4th of July; preparations
to defend him from all arrests, and to take occasion from that to rise in all the
States wherein the order existed and seize the reins of government, get the officials out of the way, and get the arsenals, forts, and public propPrty; that
these plans were known to the south, to a similar association, the supreme commander of which was General Stirling Price; that the rebels to co-operate with
this movement were to invade Missouri under Price; that the American
Knights in Missouri, about 23,000 strong, were to rise and join him ; that
Kentucky was to be invaded by Morgan's or some other force; and that the
north was to be invaded by the way of Cumberland valley-probably by way
of Gettysburg.
Having about a thousand pages of testimony, obtained in the way I have
just mentioned, I wrote a note to General Garfield, in Washington, requesting
him to state to the President that I had this; and to say, that as the time for
the denouement was approaching ra piuly, and that as the thing was not in a
sufficiently perfect state to take action on without submitting it to him, more
particularly as it concerned not only my own department, but the whole west
of the nation, I wished permission from him to send a staff officer, who understood the subject, with the fragments of the testimony we had collected, to lay
the whole matter before him, and answer such questions as the President desired to put ; that I made this request, not because I doubted my right to send
a staff officer to Washington, but because, when I had before sent a staff officer
on a similar occasion on business of importance, he had been arrested by the
Secretary of War, and I did not wish to subject another officer unnecessarily to
such an indtg:nity.
The Pree1dent telegraphed me to send the depositions and information by
mail. I wrote him that it was of such a nature that it would not be safe to
transmit it by mail. He then suggested that it be sent by express. I then
wrote him as well as I could, that it might be giving an opportunity to the society
to find out what we were doing, and gave the reason why I could not send it
in that way. He then sent his secretary, l\fajor Hay, who came out to Missouri.
As soon as h e read over the fragmentary testimony he hastened back and reported to the President, then in Philadelphia, the condition of affairs.
In the meanwhile the period approached when the mischief was to begin.
In Missouri, about this time, at one of their lodge meetings, when a principal
man of St. Louis was present, a resolution was offe1ed to commence the assassination of Union officers in St. Louis, beginning with the provost marshal, and
then wind up with a grab at department headquarters. The resolution was laid
over without objection until the next meeting, apparently because they wished
to get ready. I then caused the arrest of the commander, who had been, and
was then, I believe, the Belgian consul-of the deputy grand commander, the
grand secretary, the lecturer, and thirty or forty of the principal cons}Jirators
throughout the State, and lodged them in the Gratiot street prison, awaiting the
orders of the President as to what should be done-what should be the general
policy, to meet the schemes of the organization. These men were simply permitted to make a statement under oath before the provost marshal, wherein
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every man of them swore distinctly that he did not know anything whatever of
the existence of such an organization.
Instead of receiving the orders of the President, I received a despatch from
Secretary Stanton ordering me to report why I arrested the Belgian consul,
and directing me to restore him to liberty, return his papers to him, and to state
to the War Department how it came to pass that I had done such a thing. He
said these were the President's orders. I replied to the Secretary that, had the
. President known the circumstances of the case, he never would have issued that
order. I respectfully requested a suspension of the order until Major Hay
returned and reported to the President.
In the meanwhile, to avoid any possible difficulty in the matter, I sent the
Provost Marshal General, with as much testimony as had been put into shape,
to Illinois to submit it to Judge Daniels, who, in company with Governor
Yates, read it over carefully, and telegraphed the President immediately that it
was of the greatest importance, and that he ought by all means to see it.
About two weeks afterwards I got a despatch from the President, saying
that if I had not done anything about releasing the Belgian consul I had better
not do anything.
Question. Had you done anything 1
.Answer. No, sir, I had not. I would not have released him; I would have
been relieved from duty myself before I would have released him. About this
time I ascertained through the lodges that V allandigham, suspecting that some
information about his orga:1ization had got abroad, had determined to return to
Ohio at an earlier period than was contemplated in their original project; that
he would be a candidate for delegate from Butler county to the Chicago convention, and would make a speech in Hamilton on the 15th of May. Satisfied
that this would be the case, I sent a stenographic reporter, who obtained a
letter of credence from the Chicago Times, and who arrived on the ground in
time to receive Mr. Valland1gham and report his speech, a copy of which he
sent to the Chicago Times, the original of which he carried, by my order, to
Governor Brough and General Heintzelman, whom I had telegraphed what was
going to take place.
No orders mime from the President until the time approached for the Chicago
convention so nearly that I became alarmed, lest they should not get the
information I had about the invasion of Pennsylvania. I determined to send
an officer to Governor Curtin with the evidence, and a letter requesting him to
examine it in company with one or two other leading men, and to see that the
information it contained was made of use. r:rhe officer went to Harrisburg and
laid the papers before Governor Curtin. Mr. Meredith, the attorney general of
the State, General Couch, and General Cameron were called in. Fully impressed with the importance of the information, they despatched a special messenger to Washington with letters to Mr. Seward, General Garfield, ~nd Senator
Convers, who took the papers to the President. One week after that the invasion of Pennsylvania began, as the evidence predicted it would.
In the meanwhile I thought it my duty to permit to be prepared, from the
evidence on hand, a synopsis of our information, which was published in the
Missouri Democrat and other western papers, for the purpose of anticipating as
far as we could the plans of this organization. Judge Holt came out some
time after this and read over all the papers with me, and returned to Washington as fully impressed as I was with the magnitude of the mischief with which
we had been threatened.
The committee remembers that the dP-mocratic convention at Chicago was
postponed; but operations in Missouri, under the plans, could not be postponed.
The thieves and the rascals in the northwest hoisted the rebel flag in Platte
county, and commenced operations on the 7th of July. From that time until
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after the expiration of the invasion and the expulsion of Price, there was nothing
but murder and rapine wherever they could operate.
Question. Do I understand correctly that you had ascertained that the State
of Missouri was to be invaded by Price before he came there 1
Answer. Yes, sir; that was the rumor there when I first arrived. The
organization gained strength day by day; that is to say, I became daily more
and more convinced and satisfied that the rebel portion of Missouri felt satisfied
that Price would invade that State.
Question. Do you suppose his invasion was intended to be in concert with
the plans of these secessionists you have mentioned 1
.Answer. I have no doubt it was. Not only that, but he supposed himself to
be a kind of master of their movements ; he supposed the societies to be acting
under his guidance in a certain measure, and paving the way for him, informing
him as thoroughly as they could what they would do. They had an organization to run horses to him, to carry pistols in small quantities to him and to the
recruits and guerillas in .Arkansas. rrhey kept up a regular mail with him.
Question. Did you learn from your evidence in any way that he belonged to
this order of knights 1
.Answer. He was the supreme commander of the order south; and the order
was instituted in Missouri mainly by a man who was called the deputy high
priest, commissioned by him to do it.
Question. Who was he 1
.Answer. One Douglass.
Question. .A resident of Missouri?
.Answer. Yes, sir, who had been in the rebel army, and had come back to
Missouri some nine months or a year before.
Question. You have stated that Secretary Stanton arrested one of your messengers on the way here with information. Why was that done 1
.Answer. He arrested my senior aid who brought letters to General Halleck
and General Grant respecting the condition of Missouri, and the measures
which I thought immediately necessary there to be of advantage to the government and to the State. He was arrested on the pretence that he had no permission to come here, under an old order that no officer should visit Washington
without permission from the Secretary of War. Major Bond returned home
under arrest; and considering that the shortest way to get rid of his arrest
would be to have him tried, I ordered his trial by a court composed of the
fiighest officers in Missouri, Major General Pleasonton being president. 1.,hat
court unanimously and honorably acquitted him.
Question. Did the authorities refuse to receive the information you sent by
him 1
.Answer. They never answered any of the letters, although they were important-so much so that I should like to submit copies of them to the committee.
Question. I wish you would submit them in connexion with this testimony.
Answer. I have gone through a sort of history of our discovery of this
secret society, and what was the end of it. I will now return to the military
arrangements and what I proposed to do.
I proposed to the government, in the first place, that the citizen provost marshals, who were scattered all over the State, who had been used as tools of political factions, and had created a distrust of all military authority and of all
just action, should be replaced by good officers, taken from those not fit for
active service on account of disability, headed by a provost marshal of the same
sort. I proposed, secondly, tha.t there should be sent four or five regiments of
troops·, well disciplined and well officered, but belonging to other States, to ·be
posted in the most disturbed districts of the State, where collisions between the
Unionists and the-I might almost say-conservatives were imminent ; and also
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for the purpose of enabling me to reorganize the Missouri State militia, and put
it upon the basis of the three-years service. Thirdly, that inasmuch as the
principal use of those troops beyond guarding the depots was to secure the citizens of the State in tilling the ground, and as the principal danger to them lay
from Price's army south, and from his e~issaries who came up to pave the
way for his purposes and get recruits for him, all the spare troops of Missouri,
those of Arkansas and those of Louisiana, should be combined under one command to operate against the enemy, drive him out west of Mississippi, and sweep
them down from the Arkansas river to the Gulf.
I sent General Ewing to have an interview with General Sherman, to whose
division the department of Arkansas belonged, and requested him to see General
Grant; and I wrote a letter to the War Department, dated the lOth of March,
proposing this, which letter I should like the committee to see. General
Sherman agreed with my plan, and presented it to General Grant at Nashville,
who then appeared to think favorably of it; but he reserved his decision until
he arrived at Washington, from whence he had me informed that no other
movements would take place west of the Mississippi than those then about to
commence, viz., the Red river expedition, under General Banks, and Steele's cooperative expedition.
After the massacre at Fort Pillow the four regiments of three-years troops
were taken away from St. Louis, which was also stripped of all the three-years
cavalry which could be turned out from the cavalry bureau. This subtraction
of all regular troops, just about the time the order of American Knights had
planned their insurrection, made it necessary to make some provision against
accident. To that end I obtained authority from the Secretary of War to raise
twelve-months volunteers for the defence of the State, and under that authority
I called for eleven regiments. As my personal popularity was of some use, we
succeeded in raising the regiments and organizing them during the summer and
early part of the fall.
Although the invasion by Price did not take place as early as it had been
threatened, from the first to the middle of July, it was only deferred until corn
was ripe enough. In the mean time the secret societies, and the soldiers from
Price's army, recruiting through their instrumentality in the rebel districts
of Missouri, kept up a guerilla war which was very harassing to the citizens.
The account of the campaign against General Price and its result, are so fully
given in my official report, that I think it best to have that taken as a part of
my testimony.
,
Question. Have you a copy of that report 1
Answer. Yes, sir; and I will furnish it to the committee. To what is therein
stated, I can now add from various reports founded on rebel authority, that I
am satisfied General Price lost in that campaign between 18,000 and 19,000
men. The report, which appeared in both the New York Herald and New
York Tribune, some time in March, obtained, I believe, from Henry S. Foote,
states that they report a loss of 19,500 men.
Question. In connexion with your account of this conspiracy of the American Knights, I will ask you who were the leaders of the organization in Missouri, so far as you ascertained 1
Answer. In my official report which, is in Judge Holt's office, there is a full
list of the leaders throughout the State. I would suggest that that be made a
part of my testimony.
Question. For what reason were you ultimately removed from that command 1
Answer. No reason was ever assigned to me, nor have I ever, directly or inilirectly, heard of any reason for it until within the last six weeks. I have
lately heard, from three or four different sources, that I was removed at the
personal request of General Grant, who was supposed, by the parties giving
rue that information, to be extremely hostile to me. As no occasion for any
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such l10stility has ever been given by me, so far as I know, I am at a loss to understand it. General Grant's chief of staff, General Rawlins, visited me after
the close of the campaign of General Price. He mixed freely with the citizens,
and took the pains to volunteer the statement, in my office, in the presence of
various members of my staff, that he was satisfied that things had been
managed wonderfully well during that campaign; that few could have done as
well, and probably none better.
Question. Has there been any misunderstanding between you and General
Grant at any time 1
.Answer. Never. On one occasion, when some of his staff told my staff that he
was under the impression that the newspaper correspondents who, in 1862, attack·
ed him in the Chicago Tribune and other papers, had received some countenance
at my headquarters, I had a conversation with him upon the subject. He
expressly stated that he did not suppose it came from me; and after conversation with him, in which I answered him that there was not the slightest foundation for such a feeling, he not only expressed himself satisfied, but we parted,
promising continued friendly intercourse wherever duty might throw us.
Question. Was there any complaint or remonstrance fi·om the authorities
here in regard to any part of your administration 1
.Answer. Never a complaint, never a remonstrance, never the slightest inquiry from any one except the President, early in my administration, concerning the order which I published requiring preachers holding conventions to
take the oath of allegiance, if they had not already done so. .About that Mr.
LinGoln wrote me a letter asking some explanations, and, among others, how I
could reconcile it to require the oath of allegiance of preachers, and allow political meetings to take place without requiring those who took part in them to
take the same oath. To this I replied that political meetings were open to
surveillance, while religious convocations were not; that if I sent a man to their
religious convocations to exercise a surveillance over them, and prevent them
from using their meetings as a clock for political iniquity, it would be an interference with their religious freedom. I therefore required of them to assure me,
under oath, that they were not going to do any mischief to the government in
their convocations, and the President appeared to be satisfied.
Question . .Among the religious denominations were any of them of secession
proclivities 1
.Answer. The southern Methodists were regarded as extremely so, and it was
at the suggestion of some southern Methodists who were loyal that that order
was published. It was made general, however, so that no religious bodies
could assemble without first taking the oath of allegiance; believing that those
who were loyal wonld have no objection to do that, and that those who were
disloyal would be compelled to hold no meetings, or to put themselves under
a bond of good behavior.
Question. That applied to all religious societies 1
.Answer. Yes, sir; the southern Methodists said that a large number of
preachers, who had run off to .A.rkanoas, would participate in this meeting, and
that they would pave the way for Price.
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PAPERS FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, May 15, 1865.
SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith, in compliance with your request
of the 24th ultimo, copies of the following documents:
Reports of General McClellan and General Rosecrans of the battle of Rich
Mountain, Virginia, with accompanying sub-reports.
Reports of General Grant and General Rosecrans of the battle of Iuka,
:Mississippi, and of the battle of Corinth.
Report of General Rosecrans of his campaign in Missouri.
Your obedient servant,
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary if War.
Hon. B. F. WADE,
Clwirman Committee on the Conduct if the War, Washington.

BATTLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN.
Omo,
Buckhanmm, Virginia, July 3, 1861.
GENERAL : Yours of the 2d has reached me.
After questioning your messenger and
hearing his full story, I confess that I do not share your apprehensions, and that I am not
a little surprised that you feel the defense of Philippi so hazardous and dangerous an
operation.
If four thousand (nearly) of our men, in a position selected and fortified in advance,
with ample time to examine the ground carefully and provide against any possible plan of
attack, are not enough to hold the place against any force these people can bring against
it, I think we had better all go home at once. If we cannot fight in position, I am much
mistaken as to our men.
I have, however, in deference to your views, ordered the 6th Ohio on temporary duty
with you until the crisis is past, although I believe they can be employed to more advantage at other points.
This is all the re-enforcement I can now spare. As to the one or two squadrons of efficient cavalry asked for by Captain Benham, it seems hardly necessary for me to repeat that
I have only one and a half companies, such as they are, and that more important duty is
for them here.
You have only to defend a strong position, or, at most, to follow a retreating enemy. I
fear you do not share the confidence I feel in our men, and that you regard their cavalry as
more dangerous than I do.
I feel that these men of ours can be worked up to any deed of daring, that their leaders
can make them cool under fire, and that a couple of good companies of infantry can drive
off all their cavalry in this mountainous country. I propose taking the really difficult and
dangerous part of this work on my own hands. I will not ask you to do anything that I
would not be willing to do myself. But let us understand each other: I can give you no
more re-enforcements. I cannot consent to weaken any further the really active and important column which is to decide the fate of the campaign. If you cannot undertake the
defence of Philippi with the force now under your control, I must find some one who will.
I have ordered up Latham's company, all of "Keys's" cavalry that are fit to take the field,
and the 6th Ohio. Do not ask for further re-enforcements ; if you do, I shall take it as a
t·equest to be relieved from your command and to return to Indiana.
I have spoken plainly; I speak officially. The crisis is a grave one, and I must have
generals under me who are willing to risk as much as I am, and be content to risk their
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE

58

ROSECRANS's CAMPAIGNS.

lives and reputation with such means as I can give them. Let this be the last of it. Give
me full details as to the information you obtained-not mere rumors, but facts-and leave
it to my judgment to determine what force you need. I wish action now, and determination.
I am, sir, very respectfully. your obedient servant,
GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, MaJor General, Commanding.
General T. A. MoRRIS, Philippi.
HilADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Beverly, Va., July 10, 1861.
Official copy :

S. WILLIAMS, Assistant AdJutant General.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
Buckhannon, Virginia, July 6, 1861.
GENERAL: The major general commanding directs that you advance from your present
position to-morrow morning and take up a position within two miles of the enemy, near
Elliott's farm-in preference on the south side of Barker's Mill run, on the heights in rear
of William Yeager's house. It is deemed preferable to avoid the defile north of the Elliott
house by crossing the river somewhere near the nineteen-mile post from Beverly, andrecrossing at the ford where the middle fork road crosses, just at the po~:~ition to be occupied.
Your train may remain at Philippi, under a sufficient escort, until you have occupied your
new position. You will move prepared to force any opposition offered, and will at all
hazards accomplish the object proposed. Occupy Beelington by a strong advanced guard,
and place a strong detachment to cover the paths leading from the rebel camp to the left
flank of your position. From this position push out strong infantry reconnoissances to
ascertain the exact position, condition, and movements of the enemy. Watch them closely
day and night, have everything ready to pursue them should they retreat, and follow them
up closely in that event.
Make extended reconnoissances, calculated to give the impres~ion that the main attack
is to be made by you, and use all efforts to retain them in their present position. Arrange
your hour of starting from .Philippi so that you will, by an easy march, reach the vicinity
of Elliott's within an hour or two after sumise. Let your advanced guard be of infantry,
strong, and near the main column. Do not push out any advanced cavalry patrols. A
strong advanced guard will move from here to-morrow morning to occupy the middle fork
bridge ; by the next day the Roaring creek bridge will be taken, and peThaps on the same
day the town of Beverly will be occupied. The general is delayed by the non-arrival of
supplies, but hopes to occupy Beverly on 'fuesday, at latest-probably on Monday. He asks
you to do all in your power to hold the enemy in check in the present position, and to
induce them to believe that you will make the main attack, the object being to cut them
off at Beverly.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. WILLIAMS, Assistant AdJutant General.
Brigadier General T. A. MoRRIS, Commanding at Philippi.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTJIIENT OF OHio, Beverly, Va., July 16, 1861.
Officia.l copy :

S. WILLIAMS, Assistant AdJutant Gmeral.
HEADQUARTERS, AT MR. KETTLE's HousE,
Near Tygart's, Vally Rive1·, six milesfrom Beverly, July 12, 1861.
SIR : I write to state to you that I have, in consequence 9f the retreat of General Garnett,
and the jaded and reduced condition of my command, most of them having been without food for two days, concluded, with the concurrence of a majority of my captains and
field officers, to surrender my command to you to-morrow as prisoners of war. I have only
to add, I trust they will only receive at your hands such treatment aR has been invariably
shown to the northern priRoners by the south.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
JNO. PEGRAM,
Lieutenant Colonel P. A., 0. S., Commanding.
COllllfANDING OFFICER of Northern Forces, B everly, Vtrginia.
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HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
Beverly, Virginia, July 13, 1861.
SIR: Your communication dated yesterday, proposing to surrender as prisoners of war
the force assembled under your command, has been delivered to me.
I will receive you, your officers and men, as prisoners, and I will treat you and them
with the kindness due to prisoners of war, but it is not in my power to relieye you or them
from any liabilities incurred by taking arms against the United States.
I am , sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
MaJor General U. S. Army, Commanding Department.
JoaN PEGRAlii, Esq.,
Styling himselj Lieutenant Colonel P. A., C. S.
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
Beverly, Vtrginia, July 13, 1861.
Official copy :
S. WILLIAMS, Assistant AdJutant General.

CHEAT RIVER CAMP,
Corrick's Ford, eight mile~ south of Saint George, Va., July 13, 1861.
SIR: In accordance with your directions this morning, I took command of the advance
guard of your column, consisting of the 14th Ollio, Colonel Steadman, with one section of
Colonel Barnett's artillery, the 7th Indiana, under Colonel Damon, and the 9th Indiana,
Colonel Milroy, in all about 1,800 men, and with this force, as instructed, I started from
near Leedsville at about 4 a. m. to pursue the army of General Garnett, which consisting,
as we learned, of 4,000 to 5,000 men, and four to six cannon, had retreated from the north
side of Laurel mountain, near Beelington, the day before yestJrday.
It being a~certained that. the enemy had retired towards the village of " New Interest,."
and thence, as was supposed, ove·r a mountain road leading to Shaffer fork or main branch
of the Cheat river, to St. George, the troops were brought rapidly forward on their route,
so as to reach the entrance of the mountain road, about seven miles' march, at about 6
o'clock.
A short distance after entering this path the passage was found to be obstructed by large
trees, recently felled in about twelve to fifteen places, and in nearly every defile for three or
four miles ; but the information that was from time to time received that this force, which
had some fifeen hours the start of us from Beelington, were now only four or five miles in
advance, encouraged our efforts, and though for nearly the whole time the rain was pouring
in torrents, and the clayey roads almost impassable in many places, the spirit of the troops,
without exception, as it came under my eye, was such as to bear them most rapidly
onward. Under all these trials, superadded to that of hunger with the greater part of
them for thn previous fifteen or twenty hours, at about noon we reached Kaler's, or the
first ford of the Shafer branch or main Cheat river, having within the previous two or
three miles fired at and driven in several pickets of the enemy, protecting those who were
forming the barricades, and at one place we broke up a camp where the meals were being
cooked.
At the ford near Kaler's, and at about one-half the distance to another ford, which we
afterwards m et with about one mile further on, we saw the bagg11.ge train of the enemy
apparently at rest. This I proposed to attack as soon as strengthened by the arrival of
Steadman's 2d battalion, with Dumant's regiment, when the thoughtless firing of a musket
at our ford ; set the train rapidly in motion, and long lines of infantry were formed in
order of battle to protect it In a few minutes, however, the arrival of Barnett's artillery,
with Dumant close upon it, enabled the commander to push forward in its original order.
But the train and its guard had retired, leaving only a few skirmishers to meet us at the
second ford, where, however, quite a rapid firing was kept up by the advance regiment,
and the artillery opened for some minutes to clear the adjacent woods the more completely of the enemy. We then continued our march rapidly to this ford, and as we
approached it we came upon their trains the last half of it just crossing in the river. The
enemy was found to have taken a strong position with his infantry and artillery, upon a
precipitous bank of some fifty to eighty feet in height upon the opposite side of the river.
While our own ground was upon the low land, nearly level with the river, Steedman's
regiment in the advance, opened its fire most gallantly upon them, which was immediately
returned by their strong force of infantry and by their cannon, upon which Barnett's
artillery was ordered up, and opened upon them with excellent effect.
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As I soon perceived a position by which their left could be turned, six companies of
Colonel Dumant's regiment were ordered to cross the river, about three hundred yards
above them, to pass up the hill obliquely from our right to their left, and take them in
rear. By some mistake. possibly in the transmission of the order, this command crossed
at about double this distance, and turned at first to their right, which delayed the effect
of this movement. After some fifteen minutes, however, this error was rectified, and the
hil1 being reported as impracticable, this command, now increased to the whole regiment,
were ordered down to the ford under close cover of this bill on their side, and then to take
them directly in front at the road.
The firing of Steedman's regiment and of Milroy's, now well up and in action, with repeated and rapid discharges of the artillery during this movement, decided the action at
once.· As Dumant reached the road, having passed along and under their whole front,
the firing ceased, and the enemy fled in great confusion, Dumant's regiment pursuing them
for about one mile further, having a brisk skirmishing with their rear for the first half of
that distance, during which General Garnett was killed .
The enemy would still have been followed up most closely, and probably to the capture
of a large portion of thtir scattered army, but this was absolutely impossible with our
fatigued and exhausted troops, who had already marched some eighteen miles or more in
an almost incessant violent rain, and the greater part of them without food since the
evening, and a portion of them even from the noon of yesterday, so warm bad been
the pursuit on their hasty retreat from Laurel mountain, twenty-five miles distant. The
troops were therefore halted for food and rest at about 2 p. m. The result of the action
proves to be the ca·pture of abOut forty loaded wagons and teams, (being nearly all their
baggnge trains, as we leflrn,) and including a large portion of new clothing, camp equipage, and other stores, their headquarters papers, and military chest ; also, two stands of
colors, and one fine rifled piece of artillery.
While the commanding general, Robert S. Garnett, is killed, his body being now cared
for by us, and fifteen or twenty more of the enemy are killed, and nearly fifty prisoners al'e
taken, our own loss iR two killed, and six or seven wounded, one dangerously.
In concluding this report, I feel it my duty to state that just as the action was closing,
the head regiment of the body of the troops under yourself, though starting, as I learn,
three hours later, (the 6th Indiana, under Colonel Crittenden,) came up to the field in excellent order, but unfortunately too late to aid us in the battle.
The conduct of those gallant officers, Colonels Barnett, Steedman, Dumant, and Milroy,
with the steady perseverance of their officers and men, in their long and arduous march,
suffering from hunger, rain, and cold, with their gallantry in action, was most heroic, and
beyond all praise of mine. Their country only can appreciate and reward their services.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. BENHAM, Captain of Engineers,
Chief Engineer Department of the Ohio and Commanding Advance Column.
General T . .A.. MoRRIS,
Commanding United Stales Force&.
SIR: I reported yesterday, at about 6 a. m., the progress of the forces of my command
in pursuit of the enemy retreating from Laurel bill.
The pursuit was continued through the day in the same order as stated in my report of
yesterday morning, viz: Steedman's 14th Ohio in advance, with two sections of Barnett's
artillery; next Dumant's 7th Indiana, and Milroy's 9th Indiana.
These regiments, as I reported, started in pursuit from our resting place near Leedsville
at about 4 o'clock in the morning, under the immediate command of Captain Benham.
The remainder of the column were on the march by 5 o'clock a. m. A drizzling rain
commenced about 6 o'clock, which by 9 became quite heavy.
The enemy left the main turnpike and turned towards Cheat river, crossing two branches
of the Laurel mountain over a narrow and difficult road . Owing to the heavy rain the
roads were rendered very difficult for the men and the few wagons of l}mmunition and
provisions. By 11 o'clock the rain became a drenching storm, and contiiiued for several
hours, the roads in the mountains becoming nearly impassable. At 2 o'clock the whole
command were up to the position which we now occupy.
For details of the operations of the advance column I refer you to the report of Captain
Benham.
The attention of the commanding general is particularly called to the gallant bearing of
the regiments which led the advance. I would also call attention to the fact that the entire
command commenced the pursuit on a few minutes' notice, without time to prepare even
a day's rations for the haversacks.
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I ordered four wagons to be ]oaded with hard bread and pork, to follow the command.
These four wagons, with the additional rations put in with the ammunition, is all the provisions the command has had since leaving Burlington, except. some beeves procu.red in
this vicinity. The march of yesterday was from eighteen to twenty miles.
When it is considered that we have put to flight a force equal to our own, and have pursued him night and day for thirty hours, almost without provisions, over a mountainous
and difficult road, and part of the time through a drenching storm, we may feel sure that
our cause must be successfully maintained by men who show such gallant bearing and
20ldierly endurance.
Justice to a gallant soldier compels me to say that, from Philippi to the routing of the
enemy at this place, too much praise cannot be bestowed on Captain Benham, and I take
this occasion to thank him for the invaluable service he has rendered me I must also call
attention to the services of Major W. Gordon, now of the 11th regiment of infantry,
United States army. Major G01don volunteered a private in the 9th Indiana regiment,
was promoted sergeant major in the same regiment, and two weeks since received the appointment of major in the regular army. Owing to the position of the enemy in front of
the brigade in which he was serving as sergeant m'ajor, he requested to be retained until
the issue should be settled. Acting yesterday as my volunteer aid with the advance
column, Captain Benham testifies to his gallantry and invaluable services during the entire
day, and more especially in the face of the enemy.
I am, sir, very reRpectfully, your obedient servant.
T . .A.. MORRIS, Brigadier General, Oommaruiing.
MaJor SETH WILLIAMs,

Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Ohio.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION, WESTERN VIRGINIA,

Camp near Huttonsville, July 14, 1861.
CoLONEL: I have the honor to submit, for the information of the commanding general,
the following report of the operations of the forces under ruy command from the time of
my leaving Grafton :
Previous to my departure from Grafton I became satisfied that a large body of the rebel
army (supposed to consist of six or seven thousand men, under Brigadier General Robert
S. Garnett, formerly of the United States army) occupied an intrenched position at Laurel
hill, about thirteen miles south of Philippi, on the turnpike leading to Beverly, with the
apparent intention of making a determined stand at that point. Whereupon I at once
resolved to push on with all the available force at my disposal, and endeavor, by making a
rapid detour through Buckhannon, to reach Beverly and strike their rear, cutting off their
supply communication from Staunton.
As soon as I had concentrated my forces at Buckhannon, I moved forward, and at the
same time ordered General Morris to advance from Philippi and take a commanding position
about a mile and a half distant, and directly opposite the enemy's works, thereby enabling
him to divert their attention from me, also to watch their movements and be iu position to
act promptly after I had reached their rear at Beverly.
General Morris promptly responded to my order and secured the proper position with but
slight resistance, and I pushed forward with my column as rapidly as my means of transportation wouid permit.
On the evening of the 9th instant I arrived at Roaring creek, near the base of Rich
mountain, where I found the enemy, in considera.ble force, had destroyed a bridge, and
were strongly intrenched at a point where the road enters a defile leading up the mountain, about two miles distant from my camp. On the morning of the lOth I ordered
a reconnaissance in force, consisting of the 9th and 4th Ohio volunteers and Loomis's
battery, under the supervision of Lieutenant Poe, topographical engineers. This was
pushed within two hundred yards of the enemy's guns, and resulted in the loso of one
man killed and one wounded, but the dense thickets with which their works were surrounded prevented the attainment of much positive or satisfactory information. It served,
however, to confirm my previous supposition that the intrenchments were held by a large
force, with several guns in position to command the first approaches, and that a direct
assault would result in a heavy and unnecessary Lss of life. 'l'hese considerations at once
determined me to make an effort to turn their flank and commence the attack from the
rear. Accordingly I ordered General Rosecrass to move at 4 o'clock in the morning with
the 19th Ohio, the 8th, lOth, and 13th Indiana regiments, and Burdsall's dragoons, to cut
his way through the almost impenetrable thickets of brush to the lofty summit of Rich
mountain, at Hart's farm, about five miles distant, and to move thence at once down the
turnpike road and attack the intrenchments in rear, and, during the progress of his r.u.arch,
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to communicate with me every hour. The remainder of the force under my command to
be held in readiness to assault in front as soon as Rosecrans's musketry should indicate that
he was immediately in their rear. The order to General Rosecrans to attack the rear of
the enemy' s lower intrenchments was not carried out, but his brigade remained at Hart's
farm during the remainder of the day and night, and I received no communication from
him after ·about 11 o'clock a. m., when he was still distant about a mile and a half from
Hart's farm.
About the time I expected the general to reach the rear of their intrenchments I moved
up all my available force to the front and remaine::l, in person, just in rear of the advance
pickets, ready to assault when the indicated moment should arrive. In the mean time I
sent Lieutenant Poe to find such a position for our artillery as would enable us to command
the works. Late in the afternoon I received his report that he had found such a place. I
immediately detailed a party to cut a road to it for our glins, but it was too late to get
them into position before dark, and, as I had received no intelligence whatever of General
Rosecrans's movements, I finally determined to r eturn to camp, leaving merely sufficient
force to cover the working party. Orders were then given to move up ten guns with tha
entire available infantry at daybreak the following morning. As the troops were much
fatigued, some delay occurred in moving from camp, and just as the guns were starting
intelligence was received that the enemy had evacuated their works and fled over the
mountains, leaving all their guns, means of transportation, ammunition, tents, and baggage behind . Then, for the first time since 11 o'clock the previous day, I received a communication from General Rosecrans giving me the first intimation that he had taken the
enemy's position at Hart's farm, from which it appeared that he, with great difficulty, and
almost superhuman efforts on the part of his men, had forced his way up the precipitous
side of the mountain, and at about 1 p. m, reached the summit, where he encountered a
portion of the enemy's forces, with two guns in position behind earth and log works, affording protection to their men.
The attack was commenced by the enemy with heroic spirit and determination. They
opened upon the advance of our column with volleys of musketry and rapid discharges of
canister, killing several of our men and at first throwing them into some confusion. They
however soon rallied and returned a brisk aud accurate fire, which told with terrible effect
in the enemy's ranks, killing and wounding nearly every man at their guns. The troops
then advanced, continuing- their well-directed fire until they drove the enemy from their
position and caused them to take flight down the turnpike towards their intrenchments at
the base of the mountain.
The troops then encamped on the battle-field at about 2 o'clock p . m., and remained
there until the following morning, when I made a rapid march and occupied Beverly. I
here learned that General Garnett, as soon as he discovered we were approaching his rear
a.nd had cut off his retreat in this direction, abandoned his intrenchments at Laurel hill,
leaving his ten.ts and other property, and had made a hasty retreat in the night over a
rough country road leading towards St. George. General Morris had been repeatedly instructed by me to keep a close watch upon Garnett's movements, and to be ready the
moment he retreated to follow him up vigorously with all his available force and crush
him if possible ; but, much to my t>urprise, when he discovered that Garnett had escaped,
he only sent a portion of his force about eight miles, and then halted it for several hour111
to communicate with me and bring up re-enforcements.
This detention gave Garnett the opportunity to g et far in advance, and had it not been
for the rapid and well-directed march of the advance conducted by Captain Benham, it is
believed that t he rebel general would have escaped unharmed Captain Benh'tm is entitled
to great p raise for his prompt and energetic movement upon Garnett's rear, the r esult of
which will be seen from his report enclosed . This shows that General Garnett and about
twenty others of the enemy were killed, and fifty prisoners, two stands of colors, and one
rifled cannon taken, besides the baggage tr(lin and a large amount of other property. I
take very great pleasure in recommending Captain Benham to the special notice of the
general-in-chief.
Immediately after learning that Garnett had retreated, I ordered Brigadier Genera.! Hill
(commanding at Grafton) to assemble all his disposable force and endeavor, by a rapid march
upon Saint George or West Union, to cut off the retreat of the rebels; but I have not yet
heard the result of his movement My last advices this evening report General Hill's
advance within four miles of the retreating rebels.
I have not time now to notice individual acts of merit and bravery displayed in the
recent conflicts, but shall take an early opportunity of presenting them to you in detail.
I cannot, however, let the present occasion pass without making mention of the services of
Brigadier General Rosecrans in conducting his command up the very precipitous siddS of
the mountains and overcoming the formidable obstacles which impeded his progress; also,
for the very handsome manner in which he planned and directed his attack upon the rebels

ROSECRANS'S CAMPAIGNS.

63

at Hart's farm, carrying them after a stout and determined resistance. I also consider it
due to my volunteer aide-de-camp, Colonel F. W. Lander, to speak of his services in this
connexion. He (by the request of General Rosecrans) accompanied his column, and by
his experience assisted materially in conducting the troops over a most difficult country,
and displayed extraordinary activity and courage in the battle. He escaped unhurt, having
the horse under him disabled by a canister shot.
I pursued the retreating rebels yesterday as far as Cheat river, and became satisfied that
they would not stop short of St,mnton. I therefore returned to this camp. which commands the communication between eastern and we~:~tern Virginia over the Staunton and
Parkersburg turnpike.
General Garnett's command, when last heard from, were retreating in great confusion
near the north branch of the Potomac on the road leading from West Union to Williamsport.
I trust I will not be regarded as merely conforming to a formula when I expres the
great obligations due to my personal and general staff, who by their good judgment, un·
tiring energy and cool conduct, have enabled me to overcome the inevitable difficulties of
an imperfect and hasty organization, and to accomplish whatever good results have been
achieved. As far as I have myself observed and learned from their officers, the conduct of
the volunteers who participated in the actions at Rich mountain and at Carrick's ford was
unexceptionable. They inva!'iably displayed an ardent desire to meet the enemy, and
great gallantry in action, and, in my jurlgment, all they require to make good and reliable
soldiers is a little more drill and discipline.
The results of the action at Rich mountain, as nearly as can be ascertained, were as
follows: Our loss in killed, 12; wounded, 59; no prisoners. The loss of the enemy in
killed, 135; wonnded and prisoners, (not yet reported,) as near as can be determined,
between 800 and 900. Two brass 6-pounder cannon, a large number of muskets, two stands
of colors, and other property, were taken. Two 6-pounder brass cannon were captured at
the lower intrenchments, with a large wagon train, with horses and a large number of
tents. But the really important results of these operations are the complete rout and an·
nihilation of the rebel forces, the capture of one and the death of the other of their
leaders, that this portion of Western Virginia is entirely freed from their presence and
that there is now not one seingle organized band of the rebels on this side of the mountain
north of the Kanawha valley .
.After my arrival at Beverly I received a note from Colonel Pegram containing a propo
sition to surrend0r his command as prisoners of war. Tbis note, with my reply, are enclosed. His command, consisting of 33 commissioned officers and 560 men, are now
prisoners.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Mafor General U.S. Army.
Colonel E. D. TowNSEND, A. .A. G.,
Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. 0.

HEADQUARTERS 1sT BRIGADE U.S. VoLUNTEER MILITIA,
Beverly, hrginia, July 19, 1861.
MAJOR: In obedience to the order of the major general commanding, I have the honor
to submit the following report of the operationH of the 1st brigade, consisting of the Sth
and lOth Indiana volunteer militia, the 13th Indiana U. S. volunteer infantry, and 19th
Ohio U. S. volunteer militia, which resulted in dislodging the rebel forces from their intrenched position at camp Garnett on Rich mountaiu .
.After the armed reconnoissance was over, by direction of the major general I ordered
the 8th Indiana to bivouac in advance of the camp at Roaring creek, and the lOth and
13th into camp .
.About 10 p. m I came to the headquarters with a plan for turning the enemy's position.
The general,·having considered it and heard the information on which it was based, was
pleased to direct me to carry it out, and for that purpose ordered Colonel Sullivan, of the
13th Indiana, and Burdsall's cavalry, temporarily attached to the brigade, and that the
movement should begin at daylight on the next morning.
The troops were ordered to parade in silence under arms, without knapsacks, with one
day's rations in their haversacks and their canteens filled with water. By inadvertence
the assembly was sounded in the 19th Ohio regiment and lights put in several tents, when
I discovered it; but they were promptly extinguished
The pickets relieved, the regimental camps and guards with the sick, and a few men of
each company remaining, orders wer·~ given that the reveille should be beaten at the usual
b..Qut, and the column formed and moved forward in the following order and strength :
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First. 8th Indiana, under Benton •••••••••••••••••••••••••
Second. lOth Indiana, under Manson ••••• ·-·----·----·--··
Third. 13th Indiana, under Sullivan •••• ·---·- •••••.••••••
Fourth. 19th Ohio, under Beatty __ •••••• __ ••• _____ ._ •• __ •

242 strong.
''
425
650
525
"

Total infantry ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••• I, 842
Fifth. Burdsall's cavalry .•••••••••• -----------· •••• ~.---75
Aggregate •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1,917
Colonel Lander, accompanied by the guide, led the way through a pathless forest over
rocks and ravines, keeping far down on the southeastern declivities of the mountain spurs
and usillg no axe, to avoid discovery by the enemy, whom we supposed would be on the
alert by reason of the appearance of unusual stir in our camp and the lateness of the hour.
A rain set in about 6 a, m. and lasted until about 11 o'clock a. m., with intermissions,
during which the column pushed cautiously and steadily forward, and arrived at last and
halted in rear of the crest on the top of Rich mountain, hungry and weary with an eighthours' march over a most unkindly road. They Jay down to rest, while Colonel Lander
and the general examined the country. It was found that the guide was too much scared
to be with us longer, and we had another valley to cross, another hill to climb, another
descent beyond that to make, before we could reach the Beverly road at the top of the
mountain. On this road we started at 2 o'clock and reached the top of the mountain
after the loss of an hour's time, by mistake in the direction of the head of the column,
in rectifying which the lOth Indiana took the advance.
Shortly after passing over the crest of the hill, the head of the column, ordered to be
covered uy a company deployed as skirmishers, was fired on by the enefty's pickets, killing Sergeant James A. Taggart and dangerously wounding Captain Christopher Miller, of
the lOth. The column then advanced through dense brushwood, emerging into rather
more open brushwood and trees, when the rebels opened a fire of both musketry and
6-pounders, firing some case shot and a few shells.
The lOth advanced and took position at A, Plan No. 1, with one company deployed as
skirmishers covering its front. The 8th advanced and halted in column of fours at B.
The 13th advanced to C, in an old road, where it w~s ordered to occupy the heights, with
three companies at d d d, and skirmish down the hill, keeping strong reserves on the top ;
three companies were ordered back toE, to cover the debouch up the valley on the left;
the companies of the remainder were to fill the space in the line marked 1 1 1 , theremaining two companies standing in column at 1- • The 19th Ohio came down the road
and halted in column at H.
Owing to misunderstanding orders, Colonel Sullivan occupied the hill with his whole
regiment, &nd it took forty minutes to correct the error and get into the proper position
as indicated. 1'he command forward was then given, and another company from the
right of the lOth deployed as skirmishers, leaving an interval through which the 8th could
pass in column and charge the rebel battery on the left of their position at Z as soon as our
fire had told properly. At the same time Colonel Sullivan was to take his four companies
and charge around the road on the left. After an advance of fifty yards and some heavy
firing from our line, the enemy showed signs of yielding, and I gave orders to the 8th and
sent them to the colonel of the 13th, to charge in column. The 8th made a mistake and
got into line at B, where, in consideration of their abundant supplies of ammunition, I left
them.
The 13th went into column at D, Plan 2. Seven companies of the 19th Ohio deployed
into line at Hand delivered two splendid volleys, when the enemy broke. Meanwhile I
rode round to the 13th and drove them in to charge up across the road, as shown at L. The
lOth charged by fours at J. The 8th came down and charged upon the rebel front at K.
The battle was over, the enflmy dispersed, one piece of cannon taken at A, another at
B, and their dead and wounded scattered over the hill-side.
Learning from a captive that the 44th Virginia and some Georgia troops and cavalry
were below, and finding it too late to continue the operations against the rebels' position
that evening with troops as much exhausted as. were ours, and threatened, too, by succors,
the troops were bivouacked in the position shown on Plan No. 2- -Lieutenant Colonel Hollingsworth going down on the ridge with six companies to the position mentioned, within
half a mile of the rebel pickets.
The two brass 6-pounders captured were put in order, and, under command of Captain
Conckle, 19th Ohio, placed-one looking down the Beverly road at C, the other at d, looking towards camp Garmtt.
During that rainy night our men bivouacked cheerfully, and turned out with great
promptitude whenever the rebels by their movements alarmed our pickets. About 3
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.o'clock in the morning of the 12th our pickets brought in a prisoner from the r ebel camp,
from whom I learned their forces were disorganized and probably dispersing. This determined the dispositions for the attack on the camp. I ordered Colonel Beatty, with all the
19th, to proceed along the ridge and take their position on the south side of the road, and
directed Burdsall's cavalry, accompanied by one company of the lOth Indiana, to reconnoitre down the road. Colonel Sullivan, with the 13th, was to follow the movement
promptly, and by his skirmishers to clean the hill-side north of the road.
These orders were obeyed, and, finding the position abandoned, Burdsall's cavalry and
-company C, lOth Indiana regiment, entered the camp about 6 o'clock a. m., where they
found and took prisoners t en (10) officen;, five (5) non-commis~;ioned officers, fifty-four (54)
privates, the descriptive list of which is hereto attached, and marked A. Colonel Beatty'
entered the upper camp about the same time and occupied it, taking charge of the property,
.a mong which were two brass 6-pounders, and some eighty tents, four caissons, and one
hundred (100) rounds of ammunition. Colonel Sullivan, of the 13th Indiana, came in
.and occupied the camp on the north side of the road, and took charge of the horses,
wagons, tents, tools, and implements of the rebels there.
'l'he 8th and lOth Indiana were left in possession on the battle-field, and were charged
with the duty of burying the dead. They remained until next morning, the 13th, when
the whole force moved forward to their present encampment at Beverly.
Having given the details, I close my report by the following
SUMMARY OF THE

!IOVE~fENT.

With strong detachments from the 19th Ohio, the 8th, lOth, and 13th Indiana, and
Burdsall's cavalry, amounting to 1,912 rank and file, I set out at 5 a.m. of the 11th, and
by a circuitous route through a trackless mountain forest reached the Beverly road at the
top of Rich mountain, where I found the enemy advised of my approach, and in force with
two 6-pounders, field-pieces, and infantry, from various circumstances judged to have
been from 800 to 1,200 strong, though probably not all of them in action. We formed at
about 3 o'clock, under cover of our skirmishers, guaruing well against a flank attack from
the direction of the rebels' position, and after a brisk fire, which threw the rebels into
·confusion, carried their position by a charge, driving them from behind some log breastworks, and pursued them into the thickets on the mountain. We captured twenty-one
(21) prisoners, two brass 6-pounders, fifty stand of arms, and some corn and provisions.
Our loss was twelve (12) killed, and forty-nine (49) wounded.
The rebels had some twenty (20) wounded on the field. The number of the killed we could
not ascertain, but subsequeutly the number of burial,; reported to this date is one hundred
and thirty-five, (135,) many found scattered over the mountain. Our troops were informed
that there were one ur two regiments of rebels towards Beverly, and finding the hour late,
bivouacked on their ;trrus, amid a cold, drenching rain, to await daylight, when they moved
forward on the enemy's intrenched pof:iition, which was found abandoned by all except
sixty-three (63) men, who were taken prisoners.
vVe took possession of two brass 6-pounders, four caissons, and one hundred rounds of
ammunition, two kegs and one barrel of powder, 19,000 buck and ball cartridges, two stands
of colors, and a large lot of equipment.s and clothing, consisting of 204 tents, 427 pairs
pants, 124 axes, 98 picks, 134 spades and shovels; all their train, consisting of 29 wagons,
75 horses, 4 mules, and 60 pairs harness.
The enemy finding their position turned, abandoned intrenchments which taken by the
front would have cost us a thousand lives, and dispersed through the mountains, some
attempting to escape by the way of Laurel hill, and others aiming for Huttonsville.
Among the former were the command of Colonel Pegram, which, unable to join the rebels
at Laurel hill, surrendered to the major general on the 13th. Our loss in the engagement,
killed and wounded, is shown in the statement hereto appended, marked B. The list of
.prisoners taken is shown in the paper hereto appended, marked D. 'l' he invoice of property
captured and turned over to the post quartermaster is hereto annexed, marked E.
In closing this report, I deem it proper to observe that, considering the rawness and inexperience of both officers and meo, the fact that one-fourth were on picket guard the
previous evening, and had made a most fatiguing march through the rain, and with only
inadequate supplies of food, their conduct was admirable.
Among those who are entitled to special mention are Colonel Lander, who, with the
.guide, led the way into the very midst of the action; Coloncll\'Ianson, of the lOth Indiana,
who was everywhere along his line, inspiring the men by his voice and presence, and who
bravely led the charge of his regiment.
Colonel Benton was ready to obey orders, and moved among his men with alacrity.
Colonel Sullivan charged with his command as the rebels were dispersing, and captured
.several of the prisoners. 1\'fajor Wilson, of the 8th, was conspicuous for coolness and prompt-
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itude of action. Lieutenant Colonel Colgrove, of the 8th, deserves especial mention for
his coolness while forming his lines of the regiment under fire. Major Foster, of the 13th,
showed coolness and self-possession in forming a portion of his men under the fire of the
cannon.
My thanks are dne Captain Kingsbury, my assistant adjutant general, and to Captain
A. Irwin Harriso"!l, for their valuable and efficient aid in carrying orders under fire.
The lOth Indiana was under fire for an hou.r and a half.
The 19th Ohio distinguished itself for the cool and handsome manner in which they
held their post against a flank attack, and for the manner in which they came into line
and delivered their fire near the close of the action.
I consider Colonel Beatty to have managed his men well, and to have been ably seconded
by Colonel Hollingsworth and Major Buckley.
For the individual:; who distinguished themselves under the eyes of their regimental
commanders, I respectfully refer to the report of the colonels of regiments herewith submitted.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. S. ROSECRANS,
Brig!Jdier General United States Army.
MajorS. WrLLIA:r.Js, A. A. G. ,
United States Army, Headquarters Army of West Virginia.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE AR:r.!Y OF OCCUPATION,
West Virginia, July 23, 1861.
MAJOR: Herewith please find report of the affair at Rich mountain, July 11. The map
which should accompany it will be forwarded you to-morrow.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. S. HOSEORANS,
Brigadier General United States Army.
MajorS. WrLLIA:~>Is, Assistant Adjutant General.

B.
List of wounded in the 1st brigade, army of West Virginia, under Brigadier General Rosecrans, in
the affair at Rich mottntain, July 11, 1861.
lOth regiment Q( Indian(!- volunteer militia.-James R. M. Briant, lieutenant colonel; W. C.
Wilson, Major; Chris. Miller, company A, captain; - - - Conklin, company H, captain;
John Brower, company D, lieutenant.

Commissioned officers wounded--------------------------------------·------Non-commissioned and privates __ • __ . __________ .. ___ •.• _•• ____ • ___ ••• ___ • ___ •

5
51

Total wounded ___ • _. ______ . __ ••• _______________ •. _••• _ •••••• _•• _ ••. __ .. ___
Total non-commissioned officers and privates killed---------------- .••••• -------·

56
12

Total killed and wounded ___ •• _ •• _•••• _••• _____ •• _____________ ••• __ •• _____ •
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8th ,Indiana regiment.-Franklin l\1. Slobangh, company A, 2d corporal, Joseph Funk,
company A, private; William H. Keller, company A, 1st sergeant; G. vV. Rhane, company
B, 4th sergeant; Henry L. Powell, company B, private; C. W. Heid, company C, private;
Andrew Ridenour, company C, private; Ashbury Kerwood, company C, private; John
Walker, company C, pri\·ate; Frederick Coppersmith, company C, private; Park Strahan,
company E, private; Samuel Williams, company E, private; William Lamb, company F,
private; Benjamin Curtis, company G, private; Lemuel Cuzick, company H, private; Jacob
Saibors, company FI, private; Jacob Beroth, company H, private; Jesse King, company
H, private; M. M. Stevenson, company I, 1st sergeant; James Buchanan, company I,
private; Andrew Stutzman, company I, private; Frank Hall, company K, 2cl sergeant;
Samuel DeVaughn, compatq K, private.
lOth Indiana regiment -William Stokes, company A, private; William Man burn, company
A, private; Chauncey Thompson, company A, private; Frank M. Bryant, company A,
private; Thomas C. 'fruit, company A, private; Noah Kick, company A, private; Lent
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Sanders, company F, private; Howe Husel, company F, private; H. T. Everhart, company
F, private; James W. Gwin, company D, private; Aaron---, company D, private; John
Cungh:tw, company D, private; Henry Rank, company D, private; Henry Young, company D, private; Daniel Lander, company I, private; William Singleton, company I,
private; Reuben Wes(O, company I, private; George W. Brooks, company K, private;
Reilly Wo ods, company K, private; Henry McGill, company H, private.
13th Indiana regiment.-Charles Crumbo, company A, private; Henry Loop, company E,
private; Charles Paff, company E, private; Durban Mathews, company E, private; Isaac
Thornburg, company H, private; James Carnagan, company H, private; James Thompson,
company G, private; John Fordzee, company G, private.
List of casualties in the 1st brigade, army qf occupation, West Vir:qinia, under Brigadier General
Rosecrans, in the affair at Rich mountain, July 11, 1861.
8th Indiana regiment.-Philander Wiseheart, company B; Joseph Beck, company G,
private; James H. Emmett, company H, private.
lOth Indiana regiment.-James A. Taggert, company A, private; Samuel Yocum, company
F, private; R. R. Ellington, company E, private.
13th Indiana regiment.-James Blazer, company A, private; John Powell, company B,
corporal; John F. Warner, company B, corporal; William Riffie, company E, private ;
Patrick Welsh, company G, private; Allen Thompson, company H, private.

Received, Beverly, Virginia, July 15, 1861, of Captain 0. N. Goulding, quartermaster b1'igade Ohio
and Indiana United States volunteer milttia, commanded by General Rosecrans, being property captured
from the enemy at Rich mountain, July 12, 1861-

890 muskets.
42 rounds 6-pounder shot, fixed.
60 rounds 6-ponnder shot, case.
1 keg blasting powder.
1 keg rifle powder.
1 barrel C)mmon powder.
18, 000 musket cartridges, calibre 69.
I, 000 musket cartridges, calibre 54.
1 can powder.
4 6-pounder brass cannon.
4 caissons.
84 axes.
98 picks.
11 pick handles.
98 picks and handles.
19 axes, (hand.)
1 mallet.
1 auger.
104 shovels.
30 spades.
585 cartridge- boxes.

84 tents.
84 sets tent poles.
6 unfinished tents.
60 harness.
157 cotton haversacks.
30 oil-cloth haversacks.
21 knapsacks.
67 canteens.
427 pantaloons.
l trunk.
1 chest.
~ keg of nails.
i$ drums.
75 horses.
4 mules.
2 spring wagons.
5 Conestoga wagons.
1 four-horse common wagon.
19 two-horse common wagons,
21 tents in company I, 13th regiment Indiana
volunteer militia.
·

Received, Beverly, July 15, 1861, of C. N. Golding, quartermaste1· brigade Ohio and Indiana
United States volunteers, militia, commanded by Brigadie1 General Rosecrans-

40 tin cups.
25 tin plates.
20 coffeepvts.
14 tin pam;.
12 tin buckets.
71 wooden buck ets.
8 frying pans.
6 quart cups.
3 ovens and seven lids.
4 skillets.
6 camp kettles.
5 wash pans.

3 saucepans.
2 baking pans.
2 brass kettles.
3 tin dippers.
2 sieves.
1 teakettle.
1 artillery bucket.
1 wooden can.
1 hatchet.
1 hand axe.
81 tents.
81 sets tent poles.
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BATTLE OF CORINTH.
HEADQUARTERS 13Trr ARt.IY CoRPS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
Lagrange, 'Tennessee, November 13, 1862.
COLONEL: I h.ave the honor to transmit herewith Brigadier General Thomas J. McKean's
report of the part taken by the sixth division in the battle of Corinth. It was not in at
the time of forwarding other reports
I am, colonel, very re::;pectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, MaJor General.
Colonel J. C. KELTON,
Assistant Adjutant General, Washington, D. G.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
THIRD DIVISION DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,
Corinth, October 25, 18G2.
MAJOR: I have the honor to submit, for the information of the major general commanding
the district, the following report of the battle of Corinth :
PRELIMINARIES.
The rumors which followed the battle of Iuka were, that Price had marched to the vicinity
of Ripley, and was being joined by VanDorn with all the available rebel forces in north
:Mississippi, for the purpose of capturing Corinth, or breaking our line of communication,
and forcing us to retreat towards Columbus. These rumors gained strength until the first
of October, when strong cavalry scouts, sent out for the purpose, demonstrated the fact
that the rebels were moving in force from Ripley, via Ruckersville, and that the main body
was at Pocahontas.
The question then was, where would they strike the main blow? Equally favorably
situated to strike Bolivar, Bethel, Jackson, or Corinth-which would it be?
Unfortunately for me, there was no map of the country northwest of this place to be
found, therefore I could not tell whether to expect a strong demonstration here, to hold
us in suspense while the blow was struck elsewhere or vice versa. Rumors that tbe attack
was to take the direction of Jackson or Bolivar, via Bethel, were so rife, and the fortifications
of Corinth were so well known to the rebels, that I had hopes they would undertake to
m'lsk me, and, passing north, give me an opportunity to beat the masking force and cut
off their retreat. This hope gained some strength from the supposed difficulties of the
country lying in the triangle formed by the Memphis and Charleston, the Mobile and Ohio
railroads, and Cypress creek.
To be prepared for eventualities, Hamilton's and Stanley's divisions were placed just
beyond Bridge creek, the infantry outposts were called in from Iuka, Burnsville, Rienzi
and Danville, and the outpost at Chewalla retired to near Alexander's, and strengthened
by another regiment and a battery, early on the morning of the second.
During that day evidences increased, showing the practicability of the c0untry northwest
of us, aud disclosed the fact, not before known, that there were two good roads from Chewalla eastward, one leading directly into the old rebel intrenchments, and the other crossing
over into the Pittsburg Landing road.
Accordin~rly, the following disposition of the troops for the 3d was ordered at half past
one a. m. of that day, viz:
There being indications of a possible attack on Corinth immediately, the following dispositions of troops will be made : General McKean, with his division, will occupy his present
position; General Davis will occupy the line · between the Memphis and the Columbus
roads; General Hamilton, with his division, will take position between the rebel works on
the Purdy and on the Hamburg roads, and General Stanley will hold his division in reserve
at or near the old headquarters of Major General Grant.
rrhe respective divisions will be found in two lines, the second line being either in line
of battle, or close column by division, as circumstances may require.
'lhe troops were ordered to move towards their positions with one hundred rounds of
ammunition, and three days' rations per man, by 3 o'clock a. m.
These dispositions were made, and the troops at 9 o'clock on the morning of the third
occupied the positions shown on the accompanying map : Hamilton on the right, Davis in
tbe centre, McKean on the left, with an advance of three regiments of infantry and a section of artillery under Colonel Oliver, on the Chewalh road, at or near Alexander's, bevoEd the rebel breastworks.
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The cavalry was disposed as follows, (see map accompanying Colonel Minzer\; report :)
A battalion at Burnsville, one at Rory's mill, on the Jacinto and Corinth road. Colonel
Lee, with the 7th Kansas and part of the 7th Illinois, at Kossuth and Boneyard, watching
the rebels' right flank. Colonel Hatch and Captain Wilcox on the east and north fronts~
covering and reconnoitring.
The reasons for these dispositions flow obviously from the foregoing explanations of our
ignorance of the northwesterly approaches, and of the possibility that the rebels might
threaten us on the Chewalla, and attack us by the Smith's Bridge road on our left, or go
round and try us with his main force on the Purdy, or even Pittsburg Landing road.
The general plan, which was explained to the division commanders, verbally, in the
morning, was to hold the enemy at arm's length, by opposing him strongly in our assumed
positions, and when his force became fully developed, and he had assumed position, if we
found it necessary to take a position which would give us the use of our batteries and tte
open ground in the immediate vicinity of Corinth, the exact position to be determined by
events and the movements of the enemy.
OPERATIONS OF TilE BATTLE ON THE

3D

OF OCTOBER.

Early in the morning the advance under Colonel Oliver found strong indications that
the presence under which he had retired on the second came-from the advancing foe, and
accordingly took a strong position on the hill near the angle of the rebel breastworks with
his three regiments and a section of artillery.
By 9 o'clock the enemy began to press them sharply and outflank them. Brigadier
General McArthur, whom I had requested to go to the front, reported wide-spread but
slack skirmishing, and said the hill was of gteat value to test the advancing force. I
ordered him to hold it pretty firmly with that view.
About 10 o'clock word came that the enemy were pressing the point hotly, and that
re-enforcement::; were required, or they must yield the position. Supposing its importance
was properly understood, and that it was held in subordination to the general views of its
use, which had been expl\ined, I directed General Davies to send up from his position two
regiments.
But it proved that General McArthur had taken up four more regiments from McKean's
division, and was contesting the ground almost as for a battle. It was probably this which
induced General Davies to ask permission to rest his right on the rebel intrenchments, and
to which I consented, adding the verbal order to Lieuten~nt Colonel Ducat that be might
use his judgment about leaving his present for that position, but in no event must he
cease to touch his left on McArthur's right.
The advance was marie to the breastwork, as shown on the drawing, but leaving an
interval between McArthur and Davies's left. The enemy developed his forces along that
line. McArthur retired from his position, which gave the rebels an opportunity to advance
behind Davies's left, and forced it, after obstinate resistance, to fall back rapidly about a
thousand yards, losing two heavy guns
Our troops fought with the most determined courage, firing very low. At 1 p.m.,
Davies havin~ resumed the same position he had occupied in the morning, and McArt~ur's
brigade having fought a heavy force, it became evident that the enemy were in full strength,
and meant mischief. McKean, with Crocker's brigade, had seen only skirmishers; there
were no signs of any movements on our left, and only a few cavalry ~krmishers on our
right. It was pretty clear that we were to expect the weight of the attack to fall on our
centre, where hopes had been given by our falling back.
Orders were accordingly given to McKean to fall back to the next ridge beyond our intrenchments, to touch his right on Davies's left; for Stanley to move northward and eastward, to stand in close echelon with McKean, but nearer t'Jwn. General Hamilton was
ordered to face towards Chewalla, and move down until his left reached Davies's right.
Davies was informed of these dispositions, and told to hold his gTound obstinately, and
then when he had drawn them in strongly, Hamilton would swing in on their flank
and rear, and close the day. Hamilton was carefully instructed on this point, and entered
into tho spirit of it.
Owing to loss of time in conveying orders to Generals :McKean and Davies, the order~
were less perfectly conformed to, but nothing materially injuriJm; resulted therefrom.
But, owing to the tremendous force with which the enemy pressed Davies back, Stanley
was called with his division into the batteries, and sent a brigade under Colonel Mower to
support Davies, whose right had at last become hotly engaged. Mower came up while Davies
was contesting a position near the White House, and Hamilton began to swing in on the
enemy's flank, across the Columbus railroad, through a. very impracticable thicket., when
night closed in and put an end to the operations for the day.
The details of the heroic deeds of the troops of Davies's division, of McArthur's and
Oliver's brigades, as well as those of Snllivan's brigade, of Hamilton's division, will be
found in the accompanying sub-reports.
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'IHE DISPOSITIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF 4TH OCTOBER.

We had now before us the entire army which the rebels could muster in northern Mississippi, Van Dorn commanding-Price's army, Van Dorn·s army, Villipigne, and the
remnants of Brecldnridge's corps. They were in the angle between the Columbus and the
Memphis roads. Our left was comparatively free, our right very assailable; they outnumbered us probably two to one.
THE PLAN.

Was to rest our left on the batteries extending from battery Robinett, our centre on the
slight ridge north of the houses. and our right on the high ground covering both the
Pittsburg and Purdy roads, while it also covered the ridge road between them, leading to
their old camp.
McKean held the extreme left ; Stanley, with his well-tried divison, batteries Williams
and Robinett, the Memphis railroad and the Chewalla road, extending flearly to the Columbus road. Davies's tried di vison was placed in the ceutre, which was retired, reaching to
battery Powell. Hamilton's staunch fighting division was on the right, with Dillon's
battery, supported by two regiments posted on the prolongation of Davies's line. The
design of General Hamilton was to use the hill where the batteries stood against an
approach from the west, where Sullivan found the enemy on the last evening. Against
my better judgment, expresEed to him at the time, I yielded to his wishes, and allowed
the occupation as described.
Early m the evening I called the chiefs of divisions together, and explained to them
these plans, and having supervised the positions, retired at three a. m. of the fourth to take
some rest. I was soon aroused by the opening of the enemy's artillery, whi ch he had
planted within six hundred yards of battery Robinett.
TilE BATTLE.

,

This early opening gave promise of a hot day's work, but the heavy batteries and the
lOth Ohio, placed north of General Halleck's old headquarters, silenced them by 7 o'clock,
and there was an interval of an hour, which was employed in going over our lines.
About 9 o'clock the skirmisLers which we bad sent into the woods on our front, by their
hot firing, proclaimed the presence of their forces preparing for the assault. Soon the
heads of their cohtmns were seen emerging to attack our centre-on Davies first, Stanley
next, and Hamilton last. The drawing shows these positions, and is referred to for the
sake of brevity.
I shall leave to pens dipped in poetic ink to inscribe the gorgeous pyrotechny of the
battle, and paint in words of fire the heroes of this fight, the details of which will be
found graphically depicted in the .accompanying sub-report.
I will only say that when Price's left bore down on our centre in gallant style their
force was so overpowering that our wearied and jaded troops yielded and fell back, scattering
among the houses. I had the personal mortification of witne~sing this untoward and untimely stampede.
Riddled and scattered, the ragged head of Price's right storming columns ad vanceci to
near the house, north side of the square, in front of General Halleck's headquarters, when
it was greeted by a storm of grape from a section of Immell's battery, soon re -enforced by
the lOth Ohio, which sent them whirling bacl1, pursued by the 5th Minnesota, which advanced on them from their positiun near the depot.
General Sullivan was ordered and promptly advanced to support General Davies's
centre. His right rallied and retook battery Powell, into which a few of the storming
column had penetrated, while Hamilton having played upon the rebels on his right, over
the open space effectively swept by his artillery, advanced on them, and they fled . The
battle was over on the right.
During all this the skirmishers of the left were moving in onr front. .A line of battle
was formed on the ridge, as shown in the rtrawing . About twenty minutes after the
attack on the right, the enemy advanced in four columns on battery Robinett, and were
treated to grape and canister until within fifty yards, when the Ohio brigade arose and
gave them a murderous fire of musketry, before wllich they reeled and fell back to the
woods. They, however, gallantly reformed and advanced again to the · charge, led by
Colonel Rogers, of the 2d Texas.
This time they reached the edge of the ditch, but the deadly musketry fire of the Ohio
brigade again broke them, and at the word charge, the ll th Missouri and 27th Ohio
sprang up and forward at them, chasing their broken fragments b:1ck to the woods. Thus
by noon ended the battle of the 4th of October.
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After waiting for the enemy's return a short time, our skirmishers began to advance,
and found that their skirmishers were gone from the field, leaving their dead and wounded.
Having ridden over it, and satisfied myself of the fact, I rode over all our lines, announcing the result of the fight in person, and notified our victorious troops that after two
days of fighting, two almost sleepless nights of preparation, movement, and march, I
wished them to replenish their cartridge-boxes, haversacks, and stomachs, take an early
sleep, and start in pursuit by daylight.
Returning from this, I found the gallant McPhersou with a fresh brigade on the public
square, and gave him the same notice, with order!:' to take the advance.
The results of this battle briefly stated are :
We fought the combined rebel forces of Mississippi, commanded by Van Dorn, Price,
Lovell, Villipigne, and Rust, in person, numbering, according to their own authorities,
38,000 men. We signally defeated them with little more than half their numbers, and
they fled, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. The enemy's loss in killed was
fourteen hundred and twenty-three otlicers and men; their· loss in wounded, taking the
general average, amounts to fifty-six hundred and ninety-two.
We took twenty-two hundred and sixty-eight pr~soners, among whom are one hundred
and thirty-seven field officers, captains and subalterns, representing fifty-three regiments of
infantry, sixteen regiments of cavalry, thirteen batteries of artillery, and seven battalions;
making sixty-nine regiments, seven battalions and thirteen batteries, besides separate companies. We took also fourteen stands of colors, two pieces of artillery, thirty-three hundred
stand of small-arms, forty-five thousand rounds of ammunition, and a large lot of accoutrements.
The enemy blew up several ammunition wagons between Corinth and Chewalla, and beyond Chewalla many ammunition wagons and carriages are destroyed, and the ground was
strewn with tents, officers' mess chests, and small-arms. We pursued them forty miles in
force, and sixty miles with cavalry.
Our loss was only three hundred and fifteen killed, eighteen hundred and twelve wounded,
and two hundred and thirty-two prisoners and missing.
It is said the enemy was so demoralized and alarmed at our advance, they set fire to the
stores at Tapello, but finding we were not close upon them, they extinguished the fire and
removed the public stores, except two car-loads of bacon, which they destroyed.
To signalize in this report all those officers and men whose action in the battle deserves
mention, would unneces::arily lengthen this report. I must, therefore, refer to the subreports and special mentions, and to a special paper herewith, wherein those most conspicuous to the number of one hundred and nine officers and men are mentioned.
W. S. ROSECRANS, MaJor General.

GENERAL ROSECRANS'S REPORT OF BATTLE OF IUKA.
HEADQUAP.TERS DEPARTMENir t)F THE TENNESSEE,

Jackson, Tennessee, October 25, 1862.
CoLONEL : I have the honor to transmit herewith my official report of the "battle of
Iuka," fought on the 19th day oi September, 1862, and the following official papers relating to the same, viz :
1st. General Rosecrans's report of the battle, and the following enclosures, viz:
1. General Hamilton's report of tbe part taken by the 3::1 divi~ion, and twefve (12) enclosures. 2. General Stanley's report of the p;u t taken by the 2d division, and fifteen (15)
enclosures. 3. Colonel Mizner's report of the part taken by the cavalry division, and four
(4) enclosures. 4. Colonel Lathrop's report of the part taken by the artillery. 5. Captain Simmons's report of the commissary stores captured at Iuka. 6. Captain Taylor's
report of the quartermaster's stores captured. 7. Medical director's report of the killed,
wounded, and mi6sing. 8. Provost marshal's report of the enemy's killed, wounded, and
paroled prisoners. 9. Chief of ordnance's report of the quantity and ldnd of ordnance
and ordnance stores captured.
2d. Major General Ord's report of the part taken by the forces under his command.
3d. The report of Surgeon John G. F. Holston, medical director, of the number of
wounded.
4th. Report of Brigadier General Lenoman, and four enclosures.
I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. R. GRANr, MaJor General.
Colonel J. C. KELTON,
Assistant AdJutant General, Washington, D. G.
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HEADQUARTERS AR~IY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
THIRD DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT OF ..WEST TENNESSEE,

Gcrintl~, .Mississippi, September 29,1862.
Having received the reports of the commander of the troops, lists of stores and
prisoners captured, I hasten to lay them before the major general commanding, with the
following
MAJOR:

REPORT OF THE BA'ITLE OF IUKA.
Mower's able reconnaissance on the 15th, on the Burnsville road, to within two miles of
Iuka, with other information, having established the fact that Price occupied that pla<::e
with a force of about twenty-eight regiments of infantry, six batteries, and a strong body
of cavalry, you resolved to attack, and gave orders for Ord's and Ros~'s commands to concentrate at Burnsville, while I prepared to do the same at Jacinto.
I telegraphed you proposing that the force from Burnsville should attack the rebels from
the west and draw them in that direction, and that I would move in on their rear by the
Jacinto and Fulton roads and cut off their retreat. Your approval of the plan having
been received, I ordered Stanley to concentrate his division at Jacinto on the 18th, where
they had all arrived by 9 o'clock p. m. I despatched you that evening, from Jacinto, of
the arrival of Stanley's troops, jaded by a long march, and that in consequence of it we
would not be able to reach Iuka until half past two of the 19th.
The whole c0lumn-consisting of Stanley's and Hamilton's divisions, with five batteries-moved by daybreak of the 19th on the Tuscumbia road towards Barnett's. I
despatched you at 7 a. m. that it had moved forward in good spirits and time, and that I
hoped to reach Iuka by half past 2 p. m. We reached Barnett's (a distance of twelve
miles) by noon, having driven the enemy's cavalry pickets some two or three miles. Here
Sanborn's brigade, of Hamilton's division, took the lead, the rest of Hamilton's division
came next, and Stanley's division followed. The advance drove the enemy's cavalry skirmishers steadily before them, until we arrived within a mile and a half of Iuka, near the
forks of the Jacinto road and cross-roads leading from it to the Fulton road. Here we
found their infantry and a battery, which gave our advance guard a volley. Hamilton,
pushing his first brigade rapidly forward up the narrow road on the right hand, leading
from the church at the forks, found them astride it around the brush on the rough wooded
knoll, (see accompanying map,) placing Sands's battery on the only available ground. The
action opened immediately with grape and canister ft om the enemy's battery, directed at
ours, and sharp musketry fire from his skirmishers.
Having inspected General Hamilton's dispositions on the front and found them good, I
ordered Colonel Mizner to send a battalion nf the 3d Michigan cavalry to reconnoitre our
right, and Colonel Perezel, with the lOth Wisconsin infantry and a section of artillery, to
take position on our left on the road leading norLh. The remainder of Hamilton's division formed in rear of the first line, and the head of Stanley's division (in column) stood
below the hospital, awaiting the developments on the front before being moved into line.
The position of the troops at this time-say, 5 p. m.-is shown very nearly on the map.
The enemy's line of infantry now moved forward on the battery, coming up from the
woods on our right on the 5th Iowa, while a brigade showed itself on our left and attempted
to cross the road towards Colonel Perezel. The battle became fUtious. Our battery poured
in a deadly fire upon the enemy's column advancing up the road, while their musketry
concentrated upon it soon killed or wounded most of our horses. When within one hundred yards they received a vo1ley from our entire line, and from that time the battle raged
furiously. The enemy penetrated the battery, were repulsed, again returned, were again
repulsed, and, finally, bore down upon it with a column of three regiments, and this time
carried the battery. The cannoniers were many of them bayoneted at their pieces. Three
of the guns were spiked. In this last charge, the brigade of Texans which had attempted
to turn our left, having been repulsed by Perezel, turned upon the battery and co-operated
in the charge. The 48th Indiana, which lay in its track, wns obliged to yield about one
hundred yards, where it was supported by the 4th Minnesota, and held its position until
relieved at the close of the fight by the 47th Illinois.
The 5th Iowa maintained its position on the right against a storm of fire from the rebel
left and centre, and even when the battery was carried its left yielded but slightly, when
~oomer, with a part of the 26th Missouri, came up to its support, and maintained its
position to the close of the fight.
About this time it was deemed prudent to order np the 1st brigade of Stanley's division, which went forward with a shout. The 11th Missouri, filing into the woods, took its
position on the right of the 5th Iowa, slightly in its rear. Here the rebels made a last
desperate attempt with two Mississippi brigades. As the first came bearing down upon the
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11th Missouri, when within twenty paces, an officer from the rebel ranks sprung forward
and shouted, " Don't fire upon your friends, the 37th Mississippi." He was answered by
a volley, which drove them back in confusion. The second brigade followed, and, in the·
dusk of evening and the smoke of battle, reached the very front of the Missouri 11th. The
roar of musketry was terrific; but Mower met the shock and stood firm. The rebels rerecoiled, and the firing ceased throughout the line.
The troops rested on their arms. The 39th Ohio and the 47th Illinois held the front, slightly
in rear of the position of the advan::e regiments, which were withdrawn to replenish their
ammunition. The 11th and 26th Missouri took position in a depression of the ground, in
the open field, in rear of the woods in which the fight h::td occurred. The lOth Iowa and
the 80th Ohio held our left, on the road running north, at 8 p. m.
During the early part of the night the enemy made great noise, as if chopping and con,
structing batteries. There was much moving of troops ; commands of halting and aligning were heard, as if massing on our front.
Profoundly disappointed at hearing nothing from the forces on the Burnsville road, and
not knowing 'vhat to expect, it became my duty to make dispositions for the battle next
morning, a8 if we were alone. To this end, Stanley's batteries were brought into position
in the field south of the hospital, on advantageous ground, and a line was selected for
the infantry, in case the enemy should attack us in heavy force; while Hamilton's division, having borne the brunt of the battle, was ordered to the rear, in the next field below,
with the intention of moving it thence across the field to th~ east through the strip of
woods, to attack the enemy's left.
The enemy's trains were heard from midnight, moving in a southeasterly direction, and
it became evident that he was providing for its safety.
Day dawned: no firing on the front. Our skirmishers, adv<tncing cautiously, found the
enemy had retired from his position. Skirmishers were immediately pushed forward, and
Stanley's column ordered to advance upon Iuka. When. within sight of the town, discovering a few rebels, he ordered some shells to be thrown. They were a few stragglera
from the enemy's rear gnard, his entire column having gone by the Fulton road. Taking
possession of the town and the stores left there, General Stanley's column pushed on in
pursuit.
The cavalry advanced by the intermediate road between the Fulton and Jacinto roads
Hamilton's division faced about and marched by Barnett's, following the enemy until'
night, when, finding themselves greatly distanced, the pursuit was discontinued, and our
troops returned the next day to Jacinto, while the rebel column continued its flight by
Bay Springs and Marietta to its old position on the Mobile and Ohio railroad.
The enemy left his dead on the field, part of them gathered for interment, and his badly
wounded in the hospital at Iuka. His loss wasKill eel ••• __ • ______ • _•••• ___ • _• _____ •••• __ • ____ • • • • • • ____ •••• _•
2 65
Died in hospital (of wounds)---·------···--- ____ -·--------......
120
Left in hospital.----------·----·---··-------- ·- -----------·---·
342
Estimated number of wounded removed·--···-----------···......
350
361
Pri8oners. ____ , ---··-···· ----·----·-·-·· ------···-·· .•••.. ·-····
Total loss ____________ • ___________ .•• _••.• _. _. ___ • _. ___ __ _ 1, 438
Among his killed were General Liltle and Colonel Stanton; how many other officers we·
clo n ot know. Among his wounded were twenty-six commissioned officers.
Our loss consists of-Commissioned officers killed .••• _,····-· ..... ···-···-····......
6
Commissioned officers wounded. ___ ·-··----····-·---·-·····---· 39
Commissioned officers missing ____________ ••.••••. ___ -------__
1
Total ____ .• __ •. _________ ..••• _•...• _. ___ ..••• _. ____ . _ __

46

Enlisted men killed ___ ..• _..•..... _ .•• _•.. __ ••. _. __ • _ - •• - --.. 138
En listed men wounded _______ . ______ . __ . ___________ • ___ . __ .- 559
Enlistedmenrnissing _______ , ________________________________ 39
Total . _. _ . _•••....• __ • ____ . _... _______ •.. _••••••..• _ ___ 7 3 6
736
Total .••••. ··---· ____ .••• ________ .••. ----··--- •••• -··-··---S.nne of the missin g have returned.
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Among the ordnance stores captured, as will be seen by the accompanyin;; exhibit,
were 1,629 stand of arms and a large number of equipments, a quantity of quartermaster
and commissary stores, and thirteen thousand rounds of ammunition.
Having thus given a detailed narrative of the battle, with sub-reports, appended statements, and a map, I conclude with the following brief recapitulation :
We moved from Jacinto at 5 a. m., with nine thousand men, on Price's forces at Iuka;
after a march of eighteen miles, attacked them at half-past 4 p. m. ; fought them on unknown and disadvantageous ground, with less than half our forces in action, until night
put a stop to the contest. Having lost about two hundred and sixty-five (265) killed,
seven or eight hundred wounded, three hundred and sixty-one prisoners, over Rixteen
hundred stand of arms, and a quantity of qmtrtermaster and commissary stores, the rebels
retreated precipitately during the night towards Bay Springs Our troops pursued them
nfteen miles, and, finding themselves distanced, gave up the pursuit and returned to Jacinto.
After the detail of our operations, it is with pride and pleasure I bear testimony to the
cheerfulness and alacrity of both officers and men during the march, and their courage and
energy in action. With insignificant exceptions, it was all that could be asked
Among the infantry regimento deserving special mention are the 5th Iowa, which, under
its brave colone1, (Matthias,) withstood the storm of triple fire and triple numbers; the 26th
Missouri, which nobly sustained the 5th Iowa; the 11th Missouri, which, under the gallant Mower, met and discomfited two rebel brigades, and, having exhausted every cartridge,
held its ground until darl:ness and the withdrawal of the rebels enabled him to replenish;
the 16th Iowa, the 4th Minnesota, the 48th Indiana, and lOth Iowa, who shared in the
combat, and the 47th Illinois, the 39th Ohio, and others, who fought in the front or supported the rest. Sands's 11th Ohio battery, under command of Lieutenant Sears, behaved
nobly. The fearful losses sustained by this battery (16 killed, 44 wounded) shows their
unyielding obstinacy in serving the battery. The cavalry-3d Michigan and 2d Iowacovered our flanks, reconnoitred our front, whipped the vastly superior numbers of Armstrong's cavalry, under the protection of their infantry, and kept them there during the
battle and retreat. I must not omit to mention tlle eminent services of Colonel Du Bois,
commanding at Rienzi, and Colonel Lee, who, with the 7th Kan sas and part of the 7th
Illinois cavalry, assured our flank and rear during the entire period of our operations.
Am ong the officers of the command who deserve special mention are Brigadier General
Hamilton, commanding the 3d division, who took the advance and held the front in the
battle; Brigadier General Stanley, who never failed to yield the most efficient and unwearying support and assistance; Brigadier General Sullivan, commanding the 2d brigade of
Hamilton's division, whose determined courage riRes with, and has always proved equal to,
the occasion; Colonel Sanborn, commanding the 1st brigade of the same division, whose
-conduct in his first battle was highly creditable ; Colonel Eddy, 48th Indiana, and Colonel
Matthias, 5th Iowa; Colonel Boomer, 26th Missouri, wounded in the action; Colonel
Mower, whose gallantry is equalled only by his 'energy; and numerous others, whose names
.appear conspicuously in the accompanying reports, are commended to the favorable notice
of the major general commanding. Besides officers of the line and their respective staffs,
I must not omit to acknowledge the services of the able and indefatigable chief of cavalry,
·Colonel Mizner. Colonel Lathrop, chief of artillery, also rendered services cont~·ibutiug
much to the general strength and efficiency of his arm. Captain Temple Clark, assistant
.adjutant general, Greenwood and Goddard, my aids, were very gallant and indefc~.tigable
in the discharge of their duties. The energy, painstaking, and care of Surgeon A. B.
Campbell, and the medical officers who attended the wounded, deserve most honorable
mention.
W. P. ROSECR.A.NS, -~Iajor General.
Major JoHN A. RAWLINS, A. A. G.,
District of Wt>~t Tennessee.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION AR~1Y OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

September 23, 1862.
SIR: I have the honor to report that my division, the 1st brigade leading, marched
from Jacinto, on the morning of the 19th instant, to attack the enemy at Iuka. One-half
mile west of Barnett's the advanced pickets of the enemy were first encountered in a deep
ravine; a battalion of the 3d Michigan cavalry, by dismounting a body of skirmishers, soon
drove the enemy from his cover. Soon after passing Barnett's the cavalry were thrown to
the rear and a battalion of the 5th Iowa deployed as skirmishers. From this time out
·Our advance was warmly contested. The enemy's sharpshooters occupied every position
,of defence, making the last five miles of the march a steady contest, a constant skiimish.
At Mrs. Moore's house, four (4) miles from the battle-ground, the action became quite hot.
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Lieutenant Schranne, of thP- Benton hussars, one of my body-guard, was mortally wounded,
and a number of our skirmishers killed or wounded . The enemy was steadily driven
before us, and with constant loss. When within two miles of the battle-field the battalion of the 5th Iowa skirmiehers was re)ieved by an equal force of the 26th Missouri, and
the forward movement of the column pressed. When the head of the column had reached
a point on the brow of a bill at the cross-roads, two (2) miles from Iuka, it was halted for
the purpose of reconnoitring and the line of skirmishers pushed rapidly forward. This
line bad not advanced more than three hundred (300) yards when they came upon the
enemy drawn up in great force and occupying a strong position along a deep ravine running transversely with the main road and behind the crest of the hill.
I was in position just behind the line of skirmiRhers and saw at a glance that the moment for action had come. The skirmishers were driven back on the head of the column,
and the attack by the enemy immediately begun. The ground occupied by the head of my
column was on the brow of a densely wooded hill, falling off abruptly to the right and left.;
the underbrush and timber were too thick to admit of deploylnents, and the most that
could be done was to take a position across the road by marching the leading regiments
into po~ition by a fh,nk movement. This was done under a heavy fire of musketry and
grape, canister and shell.· The 11th Ohio battery was with difficulty got into position on
the crest of the hill, where it could command the road in front of us. The 5th Iowa, un_
der the brave Matthias, being the leading regiment, was first in position in the woods to
the right of the road, with its left resting near the battery. The 26th Missouri, under
the resolute Boomer, immediately took position on the right of the 5th Iowa; the next
regiment in the column, the 48th Indiana, under its brave Colonel Eddy, took position on
the left of the road, a little in advance of the battery, and with its left thrown forward so
as to cover the open field on their left with their fire. This was the position when the
battle opened on our side. I directed each of these regiments into position myself, and
they were taken by the troops, under a heavy fire, with the steadiness of veterans determined to conquer. The battle thus opened with but three (3) regiments in position.
The rebels were commanded by Major General Sterling Price in person, who had arrayed
against us no less than eighteen (18) regiments. I saw the importance of holding the position we had assumed, and gave each regimental commander orders to hold every inch of
ground at every hazard; as the remaining regiments of the 1st brigade came up the hill
I threw them into position to protect the flanks of our little line of battle, the 4th Minnesota, uoder Captain Le Uro, and the 16th Iowa, Colonel Chambers, the former on the
left and the latter on the right of the line, in rear, ''en echelon.''
The battle at this time had become terrific; the enemy in dense masses bore down in
front, on the right and left, showing a determined purpose to envelop and crush the little
line in front. The ground admitted of no more forcea being brought into action in front,
and our position must be held, or the enemy once forcing it, his overwhelming masses
would bave passed over the 'hill and fallen on our unformed column in the rear. Brigadier
General Sullivan having reached the rear of the battle-ground with the head of his brigade,
placed one of his regiments, the lOth Iowa, under the gallant Perezel, with a section of
the 12th Wisconsin battery, on the road across the ravine and open field on our extreme
left, and finding no more of hi:; forces could be brought into immediate action, placed
them in position in reserve and came gallantly to the front asking to be of service. I immediately placed him in charge of the right of the line in front, with instructions to hold
the ground and see that the tight flank was not turned by the heavy force of the enemy
moving in that direction. Colonel Sanborn, in command of the first brigade, most gallantly held the left in poEition, until, under a desolating carnage of musketry and canister,
the brave Eddy was cut down, and his regiment, borne down by five time~ their numbers,
fell back in sorue disorder on the 80th Ohio, under Lieutenant Colonel Bartelson. The
falling back of the 48th exposed the battery; as the masses of the enemy advanced the
battery opened with canister at short range, mowing down the rebels by Fcores, until, with
ever;v officer killed or wounded, and nearly every man and horse killed or disabled, it fell
an easy prey. But this success was short-lived. The hero Sullivan rallied a portion of
the right wing, and with a bravery better characterized as audacity, drove the rebels back
to cover. Again they mllied, and again the battery fell into their hands, but with the
wavering fortunes of this desperate fight, the battery again fell into our hands, and with
three of its guns spiked, and the carriages cut and splintered with balls, it is again ready
to meet the foe. While these events were transpiring along the road, the brave General
Stanley had come to the front, and joining bis personal exertions to mine, the regiments
that had fallen into disorder were rallied and held in position to the close of th3 battle.
One of Stanley's regiments, the 11th Missouri, coming up fresh and eager for action, was
pushed in to the right, where, uniting its efforts with tile 5th Iowa and 26th Missouri, it
made a most gallant fight, and aided m11ch, first, in holding our ground against the
enemy, and afterwards in driving him back in confusion to the cover of the ravine from
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which the attack was begun. An attempt to turn my left flank, by a heavy force of the
enemy moving up the open field and ravine on my left, was most signa.lly repulsed by •
Colonel Perezel with the lOth Iowa and a section of Imrnell's battery. So bravely was
this attempt repulsed that the enemy made no more attempts in that direction. After
this repulse the 4th Minnesota was withdrawn from the left and ordered to report to General Sullivan on the right, where it did good service to the close of the action.
This completed the movements in the front, and the battle was fought and won in this
po~ition.
The 39th Ohio, of Stanley's division, corning up during the heat of the contest,
could not be placed in position to take an active part, owing to the want of ground, and
was placed in reserve near the log _c hurch. From 5 p. rn. until darkness prevented distinguishing friend from foe, the battl8 was fought along the road, and to the right of it, by
the 5th Iowa, the 26th J\fissouri and 11th .1\lissou,ri, with a bravery which scarcely admits of
a parallel.
·
,
The enemy, confident in the heavy forces they had deployed, pushed on with frantic desperation, but they were met IJy a greater heroism, and though often rallied and driven to
the charge, they were as often met and hurled back to their cover. Against this little front
the fiercest of the battle was waged. Colonel Boomer was cut down by a terrible wound,
but his regiment held their ground undismayed. The 5th Iowa, under its brave and accomplished Matthias, held their ground ag:;,inst four times their numbers, making three
desperate charges wEh the bayonet, driving back the foe in disorder each time, until, with
every cartridge exhausted, it fell back slowly and sullenly, making every step a battle-ground,
and every charge a victory. Night alone closed the contest, and left us in· possession of
the field so bravely won.
For a detailed report of the operations of each regiment I respectfully refer you to the
reports of subordinate commanders llerewith submitted.
I am indebted for able and cheerful assistance rendered by Brigadier General Stanley,
whose clivi&ion, with the exception of one regiment, the 11th Missouri, being in rear, could
not take an actiye part. General Stanley had come to the front and tendered his services.
To the commanders of brigades, Brigadier General J. C. Sulliv:m, whose personal exertions and bravery contributed very largely to our success, and to Colonel J. B. Sanborn,
who, in this his first battle, exhibited a coolness and bravery under fire worthy a veteran, I
am greatly indebted.
These commanders, Stctnley. Sullivan and Sanborn, I cordially commend to the fctvorable
notice of the government. The reports of brigade and regimental commanders do justice
to those who were conspicuous in this daring contest. I cordially unite in all they have
said, and, were it in my power, would do personal honor in this report to every hero.
To my personal staff I am under the deepest obligations ; Captain R. M. Sawyer, assistant adjutant general, Captain D. P. Allen, assistant commissary subsistence, Lieutenants
E. T. Pearce and W. F. Wheeler, aides-de-camp, bore my orders through the thickest of
the battle. Intelligent, capable and brave, their gallant conduct is worthy of, and will receive, the honor rightly their due.
My division surgeon, J. E. Lynch, was unceasing in his efforts in his own department,
and to his energy and skill the greatest credit is due for the prompt and efficient care of
the wounded.
Captain Allen, in carrying orders along the line, came upon one of the enemy's regiments, but by his cc;wlne~s and courage escaped from a murderous fire, though with a terrible wound; Lieutenant ·wheeler received a slight but honorable wound, while bearing
orders in the f<~.ce of the enemy ; Captain Borcherdt, commanding my personal escort, did
excellent and gallant service in rallying men to thei.r standards. He was seriously hurt
by the f<tll of his horse.
Much of the time I was without a single officer of my staff, and was forced to send messages by orderlies; two of the3e, Corporals White and Hill, did excellent s~rvice, and I beg
to commeud them to the notice of the general commanding.
To the comm:mders of batteries, Lieutenant Sears and Lieutenant Immel, the highest
praise is due for unyielding bravery, and tbe skill with which their pieces were handled.
Lieutenant Sears w11s severely wounded, and left his guns only when his officers, men and
horses were nearly all killed and disabled, and when the battery was fclirly in the enemy's
hands.
In cloeing this report I shall be permitted to embody this summary :
On the 19th instant my division marched nineteen (19) miles; fought a desperate battle
with seven regiment:; against a rebel force under General Price of not less than eighteen
regiments; won a glorious victory ; lying at night on their arms on the field their valor
had won, and the following morning chased the fleeing enemy for fifteen miles, nntil, worn
out with labor and fighting, and famishe-d for want of food, the pursuit was discontinued
only when the powers of nature ·were exhausted. The records of war may well be challenged to produce a victory under circumstances und odds so desperate. No words of mine
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can add lustre to the brilliancy of this victory, and no award of prai::;e given to those )\·h o
were miles away from the battle-field will detract from th e glory justly due to those h eroes
who won this audacious victory.
The fearful list of killed and wounded in the fe·w regiments actiYely engaged shows
with what heroism and desperation this fight was won.
I say boldly, that a force of not more than 2,800 m en m et and conquered a rebel force
of 11,000 on a field chosen by Price, and a position naturally very strong- and with its
every advantage inuring to the enemy.
A list of casualties is herewith submitted.
It is known that 263 rebel bodies were buried on and near the fielci. All their severelv
wounded, numbering over 400, fell into our banda. ~he number of able-bodied prisone1~s
who fell into our hands is large.
I report with the greatest satisfaction l:tut twenty-six (26) missing from my r-ommand.
Over eight hundred (800) stand of arms were gathered on the battle-field, mostly of improved patterns, showing that the rebels arc not wanting in this essential means of making
war.
The dead of my division number .••••. ------ .••••. '-----··-··---- .............. 135
rr~e .wounded of my division number __________________ ·-------------·----·---- 527
MISSing .• _. _. ____ • ____ . _• __ .••••..••• _. ___ • _.••••• ___ . ____ •• _ .•••.••.••. _• • 2 6
Of my staff and escort, officers wounded __ •• _ .••
4
private killed _. __ •. __ . ___ •••.••••.•••••. _.............
1
"
r- .... _ ................... --....

693
Respectfully submitted:
Lieutenant Colonel H. G.

KENNETT,

C. S. HAMILTON,
Brigadier General, Oomm'lndiug 3d D ivision.
Chiif of Staff.

lsr BRiGADE, 'Irrnm DIYISIO)I,
Army of the .Llfississippi, September 21, 1862.
Sm : I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of your orders of ihe 17th instant, I
moved my command, consisting of the 5th Iowa infantry, 26th l\1iss<;luri infantry, 48th
Indiana infantry, 4th Minnesota infantry, 16th Iowa infctntry, and Uth Ohio battery, at
four o'clock a. m., in an easterly direction, to a point on the Tu~i1mbia road one mile
west of the junction of the Pontotoc road with the same, without meeting with any opposition. At this point I disposed of my command in order of battle, and posted a strong
guard on my front and flanks, a:1d awaited further orders.
In pursuance of your orders of two o'clock a. m of the 19th instant, I moved my command in an easterly direction on the Tuscumbia road, preceded by the 3d Michigan cavalry.
When I had advanced about three miles I fell upon the enemy's pickets, who fired briskly
at the advanced cavalry and retired across a clearing into a thick growth of timber and
vrush, and continued their fire as the cavalry advanced, so rapidly that it was deemed prudent to have a portion of the cavalry dismount and adyance as infantry skirmishers. It
being desirable at this time to conceal from the enemy all our force except the cavalry, I
advanced in this manner to the point where the road leading from Iuka to Bay Springs
crosses the 'ruscumbia road, and halted, disposing of my command in the best manner possible, in my judgment, to receive an attack from any quarter, and posted guards south,
east, and north. I had hardly accomplished thiR when I received your further orders to
move forward immediately toward Iuka. I at once drew in my guards and took up my
line of march on the Iuka road, preceded as before by cavalry. When I had advanced
about two miles the firing of the enemy's pickets was so rapid and well sustained that under
your orders I threw out four companies of the 5th Iowa infantry as skirmishers. These
companies moved forward to their task with great alacrity, and soon succeeded in driving the
enemy's pickets from a strong position they had selected in a house by the road-side, and
advanced steadily, driving them for three hours, killing two of them and seriously wounding one, at least.
At this time (about four o'clock p. m.) I relieved the companies skirmishing from the
gth Iowa by four companies of the 26th Missouri infantry, who went forward with the
5reatest cheerfulness, and continued to drive in the enemy's pickets rapidly till they
reached a point a little more than a mile from Iul•a, where they met the enemy drawn up
in line of battle in strong force, about eighteen thousand infantry, with cavalry and
artillery, and drev.· the flre from neaTly his whole line The enemy almost instantaneously
HEADQUARTERS

76

ROSECRANS's CAMPAIGNS.

opened his batteries upon us and commenced advancing his line, and rendered the most
rapid movements and formations nec~tssary to prevent him enveloping my whole command.
I immediately caused the 5th Iowa infantry to file to the right of the road and form in
order of battle, with the right wing slightly refused, to prevent it, as far as possible, from
being flanked on that wing before other troops could be brought up.
The 11th Ohio battery was brought into position immediately on the left of this regiment. the 48th Indiana infantry on its left, with the left wing slightly refused, and the
4th Minnesotlj, in the prolongation of this line; this line was upon the crest of a ridge. These
regiments were ordered to hold their positions at all hazards until further orders. The 26th
Missouri infantry was formed in order of battle below the crest of the ridge, with its left
nearly in rear of the centre of the 5th Iowa, and its right retiring from the front line, with
orders to Colonel Boomer, commanding, to move immediately to the right of the 5th Iowa,
should the enemy make his appearance in that direction, but with discretionary authority
to move to the relief of any point the most strongly assailed.
The 16th Iowa infantry was formed in order of battle below the crest of the hill, with
its right in rear of the ieft of the 5th Iowa and the battery, and the three right companies of the 48th Indi,,tna, masking the balance of its front and about twenty yards in
advance, this formation being made to support the battery. All these formations and movements were made under a steady fire of canister from the enemy's batteries, and hardly
had the disposition of the troops been made when the enemy came forward with his whole
force and formed in front of the battery three battalions deep. I immediately ordered the
battery to open fire nnd the infantry to commence firing. The battery fired with great
rapidity and with extraordinary accuracy of aim, which, in conjunction with the volleys of
musketry from the regiments in the front line, threw the enemy into confusion, and thus
in his first attempt to take the battery the enemy was repulsed with heavy loss. The firing
of his musli.etry during this advance was vgry rapid and quite destructive, and camed the
battalion on the left of the battery to waver and the right to fall back. The enemy soon
reformed, and with renewed vigor and cheers came on to the assault again, and was again
repulsed by the well-directed fire of the battery, and the volleys and charges made by the
5th Iowa.
'l'he three companies of the 5th Iowa flanking the battery had by this time become so
unmasked by the loss of men that it seemed impossible for the regiment or the battery to
hold out, and Colonel Boomer, of the 26th Missouri, immediately brought up four companies of his command and formed them in line under the most galling fire on the .right
of the battery and left ofthe 5th Iowa. The firing of the enemy at this time had become so
destructive that Colonel Boomer promptly proceeeded to bring up the balance of his command
with great gallantry and personal bravery, but fell severely wounded before reaching his
command, and was carried from the field. I had during this time been making the greatest
efforts, in conjunction with the general commanding the division and members of the staff
and field officers of the regiment, to bring back the regiment placed upon the left of the
btlttery to its first position. During these efforts Colonel Eddy, commanding the regiment
with the greatest valor, fell severely wouuded and was carried from the field. The fire was
so galling it was found impossible to bring this regiment again on to this line.
Colonel Chambe1s, commanding the 16th Iowa infantry, had already fallen and been
carried from the field, and it did not at this time seem prudent to move the 2d line of battle in rear of the battery. I proceeded to the left flank of the whole line with a view of
drawing in that battalion in support of the battery, but the enemy had then appeared in
its front, and was engaging it with musketry. '1 here was no alternat.ive but for the battery,
the 5th Iowa, and the four companies of the 26th Missouri to fight the battle out with
nearly the whole force of the enemy concentrated on that point, and nobly did they do this.
The infantry o~ the right continued to fire and charge upon the enemy under their gallant leader, Colonel Matthias, until their whole forty rounds of ammunition was exllamted,
and until it was too dark to distinguish one object from another, and until one half of all
the men that had been taken upon the line upon the right of the battery were killed or
·
wounded.
The battery at the same time, under command of the gallant Lieutenant Sears, held out,
if possible, with still greater desperation, firing until all canister shot was exhausted, and
more than one-half of his men and nearlv all his horses had been killed or wounded.
After this, the enemy came upon the grou~d where it was stationed, but did not remove
the battery from the field.
The position where the remaining companies of the 26th Missouri were left had become very much exposed to the enemy's fire, and tbe lieu tenant colonel, in his discretion,
and without orders, removed them to an open field, to the right of the 5th Iowa, and there
formed them in order of battle, where they remained for the night.
The enemy making no further appearance on my left, I withdrew the 4th Minnesota infantry from that wing, and ordered them to n1ov~ forward and occupy the ground originally
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occupied by the battery and the left of the 5th Iowa. 'fhey promptly moved forward to
within a few yards of this position, when they received a heavy volley of musketry from
one of the regiments of the second brigade, which caused them to hault and lie down.
The regiment occupied this position until a quarter past 8 o'clock, when it was relieved
by General Sullivan, with one of the regiments of the 2d brigade.
I am happy to report that, with the single exception of the battalion on the left of the
battery, each rPgiment obeyed every order with alacrity, and held every position assigned
them until directed to vacate them ; and, in the case of the exception above named, I
deem it proper to state, that the enemy's fire, in that position, was so severe that vetera\l
troops even could hardly be expected to hold it The brigade was in order of battle soon
after the close of the engagement, ready for action on the following morning.
Every regiment conducted itself with coolness and deliberation, and in no case fired'
except when the enemy appeared in full view, aud then with deliberate aim, but were subjected to four full volleys from regiments of other brigades of our own troops in the rear.
I forward herewith the reports of the commanders of the respective regiments of my
brigade, containing full lists of casualties of the respective commands.
The offidal report of the 11th Ohio battery will be forwarded at an early day, the only
officer able to be on duty since the battle, having been constantly t:ngaged in refitting his
battery for service.
I regret that, i.n an action occupying a little more than an hour and a half, there wrre, out
of about twenty-one hundred (2, 100) men of my hrigade engaged, five hundred and eightyfour (584) killed or wounded, and twenty-four missing.
It will be a consolation to the friends of all to know that they died or were injured
fighting manfully for their country, and in an engagement where the killed and wounded
of the enemy were twice the number of our men.
All the commanding and field officers of regiments and detachments labored with equal
zeal and courage to pe1form their whole duty. Colonels Matthias and Boomer made most
extraordinary efforts and with measurably successful results. The former was more fortunate than the latter in being able to continue his efforts to the close of the engagement.
They both deserve from the country the rewards that a grateful people are always ready
to confer upon faithful servants. Lieutenant L. B. Martin, acting assistant adjutant general, on my staff, conducted himself with great gallantry, and labored incessantly and successfully in rallying the men who haclleft their commands, and bringing them into position to do good execution against the enemy. The line officers deserving especial mention
for gallantry in the field during the action are named and referred to in the reports of the
commanders of their respective regiments, which reports are by me approved and confirmed, and to which attention is directed.
Respectfully submitted.
JOHN B. SANBORN, Culonel, Commanding.
Captain R. M. SAWYER, A. A. G.,
1st Brigade, 3d D;visifJn, Army of the Mississippi.
RECAPITULATI0~.-5th Iowa infantry: killed 37, ~ounded 179, nnssmg 1; total 217.
26th Missouri infantry: killed 21, wounded 74, mis:;ing 1; total 96. 48th Indiana infantry: killed 37. wounded 56, missing 7; total 100. 4th Minnesota infantry: killed 3,
wounded 43, misoing 2; total 48. 16th Iowa infantry: killed 14, wounded 48, missing
13; total 75. 11th Ohio b<tttery: (unofficial,) killed 18, wour1ded 54; total 72. Total
killed 130, wounded 454 ; missing 2± ; aggregate 608.

HEADQUARTERS TENTH REGBIENT MISSOURI INFANTRY,
Camp near Iulca, September 20, 1862.
CAPTAI~: I herewith submit a report of the part taken in the late action near Iuka by
the force under my command, consisting of the lOth Missouri and Captain L. M. Rice't~
attached company, 24th Missouri infantry, in all numbering six hundred and fifty (650)
men and officers.
My regim ent took position in line of battle about four hundred yards to the right of
the Iuka road, and paral lel with it, with the view of preventing any flank movement of
the enemy through the woods opposite me, and at the same time to furnish a support to
the m ain line formed across the road, and to my left. Company A, lst Lieutenant Walker
commanding, was deployed as skirmishers along my whole front, in the edge of the woods.
The action soon became general with the main body. I remained in the position named
for some time, exposed to an enfilading firo of the enemy's artillery, which severely
wounded several of my men.
Discovering no attempt of the enemy to come through the woods on my front, and see-
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ing that some of the regiments on the right of the main body were apparently falling back
under the terrific fire to which they were exposed, I changed front forward on my left, with
a view to furnish any support which might be required, leaving my skirmishers as originally placed. With the exception of having once ployed my regiment into close column
by division on the road, being ordered to take position there, I remained on the lastnamed line to the end of the action and during the night, the men sleeping on their arms.
In that most trying situation of being exposed to a heavy fire, without being able to
return it, my officers and men behaved with the greatest steadiness, executing the rerluired manamvres with the precision of ordinary drill.
I may here aknowledge the valuable assistance which I received during the action from
Lieutenant Colonel John D. Foster, Major L. Horney, and Adjutant F. C. Deimling, Surgeon
C. B. Payne, and Chaplain George R. Palmer, are also entitled to especial mention for their
services on the field, attending to and removing the wounded. My loss was fourteen (14)
wounded, a list of whom is appended.
I kept my men screened while in position by the nature of the ground as fa.r as pol'!sible,
and by lying down, which will account for the smallness of the list.
Very respectfully,
SAMUEL A. HOLMES, Colonel, Commanding.
Captain THOMAS H. HARRIS,
Assistant Adjutant General, 2d Brigade, 3d Division, Army of Jfississippi.
List of wounded.-Augustus D. Peyton, company A, private, face, dangerously; Robert
Staton, company C, private, face, severely; Stuart Wishard, company D, sergeant, thigh,
slightly; Asbury Salters, company D, private, contusion in region of spine, severely ; John
Rebstock, company D, private, foot, slightly ; Thomas Hibbler, company D, private, hand,
severely; Robert B. Glass, company D, private, breast and leg, slightly; Reuben 'fharp,
company D, private, leg, very severely, amputated; 'Vashington J. Deane, company D,
leg, very severely, amputated ; Peter Thoma, company D, private, leg. very severely,
amputated; August Zunkle, company E, private, arm, seriously; James Young, company
F, private, hand, severely; Alexander B. Webb, company H, private, arm, severely; John
Liles, attached to 24th Missouri, company F, private, leg, severely.

CAMP IN FIELD, September 21, 1862.
SIR: Agreeably to orders from General Sullivan I advancGd, September 19, at about 5
o'clock p. m., with my regiment and a section of the 12th Wisconsin battery, under Lieutenant Immel. After a short survey of our line of battle, I took position, with seven companies, en cheval, on the Iuka road, about a quarter of a mile ahead of our left wing, sent
three companies to the ri6~ht into a dense wood ; then I put my two pieces into position,
and threw a few shells in an oblique direction, where I discovered the Jebel lines. l\1y
three companies in the woods reported a full brigade of the rebels advancing on our left
wing, on which I withdrew them, and leaving only one company for the observation of
the enemy I changed front perpendicular to our line of battle on the Iuka road. I planted
my two pieces anew, and thus obtained a dominating flanking position. Being on a ridge
I could watch the enemy's movements, who had to cross a broken open field in order to
attack our forces; they soon emerged from the woods, opened a heavy fire, and advanced
on our lines; their fire was returned, and I, too, opened with musketry and canister; the
rebels wavered, fell back a little, but were soon rallied by an officer on a gray horse, and
advanced again, nothing daunted by our fire, which ~ade great havoc in their ranks;
they followed our left wing into the woods, and for a short while there was no enemy in
our sight, but at a sudden a full regiment marched out from the woods on their side,
offering their right flank to my fire, with the evident intention to ad vance for the support
of their forces already engaged. I opened instantly with canister and musketry, on which
they fell back to the woods, formed there parallel to my regiment, advanced to the edge
of the wood, and commenced a bri~k fire; we replied vividly; they attempted twice to
advance, but were driven back each time ; we had the advantage of the ground; our fire
told fearfully upon them, while we suffered next to nothing; their fire up a steep hill has
been altogether too high.
In the mean time the battle wavering to and fro, and apparently approaching the Iuka
road, which was our only road of retreat, I got a little ala.rmed lest the pieces under my
charge should be cut off in case we should be compelled to fall back. At this time one of
General Hamilton's aides-de·camp rode up, inquiring how matters stood on our side; he
told me that the road, although raked by the enemy's fire, was still in our possession, on which I ordered the pieces back, and they were withdrawn safely. Night
coming on I drew a little closer to our main body, but on the report of company I, which
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I ~eft to observe the enemy's movements, that a new body of rebels were advancing I advanced again with three companies . Advised by the noise of our steps the enemy opened
and gave us several tremendous volleys. Owing to the darkness and, again, to their up-hill
tiring not a man was hurt. We returned their fire, and made great execution, as we found,
on the morning of the 20th, all the ground strewn with dead rebels. They left part of
their wounded, having carried away a great number even during the action. We may
safely assert having killed between sixty or seventy, and wounded in proportion, while our
loss was seven wounded, and one of my orderlies' horse killed.
Thus ended our part in this memorable fight. I have but to add that officers and men
behaved with the greatest bravery. All movements have been executed promptly in spite
of the shower of lmllets, and I dare to say that the tenth Iowa are good soldiers.
I have yet to mention the efficient services and assistance of our brave Major N. McCalla,
and of my adjutant, Wm. Manning, and also the able and brave manner in which Lieutenant M. E. Immel handled his two pieces.
Yours, respectfully,
N. PEREZEL,
Colonel; Commanding 10th. Iowa Volunteers.
Captain T. H. HARRIS,
A 8s,i!lant Adjutant General, 2d Brigade, 3d Division.

HEADQUARTERS IowA SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY,
Jacinto, ~M'ississippi, September 22, 1862.
GENERAL : In compliance with your request, I make the followiug brief statement concerning the battle near Iuka on the 19th instant.
Wh(.;n you ordered the 17th Iowa to form line of battle acro~s the ridge at right angles
with the road leading up from the hospital building, we were filed off to the right by Col<>nel Rmkin (then commal'lding) until a little more than the right wing of the regiment
had filed to the right, when tbe regiment was halted and brought to a front, and theremainder of the left wing formed on the left of the road.
We wt>re then ordered forward. We advanced a few paces and were ordered to give
way to the right, which the right wing of the regiment obeyed, and which, I think, the
left wing failed to hear. The right wing passed, I should think, thirty or forty yards
to the right, ord ~ red by Colonel Rankin to halt and come to a front.
By this movement of the right wing to the right, the regiment was divided near the
centre. About tbis time the firing from the enemy became quite brisk, and there seemed
to be a strong inclination to fall back. I communicated this fact to Colonel Rankin, and
he told me to do the bc8t I could for them, and keep them together if possible.
After this I saw no more of him during the engagement. I learned afterwards from
him that his horse was shot from under him, and that he plunged him against a tree,
which rendered him unable to longer command the regiment.
Lieutenant Colonel Hillis being ab~ent, and Major Wise being under arrest, I was the
next officer in rank, and I took command of the right wing of the regiment, that being all
that was in sight or hearing of me. About the time I mention as having lost sight of
Colonel nankin, our men retreated without any command, which caused great confusion.
They had not proceeded far to the rear, however, until I succeeded in rallying them, and
got them back to about where our line was first formed, and succeeded in quieting them
for a time.
About this time I saw you and told you I had assumed command, and was told to take
command of the battalion and do the best I could.
,
I then went to near the right of the right wing and urged the men forward; we had
proceeded but a ehort distance when a tremendous volley from the enemy caused a panic
in the entire battalion, and with all my efforts, and assisted by Captain D. A. Craig, who
was the only captain I saw after Colonel Rankin left the field, could not rally them until
they Lad retreated almost to the road near the old log church. I here succeeded in stopping tLem. got a line partly formed and marched them forward. By the time I had got
tl1em to our f. ,rmer line I had, I should think, about three hundred (300) men, consisting
of the right wing of our regiment and stragglers from Iowa 5th, Missouri 11th, Minnesota
4th, Ohio 39th, and some others. I now held tbem near where our first line was formed
for about three-fourths (t) of an hour waiting orders. Not having been told by Colonel
Rankin what the design was in placing us there, or whether any of our own forces were between us and the enemy, and when Home of my men fired I ordered them to cease firing
until ordered. About this time a soldier from the 5th Iowa, I think, came near us and
told me that my men were firing upon our own men. I then ordered my men forward
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with the intention of taking a better position to support our men in case they should fall
back. We had not proceeded far when some of my men again commenced firing, which
was apparently answered by a tremendous volley from the direction of the enemy, but a
soldier, who was some distance in advance, came rushing back and said that our own men
were firing upon us. I then orde1·ed my men to fall back in good order, so as not to come
in contact with them. I fell back, I should think, about 25 or 30 yards, and to near
where our original line had been, halted them, about-faced them, and ordered them to
kneel. They rt> mained in this poeition for some time, and until quite a number of men in
front of us came back on double quick, which, wgethel' with increased firing from the
front, caused another panic among the men, and in spite of all exertions ran back about
one hundred yards, where I succeeded in forming another line, and having advanced a few
vards I ordered the men to stand and wait for orders. We bad stood bt>re but a short
time when a tremendous volley was fired by the enemy and was answered immediately by
Burne regiment still in our rear ; we wet·e now between two heavy fires from front and rear.
This caused a dreadful stampede among the men, and all commenced firing in all directions without regard to where their guns were aimed. This, however, continued but a.
short time, for at> soon as the guns were all discharged I had no difficulty in preventing a
repetition of the fire. I again rallied the men and kept them in pretty good line until the
retreat was sounded, when I brought the men off and formeu them on the right of the 39th
Ohio. I brought off, I should think, about 350 men Lelonging to the regiments above
named.
It may be said that the foregoing would not add much to the reputation of a regiment,
but this I cannot avoid. I give you a simple ~tatement of the facts that came und er my own
observation, hoping to be able to give a better account of the 17th Iowa in the next engagement.
It is due to Captain Craig, company H, Lieutenants Garret and Johnson of company A,
Lieutenants Rice and Snodgrass, of company I, Lieutenant Hull, company E, Lieutenant
Morris, company F, Lieutenant Stapleton, company C, and one or two others, probably,
who were with me dming the entire engagement, to say that they acted in a very brave
and unflinching manner, and deserve great credit
I do not wi~h to be understood as casting any insinuation upon any officer in the regiment, but I only mention those whom I saw in the engagement.
Respectfully submitted.
JOHN L. YOUNG,
Captain Company A, (Jqmmanding Regiment.
Brigadier General SuLLIVAN,
Commanding 2d Brigade, 3d Division, Army of the Missig1ippi.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFI'H WISCONSIN BAT.rERY,

'Jacinto, Mi31issippi, September 20, 1R62.
I have the honor to report the part which the 12th Wisconsin battery took in
the engagement of the 19th of Septf~ mber, near Juka, Missi::;sippi. I was ordered by General Sullivan to t ake position, with one section of the battery, on the road leading to the
left and front of line of battle, which was formed across the main road leading to Iuka. I
took position five or six hundred yards to the front and left of the 11th Ohio battery,
under the immediate direction of Lieutenant Colonel W. L . Lothrop, chief of artill ery , and
Colonel Perezel, of the lOth Iowa volunteers, whose personal bearing won tbe applause
of myself and men . Several shells were thrown into the field and timber in front to find
the position of the enemy, who StlOn advanced from our right through the thick timber.
I then fell back a short distance and took a position·, while Colonel Perezel was engaging
the rebel inf;-~.ntry , who now came in great numbers. It was about this time the 11th
Ohio battery was talu·n, and the enemy bad cut us from the main body. At this time the
enemy were driven back with great loss by the lOth Iowa, and the two guns under my
charge, which were served with great dexterity by the cannoniers, most of the ti 'l e using
canister.
I call your attention to the great bravery of Colonel Perezel , his officers, and men, the
gallant manner in which they fought. supported the artillery, and repulsed the enemy with
great loss. My non-commissioned officers and men stood well to their posts. Thoae most
meritorious I am constrained to mention are, 1st Sergeant, S. E. Jones and Sergeant
Philander Cady, who nobly did their duty. At the time the enemy opened fire upon us,
First Lieutenant Edward G. Harbon, chief of 1st section, left his section, and I saw no more
of him till after the engagement was over.
When I returned where I had left the 2d section in command of First Lieutenant William
Miles, I found the guns with the poles broken out of both pieces and caissons; the drivers
CAPTAIN :
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ani! horses all gone; the gunners and cannoniers at their posts, but their commanding
officer gone while the battle was still raging in their immediate front. I caused the
pieces and c~issons to b a drawn off and repaired This action lasted some time, but the
battery was not under fire more than an hour or an hour and a quarter.
The loss sustained in this engagement was six (6) horses killed ; one man kitled,
Private James C. Atherton, company D, 17th Iowa v olunteers, who was on detached service in this battery, and three (3) men slightly wounrled .
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
L. D. IMMELL,
2d Lieutenant 1st Missouri Light Artillery, Com'g 12th Wiscomin Battery.
Captain T. H. HARRIS, A. A G.,
2d Brigade, 3d Division, Army qf the lJficsis~ippi.

HEADQUARTERS 26TH REOiliiENT MissouRI VoLUNTEERS,
September 22, 1862.
CoLONEL: I beg leave to submit the following report of the action of the troops under
my command in the bcLttle ne •r Iuka, Missh;::;ippi, September 19, 1862. By order of Colonel George B. Boomer, commanding the 26th Missouri volunteers, I took command of
companies A, Captain Robinson; B, Captain Welker; G, Captain Rice, and I, Lieutenant
Berry, and relieved the skirmishers of the 5th Iowa.. I deployed company A on the left,
company Bon the right of t ne m ·'\in road, leading to Iuka, holding companies G and I as
a reserve, under command of Captain Rice. I drove back the enemy's pickets without
much firing, excapting on one occasion, when he had taken refuge in a house on the road,
when a brisk skirmish ensued, but we soon forced him to leave his shelter, and continued
to advance under a brisk fire. The enemy's cavalry attempted a charge, but seeing me
prepared to receive him with the reserve, and flanking companies rallying, he promptly
fell back. 1 again deployed and advanced, and soon came upon the main force, posted
about forty yards above a ridge cover.::d with timber and thick undergrowth ; his artillery being in posititn in the road in front. A few shots were fired by my skirmishers, but
the enemy held his fire. At this time I had advanced to the top of the ridge in the road,
and discovered the position of the enemy; at this instant company B drew the fire of the
whole rebel lin~ on th'3 right, and fell back and rejoined the regiment. Company A rallied on the right, and Captain Rice brou~ht up thE' reserve, and after getting into position
near the top of the ridg;', these companies gave him their entire fire, and almost instantly
drew the fire of their artillery and two r egiments of infantry. My troops were so protected
by the ridge that their fire took no efft!ct. I gave them a few more shots, when Captain
Robinson reported the enemy flanking him on thr> left, and Captain Rice discovered him
on the right. Seeing our bitttery in position and line of bil.ttle formed in my rear, I gave
the order to retire, aud soon after received orders to rejoin the regiment and await orders.
Soon after joining the r egiment, Colonel Boomer went to the left, leaving Adjutant Schoenen and myself on the right. The battle soon opened with great fury. The four companies on the left, with the colors, were here detached by the Colonel, (as I afterwards
learned,) and moved forward under his and Maj or Koniuszeski's command in support of
the battery. I remained in position until the adv.tnce of the enemy bad turned our left,
which placed me and my right under a destructive cros;;-fire from the rear,left, and front.
The battery had been carried, and one of the cai~sons came down on my left, and threw
that part of my line into confusion. Seeing tha.t I Wi:LS being flanked on the left, and
it being impossible to rally th0 left of my line, which had become disordered , I ordered
my command to fall back to the field, a short distance below my first line. This movement was quickly executed and in good order, when I again formed in line of battle near
the edge of timbers. I then, by order, moved back my line about 150 or 200 yards,
and took position on the right of the lOth Missouri, awaiting the approach of the enemy,
where I remained until the close of the engagement. I was then ordered to remain on arms,
which I did until the next morning. About 7 o'clock in the evening I was here rejoined
by the remnants of companies E, 1!', and H, bearing the colors in charge .of Lieutenant
·wheeler and Lieutenant Charles F . Brown, regimental quartermaster. From the opening
to the end of the engagement my command was constantly under a galling and destructive
fire, and my loss in killed and woundfld was severe. Permit me further to report, that
the officers and men under my command, with scarcely an exception, during the whole
engagement, conducted themselves with rare coolness and true soldierly bearing; but
Captain John Welker, '1'. M. Rice, Captain William M. Robinson, Lieutenant F. G. Scboenen, acting adjutant, and lieutenant C. F. Brow11, regimental quartermaster, with many
others, are deserving a special notice. Their conduct was truly brave, gallant, and noble;
if space would permit, too much could not be said of their signal acts of daring, their
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coolness and skill in discharging the duties respectively assigned them on the field. TlJe
country may truly be proud of such men, for under their leadership continued success
will rriark the progress of our gallant army. Of those officers above named it will be doing no injustice to any for me to say that Captains Welker, Rice, and Robinson, Lieutenant C. F. Brown, regimental quartermaster, and Lieutenant Schoenen, that they have won
for themselves distinguished m erits, efficient in camp, brave and patriotic on the field. I
can cheerfully recommend them for promotion in the army.
JOHN H. HOLMAN,
Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding 26th Regiment Missouri Volunteers.

MissouRI,
September 21, 1862.
CoLONEL: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to your orders, I marched on the
morning of the lRth from camp, west of Jacinto, and camped that evening six miles east
of the town, on the Iuka road. On the 19th we marched to within two miles of Inka, the
5th Iowa infantry leading the column; next 11th Ohio battery, and next 26th Missouri infantry. About 3 o'clock p. m. I relieved four companies of the 5th Iowa skirmishers with
companies B, A, G, and I of my regiment, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Holman,
who continued to drive back the enemy's line, till they came upon his main body, from
whom they received a volley, causing considerable loss. They remained in position till the
column came up, and upon my arrival I ordered them into the line, and formed the regiment
according to your order, in rear of the 5th .Iowa, the right down a steep ravine, the left
resting near the 11th Ohio battery. You also ordered me, in case the enemy should attempt
to flank on the right, to move my regiment in that direction into the open field. I reconnoitred the position on the right, and seeing no indication of a flank movement I
remained in position. Shortly after the engagement opened in earnest on the front of the
5th Iowa, Colonel Matth.ias finding the left of his regiment next to the battery too hard
pressed, called on me for a•sistance~ I seeing that the battery was nearly disabled, and
that the enemy were directing all their efforts against that point, immediately ordered
Major Koniuszeski to mount and go forward with the left wing of my regiment, composed
of companies F, E, H, and C, in all 162 men, exclusive of hospital details. I at the same
time ordered the right wing to remain where it was and await my orders. Seeing Major
Koniuszeski dismount, and that he gave no orders at all, or at least none adequate to the
occasion, I took command in person, and remained until I thought the time had arrived to
bring up the right wing, with which, being five large companies, I had intended to
charge. In the mean time the colors, contrary to orders, had advanced with the left wing,
and a short time previous to my returning to the right wing I had ordered the colors
back to their f,, rmer position. When I returned to where I had ordered Lieutenant
Colonel Holman to remain with the right wing, I found it gone as well as the colors. I
immediately returned to the left wing, where, mixed up with the disabled battery, we
remained, without giving an inch, until I was severely wounded, having been slightly
wounded before. I immediately after this ordered the men to retreat down the ravine,
and was off the field.
We had lost seventy-nine (79) men, including five (5) commissioned officers wounded.
The fire was ve1 y severe, and the position in the midst of tangled horses, struggling to
get away, was difficult both to take and maintain in order. I did not see Major Koniusze~ki
during the action; had he and Lieutenant Colonel Holman (whom I since understand
ordered the right wing to retreat shortly after I left him) obeyed my orders properly, I
think a charge with these fresh troops would have prevented the temporary capture of the
battery. The 5th Iowa, with ruy four companies, fought with great dt> speration and effect,
and we left the field at the same time. I have no means of knowing with certainty why
the right wing left the field as it did, as I have not seen the command since I was c:uried
off the field, to be able to get any accurate information, but they could not have left without orders, as they were almost completely under shelter. It will be necessary for Lieutenant
Colonel Holman to explan this in his report, which should begin at the time those companies left their position.
It gives me great pleasure to mention the names of several officers engaged with me on
the left wing, who behaved with distinguished gallantry and energy. Captain B. D. Dean,
2d Lieutenant J. W. Maupin, of company F; Captain Robert C. Crowell, 1st Lieutenant
H.. B. Denny, 2d Lieutenant J, T. Crowe, of company E ; 1st Lieutenant Schirmer, com·
HosPITAL AT IuKA, MisSISSIPPI, 20TH
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manding company H, and 1st Lieutenant J . M. Dennis, of company C. I was not present
with the skirmishers in action, but understand that all exhibited great coolness and energy.
I enclose a list of killed and wounded so far as known at this time.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEORGE B BOOMER.
Colonel, Oommandtng 26th Regimen~ Missouri Infantry Vulunteers.
Colonel John B. SANBORN,
Comrt1.ftnding 1st Brigade, 3d Division, Army of the Mis~issippi.
Official:
L. B. MARTIN I
Lieutenant and Acting Assistant AdJutant General.
HEADQUARTERS 5TH REGIMENT IowA VoLGNTEERS, September 21, 1862.
Sm: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken in the engagement, near Iuka, on the 19th instant, by the 5th Iowa infantry.
We left camp, six miles from Jacinto, early on the m orning of the 19th instant, leading
the column of the 3d division, and soon call?-e on to the enemy's picket~ posted on the
road. Three companies of my regiment, E, G, and D, were or.!ered forward as skirmishers,
and succeeded in driving them from their positions, and continued to drive them from one
position to another, which they contested for more than six miles, killing thr~'e and
wounding a number, when these companies were relieved by the 26th Missouri infc1ntry.
Our loss was one sergeant, severely wounded.
The skirmishers soon came on to the main force of the enemy, placed in a strcng position,
and received a volley from one or more regiments. My regiment was ordered into line
on the right of the 11th Ohio battery, which had just been placed in position, when I was
informed that a large force was moving on my right, which compelled me to change
front, and had just got into position on the crest of a hill, when the enemy in 8trong
force-two brigades-as I learned, under Generals Green and Norton, came up in front,
and ·poured a terrible fire of musketry into my line, which was promptly returned . The
firing continued without cessation on both sides for more than a quarter of an hour, when
I found the enemy was pressing my left wing near the battery, and I ordered a charge,
which was executed in the most gallant manner, every officer and man moving up in
almost perfect line, cheering lustily; the enemy gave way before us, when we poured a
most deadly fire into their ranks, causing them to fall back down the hill; they soon returned with renewed vigor on my front and left, cheering as they came, and were received
with a steady fire from the gallant uoys of my regiment, holding our position under the
most terrific fire possible. I then gave the command forward, and the enemy were again
driven over the hill, but not until they had come so near as to boldly reach out after our
colors, thus showing the United States flag, and saying "Don't fire at us, we are your
friends ." At this juncture th111 left wing of my regiment was suffering terribly from a
cross-fire coming from the left of the battery ; nearly every officer of the three left companies being either killed or wounded. At this moment four companieH of the 26th Missouri infantry came up to the support of my left, and nobly assisted in holding the ground,
until I found my ammunition was exhausted-more than an hour-when I ordered my
regiment to retire to a field about one hundred yards distant. which was done in good
order, where it was reformed under a galling fire. At this time the 11th Mi~somi infantry
advanced in order of battle, and my regiment retired by the right of companies to the
rear, passing the lOth Missouri infantry, which was advancing to take a position near the
road, under the direction of an aide·de-camp. 'The regiment was here reformed in line,
ammunition distributed to the men, and the firing having ceased, the men rested upon
their arms for the night. The casualties in my regiment were seven (7) commissioned
officers killed and eight (8) wounded, and thirty-three (33) enlisted men killed and one
hundred and sixty-eight (168) wounded.
In commanding my regiment before the enemy, I was gallantly assisted on the right by
Lieutenant Colonel Lampson, and on the left by Adjutant R. F. Patterson, acting major,
and Lieutenant W. S. Marshall, acting adjutant, which officers, without leaving their
places, repeated my commands and cheered my brave boys throughout the fierce engagement.
The long list of casualties of both officers and men is ample proof of the noble manner
in which all stood at their posts. The highest praise is due to all. A grateful country
will reward them for their deeds of daring.
Very respectfully,
C. L . 'MATTHIAS,
Colonel Commanding 5th Iuwa Infantry.
Lieutenant MARTIN, A. A. A. G.,
1st Brigade, 3d Division, Army of the Mississippi.
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HEADQUARTERS, 16th IOWA INFANTRY,
s~ptember 21, 1862.
Sm: I have the honor to report the part taken by the 16th Iowa infantry in your brig.
ade, in the battle on the 19th instant, (evening,) one and a half mile south of Iuka, Mississippi. The regiment, under command of Colonel A. Chambers, was placed in position
about 5~ o'dock p. m. in rear of the 11th Ohio battery, the left of the regiment extending
across the road from which it had filed in position. Immediately after the regiment was
formed in line, a charge of grape and shell from a battery of the enemy cut down six or
seven men, including an officer, when the men were ordered to lie down; in this position
but few or none were injurerl by the repeated discharges of canister and ball from the
rebel ba ttery. In probably half an hour from forming in line the enemy made a charge of
infantry on the battery; our fire was reserved till the last moment iu the centre of the regiment for fear of killing those manning the battery or the horses of the same, and in the
two right companies, till a regiment, which were lapping them, were withdrawn. But when
the enemy's lines were plainly or partially in sight, which, owing to the trees and thick underbrush, was not till they were very close, Colonel Chambers ordered the men to ri se and fh:e,
which order was instantly obeyed, for a time stopping the enemy's advance, but they again
chargEd. The attack was evidently by a very heavy force, and with the object of capturing the battery. Our men stood their ground manfully, and I am not aware that a single
officer or man failed in any part of hit; duty ; they were finally beaten back by the overwhelming force of the enemy. The centre, in the rear of the left section of the battery,
retiring first, but warmly contending with the enemy till they were almost in our ranks;
the left, holding a comparatively safe position, did not retire till they were fired into by
one of our own regiments in the rear. The entire right companies, although under a remarkably heavy fire, held their position longest, and experienced the heaviest loss. Com.pany A, Captain Smith, was the last to leave the field, and for a time held it& ground
alone, the regiment on its right having, at an early hour, been compelled to retire, and
the remaining companies of its own regiment the same, at a later hour.
While all the officers did so well it seems scarcely fair to particularize the conduct or
bearing of one from the others, yet I deem it my official duty to notice the fact that Captain Smith exhibited in this action bravery and gallant conduct for which he cannot receive too much praise. He brought out of the battle scarcely half the men he took in it,
and the same may be said of Company F, Captain Frazier.
The remaining portion of the regiment were immediately after reformed by myself, and
took a position near the battle-field, it then being nearly dark, and soon after, while changing to another position, was directed to rest on the right of an Ohio regiment, formed
along the Iuka road, where it remained during the night.
I regret to report the severe wounding of Colonel Chambers, by gunshot wounds, in the
shoulder and neck, towards the close of the action. He was taken prisoner at the time of
receiving the wounds, but was left by the euemy in the hospital at Iuka. I have the honor
to enclose herewith a list of the killed, wounded and missing of the 16th Iowa infantry at
the late action near Iuka, complete as it can be made at this time, summing up : Killed 14 ;
wounded 48 ; missing 14. The regiment went into battle with about 350 men, exclusive
of details made to take care of the wounded.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ADD. H. SANDERS,
Lieutenaut Ooloml, Commanding 16th Iowa Infantry.
Colonel SANBORN,

Commanding Ist Brigad~, 3d Division, Army of the Misaissippi.

HosPITAL No. 2, IuKA, MISSISSIPPI, 48TH INDIANA,
September 21, 1862.
COLONEL: I respectfully report the part taken in the action by my regiment while Iremained on the field, near Iuka, on the 19th instant.
In pursuance to your orders and that of General Hamilton, the regiment was formed on
a line nearly with and to the left of the 11th Ohio battety, Lieutenant Sears commanding,
on the crest of a hill or ridge receding to the left and semicircular in form. In rear Wl'tS
placed the 16th Iowa for our support, and not more than 20 yards from us, and to the left,
was the 4th Minnesota, in continuation of the front.
'fhe men were ordered to lie down and to hold their fire until they could make it effective. There was a deep gulch or ravine which it was impossible to reach with musketry
as the line was then formed. To the right wing of the regiment the line of fire was much
circumscribed, the range being confined to the sharp slope of the hill opposite, and to a
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descending plain to the front of the line on which we were formed, of not more than 25 or
30 yards in width. On the left of the regiment the descent of the ground was less rapid
and abrupt, but rolling, and at many points offered a cover to an enemy's approach. The
fire o~ened upon us by their batteries at about 5o' clock. p m., and at first seemed mainly
directed at the battery on our right, but taking in its range the first and second companies
of the regiment, who suffered early and severely in the engagement.
The fire from the batteries was from converging points, and therefore enfilading, under
which those troops to the front and to the right and left of our battery suffered severely.
After their cannonading had lasted a half an hour or more, circumstances indicated the
approach of an attacking column, of which I promptly informed you.
They advanced in three Jines, two deep each. As soon as they were perceived on the
summit and descent of the hill on the apposite side, at about 250 yards distant, we opened
our fire upon them, and continued it until they were hidden by the declivity below, retmming the fire as soon as they came within reach. Here they met us with a volley, and
our support having given way, with a force in our front of at least four to one, the regigiment followed.
They fell back nearly 100 yard!!, where they were rallied, and although the line was
irregular, they still showed a front to the enemy and continued to fire.
By your direction I advanced to the Empport of the battery. When within about 40
yards of it I was wounded and compelled to retire to the rear. 'l'he command of the regiment then devolved upon Lieutenant Colonel Rugg. His report, which no doubt will accompany this, will embody all the essential facts connected with the regiment after I left
the field.
Considering that it was the first time the regiment had been under fire, and that it was
outnumbered four to one by the veteran troops of the rebel army, and that they remained
in the battle to its termination, its conduct may be deemed satisfactory, though not in all
respects what I could wish it. To the officers especially much praise is due; they were
prompt in the execution of every command, attentive to every duty, and remained with
their men, encouraging them by word and example to the last.
To Lieutenant Colonel Rugg I am under especial obligations. He gave me every aid
and assistance while I remained on the field, and contributed much to the order and good
conduct of the men. His gallantry was conspicuous at every point of danger. I take
pleasure in also mentioning with approbation the conduct of Adjutant Stanfield, and particularly that of Sergeant Major Ellis. Other special instances of meritorious conduct on
the part of commissioned officers and enlisted men deserving notice will, doubtless, be mentioned by Colonel Rugg in his report.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
NORMAN EDDY, Colonel, Commanding.
Colo11el SANBORN,
Commanding 1st Br~qade, 3d .Division, Army of the Mississippi.
Official:·
L. B. MARTIN,
Lieutmant and Acting Assistant Ad:jutant General.

Report of Lieutenant Colonel Rugg.

The regiment was speedily reformed on the right of the road on which the battery was
placed.
Here Major Torma.ns and Captains Byrkit and Wilson rendered valuable assistance.
Order being restored in the regiment, I held it in waiting for the orders of a superior, not
feeling authorized to move it at my own discretion ; but not being called upon for further
service, I moved it off the field in good order at the close of the battle. I may add that, '
considering the unusual fierceness of the fire of grape and musketry, to which particularly
the right wing was exposed in the position assigned to it, it is not strange or discreditable to
the men that they withdrew, knowing, as they certainly did, that it was impossible to
withstand the murderous concentration of the enemy's fire upon it.
I take great pleasure in mentioning the name of Lieutenant White, commanding company G, for the cool courage he displayed during the battle. He deserves great credit for
his gallantry.
Newton Bingham, 1st sergent company F, was also among the foremost of those who
displayed remarkable bravery. There are other non-commissioned officers and privates,
whose faces I remember well, but whose names I cannot now recollect, who deserve and will
receive advancement for their good conduct.
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The regiment went into the battle 43! strong.
and 8 missing.
Respectfully submitttd:

Our loss was 37 killed, 56 wounded,

D W. E. RUGG.
Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding Regiment.
Official:

L. B. MARTIN,
Lieutenant and Acting .Assil!tant Adjutant General .•

HEADQUARTERS 4TH

VoLUNTEERS, CAMP 6 MILES souTH o:P IuKA,
Septembt:r 20, 1~62.
SIR: I h:we the honor to make the following report of the movements of the regiment
under my command during the battle of yesterday near Iuka.
At 5 o'clock p . m. I
moved my command at double-quick to a position on the left of the 48th :Indiana, which
regiment was in support of the lith Ohio battery, commanded by Lieutenant Sears.
Shortly after, the battle was opened by the battery, and raged furiously along the line for
half an hour, when the 48th Indiana, being compelled to give way, fell back to the edge
of the woods, leaving my regiment exposed to an oblique fire in the rear from the advancing enemy. I then ordered the Tight wing to fall back ten rods to the timber, which was
accomplished in good order, nvtwitbstanding the galling and incessant fire from the enemy.
This change of position brought our line in the form of a semicircle, partly facing the
battery; here we remained some twenty minutes, when the fire of the enemy was directed
agai.ast the troops on the right of the battery.
I was then ordered to move by the right flank about forty rods up the road at nearly a
right angle to my first position, then by the left flank, in order of battle, to a point near
where the battery was first placed, which I did immediately. This position I occupied
until a quarter past 8 o'clock, when the enemy having fallen back, I was relieved
by the 80th Ohio, and ordered to the rear for a fresh supply of ammunition.
Throughout the whole, both officers and men behaved with coolness and courage, con.
ducting themRelves in a manner highly commendable.
Too much praise cannot be awarded to Surgeon J. H. Murphy and his assistants, for
their unceasing attentions to the wounded through the action and during the night.
I enclose a list of the killed, wounded and missing .
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,
E. LEE GRO,
MINNESOTA

Captain, Commanding -!th Minneoota Valunte~rs.
Colonel JonN B. SANBORN,

Commanding

l~t

Bri[Jade, 3d Division, Army of the Mi3sis11ippi.

HlilADQUARTER!I SECOND BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION, ARMY OJ' THE M1S..'~I6!1IPPI,

luka, Sqjtember 20, 1862.
I have the honor to submit this report of the part the second brigade took in the battle
of Iuka:
On the evening of the 18th I received orders to move the next morning, at 5 o'clock,
on Tuscumbia road, towards Iuka, to join in an attack on Major General Price, who was
encamped with the rebel army at that place. Leaving camp punctually at the time
appointed, we arrived within one and a half mile of Iuka by 4 p. m., our advance
brigade having been skirmishing with the enemy's pickets for over six miles. Halting at
this point, the first brigade was formed in line of battle by General Hamilton, who was
in advance, while the second was halted on the road until a reconnoissance could be made
of the ground to the left, and a position obtained for the battery. Before a position
could be selected the rebels opened a te.srrific fire along the entire front of our line, having
approacht;d us entirely unperceived, owing to tbe dense underbrush and broken character
of the ground, at the same time attempting to turn our position by an attack on both
flanks. I ordered Colonel Holmes, of the lOth Missouri, to take position guarding our
right flank, while Colonel Perezel, of the lOth Iowa, with a section of the 12th Wisconsin
battery, was ordered to hold a road leading to our left and rear. (Their reports are herewith enclosed.) The position occupied by Colonel Holmes was so important and so
effectually checked the enemy's advance on our right, that their artillery fire was directed
especially to that point. Although the enemy's fire enfiladed his line, the movements of
his regiments in taking position were performed with as much precision as if on the drill
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ground. His officers and men are entitled to praise. Colonel Perezel, with his command,
held the position assigned them, and drove back a brigade of the rebels, who were
advancing to take possession of the road. He gallantly held his position, and by his
determined stand led the enemy to believe we were in strong force at that point, and to
desist from their attack. Before the disposition of the regiments above mentioned could
be made the rebels, by bringing a vastly superior force against the left wing of the first
brigade, had driven in the regiments, flanking Sands's battery, and occupied a position
commanding the battery, and were moving down the road with the intention of attacking
the firat brigade in the rear. Forming a portion of the 80th Ohio and 17th Iowa, which
had been halted in the road, two volleys, r!l,Pidly delivered, checked the enemy's advance,
and drove them back to the brow of the h.. By this time portions of the 26th Missouri
volunteers, 48th Indiana volunteers, and 16th Iowa volunteers, whose colonels had all
been seriously wounded, with a few of the 4th Minnesota volunteers, joined my command
and fought bravely through the remainder of the action. General Hamilton at this time
desired me to save Sands's battery, which was entirely disabled, every officer and cannonier being either killed or wounded, and all the horses killed. At the order to advance
the men gave three cheers, and with a rush drove the enemy back out of the battery,
down the hill, and were yet advancing, when a murderous fire was opened on my flank by
a regiment of sharpshooters, which lay concealed on my left in the woods. Ordering my
men to fall back, I reformed my line, which had become somewhat disordered. The
rebels, taking heart at our supposed retreat, advanced with loud cheers, but were soon
undeceived by a volley, followed by an order to charge, which again drove them below
the brow of the bill. Receiving re-enforcements the rebels again advanced, but were held
in check, when the 39th Ohio, through a mistake and without orders, fired a volley into
the rear of my line, killing and wounding more than my whole loss prior to that time.
By this time it was so dark that friends could not be distinguished from foes. The enemy
improved this occasion to remove the guns from their position, but were not able to take
them entirely off, and were compelled to leave the caissons in their original position. At
8 o'clock the firing ceased, and the field of battle was ours. The position in which t~e
battery was planted, and which was so hotly contested, was held by our troops.
Lieutenant Colonel Bartelson, of the 80th Ohio, together with his adjutant, Joseph E.
Philpot, were wounded early in the fight, wben Major Lanning took command. The 17th
Iowa regiment was without a field officer, and Captain Archer, the senior captain, soon
fell severely wounded, when Captain Young assumed command and did his duty nobly.
Our troops labored under a great disadvantage from want of knowledge of the ground, by
being compelled to fight in the dense underbrush, and in a position chosen by the enemy.
The enemy attacked my position in vastly superior force, a fresh brigade of the rebels
having been sent to relieve the troops first repulsed. Lieutenant Immell, of the 12th
Wisconsin battery, is especially mentioned by Colonel Perezel, and I desire to recommend
him to the favorable notice of the general commanding. I am also indebted to Captain
T. H. Harris, assistant adjutatlt general; Lieutenant Jacobson, assistant acting commissary of subsistence; Lieutenant Delahoyde and Lieutenant Buchanan, of my staff, for
efficient service rendered on the field. They displaytld a coolness under fire worthy of
older soldiers. Lieutenant White, of the 48th Indiana, and the assistant adjutant general
of Colonel Mower's bri~ade, who joined me, rendered valuable assistance. The victory
gained is sufficient evidence of the bravery of the men. The number of the dead and
wounded is sufficient evidence of their devotion to our glorious cause. They are justly
entitled to the highest praise, for a battle ::~gainst such superior numbers and on such
ground has not been fought in this war. I enclose reports received from commanding
officers of regiments, together with
list of the killed, wounded, and missing of my
brigade.
The regiments of my brigade engaged were:
lOth Iowa, Colonel Perezel.
17th Iowa, Captain Archer.
80th Ohio, Colonel Bartelson.
One section 12th Wisconsin battery, commanded by Lieutenant Immel.
I have the honor, captain, to be yours, respectfully,
GEO. C. SULLIVAN, Brigadier General.
Captain R. M. SAWYER, AssMtant Adjutant General.

a

CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA, October 15, 1862.
GENERAL: Frequent and continued movements have hitherto prevented my reporting
the operations of the left wing of the army before Iuka, between the 16th and 20th of
September.
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It having been reported on the 16th by Colonel Mower, commanding at Burnsville, that
General Price was threatening from the direction of Iuka, with a large force at the latter
place, you gave me verbal orders to prepare all my available force, consisting of Davies's,
Ross's and McArthur's divisions, altogether numbering about eigh~ thou1:1and (8,000,) to
move upon the enemy by the roads north of the Memphis and Charleston railroad. In
addition to the verbal orders, the.following written instructions were rectived from you :
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,
Corinth, September 16, 1862.
GENERAL: On the strength of Colonel Mowet' telegram, I deem it advisable to send our
forees to within supporting distance of him.
If General Ross can move. his forces had better go to Glendale, or either side of there,
where water can be found, and be on the alert to give assistance if required.
Captain Reynolds can furnish any teams they may require.
Respectfully, &c.,
U. S. GRANT, MaJor General.
Major General 0RD, Commanding Post.
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, •
Corinth, September 17, 1862.
GENERAL: We will get off a1l our forces now as rapidly as practicable. I have despatched
Rosecrans that all our movements now would be as rapid as compatible with prudence, informing him at the same time of where your troops now are, and that those not yet off
would be at and near Glendale to-night; you, probably, with them
I directed Rosecrans to give me his routes, and will inform yon of them. Take an operator with you, who has a pocket instrument, which can be attached to the wires any place
desired, if there is such a place.
I will leave to-morrow for Burnsville, if to-day does not develop something to make a
different plan necessary.
Respectfully, &c.,
U.S. GRANT, Major General.
Major General 0RD, Corinth, Mississippi.
The latter of these two despatches was received about 5 p. m. on the 17th of September.
In obedience to these orders, the troops, which had moved up to Glendale on the 17th,
wP-re moved to Burnsville on the morning of the 18th, at which place I arrived about noon,
and found you there. In the course of that evening despatches were received from General
Rosecrans stating that a large portion of his command had been delayed by mistaking the
route and following one of my columns, and was still about twenty milt'S from Iuka.
Early on the morning of the 19th, by your orders, Ross's division was placed within six
miles of Iuka, to hold the enemy's advanced guard and skirmishers in check. This was
on the direct or town road between Burnsville and Iuka. McArthur's division was ordered
to advance to within a like distance of Iuka, on the Eastport road, and intelligence having
been received that the enemy were making demonstrations upon Corinth from the south
and west, you directed me to retain Davies's division at Burnsville, to be ready to return
to Corinth by rail at a moment's notice. I made a careful reconnaissance of the enemy's
front towards Corinth, between 9 and 3 on that day. While making the reconnaissance,
about 10 o'clock that morning, I received from you lhe following despatch:
19TH SEPTEMBER.
GENERAL: I send you despatch received from Rosecrans late in the night. You will see
that he is behind where we expected him. Do not be too rapid with your advance this
morning, unless it should be found the enemy are evacuating.
By order of Major General Grant.
CLARK B. LAGOW, Colonel and inspector General.
After completing the reconnoissance, I returned to Burnsville about 4: p. m ., and reported to you that the enemy showed a bold front towards Burnsville and the north, and
that their skirmishers and ours bad been engaged all day within four mile~ of Burnsville.
You expressed the opinion that General Rosecrans was, from last accounts from him, too
far from Iuka for us to attack on our front, until further information was received as to
his whereabouts, which was manifestly true. At the same time you directed me to move
my whole force forward to within four miles of Iuka, and there await sounds of an en-
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gagement between Rosecrans and the enemy. before engaging the latter. About 5 p. m.,
after you had given me these orders, and I had issu~d directions accordingly, the following despatch was received from General Ross, in charge of the advance division, about
seven miles from Iuka:
SEPTEMBER 19, 4 o'clock p. m.
Major General 0RD: For the last twenty minutes there has been a deo.se smoke arising
from the direction of Iuka. I conclude that the enemy are evacuating and destroying the
stores.
L. F. ROSS, Brigadier General.
That night, in ac<::ordance with your orders, my whole force was moved up to within
four miles of Iuka, exctpt McArthur's division, and the next morning at a m., hearing guns
in front of us, I moved rapidly into Iuka, and found it had been evacuated during the
night. The guns heard that morning (the 20th, 8 a. m ) were the first heard by us, although the aft.ernoon of the 19th the hearl of General RoEecrans's column had engaged
the enemy two miles south of Iuka-about the time that General Ross reported a smoke in the
dil'ection of Iuka. The wind freshly blowing from us in the direction of Iuka during the
whole of the 19th prevented our hearing the guns and co-operating with General Rosecrans. My loss during the approach was one man wounded. We took eleven prisoners
and wounded three of the enemy during the skirmishing of the advance. Every officer
and soldier of the command showed a zeal and energy highly commendable, and nothing
but regret was felt and expressed when it was learned, on the 20th, tha.t General Rosecrans's
column had had a fight, and we were not by to share it, though every effort was made to
do so consistent with the information possessed of General Rosecrans's movements.
Corinth still being threatened, you dil ected me to return with my whole force at once,
leaviug Crocker's brigade as a garrison in the town of Iuka, which I did.
I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. 0. C. ORD,
Major General Volunteers, Commanding Left Wing.
Major General U. S. GRANT, Commanding lJutrict of Wtsl ~nnessee,
Headquarters, Jackson, Tennessee.

HEADQUA:&TEBS

BRIGADE, 4TH DIVISION,
Bolwar, September 22, 1862.
GENERAL : We left our camp, five miles north of Grand Junction, on Sunday morning, between 7 and 8 o'clock, having previously eent forward the cavalry to Grand Junction and
Lagrange, and proceeded slowly until we arrived within two miles of the Junction, where
I halted the column to let it close up. While resting here, Major Mudd came in from
Lagrange with information that he saw there a large body of infantry and cavalry moving
on the Lagrange road, towards our rear, with the evident intention of cutting off our train.
Having previously received information that a large force was a,t Davis's Mills, I, without
a momemt's delay, ordered the train to fall back, following them closely with my main
column. We passed the railroad crossing, where we encamped the previous night, and
where the road forks to Grand Junction and Lagrange, about twenty minutes before the
rebel cavalry, closely followed, as I have since learned, by their infantry and artillery.
They hung upon our rear until about 1 o'clock, when, arriving near the creek, about
two miles north of Van Buren, where, finding it necessary to halt my train for rest and
water, I placed my command in position so as fully to command the approaches, and sent
out a small force of cavalry, to see whether the rebels were still on our track. They soon
returned with the rei.Je! cavalry at their heels. Letting them approach to within easy
range, Mann's battery (Lieutenant Brotzman commanding) opened on them and sent
them flying back. My train by tfiis time having rested and watered, we continued our
progres~ and arrived in camp at dusk.
Our casualties were few, for which I refer you to accompanying reports.
I have the honor to be, general, your most obedient servant,
J. G. LAUMAN, Brigadier General.
Brigadier General HURLBUT, Commanding 4th Division, District of West Tennessee.
1ST

List of casualties in I~t brigade, 4th division, during the march from Bolivar to Grand Junction and
return, General Lauman commanding.
Bd Iowa infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Trumbull commanding.-Privates M. Goss, company
G, and W. A. Lister, company H, missing; total, 2.
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28th Illinois infantry, Colonel Johnson commandin,q -Private Samuel Sutcliff, company A,
prisoner; private J. Edwards, company E, missing; privates 0. P. Hurlbut, company G,
and J. T. Davis, company G, deserted; total, 4.
32d Illinois infantry, Colonel Logan commanding.-Corporal Wm Ogles, company & ; privates
John Grambaugh, company 5, and Franklin Howell, company 5, missing; private Thomas
Sorrell, company D, deserted ; total, 4.
53d Illinois i"njantry, Captain McClanahan cornrnanding.-Acting Adjutant C. R. May, (2d
Lieutenant company C,) prisoner.
15th Ohio battery, Captain Spear comrnanding.-Private Seth Brown, prisoner.

HEADQUARTERS 2D lLLINO'[S CAVALRY,
Bolivar, Tenntssur September 22, 1862.
SIR: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with Order 200, I marched with

three hundred and fifty men. of my command, as the advance of the forces under command of General Lauman, and entered Grand Junction about 5 o'clock p . m . of 20th.
Found everything quiet at that place, and very few inhabitants left there. From all the
information I could gather, the force of the enemy near Davh;'s Mills was about eight
thousand .
Having accompli&hed the reconnaissance of the place and vicinity, I returned about four
miles to the camp of General Lauman and bivouacked for the night.
On the morning of the 21st, in accordance with orders from GtJneral Lauman, I went
again to Grand Junction, sending two companies, und er command of Major Mudd, to
Lagrange, to examine that place and the country around it. At Grand Junction all was
in the same condition in which I found it the evening previous. I was directed to hold
this place until the arrival of General Lauman with the main force . But upon learning
from Major Mudd that the enemy in large force was making a movement to pass to the
rear of our army, through Lagrange, I at once retired and joined General Lauman, and
with him returned to this place, the cavalry under my command being employed as
flankers and reconnoitring parties.
Major Mudd was active in ascertaining the position and force of the enemy.
I have the honor to enclose his report.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. NOBLE, Colonel, Commanding 2d Illinois Cavalry.
Captain H. BINMORE 1 Assistant AdJutant General.

BoLIVAR, September 22, 1862.
COLONEL : I have the honor to re'Port the following as the part performed by the detachment of the 2d Illinois cavalry, under my command, in the recent movement on Grand
Junction and Lagrange:
When, on Saturday evening, you moved forward from the main body, I took command
of the advance, being company K, Captain Jones, and twenty men of company H, under
Captain Higgins, and moved rapidly to Grand Junction, dispersing a squad of rebel
soldiers on our wa.y. Finding no enemy at that place, I had just pressed a guide and
started Captain Jones, with his company, in direction of Davis's Mills, when you arrived
and recalled him.
On Sunday morning, in accordance with your order, I, with companies H, Captain
Higgins; K, Captain Jones; M, Order.l y Webb commanding, and C, Captain Fullerton,
moved towards Lagrange, arriving within half a mile of that place at 8 o'clock a . m . On
the way we had noticed persons at distant points in several places across fields, but were
not able to decide whether soldiers or citizens. We also· ~rrested some citizens, but could
gain no information from them.
My extreme advance now reported a large body of cavalry half a mile ir. front of the
head of our column. I ordered the fences pulled down and preparations made for battle,
while, with a few men, I went forward to view their movements. I soon found it to be a
large body of infantry moving to the north, diagonally across the road occupied by me.
They moved with celerity, and paid no attention to us, except to place pickets on the
road to watch us . A citizen brought in by pickets reported that the whole rebel army
had been passing through Lagrange for an hour and a half, and that their desi gn was to
fall in our rear and cut off our train. This was evident from the movement to which I
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was now a witness. I immediately despatched couriers to notify General Lauman and
yourself of the state of affairs, called in my pickets and advance guard, and moved
with haste to the main body of the army, being during the march watched, but not disturbed, by rebel cavalry on our left. Under General Lauman's direction I despatched a
squad of men from company I to reconnoitre on the left. They soon reported enemies,
cavalry and artillery, a little to the rear and half a milA to the left. Fearing they might
be moving on our left, on parallel roads with us, I, without orders, (being without communication with yourself or General Lauman,) called out companies Hand K, and with
them moved north four or dive miles, until satisfied that none had passed. Returning, I
had just got well into the road, when I discovered the enemy in bailing distance on our
last night's camp grcund. I directed Captain Higgins to move forward, while with a
small squad of men from companies I and K I kept the enemy at bay until my command
had reached a safer position. Finding that no rear guard was following, I assumed to
perform that duty, and followed at a good distance from the army, keeping the enemy at
bay, picking up and urging forward stragglers, until I came up with General Lauman,
with his command in order of battle, one mile this side of Van Buren. At his suggestion
I despatched Captain Vieregg, with a squad of men, to watch the movements about the
village. He soon returned, followed by a large body of rebel cavalry, who followed within
range of our artillery, when a few rounds from Captain - - - ' s battery dispersed them.
When the column ne:x,t moved, I or;cupied the ground for half an hour after the whole
train bad passed out of sight, during which time we could see the rebel forces slowly
advancing acroEs the field to the south and west of the point of timber on our right flank
when in line Finding they had all paEsed into the timber, and deeming the position no
longer safe, I withdrew my little force and again took my place in rear of the column.
After cros::;ing Spring creek, in obedience to orders from General Lauman, I despatched
Captain Hig-gins, with forty men, to reconnoitre to the left, and myself, with a small squad
of men, watched the road from the edge of the timber. Captain Higgins reported all
clear for two miles west. I sent my command .t o a suitable point to feed, and remained
in the rear for an hour and a half after the column had passed, seeing no signs of enemies,
when I received your orders to follow, which I did, bringing up the rear, and arriving in
camp at nine o'clock p.m. without the loss of a man. To the admirable order preserved
by the commanders of companies we are indebted for the safety of the men for so long a
time in immediate presence of an artvancing enemy. No stragglers were out. With
such officers straggling would go out of fashion, and to them I am much indebted for
their promptness in carrying out my orders; also to my men for the cheerful alacrity with
which every command was obeyed.
I have to report the loss of two horses by company M, one killed by a fall, and the other
disabled and left.
I wish to report the carbine cartridges now furnished us as being of very poor quality.
They shake to pieces in riding, and at the end of each day's march many of the men find,
instead of cartridges, only a mixed mass of powder, ball, and paper.
All of which is respectfully submitted, by your obedient servant,
JOHN J. MUDD, Jlajor 2d Illinois Cavalry.
Colonel S. NOBLE, Commanding 2d Illinois Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS AR.MY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

Office Ohiif of Artillery, Corinth, Mississippi, September 38, 1862.
Sm : I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the part takm by the artillery
under my command at the battle near Iuka, on the 19th instant~
Gt'neral Rosecran's army left Camp Clear creek, near Corinth, on the 18th instant,
camped at Jacinto that night, and left the next morning for Iuka. When within about
two miles of the town, the enemy was discovered in force, and Captain Sands's battery
(11th Ohin volunteers, under command of First Lieutenant Sears) was ordered to the front,
and near the right of the line of battle. At the same time I was ordered by General
Rosecrans to take one section of the 12th Wisconsin battery, under command of Lieutenant
Immel!, lst Wisconsin light artillery, together with Colonel Percell's regiment 5th Iowa
voluuteers, and posted them on the right of the enemy's line. This po~ition was in an
open field. The enemy was discovered in front, and I opened on them with shell ; they
left and disappeared in the woods ; soon after this they appeared in strong force, and pressed
so hard upon the section and regiment they were compelled to withdraw. At this time
a general engagement occurred along the whole line, and continued until late in the
evening. We remained on the battle-field during the night, and advanced the next morning
on the town. When within about a half mile, the rear guard of the enemy was discovered
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leaving. One section of Captain Powell's battery was ordered forward, placed in position
and opened upon them with case-shot, causing a hasty flight and much confusion in their
ranks. I would call the attention of the commanding general to the manner in which
Lieutenant Sears, his officers and men, behaved during the battle. One officer and sixteen
men were killed at their pieces, several of them being bayoneted by the enemy. I cannot
speak in too high terms of the bravery of the officers and men in this battery. Lieutenant
Immell, 1st Missouri light artillery, and Colonel Percell's regiment 5th Iowa, also deserve
particular mention. They remained until they heard the roar from the enemy in the
bushes on their right, and Colonel Percell deemed it prudent to send the section back,
fearing they would be cut off Colonel Percell remained with his command on the field
during the night.
CASUALTIES.

Killed.-Acting 2d lieutenant, Richard Bauer ; sergeant, M. V. B. Hall ; corporal, Samuel
Gilmore; privates, William Crawford, John Dean, John Ettie, John J. McCowne, Charles
Shi:fftner, J. H. Ingersoll, W. H. Bolser, J. W. Bruoer, James Ca:,ey, Jacob T. Malson,
William H. Rosey, Charles P. Olson, Joseph Taylor.
Wounded.- First lieutenant commanding battery, Cyrus Sears; first lieutenant, H. M. Niel;
acting second lieutenant, A. B. Alger; first sergeant, T. E. Armstrong; sergeant, H. C.
Woley; corporals, George W. Bush, George W. Buckley, L. Bothwell; privates, J. B.
Brooks, William Bomen, Amos B. Brewer, A. Clouse, William L. Colton, Jacob Eberhat,
Isaac Dezobell, Matthew Free, Martin L. Fritz, Charles Hughlin, Benjamin Huber, John M.
Ike, Noris T. Jillison, H . C. Kelton, Hiram McDonald, Henry McL":Lughlin, .J. J. McBreight,
Charles Rodes, Ira C. Swayze, Robert Swagle, Thomas Taylor, N. T. Wesinberge, Henry
M. Welch, Z_tchariah Welch, Jerome Wolsey, Silas Wheton, S. W. Williams.
Missing -Privates, Charles Jones, William Jones, A. B. Myers.
Wounded in Captain Spoor's battery, 2d Iowa volunturs.-Corporal, A. Atkinson; privates,
Robert Rose, William Eckles.
Total number killed, 16; total number wounded, 38; missing 3; total 57.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. L. LOTHROP,
Lieutenant Colonel and Chief of Artillery.

Lieutenant Colonel H. G. KENNETT,
Chief of Stoff, Army of the Mississippi.

Report of William M. Wiles, captain 22d ln.diana infantry and provost marshal qf army of the
Mi$si11sippi, of killed, wounded, and prisoners of the enemy at the battle of L~k:~,, Mississippi, September 19, 1862.

Number killed, found upon the field, and buried by our men·------------------Number died of mortal 'wounds since battle-----------------··----·---··-----

265
120

Total number killed. __ ••• _____________________ • ________ • ___ •• ___ _ ____ ____
Number of wounded carried off by the enemy, according to the best information,
not less than-----------------------·----- ---------------~---------·____
Number of wounded found at Iuka·----------------·-----------------------Prisoners not wounded-------------------- ---· __ ----------. ___ ---- ---· ----

385
350
34:2
361

Total loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners ___ ••• __ •• ______ • _____ 1, 4:38
WILLIAM M. WILES,
Captain 22d Indiana I11jantry, Provost MrRrshal, A.rmy of the Mississippi.

List of ordnance taken on the battle-field, near Iuka, September 19, 1862.

214 rifles, Enfield.
6 rifles, Sharp's.
42 rifles.
43 rifles, Whitney.

226 waist-belts.
112 cross-belts.
29 cross-belt plates.
36 frogs for sabre bayonet.
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109 Springfield muskets.
111 muskets, smooth-bore.
1, 009 guns, mixed.
7 5 shot-guns.
20 pistols, mixed.
7 sabres.
5 sabre scabbards.
20 gun-slings.
572 bayonets.
349 bayonet scabbards.
448 cartridge- boxes.
27 0 cartridge- box plates.
279 cap-boxes.
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217 waist-belt plates.
32 sabre bayonets.
32 sabre bayonet scabbards.
Total number of1, 629 fire-arms, guns, rifles, &c.
12 sabres and scabbards.
20 gun-slings.
921 bayonets and scabbards.
718 cartridge..t>oxes and plates.
420 cap-boxe?, cross-belts, and plates.
543 waist-belts and plates.
64 sabre bayonets and sc.ot bbards.
36 fro~s for sabre bayonets.
W. L. LOTHROP,
Lieutenant Colonel, Ohief of Artillery and Ordnance.

2n DIVISION, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Gamy near Jacinto, Mississippi, September 24, 1864.
CoLONEL : I have the honor to report, for the information of the major general commanding the right wing, that the 2d division, consisting of the 1st brigade, Colonel Fuller,
commanding, and the 2d brigade, Colonel Mower, commanding, left our camp on Clear
creek, on the 18th instant, with t.hrec days' cooked rations, and one hundred rounds of
ammunition to ettch man, and marched the same day, by the way of Patrick's, on the
Burnsville road, where we turned and marched to within one mile of Jacinto. Early the
next morning we followed General Hamilton's division, on the Tuscumbia road, to Barnett's.
At 2 o'clock p. m. the head of the column took the direct road to Iuka; at half past 4
o'clock p.m. the enemy opened fire, and the division was pushed rapidly to the front ;
arriving under fire, we found General Hamilton's entire division eng'1ged, and hard
pressed. Colonel Mower, commanding the 2d brigade, was ordered into immediate action
by General Rosecrans, and by some mistake carried in only his own regiment, the 11th
Missouri; they immediately became heavily engaged. The 47th Illinois, Colonel Thrush
commanding, formed on the left of the 11th Missouri. The 26th Illinois was formed on
the right and retired. The 8th Wisconsin and three Ohio regiments, the 27th, 43d, and
63d, were held in reserve, The 39th Ohio was carried forward and posted close to the
enemy on the right-hand road. This was the disposition of the troops of my division.
The only regiment that became hefl.vily engaged was the 11th Missouri; this regiment
stood its ground under a storm of musketry, which they repaid with double interest. The
other regiments of the division were more or les8 engaged, the officers and men all behaving
with great gallantry. The attention of the general commanding is called to the gallant
conduct of Colonel J. A. Mower, commanding the 2d brigade, and Major Weber, commanding the 11th Missouri.
It is a subject of regret to our officers and men that the coming on of darkness prevented
their having the opportunity more fully to engage our wicked rebel enemy.
During the night Colonel J. L. Kirby Smith was very efficient in posting the artillery
of the division, ready to renew the fight in the morning, but at dawn the enemy had
entirely disappeared, leaving his dead and wounded. A pursuit of one mile brought u& in
sight of his rear guard in the village of Iuka.
Colonel Fuller's brigade led, and I immediately made dispositions to attack, but a few
rounds from Powell's battery sent the enemy flying, and no further sight of them was had
that day, they being in full retreat on the Fulton road.
Enclosed you will find reports of brigade, regimental, and battery commanders; also
lists of killed and wounded, the latter have been duplicated by the division surgeon, Dr.
Crane.
My obligations are due the members of my staff, Captain W. D. Coleman, assistant adjutant general, Lieutenants C. L. Smiedel and W. H. Sinclair, aids, for efficient and useful
service on the field.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. S. STANLEY,
Brioadier General, Oommandin!J.
Colonel H. G. KENNETT,
Ohiej of Staff, Army of JJJiasissippi.
HEADQUARTERS
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HEADQUARTERS 11TH MISSOURI VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Septtmber 22, 1862.
CoLONEL: In regard to the part taken by the 11th Missouri volunteer infantry in the
battle fuught at Iuka, Mississippi, the 19th of September, 1862, I have to report the
following:
During the day the rrgiment had marched as the third regiment of the 2d brigade, immediately in rear of the 3d division, army of the Mississippi, commanded by General C.
S. Hamilton. The ~neru was first engaged by General Hamilton. but they were in such
force that General Ro,- ecrans deemed it necessary to order forward onr brigade, which he
did in person. F'or some reason the regiments in front of us did not move forward, and
by ordt:r of Colonel Mower, commanding the brigade, I immediately ordered my regiment
to advance, which they did, taking the double-quick step and cheering vociferously. I
advanced to General Hamilton's line of battle, and hearing heavy firing on the extreme
right I hastened on in that direction. Owing to the den~ity of the woods and briers immediately on the right of General Hamilton, I formed in the open field on the right and then
moved forward in line of battle. Immediately on t'ntering the woods we found ourselves
face to face with the 4th Mississippi bri5ade, and not more than thirty paces from their
line of battle. We fired a volley into them, which must, in consequence of our close
proximity, have done great execution. At this juncture a man ran into our ranks, exclaiming, "For God's sake, stop firing into your own men; you are firing into the 31th M1ssiss1ppi.'' This information was promptly answered by a cheer and a volley more terrific
than the first The :firing now bt> came general on both sides, and the smoke of our and
the euemy's guns was so dense that an object could not be seen five paces distant. We
were charged upon three different times, and I am proud to report that each time the
charge was equally unsuccessful. In several instances the enemy was received on the point
of the bayonet and then shot off, and others were shot by officers who placed their pistols
iu their very faces. A number of pris0ners were taken who pressed iuto our line-five by
my color-guard alone. After about an hour's firing the enemy fell back to the top of the
riJge, when I found that my ammunition was entirely gone . I reported the fact to Colonel
Mower, who bad just learned that an attempt was being made to turn our h·ft flank, and
he ordered us to fall back slowly, which we did ir. order for about eight or ten rods. The
enemy did not follow. We receivtd ammunition, and remained in our new position until
morning.
During the engagemeut we had seven men killed, sixty-fom wounded, and three missing.
Our loss was thw; small from the fact that our men were below the enemy, and they overshot us
I could not speak too highly of the conduct of every officer and man of my command.
I would desite to mention them by name; but brave and gallant conduct on the part of
my officers was so univen;al that I cannot attempt it. Captain Singleton, one of our best
officers, was, I regret to say, very dangerously, if not mortally, wounded wllile bravely
doing his duty. Lieutenant W. W. Cleland, of the same company, who was acting regimental adjutant, was badly hurt by the fail of his hone, which was shot under him.
Lieutenant Osgood, of company I, was badly wounded while encouraging his men. Captain Warner and Lieutenants Coperthwait and Foster were slightly wounded.
Respectfully submitted, by your obedient servant,
A. J. WEBER,
MaJor, Commanding 11th Mi:osouri Volunteers.
Colonel JosEPH P. MoWER,
Commanding 2d Bri[Jade.

HEADQUARTERS 47TH ILLINOIS INFANTRY,
Camp near Jacinto, September 22, 1862.
CoLO~EL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the
4ith regiment of Illinois voinnteer infantry in the battle of Iuka, fought on the evening
of the 19th in:;tant. A rriviog at 4 o clock on the afternoon of the 19th within four
miles of the town of Iuka, we heard indiscriminate firing in front, and proceeded in line
of man:.:h uy the flank to within three miles of the town, where our column was halted.
At twenty miuutes past 4 o'clock hca vy YOllt·.ys of musketry and cannonading was he:ud
in front, aud immediately my rtgiUleot was ordered forward in double-quick time, following the 11th Missouri voluuteers. Arriving near the scene of action, the 47th Illinois
formed in line of battle on the lt>ft of the 11th Missouri volunteers, when, by direction of
Gen t· rr~.l Stanley, my regiment \\as ordert!d to tbe front to take position on the side of a
hill and on both sides of the road leading to Iuka, and hold it, and not to attack the
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enemy, which position I occupied until about 2 o'clock on the morning of the 20th instant.
At that time, by order of General Rosecrans, the right of my regiment was thrown to the
rear, in continuation of a line formed by the 39th Ohio, and we remained on that line until
about half past 5 o'clock, when we were ordered to proc€ed with the 1st brigade into the
town of Iuka. From the town we joined in the pursuit of the rebel army, following them
to Crippled Deer post office, on the Franklin road.
The position of my regiment on the field was to the left of the severe fighting, and,
although we were all the time under fire, opportunity did not offer to give the enemy more
than four volleys. It gives me pleasure to rt>port the steady, cool, and soldier-like bearing
of both officers and men of my command while occupying a position in which we were
continually annoyed by the fire of the enemy, without being able to respond to any purp ose We captured First Lieutenant Shehan, of the 1st Missouri cavalry. I append list
of casualties, and submit this r eport for your consideration.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. A. 'l'HRUSH.
Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding 47th Illinois Volunteer Inf~ntry.
R. W. CHAMBERS, Adjutant.

Colonel MowER,
Commanding 2d Brigade, 2d Division.
List qf casualties of 47th Illinois.

Hugh Galway, musrcmn, company H, wounded slightly. Ethan A. Drake, corpoml,
company G, wounded in thigh. George Robinson, corporal, company A, wounded in leg.
Charl es Stevens, private, company A, wounded in chest. Philip ~nyder, private, company
F, two wounds in hips. Hiram Boardman, private, company K, killed. Major John N.
Cromwell, mil3sing.
HEADQUARTERS 26TH REGIMENT ILLINOIS VoLUNTEERs,
Camp near Jacinto, Mississippi, September 22, 1862.
LIEUTENA:t\T : I have the honor to transmit the following report of this regiment, under
command of Major R. A. Gillman, during the engagement on the 19th of September,
1862, near Iuka, Mississippi:
Were ordered forward from the road into a corn-field, there to extend the line to the
right, by General Stanley in person. After holding this position for about three-quarters
of an hour, Captain Temple Clark, assi8tant adjutant general, ordered us to move by the
right flank, file left, into the woods in front of our former line; then moved, by the .left
flank, forward to the brow of a hill, where we remained during the 11ight. Kept skirmishers in front of our regiment all night.
One lieutenant (J. B. Bunn, company K) wounded in hip by spent ball. George Hall,
private, company K, slightly, with spent b,tll. Philip Hill, private, company K, wounded,
ball passing through the back of the left hand and through the right wrist . Andrew
Hughes and Charles J . Perkins, privates, company G, slightly, with spent b:.1.lls.
I have tbe honor to be, lieutenant, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. A GILLMAN, Major, Commanding 26th Illinois
E. A TUCKER, Adjutant.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH REGIMENT MINNESOTA VOLUNTEERS,
Camp, &ptember 22, 1862.
I have the honor to report that during the action of the 20th instant, near Iuka, Mississippi, the 5th regiment Minnesota volunteer infantry was detailed by order of Brigadier
General Stanley to guard the train of transportation wagons belonging to the division, and
was not brought into action. The regiment remained upon the duty assigned it as above,
until the morning of the 21st instant, when it was moved to the breastworks, near Barnett'~,
by order of General Rosecrans.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
L. 1!'. HUBBARD,
Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding 5th Minnesota Volunt£ers.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH REGIMENT WISCONSIN VoLUNTEERs,
Camp near Jacinto, ])'Jississippi, September 22, 1862.
I respectfully submit the following report of the part taken in the late engagement by
he 8th rc' giment Wisconsin volunteers, near Iuka, Mississippi, September 19, 1862.
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I was ordered with my regiment by General Stanley to take up a position in rear of the
hospital, to support Captain Spoor's battery, which was posted on rising ground on my
· right and rear, my right resting on the road. We held this position during the engagement, exposed to a heavy fire from infantry in our front, but not very destructive, as most
of the shots passed too high.
There were only two men wounded during the action, Captain J. B. Redfield and private
John C. Green, both of company A. Our regimental surgeons, S. F. Thornhill and J. E.
Marta, were actively engaged at hoFpital taking care of the wounded of other regiments.
Yours 1 respectfully,
G. W. ROBBINS,
Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding 8th Wis~onsin Volunteers.

Colonel J. A. MowER,
Commanding 2d Brigade, 2d Division, Army qf Mississippi.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-NINTH OHIO REGBIENT,
Camp near Jacinto, &ptember 23, 1862.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report, for the information of the colonel commanding 1st
brigade, 2d division, army of the Mississippi, that, in compliance with orders, the 39th
Ohio regiment marched on the 19th instant from the place of bivouac, near Jacinto, to the
battle-ground of the battle of Iuka. When the regiment arrived in the immediate vicinity
of the battle-ground, other troops which had the advance were already engaged, and
before this regiment could be brought into action, night had closed in, and the darkness
prevented further moYements. The 39th Ohio was ordered to the front, and lay upon
their arms during the night, upon a portion of the ground covered by the fight. The
enemy retreated during the night.
I have to report six per;:;ons wounded by Rtray shots; no other casualties.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EDW. F. NOYES,
Lieutenant (]olonel, Commanding.

Captain W. H. LATHROP,
Acting Assistant AdJutant General.

HEADQUARTERS HrxrY-'fHIRD REGIMENT Omo VoLUNTEER INFAN'I'RY,
In the Field, near Jacinto, . Mississippi, September 22, 1862.
MAJOR: I have the honor to report, that in the engagement near Iuka, the evening cf
the 19th instant, in my command there was none killed, two wounded-Corporal Isaac
Jarvis, company H, very slightly, in the breast; private George Mears, company K, in the
foot, slightly; none missing.
I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
I. W. SPRAGUE, Colonel, Commanding.
Major W. D. CoLE~IAN,
Assistant Adiutant General.

HEADQUARTERS FoRTY-THIRD OHIO VoLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Camp near Jacinto, Mississippi, September 22, 1862.
CAPTAIN : In accordance with general orders, dated headquarters department of the
Missis,ippi, Barnett's, September 21, I have the honor to report, for the information of the
general commanding, that my regiment, at the opening of the engagement near Iuka, was
on the Jacinto and Iuka road, between one and two miles from the field of battle, being
the rear regiment of the 1st brigade, 2d diviRion.. During the action it was moved forward,
with the brigade, to a point near the building used during the fight as a hospital, near
the headquarters of the division commander. 'l'he regiment was here halted and moved a
short. ditstance out of the road to the left; it remained in this position during the action
and the night following. The regiment having taken no part in the action, I have no casualties to report.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
.J. L. KIRBY SMITH,
Colonel 43d Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

Captain \V. H. LATHROP,
Acting Assistant Ad;'utant General.
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CAMP NEAR JACINTO, MISSISSIPPI, September 22, 1862.
CAPTAIN: In compliance with orders I herewith submit a report of the battery under
my command at the battle near Iuka, Mi~sis~ippi, on th e 19th instant.
The battery marched from camp on Clear creek, September 16, 1862, attached to the 1st
briga,de, 2d divieion, Colonel J . W. Fuller, commanding. On the evening of the 19th,
when near Iuka, the firing commenced about two miles in our front; the battery was
ordered forward and p laced in posi tion on the right of the road, and one mile from the
battle-field, remained in position during the night, and on the morning of the 20th moved
up, passing th e battle·ground and halting in sight of the town. The enemy having
retreated during the night, the battery was ordered back on the road to Barnett's plantation and cctmped, moving again ~unday evening to Jacinto, having taken no active part
in the engagement. No losl:l or cas ualties to r eport.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS D . MAURICE,
Captain 1st Mtssouri Light Artillery, Commanding Co. F, 2d U. S. Artillery.
Captain C. W. DusTAN,
A ssistant Ad}utant General.

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SEVENTH OHIO INFANTRY,
In the Field, September 23, 1862.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that this regiment was not called into action during
the receut engagement before Iuka, and therefore met with no casualties in killed, wounded,
or mii:ll:dng.
In accordance with orders I marcheci the command at double-quick time up to a point
within half a mile of the scene of action, and remained under arms during the entire
evening and night On the morning of the 20th instant we marched into the town, meeting no resistance from the enemy.
I am, with respect, your obedient servant,
Z. S. SPAULDING, Jfa}or, Commanding.
Captain C . W . DusTA:S, A. A G.,
1st Brigade, 2d

Divi~;wn,

Army of the Mississippi.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE SECOND DIVISION,
Army of the Mzssissppi, September 23, 1862.
MAJOR: In obedience to orders, I have the honor to report that my command formed
the rear of the column during the mctrch upon Iuka, on the l?th instant, moving in the
following order :
39th Ohio infantry. Colonel Gilbert; light company F, 2d United States artillery, Captain Maurice; 27th 0hio in fantry, Major l::lpaulding; 63d Ohio infantry, Colonel Sprague;
battery M, 1st Missouri ligl1t artillery, Captam Powell; section of battery, 8th Wisconsin,
Lieutenant McLean; 43d Ohio infa.nt1y. Uvlonrl Smith.
·when within about three mdes of Iuka we were halted in the road, and the batteries
moved to the right of the road and plncerl in pm;ition near the edge of the woods and on
the hill, which overlook ... d the open tield directly south of the scene of the action.
At sunset I received otdert:; to adv<t.nce immediately to the front. As soon as the order
double-quick was given, the infantry rau forward, swinging their hats and cheering lustily,
but dculmess brought a Ct-l'S<ttion of firing just in time to prevent our taking a part in the
action. Soon after dawu it w.-~s reported that the enemy had left the field of battle, and
taken a position near the town
My command took the ad vance, P.nri after passing the field, three regiment;; formed
in line of battle, the i7th. 39tiL at1d 4:~d of my brigade, and the 47th Illinois, (Colonel
Mower's brigadd,) and moved f.,rward upon the town.
During 1he depluymed l:aptain Powell's battery was brought forward, and threw a few
shots at a body of the eno ·my which appeared near the Fulton road. As we neared the
town a fl .g of truce came 1·ut, 1>orne by a citizen, sayiug "the citizens desired to surrender
the town, and th tt the ~:>old , l-1rS l .~n my) were all in the ditches dug by the federal army."
We then moved fvrw~H·d into tlle town, and found thr~t the enemy had evacuated the
place, leaving- by the Fu,ton rua,d My command went forward in pursuit till we reached
Crippled Dee r ('reek.
The stateuJents of several prh;oners, confirmed by a reconnaissance made by Captain
Sawyer, with two comp,,nies of the Kansas 7th cavalry, proved that the enemy was several
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miles in advance and rapidly retreating, and in the exhausted condition of our men, and
the total absence of subsistence, it was deemed impracticable to continue the pursuit
further. Resting near Cripple Deer creek for the uight, we commenced our return toward
Jacinto about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 21st.
Herewith I send copies of reports of commanrling officers, which show that six casualties
occurred in the 39th Ohio, and two in the 63d Ohio.
I am, major, your obedient servant,
JOHN W. FULLER,
Colonel 27th Ohio, Gomm'lnding.

Major W. D. CoLEl\JAN, Assistant Ad}utant General.
0A)lP NEAR JACINTO, MISSISSIPPI,
Septembtr 22, 1862.
SIR: I have the honor to report as follows of the uattery under my command in the
action of September 19.
On the arrival of the brigade the battery was ordered by 1.\iajor Coleman to take position on the right of the road leading to Iuka, prepared to open fire if the enemy drove back
our infantry in front.
The battery remained in this position until 12 p. m., when, by order of Colonel Smith,
it retired six hundred yards, being replaced by Powell's battery.
Corporal A. Atkinson, privates William Eckles and Robert Rose, were slightly wounded
by spent balls. Three horses received flesh wounds, but were not disabled.
The ambulance atta~hed to the battery was engaged during the night in removing the
wounded from the field, and six blankets were taken by the hospital department.
Very respectfully, your ober:lient servant,
N. T. SPOOR,
Captain, Commanding 2ri Iowa Battery.

Lieutenant SPRAGUE,
Acting Assistant Ad}utant General, 2d Brigade, 2d Division, Army of the

HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE, 2D DIVISION, ARMY

OF

Jfis~issippi.

THE MISSISSIPPI,

Near Jacinto, :J[ississippl, September 22, 1862.

I have the honor to report that, in obedience to orders, I moved forward on the evening
of the 19th instant, at the head of my brigade, to a position in front of the enemy. On
arriving at that point I halted the head of the brigade, when I found that I had only one
regiment with me, the 11th Missouri volunteers.
I opened fire on the enemy, which they b1isklyreturned. The engagement was kept up
until the men had exhausted their ammunition, and the enemy had ceased firing, when I
ordered the regiment to fall back a short distance to prevent their being outflanked.
The men fell back in good order, when I halted them, and directed them to remain in
that position, which they did through the night.
The 11th behaved with the greatest gallantry and determination, both officers and men
standing to their posts in the midst of a most deadly fire. Where all did their duty so
well, I can hardly mention any particular persons without appearing to be guilty of partiality. Major Weber encouraged the men by his presence and coolness under the fire of
the enemy. I refer to his report for particulars of the engagement.
Enclosed herewith find reports of the command~>rs of the several regiments and the battery of the brigade, also list of the killed, wounded, and mii;sing. I am unable to speak of
what was done by the other regiments of the brigade, as they were det.ached from it.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. A . .MOWER,
Colonel, Commanding Brignde.

Major W. DEAN CoLEliiAN,
As~istant

Ad;"utant General.

CAMP NEAR JACINTO, September 23.
Report in accordance with General Order of 21st
.at Iuka.
Killed, none. Wounded, none. Missing, none.

Was not in the recent engagement
Lieutenant J.D. McLEAN,

Commanding Section 8th Wisconsin Battery.

CHARLES H. DusTAN,
Assistant Ady"utant Gentral.
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CAMP NEAR JACINTO, MISSISSIPPI,

September 22, 1862.
Sm: I have the honor to submit the following report in regard to the part my battery
took in the reconnaissance towards luka, Missisfippi, under command of Colonel Mower,
commanding 2d brigade, 2d division, army of the Mississippi, on the 16th day of September, 1862.
The force, consisting of three regiments of infantry, two companies of sharpshooters, several
companies of cavalry, and my battery, left Burnsville early in the forenoon. About 6
miles from Iuka the command was met by the enemy's pickets, which were driven i:a and
the force advanced. Continued reports of musketry were heard to within two miles of Iuka,
where line of battle was formed on a hill commanding the ground for about a mile. In
accordance with Colonel Mower's orders, I placed two of my guns (one 10-pounder Parrott,
and one 12-pounder howitzer) on the brow of the hill~throwing shell to the right, left,
and front, where heavy clouds of dust, moving towards Iuka, led me to suppose the enemy to be.
.
The other two guns of the battery were soon after brought in position, and the firing
continued for about fifteen minutes.
The force now advanced through the open field below the hill, aug reaching the w0od
on the other side, turned to the right, whereupon our infantry and cavalry advancing,
opened fire on the enemy. The firing was brisk on both sides for a short time, when the
colonel commanding, finding the enemy's intentions to flank us on the right, ordered a
retreat, which was done in good order. I covered the retreat. The narrow road did not
allow me to deploy more than one gun, the howitzer, loaded with canister and moving by
a fixed prolonge. After reaching the above named hill we again halted, and I was ordered
to place the howitzer and one Parrott gun in position on the hill and re-open fire. I again
shelled in several directions for a short time ; and everything quiet, I was ordered to cease
firing, and Colonel Mower threw out sharpshooters as skirmishers in the field below the hill.
Opposite our position, on the end of the open field, a distance of about a mile, was a wood.
On the advance of our skirmishers the enemy opened a brisk fire from the edge of this
wood, whereupon I re-opened fire from my 10-pounder Parrott gun, shelling the enemy
with such a good result that they very soon retreated frem the wood, and being ordered to
cease firing again, the whole force advanced in line of battle. The skirmishers on both
sides continued firing for a short time, when, night approaching, the darkness prevented us
continuing the fight.
It was concluJed we should camp on the battle-ground for the night, but a deserter
coming in from the enemy, informed the colonel commanding that General Price was in
Iuka with at least 12,000 men, and that he intended to send out a force to flank us during the night, whereupon the colonel commandiug ordered the whole command back to
Burnsville, which place we reached about 11 o'clock p. m.
No casualties whatever occurred in the battery during the fight.
It gives me gteat pleasure to say that the officers and men under my command acted
with great bravery and coolness.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. W. DEES,
Captain, Commanding Dees's Battery, 3d Michigan Light Artillery.
W.

DEAN CoLE~IAN,

MaJor and Assist. Ad}t. Gen., 2d Division, Army of the llnssissippi.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Jacinto, ~111ississippi, September 23, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements and operations
of the cavalry under my command during the advance upon, and engagement with, the
enemy at Iuka, Mississippi, on the 19th instant.
The 2d Iowa cavalry, under the command of Colonel Hatch, moved out early on the morning of the 19th instant, on the Tuscumbia road, with instructions to proceed to Peyton's
mill, via Russelville road, and was charged with covering the movements and protecting
the flanks of the advancing columns.
At Peyton's mill he fell in with and had a sharp skirmbh with six hundred of the enemy's cavalry, which he drove from their position; they losing six men killed, teo wounded, and six prisoners.
The 3d Michigan cavalry, under the command of Uaptain Wilcox, (with the exception of
four companies employed in escorting trains,) formed the adv,mce of General Hamilton's
division, which moved east on the Tuscumbia road.
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At a point about nine miles east of Jacinto the enemy's pickets were met and driven in
rapidly. About five miles south of Iuka the enemy's cavalry made a stand, but upon being
charged by a portion of the advance guard, led by Sergeant Cutting, 3d Michigan cavalry,
they were forced back. Here an officer of General Hamilton's staff was mortally wounded.
Without further loss the cavalry succeeded in driving the enemy t') within three miles of
Iuka. This point was reached at 4 o'clock p. m. Here the infantry skirmishers were
thrown in the advance. About this time the enemy's long roll was beat, and they formed
in line of battle. Soon the armie3 became eng•tged, and a terrible conflict ensued Four
companies of the 3d Michigan cavalry, under Captain Wilcox, were sent to the right wing,
on the right of Constable's Ohio battery. Two companies were sent to the northea5t, and
the remaining two to the northwest, to observe the movements of the enemy. A portion
of the four companies on the right wing were dismounted, and becoming engaged with the
enemy, prevented a flank movement on our right wing . At this point Captain Latimer
and two men were slightly wounded.
Two companies of the 7th Kansas cavalry, under the comm'l.nd of Captain Swoyer, were
ordered to form a junction with the 2d Iowa cavalry at Peyton's mill, which they did, and
with this regiment moved to the main Fulton roar!; thenc:e to Thompson's corners, where
they found tents, commissary stores, and two wagons, belonging to the enemy, which they
burned; then moved west to Burnett's, a p~int seven miles south of Iuka, where they
arrived about dark.
Eight companies of the 7th Illinois cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Prince commanding,
were the advance of General Ross's division of the left wing, under General Ord, which
moved on the Burnsville and Iuka road. In consequence of this division not moving forward on the night of the 19th instant, they were not engaged with the enemy except in
some slight skirmishing.
Captain Dyckman, of the 3d Michigan cavalry, on the evening of the 18th instant, with
his company, made a reconnaissance in the direction of Iuka, for the purpose of ascertaining
the practicability of a road direct from Jacinto to Iuka, and to learn the whereabouts of
the enemy. He conducted the movement in a manner very satisfactory, and worthy of
high commendation.
The battle near Iuka was stnguine, the firing heavy and rapid, and the ground hotly
contested. Night coming on, closed the scene of carnage.
The morning disclosed the fact that during the darkness of night the enemy had evacuated and were retreating south on the Fulton road.
Eight companies of the 2d Iowa cavalry, under command of Colont-'l Hatch, and eight
companies of the 3d Michigan, under Captain "'Wilcox, were sent in pursuit of Price's retreating army, each portion of the regiments striking for different points of the enemy's
column, while our infantry followed on the Fulton ro:td. Four companies of the 2d Iowa
cavalry, under command of Captain Kendrick, and two companies of the 7th Kansas
cavalry, under Captain Swoyer, were directed to move on the Tuscumbia road, to check
the enemy's movements at the intersection of the Tuscumbia and Fulton roads, six miles
south of Iuka. The enemy's movements were greatly retarded, and his flanks attacked,
and his troops harassed by frequent attacks and skirmishes, until our cavalry was forced
to retire by the enemy's artillery, which was repeatedly turned upon them.
Seven miles south of luka the 2d Iowa cavalry came on thg flank of a heavy patrol of
the enemy's cavalry, which they engaged and drove nearly four miles, when his skirmishers falling back rapidly, drew the 2d Iowa upon a masked battery, heavily supported
by both infantry and cavalry. The artillery and inf<~.ntry opened a very sharp fire, but did
not succeed in doing much damage; soon the firing ceaserl, and the enemy's cavalry charged,
but were repulsed; 2d Iowa then fell back, fighting through the timber, until out of the
range of the enemy's guns, aml formed a line to receive a second charge from his cavalry
in force, in which the enemy were repulsed with loss; the 2d Iowa capturing ten prisoners, from three to four h undrcd stand of arms, and one wagon, and lof;ing but six men
wounded.
'l'he 3d Michigan cavalry and the two companies of the 7th Kansas continued the pursuit eleven miles, becoming several times engaged, and causing the enemy repeatedly to
form a line of battle.
Our troops being much fatigued from having marched twenty miles the day previous,
further pursuit was impossible.
·
The 3d Michigan cavalry occupied a position for tile night at Peyton's mill, watching
closely the movement3 of the enemy, and following his movements on the succeeding day
until ordered to return towards Jacinto.
'l'aking into consideration the great exposure to which the cavalry was subjected, that
our losses were so slight is most rem,ukable, and truly a subject of congratulation. One
officer and eight men were wounded, and ten horses killed.
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During the advance, engagement and pursuit, the officers and men of the cavalry division displayed great zeal, enterprise and gallantry, and are all entitleJ to great credit.
The conduct of aU was in a high degree praiseworthy, and where all behaved so well it
is difficult to particularize individual acts of bravery without a seeming neglect of the
claims of others. Colonel Hatch, Mujor Coon, Captain Kendrick, of the 2d Iowa cavalry,
Captains Wilcox, Lattimer, Dyckman, Newell, and Reise, Adjutfmt Buchanan, and Sergeant Cutting, of the 3d Michigan cavalry, and Captain Swoyer, of the 7th Kansas cavalry,
having commands of companies and detachments, with the commands under them, performed tht>ir duty with great energy. Lieutenants McGregor and Martin, of my personal
staff, conveyeti with becoming e:pirit and ability my orders to the various parts of the field,
displaying coolness and efficiency.
The usefulness and efficiency of the cavalry on this occasion cannot be too highly estimated, covering as they did so many important movements, guarding the flanks of the
army, and rendering valuable service, which I feel assured will be fully appreciated, and
will gain for them such confidence and respect as will fully reward them for their efforts
to discharge their whole duty.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. K. MIZNER,
Colonel, Commanding Cavalry Division.

Lieutenant C. GoDDARD,
Assistant Adjutant General, Army of the J.fississippi.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND IowA CAVALRY,
Camp near Barnett's, September 19, 1862.
Sm: I have the honor to report, complying with Colonel Mizner's order to proceed to
Peyton's mills, from there on the Russelville road to main Fulton road, thence via
Thompson's house to Barnett's. Moved with my regiment at six this morning, from ~:,ix
miles east of Jacinto to Peyton's mills. Two miles this side of Peyton's mill began
skirmishing with the pickets; drove them into the mill, and engaged a regiment of dismounted cavalry. After sharp firing of twenty minutes, routed the enemy; the enemy
falling back into a swamp, escapetl with nearly all their wounded, leaving three dead and
two mortally wounded. Captured six prisoners, then moved forwarded to main Fulton
road; from there to Thompson's Corners. Near there found tents and commissary stores,
which we burned, with two wagons of the enemy's; then moved west to Barnett's to camp.
Very respectfully, yours,
EDWARD HATCH, Culonel 2d Iowa O..~valry.
-vv. A. MARTIN,
Lieutenant, Assistant Adjutant General Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERs SECOND IowA CAVALRY,
Camp near Jacinto, September 22, 1862.
Sm: I have the honor to report, complying with the order of Colonel Mizner to pursue
the enemy retreating southward, on the morning of the 20th, and if possible to fall upon
his trains. Moved forward with my regiment from Iuka, at 9 o'clock in the morning.
The enemy's trains and flankers were so heavily guarded, I could find no practicable point.
to attack them. Fell on the enemy's guard about seven miles south of Iuka, on the main
Fulton road, attacked and drove their rear four miles, when the enemy's skirmishers
falling back rapidly, my men were drawn upon a masll:ed battery, with a support of two
regiments of infantry and a strong reserve of cavalry. My men being dismounted, dropped
flat upon the ground; the guns and volleys of the enemy's infantry playing over them,
not hurting a man. The enemy's cavalry charged the moment the firing ceased; t he
c1larg ~ was repulsed, our men falling back, fighting in the timber to my reserve of mounted
men. Learning the enemy run two of his guns up, fell back, the enemy keeping up a
fire of grape and canister down the road until out of range. I then formed four companies of
my mounted rifles to receive cavalry charge in rear of fence to open fields, when the enemy
charged in force over the fields, and was repulsed with loss; when the enemy again run
up his guns, forcing us back to another position, where we again prepared to receive
cavalry cha.rge. Our infantry coming up rapidly, the enemy retreated. We captured ten
prisoners, three to four hundred stand of arms and a wagon, when we were repulsed,
destroying them. Our loss is very slight-six wounded, and three horses killed. Captain
Egbert had his horse killed under him.
Very respectfu!l y,
EDWARD HATCH, Colonel 2d Iowa Cavalry.
"\V. A. MARTIN,
Lieutenrmt, Assistant AdJutant General Cavalry Division.
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HEADQUARTERS THIRD MICHIGAN CAVALRY,

Camp near Jacinto, Mississippi, September 23, 1862.
SIR : In relation to the movements of the 3d Michigan cavalry, from the 18th until
the 22d instant, I have the honor to report as follows :
At a late hour on the 18th instant, while encamped at Davenport's mills, near Jacinto,
I directed company A, Captain Dyckman, to examine the Iuka road, running northeast
from the mills, and midway between the Tuscumbia and Burnsville roads, in order to
determine the practicability of moving wagon or artillery trains on the road, and whether
any portion of the road was occupied by the enemy.
The reconnoissanc3 was properly and promptly made, and the road found to be impracticable for moving trains, but passable for infantry and cavalry. The road was occupied
by pickets, who fired upon the reconnoitring party.
At 4 o'clock on the following morning, pursuant to instructions from Colonel Mizner, I
took eight (8) companies of my command, (leaving four (4) in camp,) and proceeded in
light marching order along the Tuscumbia road, east, to its intersection with the Russel ville
road, about six (6) miles east of Jacinto, where my command took the advance of General
Hamilton's division, and moved in the direction of Barnett's Corners. I had moved about
two (2) miles further, when I found indications of the presence of the rebel cavalry; the
indications were more ma1ked as we proceeded, and as we arrived at the brow of the hill,
about one-half (~)mile west of Barnett's, a volley was fired into the head of the column.
The rebel force seemed well supported, and I immediately dismounted twenty (20) men, and
sent them, in command of Captain Latimer, into the woods to the right. Twenty more
were sent into a corn-field to the left, in command of Lieutenant Mix, and companies A
and F, under Captain Dyckman, were sent forward on the road. After a sharp skirmish of
about fifteen minutes, the rebels were driven from the woods, leaving one man killed and
one horse; also one mao, horse and equipmeuts were taken by Captain Latimer. From
this point (Barnett's) a running fight was kept up, the rebels falling back to a branch
of the Cripple Deer creek, distant about four (4) miles. On arriving at the branch we
found that the rebel cavalry bad rallied at a house situated on an elevation four hundred
(400) yards distant, and commanding the road. The advance under Sergeant H. D.
Cutting, company K, charged up the road at full gallop, and drove them from their
position into the woods, but the enemy rallied, two squadrons strong, and forced the
advance to retire. Sergeant Cutting's horee was shot, which was the only casualty occurring to my command in this instance. A number of shots were fired into the hee.d of the
column, killing a lieutenant on General Hamilton's staff. I at once wheeled the cavalry
into line on the roadside, and uncovered a column of infantry, which moved to the
front and deployed on either side of the road, and drove the enemy from the cover of
some buildings, behind which they were sheltered.
A column of infantry then moved in advance, and position having been taken at a point
about one and one-half (1&) mile from Inka, pursuant to orders received from Colonel
Mizner, I immediately moved with four (4) companies, viz: companies K, Captain Newell;
company E, Captain Latimer; company.!!. . , Captain Kiese, and company A, Captain Dykman, to the front, and moved out to the right of Constable's Ohio battery, Lieutenant
Adams commanding the advance guard.
After proceeding about one-half (!) mile, Lieutenant Adams perceiving a body of cavalry
on a hill directly east of the battle-field, attacked and drove them away with considerable
loss. I then formed my men behind the brow of the hill, dismounted a portion, and
poured an irregular fire into the enemy's left flank, and, upon those who showed themselves
in our front, with considerable effect-twenty-two dead having been afterwards found, who
must have fallen by our hands. During the time that we were in this position the enemy
occasionally gave us a heavy volley, but the nature of the ground was such that no casualties had occurred until near sundown, when the enemy seemed to manifest a disposition
to gain our position. I immediately dismounted all the men that could be spared, sending
the horses into the woods in our rear, and opened a destructive fire upon them. They
immediately fell back, and made no further attempt to advance upon us. We took a first
lieutenant, bearing the stand of colors belonging to the 3d Louisiana infantry. Captain
Latimer was wounded in the shoulder, also two privates slightly. Six (6) horses were
lost. After dark I moved my command to the left of the road, in rear of the infantry,
where I was joined by the other four companies of my command, which had been employed in reconnoitrin~ on either flank during the afternoon. On the morning of the
20th, pursuant to orders received from Colonel Mizner, I proceeded with my command in
the direction of the Fulton road, to learn the whereabouts of Price's army. I struck the
Fulton road some three or four (3 or 4) miles from luka, and found the rebel army still
_paRsing that point. After gaining the desired information, I immediately fell back, and
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proceeded down a r·oad running nearly parallel with and about three (3) miles from the
Fulton road to the Tuscumbia road, where we found that the rebels were making a stand,
and the infaatry were moving upon them. We encamped that night on the Tuscumbia
road.
The following day I remained in the same position, prepared some rations, brought
forward the four companies left at Jacinto on the 18th, and sent out Captain Reece and
company on the Fulton road, with instructions to gain all possible information relative to
the retreating army. He returned at night with ten (10) prisoners, having been down the
Fulton road about ten miles.
The following day (22d) I moved ¥{ith my entire command (12 companies) to Peyton's
mill, where I remained but a short time, as orders were received soon after my ani val to proceed to Jacinto. I had, however, sent out company A, Captain Dyckman, to make a
reconnoissance on the Natchez Trace road, where he took a captain belonging to the
Arkansas battalion; also found two men belonging to an Iowa regiment, who had been
taken by the rebel cavalry the day previous, and had succeeded in making their escape. I
arrived at Jacinto on the evening of the 22d, and encamped at Davenport's Mills, where
my command is now stationed. The bearing of both officers and men during the entire
conflict and subsequent movements was admirable, and it gives me great pleasure to
mention the valuable services of Adjutant U. Buchanan, who was always where duty called
him, and who was particularly useful to me during the engagement on the 19th.
L. G. WILLCOX,
Captain, Commanding 3d Michigan Cavalry.
ADJUTANT GENERAL, 1st Brigade Cavalry Division

HE:\DQUARTERS 7Tn ILLINOIS VoLUNTEER CAVALRY,
Burnsville, Mis~issippi, September 23, 1862.
SrR: I have to report, that on the 18th day of September, 1862, the 7th regiment of
Illinois cavalry was ordered forward towards Iuka, to co-operate with the infantry under
the command of General Ross. The regiment was engaged in frequent skirmishes, but
nothing serious resulted. On the 19th the regiment was in line, some three and a half
miles from Iuka, and waiting for orders to go forward, but none was received; and, after
the evacuation of Iuka was known, the regiment was 0rdered back. by General Ross to
Durnsville.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EDWARD PRINCE,
Lieutenant Colonel 7th Illinois Cavalry Volunteers.
Lieutenant WELDEN,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General,
Cavalry Division, A.rmy of the Mississippi.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, September 28, 1862.
GENERAL: My report of the battle of Iuka has been delayed until all the sub-reports
came in. In accordance with your instructions, all the sick of your command, 900 in
number, were disposed of comfortably in the general hospital at Corinth, Mississippi, and
Jackson, Tennessee, by the 18th instant.
The command commenced their march from Clear creek in a rain-storm, which ceased
about 9 o'clock in the morning, and left the roads a little muddy, but free from the annoyance of dust. The column reached Jacinto without much fatigue.
On the 19th the roads were in splendid order, hard, and entirely free from dust. The
men marched with ease, and in fine order, none lagging and very few straggling. They
reached the battle-field unwearied, and in good spirits. As soon as it became known that
an engagement was impending, I established a field hospital at the only place, within two
and a half miles of the field, where there was water to be obtained; as it was on the roadside, all the men saw the locality. Immediately after the firing commenced the wounded
began to arrive, generally carried by two men ; those whose legs were nearly shot away
were carried, in some instances, on blankets, by six men. The details previously made for
the purpose behaved admirably, depositing those brought off, and immediately returning
for others . The Eturgeons did their best, and everything moved on almost like clock-work.
Finding the wounded became very numerous, a second depot was established, about half a
mile in the rear of the first, under the supervision of Surgeon Thrall, late mAdical director.
Very fortunately, the niglft was calm, and without a breath of air stirring, so that, as the
battle raged until after nightfall, we were enabled to clress the wounded by candle-light as
well as if we had been inside a house.
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At 11 o'clock all bad been attended to, when your order came to transport the wounded
to the rear. The ambulances were brought up by the aid of Captain Mott, acting commissary of subsistence, and were loaded under the energetic supervision of Surgeon Thornbill, and were received at the new depot, two miles and a half to the rear, by Surgeons Lynch
and Ham. They had all reached the new depot by an hour after daylight, and the last
were about to be unloaded when your order was received to move them into Iuka, the
enemy having evacuated during the night. Surgeons Thrall and Ham attended to the
reloading, assisted by all the surgeons present.
It was found, on reaching Iuka, that the rebel wounded occupied our old hospital, the
"Iuka Springs hotel," as well as the seminary buildings. Upon consultation with Medical
Director Holston, it was determined to occupy the other, "the Iuka hotel," and turn over
all the rebel wounded to their own surgeons, as they bad enough, and give them the
seminary buildings. At this time I turned over the enti··e charge of the wound ed to Surgeon Holston, and, in accordance with your order, reported back to your headquarters, at
Barnett's, for duty.
I cannot speak too highly of the surgeons, nor discriminate between them. I doubt if
the wounded of so great a carnage were ever taken care of more gently and more expeditiously. They sustainecl their removal with fortitude, and with but little apparent fatigue.
Appended is a list of the killed, wounded, and missing, amounting to 108 killed, 611
wounded, and 17 missing. The rebel loss was very much greater, amounting to over 520
killed, 1,300 wounded, and 181 prisoners, not including the wounded. I am satisfied that
these figures are within bounds, from personal inspection and what I consider reliable
information.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. B. CAMPBELL,
Medical Director, Army of the J1J.ississirpi.

Repm·t of killed, wounded, and missing if the troops engaged in the battle at
Iuka, Jlllississippi, September 19, 1862, Major General Rosecrans commanding.
SECOND DIVISION-GENERAL STANLEY.

Thirty-ninth Ohio volunteers.- Wounded: Hontner, sergeant, and Silas Bland, private, company C ; 0. P. Brown, sergeant, and Spenser Cooper, private, company D; Henry Guker,
company F, and William Miller, company H, privates, and eight missing not reported.
Sixty · third Ohio volunteers- Wounded: Isaac Jarvis, corporal, company H, and George
Mars, private, company K.
Elevtnth Jfi.~souTi volunteers.-Killed: J. B. Robinson, corporal, and F. W. Shay bury, private, company B; John Cunningham, private, company F; Edmund Leidy, sergeant, company G; J. Bedford, sergeant, company H; William Chapman and Charles C. Easton,
privates, company I ; and Marshall Osburn, private, company K. Wounded: Samuel Brown,
Alex. Brooks, J. B. Lappin, Gray H. Moore, William H. McGuire, and Ed. F. Raindan, privates, company A; Andrew Reed, Sylvester Turner, Antonio Bush, Thomas Pugh,
and Elias Ross, privates, company B; M. M. Warner, captain, company C; William T.
Rony, corporal, company C; John Byrd, John H. Rose, John Hines, Martin Hogue, Montgomery Sweat, James H. Hansley, Daniel Cuppis, Samue~ M. Neal, and Thomas Cuppis,
privates, company C; John Cowpertwaite, .1st lieutenant, company D; Jasper Shockley,
John Gross, M. M. Burton, Dios C. Hagle, and James H . Davis, plivates, company D;
.John D. Bail, color sergeant, company E, and John I!'. Perry, private, company E; Amos
Singleton, captain, company F; W. W. Clellaud, 1st lieutenant, company F; J. P. Lan·
son, 1st sergeant, company F; G. P. Southerland and Elias Draper, corporals, company F;
J. M. Robertson, David Hamman, William Doyle, and J. McLean, rrivates, company F ;
George Quick and Patrick Morton, corporals, company G; G. Adams, John Abbee, Bedford
Clark, Franklin Lewis, John Mumpower, Lewis Swagler, Thomas Wallace, Edwin Kroef,
G. W. Luhr, and Jacob Cochran, privates, company G; J. Adams, sergeant, company H;
John Moran, John Mills, Timothy Kinny, H. P. Kellogg, and S. B. Donnell, privates,
company H ; Charles H. Osgood, 1st lieutenant, company I; Cyrus Spicer, sergeant, com·
pany I; William H. Capper, corporal, company I; John SeHger, Luther Vance, Cyrus Bail ,
Albert Bryner, and William H. Spicer, privates, company H; Charles H. Foster, 1st lieutenant, company K.
Eighth JVi~consin volunteers.- Wounded: J. B. Bedfield, captain, company A, and John
Green, private, comp:my A.
Twenty-sixth Illinois.- Wounded: Bummer, lieutenant; George Hale, Philip Hall, Andrew
Hugh, and Charles Perkins, privates.
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Eleventh Ohio battery.-Killed: Richard Baur, acting 2n lieutenant; M. V. B Hall,
sergeant; S. Gilmore, corporal; Joseph H. Iugersall, William H. Balser, James W. Bener,
William Crawford, James Casey, John Dean, Juo. Ettle, J. J. McGowan, J. T. Malson,
0. P. Olson, William H . Rosey. Charles Schifftner, and Joseph Taylor. Woltnded: Cyrns
Sears, 1st lieutenant commanding; H. l\1. Niel, lst lieutenant; A. B. Elger, acting 2d
lieutenant, (taken prisoner;) F. E. Armstrong, orderly sergeant; H. C. Worley, acting
sergeant; G. W. Bush and L . Bothwell, corporals; G W. Buckley, acting corporal; J. B.
Brooks, W. Bowen, A. P. Brewer, 0. Clonse, 'William L. Colton, I saac Dezotell, Jacob.
Everhart, Matt. Free, M. L. Fritz, C. Haglin, B. Huber, J. M. Ike, J. F'. Jellison, H. C. Kellton, H.McDonald, H. McLaughlin, J. J. McCreight, Charles Rhodes, J. C. Swayre, Robert
Swegle, Thomas Taylor, M. F. Wesenberg, H. M. Welsh, Zachariah Welsh, J. Wolsey, S.
Wheaton, and S. N. Williamson, privates. Missing: Charles Jones, William Jone ..;, and
A. B. Myers, privates.
Second Iowa battery.- Wounded: Albert Atkinson, corporal ; ·william Eckles and Robert.
Rose, privates.
THIRD DIVISION, 1ST BRIGADE-BRIGADIER GENERAL

C. S.

HAMILTON.

Fifth Iowa volunteers.-Killed: Lafayette Shawl, second lieutenant; Joseph Edgar, private,.
compltny A. Elias Babcock, corporal; J.D. Bodley, M. W. Gatrell, Geo. W. Lowe, Oscar B.

Piper, Samuel Pitman, Henry Smeil, and Levy F. Shelby, privates, company B. Nicholas.
Reinehart, sergeant, company C. Jacob Oswold and Davicl Sullivan, privates, company D.
John Fowle, private, company E. A.M. Holcomb, second lieutenant; S. Fhher, acting
lieutenant; Isaac Long, William J. Fulton, Isaac Green, R. B. Howell, and J. W. Seller,
privates, company F. Earl Wellington and Henry Ditch, privates, 0ompany G. R. B.
Hughs, sergeant; Alvin C. Ebbert, Thomas J. Nutt, Hamilton Rogers, and George Armentrout, privates, company H. Samuel Hughs, P. S. O'Driscoll, N. B. Pearson, and
A. B. Wright, privates, company I. Stephen W. Smith, second lieutenant; George W.
Ji,oot, corporal; Homer Ellis, H. W T. Field, and John Shideker, privates, company K.
Wounded: R. F. Patterson, adjutant; John Casad, first lieutenant; Luke Ingman, Parley McCracken, sergeants; Wm. C. Hawk, corporal; Joseph J. Anderson, Nelson Alexander, Wm. F. Begole, Joseph Fobes, Robert A. Fanal, Charles B. Hawass, Charles S. Hussey,
Jackson Mitchell, Wm. H. Morron, (missing,) Samuel Olinger, Thomas S. Parsons, John
Rumsey, JohnS. Smun, John C. Stone, Wm. A. Tisdale, W. E Thurston, Freland G. A.
Tubbs, Jacob F. Weaver, John F. Webb, and Hilburn Zeiter, privates, company A.
Alexander Mateer, first lieutenant; James Vanata, Wm. Dangan, sergeants; James McCraskey, James B. Ba,nkr;:, George F. Works, David Wenor, corporals; I. T. Borden, Bar-.
nett Dewitt, J. H. l\1. De Long, Hiram C. Hall, I. M . Louderback, Charles l\1. Norris,
William A. Rice, Asbury D. Romans, William Sp:nks, Luther K. Cary, Henry Scott, W.
W. Warrell, W. C. Winslow, and J. D. Pergrine, (missing,) privates, company B. John
Albaugh, captain; Albert Ellise, first lieutenant; Milton Camnel, sergeant; Wm. Gamb::>l,.
R. E Patyten, Wm. B. Wallace, corporals; John Butler, Wm. P. Brandon, J erry Carnady,
J. M. Cooper, V. Graham, E. 0. Griswell, 0. George, Oscar K. Haun, G. Jenkins, John F.
Kellogg, 'l'homas F. Littleton, Robert Lvnch, Willard Neal, Wm. F. Orr, Joseph t:l. Osborne,
J. W. Palmer, Humphrey Roberts, J. F. Spafford, Isaac Schofield, James Smith. James L.
Stephens, Stewart Thompson, and Clemant Zingshiem, privates, company C. Benjamin
Jarvis, second lieutenant; John E. Page, Harmon .Jones, sergeants; Wm. C. Hansifa~,
Wm. R. Brush, Wm. Mooney, James Johnson, corporals; Wm. H. Hartman, Warren B.
Parrot, Amos B. Miles, Tillman H. Paton, James Reynolds, <Tacob Sipe, Fred. E Strong,
Stephen Mills, and Samuel W. Williams. privates, company D. Alexander B. Lewis, first·.
lieutenant; Wm. Bunce, sergeant; E. Cluttester, Wm. W Baughnan, A. B. Kinsel, and
Wm. H. Brown, privates, company E James A. Renford, Abraham Long, Methel B
Jones, Charles S. Miller, sergeants; Robert N. McClanahan, Henry Saunders, Ransom P.
Laffer, corporals; Andrew Beard, John Cabler, Wm Eberhardt, (missing,) D. C. Glenden,
Charles W. Gross, Charles Gaos, John Hall, Dc~.vid N. Jones, John V. Catcbum, Pleasant
:K Miner, Sbindon G. Ross, James H. Roland, Ora Slate, Wm. L. Sweitzer, George B.
Tipton, Thomas A. Shockley, (missing,) A. F. Wilson, James E. Woods, and Hardnick
Vass, privates, company F. Samuel S. Sample, first lieutenant; John E. Pangborn, acting lieutenant; Basil H. Martin, sergeant; Americus Campbell, corporal; Henry V.
Fisher, Pearson Mills, Byron A. Knowles, James 1\iiskimons, John Wightman, and John
Wintin, privates, company G. Joel Brown, captain; John H. Hoffman, sergeant; Jacob·
Oberturff, Milton W. Shaw, corporals; George W. Btddwin, Thomas P. Estail, Wm. T
Hughs, Wm. Knapp, John A. 'rrout, Benjamin Penn, Elijah Roberts, Asbury Sutton, John
Shuffieton, Simeon Muscott, John Whitton, Milton Armington, and John A. Purse, privates ~
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company H. Wm. H. Cotton, second lieutenant, (missing;) Wm. H. Brakey, acting lieutenant; Wm. D. Thompson, Richard B:trrett, sergeants; G. Vv. Bowsman, F. Blusch,
.Tohn S. Howard, H. P. Maron, Wm. C. Morden, Charles P. Read, Wm. H. Stephens, Wm.
Shuler, and S. H. Skniderlin, privates, company T. H. G. Doolittle. J. Darling, sergeants;
Wm. M. Letchfield, corporal; Henry Ji'ry, John Haley, Henry Spalding, John A. King, W.
E. Little, Wm . Presho, Job K. Reinh rtrdt, John 'I'. Reinhardt, Semon Shryock, John W.
Smith, Andrew Saul, Newton E. Terrel, R. Stutsman, 'I'. L. Burrington, tmissiog,) and G. W.
Bottsford, privates, company K .
Twenty sixth Missouri regiment .-Ktlled: Thomas Murray, private, company A; J \lhn Hommit, private, company B; Herman Brant, G. Marcel, and Joseph Smith, privat0s, company
C; Hiram Clery, sergeant, James M. Halsey, John Horace, and George Huff, corporals,
George Gamble, James Hurley, and Samuel Kee, privates, company E; Al0nzo A. Bliss,
sergeant, Henry Meyer, corporal, Andrew Jones and Mark Wilt, privates, company F;
SilaR Laughlin and August Pigunot, corporals, Bernard Bakers, James S. L:tugbiin and
Albert Spanhaus, privates, company H.
Wounded: George W. Boomer, colonel; A.
M. Craig, E. Malone and James A. McLain, privates, company A ; Thomas Jarvis,
private, company B; Augustus E. Grier, sergeant, John Savage, corporal, Henry
Kreumend. Vincent ~lorge, Herman Perick, John Selhein, Henry Schutte, Bernard
Wesbeck, Frederick Weisick, Louis L:w genberg, privates, and Charles Hafnagel, musician, company C; Charles Clifton, corporal, Reily D. Rice, private, company D;
Robert C. Crowel, captain, Robert B. Denny, 2d lieutenant, Frederic Lenter, 1st
sergeant, Michael Gress, sergeant, Jerry Casey, corporal, Adrian Combe, David Duukeday, John K. Dixon, Isaac W. Fugit, William Grier, Eli Hiatt, George Hopkins, John
Hal:;ey, Thomas Joice, William Locke, William V. Locke, William F. Montgomery, George
Oliver, James Palmer, William Verian, Isaac Yambury, and William D. Simmons, privates,
company E ; Benjamin Dean, captain, J. W. Mapsin, lieutenant, William M. Boan, sergeant, Thomas F. Smith, corporal, Henry Att, B. B. Bundridge, John Fletcher, Patrick
Fay, William Grandiah, Carel McCalister, Henry Patrie, Christian Pupple, Daniel Robertson, n.nd Christian Voss, privates, company F; Cornelius .Herrigan, John Anderson, and
Anderson Colbert, privates, company G; W. B. Furgison, sergeant, B. Shaffer, corporal,
Alexander Magary, John H. Allen, Henry Potting, Henry Twehou::;e, Anton Weitery, Joseph Marcus, G. Messerlie, and Thomas Laughlin, privates, company H; Reuben Hardin,
corporal, Uriah Dodsin, Levi Renick, Frank Vardot, Andrew Roberts, Peter Leazy, and
William Lewis, privates, company I. Missing: Earnest Berner, private.
Forty-eighth Indiana Regiment.-Ktlled: Charles vV. Huston, 1st sergeant, Lewis C. Haney,
sergeant, Lorenzo B. Brownell and Bcutlett Y. Pigg, corporals, Reuben Glottfester, Henry
Huntzinger, Albert Steentsman, and Napoleon B. Upson, privates, company A; Philip
Critis, Miles H. Miller, David Reddick, Benjamin H. Ross, and James Zigler, privates, company B; A. P. Bradley, Jacob Nick, Henry Taylor, and Philip F. Tutor, privates, company D; Samuel Shepley, corporal, Edward Curn, private, company E; John Saunders,
sergeant, William Hiner, Thomas Kirkwood, and Wisel Manuel, privates, compan;r F;
Joseph Clemmens, Eugene Clongdon, William Nixon, and William Mack, privates, company G ; William H. Alle, private, company H; Samuel L. Connell, sergeant, Noah Barnheart, Martin Cavenaugh, and Soloman Fisher, privates, company I; William Jeanes, Henry
Shoup, Thomas Simmons, Louis Wi:cox, and Martin Zarbomekie, privates, company K.
Wounded: Norman Eddy, colonel; Alfred Billows, lieutenant, Hemy Williams and Rudolph Ash, corporals, William Bell, George H. Bloomer, Isaiah Irwin, Jacob Raefsneider,
George Shultz, Marcus Washburn, and George Byskett, privates, company A; Abraham
Rhone, sergeant, Thomas H. Abshire, corporal, John Hone, Amos Heston, George Monroe,
and John Sousley, privates, company B; James H. Warner, corporal, John Hoban, Martin
Hutzel, Burnett Knoff, William McCormack, George C. Rhodes, Moses H. Sanborn, and
Walter Tuter, privates, company D; Thomas Simcnton, sergeant, John Martin and Abraham Bonebrake, corporals, and Edward Brisett, private, company E; William Judkins,
lieutenant, James Anderson, corporal, Charles Dewy, James Lus, and Charles Lebring,
privates, company B'; John Gordy, Alonzo Carpenter, and John Poil'er, corporals, Martin
Weaver, Emanuel Hoover, and Jackson Raight, privates, company G; G. Hollingshead,
sergeant, John Hemph, corporal, John Smith and 'I'. Hilderbrand, privates, company H;
Henry Lung, Joseph Heffner, Cyrus Carr, and John Blomfield, privates, company I; Albert
Guthridge, captain, Samuel Rabb, William Goodin, Nathaniel Maymeyer, William War;rell, and Samuel vVarren, company K .
Fourth Minnesota Regiment.-Hilled: Benjamin Poole and James Casey, privates, company
C; Thomas Smith, private, company F. Wounded: 'l'homas Olson, private, company A;
J. vV. Dunn, 1st sergeant, A Graham, sergeant, C. G. Mickel, corporal, James Neil and
Edward Zebrath, privates, company B; Charles Perkins and Thomas Reeves, privates,
company C ; George Kimball, 1st sergeant, George Clark, J. E. Sampson, aud S. M. Mo-
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meny, privates, company D; James, A Goodwin, 2d lieutenant, .Addison Phelps, sergeant,
G. W. Thomas, corporal, John Bass, Enos A. Bnncker, Orlando Lindersmith, Benjamin
Seirs, Frederick Schaum, and Joseph Tatro, privates, company E; J W. Burdick, corporal, Ira 0. Russell, George Wincl1el, and Hollis E. Sergant, privates, company · F;
George K. Campbell, John Eike, John Fobbe, Patrick Loftes, Antone Montrail, Georg·e
Reider, and Bernard Westinan, privates, company G; Charles Olson, N. S. Howland,
Peter Lentz, .Andrew Anderson, privates, company H; Samuel P. Isaacs, sergeant, company I; George S. Hutchison, .Avon B Morse, Samuel M. Milholland, John E. Mc:Jann,
and Martin Keifer, privates, company K.
Sixteenth I owa regimtnt .-Killed: Jacob Shambaugh, sergeant, R. G. Kelley and Gilbert
Wakefield, privatee, company A; Samuel Simmons and Levy Hester, privates, company
D; .Alexanrier Britt and Franklin Woodruff, privates, company E; Harvey Whitman,
corporal, Michael McGowan, George Bedford, and John Conard, privates, company
F; Solomon Zook, corporal, company H; E W. Watson, private, company, I.
Woundtd: J. V. Lawrence, sergeant, Henry Horn, Alexander Gordon, E . .A. Cassidy,
Frederick Osborne, Alonzo Spore, George Miller, Michael Connelly, and Humphrey Manahan, privates, company A; H. F. Heartman and J. Orpe, corporals, company B; James
Correl, H. Smith, H. W. Blessing, James King, Louis Heger, John Hettinger, privates,
company C; Robert Alcorn, lieutenant, David Uanot, and Thomas Parr, corporals, Hawkins McNally, W. V. Goss, John Berry, H. Ellis, and H. Miers, privates, company D ;
George Gallespie and Fra.nklin Forbes, privates, company E; M. K . Laird and John
McGraw, sergeants, E Wilcox, William Welsh, James Barnes, 0. R. Shepard, Enoch Haworth, and John Carpenter, privates, company F; A. Peick and G. B. t:lciok, corporals,
company G; John Mulhall and .John Huntington, privates, company H; H. D. Williams,
lieutenant, H. Skilling, sergeant, J. C Munger, curporal, H. Cripe, private, company I ;
J. H. Lucas, lieutenant, William Defore, sergeant, Harvey Harstein, corporal, David Darl
and David Signer, privates, company K.

THIRD DIVISION, 2D BRIGADE.

Tenth regiment, Iowa volunteers.- Wounded: Peter B Mishler, corporal, company A; Frederick A. Downs, private, company A; Henry Howard aud Peter Joice, privates, company
0; Philip Thoma, private, company E; Elias Deodman, private, company F.
Tenth regiment Missouri volunteers.- WoundP.d: A D. Peyton and Bichard Staton, privates,
company C ; Stuart Wishortt, sergeant, company D; Asbury Saltus, John Rolstock, Thomas
Hibbler, R. B. Glass, Reuben Sharp, W. J. Oeana, and Peter Thoma, privates, company D; .Augustus Zungle, private, company E; Joseph Young and John Siles, privates,
company F; Alex. B. Webb, private, company H.
Twelj~h Wisconsin battery.-Killed: J. J. Atherton, private, company D.
Seventeenth regiment Iowa volunteers. I(!lled: 2d Lieutenant 0. H. B. Smith, company G ;
Bine. S. Lee, corporal, company K; A. R. Richmore, private, company G, and William
Frank, private, company K. Wounded: CaptainS. H. Archer, company C; lst Lieutenant
William Reach, company G; 2d Lieutenant C. B. Woodrow, company K; Henry C. Willis,
private, company A; John J. Zermes and DanielS. Arnold, privates, company A; George
W. Dandy, corporal, company B; Charles P. Smith and E. Y. Burns, privates, company B;
T. Jackson: and Thomas Stafford, corporals, company C; W. L . Godly, 1st Gergeant, comp1-ny E ; J. S. Parkhurst, W. D. Fisher, Aaron W. Reary, .A. J. Headly, R. E. Williams,
and B. H Schooler, privates, company E; W. L. Richardson, corporal, company F; W. J.
Cline, private, company H'; Samuel V. Duncan and Thomas Steward, sergeants, company
G; John King, corporal, company G; J~sse Lee anJ Samuel Yard, privates, company G; A. M. Vance, 2d sergeant, company H; S. H. C. Grubb and Ezra T. Vance,
privates, company H; John J. Roohbeck, sergeant, company I; Z. F. Wood, corporal,
company I; Huston Smith, private, company I; Frank Orone, sergeant, company
K; John Fullerton, John Anderson, and George Simmons, corporals, company K; W.
McGill, Hugh White, aRd Jephtha .Ackley, privates, company K .
Etghtieth regiment, Ohio volunteers.- Wounded: Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Bartleson, commanding regiment; lst Lieutenant .Jno. E. Philpott, adjutant of regiment ; H. H. Whitcraft, 1st sergeant, company A; James Andrews and J. Dentenhamer, privates, Jesse
Gnomer and Andrew Hedge, corporals, company B; Simon Durst, private, company C ;
J. H'. Huddleson, lst sergeant, company D; Thomas Elder, Robert G. Hill, and Allen Talbott, privates, company D; H. E. Clindening, corporal, company F; 'l'urner Drummond
and Benjamin Vial, privates, company F.
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I certify that the above report is correct.
sent in as soon as received.

'Ihe Lreport from the other brigade will be
JOE E. LYNCH,

Dwision Surgeon, 3d Division, Army of the Missis~ippi.

.

CAVAJ.RY DIVISION OF COLONEL MIZNER •

5th .~IIfissouri cavalry.-Killed: Louis Berthold, private, company C.
Wounded: Albert
Borcherdd, captain, company U; Louis Schramm, lst lieutenant, company C; Louis Berthold, private, company C.
17th Iowa infantry.-Ktlled: J. J. Autherton, private, acting in 12th Wisconsin battery.
2d Iowa cavalry.- Wounded: Henry Melchert and Nelson Lovell, privates, compar.y C ;
James W. Nation, private, company A ; George Zeigler, lst sergeant, company A; John
Schaffer, private, company A; Allison Aurey, private, company B.
3d Michigan cavalry.-Wounded: M. M. Lattimer, captain, company E; Oliver Spooner,
private, company F ; - - Ayer~, private, company K.
Killed,l08; wounded, 6ll; mis8ing, 17.
A. B CAMPBELL,
Medical Director, Army ll'lississippi.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CAVALRY BRIGADE,

Left Wing 16th Army Corps, Corinth, July 9, 1863.
Gl'~NERAL: On the morning of the 7th, having received instructions to proceed with my
brigade out on the Burnsville road to make a Teconnoissance in force, I left Corinth at
about daylight with the 7th Kansas cavalry, Colonel T. P. Herrick, eight companies of the
lOth Miss0uri cavalry, Major F . W. Benteen, and the detachment of the 15th Illinois
cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel F. rr. Gilbert, (in all about 750 men,) and moved out by the
way of the North Farmington Toad On reaching the corral on this road we found that
the enemy, with twelve companies of mounted men, had, a short time before our arrival,
surrounded and attacked the small force guarding that point, and, after overpowering and
taking the most of them prisoners, bad decamped with all the stock that was in the corral.
After making a few inquiries from the neighborhood I started in pursuit out by the said
Toad, when, finding that the enemy had taken a Toute by the way of thl! Hamburg road,
I concluded to pursue him by that route His traces guided us by by-roads through
twamps and over hills, until we reached the main road leading from Red Sulphur Springs
so Iuka, which Toad he had taken to that town.
Taking this last named road we came upon the enemy in force, posted in an open field
on both sides of the road, with a dense woods in his front, and about a mile and a half
from Iuka. He opened on us with musketry, and I immediately threw out a detachment of
of the 15th Illinois (dismounted) as dismounted skirmisheTs, with the road as the centre of my
line of battle. I ordered the lOth Missouri to deploy to the right and left of the road an:i
dismount, which was quickly executed, with four companies on the right and three on the
left-hand side. 'lhe mountain-howitzer battery was ordered into batteTy on the road. I
then ordered some four companies of the 7th Kansas to dismount and deploy to the right
and left of the road in line of skirmishers, behind the lOth Missouri cavalry, thus forming
a double line of battle in the rear of my advanced skirmishers. In the mean time a very
hot fire had been kept up by the enemy, the skirmishers, and the companies of the lOth
Missouri on the right of the road, and I ordered Lieutenant Joyce, commanding the battery, to shell the enemy vigorously. That portion of the 7th Kansas not dismounted were
held in reserve.
The ordeT to shell the enemy was obeyed with good will, the men standing to their guns
under a heavy fire of musketry without flinching aud with undaunted coolness. Much of
this courage must be attributed to the daring and bravery of Lieutenant Peter Joyce, who
was everywhere among his men, encouraging them with his presence and assuring them by
his coolness. First Sergeant W. P. Edgar, of this battery, was acting lieutenant, and
deserves much pmise for the efficient aid he rendered in working the guns and the unsurpassed bravery he displayed. I regret to say that be met with a serious, though not dangerous, wound, the ball passiug through his band.
Having cannonaded the enemy, as I considered, a sufficient length of time, I ordered the
battery to cease firing, and advanced my whole line of battle up the hill and through the
wood; and if the fire had been seveTe before, it now became heavier, and no sooner had my
men shown themE<elves on the summit of the bill than the enemy discharged upon us
along his whole line a tremendous and destructive volley of musketry, as severe, for the
time it lasted, as any I have ever had the fortune to witness.
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Here we sustained all the losses that befell us that day. Captain H G. Bruns, of the
lOth Missouri, a young and dashing and as brave a soldier as ever wielded a sword, fell at
this point, pierced"through the lnngs by a musket ball, in advance of his men and cheering
them on to victory. Two of his own men, and one of company E, lOth Missouri cavalry,
were killed at this place and almost at the same time . Several men were wounded here.
From this time on, it was evident the day was ours. We continued our ad vance through
the woods, when, after a few wavering volleys, the enemy fled in dismay, leaving us the
victory and the field. As soon as the enemy began to fly, I ordered three squadrons of the
7th Kansas, under Major Jenkins, to pursue him as far as Iuka. He followed him to that
place, captured a battery wagon and fgrge and burnt them, but saw nothing of the enemy,
and returned. He had a battery of four pieces of artillery, with which he ingloriously fled
to his fastnesses on Bear creek.
Having proceeded as far as my instructions directed, I made inquiries as to tbe enemy's numbers and position, when I learned that in front of me, towards Bear creek, his
force was some tweuty-five hundred strong, while the~e was a large force on either of my
flanks. The force I had encountered numbered from fifteen to eighteen hundred.
As to the enemy's loss I have no definite means of ascertaining, but am told, on inquiry,
that it was large. Four dead bodies of rebel soldiers were found by us on the field, and
the traces of blood around fully corroborate the story. The total loss to my command will
be found in the recapitulation at the end of this report.
After ~aring for my wounded and placing them in ambulances, I brought aw11y my dead,
l\nd fell back some six miles and encamped for the night. On the morning of the eighth
we took up our line of march for Corinth, and arrived here at about half past 10 o'dtJck.
Before closing this report, it would be neglect on my part if I did not return my thanks
to the officers and men under my command fc.r the unflinching coolness with which th• y
met danger, and the courage with which thtiy routed a superior force, occupying a position
chosen by its own leaders. In particularizing I do not desire to be invidious, but the officera hereinafter named came more particularly under my notice Major F W. Benteen,
commanding the lOth Missouri cavalry, was where a leader should be, in the front, and
by his coolness and great tact and skill did much towards gaining t.he day. Captain M.
H. Williams, of the lOth Missomi, acting field officer, and Lieutenant I. F. Young a •ljutant of the same regiment, were foremost in the line of skirmishers, rallying aud urging
them forward regardless of danger. Captain David Cain, acting field officer uf the lOth
Missouri, displayed great gallantry, and effected much in the direction of the tiring of the
batteries Captains Neet, Naughton, Underwood, and Mcl}]asson, of the same r.-g1ment,
also deserve particular mention for their gallantry and daring in lea-:iing their meu into
the hottest of the fight
Lieutenant Colonel F. T. Gilbert and Major E Carmichael acted with their customary
devotion to the cause, and were ever foremost in the path of danger.
Particular mention will not be undeserved in the person of Captain Ford, of that regiment, who bravely Jed where his men dauntlessly followed. He reueivc ·d a :;hot from the
enemy in the scabbard of his sabre, deeply indenting it, thus avoiding a seriou,; wound
Colonel T. P. Herrick, Major Jenkins, and Captains Malone, Thorntou, and Gregory, of
the 7th Kansas, also came under my notice, and deserve the praise due to brave and devoted soldiers. Of the officers of the battery I have already spoken, uut too wuch pra1~e
cannot be bestowed upon them. All honor and praise are due to the g<\ll>~.nt dead, aud it
might not be amiss to mention, particularly, Captain H G Bruns, lOth .VJi,..~wuri cavalry.
Reared in the lap of luxury, at the first breaking out of the war, although qn1te young, he
enlisted in the 3d Missouri volunteer infantry, and served in that regiment thco11gh all the
battles of Missouri, Booneville, Wilson's creek, aud others. He was with hi.~ regilllent
during Geneml Curtis's chase of the rebel Price through Missouri, and partJcip;w•d in
every battle of that eventful campaign, including the hard-earned field of Pea Kid;.(e.
He received a di~charge from his regiment only to accept a commis~ion in the lOth Missouri, and has served with it in every one of its engagements in thiti r.lititrict
Ere yet in the first dawn of manhood this polished gentleman and g,L\Ia .t soldier bas
been cut down, one among the many victims to the mad ambition of ~ •Uthem tri"littJTS.
He has left behind him an unsullied name. Fond friendd sb ,dl wee!J for h1111, uurnrade::; in
arms shall mourn for him; but he died a martyr to a holy cause, sa(;rificed upcm tiJe alt,tr
of his country. He fell foremost in the fight, and while the vktorious "hunt , ot lw; comrades rent the air "all grew dark," and his fearless spirit winged itti way to a blighter,
happier land.
Lieutenants John W. Rice and M. McDonald, serving on 1ny persomtl staff, rendered
me every desirable assistance, carryiog orders, . regardless of flying i.Jalls, to all p<Lrts of
the field.
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The following is a list of the killed and wounded :

Killed.-Henry G Bruns, captain, F. S. Burlingame, corpoTal, and N. Sahli, private,
company G; William Frazier, private, company E, lOth Missouri cavalry.
Wounded.-W. P. Edgar, 1st sergeant, company A; Rogers, private, company I; Shine,
company M, lOth Missouri cavalry. Marion Cross, corporal, company D; Charles H.
Dawn, prh·ate, company E; Jacob Snyder, private, company I, 7th Kansas cavalry.
Henry Shaeffer, private, company F; John Moorly, private, company G, 15th Illinois
cavalry.
Recapilulation.-Killcd, 4; wounded, 8. Total loss, 12.
Respectfully,
F. M. CORNYN,
Colonel lOth .llfissouri Cavalry, Oommandi11g Brigade.

MISSOURI CAMPAIGN.
CINCINNATI, Omo, February 25, 1865.
GENERAL: I enclose, and transmit for file in your office, copy of my official report uf
the late campaign against Price in Missouri; the original, with accompanying sub-reports,
was forwarded to Major General Canby, commanding the military division of west Missis·
sippi, under whose command I was placed.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. S ROSECHANS,
Ma;'or General.
Brigadier General L. THOMAS,
Adjutant General U. S. Army, Washington, IJ. 0.

a

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI,
St. Louis, December 7, 1864.
COLONEL: The commanding general of the military division is already informed, by my
current official despatches, of the principal incidents of the late campaign against Price in
this department, but it is proper that I should submit a more detailed and connected report
of the operations for a correct understanding of their extent and the importance of the results.
From early in the spring it was lmown through the lodges of the "0. A. K.'s" and other
rebel sources, that Price intended a great invasion of this State, in which he expected the cooperation of that "order" and of rebels generally, and by which he hoped to obtain important military and political results.
In pursuance of these plans, the lodges with rebel recruiting officers and agents sent into
Missouri clandestinely, or under cover of the amnesty oath, for that purpose, began an insurrection in Platte county on the 7th of July last. From that time guerilla warfare raged in
the river counties, west from Calloway in the north, and from Cooper on the south side of
the Missouri.
This department having been depleted of troops, permission was obtained to raise volunteers to meet the exigencies of our situation, and under it about five complete, and as many
incomplete, regiments of 12-months volunteer infantry had been organized previously to
the raid.
On the 3d of September General 'Vashburn sounded the tocsin, by information that the
force under Shelby at Batesville, Arkansas, was about to be joined by Price for the invasion
of our State. The ripening of the corn lent to this additional color of probability, so that,
on the 6th, Major General A. J. Smith, passing Cairo, with a division of infantry, on the
way to General Sherman, I telegraphed General Halleck the state of affairs, requesting orders
for this division to halt at that point and wait until we could ascertain the designs of the
enemy.
The division was halted, and on the 9th General Smith received orders from General Halleck to operate against Price and company; but deeming it impracticable to penetrate between
one and two hundred miles into Arkansas with a small column of infantry in pursuit of a large
mounted force, the exact whereabouts as well as intentions of wl:ich were still unknown,
he decided to move his command to a point near St. Louis, whence he could readily move by
rail or river, and await Price's movements.
:From that time information accumulated showing the imminence of the raid. On the
23d we received certain information that Price had crossed the Arkansas with two divisions
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of mounted men, three batteries of artillery, a large wagon train carrying several thousand
stand of small-arms, and was at or near Batesville, on White river.
From this point midway between the Mississippi and the western boundary of the State
there are three practicable routes of invasion: one by Pocahontas into southeastern Missouri;
another, ·west Plains and Rolla or vicinity, north towards Jefferson City; a third by Cassville, north, either through Springfield and Sedalia or by the Kansas border to the Missouri
river.
Strong military reasons favored the movement of their main force by the central route,
while a detachment should go by Pocahontas, and strip southeast Missouri. Under these
circumstances my first object was to secure onr great depots at Springfield and Rolla. The
hay cut during the summer, and our train of government wagons, required to maintain the
troops in the f::ipringfield district.
To do this and, as far as possible, save the scanty agriculture of the country from devastation, it was necessary to hold both Springfield and Rolla; indeed, to have abandoned these
points would have been not only to abandon the loyal people of those districts and their
property to destruction, but to invite the enemy to destroy our trains while moving them,
capture our stores, and beat our troops in detail.
Generals Sanborn and McNeill were therefore informed and ordered to place the trains
and public property of their districts under the protection of the fortifications at Springfield
and Rolla, to put their forts in the best possible state of defence, using every foot and dismounted cavalry soldier, including citizens and local militia, to the best advantage, and with
all their efficient mounted force to watch the enemy's motions and report the earliest indications of the direc.tion of the coming storm. General Brown was ordered to concentrate all
troops from the west of the central district at Sedalia, to notify the citizens, guards, and see
that neither they nor their arms ·were exposed to capture.
On the 24th Shelby was reported south of Pilot Knob, moving toward Farmington with
five thousand men and four pieces of artille(y. General Ewing was ordered to concentrate
the troops in the southern part of his district at Pilot Knob and Cape Girardeau, and to
verify the accuracy of this report, which proved true. On the 26th General A. J. Smith,
with two of his brigades, was ordered to a point on the Iron Mountain railroad, as far towards
Pilot Knob as he deemed compatible with certainty that his position would not be turned
and the enemy get between him and St. Louis. On the day before Sanborn had orders to
move, with all his mounted force, to Rolla, it having become evident that the enemy would
not probably strike west of that point. The safety of St. Louis was vital to us. I therefore telegraphed Brigadier General H. E. Paine, commanding in Illinois, who promised me
assistance from some regiments of returning "hundred-day volunteers," who, though they
had already served beyond their time, generously consented to come for the defence of the
city. The enrolled militia of St. Louis, though but skeleton regiments, were called out, and
the citizens also requested to organize and arm. General Ewing was sent to Pilot Knob, with
directions to use his utmost exertions to find out whether any more than Shelby's division
was in southeast Missouri, and to that end to hold Pilot Knob until he was certain. With
a soldierly comprehension of the importance of his duties, while reporting the eurrent rumors
of the advance of Price with his whole force, he expressed his doubts and held his position
until the 27th, when he snstained a terrific assault in Fort Davidson, a small field-work in
the valley, surrounded by hills within cannon range, which he held with about 1,000 men,
one-half raw troops, establishing beyond question the presence of all Price's command in
that quarter. He gloriously repulsed them, killing and wounding some 1,500 of the enemy,
and lost only 28 killed and 56 wounded, as appears from his report herewith.
While Ewing's fight was going on Shelby advanced to Potosi, and thence to Big River
bridge, threatening General Smith's advance, which withdrew from that point to within safer
supporting distanee of his main position at DeSoto. Previous to and pending these events
the guerilla warfare in north Missouri had been waging with redoubled fury. Rebel agents,
amnesty oath-takers, recruits, "sympathizers," 0. A. K. 's, and traitors of every hue and
stripe had warmed into life at the approach of the great invasion. Women's fingers were
busy making clothes for rebel soldiers out of goods plundered by the guerillas; women's
tongues were busy telling Union neighbors "their time was now coming." General Fisk,
with all his force, had been scouring the bush for weeks in the river counties in pursuit of
hostile _bands, composed largely of recruits from among that class of inhabitants who claim
protectiOn, yet decline to perform the full duties of citizens, on the ground that they "never
tuck no sides." A few facts will convey some idea of this warfare carried on by confederate
agents here, while the agents abroad of their bloody and hypocritical despotism-Mason,
Slidell, and Mann, in Europe--have the effrontery to tell the nations of Christendom our
gov~rnment "carries on the war with increasing ferocity, regardless of the laws of civilized
warfare." These gangs of rebels, whose families bad been living in peace among their loyal
:r;teighbors, committed the most cold blooded and diabolical murders, such as riding up to a
farm-housP, asking for water, and while receiving it shooting down the giver, an aged, inof-
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fensive farmer, because he was a radical" Union man." In the sing·le sub-district of Mexico the commanding officer furnished a list of near one hundred Union men who, in the
course of six weeks, had been killed, maimed, or '·run off," because they were ''radical Union
men" or d--d alJolitionists. About the 1st of September Anderson's gang attacked a railroad train on the north Missouri road, took from it twenty-two unarmed soldiers, many on
sick leave, and, after robbing, placed them in a row and shot them in cold blood, some of
the bodies they scalped, and put others across the track and run the engine over them. On
the 27th this gang, with numbers swollen to three or four hundred men, attacked Major Johnson, with about one hundred and twenty men of the 39th Missouri volunteer infantry, raw
recruits, and after stampeding their horses shot every man, most of them in cold blood. Anderson, a few clays later, was recognized by General Price, at Booneville, as a confederate
captain, and, with a verbal admonition to behave hims elf, ordered by Colonel Maclane, chief
of Price's staff. to proceed to north Missouri and destroy the railroads, which orders
were found on the miscreant when killed by Lieutenant Colonel Cox, about the 27th of
October.
On the 28th, when information of Kwing's fight and Price's presence at Pilot Knob came
to hand, General Smith, discovering the enemy on his front moving to west and north, in
pursuance of his orders to hold the most advanced position compatible with the certainty of
keeping between the enemy and St. Louis, determined to leave De Soto and retire behind the
Meramee, a stream which, at from 10 to 15 miles south of St. Louis, offered considerable obstacles to the passage of a hostile force with wagons and artillery.
General Ewing, finding Marmaduke's and Fagen's rebel divisions before him, and his position commanded by a numerically superior artillery, acting on suggestions made when discussing with him the possibilities of the position, on the night of he 27th spiked his heavy
guns, blew up the magazine, ammunition, and supplies, and with the field battery and remains of his command retreated through the hills towards the Meramee valley, hoping to reach
a point on the railroad from whence he could move to St. Louis, but, as will be seen from
his report, the enemy pursued him, harassed his rear on the march, which be directed along
a ridge where the enemy could not flank him, and overtook him near Harrison's Station,
where, seizing and extending the temporary defences constructed by the militia, he displayed
such vigor that, after harassing· him for 36 hours and making several attacks, on the approach of a detachment of Sanborn's cavalry the rebels left him, and he escaped with all his
command to Rolla.
The enemy's strength and position thus dev 3lopec1, my first business was to secure the
points he best would strike-St. Louis, Jefferson City; and Rolla. General Smith's 4,500
infantry and the mounted force '"e could raise, the 7th Kansas, just in from Memphis, part of
the 13th Missouri volunteer cavalry, Colonel Cutherwoocl, and the recruits of Merrill's horse,
hastily mounted and organized, a total of 1,500 men, were all the force we could place between St. Louis and an invading army of at least 15,000 mounted men, whose advance was
within a day's march of the city. Meanwhile Brigadier General Pike, ably seconded by
Generals ·w olf and Miller, of the East Missouri militia, had assembled and armed skeletons
of the J st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, lOth, lith, 1~th, and 52d regiments of enrolled militia.
The mayor and others, under the direction of the Hon. B. Gratz Brown and Mayor Ledergerber, organized the citizens exempt from militia duty, who yolunteered for the defence of
the city, into companies and regiments, numbering by the 30th some four or ii.ve thousand
men. The 122d, 134tb, 138tlJ, 140tb, and 142d Illinoi::; hundred-day volunteers also began
to arrive on the 80th, and were all in by October 1, and formed into a brigade, under Colonel
Wanglein, for the immediate defence of the city, beyond which they did not wish to serve,
as all of them were out over time and many having desirable offers as substitutes.
The enemy moving up by Potosi, seemed to halt at Richwoods, about 40 miles southwest
of St. Louis, in the hills between Big River and the Meramee, as if concentrating for an attack on the city. This appeared the more possible hom the magnitude of his interest in it,
and the fact that he did not show much force in the Meramee Yalley, even on the 30th. On
that day Major General Smith ·was ordered to occupy Kirkwood, which commands the Richwood road and crossing of the Meramee to St. Louis, his cavalry to reconnoitre south and
west, Colonel Merrill going as far as F'ranklin.
General Fisk, previously ordered to join General Brown with all his available force,
reached and reported from Jefferson City to-day. At the close of it news came that a brigade of rebel cavalry bad burned the Moselle bridge, and '"ere moving north towards Pranklin. General Smith was ordered to send a brig·ade of infantry to support the cavalry at that
point, and on the 1st of October Colonel \Volfe, with his brigade, reached Franklin, and
after a sharp skirmish drove the enemy from the place, but not until he had burned the depot.
The rebels were now apparently at bay. With 1,500 ca-,alry and 4,500 infantry, General
Smith was not in condition to attempt offensive movements against a force of 15,000 veteran
mounted rebels, who could reach St. Louis from any point in the Meramee valley, where he
might confront them in half the time it would take Lis infantry to reach it. Our obvious
policy, under these circumstances, was to keep as close as possible to the enemy, without
risking St. Louis, until General Mower's command should arrive from Arkansas, or at least
we be able to join to Smith's our mounted forces at Rolla. EYery hour's delay of the enemy
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in the Meramee valley brought Mower nearer and increased our chances of striking- him, as
it did the security of Jefferson City. On the 2d the enemy ·was reported massing in the vicinity of Union, on the road either to Jefferson City or Rolla and General Smith was ordered
to Franklin; but as the enemy's movements appeared to tend westward, on the 3d General
Smith was advanced to Gray's summit, and General Pike moved to Franklin. On the 4th,
General Smith pushed his cavalry towards the Gasconade, advanced his infantry to Union.
followed up by General Pike's militia. On the 5th Price's command took Herman, burned
the Gasconade bridge, and was crossing that stream at the old State road ford. General
Smith followed him. General Mower reported his arrival at Girardeau, out of supplies, his
teams worn clown, part of his cavalry dismounted, and many horses unshod. Transports
and supply-boats were at once despatched, and on the 8th and 9th his command reached St.
Louis, from whence the infantry was pushed forward by water, as rapidly as the low stage of
the river would peTmit, to join General Smith. The cavalry under vVinslow reshod and
started by land from St. Louis on the lOth towards Jefferson City, which point it Teached
on the 16th instant, one day in advance of the infantry.
On the 6th the enemy began crossing the Osage at Castle Rock, and one or ·two other
fords, under cover of his artillery, opposed by Colonel Phillips with the available cavalry at
Jefferson City. While thus engaged, Generals McNeill and Sanborn reached Jefferson City
by a forced march with all the mounted force from Rolla, and, uniting with Fisk and Brown,
gave us a garrison there of 4,100 cavalry and 2,600 infimtry, mostly the new and partially
organized twelve-months men, with a few citizens and militia. As this force, though capable of giving a strong battle behind intrenchments, was not very formidable to act offensively against a veteran force like that of the enemy, it was decided by General Fisk, the
other three generals concurring, to oppose a moderate resistance to the enemy's advance
across the Moreau, a small stream with muddy banks and bad bottom, four or five miles east
of the city, and then to retire and receive his attack at the defensive line, which with industry and good judgment had been prepared by the entire laboring force, civil and military, at
Jefferson City. The enemy burned the Osage bridge and crossed the river on the 6th. On
the 7th he advanced on the city, erossecl the Moreau after sharp fighting, and developed a
line of battle three or four miles long, east, south, and west of the place. But after reeonnoitring its apparently formidable intrenchments, warned by his Pilot Knob experience in
storming earthworks, he declined attacking, and passing his train in the rear, moved around,
massing on the west, and finally retiring. On the 8th General Pleasonton, on his arrival at
Jefferson, under orders to assume command, despatched General Sanborn with all the available cavalry-4,100 men-to follow and harass the enemy until General Smith's command
could come up. · General Smith was informed of the rebel failure at Jefferson, and directed
to move by the most expeditious route to that place, where Mower's infantry were to join
and the cavalry overtake him. He was to send all his cavalry under Colonel Cutberwoocl
in advance, to report to Pleasanton, who, on its arrival, was to join Sanborn's, and assume
direction of the provisional cavalry division. Thus formed, General Pike, with his militia,
was charged with the control of the country and the defences of our line of communication
from St. Louis to Jefff'rson City. Sanborn followed the rebels, attacked their rear guard at
Versailles, where it was uncertain what course they would take, found they were going
north towards Booneville, followed and drove them into line of battle near that place, and
when be found himself nearly enveloped by their entire army, fell back out of their reach
to meet Cutberwoocl's command and his provisions, both of which arrived at California on the
14th.
The enemy taking advantage of this, crossed the Lamine at Scott's and Dug's fords and
moved north towards Arrow Rock.
Sanborn immediately followed this movement by Georgetown bridge, keeping between the
Pacific railroad and the line of the enemy's march, and holding the line of the Blackwater,
a western tributary of the Lamine, while Price, crossing a part of Shelby's command at Arrow Rock, on the Booneville ferry-boat, to the north side of the river, advanced on Glasgow,
which he captured, after a seven hours' fight, ·with a part of Colonel Harding's regiment,
43d Missouri volunteer infantry, and small detachments of the 9th Missouri State militia and
17th Illinois cavalry. On the 17th our cavalry, following his westward movement, keeping
south of without pressing him, until General Smith's and Mower's troops could be brought up,
kept the line of tHe Blackwater, and on the 17th reported themselves out of supplies and the
enemy between Marshall and Waverly.
On the 17th Mower's infantry, except two small regiments, arrived at Jefferson City and
went at once by rail to Lamine bridge to join GenPoral Smith, who, passing .Jefferson by land
on the 14th, had followed the cavalry movement to that point, taking charge of the supplies,
whic~b, in consequence of the destruction of the bridge by the rebels, could go by rail no
further. vVinslow's cavalry marching, reached Jefferson, the advance 20 miles beyond at
California, on the 16th, and was ordered to join General Pleasonton without delay.
On the 18th General Smith was ordered to move to Dunks burg, near the cavalry headquarters, taking- five clays' rations and leaving minimum garrisons to guard ancl handle stores
at Sedalia and Lamine bridge. The 19th found this movement accomplished; the cavalry
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with its centre near Cook's store, its right behind the Blackwater, and its left near Kirkpat.rick's mills, towards Warrensburg.
The enemv apparently hesitated in the vicinity of Marsha1l, as if uncertain whether to go
west or double on his tracks between Sedalia and Jefferson, but our cavalry advance receding a few miles to meet supplies and concentrate, on the 17th and li3th, seemed to decide his
movements towards Lexington, where General Curtis telegraphed me, on the 19th, the head
of his column had arrived, General Blunt, after a sharp skirmish, retiring towards Independence. I informed General Curtis of our position ; that our troops reported Price near W averly; advised that Blunt check his advance at Wellington, and as soon as we were sure his
main force was moving on Lexington we would endeavor by a forced march to strike him in
the flank. To ascertain Price's real intentions General Pleasanton was directed to make a
strong reconnaissance towards Waverly. The results of this reached me on the morning of
the 2Uth, and Pleasanton was directed at once to push the centre of his cavalry to Lexington,
and General Smith with his infantry to support the movement. At 7 p. m. Pleasanton
reported the enemy had left Lexington, going west, and MeNeill and Sanborn entering the
town. October 2L our cavalry advance followed the enemy to Fire Creek prairie, Brown's
and Winslow's brigades reaching Lexington at 2 o'clock p. m. and the infantry at 9 p. m.
of the same day. General Curtis also reported a fight with the enemy's entire force at the
Little Blue, from 10 a. m. to 2 p. m., and that to prevent being flanked he should retire to
the Big Blue, where his militia and artillery were in strong position. Supposing the enemy
could not cross the Big Blue in the face of Curtis, I despatched General Pleasanton my belief
that he would move south, and that while MeNeill's brigade should harass his rear, he, with the
other three brigades, should move towards Lone Jack, near which would be General Smith's
infantry, now marching from Lexington to Chapel Hill. At 10 o'clock p. m. a despatch from
Pleasonton informed me of the receipt of these conditional orders, and that the enemy in full
force was moving far to the west, followed by his cavalry. October 22 Pleasanton's cavalry reached the Little Blue at 10 a. m., found the bridge destroyed; a temporary one was
constructed, the enemy's skirmishers driven, the command crossed, when the en~my opened
with artillery and was steadily driven towards Independence, which place was taken by a
brilliant cavalry charge, in which Cutherwood's regiment captured two guns complete, near
a hundred prisoners fell into our hands, and our troops pushed the enemy's rear guard all
night. At 8 p. m. Pleasanton reports: "All my brigades have been engaged. The enemy
have left 40 killed and many sick and wounded in my hands. Heard nothing from Curtis.
If Smith can come up in case we get a fight, it will be well. Have sent McNeill's brigade to
Little Santa Fe. Price is reported intrenched this side of the Big Blue. Fighting still going
on with an obstinate rear guard. Let Smith come to this place." Reluctantly General
Smith was despatched to move to Independence as requested, the messenger reaching him at
Chapel Hill as he was putting his column in motion to march there in response to a direct
message from General Pleasanton advising him of the posture of affairs.
On the morning of the 23d Pleasanton began to move on the enemy at the crossing of the
Big Blue, where the fight opened at 7 a. m. and continued untill p. m., when Shelby, who
had been fighting General Curtis's command, finding Marmaduke and Fagan were giving
way, turned on Pleasanton and "for a moment shook Sanborn's brigade," but by the skilful use of Thurben's battery, throwing double-shotted grape and canister, and the gallant
charging of our troops, they were routed and fled southward, pushed by Generals Pleasanton
and Curtis that night beyond Little ~anta Fe.
General Smith's command, arriving at Independence at 5 p. m., was ordered to move that
night by a forced march to Hickman's mills, hoping it would strike the enemy in flank
while passing that point. Had he been ordered and marched for that point instead of Independence the day before, General Smith would have arrived in time to strike the enemy's
compact columns and train with nine thousand infantry and 1iYe batteries, but it was too
late. He did not reach the mill until long after not only the enemy's but our own columns
had passed there.
News from the cavalry fronts during the night showed that nothing remained but to push
the enemy with our cavalry; allowing the infantry to follow as best it could, to act as
support in case of possible reverse to us, or re-enforcements which were currently reported on
their way to meet the enemy.
On the 24th, with the Kansas troops in advance we pursued the enemy until within fifteen
miles of the Trading Post, where, at General Curtis's request, General Pleasanton's command
took the lead, and at the end of sixty miles march overtook the rebels about midnight at the
Marias-des-Cygnes, began skirmishing, and on the 25th at4 a.m. opened upon their bivouac
with artillery, creating the greatest consternation, following it up by an attack which drove
them promptly hom the field, leaving in our hands horses, mules, wagons, arms, and some
prisoners, Onr troops followed them in a running fight until 2 o'clock p. m., when they
came up with them at the Little Osage, crossing in position with eight pieces of artillery on
their line of battle. With the instinct of a true cavalry general, Pleasanton immediately
ordered an attack by Benteen and Phillips' sbrigades, which by a magnificent charge completely routed them, capturing eight guns, two stands of colors, Major General Marmaduke,
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Brigadier General Cabell, fiye eolonels, other officers, and near one thousand prisoners, besides wagons, small-arms, &c. Sanborn's brigade, which was a mile and a half behind, and
the Kansas troops. still further in rear, did not arrive in time to take part in the battle, but
Sanborn's brigade led in the pursuit of the routed en.emy, o-yertook them at a small ~tr~am
a few miles beyond the battle-ground, charged them m the timber, drove them across 1t mto
the open prairie, where they formed in order of battle, three lines deep. But such was t~e
enthusiasm of the men of this brigade when they reached the edge of the wood an_d. saw thi_s
triple line, they charged it without orders, knocked it in pieces and chased the fugitives until
night closed the pursuit and the enemy fled under cover of the darkness towards the Arkansas
border. Besides the wagons captured during this day at the Mari~s-des:Cygnes, o~ ~he
way to and at the Little Osage, the enemy had destroyed many, mcludmg ammumhon
wagons, and for twenty-five or thirty miles beyond the Osage battle-field their route was
strewn with debris of burning wagons and other property. Pleasanton's cavalry had now
been in motion almost day and night for six days, during which it had marched at least 204
miles and fought four battles. It was pretty well exhausted and broken down, and we~t
into Fort Scott that night for food and a little rest. He reported to me the results of his
day's work; that the enemy was going at his utmost, and his own troops were so broken
down it would be impossible without fresh horses to strike the enemy another great blow this
side of the Arkansas, and recommended that Generals Sanborn and McNeill follow to support
Curtis's troops in pursuit so long as there was any prospect of damaging the enemy, and then
return to Springfield and Rolla.
On the receipt of the news of the enemy's rout, General Smith, whose command was out
of provisions, was directed to move to Harrisonville, and thence get supplies from Warrensburg, where 100 wagons were waiting with provisions for our command, sending thirty
thousand rations to the cavalry. Further reports of the enemy's condition satisfi!id me there
would be no use of breaking down any more of our horses, since General Cuttis, whose
cavalry horses were fresher than ours, supported by Sanborn and McNeill, on their way
down the State line, would be more than ample to deal with any resistance Price's command
would offer this side of the Arkansas.
Orders were accordingly given, and General Pleasanton returned, with Phillips's brigade, the
cannon and part of the prisoners, to Warrensburg. The Kansas troops and Benteen's brigade
pursued the enemy's flying columns, a part of whom made their last stand at Newtonia,
Missouri, where General Blunt overtook and attacked them on the 28th, but was being
worsted when Sanborn, having marched 102 miles in 36 hours, arrived in time to save the
day. The enemy fled, making no further stand this side of the Arkansas. In a country
destitute of food for man and beast, five times defeated, pursued four or five hundred miles,
w~th loss of nearly all their artillery, ammunition and baggage trains, demoralizntion and
destitution and want of supplies, would the rebels recross the Arkansas-supplies at the risk
of falling into the hands of Thayer's forces or Steele's cavalry, and, if allowed, would almost
disintegrate and disband them on the way thither.
General Curtis thought pushing them was best, and accordingly followed, although he
did not again overtake them. At his urgent instance, against my own judgment as well as
that of Generals Sanborn and McNeill, I pushed their two brigades down to the Arkansas
border, whence Sanborn sent an advance to Fort Smith, reaching there on the morning
of the 8th, to notify General Thayer of the enemy's desperate condition, and the direction
he had taken from Cane Hill, towards the Indian nation, between Fort Smith and Fort
Gibson. Meanwhile, at Sherman's request, followed by orders from the general-in-chief, I
directed Major General A. J. Smith to move his command by the most expeditious route to
the Mississippi, in the vicinity of St. Louis, there to embark and proceed to Nashville, and
report to Major General George H. Thomas. On the 3d of November I returned to St.
Louis, to be there during· the election, and on the receipt of the news of the enemy having
crossed the Arkansas, directed the cavalry to repair to their respective districts, and Winslow's cavalry to move by the best route, and join General Thomas at Nashville.
In entering into details, I have aimed to give the general commanding a sort of military
photograph of our daily condition and movements, as well for his critical judgment as for
history, omitting events of whatever magnitude not having a bearing on our movements,
and most of the minor ones which did enter into their determination. I trust that the precautions taken in advance of Price's movements, the preparations before we knew where he
was coming, the means taken to secure our most important points, and occupy him until we
could concentrate the forces to strike him with a certainty of success, outweighing any
damage he could meanwhile do us; the energy and activity in concentration, vigor in pursuit, and fiery gallantry of our troops in battle, will receive the approbation of the general
commanding the military division. It will appear from these details and accompanying
reports that our dismounted cavalry, infantry and militia nobly performed their duty,
watching, marching, and fighting, whenever and wherever opportunity offered; that by their
aid, in holding our depots and supporting our mounted force, we have saved all our important posts, and most of the country from pillage, except a belt of some twenty miles wide
along the route of the invasion; and with less than seven thousand effective cavalry have
pursued, overtaken, beaten in seYeral engagements, and finally routed, an invading cavalry,
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variously estimated at from 15,000 to 26,000 men, re-enforced by six thousand armed recruits
from Missouri, taken from them ten pieces of a1·tilleTy, two stands of colors, 1, 958 prisoners
of war, a large number of horses, mules, wagons, and small-arms, compelled them to destroy
most of their remaining wagon trains and plunder, blasted all the political schemes of the
rebels and traitors who concerted with Price to revolutionize Missouri, destroy Kansas, and
turn the State and presidential elections against the Union cause; and by our triumph in the
late elections have given to gallant and suffering Missouri the fairest prospect she has ever
yet seen of future freedom, peace, and prosperity-all the fruit of a campaign of 48 days, in
which most of our victorious troops had never before seen a great cavalry battle. Rarely
during this or any war has cavalry displayed more perseYering energy in pursuit, more impetuous courage and gallantry in attacking, regardless of superior numbers, or had its efforts
erowned with greater fruits of success. While paying a just tribute of thanks to all the
officers and soldiers of the cavalry, artillery, infantry, militia and citizen guards, who served
during the raid, for their prompt and cheerful obedience to all orders, whether to labor,
march, or £ght, I must refer the accompanying reports of their commanders for special mentions of individual gallantry.
Major General Pleasonton deserves the thanks of the country for the able manner in which
he handled and fought the cavalry, and the brilliant and fruitful victones he won over triple
his own force. I hope he may receive promotion in the regular army. Major General .A. J.
Smith deserves thanl{s for promptitude, energ·y and perseverance in all his movements, and
for the good judgment displayed in his campaign. Nor must I omit a tribute of admiration
to those brave and true soldiers who, under Mower, followed Price from Arkansas, marching
300 miles in 18 clays, and after going by boat from Cape Girardeau to Jefferson City, resumed
the pursuit, marching another march of 462 miles before they embarked for Nashville to take
part in the not doubtful contest before that city for the mastery of Middle Tennessee. The district commanders all deserve my thanks for prompt and cordial co-operation in all measures
precautionary and preparatory for the raid.
General Ewing deserves special mention for military judgment, courage, and gallantry in
holding Pilot Knob till he had certainty of the enemy's force, as well as for the manner in
which he withdrew his troops to Rolla.
General McNeill, for promptitude and energy in putting Rolla in a state of defence, and for
moving with all his force to Jefferson City in time to succor it.
General Fisk, for the prompt and cheerful discharge of very trying administrative duties,
and for the energy and good sense in preparing the defence of Jefferson City, as in the
subsequent repair of Lamine bridge.
General Brown displayed energy and good sense in preparing the city for a good defence;
and General Sanborn, for vigilance, energy, and soldierly judgment, while commanding the
cavalry advance between Jefferson City and Dunksbury, as well as throughout the campaign. Colonel J. V. Du Bois, A. D. C., chief of stafl"; Captain Henry, assistant quartermaster of General Steele's staff, volunteer quartermaster in the £eld; Captain G. Saull, chief
commissary surgeon; P. V. Schenck, medical director in the £eld; Captain Hocke, acting
aide-de-camp, engineer; Major Fisher, 5th Missouri State militia, on engineer duty; Captain
J. F. Bennett, assistant adjutant general, and my personal aids, Major T. S. Bond, aide-decamp, and Captain R. S. Thomas, aide-de-camp; Captain Hills, 1~th Kansas, and provost
marshal, accompanied me during the campaign, and were zealous and indefatigable in the
discharge of their respective duties. Major McDermott, 1st Iowa cavalry, who, with his
battalion of 1st Iowa cavalry, did such good service in northern Missouri, and behaved very
gallantly in the pursuit of the rebels from Jefferson City to Booneville, commanded the
escort from Sedalia, and deserves honorable mention. Brigadier General J. B. Gray, adjutant
general of Missouri, and Brigadier General Pike, of the enrolled militia, are entitled to public
thanks for their valuable and indefatigable service in connexion with the enrolled militia.
Colonel E. J. Hains, commissary of subsistence, to whom all the armies as well as the
country owe a debt of gratitude for invaluable services not likely to be overpaid, displayed
his usual promptitude and foresight in providing for th(l wants of our troops and depots.
Colonel "William Myers, chief quartermaster, in supplying animals, £tting up trains, and
providing for the wants of our troops, exhibited his eharacteristic care and skill.
I must also mention the voluntary services of those tried veterans, Colonel Wanghim, of
the 12th Missouri volunteer infantry, and Colonel Laibold, who did all in their power to aid
in the defence of St. Louis. Senator B. Gratz Brown and Mayor Thomas, seconded by
the efforts of many patriotic citizens of all classes, did much to prepare for the defence of the
city, and deserve my thanks. I should be glad to call the general's attention to many
military officers, such as General Craig, whose able management in the northwest in the absence of General Fisk; Colonel Gale, who so promptly organized his militia regiment (54th
enrolled Missouri militia) at Franklin, and many others scattered over the State, who rendered great service to the country. But as the chief motive of these officers and the men of
their commands was their country's good, the consciousness of duty manfully performed
must be their chief reward until the day comes when our children, pointing to them as to
others who have borne arms in this great national struggle, shall say "there go some of the
men " ·ho helped to save our nation."
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The accompanying reports show our total losses in this campaign were 174 killed, of
whom 116 were wounded at Centralia; 336 wounded; 171 prisoners, of whom many, if not
all, are illegally paroled; 601 hors-du-combat. Besides which, there were several small
squads of prisoners illegally captured and paroled in southeast Missouri, and the troops at
Glasgow, whose surrender was, I think, justifiable and possibly lawful.
vV. S. ROSECRANS, Major Geneml.
Lieut. Colonel CHRISTENSON. A. A. G ..
1
Military Division, ri est Mississippi, New Orleans, La.
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MISCELLANEOUS.
OPERATIONS AGAINST CHARLESTON.
NAVY DEPARTMENT,

Washington, June 30, 1864.
SIR: At the request of Rear-Admiral John A. Dahlgren, I have the honor
to forward the accompanying communication, dated the 20th instant, addressed
by him to the chaiqnan of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.
Very respectfully, &c.,
GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary qf tlte Navy.
Hon. B. F. WADE,
Clz,azrman qf tke Com. on Con. qf the War, U. S. Senate.

UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP PHILADELPHIA,

Glwdeston Roads, June 20, 1864.
SIR: I understand the committee to inquire whether there has been any
failure in conducting operations off Charleston, To this I lJeg leave to reply,
that in my opinion there has been no failure to accomplish all that the naval
force present was capable of doing, and more, perhaps, than could properly
have been expected of it.
Previous to the lOth of July, 1863, the blockade of the port was so imperfect that vessels entered and departed with so little risk that the export of cotton
and import of supplies did not suffer any material interruption. I have been
informed by persons who certainly have opportunities of knowing that the storehouses of the city were never more full of cotton than then. As a consequence,
the rebel government and people depended chiefly on this trade for the great
aid and comfort they received from foreign sympathies. Besides this, Morris
island was in the hands of the rebels, and Fort Sumter continued to be a formidable fortress, which, in connexion with Moultrie, completely barred entrance
to Charleston harbor.
Two attempts had been made to approach the city-one by the army, 'intended to operate across James island, beginning at Secession ville ; the other
by the navy, in a direct attack on Fort Sumter-about one year ago. Both of
these failed entirely, and Charleston seemed to defy every effort on our part to
disturb the prosperity that she enjoyed, and which was far greater than h~d
ever been known under the compact of the Union. '.rhis was quickly reversed
by the combined operations under General Gillmore and myself, which concluded in the capture of Morris island and the occupation of the roadstead, or
main ship channel, leading into the harbor, while Sumter, though still sheltering
a small rebel ·garrison, was reduced from its great power as a first class fortress
to the condition of an outpost for Forts Johnson and Moultrie.
A perfect blockade was thus enforced, so that the illicit trade of the city was
completely cut off, and the produce wrung fro~ a degrading system of labor
1M

.

2

MISCELLAN.EOUS.

was compelled to find exit elsewhere. The prosperity of the city collapsed at
once, and this nest of a wicked rebellion was thus made to experience some of
the horrid evils which it has been so instrumental in spreading over this once
happy land.
'I'he following is a brief account of the operations of the navy and army in
this quarter :
Morris island is a narrow outlying strip of sand beach about three and a
half miles (statute) long and of irregular width, not exceeding three hundred
or four hundred yards at the widest part, and in many places not half that.
This beach is completely insulated seaward by the main ship channel, and
westward by an impassable morass, which extends landward some three thousand five hundred yards, and is there terminated by the firm land of James
island. It is intersected by small streams and dotted with a few little spots of
firm soil. The north end (Cummings's Point) forms the left angle of Charleston harbor in entering. From the ship channel the beach can be approached
by the monitors to twelve hundred yards at low water, and at high water to onethird of that distance.
The site of Wagner is about three-fourths of a mile from the north end,
stretches entirely across the island, and a battery of heavy guns occupied the
t'xtreme northern end. Ji\·om Wagner to the southward the beach runs evenly
for a mile and a half, when there arises a succession of sand-kills, upon which
the rebels bad placed cannon to command the approach from Folly island, and
the narrow inlet that separated it from Morris island.
Nearly north from the north end of Morris island the hr,avy masonry of
Sumter rises out of_ the water at the distance of about thirteen hundred yards.
I took command of the naval forces on the 6th of July at Port Royal, left
there on the 8th, collected the scattered monitors, and on the 9th, before daylight, was off the bar of Charleston, ready to cross. The general asked for a
day's postponement, and on the lOth of July, 1863, I began the attack on
l\Iorris island. The enemy were driven by the combined operation from their
positions on the south end into Fort Wagner, which I cannonaded with the
monitors from 9 a. m. till the evening. rl'he next morning the general assaulted
and was repulsed. Of this intention I was not informed previously, and therefore had no opportunity of assisting until all was over.
Some light batteries were thrown up, and in a week afterwards (18th July)
an assault in force was made. The iron-clads battered Wagner almost out of
shape, and on the afternoon of that day the flag-monitor (Montauk) lay only
three hundred yards from the sea face of the work; not a gun was fired from
it ; not a head was visible to my glass as I stood with other officers outside
watching the first symptom of renewed resistance. Our column came up, but it
was too dark to discern objects from the vessels, and after a fierce and resolute
effort the column fell back with a loss of fifteen hundred men.
This assault could derive no aid from the fire of our guns, because it was
impossible to distinguish our troops from the enemy.
This compelled a resort to the regular approach es, and after incessant labor
the rebels were finally forced to evacpate on the 7th of September.
'l'he committee will perceiYe, by examining the annexed plan of the locality,
· that it would have been impossible for the troops to have landed on the island,
or to have continued operations there, without the active assistance of the navythe presence alone of the vessels would not suffice ; the action of their cannon
was required to restrain the rebels from advancing by counter approaches upon
our lines, or from landing in force at the north end of the island, and marching
in superior numbers upon our men, and driving them off the island.
This is evident from the very configuration of the island, and is also assumed
by General Hunter as the reason for his ·not proceeding against 1\iorris island,
precisely as was done by General Gillmore and myself subsequently.
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The letter of Genc·,ral Hunter is addressed to the President, and a copy of it
is appended, from which it will be seen that he deemed the aid of the navy
absolutely indispensable to the reduction of Morris island, and would not proceed without it.
'rhe conviction then of General Hunter was, that he could do nothing at all
on Morris island without the aid of the navy, even when the rebels were comparatively unprepared to what they were when the attack was made by General
Gillmore and myself.
I will now cite the opinion of General Gillmore himself, who informed the
authorities on the 20th of June that he "could do nothing," as the •' admiral
had no instructions, and did not fe~l at liberty to put his vessels into action," &c.
The committee will observe that the plan of General Hunter was virtually
the same as that put into execution by General Gillmore.
The following will show how faithfully the aid of the vessels was rendered,
being a brief exhibit of the occasions when they engaged the different rebel
works:

Date, object engaged, vessels engaged.
July 10, 1863; Fort Wagner; iron-clads Kaatskill, (flag-ship,) Montauk
Nahant, Weehawken.
July 11, 1863; Fort Wagner; iron-clads Kaatskill, (flag-ship,) Montauk,
Nahant, Weehawken.
July 18, 1863; Fort Wagner, assault; iron-clads Montauk, (flag-ship,) Ironsides, Kaatskill, Nantucket, Weehawken, Patapsco; gunboats Paul Jones, Ottawa, Seneca, Wissahickon.
July 20, 1863; Fort Wagner; iron-clad Ironsides.
July 22, 1863; ~..,ort Wagner; iron-clad Nantucket; gunboat Ottawa.
J u~y 24, 1863; Fort Wagner, to cover advance of our shore batteries; ironclads Weehawken, (flag-ship,) Ironsides, Kaatskill, Montauk, Patapsco, Nantucket ; gunboats Paul Jones, Seneca, Ottawa, Dai Ching . .
July 25, 1863; Fort Wagner; gunboats Ottawa, Dai Ching, Paul Jones.
July 28, 1863 ; Fort Wagner; iron-clads Weehawken, Kaatskill; gunboat
Ottawa.
.
July 29, 1863; Fort Wagner; iron-clads Ironsides, Patapsco, Passaic.
July 30, 1863; Fort Wagner; iron-clads Ironsides, Kaatskill, Patapsco; gunboat Ottawa.
July 31, 1863; Fort Wagner and rebel batteries on Morris island; gunboat
Ottawa.
August 1, 1863 ; Fort Wagner ; iron- clads Montauk, Patapsco, Kaatskill,
Weehawken, Passaic, Nahant ; gunboat Marblehead.
August 2, 1863; Fort Wagner; gunboats Ottawa, Marblehead.
August 4, 1863; Fort Wagner; iron-clad Montauk; gunboat Marblehead.
August 6, 1863; Fort Wagner; gunboat Marblehel:td.
August 8, 1863; Fort Wagner; gunboats Ottawa, Marblehead, Mahaska.
August 11, 1863; Fort Wagner and vicinity; iron-clads Patapsco, Kaatskill.
August 13, 1863; ~..,ort Wagner and rebel batteries on Morris island; gunboats Dai Ching, Ottawa, Mahaska, Wissahickon, Racer.
,
August 14, 1863; Fort Wagner and rebel batteries on Morris island; gunboats
Wissahickon, Mahaska, Ottawa, Dai Ching; mortar boats Racer, Dan Smith.
August 15, 186:3; Fort Wagner; mortar boats Racer and Dan Smith.
August 17, 1863; Fort Wagner and other rebel batteries on Morris island, in
order to divert their fire from our shore batteries, which opened on Sumter;
iron-clads Weehawken, (flag-ship,) Ironsides, Montauk, Nahant, Kaatskill,
Passaic, Patapsco; gunboats Canandaigua, Mahaska, Ottawa, Cimarron, Wissahickon, Dai Ching, Lodona.
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August 18, 1863 ; Fort Wagner ; to prevent assault anticipated by Genrral
Gillmore; iron-clads Ironsides, Passaic, Weehawken; gunboats Wissahickon,
Mahaska, Dai Ching, Ottawa, Lodona.
August 19, 1863; Fort Wagner; iron-clad Ironsides.
August 20, 1863; rebel batteries on Morris island; iron-clad Ironsidel3; gunboats Mahaska, Ottawa, Dai Ching, Lodona.
August 21, Forts Sumter and Wagner ; iron-clads Ironsides, Patapsco; gunboats Mahaska, Dai Ching.
August 22, 1863; Fort Wagner; iron-clads Weehawken, Ironsides, Montauk.
August23, 1863; Fort Sumper, (night attack;) iron-clads Ironsides, Weehawken, (flag-ship,) Montauk, Passaic, Patapsco, Nahant.
August 31, 1863 ; Fort Moultrie; iron-clads Passaic, Patapsco,Weehawken,
Nahant.
September 1. 1863; Fort Sumter and "obstructions in channel, (night attack;)
iron-clads Weehawken, (flag-ship,) Montauk, Passaic, Patapsco, Nahant,
Lehigh.
September 2, 1863; Gregg and Fort Sumter; iron-clad Ironsides.
September 5, 1863; between Sumter and battery Gregg; iron-clads Ironsides,
Lehigh, Nahant.
September 6, 1863 ; Fort Wagner and battery Gregg; iron-clads Ironsides,
Patapsco, Lehigh, Nahant, Montauk, Weehawken, Passaic.
September 7, 1863; Ji,orts Moultrie and batteries on Sullivan's island, to cover
the Weehawken, (ashore;) iron-clads Ironsides, (Bag-ship,) Patapsco, Lehigh,
Nahant, Montauk, Weehawken, (ashore.)
September 8, 1863; Fort Moultrie and batteries on Sullivan's island, to cover
the Weehawken, (ashore;) ii·on-clads Ironsides, Patapsco, Lehigh, Nahant,
Montauk, Weehawken, (ashore,) Passaic in a disabled condition.
The following telegrams from General Gillmore will inform the com!Pittee of
the value that was attached to the power of the vessels:
Teleg1·ams from Geneml Gillmore. .
JULY

Replies j1·om Rear-Admiral Dahlgren.

30-8 a.m.

The enemy firing musketry from
Wagner, and interferes with my working. Can you not help me to subdue
him1

AuGUST 11-2.35 a.m.
Please open as soon as possible ; the
enemy's fire is very heavy.

I have just ordered a monitor and a
gun-boat into action.

All right.

AuausT 17.
To save Sumter, the enemy may atA detachment of iron-clads will be
tempt a sortie in the morning. Can in position at daybreak.
you get monitors in position as early as
to-day1
AuGusT 17.
The enemy are mounting a heavy
I have sent two monitors up to keep
gun on the sea-face of Wagner.
them quiet in Wagner.
AuGUST 19.
If you could replace them (Whitwm;th guns) with 8-inch guns, and 300
or 400 rounds of ammunition for each
gun, it would help us greatly.

I will have them replaced immediately.
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approaches to Wagner are suspended on account of the annoyance
from the enemy's sharp-shooters. Can
you not stop it?

~fy

AuGUST 21.
rrhe 'fire from wagner is very galling.
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I will try to do so.

I am now going to move up with the
monitors.

AuGUST 22.
Wagner has opened a heavy fire on
I will send up two or three monitors
our works. Unless the navy succeed at once.
in silencing them, there is great danger
of their dismounting our guns.
AuGUST 22.
Colonel Turner telegraphs me from
Orders have been given, and the
the front that, unless the navy opens monitors are moving up.
speedily, two of our guns will certainly
be dismounted·:
AuGUST 23.
Can you let me have some 100pounder Parrott shells 1 I am entirely
out.
AuausT 27.
Can I take another S-inch gun and a
100-pounder Pa.rrottfrom your vessels 1

I can let you have 250 shell, and 100
shot; also, 100 Schenk! shells.

You can take the guns.

It will be perceived that, besides the assistance ordinarily given, it frequently
happened that exigencies arose when the fire of the iron-clads was specially
needed; and these at times were so pressing that the request was repeated
before the iron-clads could get up their anchors and steam into position, and, by
referring to the previous minutes of occasions when they were in action, it will
be seen that they never failed to render what was asked.
Besides this assistance from the heavy guns of the batteries our men and boats
with their light guns were often asked for and always accomplished their work
satisfactorily.
At the crossing of Light-house inlet the column waiil conveyed in our boats,
under Lientenaut Commander Bunce and Lieutenant Mackenzie, and covered
by the navy howitzers.
A picket of launches was placed in the creek on the left flank of the works
on Morris island, and the boats of the vessels were also frequently stationed at
night on the :3ea-shore of the island to guard against the enterprise of the enemy.
I also landed some rifle cannon with seamen under Ca,ptain Parker, with
which a battery was armed, and engaged with the other batteries in battering
Sumter.
And yet efforts have been made to give the credit of the capture of Wagner
and all the consequent results entirely to the general commanding the troops
and to the engineering operations which he conducted on Morris island. Every
mail from this locality teemed with glowing accounts of what was achieved by
the army, while the co-operation of the navy received little notice and no credit,
for which I need only refer you to the columns of some of the daily papers.
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These partial notices finally took the forms of direct attacks on myself. It was
affirmed that I was at variance with General Gillmore, thereby doing injury to
·pending operations, and this at the very time when those operations were proceeding most harmoniously and successfully. It was not only untrue that there
had been any variance between General Gillmore from the first-and these infamous libellers knew it-but at last they went so far as to assert that General
Gillmore intended to resign because of these difficulties; whereupon the general
found it proper, of his own accord and without the first word from me upon the
subject, to address me the following note :
"MoHRIS IsLAND, S. C., September 23.
''ADMiRAL: I am much chagrined at the reports in the newspapers about my
tendering my resignation in consequence of a disagreement between you and
myself, and that we did not co-operate cordially. It is not necessary for me to
assure you that I am entirely ignorant of the slightest foundation for such reports, and had no idea that they existed until they appeared in the papers.
They were doubtless started by some scribbling se1lsationist in lieu of news.
I will see that they are authoritatively contradicted.
"Sincerely yours,
"Q. A. GILLMORE.
"Rear-Admiral DAHLGHEN."
I was utterly at a loss to comprehend the motion of these assaults for a long
time, but have been somewhat eRlightened on the subject lately.
It is with great reluctance that I now permit myself to notice them, for I fe1t
that in a cause so great, and when the suffering country demanded every exertion from her som, it illy became them to yield to their priv:ate griefs.
I came here prepared to give my best efforts to the flag I had served so long,
and to make any sacrifice that was demanded of me; every moment of my time
was given to the duties about me, and the smallest matter that could be useful
was not too small for my personal attention. I could not understand that actual
witnesses of what was going on could so degrade themselves by the scandal of
misinterpreting and underrating· my own exertions and everything that was done
by the navy.
I have thus briefly, but I hope rlearly, explained the nature and effect of the
operations upon Morris island, and the full share which the navy had in its
occupation, as well as the reduction of Fort Sumter to a heap of ruins. ·
rrhe rebels had no alternative but to abandon Wagner and the smaller works
north of it on the island, for if they had not it would have undoubtedly been taken
by assault on the 7th of September, and the garrison would have been captured
as well as the works.
But they would not evacuate what was left of Sumter, and, as the sequel
proved, with good reason.
It was no longer what it had been, a first class work with a powerful armament, co-operating with Moultrie in forbidding passage to ships-of-war, and
bearing with great effect on the interior anchorage; but it served as an outpost
to Forts J <:>hnson and Moultrie, and with a small garrison was capable of maintaining a fire of musketry and light artillery, which would prevent us from
effectually removing the obstructions between Sumter and Moultrie, and interfere
to a great degree with our scout boats in traversing the lower harbor.
Moreover, there was every reason to apprehend that by some exertion they
would convert the ruins into a better defence th&n bad been the solid walls, and
even succeed in establishing cannon on the fronts inaccessible to our battelies.
If, on the contrary, the rebels were driven out they would be deprived of
these advantages, and we would have access to the lower harbor on terms nearly
·
as good as they had.
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Subsequent experience has shown that I did not overestimate the importance
of mastering this spot, and impressed with the advantages that seemed so plain
to me, I decided to assault it while the confusion and depression caused by the
loss of Morris island were still in full force.
I fully appreciated the difficulties that were to be ~xpected in making the
assault, but. believed that the great advantages in view fully justified the undertaking.
Great care was taken in organizing the column of attack; there were no better
meu at hand, and they were led by officers whose standing fully jnstified their
selection. A strong detachment of marines formed part of the column, in all
about four hundred and fifty men, while the force of the rebel garrison was afterwards learned to be two hundred and fifty to three hundred men.
1'he rebels evacuated Wagner on the nights of the 6th and 7th of September,
and the assault on Sumter was made about an hour after midnight of the 8th
and 9th of September.
It failed, and the causes will never be well understood, as few who participated could see far in the darkness of the night.
It seems that General Gillmore had intended to make the same attempt on
the same night.
Of th is I knew nothing until late in the day, when I became acquainted
with it on sending to borrow some of his boats. A proposal to co-operate was at
once acceded to by me; but on account of the difficulty of communicating
promptly and correctly by signal I sent Lieutenant Preston a::;hore, (the acting
fieet-captain,) who returned and reported that all was arranged satisfactorily,
so we proceeded. It was now past midnight; the navy column with the greatest
celerity pushed straight for the work, supposing that the military column would
join, and in the darkness never paused to see whether it did so or not, but
resolutely went to its task. After a brief conflict the fire of the enemy was found
to be too heavy, and our men fell b::~ck.
I learned afterwards that the army boats had not been able to get out of the
creek in time.
The committee will perceive that the failure to co-operate was just such an
occurrence as frequently mars combined operations.
I was so intent on acting together, that while waiting for Lieutenant Preston
I wrote an order recalling my boats, in case he returned without being able to
effec:;t an arrangement. It was, of course, not sent when Lieutenant Preston
reported that the co-operation was satisfactorily adjusted. And I went myself
up the channel in order to insure personally the desired connexion of my
column with General Gillmore's. The attack began, however, when I was
within a few hundred yards of Sumter, and ended very quickly.
It should not e8cape notice that the intention of the general coincided
exactly with my own plans, in time of attack, number of men, and belief in
the pmcticability of the breach; so that if my judgment was at fault, General
Gillmore shared the error, and I may venture to believe that our concurrent
opinion was more reliable at the time than that of other parties present or
absent, who could not have had the same opportunities for opinion.
Of course, judgments formed after an event have facts to proceed upon
which are wanting previously.
I am by no means sure that a greater force would have improved the chances
of success, while our losses would have been greater.
Had this attempt succeeded, it would have materially changed the aspect of
affairs in conducting future· operations.
As it was, I believe now, as I did then, that the possession of the remains of
tlJe work was all-important, and my only regret is that my attempt failed to
obtain it.
As it was, Sumter remained with the rebels. General Gillmore opened the
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batteries f1·om vVagner and Gregg, as soon as he bad completed them late in
October, and I also sent two monitors with rifl~s.
Together, the walls of the fort were again battered until , the gorge and seaface were one heap of ruins.
rrhe monitors made excellent work, and cut through the nearest and furthest
walls.
No attempt was made to assault it by the army, though a large force was
sent one evening to feel the state of its defence.
So that if my assault failed, nothing else has succeeded to this day, for the
rebel garrison still occupies Sumter.
I should have premised this account of the effort to capture Sumter, by saying that accident had also contributed to disr~ppoint me in another respect. I
had ordered the Weehawken (monitor) to take position in the only channel
rearward of Sumter, where she could float; in doing so, she grounded where
the batteries of Moultrie had full sweep, and I not only lost her service in
covering the assault, but was obliged to order up other iron-clads to prevent
her being disabled, which brought on a severe conflict, that bore with considerable severity on the vessels, and was hoped at the time had caused at
least equal inconvenience to the rebels. r.I'he Ironsides hauled off with little
ammunition left, and her associates were roughly handled.
I learned afterwards from a deserter, who was in battery B, that not a gun
or man was hurt there, and the parapet was only pierced in a few pla0es.
}1-,our guns of eighteen were dismounted in Moultrie, and the only serious
casualty was produced by a 15-ineh shell, from the Weehawken, which landed
in a large pile of loaded shellR; by its explosion some twenty men were killed,
and the same number wounded. So that, for all effective purposes, our fire bad
not impaired these works.
I now proceed to explain why the operations have been delayed in reaching
Charleston itself:
1st. r.I'he landing on Morris island was a complete surprise, and its result
was to afford us foothold from which we could gain possession of the entire
island and the main ship channel, besides reducing the great power of Sumter
as a fortress.
Had there been sufficient force, we could have overpowered Wagner by
assault, and entered the harbor before the rebels were able to complete the
interior defences or recover from their panic.
But there was supposed to be no greater land force than sufficed to overcome
Wagner by the slow process of engineering, and the rebels contrived to keep
us out of possession for nearly two months, during which time no exertion was
spared to extend and perfect the works that defended the interior harbor.
The incesRant battering to which the monitors had been exposed while bearing their part in reducing Wagner and Sumter, required considerable repair in
order to fit them to endure the fire of works far more formidable than Wagner.
And the scanty resources of the improvised workshops at Port Royal d:d
not permit this being effected with the promptness that would have been very
easy at New York or other cities with large establislm1ents. Material must be
brought from a distance, and machinery and tools, and the workmen, who could
hardly be obtained here in great numbers when they were scarce at the north
at any prices.
Moreover, if they had been, all of the monitors could not have been removed
from Charleston and put under . repair at the same time, because a certain
number was absolutely indispensable at Charleston to prevent the rebel ironclads from corning out.
The bottoms of the monitors had also become so foul that the speed was reduced to three or four knots-a very material consideration in battle.
And besides the repair, there were certain additional pieces to be put on to
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strengthen the construction, which work I found in progress when I took the
command, and nece:::sarily caused to be discontinued in order to commence
operations.
2d. I was in expectation of additional monitors about the 1st of October;
these were postponed from month to month by the failure of the contractors,
and have never reached me to this date, for, when they were £na1ly completed,
about the middle of April, they were needed in the James river, where they
now are.
3d. It was not until late in October that Wagner and Gregg had been turned
upon the rebels and armed, so that their assisting fire was not available before
that period.
It was, therefore, impossible to have moved with seven battered monitors
upon the strong works which lined the approach to the city, without certain
hazard to all that had been gained, and without any certainty of positive
advantage.
At the instance of the Navy Department, I convened a council of the ironclad captaim-officers well experienced in the offensive power of their vessels
and the defences of the rebels ; they were as follo·ws :
CommodoreS. C. Rowan, commanding Ironsides; Captain G. F. Emmons,
fleet-captain; Commander Daniel Ammen, special staff duty and formerly in
command of the Patapsco (monitor) during attack on Sumter, April 7, 1863.
Commander 'I\ H. Stevens, commanding Patapsco; Commander A. Bryson,
commanding Lehigh; Commander E. R. Calhoun, commanding Weehawken;
Lieutenant Commander E. Simpson, commanding Passaic; Lieutenant Commander J. L. Davis, commanding Montauk; Lieutenant Commander G. Cilley,
commanding Kaatskill; Lieutenant Commander J. J. Cornwell, commanding
Nahant.
A full and unrestrained discussion took place, and the following propositions
were voted on as follows :
Would there be "extreme risk incurred without adequate results" by entering the harbor of Charleston with the seven monitors, the object being to penetrate to Charleston 1
Ayes six. Noes four.
Should the Ironsides enter with the monitors 1
A yes four. Noes four. Doubtful two.
I{ the present force were not sufficient to enter the harbor, would it be advisable to co-operate with the army in an attack on Sullivan's island~
Ayes nine. Noes one.
Can Forts Moultrie and Johnson be reduced by the present force of ironclads, unsupported by the army 1
Unanimously, no.
It will be understood, of course, that in thus speaking and deciding the monitors were pre-supposed to be in good fighting order. r.rhis, however, was not
the case at the time, nor soon afterwards.
My own opinions were not stated to the council, and I took no further part
in the deliberations than to state the question and regulate the order of business.
In viewing the question of further operations, it was to be premised that the
co-operation of the army was at an end, aucl that whatever was to be done in
attacking the interior defences was to be the work of the navy alone.
A view of the harbor showed what this was to be. On the right lay Sullivan's island, with a continuous line of batteries from Bee, at t,he inner end, to
Moultrie. Somewhat further on, and to the left, Fort Johnson, a strong earthwork with eight or nine 8-inch and 10-inch smooth and rifled cannon, supported
seaward by Battery Simkins, and to the rear by Battery Cheves. Beyond
Johnson, some fifteen hundred yards, was Wampler, with two 10-inch guns;
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then Glover and another ~arth-work-force not known. Nearly opposite Johnson was Fort Ripley, with two or three heavy guns.
'rhese past, we confront the city batteries; Ramsay, at the lower angle of
the city, with seven heavy cannon; above it, on the Ashley, at Chisholm's
Mills is Battery Waring, with two heavy guns ; and opposite, the battery defending the entrance of Nappoo.
Ascending the Cooper river, on a wharf not far from White Point, is the
English 1:~-ineh 700-pounder; at the foot of Lawrence street is another battery; and further on, lying somewhat back, is the half-moon battery. Castle
Pinckney enters into the system, but has no material strength.
Other batteries at Habbrell's Point, Mount Pleasant, &c., are on the right
shore of the harbor, but would not be important in this connexion, though their
guns are heavy.
1.'here were also three iron-clads similar to the Atlanta, one of which (tbe
Charleston) was new, and reported to be a better vessel.
1.'he torpedo defe!lces cannot be accnrately estimated, but the best informrttion left no doubt that they were largely relied on by the rebels as an important
offensive element.
Under these circumstances, what could possibly result from the entrance of
iron-clads alone 1 At the best thty could only drive the rebels from the earthworks and silence their fire for the time; but tlwy could not expect to destroy
any one of the batteries. Day after day tons of shell had been expended on
Wagner, and Sumter, and Moultrie, and yet cannon alone, whether in the vessels or in the trenches, had failed to give us possession of either ; they were
effective only to give the opportunity which the troops were to secure. If thi:)
was the case with Wagner, what must be expected of Johnson and "its contiguous batteries, to which "\Vaguer was insignificant?
We know now that on the 8th of September the incessant fire of the "ironsides'' and five monitors for three hours had not burt a man in Battery Bee,
and only dismounted four guns of eighteen in Moultrie; some forty men being
killed and wounded in the latter by a Ehell from the "\Veekawken plunging into
a pile of loaded shells, inflicting more injnry on the garrison than the direct fire
of all the other vessels.
1.'his established fact, together with what was witnessed daily at 1Vagner,
gave no encouragement that the seven monitors could produce any permnnent
effect on the interior batteries, unless there were troops acting concurrently to
take advantage of the effect produced by their guns; and upon this proposition
the council was unanimous.
The iron-clads might steam in and make a promenade of the harbor, suffering
much damage, and inflicting little, then retire. 'l'o remain in, would only be a
u seless expenditure of valuable vessels, which could not soon be replaced.
Some thought that if the iron-clads could occupj a position near the city, it
would compel the rebels to abandon their exterior defences lying seaward. An
inspection of the locality would show that, this could not possibly apply to
James island or Sullivan's island; and if not to them, to what 1
The truth is, that the entrance of the iron-clads could only make sure of the
destruction of the city, and not this without undue risk, if there were only seven
monitors.
The act itself could not be objected to by the rebels, for it was understood to
be their intent to destroy the place themselves rather than we should occnpy it;
if so, it was quite as logical that we should destroy it rather than they should
occupy it.
At all events, upon the proposition to enter and penetrate to the city, the vote
in council of war stood six to four, and with the majority voted all the senior
officers, including my next in command, Commodore Rowan.·
At one time General Gillmore agreed, if he could be re-enforced, to co-operate
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against James island, but he told me that additional troops were refused, and
there it ended.
And thus the winter passed away, in close blockade, and in restoring the
monitors to good.fig-hting condition.
I was called to'\Vashington upon the business of my command, and when I
returned found the seven monitors at disposaL
It was the first time since taking command in July, 1863, that all the ironclads of the squadron were in good fighting order.
It was reported that the rebels had been active improving the defences of
Sumter, and mounting some heavy guns on the channel front.
It occurred to me as a fitting opportunity to bring into action the iron-clad
squadron.
And I summitted the question to a council of the iron-clad captains as follows:
Commodore S.C. Rowan, commanding Ironsides; Captain J. F. Green, to
command the monitor Nahant; Commander G. H. Cooper, commanding Sangamon; Commander N. B. Harrison, commanding Kaatskil1; Lieutenant Commander
E. Simpson, commanding Passaic; Lieutenant Commander J. M. Bradford,
fleet captain; Lieutenant Commander William Gibson, commanding Lehigh;
Lieutenant Commander S. B. Luce, commanding Nantucket; Lieutenant Commander J. L. Davis, commanding Montauk.
After a full discussion, it was decided by a vote of seven to two that it was
not advisable "with the present force of iron-clads, viz: seven monitors and
the ironsides, to attempt the re.duction of the offensive and defensive powers of
Sumter, as now existing, having due regard to the general interests in this
quarter intrusted to this squadron; to the consequences that would ensue in the
event of a serious disaster to the iron-clads, and to the views of the Navy
Department, set forth in communications dated October 9 and November 2,
1863."
Among the majority were the senior officers-Commodore Rowan, Captain
Green, Commanders Cooper and Harrison.
The committee will perceive, therefore, that in refraining from entering the
harbor of Charleston, with a view to interior operations with such force as I
could command, I was supported by the opinions of the ablest naval officers
about me.
At the same time, if the judgment of those who can give the order inclines
to a different view, it is only necessary to give me that order, and it shall -be
obeyed to the fullest extent, for r:othing will so well accord with my feelings.
I have now laid before the committee the principal points that present themselves to my mind at this time, not by any means as I would wish to do, but as
well as the demands of public service permit.
It may seem to the committee that sufficient time has elapsed since my statemellt was required to have expressed myself to the fullest extent; but since
that, the affliction of losing my gallant son, Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, and tbe
never-ceasing cares of a command like this, have not allowed me that opportunity for correcting mi sapprehensions which I might have properly desired.
1 have the houor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN A. DAHLGREN,
Rear-Admiral, Commanding Naval Forces ciff the coasts
qf Soutl~ Ca1·olina and Georgia.
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o/ a letter from Major General Hunter to his excellency the President of
the United States.

DEAR SIR : It is more than six weeks since the attack by the iron-clads upon
Charleston-an attack in which, from the nature of the plans of Admiral DuPont, the army had no active part.
On the day of that attack the troops under my command held Folly island
up to Light-house inlet. On the morning after the attack we were in complete
readiness to cross Light-house inlet to Morris island, where. once established,
the fall of Sumter would have been as certain as the demonstration of a problem
in mathematics. Aided by a cross-fire by the navy, the enemy would soon have
been driven from Cummings's Point, and, with powerful batteries of one and
two hundred-pounder rifled guns placed there, Fort Sumter would have been
rendered untenable in two days' fire. Fort Pulaski was breached and taken
from Goat's Point, on Tybee island-a precisely similar position~with 32pounder Parrott guns, 42-pounder James guns, and a few 10-inch columbiads,
the 13-inch mortars used in that bombardment having proved utterly valueless.
I mention these things to show how certain would have been the fall of Sumter
under the fire of the one and two hundred-pounders rifled now at my command.
On the afternoon after the iron-clad attack on Fort Sumter the troops on
F•lly it:land were not only ready to cross Light-house inlet, but were almost in
the act, the final reconnoissance having been made, the boats ready, and the men
under arms for crossing, when they were recalled, as I hoped, merely temporarily, by the announcement of Admiral DuPont that he had resolved to retire,
and that consequently we could expect no assistance from the navy.
Immediately the admiral was waited upon by an officer of my staff, who represented the forwardness of our preparation for crossing, the evidently unprepared condition of the enemy to receive us, while any delay. now that our intentions were unmasked, would give the enemy time to erect upon the southern
end of Morris island, commanding Light-~ouse inlet, those works and batteries
which he had heretofore neglected. r_ro these considerations, earnestly and
elaborately urged, the admiral's answer was, that "he would not fire another
shot." A lodgement on Morris island was thus made impossible for us, the enemy having powerful works on the island, more especially at the northern end,
out of which we could not hope to drive him unless aided by a cross-fire from
the navy. I therefore determined to hold what we had got until the admiral
should have had time to repair his vessels; and to this hour we hold every inch
of ground on Folly and Cole's, and Seabrook's island that we held on the day
of the expected crossing.
Since then· I have exercised patience with the admiral, and have pushed forward my work and batteries on Folly island with unremitting diligence, the
enemy, meanwhile, thoroughly aroused to their danger, throwing up works that
completely command Light-house inlet, on the southern side of Morris island,
so that the crossing, which eould have been effected in a couple of hours and
with little sacrifice six weeks ago, will now involve, whenever attempted, protracted operations and a very serious loss of life. And to what end should this
sacrifice be made without the co-operation of the navy 1 Even when established on the southern end of Morris island, the northern end, with its powerful
works, and commanded by the fire of Forts Sumter and Johnson, would still remain to be possessed. The sacrifice would be of no avail without the aid of the
navy; and I have been painfully but fully convinced that from the navy no
such aid is to be expected. I fear Admiral DuPont distrusts the iron-clads so
much that he has resolved to do nothing with them this summer, and, therefore,
I most urgently beg of you to liberate me from those orders to co-operate with
the navy, 'fhich now tie me down to share the admiral's inactivity. Remaining
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in our present situation, we do not even detain one soldier of the enemy from
service elsewhere. I am well satisfied that they have already sent away from
Charleston and Savannah all the troops not absolutely needed to garrison the
defences, and those will have to remain in the work whether the enemy be in
sight or not.
Liberate me from this order to "co-operate with the navy in an attack on
Charleston," and I will immediately place a column of ten thousand of the best
drilled soldiers in the country (as unquestionably are the troops of this department) in the heart of Georgia; our landing and march being made through
counties in which, as shown by the census, the slave population is seventy-five
per cent. of the inhabitants.
Nothing is truer, sir, than that this rebellion has left the southern States a
mere hollow shell. If we avoid their few strongholds, where they are prepared
for and invite us to battle, we shall meet no opposition in a total devastation of
their resources, thus compelling them to break up their large armies and gar1·isons at a few points, into scores of small fractions of armies for the protection
of every threatened and assailable point. 1 will guarantee, with the troops now
fruitlessly, though laboriously, occupying Folly and Seabrook islands, and. such
other troops as can be spared from the remaining posts of this department, to
penetrate into Georgia, produce a practical dissolution of the slave system there,
destroy all railroad communication along the eastern portion of the State, and
lay waste all stores which can possibly be used for the sustenance of the rebellion. My troops are in splendid health and discipline, and, in my judgment, are
more thoroughly in sympathy with the policy of the government than any other
equal body of men in the service of the United States to-day.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. HUNTER,
Major General Commanding.
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Major General N. J. T. Dana.

FRIDAY, .April 22, 1864.
Major General N.J. T. DANA sworn and examined.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. What is your rank and position in the army at this time 1
Answer. Major general of volunteers, since the 29th of November, 1862.
I am not at the present moment on duty. I have just been relieved from duty
in the department of the Gulf, at my own request, by order of the major general
commanding the department there.~
Question. How long were you connected with the department of the Gulf 1
Answer. I arrived at New Orleans and reported for duty there about the
middle of September last, and I have been continuously on duty there since
that time until I left New Orleans on the 9th of April, the present month.
Question. During that time where were you operating 1
•
Answer. Immediately on reporting for duty I was assigned to duty in the
13th corps, and reported to Major General Ord, then commanding the corps.
By him I was ordered to Morganzia, on the Mississippi river, to relieve General
Herron, who was in command of the detachment of the 13th corps there. I
relieved him, if my memory serves me aright, on the 27th day of September,
in the afternoon.
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Question. vVill you give, in your own way, a narrative of such events as
came under your observation and knowledg·e during your connexion with that
department, such as may be important to the matters before this committee 1
Answer. That will be a narrative of the history principally of current events,
that might be made very extended and be of very little interest.
Question. Make it as brief as possible, giving important event&, not going
minutely into them, but such as may be of importance, and as brief as may be.
Answer. At the time that I relieved General Herron, the 2d division of the
13th army corps was supposed to be there. I relieved him, as I said, on the
27th of September in the afternoon. I was informed by him that he had two
regiments of infantry and a section of artillery in his advance, eight miles in front
of Morganzia. The reason assigned for having them at this distance was that
there was no water between Morganzia and the point on Bayou Fardoche where
this detachment lay. This point was pretty nearly half the distance to the
Atchafalaya river by the direct road. On the other side of the Atchafalaya
river lay the rebel Greene, a brigadier general in the confederate service, with
his force, supposed to be very much superior to that which was at Mol'ganzia.
'\'Vith the detatchment in front, General Herron stated to me that he had a small
body of cavalry, a little over one hundred men I think; that this cavalry kept a
daily reconnoissance to the Atchafalaya, and that Greene had not the means of
crossing the Atchafalaya in force; that he was convinced that he could not cross
it, and had no intention of crossing it; but if he crossed it the cavalry would
give immediate notice of it.
General Herron left in the evening, and in the morning I sent out orders to this
detachment and an officer to inspect its position. He never found the detachment and I never saw it. The messenger whom I sent out found the enemy between l4organzia and the detachment in force, as he stated. I immediately
sent a regiment out to clear the road, supposing that some of their scouts had
gotten between Morganzia and the detachment. rrhe whole detachment was
captured, with the exception of those who escaped, after being broken up by
• three brigades of the enemy's troops under Greene.
Question. Do you mean that the two regiments of infantry and the artillery
were destroyed 1
Answer. Most of the infantry and the artillery were captured. The cavalry
escaped. They fought out until they were cut into little squads of four or five
and took to the swamps. I reported this state of things immediately, and I found
that my command there was only about 1,600 men, in most wretched condition,
without a tent or shelter of any kind to cover them, ragged and dirty, lying in
the mud and exposed to the rain on the river bank, without any purpose appar-·
ently in view; and what the end intended to be accomplished by sending this
detachment there and leaving it on the nver bank was, I was not informed.
I made report immediately of its condition and the small force. I ascertained
immediately afterward that General Ord was greatly surprised at the weakness of the detachment. It was not the division in fact, although it was in
name. Nearly half the division, if not quite half, was left at Carrollton, near
New Orleans. The force with which Greene crossed the Atchafalaya and gobbled up this advance party was acertained from the prisoners who were captured by me to be about 4,000, between 3,500 and 4,000. It was three brigades
and a battery of six pieces. They attacked them on all sides simultaneously,
and the five hundred men who were captured are still prisoners in Texas, two
of the finest regiments we had.
·
I may state that nothing was ever explained to me of the plans which were
had in view by the commander-in-chief at that time. He himself, with his staff
and with his main column, composed of the greater part of the 13th corps and
the 19th corps, were at that time on a second campaign up the Teche. From
the conversation which I heard between General Or:d and General Banks at the
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time that I received orders to go up to 1\forg·anzin, I gathered that it was thP.
intention of the commander-in-chief to move this stong column up to Alexandria,
and that the way having been cleared in my front by driving Greene away from
the Atchafalnya, I was at some future time to join with my small body of troops
this mnin column; and meanwhile I was forbidden to carry any supplies to these
men, to bring up any re-enforcements of the stragglers and the troops that were
left behind at Carrollton, or even to carry up the knapsacks of the men who
were ragged and in such a filthy condition. They had gone up to JYiorganzia
and left everything they had at Carroll ton. They were comfortless and in a
wretched condition. I disregarded the instructions received so far as to carry the
men's knapsacks up to them when I went up myself, and i_t added no little to
their comfort. The men were reported by their officers to be lousy from having no change of clothes. 'l.,hey were told they were to go up there for two or
three days, and they were there I should think a month.
Soon after the affair of the Bayou Fardoche, probably two weeks after,
General Banks being then upon the Teche with his column operating, I
received a despatch sent to me by telegraph to Port Hudson, and froin there
by a special steamer, to report at headquarters for instructions. I went im··
mediately to New Orleans. General Banks was not there. I had recPived intimations that the instructions I was to receive would be of a delicate nature; and
I therefore doubted the propriety of my going down into the field to find General
Banks, as inferences might be drawn from that. I then put myself in communication with the chief quartermaster of the department of the Gulf, Colonel
Holabird, whom I supposed to be in General Banks's intimate confidence. I
told him that I had come down to report, as soon as I saw him, and he said,
" I know all about it.'' I found that he knew all the instructions that I was to
1·eceive, and I believe now that he was the only one that knew anything about
it. He told me that General Banks did not want me to go down to the Teche,
but wanted me to wait there, and had given him details of all his plans, and
what he wanted me to do. I put myself in communication with General Banks,
and receiveJ direct from him, through Colonel Holabird, a telegram saying that
he had explained everything to Colonel Holabird, who would explain matters to
me, and I received from Colonel Holabird information that I was desired not
to telegraph or write to General Banks on the subject, as the telegrams and
despatches might be examined by pm'sons whom he did not care to be initiated
into the plans. The orders were for me to prepare an expedition to the Texas
coast. 'l'he force that I had I was ordered to bring immediately down from
1\iorganzia, and rejoin the balance of it which was- lying in camp at Carrollton,
to organize it and put it in complete condition for the field, with such other
forces as should report to me, and to prepare for embarcation. With the assistance of Colonel Holabird, the whole thing· was carried out as near to perfection as it could be. I obtained from General Banks a carte blanche for drawing supplies from the different administrative members of his staff, who were
directed to furnish my requisitions without question and without delay. I prepared a large fleet of steam transports, and on the 26th day of October embarked
with them and about six thousand men for Brazos Santiago.
I had no communication with General Banks during all the time that I was
preparing the expedition, although he was in New Orleans, except to ask him
for instructions, and he told me that they were already prepared, and I would
receive them before I embarked. All the communication that had been made
to me up to this time was verbally by Colonel Holabi:rd. Colonel Holabird informed me that our expenditures down on the Rio G::.·ande would have to be
entirely coin, probably; that he had sent a quartermaster to Washington to
procure $100,000 in coin, from the Treasury Department. This was procured, as
I heard the quartermaster state who came for the money. He said it was with
great effort it was obtained, and with some opposition. I carried down arms
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and equipments to arm and equip a thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry,
I think, in case I could raise them on the Rio Grande or in Texas, and was
promised all I should call for afterwards; thirty-days' rations for my whole force,
over and above the ten days, which I distributed to the command when we
sailed; forage for thirty days over and above the ten days distributed to the
command when we sailed. It is not necessary to go into the details. 'rhe
general result I suppose is what you want.
The day before I sailed, being on board the flag-ship myself, at the wharf in
New Orleans, the rest of the fleet having been despatched to its anchorage at
the head of the pass of the Mississippi, I was awaiting orders, having not ev~n
then received my instructions. General Banks then eent a staff officer down on
board the vessel to say that he would like half of the state-rooms reserved for
himself and his staff. This was the first intimation I had of General Banks
going to 'I'exas. I expressed some surprise to Colonel Holabird about it. I
asked him if he knew all the time that the general was going. I understood
him he did not; that he did not think the general intended to go until the day
. before. He said the general wished IQe to conduct the affair just exactly as if
he were not there; that I would be in command, and that I would give all the
orders that were necessary, and he did not expect to interfere at all. I conconsidered this very complimentary, and was very willing to do all the work I
could do, but as to being the commanding officer when there was a superior
officer present, I knew enough about soldiering to know what that nieant.
A landing was made at Brazos Santiago, in Texas, and the command was
pushed forward to Brownsville, some twenty-six miles up the Rio Grande,
opposite Matamoras.
I ought to mention that I had not then received any instructions. On the
way down, on board the flag-ship, Colonel Holabird mentioned to me something
about his instructions. I then asked him if he had got them. He said he had ;
he had received them that day; he had them in his pocket, and he had also
seen mine, and asked me if I had got mine, and appeared surprised that I had
not. He said he had read them himself, and that the general had probably
forgotten to hand them to me, and that I would get them within a day or so if
I did not that day. I read his instructions, which he handed me to read, and
I never heard anything more about mine.
A few days after we arrived at Brownsville General Banks and his staff left.
He ordered me to send certain troops from Brownsville to Point Isabel for
embarcation, and he left for Aranzas Pass, carrying with him four regiments of
white troops, infantry, and four pieces of light artillery, and two siege guns
without troops attached to them, that I heard of. .A landing was made on Mustang island. 'rhe fort belonging to the rebels, which was on it, surrendered to
our troops under Brigadier General Ransom, who made his report to me, without any loss, I believe, on either side.
General Banks had told me that it was his purpose to collect all of the corps
which I then commanded, General Ord having gone to the north sick-all of
the 13th corps in Texas ; that he expected to be able to take possession of Pat:s
Cavallo and 1!-,ort Esperanza, and that the main portion of the troops would be
collected in that part of Texas, and that we should march into the interior of
Texas from Indianola, or that vicinity. It was his purpose to establish himself at Indianola or Powder Horn; he made use of the latter name, I believe, and
it was from there he would issue his address to the people of Texas.
The day after the surrender of the fort on Mustang island Brigadier General
Ransom, with his troops, crossed over to St. Joseph's island, on the northern
side of Aranzas Pass. He was joined by other troops belonging to the 13th
corps, which were being then transported from Louisiana down to Texas, and
two brigades, commanded by General Ransom and Colonel Washburne, moved
up St. Joseph's island across Cedar bayou to Matagorda island, marched up
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whole length of that island, and invested Fort Esperanza, which was
evacuated in the night time, its magazines blown up by the enemy, and they
retreated into the interior by crossing the bayous between the island and the
mainland, over such ferries as they had constructed there.
During all this time I had been left on the Rio Grande, at Brownsville, without any specific instructions. When General Banks left he told me it was well
if I could prepare an expedition to go up as high as Roma, one hundred and
twenty miles up the Rio Grande, above Brownsville. There were three highpressure steamboats on the Rio Grande, belonging to notorious rebels who had
put them under the .M:exican government, and by some arrangement between
General Banks and the American consulate in Matamoras these boats were put
into the possession of General Banks. The matter never was explained to me
as to what promises had been made about them. I knew enough to know that
the way in which General Banks had become possessed of them bound him in
honor to make a fair settlement for them, whosoever's property they were. I
received a private letter, the only one I received from Colonel Holabird after
he went to New Orleans, in which he stated that some arrangement ought
immediately to be entered into about those boats, and that they ought to be
immediately purchased. ':rhe best of them had been carried up the coast by
General Banks, and was up at Matagorda bay. rrhe other two were river
craft, and of no s ervice outsiae the Rio Grande, and very little service in it at
that time, we having no use for them.
In a communication which I made to General Banks or to his headquarters,
I think it was personally to him, I stated the matter of these steamboats, and,
if I remember aright, I urged that some settlement should)mmediately be made
about them. I feared that some grand bills would be run up against the government for the daily service of steamboats which were not used at all, or used
but very little at that time. rrhey were afterwards used a great deal. I had an
interview with the agent of the owners of the boats, the same man who was
afterwards imprisoned on the question of a forced loan in Matamoras, and who
required the interference of the authorities to get him out, Mr. Galvan, and he
stated to me that these three boats were worth $100,000 in coin-that would
make them, at the price of gold at tl1at time, somewhere near $155,000. I jeered
him a little about the even sum that had occurred to him, and tuld him that,
thtmgh I did not suppose he was in earnest about insisting on that particular
amount, still I had no doubt that there would be a fair settlement of some kind
made with him, and I wrote to General Banks-! think to him personally, at
all events to his headquarters-suggesting that some settlement should be made
for these boats, and that the only fair settlement that could be made in justice
to the .government was that three steamboat men should be sent down from New
Orleans, who would be conversant with making estimates of the value of boats,
and that they should agree on the real value of these boats at the time they
were put into our hands, and that that should be paid for them, and interest at
six per cent. on that sum from the time that we had them until the time of settlement. I do not know what has been done about those boats. I am told
that $100,000 in specie has been paid for them and their services.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Do they now belong to the government 1
Answer. I understand that they do. They are in our possession, and they
can never go out of it, I suppose. I have heard that they have been settled for.
I left there before the settlement was made, and therefore I do not know anything about it. At the time General Banks and his staff were about to leave
Brownsville, I was about being left there without any funds. We had taken
possession of about 130 or 140 bales of cotton there. I had thirty days' supplies, less a certain amount which General Banks would be obliged to take
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away up to Aranzas. I supposed that supplies would constantly follow us, and
immediately. I had never had a doubt about it up to that time. Still I was
ordered to purchase horses in Mexico to mount such recruits as we should raise
down there, and also to remount such dismounted cavalry as I had, and for all
sorts of uses, transportation, &c.; and Colonel Holabird appointed an agent
down there, who showed me subsequently his authority from the colonel for
acting as an agent in the purchase of horses. He was to receive a daily ~om
pensation by that agreement. I mention this merely to show that funds would
be necessary. If the simple assertion that an army in the field does not require
funds to subsist upon is not enough, that order to purchase horses will show
that there was a necessity to have a sum of money. I requested an order from
General Banks to have funds turned over to my chief quartermaster who was
to be left there, and to the commissary. General Banks issued an order directing his chief quartermaster to furnish such funds to the chief quartermaster
left with the forces on the Rio Grande as were required. He left with him
$12,500 in gold, and a few thousand dollars in greenbacks; not so much as that,
but I forget the amount; I think about $5,000. I was ordered to send all the
cotton that I collected in Texas direct to New Orleans, and the chief quartermaster, Colonel Holabird, was ordered to sell it. Subsequently I was obliged
to sell cotton there or starve to death. My action in that matter was sanctioned,
and I was ordered to send what I did not require for the use of the troops to
New Orleans. I succeeded in getting some 1,200 or 1,400 bales of cotton.
The first 400 bales, or a little over that, I shipped direct to New Orleans ; but
there never was, from the time that I was left there until more than two months
afterwards, when I was ordered up the coast of Texas, any supply of forage
sent fi:om New Orleans to the Rio Grande, except when animals were sent; the
rations of those animals were put on board ship with them. Our rations ran
shc,rt with the men, so that I was compelled to buy in the Matamoras market.
I was compelled to buy corn in the country, on the Mexican side, and from
merchants in Matamoras, and cargoes of it at the mouth of the river, at anchor,
entered at the Mexican custom-house, and this corn cost from $2 to $3 a bushel
in coin. I clamored considerably for money, knvwing that $100,000 in coin
had been sent down for the use of that force from Washington; and not getting
the money, either paper or gold, I thought it was rather imprudent in me to get
rid of all my cotton too, and I sold all the cotton except the first lot shipped.
I think about 200 bales of cotton were released to Union men who owned it.
About 200 bales were left undisposed of at the time I left Brownsville and
turned the. command over to General Herron. The rest of the cotton was sold
for the highest. price it would bring at Matamoras, from thirty-one to thirtythree cents a pound in gold, and the funds were turned over to the quarterma~::ter's department, the commissary department, and the medical department,
and expended for the subsistence of that force.
Question. How did you sell it 7·
Answer. Anybody that would offer the most for it got it. There was no
plan about it. We only sold it as we required the money. The balance of it
I intended to ship to New Orleans if they ever sent us any supplies. There
was no margin on cotton there. Speculators frequently came from New Orleans
expecting that they could buy cotton there the same as they did on the Mississippi river, _at from ten to fifteen cents a pound in greenbacks; but there was a
competition in Matamoras that kept it up at from thirty-one to thirty-three cents
jn gold all the time;. and then their expenses were heavy to put it on board vessels at the mouth of the Rio Grand.e, which could only be done occasionally in
a calm sea. It had to be carried out five miles from shore over a bad bar by
steam lighters, and loaded on to a vessel that lay at the mouth, and then carried
to its destination. I never could see that there was any margin for speculation
in buying cotton down there at thirty-three cents a pound in gold. But we were
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$2 a bm.lhel for corn in gold, which made it $3 a bushel all the time.

Question. Was that the result of combination or scarcity 1
Answer. Scarcity. It was all imported into Mexico; none raised there.
Question. Who were the purchasers of the cotton 1
Answer. Merchants in Matamoras ; sometimes foreign merchants ; in fact,
mostly foreign merchants, I think. Mr. Galvan, I remember, bought one lot of
about one hundred bales, or, perhaps, not quite so much.
Question. Was it bought by the attaches of the government, army, or other
officers 1
Answer. No, sir, not at all. I do not think it was. It was all bought in by
merchants. There was nobody else there who had any coin to pay for it.
A few days after General Banks left I sent an expedition up to Roma, 120
miles up the Rio Grande river. It was composed both of cavalry and infantry, .
with two pieces of artillery. It was gone some time, and suffered considerable
privation; discovered no enemy, nor heard of any exceeding 180 in that part ot
the country. I sent expeditions out in the direction of the interior of rr.exas,
towards Corpus Christi, about seventy miles or more, and discovered no enemy;
nor was there any enemy between the N ueces river and the Rio Grande that
could stand up before 300 of our men at any time. The objects of the expedition,
further than the occupation and reclamation of Texas, were never explained to
me. All the object we could accomplish on the Rio Grande had been accomplished by the occupation of Brownsville. The effect of it was to stop that
grand outlet which the rebels had heretofore made use of for letting out their
cotton and bringing in their military supplies. But it did • not stop the trade.
The starting point for the Rio Gande is San Antonio, in the centre of Texas.
It is a much shorter road from San Antonio to Eagle Pass, which is 350 miles
above Brownsville, on the Rio Grande, than it is from San Antonio to Brownsville. The rebel cotton could just as easily be sold on the Mexican side, opposite Eagle Pass, as it could at Matamoras. The effect was, then, only to divert
the trade, and all the trade that had theretofore been carried on across the Rio
Grande, at Matamoras, has since been carried on at Eagle Pass. A force to
occupy the whole of the Rio Grande up to Eagle Pass would be very large, and
the expense of it would be tremendous. I addressed, without being invited,
more than one communication to General Banks on the subject of the disposition
of the troops in that part of Texas. Having never received any explanation
from him of his plans, or any detailed instructions as to what was expected of
me, I felt very great hesitation in advancing any opinions whatever. I did it,
however, in as delicate a manner as I could. I repeated the advice, if it may
be called so ; I repeated the despatches to him more than once ; but I never ·
have received an acknowledgment of them. I advised him that the force was
out of position on the Rio Grande, although it was proper that it should have been at first carried there ; but that its proper position, if it was to effect the .
object of closing up the trade on the Rio Grande by itself, without co-operation
with any other force to fight the enemy, was to move it somewhere on the
Nueces river, probably at Corpus Christi, with a view of occupying San Antonio,
or that district of country. It that were occupied, the whole trade on the Rio .
Grande would be at an end.
I had at the same time sent a desperate refugee, who volunteered his services, up to Eagle Pass with authority to collect such refugees as he could, and
help himself up there in any way that he wanted. His directions were to
destroy anything on the road that he could not carry away; to take all the
cotton and other property that he could get within reaching distance of the Rio
Grande and put it in a Mexican custom-house, on the other side of the river, in
the name of the United States, and then, after that, to make "Jordan a hard
road to travel;" to make the road from San Antonio to Eagle Pass, over which
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the traitorous Jews of that district carry on their contraband trade, so perilous
that they would abandon it. He was just the man to do this job; and I have
received despatches from him since that he had 150 men up there, but he could
not get arms for ten of them, and the enemy, getting notice of his intentions,
had sent a cavalry force to Eagle Pass, which was just enough to keep him
away. The country between Brownsville and Eagle Pass (350 miles) is barren.
A. cavalry force cannot subsist on it. From Corpus Christi to Eagle Pass, and
from there to Loredo, the country is better. The roads are shorter than from
Brownsville to either of those places, and a force stationed on the Nueces
river would control all that part of the country, whereas any amount of force
stationed at Brownsville would not. I went into detail somewhat in the
despatches I wrote to headquarters, but I never was encouraged to repeat
them. My proposition was to leave 700 men on the Rio Grande-500 of them
at Brownsville, which I had fortified very ·strongly; 200 at Brazos island, to
guard the depot, and to take the rest of the force around to Corpus Christi, the
cavalry, artillery, and transportation by land, with a sufficient guard of infantry, and the remainder of the infantry around by water to A.ranzas Pass and
Corpus Christi.
A.t that time my information goes to satisfy me that San Antonio was not
fortified. There was no garrison at Corpus Christi, and there never has been
one since we have been in Texas, all the reports of a thomand prisoners there
to the contrary notwithstanding; and there were no troops west of the Guadalupe river which could contest the advance of a single brigade. The main
forces of the enemy had all been moved to the east of the Colorado river by
orders of Magruder, and all the people of Texas who desired protection were,
in proclamations, directed to move to the eastward of that river-that that should
be the line of defence.
When the troops moved up the coast with General Banks, a regiment of
white infantry was left at Aranzas Pass. This regiment soon after sent down
to me for rations. We had then but a few days' rations on hand, and they
stated that they were about out. I had received information that a large
steamship with 50,000 rations on board, which had arrived at Aranzas Pass,
was carried back with her whole load from there without landing a ration, and
this was what shortened their supply. I never heard what was the reason of
that, but the chief quartermaster, Colonel Holabird, it was reported to me, went
back on her, and General Banks was there at the time.
About the 1st of January I received orders to turn over the command on
the Rio Grande, of the forces there, to Major General Herron, to move myself
up the coast to Pass Cavallo, and to take personal command of all the troops
on the coast. I arrived at Pass Cavallo about the 12th of January, and found
there Major General Washburne in command. He had with him the 1st and
3d divisions of the 13th corps, and two and a half regiments of the 4th division
of the same corps, four light batteries, one siege battery, and no cavalry. He
complained of considerable dissatisfaction with the way in which he had b''on
required to conduct military affairs on the coast. He read me some despatches,
which showed that he had made the same complaints to headquarters, and he
was warm in his feelings against the manner in which he had been required to
conduct affairs. He stated to me that when Fort Esperanza was evacuated by
the enemy he could have immediately marched up with what force he had,
some 4,000 or 4,500 men, to the mouth of the Brazos river, and have taken
possession of the forts at that mouth, and established a base there which would
have been of inestimable value to us in the reduction of Texas. He stated he
bad no doubt of this; and, from all I have ascertained since, I think he was
right. He was prevented from doing it by orders; he was ordered to remain
on Matagorda island, so he informed me. But when he received that order he
was in motion across the pass to Matagorda peninsula for the purpose of moving
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up the peninsula, and he so far departed from his instructions as to land what
troops he had already emharked on the peninsula opposite, and retain them
there and the forces which subsequently joined him; and he moreover stated
to me that, from the information he had from the interior, the 11,000 or 12,000
men that he had there then were not worth as much to him as the 4,000 or
4,500 which he had at the time Fort Esperanza was evacuated, owing to the
preparations which the enemy had made, and their entire helplessness almost
at the time Fort Esperanza was so much surprised by the appearance of our
forces there. He also stated to me that he was required to act on the defensive,
and was not authorized to move into the interior or to occupy the mainland;
but I found that the mainland was occupied at Indianola by two brigades
under Brigadier General FitzHenry Warren.
I assumed command immediately of the forces there. I ordered all the white
troops from Matagorda island over on the Matagorda peninsula, and ordered the
remainder of the division, two brigades of which were at Indianola, General
Washburn's division, to join it up there, and I commenced the movement with
what means I had on hand, with a view of moving all my force towards
Indianola and Lavacca and preparing for an advance into '.rexas, for I confess
that I had not up to that moment realized the idea that I had gone down to
Texas to act on the defensive or to remain quiet. I reported very soon after
I arrived there, in some detail, to General Banks personally, the changes that I
had made there, where I had moved the troops to, and proposing to him a plan
of campaign, not in great detail, because I had never been consulted; but considering myself, as the senior officer in Texas, partly responsible for the idleness
of the troops there, and expressing myself in my despatch that at all events I
would be by public opinion held responsible for it, I volunteered aome more
advice. It was never responded to. I desired cavalry beyond all things. I
desired the control of the force on the Rio Grande, in order that they might be
made to co-operate with this force in moving into 'J.lexas. I consider that, had
those forces co-operated, and a reasonable amount of cavalry been supplied,
the campaign in '.rexas was as certain a thing as we have ever had to practice
on during this war.
The stories that have been told about Unionism in Texas I am satisfied are
true, and that the mountains of Texas are filled with refugees looking for the
flag, who have been hidden in the bushes for eighteen months there, and that
in Texas itself there are numbers of people ready to show their hands the
moment our troops approach, and some of whom have been imprudent enough,
on our appearing ou the coast, to assert a little more independence than they
had been able to assert for the last few years, and have got into difficulty on
that account. I invited all the people at Indianola, and all within our lines, to
take advantage of the oath prescribed in the proclamation of the President.
~~rhey all took it, with the exception of one man who desired to be made a
martyr of, and succeeded.
Soon after, I was directed through the headquarters of the corps. I had
then been superseded in command of the corps by the arrival of General Ord,
about the 20th of January, from sick leave from the north, and his headquarters
were established at New Orleans. I was ordered to fortify my positions in
Texas in the strongest manner, and to make requisitions for engineering
materials for that purpose, and for such heavy artillery as I required to defend
myself with. It was necessary perhaps to fortify Indianola, but I never comprehended the necessity for fortifying a large force on Matagorda island. I was
ordered further not to occupy the mainland with a view to permanent occupation, and to be prepared to be c~lled on for a considerable portion of the force
that I had at Matagorda bay, and to prepare Matagorda island with strong
defences for a garrison of six thousand men. I confess it was a da.mper on my
feelings; but I supposed that these were mere precautionary mea~ures, and
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even then did not realize that that would be carried out. But Indianola has
since been evacuated, and all the troops on Matagorda ba.y who remained there,
about five thousaud five hunJred men, are strongly fortified on Matagorda
island; and before I left there, there were two major generals and three brigadier
generals belonging to that command, without counting Major General Washburne, whose division it was; and I do not believe there were five hundred
rebels within a huudred miles of them.
I felt the evacuation of Indianola more than anything that I have felt during
the whole war. I had heard that in Louisiana, before towns had been occupied, the people had been compelled to take the oath of allegiance-whether
this is true or not I do not know-and that within a very few days afterwards
they were left to the tender mercies of the rebels, and that some of them had
been bung. The people of Indianola said they would be treated in that way
if we left them; but it was e-vacuated, although it was strongly fortified, and
with us about two hundred of the population left for fear of their lives.
I take upon myself the whole responsibility of offering the oath of allegiance
to the people in our lines in 'rexas. I will do the emme thing wherever they
come within my lines, unless I am prohibited from doing it; but I have been
told that I was responsible for it, and that I was responsible for the occupation
of the mainland. I have written records which will show the whole t:> tate of
things, and I dislike to avoid any responsibility like either of these, though I
had no responsibility for the occupation of the mainland.
Six thousand men, in round numbers, were drawn from Matagorda bay to
Louisiana. 'l'hey had been sent down at great expense for the campaign in
'l'exas. which had never been carried on. They had suffered on the coast for
want of supplies whilst they were under the command of General Washburn,
as he stated to me. They were then, at the time they •vere called back, fully
equipped, had every comfort that ~:~oldiers ought to have, and were only requiring orders to march into the interior of Texas. They were taken back at
similar expense to Louisiana. Not only that, but I think there wern eight
steam vessels which came down for loads for them, bringing nothing down, and
which went back immediately without any loads. That much surplus transportation was sent down for those troops, more than was required. I mention
this to show the bad management.
Question. Who was responsible for that 1
Amnver. The quartermaster's department in some of its ramifications-! do
not know who in particular; but a quartermaster was sent down there to take
charge of the transportation of those troops, and he knew just how many there
were, and how many loads there were to go, and, as I said before, eight steamboats were sent down empty and went back empty.
The campaign in 'l'exas has, up to the present time, resulted in the occupation
of the line of the Rio Grande up to Brownsville, or a little above there, and
the occupation of Brazos Santiago, Aranzas Pass, and Pass Cavallo, on the
coast, but the trade across the Grande is still continued; and the interior of
Texas has been left intact, although the deserters, both commissioned officers
and enlisted men, who came into camp, were agreed in their assertions, that a
considerable portion of the army of General Magruder would joirt our forces if
we would move into the interior of Texas. Those that did leave it, and came to
our lines, ran the greatest risk of their lives in getting out.
There is something very greatly to be admired in the character of the Texas
refugees. 'rhey are a very different class of men from any other refugees that
I have seen during this war. As a general thing, they are a noble set of fellows, bound up in the Union, and so sincere in their feelings that they divide
with each other the last dollar they have got until they get to our camps, and
there, as a general rule, the first thing they want to do is to enlist in the 'rexas
campaign.
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By Mr. Loan:
Question. What time did you leave there 1
Answer. I left Matagorda island, I believe, on the 6th of this month. There
were then on Matagorda island in round numbers, white and black, about 5,500
men. I believe that now on Matagorda island there are one major general and
three brigadiers with that force-Major General McOlernand, and Brigadier
Generals Benton, W an·en, and Lawler.
Question. General Banks went up to Matagorda island with a force after he
left you at Brownsville. How long did he remain there before he returned to
New Orleans 1
Answer. I can only state what I heard about that matter, because I was not
present with that force ; but I am satisfied that he never landed in Texas again
after he embarked at Point Isabel, when he left Brownsville. I l1ave been hlformed by the officers who made their statement to me, that when he left the
troops at :E'ort Esperanza, it was not evacuated, and that he went from there to
New Orleans with the expectation that that would be a slow matter, but it was,
I believe, evacuated the same night of tlie day on which he sailed for New
Orleans. I was informed by the officers who were pTesent at that time, that
General Banks left there with the expectation that that would be a siege.
Question. vVho was left in command of that force on Matagorda island 1
Answer. I believe General Washburn. General Washburn cnuld give you
much more information about matters in Matagorda bay, and the forces in Texas
and Louisiana, because he was in the campaign up the Teche, and I was not; he
was much longer in Louisiana than I was. I learned the day before yeflterday from
the chairman, with some surprise, that General Washburn had not delivered any
testimony here. He is much better informed on these matters than I am; and
some of this history, which I have given you, was received from him. He
felt warmly on the subject on account of his command and his men, and the
way in which he thought be had been restricted there.
By Mr. Chandler :
Question. Do you consider this Texas movement a success or a failure in its
results 1
A mwer. I cannot answer that question without knowing what the plans of
the commander-in-chief were. Now I do not see that he had any particular
objective in going to Texas. He has not accomplished anything in proportion
to the outlay. and the effort that has been made use of.
Question. If so, to what do you attribute that failure-to lack of energy in
its execution, or lack of orders to vigorously assault 1
Answer. I attribute it entirely to inaction-inaction of the troops in Texas,
and a lack of cavalry to begin operations with.
Question. And do you attribute that inactivity to orders from headquarters,
or to the action of the generals in command in the :field 1
Answer. Entirely to a want of orders from headquarters. I do ·not believe
there was an officer or a man in Texas that was not impatient to begin to work,
and that was not tired of lying still and doing nothing.
Question. Do you consider that the force which was in Texas would have
been adequate, with a pr0per amount of cavalry, to overrun the State subetantially, taking possession of the various salient points 1
Answer. I think there was a fair prospect of success with the force that was
in Texas if two thousand cavalry had been sent down, which they had to send.
If the divisions which were being carried down had been filled up, if the convalescents had been returned to their regiments in Texas, and the portions of
troops sent down which were ordered for embarcatiori, I consider there was
sufficient force at that time to have done the work. At all events the trade on
the Rio Grande would have utterly been broken up. The despatches which I
1·eceived from this man McManus, whom I sent up to Eagle Pass, stated to me
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. that there were between five and six thousand bales of cotton collected at Eagle
Pass in the month of February. The trade along that road was large.
By Mr. Odell:
Question. Do you know that the cavalry which you say was required could
have been furnished 1
Answer. It was in New Orleans. I merely know that, however, from the
public prints. The newspapers were filled with glowing accounts of the reviews
of the cavalry force all the winter in New Orleans.
Question. At the time you were calling for them 1
Answer. Some of that was the cavalry I was asking for. There was also
cavalry down on the Rio Grande. There were eight hundred cavalry certainly
on the Rio Grande, which I asked for, but it lay there. I was not permitted to
touch any of that force on the Rio Grande. It certainly was not wanted at Rio
Grande, in my opinion.
Question. You spoke of being authorized to take equipments for a thousand
cavalry and a thousand infantry.
Answer. Yes, sir; the equipments for a thousand cavalry were never landed.
They were shipped on board transports which could not go over the bars of Texas.
They lay at anchor till they got unseaworthy, and were carried back to New
Orleans. I suppose I have written more despatches about that load of cavalry
equipments than any one thing, but never succeeded in getting it back. It has
been reported to me by the officers of the ordnance department in New Orleans
that they had at three separate times taken those equipments down to the landing
at New Orleans for shipment again to rrexas, and that they had been refused
transportation by the quartermaster's department because they had other things
to carry down ; and an ordnance officer told me they were sent down a second time
and sent to the wrong place, and carried back a second time. But there was a
set of cavalry equipments sent down there subsequently, composed of citizens'
saddles, which are unfit for military operations, and I was obliged to use those.
General Washburn made a great complaint about the refusal to bring his supplies down by the quartermaster's department, and he made official reports to
General Banks on the subject, and in his report, which he read to me, he stated
that when his men were out of mtions a steamship came down there almost
loaded with sutler's goods, and that he had information that public supplies bad
been taken off some vessels to make room for sutler's goods. His indignation
was very great about it.
Question. You spoke ot paying your own expenses. How did that come
_out 1 Did you get cotton enough to pay the expenses of the expedition 1
Answer. Yes, sir. When I left the Rio Gran.de I left about two hundred
bales of cotton in the hands of General Herron, as I stated, and I turned over
to him all the coin that the quartermaster's department had in possession, which
was eight or ten thousand dollars-I have forgotten how much-and a good lot
of supplies, besides forage for two or three weeks.
Question. What became of the $100,000 in coin 1
Answer. That I never heard of sjnce. We got $12,500 of it; hut I do not
know what was done with the balance. Perhaps it is on hand still in New
Orleans.
By Mr. Chandler :
Q.uestion. Do you know anything of the loyalty of the people of Louisian:a
at this time 1
Answer. Not of my own knowledge, but only from conversation with people
in New Orleans, and from common report.
Question. Give us that, then.
Answer. My impression, made up from those conversations and from commml!
report, was, that the people of Louisiana are not as well disposed towards the gov-

OPERATIONS IN THE GULF DEPARTMENT.

25

ernment to-day as they were within a very short time of its occupation by our
forces. I am of the impression that but few if any of the old inhabitants of
Louisiana voted at the recent elections . . I am of the impression that their
bitterness is very great against us; and my impressions, which I have grown
up with during this war, that rebels cannot be coaxed, but must be whipped,
have been very much strengthened in Louisiana. The only way to rule this
people is by authority, and by letting the civil machine, which has now been
organized and initiated, run on with just as little friction as can be applied to
it; to punish all offenders, and not undertake to govern as much as they are
being governed now ; let the thing run on as in any other State.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. Without military interference 1
Answer. Without military interference. Now we are deceiving ourselves~
and nobody else. We are not deceiving the rebels down there by the recent
method of introducing Louisiana into the Union. We are not deceiving the
people of Louisiana, nor the army down there; but we are deceiving our
friends in the north wonderfully.
Question. Have you ever met any who were rebels in the beginning that
have become friends to Unionism 1
Answer. I have never seen any. I do not believe there are any. I think
the rebels down there are more bitter now than they were when Louisiana was
first occupied.
Question. I do not confine my question to Louisiana, but to Texas and all over1
Answer. It is my opinion, that if a column of troops were marched into
Texas sufficient to sustain itself now, rrexas woulil require no management to
bring her back into the Union. She would come back into the Union;. she
would revolutionize herself, and the rebels would be whipped out of her, so
that she would want no assistance after one or two battles. Let the rebel
army be beaten in Texas, and the people of Tex::ts will take care of all the rest
without any fostering or nursing at all; but they want to be tenderly treated;
they want to understand that we are going to do the fair thing when we take
hold; that we have come there to win their liberties, and not to divide their
subsistence.
By Mr. Chandler:
Question. By that you refer to Union men 1
Answer. Certainly. 1'here are a great many rebels in the State of Texas, I
have no doubt, who are rebels by compulsion, (they cannot help themselves,)
who would come in and take advantage of the President's proclamation of
amnesty, and remain true after that.
By Mr. Odell :
Question. You said that the people wanted to understand that we meant to
deal fairly with them 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you mean to say by that, that our military policy has been
that of spoliation 1
Answer. I cannot say that our military policy has been that of spoliation;
but although no instances have ever come under my knowledge of the rebel
population beng plundered after tbey had given in adhesion to the Union, still
stories are rife about those things, and about abuses that have existed in dif.
ferent parts of the country, and about encouragement given to speculators from
the north, under whatever name they go.
Question. What do you know about them 1
Answer. I know nothing; I say nothing of that kind has ever come u:nde:r
my J)ersonal observation.
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TRADE REGULATIONS, &c.
MouND CITY, ILLINOIS, April 23, 1864.
Captain ALEXANDER M. PENNOCK sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. What is your opinion in regard to the effect of the late treasury
regulations in relation to trade up and down the river 1
Answer. 'rhe abuse of those regulations is so great that I think the trade
should be stopped. From all the information I can obtain, smuggling is carried
on to a very great extent to the aid and comfort of the rebels.
Question. Cannot that s.muggling be prevented under this general order for
trade 7
Answer. In my opinion it cannot.
Question. Will you state how that general order operates 1 .
Answer. I will give you an example: A short time since, on the Tennessee
river, in Captain Shirk's command, a boat went up with supplies, and with
regular permits all correct and in accordance with the regulations. She was
convoyed by a gunboat, and landed her goods and left. She had left but a
.short time when Captain Shirk received information that a part of those very
goods had fallen into the hands of the rebels. He then returned, ascertained
that that information was correct, and destroyed the remainder of the goods to
prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands.
Question. Is that your constant experience of the operation of this rule 1
Answer. It is. From the best information I can receive, when the trade was
first opened, after the capture of Memphis, several steamers trading from St.
Louis were captured by the gunboat stationed at Island No. 10, and sent up
to Cairo. '.rhey had pistols, quinine, cloth for rebel uniforms, buttons, and
other articles.
Question. Had they the regular permits, according to the regulations of the
department 1
Answer. They had, in many instances, permits for "cases of goods,'' without
specifying the contents; when these cases were opened, the goods which I have
mentioned were found in them.
Question. Can this contraband trade be prevented except by a total prohibition of this kind of trade 1
Answer. I think not. The passengers on board these boats had large quantities of quinine in their valises; and quinine was often secreted in the clothes
of the women ; long bags were found tied around the waists of women containing from forty to fifty little jars of quinine. A man by the name of Tatem was
captured on the Mississippi by one of the gunboats ; he had ern barked on
,b oard the steamboat at St. Louis; had gone down to New Orleans and landed
there, and was on his return up the river. 'rhere was found with him trunks
containing rebel uniforms, pistols, buttons, a gold watch, a rebel flag, and other
articles marked "St. Louis, February 24, 1864," for the first Missouri battery,
that is, the flag was so marked. There was a government aid on this boat,
which took this man down the river, whose duty it was to examine all persons
and articles on board the boat. The man said he hired an Irishman to take
his trunk on board, and that nobody knew of its being on board the boat except
the Irishman, whom he believed was shipped as a hand on board the boat, and
went down the river at the same time he did ; that after he landed the trunks
were thrown overboard from the steamer, and he and another man received
them ; he said that this Irishman threw these trunks overboard for him.
One of the gunboats captured a man in a skiff who had about 300,000 per-
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cussion caps with him, taking them across the river. The owner of the caps
had gone down on one of the steamers from Cairo or St. Louis.
And a large rebel mail was captured on one of these steamers. I considered
it of so much importance to General Curtis, who was then in command at St.
Louis, that I sent it up to him with a special despatch boat.
Question. Have you reason to suppose that these practices were connived at,
if not openly encouraged, by these government aids 1
Answer. I suspect it is so. In conclusion, I would say that all the available
force here has been constantly on the move night and day. I have ampl€3
instructions from Admiral Porter how to act during his absence; and also with instructions to act in his name in an emergency in accordance with my judgment.
(See testimony about :F'ort Pillow for Captain Pennock's opinion about requisite force at Cairo and Mound City.)
Captain JAMHS W.
sworn and examined.

SHIRK

(commanding 7th division of Mississippi squadron)

By the chairman:
Question. What do yon say in regard to the operations of the treasury general trade regulations permitting trade up and down the river 1
Answer. I think it merdy supplies the rebels with provisions, medicines, and
clothing.
Question. Is it possible for you naval officers to be so vigilant as to prevent
successful frauds and smuggling under that order 1
Answer. I think not.
Question. Have you heard the testimony of Captain Pennock upon that
subject 1
·
Answer. I heard a part of it.
Question. Do you agree with him as to the impolicy of this trading order, and
the difficulty of so executing it as to prevent fraud under it 1
Answer. Yes, sir, I do agree with him.
Question. Can you state any instances illustrating the impolicy of such
regulations 1
Answer. Yes, sir. About the middle of last month (March) I went up the
Tennessee river with the gunboat Peosta, bearing the divisional flag. A trading
boat convoyed by a gunboat was already up the river with supplies and regular
permits from the ':rreasury Department.
Question. Did the papers appear to be regular?
Answer. Everything was just according to the regulations. The captain of
the gunboat convoying the trading boat had particular orders from me not to
allow a single thing to go on shore unless it was aU right according to the regular forms of the Treasury Department. When I came in sight of Saltillo,
about two hundred miles from the mouth of the Tennessee, I saw quite a quantity of salt, sugar, molasses, coffee, clothing, and medicines on the bank of the
river, just landed from this boat. 'l'he trading boat and her convoy were still
in sight going up the river. I went on about ten miles, and was then overtaken
by a man on horseback, who had ridden up from Saltillo, who told me that the
rebels were at Saltillo taking possession ofthe;:;e goods. I immediately returned,
and there found the gunboat 'ramak, which I had directed to follow me up the
river, shelHng the rebels, who were about fifty in number. These rebels had
already broken into those packages, and taken salt in bags, and coffee, and dry
goods, and made way with them. They also shot two men in federal uniform
who were there, calling themselves "home guards;" one of them was killed, and
the other was wounded, and the rebels were about to kill him, when a woman
asked them for God's sake not to kill him in her yard. Whereupon they threw
him across a horse, wounded as he was, and took him out into the road and fired

28

MISCELLANEOUFl.

a pistol ball into his head. They also shot a negro, who was not in uniform,
through· the back. Feeling assured that if I left those goods remaining on the
bank they would fall into the hands of the rebels, I ordered Captain Smith, of
the Peosta, to destroy them, which he did, excepting the dry goods, which I
took down to - - - , Tennessee, and delivered to the commander there ; and a
large box of medicines which I kept on board the gunboat for the use of those
on the gunboat. I have been told over and over again that articles which were
permitted to go up the rrennessee from Paducah, some of them, went directly
into the hands of rebels in arms. I will state another instance. There were
some goods sent up directed to a man who persons up there told me was
actually a lieutenant at that time in Wisdom's regiment of Forrest's cavalry.
Question. Do these treasury agents interpose any effective impediment in the
way of this course of proceeding 7
Answer. No, sir; no impediment that I ever saw. They give a permit to
every person who comes to them. Certain men on these boat!'; are appointed as
storekeepet·s. Their goods are cleared from the custom-house, and they go up
in these boats, and a treasury agent goes with them. Wherever the boat stops,
a man or a woman, n0 matter which it is, comes on board, takes the oath before
the treasury agent, and the storekeeper then sells them what they want. There
are generally two persons; one gives the permit, and the other takes them down
to the storekeeper, and they are allowed to buy any articles he bas. My experience is, that any man in Tennessee or Kentucky will swear to ~my oath so as
to get what goods he wants, no matter whether they are for himself or for his
rebel friends. They have no idea of an oath except to break it.
Question. What is your opinion of the extent of this trade 7
Answer. When I discovered how the thing was working I wrote a note to the
collector of customs at Paducah on the 24th or 25th of March, informing him
that I should not allow anything more to go up the Tennessee river, to be landed
on the west side of the river, even if it had a permit; and the thing is stopped
now. I knew perfectly well that it would go into the hands of the rebels.
Question. Are not the faithful navy officers here compelled to encroach upon
that order of the Treasury Department, in order to protect ourselves from the
danger of this trade with the rebels 1
Amwer. Yes, sir; although there is a general order from the Navy Department directing us not to interfere in any manner with trade carried on under the
regulations of the Treasury Department, except for important military necessity.
Question. 1'he object of these orders of the department is, that the trade shall
be carried on with Union citizens 7
Answer Y eE~, sir; and if it was so carried on it would be all right.
Question. Is the oath prescribed by the department really any impediment to
cheating and fraud 7
Answer. No, sir; because the rebels will swear to a lie as readily as the truth.
(See testimony of witness upon J!"'ort Pillow as to necessary force at Cairo and
Mound City.)
CAIRO, ILLINOIS,

Major General

STEPHEN

A.

HuRLBUT

April 24, 1864.

sworn and examined.

By the chairman :
Question. Has your attention been turned to the operation of trade along the
Mississippi river 1 How does it operate in regard to favoring the enemy?
Answer. My attention has been turned to it very seriously. As it is conducted on the Mississippi river it is disastrous to the Union cause for many
reasons. As the system is now carried on the commercial ports on the river
are, intentionally or unintentionally, but points of supply for the enemy. Even
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when the trade restrictions are complied with, it is done by false oaths taken by
parties who desire to obtain sapplies. The people who trade at those points do
not consider an oath of any binding efficacy at all, and will take it at any time
in order to obtain anything they want. I refer now to the legitimate trade.
The illegitimate trade is carried on at all points, and no amount of watchfulness
on the part of the officers of the customs, or of the army, or the navy, can suppress it. JPor example, there must be wood-yards on the river, and each and
every one of them, as long as this trade is permitted, is converted into a place
for the fraudulent landing of goods. 'The ultimate virtue of an army is always
in its pickets and outposts. For example, the pickets on the roads leading out
Jrom Memphis are the last points where there is an opportunity for catching
contraband goods, yet while this trade continues these pickets and outposts can
be purchased and corrupted, and it is done, and it cannot be prevented. I have
been informed by the treasury officer at Memphis that $11,000,000 of goods,
custom-house valuation, have been brought to that place since trade was opeued
in 1862. The mere statement of that fact is enough to show what that trade
must have been.
Question. In what does this trade co~sist principally 1
Answer. It should consist in nothing but family supplies. It does consist
in about everything that anybody can find the means of buying.
Question. Have you reason to suppose that articles contraband of war go
through to the rebels in this way 1
Answer. I know they do, because occasionally we find them. I have one
man in Memphis now, under sentence of death, to be hung next Friday, for
ehdeavoring to carry out a very large amount of percussion caps and powder;
and I had another man under sentence of death for a similar offence, who has
been pardoned by the President.
Question. How was that done, under a treasury order or not 1
Answer. By smuggling. There is another very serious difficulty that arises
from this trade on the Mississippi, in the corruption that the gambling operations in cotton bring upon everybody-citizens, officers, and soldiers. Mr.
1\f ellen, the treasury agent, has stated publidy that parties were authorized,
under the treasury regulations, to buy cotton from anybody that has it to sell,
and licenses are so given. No cotton, of course, is allowed to pass the confederate lines, unless with their permission; and the business ir:; therefore a
business of exchange between the cotton operators of the confederate authorities, either for their private benefit or for the benefit of their govemment, I do
not know which, for I believe they have as great :rascals as we have. 'To a certain extent, military operations are, of necessity, subordinate to the claims of
what is called trade.
Question. Have you any reason to suppose that any officers of the government and of the army are concerned in those speculations 1
Answer. I have made my report on that subject to the military authorities,
and would refer to that.
Question. You can state whether you have reason to believe so or not 1
Acswer. I have reason to believe that officers of the army are connected
with cotton purchasers and cotton speculations for profit.
Question. Is there any opportunity down there for these treasury agents to
enter into these speculations 1
Answer. Certainly; more than for anybody else. These treasury agents
grant the licenses; they can determine who shall and who shall not go to a
particular place.
Licenses are sometimes issued at Washington granting
special, extraordinary privileges; I have seen them.
Question. Does not that place those treasury agents under strong temptations to commit or permit frauds 1
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Answer. It places everybody who is connected in any way with it, either
civil or military, under the strongest temptations to defraud, of course.
Question. What amount of rercussion caps, medicines, and other contraband
articles, do you suppose, reach the rebels through this river trade-any considerable quantity 1
Answer. I should think, judging from the arrests which have been made,
that a very considerable quantity of such things did reach them, for I take it
that very few seizures are made in proportion to the amount that gets through.
For example, a man can put in a carpet bag or a small trunk a very considerable amount of percussion caps and take them through the lines, or he can
carry quinine, altL10ugh there is not so much of that taken through to them now
as there was when I :firit went to Memphis. I have closed up drug stores in
Memphis and sold their goods for selling medicines to agents of the enemy
since I have been there. Cavalry boots and cavalry equipments have been the
articles in most demand there of late and all along.
Question. Can this trade possibly be regulated so as to prevent these frauds 1
Answer. I think not.
Question. Can it be carried on under such regulations that it will be safe 1
Answer. I think not.
Question. What remedy would you then propose 1
Answer. The remedy I would apply would be this : I would have nothing
go below but army and navy supplies, and the necessary supplies for the people within such ports as we actually hold, simply provisions, &c., necessary to
keep them from starving and suffering. I am satisfied, and I know I express
the feelings of the other officers who have been on the river, that if, upon our
occupation of Memphis, in June, 1862, all trade with the Mississippi country
had been cut off, except to supply the necessities of the army and the people
within the ports that we actually held with garrisons, the States of Mississippi,
Arkansas, and Louisiana would have been clear of the enemy before this time.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What has been the effect of opening these ports in Kentucky, &c.1
Answer. 'rhe effect has been j,o accumulate large amounts of goods at such
points, for example, as Paducah, to obtain which was one great inducement for
Forrest's raid. From Paducah and Columbus large amounts of supplies have
been sent out which have gone down directly into the hands of the confederate officers.
By the chairman :
Question. Your intercourse along the river has been extensive and of long
continuance, I believe 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. I will inquire of you, what is your opinion as to the loyalty of any
considerable portion of the people along through Arkansas, and western Kentucky, and Tennessee 1
Answer. Arkansas, I think, is an exception; I believe there is a sentimeflt of
loyalty in Arkansas, but not immediately on the river. There is no loyalty
where there is a plantation. Wherever you :find a poor man on a small piece of
ground on which he works himself, there you :find loyalty. Wherever you
:find a plantation on which there is a master and negroes, there you find disloyalty.
By Ur. Gooch :
Question. Is it your understanding that, in the exchanges for cotton, we take
their cotton and pay for it in contraband articles 1
Answer. Not precisely in contraband articles, or rather not necessarily so, al-
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though a laTge proportion of it is. They will not sell their cotton fo·r moneyonly for "supplies," as they call it, which they require. But if you sell them
negro blankets they will make very good blankets for soldiers. If Kentueky
jeans are sold for negro clothing, they make very good confeder~te uniforms.
If they are allowed to take mules and horses to work theh plantations, they
are either allowed to be held there by toleration of the confederate authorities~
or taken into the confederate armies, and that is the result of cultivating plantations on the Mississippi-merely furnishing the rebels with mules and horses.
whenever they choose to come and take them. Propositions have been repeatedly made, professing to come from high authorities in the confederate armies,
to sell the cotton of the confederate government, and to allow all their private
cotton to go out without any hindrance. The proposition has been made to me,
and forwarded by me to Washington, and refused; and the proposition was
made to General McPherson.
Question. What were the terms of the proposition 1
Answer. The terms were that the cotton on the Red 1·iver, and on the Wachita,
which is among the objects of this present expedition up there under General
Banks, should be sold to General McPherson at these rates ; the confederate
cotton at either twenty or twenty-five cents per pound, when they would allow
private cotton to come through without molestation, to be sold at whatever
price could be obtained for it. That proposition was sent on to Washington
and refused. I have understood that the same proposition was made and
allowed to a private individual by the authorities at Washington.
Question. Who is that private individual1
Answer. It is reported to have been Mr. Casey, at one time a member of
Congress from Kentucky.
(See also the testimony ,of General Mason Brayman, commanding the district
of Cairo, in relation to the Fort Pillow massacre, where he expresses the opinion
that one of the principal objects of the rebel Forrest's raid was to secure the
large amount of goods which had been allowed to go into Kentucky and Tennessee under the regulations of the 'l'reasury Department.)
Uaptain JAMES H. 0DLIN sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your position in the service 1
Answer. I am a captain and assistant adjutant general, and chief of staff for
General Brayman, for the district of Cairo, where I have been stationed since
the 23d of January, 1864.
Question. Will you state what you know about the operations of the system
of trade established upon the river, whether it is beneficial or detrimental to the
service, in your opinion, and your reasons for the opinion you have 1
Answer. In my opinion it is very detrimental indeed to the service. My attention was first called to it after being assigned to the position of assistant
adjutant general for the district of Cairo. General Sherman's order was received
n0tifyiog us to not interfere with the trade permits ; that free trade was opened
with Missouri and Kentucky, and that we had nothing to do with the permit
business, but was to allow trade to go on.
As soon as this order came out everybody rushed goods right into the little
towns, whose citizens, as is well known to military commanders, embraced rebel
sympathizers to the extent of a majority of their number. In the town of
Hickman, Kentucky, we had the most persistent trouble. From all the information I can gain, there has nevm· been but about one or two men from that
town in the Union army; and there are, or were, not more than ten truly loyal
men there. 'l'he first day after they received the news through the papers that
trade was opened, 240 barrels of salt and a large invoice of whiskey were shipped
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to Hickman. On the second day about a thousand bushels of salt, a proportionate amount of whiskey, besides all sorts of groceries and coffee, in sacks,
were shipped there. General Reid, commanding the district of Cairo at that
time, af!sumed the responsibility of stopping that salt, on the second day, at
Columbus, Kentucky, until he could ascertain the facts. As soon as possible
he sent a provost marshal and some troops from Columbus to Hickman-one
company of the 34th New Jersey, and one piece of artillery, with the proper
complement of men. The provost marshal took an invoice of the number of
stores there, and the amount of goods on hand, and also ascertained about the
number of inhabitants and business men there. There were 12 stores, about a
thousand bushels of salt, and about an equal number of barrels of whiskey, to
a population of about 1,200 inhabitants; making about one bushel of salt to
each person before this large amount was sent down under the new treasury
regulations. 'l'he rebels come in there every few weeks, rob the stores and
carry off the goods, and the citizens come up here and say tl1eir goods have
been taken, and want a new supply.
From the best information we have, goods are taken to all the points in this
district-to Paducah, Columbus, Hickman, and other places-under those regulations, and from those places they go out into the country to supply the rebels;
and it can be proved that the storekeepers of Hickman sold their saltat the
rate of a barrel of salt for a bale of cotton. That is what the trade amounts
to there. We suppressed this to a great extent by placing troops there ; but
it was impossible to prevent it altogether, as we had positive orders not to interfere with the trade regulations.
Question. Does this still continue 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Is it not easy for the rebels to receive large amounts of military
stores, of all kinds, under this free trade regulation 1
Answer. It is; and in my opinion they do every day receive stores through
Missouri and Kentucky in this way, those being the two States opened to free
trade. We found out that they were receiving goods, and we have now under
arrest an officer of our army, a former district provost marshal of this place,
charged with passing goods through to the rebels.
Question. Do these treasury agents, who have charge of this matter, prove
to be any serious check upon this contraband trade 1
Answer. I cannot say anything in regard to their duties; but we have seized
contraband goods on boats whwh bad government agents on board, who had
made their inspection of the goods and passed them; and in a number of cases
the goods were seized after they were landed. In one instance there was an
officer of the rebel army got on board a steamboat at St. Louis, travelled on that
same boat all the way to New Orleans, and returned on the same boat to an
island in the Mississippi, where he got off, taking off a trunk, which was afterwards seized, and found to contain a number of rebel officers' uniforms, a large
number of buttons, and other articles for the rebels. . The buttons were stamped
"Waterford, Connecticut," as the place of manufacture. There was also found
a rebel flag inscribed "Missouri Battery." I forget the number, but I think it
was the ":E'irst," with the date, "February 24, 1864; from the ladies of St.
Louis;" Captain Pennock, of the navy, I believe, now has the flag in his possession.
.
At another time a man came down on a steamboat and got off on the
Missouri shore. In undertaking to get across the river in a skiff he was seen
by one of the gunboats and taken pri~oner. He had with him a carpet sack,
which he had brought down on the steamboat, which contained 300,000 percussion caps, which he was endeavoring to convey through to the enemy. 'rhis
carpet sack had been passed by a government aid, and allowe<f to be taken
down on the boat.
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Question. Do you know who that government aid was 1
Answer. No, sir; I do not. There was also a government aid on the boat
on which the man went down to New Orleans and back, whose trunk, containing rebel uniforms, &c., was captured. There are government aids, I believe,
on all the passenger boats running on the river.
Question. They do not seem to furnish much protection to the government.
Answer. No, sir. Like other classes, that class bas among its number' a
great many rascals. At Paducah the same trouble existed in regard to trade
regulations. Immense supplies were run in there; and Colonel Hicks, commanding there, had information from different sources that at some time or
other, he could not tell when, there would be an attack upon the place. rl'he
report was that the rebels would come and try to take the pJace, but to that we
gave no credence. There is now lying in that town over a thousand barrels
of salt in one place, which the rebels tried to roll out and carry off, but our :fire
from the fort and the gunboats prevented their doing it. That is but one lot
in the large amount there is there. Some of the barrels are now lying near the
gutter where they tried to get them out. Paducah, Columbus, and Hickman
have been considered by the military authorities here as points from which the
rebels are t;:upplied under these treasury regulations, the military having positive
orders not to interfere. But the abuse was so great that General Reid felt it
to be his duty-and I think justly-to stop it and inquire into the matter, and
try to prevent it.
Question. Is the oath they are required to take when they trade any protec·
tion at all to the government 1
Answer. Our experience is that they disregard the oath entirely ; that they
have no respect for an oath at all. In these places there are Union men whom
the authorities know, but they have to suffer in consequence of there being so
many traitors and disloyal men there who will come forward and take the oath
for the sake of obtaining goods, which they try to get through to the rebels for
the high prices which they get for all they can get through.
Question. In your opinion, what remedy can be applied for this 1 Can trade
be carried on so as to secure the government from these frauds, or must it cease
altogether 1
Answer. My judgment is, that if the government ever expects to put down
this rebellion they must stop this trade to the rebel States, unless it is carried
on under very stringent regulations, agreed upon by the military commanders
and the Treasury Department; and it will then require very stringent orders
and careful watching to prevent these frauds. In my opinion, if any trade is
allowed, none but certain kinds of goods should be allowed to go down the
river or through our lines to any of the people of the country. The people
through the country can live by obtaining provisions from us ; as a general
thing, they make their own clothing. But if free trade is allowed., they will, of
course, buy clothing, which is taken away from them by the rebels; if not with
their consent, then by force. In the towns of Hickman and Paducah, at the
time of their capture by the rebels, there was an immense amount of supplies
belonging to the citizens there, and taken there for sale, which the rebels carried off. The military authorities, under existing orders, could not interfere
with the goods being taken there, and they had no time to take them away
when the rebels were coming.
Qnestion. Does your experience and opinion upon that subject correspond
with that of all the other officers along the river with whom you are acquainted 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I think it does. I would further state that, after this attempt of :b"'orrest to take different posts in the district, General Bragman issued
an order at first to prohibit all boats landing on the Kentucky shore ; to seize
and confiscate for the time being, until properly examined into, all boats, skiffs,
3M
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barges, or anything of the kind landing on the Kentucky shore between Paducah and Columbus. He also issued another order, in obedience to instructions from Major General Hurlbut, commanding 16th army corps, prohibiting
all boats from landing any goods at any point between and including Paducah
and Columbus; and since Forrest's raid, and up to this time, we have not permitted goods, except a few supplies for officers and families which are absolutely in need, to be landed at any of these points, for fear of their being captured by the rebels.
Question. Is not that order in opposition to the trade regulations of the
Treasury Department 1
Answer. Yes, sir; but it was issued as a military necesE~ity, to prevent Forrest from obtaining supplies, he having control of the whole country outside of
our lines, and his troops pressing our troops at the different posts very hard.
CoLUMBus, Kv., Ap1·il 24, 1864.
Colonel WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE (34th New Jersey, commanding at Columbus, Ky.) sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. Have you had opportunities to observe the course of trade upon the
river, and how it affects the interests of the government 1
Answer. I have.
Question. Please give us the result of your observation, and your opinion of
the practical effect of this trade 1
Answer. I find that large amounts of goods, both those contraband of war
and those not contraband, have been shipped down the river to this place and
to Hickman. Those goods have come particularly under my notice. During
the first two weeks after free trade was opened on the river I noticed over
$100,000 worth of goods that were shipped to Hickman. At that time there
was no military force at Hickman. I seized, on my own responsibility, some
five hundred barrels of salt at this port on its way down to Hickman; but it
was afterwards allowed to go on by the general then commanding this district.
I found that goods were passed out of the picket lines here to the surrounding
towns in large quantities, which goods found their way into the rebel lines; and
I furthermore found that all articles wanted by the rebels have been supplied to
them in this way. I know that Forrest's forces have completely cleaned out
Hickman, Clinton, Moscow, and other places. 'rhe goods go to ungu:1rded
points near the Tennessee State line, and people come over and make purchases
without being questioned as to where they are going to take the goods they buy.
Question. Have you found that these aids of the Treasury Department do
much to restrain this trade and keep it in proper channels 1
Answer. In my own judgment, I do not think they have; it has struck me
several times that they have not. I have understood from several persons that
permits could be obtained for powder and shot, and everything of that kind.
Question. They are instructed, I believe, to sell to Union men, and those men
take an oath prescribed by the Treasury Department as a test of their loyalty.
So far as you know, is that oath regarded or disregarded by the people of these
places who take it 1
Auswer. I would not give a sixpence for any of their oaths.
Question. How can this contraband trade be prevented 1 Can this free trade
be so regulated, short of absolute prohibition, as to prevent the rebels from obtaining these supplies 1
Answer. I think not. I do not think any goods should be allowed to go
down the river except military supplies for our forces.
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Question. Have you conversed on this subject with other commandants of
posts along the river 1
.Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What is their experience and their opinion upon this subject 1
Answer. Exactly the same as mine. It is the universal opinion of military
officers, so far as I have heard it expressed, that these trade regulations have
inflicted the most serious injury upon our cause.
FoRT PILLOW, TENN., April 25, 1864.
Captain JAMES MARSHALL, United States navy, commanding ganboat New
Era, sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. Has your attention been called to the effect of trade under the late
treasury regulations on this river 1
Answer. Yes, sir, it has.
Question. Do you consider the system of free trade, as shown by the results,
to be the most beneficial to the United States government or to the rebels 1
Answer. I think it is a great drawback to our cause to allow any goods to go
down this river except what goes to the army and navy.
Question. In your opinion, can free trade be so regulated here as to prevent
contraband articles getting through into the bands of the rebels 1
Answer. It cannot be in any way that I can see, unless, perhaps, in one of
two ways. One is, to secure agents in whom you have confidence-those who
cannot be bought; or, let everything on board be inspected by guards and officers, and then allow no traffic except at points where gunboats are stationeJ,
and keep the whole matter in government hands. That is the only way I can
see.
Question. Have you reason to believe that the rebels have received large supplies of contraband articles through the medium of this free trade 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I have seen the order taken from the person of a rebel
woman, directing her to get a lot of stuff, caps, ammunition, opium, and quinine,
and land it at Haynes's Point, in care of Mr. Godwin. It was an order from
a rebel colonel who was killed here at Fort Pillow, and she has given me the
names of two persons who are engaged in this business.
Question. Are these oaths of allegiance of any avail to prevent frauds 1
Answer. Not a particle. Some of the worst rebels have been captured here
with oaths of allegiance in their pockets. Major Bradford captured some whom
be knew personally to be the worst of rebels.
MEMPHIS, TENN., April 26, 1864.
Captain THOMAS PATTISON sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. What is your position in the navy 1
Answer. I am a lieutenant commander in the navy, and the commandant of
the navy yard in this place.
Question. Have you observed the operation and effect of the late treasury
regulations permitting trade, and wbethei· the enemy through them are enabled
to obtain supplies of contraband goods 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I feel certain that they do obtain such supplies.
Question. Can that be prevented while this trade is permitted 1
Answer. No, sir; I do not think it can.
Question. State whether, in your opinion, large supplies of contraband articles
find their way to the rebel army in this way.
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Answer. I think they do; I feel most certain that they do.
Question. What remedy would you propose to stop that?
Amwer. I know of no remedy but to stop the trade altogether. The want
of honor and honesty among a very large portion of the people who come here
and get these permits prevent us from forming any opinion as to the truth of
their statements. They swear that they have such and such families, so many
negroes, and that each of them needs a suit of clothes, when they may not own ·
a single negro.
Question. Then the oath that is prescribed is of little avail to prevent these
frauds 1
Answer. I think it has very little force with these people.
REDEL

HouGH sworn and examined.

By the chairman:
Question. Are you in the service of the government in any capacity 1
AnswAr. I am the collector of internal revenue for this district, the first diatrict of 'rennessee.
Question. How long have you been acting in that capacity 1
Answer. Since I left the custom-house on the 5th.of November last. Previous
to that I was acting surveyor of customs.
Question. How long have you been in Memphis 1
Answer. I came here in 1859.
Question. Has your occupation been such as to call your attention to the
course of trade here, and how it affects the interest of our government ; whether,
in the way it is conducted, it ministers to the advantage of the enemy 1
Answer. I have been intimately connected with it, and I should say it did.
Question. In your own way give us your views upon that subject 1
Answer. I have no doubt that the enemy get contraband goods, not under
the trade regulations, but in violation of them.
Question. In spite of the regulations 1
Answer. Yes, sir; they get them in various ways.
Question. What is the extent of the trade here now, say, daily or weekly 1
Answer. I could not give an estimate of it, not having the proper data upon
which to make it.
Question. When people come here to trade, what guarantee do they give that
the goods they purchase will not find their way immediately into the rebel
lines?
Answer. They are bound by the prescribed oath.
Question. Is there any other assurance than the oath ?
Answer. Much is left to the discretion of the officer, who is bound to know
something of the character of the man purchasing the goods.
Question. Do not all kinds of persons come here to trade-men, women, &c.?
Answer. They do.
Question. How is the officer supposed to know much about them 1
Answer. The intention is, and the effort is, to get down to their own immediata wants in such a manner that they cannot assist the enemy with what
they get. I think there is very little actually permitted from the officers here
that finds its way to the enemy; it is t~at which is smuggled through in various
ways.
Q,uestion. What opportunities are there to smuggle under the present regulations 1
Answer. rrhe opportunities that have always existed for taking goods out clandestinely. They, of course, run the risk of being caught by the pickets, and
no doubt they sometimes bribe the pickets. I have no question in my own
mind that they bribe pickets and bribe officers. There have been larger quantities of goods permitted to go out hy military permits than even by treasury
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permits-goods that never should have been permitted to go out; that is my
opinion about it, and done in violation of the treasury regulations. The files
of the inspector will show that.
Question. Will they show what officers have interposed their military authority to get goods through which were not authorized by law1
Answer. I think they will, if the same files are there that I left there.
Question. I want to know of you, as a person of experience in this matter,
whether you suppose it is possible to carry on trade with a people situated as
these are here in this part_of the country; as I understand, some few Union
men, a great many violent secessionists, and not a great way from the rebel
lines. Is it possible that trade can be carried on here to any considerable extent without those articles, which the rebels stand so much in need of, finding
their way to them 1
Answer. I have no doubt a great many of these articles do find their way
to them; more by being seized by rebel scouts than by being carried to them.
Question. What is there to prevent a rebel sympathizer coming here to-day,
taking the oath, get~ing a considerable amount of goods, and immediately
taking them to the rebel lines 1
Answer. There would be nothing to hinder him from carrying them to the
rebel lines after he got them. 'l'he object is to ascertain his own wants so fully
as not to allow him to take more than would be necessary to supply those
wants.
Question. How would the treasury agent be expected to do that in this
this community 1 By what means could he ascertain the character and wants
of each individual who comes to trade with him 1
Answer. When I was in that department I had an extensive acquaintance
in Mississippi and Tennessee. I had charge of this railroad south, running almost the whole length of Tennessee and Mississippi, and I know something
about almost all the prominent people who come here, and I endeavored to
restrict the matter as far as possible.
Question. I have no doubt about that; but with all your endeavors, what
chance was there to really know what these people were, and what they
actually needed 1
Answer. Of course, there is no chance to know.
Question. Then it comes to this, that all the security the government has is
the oath prescribed to be taken by the person purchasing the goods 1
Answer. And the restrictions thrown around the pnrchase by the officer;
restricting the man to such goods as his own family may require, and endeavor. ing, as far as possible, to keep from him those goods which would naturally be
used in the confederate army.
Question. Suppose a man should send his daughter up here to-day to purchase a hundred dollars' worth of goods, and next week should send up another daughter, under another name, to purchase a similar quantity of goods;
how would you know that you were supplying the same family 1
Answer. When I was in the Treasury Department, I confined women to
women's wear, and what they wanted for themselves. I did not allow women to take out general plantation supplies, unless it was proved she was a
widow, and had charge of a family.
Question. Is it your opinion, with the experience you have had, that the
government has any reliable assurance against frauds where this trade is permitted, or that there is any other safe way for the government but to restrict
this trade 1
Answer. Or to prohibit it. I do not see any other way.
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By Mr. Gooch :
Question. Have permits been granted here to take oU:t any considerable
quantity of goods, except by treasury agents 1
Answer. They have.
Answer. By whom have those permits been granted 1
Answer. By General Hurlbut and General Veatch.
Question. Did General Veatch precede General Hurlbut in the command
here 1
Answer. General Veatch was under General Hurlbut. General Hurlbut was
commander of the 16th army corps. General Veatch really had command of
the post at the time.
Question. Did those permits cover goods to any considerable extent?
Answer. Yes, sir, I think they did.
Question. Can you give us any idea of the extent 1
Answer. On some boats I think they amounted to $15,000 or $20,000 at a
time.
Question. Where did those goods go 1
Answer. rro different landings on the Mississippi river-on both sides of the
river.
Question. Were those goods restrained to any further extent after the permits
were granted 1
Answer. 1'here was a government aid appointed. They would pick up a
man and appoint him government agent on a boat to see that the goods went to
the persons to whom they were directed.
Question. Who selected that government aid 1
Answer. At first he was appointed by the surveyor; afterwards it was taken
out of the surveyor's hands, and put into the hands of the assistant supervising
agents.
Question. The government aid was only to deliver the goods to the parties
named in the permits 1
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Do you know the general character of the goods thus permitted by
the military authorities 1
Answer. General plantation and family supplies, prohibiting entirely cavalry
boots and all kinds of heavy boots, and such kinds of brogans as it was supposed
would be used by the enemy's army.
Question. How was it in fact 1 Were the goods thus sent out such as could
be made useful to the enemy for military purposes ?
Answer. Yes, sir; for instance, calico prints are supposed to be women's wear
solely. But, in the absence of blankets, the confederates use quilts. And, of
course, with calico and cotton they could make very comfortable camp bedding
without blankets.
Question. Have you any knowledge whether, in fact, that was done 1
Answer. No instance occurs to me now, though I have no doubt it was done
to a considerable extent.
Question. Have the officers to whom you have referred continued to grant
those permits as long as they remained at the post here 1
Answer. I do not know what they have done since I left the custom-house.
Question. Did they continue to do it as long as you remained in the customhouse 1
Answer. Their practice in that matter would change ; sometimes the lines
would be entirely closed, and no goods allowed to go out; then they would
allow goods to go-sometimes freely.
Question. 'Vere there any particular persons who seemed to enjoy special
favor in regard to permits 1
Answer. I can hardly say that, though I sometimes thought so. Still I
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would not like to swear that I was positive it was so. There was a man hereI think his name was Dr. Walker-who was said to ~&,ve got a large amount of
permits through General Veatch's office, for which Dr. Walker was paid. Some
of the merchants-one in particular-came to my office and said: "There are
parties who get goods through here, and I cannot get any through General
Veatch's office; it is done, and I am going to find out how it is done." Afterwards I learned that he had got permits through General Veatch's office, and I
asked him how he did it. He told me confidentially that he paid a third party
for doing it, and the third party got them through.
Question. Did these military officers give permits for goods to go into the
country around here 1
Answer. Yes, sir. They were not supposed to give permits within the trade
limits, but their permits generally went beyond the limits that were fixed by the
Treasury Department. For instance, the commanding general is communicated
with, and is asked to define his lines within which trade can be carried on. The
lines were for a long time confined to the Mississippi on the south. I got up a
regulation myself that no goods should be permitted beyond N onconnah creek,
from the fact that when they once got beyond that they would go into Mississippi. General Hurlbut said he did not know of any regulation that stopped
goods at N onconnah, and they were permitted to go to any point south in 'l'ennessee. I felt the responsibility resting upon me to that extent that I did not
like to have goods going beyond N onconnah gt>tting into Mississippi; therefore
I would not allow goods to go beyond there without military permits.
Question. Did these generals continue to give permits as long as you remained
in the custom-house 1
Answer. Yes, sir, at times.
Question. What would you say about the amount of goods that went out
under military permits, and under permits of the special agents of the treasury 1
Answer. The permits given by the military covered a very much larger
amount than those given by the treasury agents-that is, one man would be
.allowed to take ont more under a military permit than under a treasury permit.
Of course the military did not interfere in all cases ; they only permitted goods
to go to certain locations to which the treasury did not feel authorized to permit.
Question. Then, in order to remedy the evil, it would be best to restrict the
military permits as well as the treasury permits 1
Answer. I think if the military had not had anything to do with it, it would
h~ve been better; that less goods would have gone out.
CAIRO, ILLINOIS,

April 28, 1864.

J. C. SLoo sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What is your position under the government 1
Answer. I am the postmaster at this place.
Question. Will you tell us what, if any, communication can be kept up with
the rebels by reason of the present mail arrangements 1
Answer. The mails on the Kentucky shore from this point and Evansville,
Indiana, are delivered all down the river, including Paducah, Henderson, Uniontown, &c. I suppose there are fifteen or twenty places at which mails are
delivered four times a week up, and four times down.
Question. What is the character of the inhabitants, the postmasters, &c., into
whose hands these mails go 1
Answer. I do not know personally a single postmaster on tl1e whole line.
But we understand here that the inhabitants are as disloyal as they are in

40

MISCELLANEOUS.

Paducah-I mean from Green river to the Tennessee line; and I think Paducah
is one of the most disloyal towns in the whole country.
Question. Is any portion of the county in which these mails circulate now in
possession of the enemy 1
Answer. So far as Forrest and his raid are concerned, it has been in their
possession. I do not know this from personal observation, but from general
report. I understand that they have been conscripting over in Bellah· county,
within fifteen or twenty miles of this place.
Question. The consequence is, that if the rebels have any agents here or anywhere in the north, and want to send letters to their sympathizers, they can do so.
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Is it your opinion that it is unsafe to the interests of the government to keep up those post offices now 1
Answer. I think it is unsafe to sAnd the mails there ; I have thought for ,
some time that it was against the interest of the country to do so.
Question. Does it furnish an easy means of communication with the rebels 1
Answer. Most unquestionably it does, so far as sending intelligence from
Paducah, Henderson, and other points on the river.
DANIEL ARTER sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. What position do you occupy under the government 1
Answer. Surveyor of the port of Cairo.
Question. How do the late treasury regulations concerning trade operate 1
Are they most beneficial to us or to the rebels 1
Answer. Until the abrogation of the restrictions in regard to Missouri, Kentucky, and Western Virginia, I think very few goods were carried over that it
was possible to put to any improper use. My instructions were, that rebels
within our lines must be fed, but sparingly. But since the abrogation of those
restrictions there have been a great many goods passed through this district
into Kentucky-how many I am not able to tell-because boats that run on the
Ohio do not exhibit their manifests unless they go below. Boats running exclusively on the Ohio or up the Mississippi do not exhibit their manifests as they used
to do. Along before they became aware of the privileges they possessed, almost all the boats would fill, as usual, through manifests. If I recollect aright,
some 600 packages of ammunition were distributed along the Kentucky shore
from Evansville to this point in one week. But I have no knowledge of or
any way of ascertaining the amount of goods since then. According to the
order of the treasury department they can take anything they please. The
instructions are, that trade is free, the same as in time of peace.
Question. Is there any doubt that the rebel authorities receive vast amounts
of military stores and contraband goods through this source 1
Answer. I am just as well satisfied that they do as I am of anything on earth
that I do not actually see.
Question. What f\ecurity is there now that the rebels will not receive any
amount of contraband articles they please '?
Answer. None at all whatever, except so far as the military interfere.
Question. If the military interfere to prevent it, are they not compelled to
do so against the treasury regulations as a matter of military necessity 1
Answer. I think so.
Question. Has it not seemed to you U?Ost singular that while we take so
much pains to guard the Atlantic coast against the admission of contraband
articles, we leave the way open for their admission here 1
Answer. I think it is one of the most extraordinary circumstances that has
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occurred since the com~encement of the war. I have expressed my opinion
to Mr. 'Turnbull in regard to this matter. I stated, in short, that hundreds of
thousands of dollars' worth of goods had gone and were then going through
this district to Kentucky, some of which I had no doubt were then in Richmond. It opened a sluice-way that there was nothing to guard. There was a
paper blockade, it is true, for it was provided that none of the goods should
be passed out of these states into an insurrectionary State; but there was nothing to prevent it.
Qnestion. There was no security against that 1
Answer. None whatever.
Question. Is the oath which is prescribed any security to the government 1
Answer. There is no oath to take.
Question. Where they take an oath to trade with what are called loyal people, does it furnish any security 1
Answer. I never had much confidence in their oaths. I think there are a
great many men who have sworn falsely. I have refused to receive their oaths,
for I knew they would swear falsely.
Question. Can you give any instances of contraband goods finding their way
to the rebels 1
Answer. I only have reports, but I have them in abundance; for instance,
when General Smith came up hera he told me that he had come across large
- quantities of those goods on their way to the enemy that had passed through
here, and he was very much put out about it. Before these restrictions were
removed, family supplies were allowed to persons who made oath that they had
only eo much on hand; that the goods they asked for were for their own use; that
no part of them was to be disposed in any way to give aid to persons in insurrection ::~gainst the United States; and then they took the oath of allegiance
also. With a great many of those men I was personally acquainted. If any
one applied with whom I was not personally acquainted, I would question him as
to the number of his family, the amount of his stock, the size of farm he had ;
and then I would cut him down to such a quantity as I thought he should
have. But those restrictions are now removed, and they can take any quantity
without limit.
Question. What is your opinion in regard to the quantity of supplies that
Forrest's forces found here prepared for them inconsequence of this open trade 1
Answer. That the amount was large I have no doubt in the woTld. A great
many goods were shipped to Hickman, and, as I always did believe, a great
many goods have been carried there from time to time under an arrangement
for the rebels, who paid the parties for them, and then under pretence of a raid
came and took the goods away.
Question. What is there to prevent such an arrangement being made all over
Kentucky1
Answer. Nothing in the world.
Question. Is there any reason to suppose that Forrest's raid was in consequence of the vast amount of goods prepared here for the rebels 1
Answer. In one of my official letters to the department I stated in advance
that these goods there would be an incentive to these guerillas, robbers and
murderers to overrun the country, and I have no doubt that was the case.
This country was perfectly bare of goods before the restrictions were removed,
and all the goods going in there since were just so much in favor of the rebels.
Major General C. C. WASHBURN sworn and examined.
Question. What is your rank and position in the service 1
Answer. I am major general of volunteers, and am now commanding the
district of West Tennessee.
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Question. What information have you in relation to the late attack on Fort
Pillow and the massacre there 1
Answer. I have seen and conversed with a number of white and colored
soldiers who were there at the time of capture. Their statements more than
confirm all that bas been published in regard to that aff.air; but as the committee have already the sworn statements of most of the parties that I have
seen who were present, I refer to their testimony for further answer.
Question. Do you know whether or not Fort Pillow could have been re-enforced from Memphis after notice of its threatened attack; and what notice
had the commander of this district that such an attacked was threatened 1
Answer. I do not know at what time notice was received by the commander
of the district that an attack was threatened. I am informed that the last letter received from Major Booth was dated April 3, in which he expressed confidence that he should not be attacked, and that he could hold out if he was.
It could easily have been re-enforced within eight hours after notice was received
at Memphis. Forrest was known to be in the interior, with a force of seven or
eight thousand men, for several days before Fort Pillow was attacked.
Question. What, in your opinion, has been the effect of the treasury regulations permitting trade with citizens in this district 1
Answer. In my opinion, the effect has been most disastrous to the cause and
interests of the general government. From the day I reached the Mississippi
river, after the campaign in Arkansas in 1862, to the present moment, my
opinion has remained unchanged. I believe that permitting trade has been of
vast assistance to the rebel armies; that it has bad a most demoralizing influence upon our army. I intend these remarks to be general, and to apply to every
department in which I have served. I know of many disasters to our arms, which,
in my judgment, would never have taken place, had not cotton, sugar, and trade
in general, invited our arms to places where they should not have gone. Permitting trade iuvites a horde of hungry unprincipled camp followers. It leaves
us to the mercy of the spies of the enemy, who, under the system, come and
go at pleasure. It brings little money into the treasury, but fills the pockets of
the class of people before named-a class who, being from home, escape conscription and their just liabilities to the government, and who, of all others, are
least entitled to favor. 'rhe extent of the trade daily passing outside of our
lines here, into the enemy's country, is estimated, by Brigadier General Buckland, commanding the district of Memphis: at from $40,000 to $60,000 daily.
Articles contraband of war, such as arms, percussion caps, and ammunition, are
often captured in attempting to smuggle them through the lines; and so long
as ~be lines are kept open, it is not possible to prevent large quantities of surh
articles from reaching the enemy.
The hope of obtaining large supplies by capture at Paducah, Columbus, and
Fort Pillow, and through the trade regulations at Memphis, I have no doubt,
was one great inducement for Forrest's late rairl. ·
The only opportunity I have had since I have been in the service to exercise
authority over this question was for a short time at Helena, Ark. On the
3d of April, 1863, I was placed in command of the United States forces
there. On the 4th day of April I issued the following order, viz :
"SPECIAL ORDERS No. 9.
"HEADQUAHTERS UNITED STATES FoRcEs,

'' Helena, Ark., April 4, 1863.
"I. The lines of this army will be closed from this date.
" II. Passes will only be granted on the most urgent cases, and then only to
persons of known loyalty.
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"III. War and commerce with rebels being utterly inconsistent, all supplies
to go beyond the federal lines are prohibited.
C. C. WASHBURN,
"By order of" MajoT General.
"W. H. MORGAN,
" A. A. General."
Under that order the lines were closed and trade suspended outside the lines,
while I remained. I was soon after ordered into another department, ,and I
think that trade was immediately thereafter resumed.
I have the most positive and reliable testimony that thousands of bales of
cotton, belonging to the confederate government, have been sold in Memphis,
and paid for in gold, greenbacks, and supplies, which have gone to replenish
the confederate treasury, and feed, clothe, and arm confederate officers and
soldiers.
Question. What, in your judgment, is the remedy for the evils you have
mentionec11
Answer. The remedy is to close the lines and suspend all commercial intercourse with the districts that are in a state of rebellion.
C. C. WASHBURN,
Major General.
This deponent states : That the provost marshal of Vicksburg, Wardell, is
a thorough secesh friend ; that the said Wardell sells passes to the rebels to
get through the lines ; that he speculates in cotton, and has abused his influence
with the government to let confiscated plantations to such individuals who are
friends of the previous 0wners, and who divide the proceeds with the said Wardell; that the provost marshal, Wardell, is actually smuggling large stocks of
goods through the lines, and that his brother keeps a very large store in Vicksburg, supplying the enemy with goods; that said Wardell has made over one
hundred thousand dollars in a very short space of time, and that he was worth
nothing when he left Chicago, his place of residence.
And this deponent further says : 'l'hat every storekeeper in Vicksbmg has
to bribe said Wardell by sums from $500 to $2,000 to carry goods through the
lines ; that one merchant, A. Genella, is Wardell's especial protege ; that said
Genella is a rank secesh, and that before the attack on Vicksburg, by General
Grant, said Genella offered $5,000 to the battery that may sink the first Yankee
cannon-boat; that other prominent secessionists and merchants at Vicksburg,
who conspire with said Wardell against the United States government, are
Joseph Botta and J. Baum; that one Kirshky (a Jew) is Wardell's especial
accomplice in supplying the rebels with contraband goods, said Kirshky having,
at the siege of Vicksburg, supplied the rebels with barrels full of brandy free of
charge to fight the more fierce against the "damned Yankees," as he expressed
himself; that Lewis Hoffman and Frederick Boni (two other prominent secessionists in Vicksburg) are Wardell's intimates, and were among the first who
received permits to keep stores; that all these persons publicly brag they could
have for money everything done by those miserable Yankees; that all the true
Union people under such sway have left and are leaving Vicksburg on acco.unt
of not being able to get permits to trade unless they are willing or able to bribe
the provost marshal with heavy amounts of money.
And deponent further says : That almost all the members of the corps of
officers, from General McPherson, Generals Hurlbut, McCarter, clown to captains and quartermasters, are interested in trade and administration of plantations
so as to fo!·m a perfectly linked chain of thieves; that the depot quartermaster,
Finker, a German Jew from Milwaukie, who has been already under court-
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martial in the Potomac army, is one of the chief thieves, and the right arm of
Provost Marshal Wardell; that the depot of Vicksburg was put on fire by these
united thieves and secesh· friends after the grain stored there had been removed
over the river to the enemy, so as to make it appear the fire had consumed the
immense quantities of provisions stored at the depot aforesaid; that the surrender of :E'ort Pillow was known two weeks before at Vicksburg, and was
publicly spoken of as being agreed between the officers of both the United
States and the enemy.
·
And deponent further says : r.I'hat many millions worth of goods and luxuriesintentionally for the rebels-are stored yet in Vicksburg, and that they can
easy be seized by closing at once all tll,e stores if the secesh sympathizers there
who received their permits from or through Provost Marshal Wardell; that any
and all the members of the loyal Union League, in Vicksburg, can and will furnish witnesses any moment who will prove the assertions made by this depo. nent ; that the chief of the permit office in Vicksburg, whose name this deponent
does not know, is linked in with the provost marshal, and that the aforesaid
officer only grants permits for trading to such secesh sympathizers as are pointed
out by the said Wardell; that the clerks in the provost marshal's office, and
those in the permit office, can give sufficient evidence in the case, and that the
books and papers of both offices, when seized, will develop a mass of swindles
on the government unheard of before.
A. GUDATH.
STATE OF NEw YoRK,
City and county if New York, ss:
On this twenty-ninth day of April, A. D. eighteen hundred and sixty-four,
personally appeared before me A. Gudath, personally known to me to be the
person described in and who made and signed before me the above statement.
EDMUND J. KOCH,
Notary Public in and for tlte city and county of New York.
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General N. P. Banks.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 14, 1864.
Major General N. P. BANKS sworn and examined.
Having testified in relation to the Red River expedition, the witness said:
There is another subject upon which I wish to make a statement. I am
sorry to say that I have made very few reports ; and, as so many people report
things that do not happen, it is perhaps excusable if there is one man who does
not report things that do happen. I had an engagement at Cedar mountain on
the 9th of August, 1862, which was a part of General Pope's campaign. I
desire to call the attention of the committee to that for a moment, for this single
reason, it has never been explained, and I have never had a chance Lo put it on
record before, except in a report to the War Department, from whence no information comes to the public at all ; and it leaves me under a wrong impression
in the public mind, as you will see when I have made my statement. I was in
command of a corps in August, 1862, in the Shenandoah valley. I was ordered
to General John Pope's command, in the Rappahannock valley. Under his orders
I moved to Culpeper on the 9th day of August, arriving there about seven
o'clock in the morning. His headquarters were in the town, and my command
was in the outskirts of the town. Immediately on my arrival at Culpeper, I
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received orders from General Pope to move to the front, which was six miles in
advance of Culpeper, where a brigade of my command had been stationed for a
week, occupying the outposts under General Crawford. 'That order was received at eight o'clock, and in thirty minutes was countermanded. At 9.45 on
the same day I received another order from General Pope to move immediately
to the front. The order was in these words-! will read from the original
paper, in the handwriting of my adjutant general, Colonel Pelouze:
11
CuLPEPER, 9.45 A.M., August 9, 1 862.
" From Colonel Lewis Marshall : General Banks will move to the front immediately, assume command of all the forces in the front, deploy his skirmishers
if the enemy approaches, and attack him immediately as soon as he approaches,
and be re-enforced from here."

This order was given to me verbally by the officer who brought it. He de'livered it in the presence of five of my staff officers. I immediately said to
him, "You will please give this order to my adjutant general, that he may reduce it to writing." Colonel Pelouze was sitting at a table at the moment, and the
officer who bore the order stepped up and repeated it to him, and it was written
from his lips as he pronounced it. Colonel Pelouze then read the order to him
in order to see if it was correct, and he approved it. 'l'his took place in the
presence of five of my staff officers and some other officers who did not belong
to my command. Within an hour from 9.45 my troops were on the march.
We reached the point indicated, five miles to the front, between one and two
o'clock. On their way out I left the head of my column and went to General
Pope'e headquarters, he occupying then a house belonging to Mr. Wallach, the
editor of the "Evening Star" in this city. I told General Pope that my troops
were on their way, and asked him if he had any other orders. He said, "I
have sent an officer acquainted with the country who will designate the ground
you are to hold, and will give you any instructions he may deem necessary."
I continued my march, and reached the ground occupied by General Crawford,
who occupied a line in front of the enemy. On my arrival there I met Brigadier General Roberts, chief of staff to General Pope. I said to him that General
Pope had told me that he would indicate the line I was to occupy. Said he,
"I have been over this ground thoroughly, and I believe this line"-meaning
the one which General Crawford's brigade then held-" is the best that can be
taken." I concurred with him in that opinion, and placed my command there.
I had about six thousand men.
The enemy had all the morning been moving his forces, with a view to action,
as I learned from General Crawford. Slaughter's mountain, or, as we call it,
Cedar mountain, was in the vicinity of our position. 'rhere were dense woods
in front, occupied by the enemy. General Crawford occupied a line a little to
the rear and centre of an open plain between us and the enemy. My force took
up the position which was indicated by General Roberts, who had looked over
the ground. It was the best position for attack, which was the object indicated
by my orders. If I had been instructed simply to act upon the defensive, we
should have taken a line in the woods behind Cedar creek, because it would
have concealed our forces and given us the benefit of the creek-where, by the
way, when we retired at nightfall, we lost one piece of artillery-but our object
being different, I was instructed to take this line. The enemy had been moving
troops down to the rear of the mountain during the day. It was supposed that
they would occupy a hill, and move upon us from the left. We made a reconnoissance from the front. I went down to the front with some officers, and we
were impressed with the idea that, while they were openly moving on the other
side, they were coming down upon the right; and if they got possession of
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those woods and attacked us, we would be obliged to fall back. Being impressed with the feeling that they were coming down on our right, I directed
Brigadier General Crawford to send one regiment to feel them. 'rhey in the
mean time had sent a line of skirmishers from the woods out to the front, and
were gradually creeping up. General Crawford went up with a regiment to the
right, and said, " The enemy begins to appear here ; I must have more force."
I sent him a brigade. 'l'he enemy by that time had massed his forces on our
right__;his left-and was moving forward, and began an attack upon us, when
my force encountered him. The battle had been going on with artillery from
two until four o'clock. About five o'clock, which is the usual time for them to
make an attack, they made a desperate attack upon our right. Of course, we
had to strengthen that with all our force. It is certain that General Jackson
was there with twenty-three thousand men, for he was in that neighborhood.
Our troops never fought better in the world than there. They had been retreating up to that time, and panted for a fight. 'l'he battle raged for two
hours, and until the combatants were separated by the darkness, with as much
stubbornness as ever men fought in the world. Alexander's troops never fought
better. They held their position until dark; but the enemy was so much
stronger that it was impossible for us to advance. In the evening, after dark,
they fell back to the line they bad occupied in the day-time, General Pope
coming up after daTk with his command. I say it was after dark, because,
after my troops were in line, understanding that General Pope was coming up,
I rode to the rear to meet him, and passed him, because it was so dark that I
could not distinguish him. I sent to General Pope every hour, from one or two
o'clock, information of what was transpiring. I did not say the enemy was in
force, because I did not know it; aud I was a little desperate, because we supposed that General Pope thought we did not want to fight. General Roberts,
when he indicated the position, said to me, in a tone which it was hardly proper
for one officer to use to another, ''There must be no backing out this day."
He said this to me from six to twelve times. I made no reply to him at all, but
I felt it keenly, because I knew that my command did not want to back out ;
we had backed out enough. He repeated this declaration a great many times,
"There must be no backing out this day." At the crisis of the battle he left.
It was really and honestly a drawn battle. We held our line, but we had
suffered very severely. The enemy was stronger than we were, and we knew
that we could not overcome him. Late at night General Pope came up with
his forces. In the morning the enemy retreated, recrossed the Rappahannock,
and did not ad vance again for ten days after the battle at Cedar mountain, when
the same troops came forward on the other side of the river and made a detour
up towards Washington with the whole of that army. By that time General
:McClellan had been able to get his forces in the neighborhood of Washington,
and we were enabled to meet them after a fashion. I regard that that battle
prevented the advance of the enemy's forces for some days.
What I want to say is that this battle was fought under positive orders in
the presence of the chief of staff of General Pope; but I am sorry to hear that
he represents in his report that it was a battle fought honestly by me, but
against orders and without being expected by him. Here is the original order,
which I will read again:
" From Colonel Lewis Marshall : General Banks will move to the front immediately, assume command of all the forces in the front, deploy his skirmishers
if the enemy approaches, and attack him immediately as soon as he approaches.''
We were obHged to fight or retreat, and no battle has ever been fought in
better faith or in a better manner. We were five thousand men against twentyfive thousand in those woods and on that hill. It was a well-fought battle.
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Letter if Major General Pope to Hon. B. F. Wade, chairman of the Joint
Committee on the Conduct if the War, wit!~ accompanying papers and testimony conceming the battle of Cedar mountain, August 9, 1862.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT oF THE NoRTHWEST,

·

Milwaukie, lVisconsin, January 12, 18~5.

SIR: It has come to my knowledge that · Major General Banks, while in

Washington city recently on leave of absence with one or two of his staff
officers, gave some testimony before your honorable committee concerning a
portion of the battle of Cedar mountain.
Of course your honorable committee would not permit an ex parte statement
on so important a subject to be recorded in their proceedings without notifying
and examining other officers concerned, and without giving the whole subject
that careful and full investigation which justice and fair dealing demand, and
which has characterized the proceedings of your committee hitherto.
In this view, and upon one point concerning which General Banks has given
some testimony, I desire to invite your attention to the following facts, which
I submit as my own testimony on the subject. Whilst it would not be consistent, probably, with the interests of the public service that I should, for the
present, be called away from my official duties in this department, I would
respectfully request that the officers hereinafter mentioned be summoned to give
their testimony in the case.
I understand that General Banks seeks, by his testimony and that of one or
two of his staff, to rid himself of the responsibility of the battle of Cedar mountain by attempting to show that he acted under my orders in making the attack.
The facts herein stated, and which the testimony of the officers hereinafter
mentioned will fully establish, will plainly exhibit to your committee the value
of General Banks's plea, and of the testimony he brings forward to justify it.
General Banks alleges that he received a verbal message from me from the
lips of Colonel L. H. Marshall, an officer on my staff, in the following words,
viz : " General Pope directs that you move to the front with your corps, and
take up a strong position at or near the point occupied by Crawford's brigade
of your corps. If the enemy advances against you, you will push your skirmishers well out and attack. Re-enforcements will be sent forward from Culpeper."
Upon this order. which I never gave, but which General Banks says he
received, he bases his justification in leaving the strong position he was ordered
to take up, and in advancing two miles (nearly) to attack an enemy well posted
and in superior force.
It is not necessary to point out to your honorable committee that even if the
message had been precisely in the words alleged by General Banks, yet it
nowhere contains any order for him to leave his strong positicn, nor is there
the slightest intimation in it that he was expected to do so. The interpretation
put upon it by General Banks, no doubt the result of afterthought, does more
credit to his ingenuity than his judgment. As interpreted by General Banks,
the order bears absurdity and contradiction on its face so plainly that I venture
to say that no man, except under the pressure of very strong personal motives,
could have ever understood it as General Banks says he did.
What possible object could there be in ordering General Banks to take up a
strong position against the advancing enemy, when the moment that enemy
advanced he was to leave it and march forward to attack 1 In this case, too, it
was not the enemy that advanced against Banks's strong position, but Banks
who advanced against the enemy's chosen position.
The movements of the army for concentration to fight Jackson were perfectly
well known to everybody in the army, and of necessity to General Banks. His
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corps was pushed forward to occupy and hold a strong position, behind which
the concentraiion of McDowell and Sigel was to be made.
I venture to point out the absurdity of General Banks's interpretation of the
verbal order which he says he received, but which in no manner authorizes his
forward movement against Jackson, because it is manifest that much dependence
is placed upon the superficial reading often given to such papers. I submit
also 'an official letter from Colonel Marshall on the subject, from which it is
manifest that I neither gave any order through him which authorized General
Banks to leave his strong position and attack the enemy, nor did Colonel Marshall intend to convey any such idea to General Banks.
Whatever, however, may have been the facts in reference to Colonel Marshall's delivery of the verbal order referred to, and whatever that order may
have been as delivered, I do not perceive that it has the slightest bE:>aring upon
the question. It was delivered to General Banks, according to his own statement, at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 9th of August, whilst his corps was
still encamped two miles northwest of Culpeper. It was, in fact, his first order
to move to the front. ].,rom the fact that neither General Banks nor his witnesses refer to any subsequent orders or instructions, they purposely leave the
inference that he received no subsequent orders on the subject; and that from
8 o'clock in the morning until 6 o'clock in the afternoon of the 9th of August
he received no orders from me concerning his operations. rrhis omission on the
part of General Banks is the more singular, because, aRide from subsequent
orders sent him on several occasions whilst he was on the field, in order to make
sure that there would be no mistake about my orders and intentions, I subsequently (at 9~ o'clock in the morning) sent Brigadier General Roberts, senior
officer of my staff and an old army officer, to the field with full and precise
orders to General Banks that he should take up a strong position near where
Crawford's brigade of his corps was posted, and if the enemy advanced upon
him that he should push his skirmishers well to the front and attack the enemy
with them, explaining fully that the object was to keep back the enemy until
Sig·el's corps and Rickett's division of McDowell's corps could be concentrated
and brought forward to his support. General Roberts was directed to remain
with General Banks until further orders, and he accordingly did remain with
him until I reached the field in person, just before dark, when Banks had been
driven back to the position he took up in the morning.
General Roberts was authorized by me to give such orders to General Banks,
or any other officer on the field, as were necessary to secure the execution of
the plans and purposes above stated. I presume there was not an officer at my
headquarters who did not know what my purpose was. In fact, the obj ect was
so plain that no military man could fail to see it. I conferred freely with
General McDowell about it, and to his official report, published by the House
of Representatives, I refer for a corroboration of my statement that that was
the understanding of my purpose.
General Roberts, in obedience to the orderR above specified, reported to
General Banks early in the day on the 9th of August; gave him my orders, as
above stated, and, in conjunction with him, selected the strong position he was
to take and hold.
General Banks posted his corps accordingly, but during General Roberts's
absence, reconnoitring the extreme right of the position, General Banks began
to move his corps forward; and when General Roberts returned he found
General Banks moving forward with his whole corps to attack the enemy.
He immediately remonstrated against the movement, and some conversation
between himself and General Banks ensued, Roberts protesting against the
movement, and saying that the enemy was in heavy force-Banks replying that
they were not in strong force, and that he could beat them and take their batteries ; but at no time pretending even that he had orders from me to attack.
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The above statement is a quotation almost verbatim from the testimony of
General Roberts on the subject of the battle of Cedar mountain, delivered
before the .McDowell court of inquiry at Washington city in January, 1863. I
transmit enclosed a certified copy of his testimony from the original record.
The testimony taken by the McDowell court of inquiry has neve1· been published, but it is on file in the War Department, and easily accessible to your
committee, if it be necessary to verify the copy herewith enclosed.
Colonel L. H. Marshall, who is the officer said to have given General Banks
the verbal order which he presents, is at present on duty as mustering and disbursing officer at Milwaukie, Wisconsin, and can readily appear before your
committee. Brigadier General B. S. Roberts is still in service, and his station
can be ascertained at the War Department. Cap.tain J. McC. Bell, assistant
adjutant general on General Roberts's staff during the battle, is now on duty
with me, and I wish him to be examined concerning the orders and despatches
from me received by General Banks on the field during the 9th of August.
Captain Bell was present when General Banks read these orders aloud to
General Roberts. All my copies of these orders and despatches have been lost,
but General Banks, doubtless, has the originals, the substance of which can be
given by Captain Bell. They are all subsequent to the alleged verbal order
·
given by Colonel Marshall in the morning.
The object in sending Banks's corps to the front to take and hold a strong
position against the advancing enemy, until Bigel's corps and Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps could be united in his rear, was so plain, and so
clearly understood by every man of ordinary intelligence, that I find it impossible to believe that General Banks did not understand it.
It is clear to me, from his own reports at the time, that he d£d understand it .
.Although in easy communication with me all day, and although I received, at
regular intervals, reports from him, he, on every occasion, expressed the belief
that the enemy did not intend to attack him, and at no time intimated to me
that he intended to attack the enemy. He neither asked for re-enforcements
nor intimated that he needed them. His last report was dated at 4.50 p. m.,
and is as follows :
".Auous·r 9, 1862-4.50 p. m.
"To Colonel RuGGLES, Chiif qf Staff:
"About 4 o'clock shots were exchanged by the skirmishers. .Artillery opened
fire on both sides in a few minutes. One regiment of rebel infantry advancing
now deployed as skirmishers. 1 have ordered a regiment from the right (Williams's division) and one from the left (Augur's) to advance on the left and in
front."
"5 p.m.-They are now approaching each other."
This is the last despatch of General Banks, but before I received it I was
half-way to the field with Ricketts's division, the rapid firing inducing me to
believe that an engagement was going on. :F'or General Banks's despatches
and my reasons for going to the front with Ricketts's division, see my official
report and General .McDowell's in the volume printed by resolution of the House
of Representatives.
I had not the slightest idea when I went forward that General Banks had
moved from his position. He at no time stated to me his purpose to do so, and
I supposed, of course, when I went £orward, that the enemy had attacked him in
the strong position he had been ordered to take up, and that he was still holding
it. I presumed he would need help in defending that position, though he did
not at any time say so, but constantly reported his belief that the enemy was
not in force and would not attack.
4.H
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I accordingly went to the front with Ricketts's division as a precaution, but
when I arrived on the field I found to my surprise that General Banks had not
only left the position in which he was posted in the morning, but had actually
advanced two miles nearly in the belief that he could beat the enemy, as they
were not in large force.
When near the field even I received word from Banks that he was "driving
the enemy," which information I at once communicated to Ricketts's division .
.As I have stated in my official report, I never designed that Banks should
attack the enemy before McDowell and Sigel joined him, and gave no order whatever
to that effect. The whole weight of the facts and circumstances, the general understanding of everybody, and Banks's own despatches, are against the fact that
he himself, at the time, thought of understanding otherwise than that he was to
hold his position against the enemy.
It is proper to state to your committee that on the 13th of .August, three days
after the battle of Cedar mountain, I sent a long telegraphic report of the battle
to Major General Halleck, which was published in all the papers immediately,
and which, as it was seen a day or two after its publication by most if not all
the officers belonging to the army, must necessarily have been known to General Banks.
Jn fact, I am positive it was known to him, since I sent him a copy of General
Halleck's despatch acknowledging its receipt, and containing some remarks
compl mentary to the ga1Lant1·y of General Banks and his corps. In that telegraphic report I stated precisely what is stated in my detailed official report,
viz: that General Banks departed from his order by leaving the position he
was ordered to take up and advancing to attack the enemy. I several times
called upon General Banks, while he remained under my command, for a report
of the battle of Cedar mountain, and when I was relieved from command of the
army of Virginia, in September, 1862, the general-in-chief of the army, (Major
General Halleck,) at my request, issued positive orders to General Banks, and
one or two other corps commanders, to make reports to me immediately of the
operations of their respective corps during the campaign of the army of Virginia,
to be used in making up my own official report.
Yet up to this time not one word has been received from General Banks on
the subject by me or by any other military official of the government. Now,
at the end of more than two years, General Banks, being on leave of absence in
"\Vashington, procures the testimony of himself and one or two of his staff officers to be taken by your committee in relation to a verbal order, which he says
he received from Colonel L. H. Marshall early in the morning of the battle of
Cedar mountain, before his corps had evt:n gone to the front. He seems to have
interpreted this alleged order in the light of afterthought, without alluding to
subsequent orders he received, and without notifying me or any other officer
concerned in that battle that he intended to give or had given any testimony
before your committee on the subject. Pure accident alone brought to my
knowledge the fact that he had given such testimony, and enabled me, I trust
in time, to present this paper and these facts as the basis of further examination
of the subject, which I hereby respectfully solicit in the cause of justice and fair
dealing.
I leave your committee to charact<=:rize such a transaction as it merits.
As General Banks, however, has chosen to pursue so questionable a course in
this matter, it is but justice to the officers and men concerned, whether of his own
or other corps of the army, that your committee examine thoroughly into the
battle of Cedar mountain, and that for this purpose you procure the testimony
of such of the division and brigade commanders of his corps and of other officers
as are within reach.
I present the names of Major General Augur, Brigadier General .A. S. Wil Iiams, Brigadier General George H. Gordon, Brigadier General Henry Prince,
Brigadier General Geary, Brigadier General B. S. Roberts, Colonel L. H. Mar-
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shall, Captain J. McC. Bell, and such others as the official records show were with
General Banks or under his command at that battle. I am much deceived and misinformed if their testimony does not exhibit the fact that, if even General Banks
had received positive orders to attack, and had had every advantage on his side,
his remarkable arrangements for that battle and his singular manner of making
the attack did not render it next to certain that the result must necessarily have
been defeat and disaster to his corps.
In my official reports I endeavored, as far as I possibly could, to avoid the
censure justly chargeable upon General B::tnks for his management of tha.t
battle, though I was warned at the time by officers of high rank that it was
misplaced generosity, and that my forbearance would assuredly be used against
me thereafter. I did not then believe it possible, and felt disposed to deal with
General Bauks with the utmost tenderness, as I knew and sympathized with
him in his mortification at the result of his previous encounter with J aekson,
and perfectly understood his natural anxiety to avail himself of the first opportunity to retrieve his rPputation. I was very unwilling under such circumstances to criticise his operations at Cedar mountain with any sort of harshness;
but as he himself has chosen at this late day to reopen the question of the battle of Cedar mountain, by endeavoring to place on your records an ex parte
statement of only one incident connected with it, it seems but proper that your
honorable committee now examine thoroughly into it, in order that the whole
subject may be fully and fairly pre~ented to the country, and the measure of
praise or censure be correctly fixed upon the parties concerned.
I am, sir, respec.tfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN POPE,
Major General U. S. V.

Testimony if Brigadier General B. S. Roberts, U. S. T~, concerning the battle qf Cedar mountain, given bifore the JJ;JcDowell court rif inquiry.
VVASHil\'GTON, D. C., January, 1863.
Brigadier General BENJAMIN S. RoBERTS, United States volunteers, a witness, was duly sworn.

By General .M:cDowell :
Question. What was your position on General Pope's staff in the late campaign in Virginia 1
Answer. In the early p~rt of the campaign I was chief of cavalry of that
army ; the latter part of it I was inspector general.
Question. What do you know of the orders of General Pope to General
Banks relative to the battle of Cedar mountain~ 9th day of August, 1862 1
Answer. Early in the morning of the 9th day of August I was sent by General Pope to the front of the army with dirrctions, when General Banks should
reach a position where the night before I had posted General Crawford's brigade, that I should show to General Banks positions for him to take, to hold
the e1iemy in check, if he attempted to advance towards Uulpeper. 'I'wo days
previous, the 7th and Sth, I had been to the point; knew the country, and had
reported to General Pope my impression that a large force of General Jackson
would be at Cedar mountain, or near there, on the !:ith, re-enforcing Ewell's
troops, who were already there. General Pope authorized me, before going to
the point, to give any orders in his name to any of the officers that might be in
the field senior to me. I understood his object was to hold the enemy in check
there that day, and not to attack until the other troops of his command should
a Tive and join General Banks.
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Question. Was the battle of the 9th day of August at Cedar mountain
brought on by the enemy or by General Banks 1
Answer. In the early part of the clay the battle was brought on (artillery
battle) by the enemy's batteries opening from new positions on General Crawford's artillery. I had been directed by General Pope to send information to
him hourly of what was going on, and I had expressed to General Banks my
opinion, about three o'clo~k in the afternoon, that Jackson had arrived; the
forces were very large. General Banks expressed a different opinion, saying
that he thought he should attack the batteries before night. I stated to General
Banks then my reasons for believing that an attack would be dangerous ; that
I was convinced that the batteries both on Cedar and Slaughter's mountains
were supported by heavy forces of infantry massed in the woods. He expressed
a different opinion. He told me he believed he could carry the field. His
men were in the best fighting condition, and that he should undertake it. I
immediately sent a despatch to General Pope-l think my despatch was dated
half past four-telling him that a general battle would be fought before night,
and that it was of the utmost importance, in my opinion, that General McDowell's corps, or that portion of it which was between Culpeper and the battlefield, should be at once sent to the field. Ricketts's division of General McDowell's corps was in the immediate vicinity of the crossing of the road leading
from Stephensburg with the road leading from Culpeper to the battle-field,
or about two miles from Culpeper, and about five from the battle-field.
'l'he court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning, January 9, 1863, at 11
o'clock a. m.
THIRTY-NINTH DAY.

Court-room, corner

of

14tk street and Penn. A ·v.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 9, 1863.
The court met pursuant to adjournment. Present : Major General George
Cadwalader, United States volunteers; Brigadier General John H. Martindale, United States volunteers; Brigadier General James 'H. Van Alen, United
States volunteers; Lieutenant Colonel Louis H. Pelouze, assistant adjutant
general, recorder of the court, and Major General McDowell, United States
volunteers, and Brigadier General Benjamin S. Roberts, United States volun·
teers, the witness under examination.
The proceedings of the preceding day were read by the recorder, and approved by the court.

~
*
*
*
*
*
Brigadier General Benjamin S. Roberts, witness under examination, desired
to state that, with reference to his testimony of the previous day, such portion of it
as reads (page 472) "General Pope authorized me, before going to the front, to
give any orders in his name to any of the officers that might be in the field
senior to me," needs to be so qualified as to read that I was authorized to give
any orders, so far as to carry out General Pope's views, as had been expressed
to me, (General Roberts,) in relation to holding the enemy there until his
(General Pope's) forces could come up.
By General 1\IcDowell :
Question. lf General Banks had not attacked General Jackson in force on
the 9th, do you think Jackson would have llttacked Banks 1
Answer. I do not think Jackson would have attacked Banks in a position
where he was first posted on coming on to the field. The position was exceedingly strong, and one which a small force like General Banks's could have held
again st a larger one of the enemy. General Jackson's troops had made a long
march that day, and I do not think they were in a condition to attack General
Banks.
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Question. Is the witness to be understood that General Banks fought the battle on his own responsibility, and against witness's advice, and the known expectatioa of General Pope 1
Answer. When General Banks first came on to the field I met him, and
WPnt to the front with him, showing him positions where the enemy had batteries already posted, and where I had discovered they were posting new batteries,
and showed General Banks the positions where his own corps could take position
to advantage, and hold those positions, as I thought, if attacked. I then told
him that General Pope wanted him to hold the enemy in check there until Sigel's
forces could be brought up, which were expected that day, and all his other
forces united to fight Jackson's forces. I mean to be understood to say that it
is my impression that General Banks fought that battle entirely upon his own
responsibility, and against the expectations of General Pope, and tho8e expectations had been expressed to General Banks as I have already stated, perhaps
more strongly.
Question. Do you know why General Banks advanced to make a division
movement upon the enemy on the 9th of August without the aid of General McDowell's troops 1 If so, state why.
Answer. I can only state impressions from facts which I can relate. Genei·al
Banks had seen nothing of the enemy on that day, or not much of the enemy,
as the country was such (and well known to them) as to enable them to conceal
their movements from General Banks. After he first came on to the field, and
I had suggested positions to the left of Crawford's brigade, where his main force
should take position, he proceeded to put those forces in position in support of
Crawford, and on his left. I went to the extreme right with one of his brigades (Gordon's) to put it into position, and was gone an hour or more, I should
think, as I went some distance to the right, under the belief that a part of the
enemy's forces were endeavoring to turn that flank. On returning back to the
field I found General Bankt had advanced his lines in order of battle, considerably toward the enemy, so that very sharp musketry firing had already commenced. I then expressed to General Banks my convictions-and I think this
was about three and a half o'clock-that the enemy was in very large force, and
massed in the woods on his right.
General Banks replied that he did not believe the enemy was in any considerable force yet, and said he had resolved to attack their batteries, or to attack
their main force. It was either one or the other. From this state of facts I
am convinced that General Banks made the attack in the belief that the enemy
was not in large force, and that he would succeed in his attack without the aid
of other troops.
Another reason for this belief is that General Banks supposed that his own
force was between twelve and thirteen thousand. whereas it was three thousand
sand less than that number. He was led to this belief by some mistake in returns, which he did not discover until after the battle was fought.
The court adjourned to meet to-morrow, January 10, 1863, at 1 L o'clock a.m.
L. H. PELOUZE,
Lieutenant Colonel and~ecorder.
A true copy of the record.

W. H. W. KREBS,
Captain and A. D. C.
A true copy.
JAMES McC. BELL,
Captain and A . .A. General.
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MILWAUKIE, WrscoNSTN, DecemheT 26, 1864.
GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note calling
my attention to an order which General Banks states that I delivered to him
verbally.
General Banks states that I ordered him to leave the strong position he was
ordered to take up, and advance and attack the enemy.
The order received from you and delivered by me to General Banks, about
eight o'clock on the morning of the 9th of August, before he moved from Culpeper to the front, was, to the best of my recollection, as follows :
"GEKERAL: The general commanding directs that you move to the front
and take up a strong position near the position held by General Crawfm·d's
brigade; that you will not attack the enemy unless it becomes evident the enemy
will attack you; then, in order to hold the ad vantage of being the attacking
party, you will attack with your skirmishers thrown well to the front."
The above is the exact language used by me to General Banks as near as I
can remember; my understanding of your intention was, that you wished to
hold the enemy in check, and put off a general engagement until Sigel's and
McDowell's corps could be got up, and I think that such was the understanding of every one in the army.
My understanding of your order was, that General Banks was to attack with
his skirmishers, and my intention was for him so to understand the order.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
L. H. MARSHALL,
Colonel and A. A. D. C.

TREATMEN'.r OF PRISONERS.
WASHINGTON, ]}fay 27, 1864.
A. J. PALMER, being duly sworn, was examined as follows:
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. State your position, company, and regiment?
Answer. I am a private in company D, 49th New York volunteers.
Question. How long have you been in the service 1
Answer. Since July, 1861.
Question. Have you, at any time, been captured by the rebels; and if so,
when?
Answer. I was captured on the 18th of July, 18G3, in the assault on Fort
Wagner, before Charles ten, South Carolina.
Question. Where were yon taken after you were captured 1
Answer. I was taken to the Charleston jail and kept three days, then to
Columbia, South Carolina, and kept about two months. About the 24th of
September, i think, I was taken to Richmond and put in the Libby prison, and
about the last of September was sent to Belle Island. I was at Belle Island
about a month when I went into the hospital.
Question. What was your treatment while you were at Belle Island 1
Answer. The treatment was very poor. vVhen I went there, in September,
they gave wheat bread, I should judge about half a pound a day, and sometimes
a little black bean soup.
Question. vVas the quantity of food which they gave you sufficient 1
Answer. No, sir; nothing like sufficient.
Question. Why did you go to the hospital 1
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Answer. I was sick. On the 27th of October I was taken sick with typhoid
fever.
Question. Did you have any tents while you were at Belle island 1
Answer. Yes, sir. I 'vas in a tent. I would not have had one but for the
fact that 700 men went north the day I reached there, and I went into one of
their tents. The men did not all have tents.
Question. How long did you remain in that hospital1
Answer. From the 27th of October until the 16th of April.
Question. Were you employed in any capacity while at the hospital; and if
so, what1
Answer. Yes, sir; for the last month or two I was employed as clerk to the
surgeon in charge of the hospital.
Question. How were you treated while in the hospital1
Answer. While in the hospital as a patient, the treatment, as far as kindness
would go, was very well, because our men were the attendants there; some of
them were very mean, though, and were very little better than their men.
Question. How was it in respect to the food furnished 1
Answer. I do not think they had as much, in quantity, as the men on Belle
island got. Sick men did not need as much. rl'hey meant to issue ab0ut the
same quantity, but there were six or eight nur8es who received what they wanted,
and of course the patients did not get as much.
Question. State whether or not you made any copy of the records of .d iseases
and deaths in that hospital during the quarter ending Man:h 30, 18641
Answer. Yes, sir. I had made a report for the surgeon in charge to the Surgeon General or medical director, I am not certain which.
Question. Have you a copy of that report with you'?
Answer. I have.
The witness produced the following copy of the report referred to:
Diseases and deaths

of federal

pn:soncrs at Ricl1mond, Va., for tlze qum·ter
ending ]}larch 31, 1864.
January.

February.

March.

Diseases.
Cases.

Deaths.

Cases. D eaths..

I

Cases.

J

Death~.

--------------------------------------

Febris, cosit. cons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
3
Febris, int. quab. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
23
Febris, int. test. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
20
Febris, rem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
20
Febris,typ hoides ----------------18
12
35
28
Erysipelas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
1
3
1
Rubeola.........................
14
1
15
7
Vari ola and Varioloid, convalescents .... ____
.... .... .... ....
Diarrhma, acuta .... ____ .... -----31
18
100
1:3
Diarrbcea, chronic ... -............
229
19:3
3!37
265
Dysentery, acuta ....... ·...... ____
6
4
23
6
Dysentery, chronic ....... ________
18
12
34
24
Dyspepsia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
1
1
Enteritis ......................... ......... ----·--1 -------Gastritis.........................
1 -------- ........ -------Heppetetis, chronic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
2
Peterris. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
1
Parotetis ............................. _..
3
'l'onsellitis ....... ------ .............. ____ .... ____
7
3
Asthn1a........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
1
1
1
Bronchitis, acuta. ................
21
46
7
20
6
45
16
Bronchitis, chronic...............

10
2
20
5
____ ____ .
11
4
35
29
1
1
6
4
77 ....... .
27
1:3
283
250
9
!3
27
20
2
1
--··---- -------·
1 ....... .
4
3
4
3
3
.... ---- 1-··· .. ..
........
12
3
50
39
_.

_

•••••

1

••••••••

1

•
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Diseases and deaths

rif federal prisoners at Richmond, Va.-Continued.
February.

January.

March.

Diseases.
Cases.

Deaths.

Cases.

Deaths.

Cases.

Deaths.

- - -- - Catarrhus, epidemic ____ ---------.
Catarrhus. _. ___________ . ____ . ___ .
Laryngetis ....................................................
Phthisis, pul. .... ---------------Pluritis .... ____ . _____ . ____ .. ____ .
Pneumonia .............................................
.. _____ . _____ . _____ . ____ .
Caritretes ... _____ . ___ ... _____ . _..
Epilepsia. ____ .. _____ . ____ .. ____ .
N emnegitis .•••••. _-.-. ____ -- __ ..
Neuralgia._ . _____ . ______________ .
Paralysis .. - -- .. __ - -. __ . - - - _- ....
Tetenus _. _---- . ----- . ----- . - ---Bubo, syph. - ............... ----- .. - ........ - ........
Cystetis .... _____ . _..... ____ .. _..
Gonorrbma ... - ..................................... --- .
Nephretis. _.-- -- .. ----. ------ ___ .
Orchitis_ .. ____ . ____ .. _____ . ____ .
Syphilis, prin1 ... _________________
Syphilis, consect _. -- --- -- _--. __ ..
Annacarete .. ...........................................
Ascetis. _- _-- . __ .-- _____ - . ______ .
Lumbago._. ____ .. _____ . __ --- ___ .
Rheumatism, act.. __________ . ___ .
Hhenmatisru, chronic. __ ._ . _____ ..
Absessis.~----- ------------ ·---·Anthrox .. _---.----- .. ---- .. ---Ulcus .... - ___ .. ____ .. ____ .. ____ .
Contusio . ____ .. __ - _.. ____ .. ____ .
Gelatis. ... - ........................... ---- ..... ----Vnlnis, inuim ______ ------ ---· ____
Vulnis, scropt ... _.. ---- . ___ -- . __ .
Otitis.-----· ............................. -------Dohilitas ... __ . ______ . _____ . ____ .
Hemorrhoix. _. ____ . _______ ·__ . ___ .
Mer be, cutis _.--- -•.---- .. __ . ___ .
Scorbutis. ___ -- . _- _-- . _____ . ____ .
Tun1ores ... ____ .. ___ .. ___ . _ . ____ .
Dry gangrene, and frozen feet. ___ .

10

1

6
9
63

2
1
38

1
1
1

1

~t\.nmn1ia

1
35
2
8
10
207
1
1
1
1
3

4

5
5
97

17
1
1
12
126

1.

l

4
1

2

5
1
1
2
2
6

1

1
11
40
2

1
6

11

1
1
4

2
7

2

4

23
42
2

12

4

20
1
15

1

4

7

27

9
1
1
9
109

3

1
27
107
2
6
7
1
23

17
1

3

8
1

7

12
14

1

3

1
1
1
15

1
6

20

3

33
6
9
17

21
2
7

4

Total cases . _____ . ____ .. _. ___ . ____ .. ______ .- _.. ____ . _____ . _____ .... __ .. ___ . . 2, 781
Total deaths._ ... --- .. __________ .. ____ . _____ .. ____ .. ____ . _____ . _______ . _. __ . _ 1, 396
The above report is a true copy of the official report made by the surgeon in charg-e of the
Confederate States military prison hospital to Surgeon General Moore, C. S. A., of thE> diseases and deaths of federal prisoners nuder his charge, for the quarter ending March ::!1,
1i;64.
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Question. Is that a true copy of the report which you drew for the medical
officer 1
Answer. It is.
Question. Have you anything which you wish to add in relation to the
treatment of our men while in hospital?
Answer. Yes, sir. After our men were dead and put in the dead-house,
nearly every morning, the eyes and cheeks were eaten out of them by the rats,
before they were put in their coffins. It was complained of several times, and
the rebel surgeon in charge slightly reprimanded the undertaker, but he took
scarcely any notice of it, and it had not been stopped when I came away.
Question. What was the condition of the hospital as to cleanliness 1
Answer. Every bed was very thickly covered with vermin. A man would
be taken with the small-pox, and after he was sent to the small-pox hospital
sometimes the clothes would not be changed, and a man would be pnt into the
same bed. The vermin were very thick. Th~y would wash a little, but not
enough to have a change of clothes once in two months.
Question. Was the hospital to which they sent our patients very much
crowded 1
Answer. Yes, sir. As soon as a man was able to have his clothes on he was
put on to the floor. In a ward where there were 70 beds there were a hundred
and eight, nine, or ten men; and then there were 10 nurses who would sometimes take the beds. Sometimes they did not have ten, and sometimes more
than that.
WASHINGTON, January 27, 1865.
Sergeant 0. W. THURSTON sworn and examined.
By Mr. Loan:
Question. vV ill you state to what company and regiment you belong 1
Answer. I am a sergeant of company K, 6th New Hampshire volunteers.
Question. About what time and where were you taken prisoner by the
rebels 1
Answer. I was captured on the 30th of September last, at what I think is
known by the name of Jones's farm. It was the time the attempt was made
to cut the Southside railroad near Petersburg.
Question. 'To what place were you taken and confined 1
Answer. I was first taken with others to Petersburg, and kept over night,
then to Richmond and pnt into what is called the Pemberton builciing, and than
to Salisbury, North Carolina.
Question. How long were you kept in Richmond 1
Answer. Only over one night.
Question. How long were you at Salisbury 1
Answer. Until the 18th of last month, when I made my escape.
Question. WlJat number of prisoners were at Salisbury, and how were they
treated 1
Answer. When I was first taken there, there were comparatively few prisoners there, but within three or four days there were upwards of 10,000. I
know that when I Lad charge of the bakery for the prisoners, I made out requisitions for more than 10,600 men.
Question. What kind of a place were you kept in 1
Answer. At the time I went there, there was a building that was made to hold
proba.bly 2,000 men. The rest had no cover or shelter at all. The enemy had
taken away from us our blankets and knapsacks and a great deal of our clothing. About the 6th of November the quartermaster gave us some tents, in the
proportion of one Sibley tent and one t:mall wall tent to each 100 men, but not
more than 50 of the 100 could get in and lie down in the tents; the rest had no
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covering, and used to dig holes in the ground with their pocket knives and
plates. because they could get no shovels or picks, and they would crawl in
those holes and lie down.
In regard to the rations for the men, what was called the regular ration was
a pound of bread made of corn and cobs ground together, to each man for 24
hours; they usually got only about 12 ounces even of that bread; then, for meat,
the men usually received 22 pounds of beeves' heads, tripes, and gullets to
each 100 men; but that was not received every day, only about once in four
days on an average, and then there was usually given about half a pint of
soup to each man a day; the soup was made of rice and water; that is, a large
bucketful of rice would be put into a large kettle of water, holding, say, 20
gallons; t~ometimes a little salt, sometimes no salt at all. rrhey would dip
out the water and but little of the rice, and then fill up again and again until
1,000 men had been served from the one bucketful of rice. Upon the slightest
provocation the rations would be cut off entirely for a day or two. I have lost
the principal diary I kept while there; but I find, in a memorandum book which
I have here, that on Friday the 28th of October the men received no ration s ; on
S ;~ turday they received nothing but soup; on Sunday they received bread and
meat, t~o that there were two days when they received nothing but a little soup.
In regard to the treatment of our men in other respects, I can illustrate it by
an incident I saw myself: I was standing one day by the hospital, (I had been
to see Mr. Davis, one of the prisoners who had been appointed superintendent of
the hospital,) and one of our negro soldiers, captured at the time of the explosion
of the mine near Petersburg, was standing near by engaged in " skirmish ing,''
as we prisoners call it, examining his clothes for vermin. A sentinel there, at
whom l happened to be looking at the time, drew up his musket, took deliberate
aim and fired, killing the negro on the spot One of our boys asked him "What
be did that for?" And he replied that he did it "to see the damned black son
of a bitch drop." rrhat I saw done myself.
Question. What notice was taken of that by the rebel autl1nrities there 1
Answer. None that I know. rl'he report is that they get 30 days' furlough
for shooting a Yankee: that it is encouraged. :Mr. Davis, the superintendent of
the hospital, assured me that he has, at the present time, the names of 1,800
of our men who died there between the 1st day of October and the 15th clay
of December, 1864.
Question. Who is this Mr. Davis 1
Answer. He was the chief clerk of the Ohio senate, so I understand, and a
correspondent of the Cincinnati Gazette. He escaped when I did, and I understand he is now in this city.
Question. He was a prisoner at Salisbury 1
Answer. Yes, sir; and Mr. Richardson of the New York r:l'imes, and Mr.
Browne of the New York Tribune.
Question. vVhat means had Mr. Davis to know the number of deaths?
Answer. He was the superintendent of the hospital, and Mr. Richardson was
clerk of the hospital.
Question. Appointed by the rebel authorities 1
Answer. Yes, sir; we made an attempt to break out of the prison one day, in
which we killed four of the guards aDd wounded quite a number of them. 'l'hl'Y
killed fifteen of our men, and wounded fifty-seven. 'rhey fired upon the b•,y s
for twenty-two minutes after they had given up and gone. int_o th eir tents.
rrhey fired right through the tents-they coulcl ~ ee no on e-nd~lmg th~m completely, and they discharged cannon several times, loaded w1th camster, or
rather with little pluo-s of iron punched out of boilers where they made them.
We have kept an acc~unt of upwards of 900 federal soldiers who have enlisted
in the rebel service merely to avoid starvation. Generally, for a day or two
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before they were enlisted they would be deprived of everything to eat but a
little soup.
Question. What rations do the rebels furnish their own soldiers?
Answer. They told me that th~y got a pound of flour and a half a pound of
bacon or other meat to a man. They were put on short rations there, or " half
rations,'·" as they called it.
Question. What else was furnished them?
Answer. Very little of anything else than a little tobacco; at least that is
what they told me. They said they had to have provisions sent them from
home, for they could not live on their rations there.
Question. What became of the beeves, the heads and tripes of which, you
say, were given to the prisoners ?
Answer. I cannot tell; sometimes we would get a little of the beef, but
very seldom; we got very little beef in proportion to the heads and tripes. I
had twelve men of my own regiment who enlisted in the rebel service.
Question. Did much sickness result from this diet ?
Answer. 'l'he diarrhooa was the prevalent sickness, cansed principally by
the water, I think. The boys did not have what water they wanted.
'l'hey had to go a quarter of a m le to a little creek, twenty at a time,
with a guard, but they did not get all they wanted. There was water in
the yard, but so thick with mud that they could not drink it. The only
well that had good water in it was closely guarded and kept for the hospital. The morning I escaped, there were 7,603 prisoners there. We never
received any of the clothing or :::upplies of the Sanitary Commission which we
understood had been sent to us. Before our soldiers would be enlisted in the
rebel service, they would usually get nothing to eat for two or three days.
Then an officer wonld come in with a guard, and when the prisoners were collected around him, he would tell them that they would not be exchanged before
the end of the war; but if they would enlist in their service, they would have
plenty of food and clothing, and be placed on garrison duty, and not be called
upon to fight. I have seen men brought up for that purpose, who were so
weak that they could not walk without staggering.
Question. Were any threats made as to what would be the consequences if
they did not enlist?
Answer. No, sir ; there was no need of threats ; the boys knew they would
die if they stayed there. 'l'he rations kept growing poorer and poorer all the
time. God only knows what they are by this time, or how the poor fellows get
along.
Question. State more fully about your being deprived of clothing, &c., when
you were captured.
· Answer. When we are first taken, they generally take from us all our money,
watches, and other valuables. When we were taken to Petersburg, an officer
came in with a guard, where we were, and took a great many of our rubber
and woollen blankets. The guard kept coming in and stealing our clothing,
the men resisting; but, of course, resistance was useless. They took our shelter tents and overcoats from HS while we were in Petersburg. When we got to
Richmond and were put in the Pemberton building, we were formed into line on
each side of the building, and made to take off our knapsacks, haversacks, and
canteens, and pile them up in the middle of the room, and they were carried off by
them. 'l'hey said they were going to search us for money, and we were invited
to give up what money we had voluntarily, and told that if we did so we
should have a rec(')ipt for it, and it would be given back to us when we were
exchangAd ; but we were told that if we did not do that, and any money was
afterwards found on us, it would be confiscated. Then they took us on to
Salisbury, many of our boys having nothing but what they had on; when
their clothes wore out they had to do without. When I left not one-half of
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them had more than a blowse and a pair of pantaloons, some nothing but a
shirt and pantaloons, still others nothing but pantalo~ms and a piece of old
cloth about their shoulders ; hundreds were barefooted and without hats or
caps, without clothing to keep them any way comfortable.
Question. Then they must haYe suffered much from the inclemency of the
weather 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I understood that some of them froze to death; I have
no doubt that many perished in that way. I have had men come to the bakery,
where I was, sl1ivering and shaking with cold, as if they had the ague, and beg
to be allowed to come in and warm themselves. I would let a few in at a time,
and then, after a short time, make them go out and let others come in. When
prisoners died they used to strip them of their clothing, which they would
sometimes give to the most needy of the living. The dead were put in a deadhouse, and then pitched into a cart any way, just as many as it would hold, and,
as I understood, carried off and tumbled into a ditch and covered up. This I was
told by some of our men who were detailed as grave-diggers, and given double
.
rations for that duty.
Question. You have no personal knowledge that any of the prisoners froze
ro death 1
Answer. No, sir; I saw none when they wPre fre<'zing, but I was told so,
and I have no doubt of it. The men would get very weak, and would crawl
into their holes, and I have no doubt they froze to death there. One man was
taken out fi:om under the hospital who had been there so long that he had
begun to decay, and was all covered with vermin; we supposed he had crawled
under there to get out of the cold and there died. I wa~ told by a rebel doctor
there, I forget his name, that not one in ten of the men who died there would
have died if they had had proper food and shelter.
Question. From all that you have seen, are you satiidied in your own mind
that our soldiers have died there in consequence of not Laving proper food and
clothing?
Answer. I know so, as well as I can know anything of that nature. There
was a snow-storm there, which changed to a cold rain, and lasted for two days,
and the morning after I saw six men taken out of one hole, into which they
had crawled, and had there died.
Question. How long were you in effecting your escape 1
Answer. vVe left on the 18th of December, and reached Knoxville on the
13th of January. From there I went to Chattanooga, and was ordered by
General 'l'homas to report here in "\Vashington, and I came right on here.
Question. You are here for the purpose of joining your regiment 1
Answer. Yes, sir; I want to join it immediately.
WASHINGTON, January 30, 1865.
:M:r. ALBERT D. RICHARDSON sworn and examined.
By the chairman :
Question. I understand that you are one of the newspaper correspondents
who lately escaped from Salisbury, North Carolina. Will yon give the committee a statement of such matters as you may deem important in relation to
your experience as a prisoner, and what you have observed in reference to the
treatment of our prisoners by the rebel authorities 1
Answer. I am a Tribune correspondent, and was captured by the rebels May
3, 1863, at midnight, on a hay bale in the Mississippi river, opposite Vicksburg.
After confinement in six different prisons I was sent to Salisbury, N. C., February 3, 1864, and kept there until December 18, when I escaped. For several
months Salisbury was the most endurable rebel prison I had seen. 'J.lhe six
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hundred inmates ex~rcised in the open air, were comparatively well fed and
kindly treated. But early in October 10,000 regular prisoners of war arrived
there, and it immediately changed into a scene of cruelty and horrors. It was
densely crowded ; rations were cut down and issued very irregularly ; friends
outside could not even send in a plate of food. The prisoners suffered constantly
and often intensely for want of water, bread, and shelter. The 1·ebel authorities
placed all the prison hospitals under charge of my two journalistic comrades
(Messrs. Brown and Davis) and myself. Our positions enabled us to obtain
exact and minute information. 'Those who had to live or die on the prison rations always suffered from hunger. Very frequently one or mo1·e divisions of a
thousand men would receive no rations for twenty-four hours; sometimes they
were without a morsel of food for forty-eight hours. The few who had money
would pay from five to twenty dollars, rebel currency, for a little loaf of bread.
Most of the prisoners traded the buttons from their blowses for food. Many,
though the weather was very inclement and snows frequent, sold coats from
their backs and shoes from their feet. Yet I was assured, on authority entirely
trustworthy, that the great commissary warehouse near the prison was filled
with provisions; that the commissary found it difficult to obtain storage for his
flour and meal; that when a subordinate asked the post commandant, Major
John H. Gee, " Shall I give the prisoners full rations," he replied, " No, God
damn them, give them quarter rations." I know, from personal observation,
that corn and pork are very abundant in the region about Salisbury. For several
weeks the prisoners had no shelter whatever. 'They were all thinly clad;
thousands were barefooted ; not one in twenty had either overcoat or blanket ;
many hundreds were without shirts, and hundreds were without blowses. At
last ·one Sibley tent and one "A" tent were furnished to each squad of one hundred. With the closest crowding these sheltered about one-half the prisoners.
'The rest burrowed in the ground, crept under buildings, or shivered throug·h
the nights in the open air upon the frozen, muddy, or snowy soil. If the rebels,
at the time of their capture, had not stolen their shelter tents, blankets, clothing,
and money, they would have suffered little from cold. If the prison authorities
bad permitted a few hundred of them, either upon parole or under guard, to cut
logs within two miles of the garrison, the prisoners would gladly have built comfortable and ample barracks in one week. But the commandant would never,
in a densely wooded region, with the cars which brought it passing by the wall
of the prison, even furnish half the fuel which was needed.
'l'he hospitals were in a horrible condition. By crowding the patients
thick as they could lie upon the floor they would contain six hundred inmates.
They were always full to overflowing, with thousands seeking admission in vain.
In the two largest wards, containing joi!ltly about two hundred and fifty patients,
there was rro fire whatever. 'l'he others had small fireplaces, but were always
cold. One ward, which held forty patients, was comparatively well furnished.
In the other eight the sick and dying men lay upon the cold aw1 usually naked
floor, for the scanty straw furnished us soon became too filthy and full of vermin for use. The authorities never supplied a single blanket, or quilt, or pillow,
or bed, for those eight wards. We could not procure even brooms to keep
them clean, or cold water to wash the faces of the inmates. Pneumonia,
catarrh, and diarrhrea were the prevailing diseases, but they were directly the
result of hunger and exposure. More than half who entered the hospitals died
in a very few days. rrhe deceased, always without ·coffins, were loaded in a
drad-cart, piled upon each other like logs of wood, and so driven out to be thrown
into a trench and covered with earth.
'I'he rebel surgeons were generally humane and attentive. They endeavored
to improve the shocking condition of the hospitals, but the Salisbury and Richmond authorities both disregarded t!Leir compl~ints and protests.
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On November 25 many of the prisoners had been without food for fortyeight hours. Desperate from hunger, without any matured plan, a few of them
13aid, "We may as well die in one way as another; let us break out of this horrible place.'' Some of them wrested the guns from a relief of fifteen rebel
soldiers just entering the yard, killing two who resisted and wounding five or
six. Others attempted to open the fence, but they had neither adequate tools
nor concert of action. Before they could effect a breach every gun in the garrison was turned upon them, two field-pieces operated with grape and canister,
and they dispersed to their quarters. Five minutes from the beginning the
attempt was quelled and hardly a prisoner was to be seen in the yard. lYiy own
quarters were a huudred and fifty yards from the scene of the insurrection. In
our vicinity there had been no participation at aU in it, and yet for twenty
minutes after it was ended the guards upon the fence on each side of us, with
ddiberate aim, fired into the tents upon helpless and innocent men. Th ey killed,
in all, fifteen and wounded abo'nt t3ixty, not one-tenth of whom had taken part
in the attempt, many of whom were ignorant of it until they heard the guns.
Deliberate cold-blooded murders of peaceable men, where there was no pretence that they were reaki11g any prison regulation, were very frequent. On
October 16, Lieutenant Davis, of the 155th New York infantry, was thus shot
dead by a guard, who the day before had been openly swearing that he would
"kill some damned Yankee yet." November 6, Luther Oonrod, of the 45th
Pennsylvania infantry, a delirious patient from one of the hospitals, was similarly murdered. November 30, a chimney in one of t1Ie hospitals fell down,
crushing several men under it. Orders were immediately given to the guard to
let no one approach the building, on the pretext that there might be another
insurrection. Two patients from that hospital had not heard tbe order, and
wAre returning to their quarters, when I saw a sentinel on the fence, within
twenty feet of them, without challenging them, raise his piece and fire, killing
one and wounding the other. Major Gee, at the time, was standing immediately
beside the sentinel, who must have acted under his direct orders. December
16, Moses :::;mith, of 7th Mary land (colored) infantry, while standing beside
my quarters, searching for scraps of food from the sweepings of the cook-house,
was shot through the head. 'l'here were very many similar murders. I never knew
any pretence, even, made of investigation or punishing them. Our lives were
never safe for one moment; any sentinel, at any hour of the day or night, could
deliberately shoot down any prisoner, or into any group of prisoners, black or
w bite, and he would not even be taken off his post for it.
Nearly every week an officer came into the prison to recruit for the rebel
army. Sometimes he offered bounties; always he promised good clothing and
abundant food. Between 1,200 anrl 1,800 of our men enlisted in two months.
I was repeatedly asked by prisoners, sometimes with tears in ' their eyes,
"What shall I do 1 I don't want to starve to death. I am growing weaker
daily; if I stay here I shall follow my comrades to the hospital and dead-house;
if I enlist I may live until I can escape."
I had charge of the clothing left by the dead, and reissued it to the living.
I distributed articles of clothing to more than 2,000 prisoners; but when I
escaped there were fully 500 without a shoe or a stocking, and more yet with no
garment above the waist except one blouse or one shirt. Men came to me frequently upon whom the rebels, when they captured them, had left nothing whatever except a light cotton shirt and a pair of light ragged cotton pantaloons.
The books of all the hospitals were kept, and the daily consolidated reports
made up, under my supervision. During the two months, between, October 18
and D ecember 18, the average number of prisoners was about 7,500. The
deaths for that period were fully 1,500, or twenty per cent. of the whole. I
br.o ught away the names of more than 1,200 of the dead; some of the remainder were never reported ; the others I could not procure on the day of my
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escape without exciting suspicion. As the men grew more and more debilitated,
the percentage of deaths increased. I left about 6,500 remaining in the garrison, December 18, and they were dying then at the average rate of 28 a day,
or thirteen per cent. a month.
The simple truth is, that the rebel authorities are murdering our soldiers at
Salisbury by cold and hunger, while they might easily supply them with ample
food and fuel. 'rhey are doing this systematically and, I believe, intentionally,
for the purpose of either forcing our government to an exchange or forcing our
prisoners into the rebel army.
I will also, with the consent of the committee, lay before them a sworn affidavit I obtained in Louisville, Kentucky, from one of the priaoners at Salisbury,
North Carolina, who escaped at the time I did. It is as follows :
I am a mariner by profession, and reside at Mystic River, Connecticut; was master of the
bark Texana, captured and burned by the rebels near the mouth of the Mississippi river June
10, 1863; was confined in Hichmond, Virginia, until the 20th of July, 1864, when I was
sent to the military prison at Salisbury, North Carolina, and kept there until my escape on
the 18th of December last. After the transfer of prisoners of war to Salisbury in October
last, I mingled with them constantly, and was familiar with their treatment in all respects.
For a month before my escape I was ward-master of one of the largest hospitals in the prison.
The prisoners were in a most pitiable condition. They all, without exception, and at all
times suffered greatly for want of food, the most of them for the want of clothing, and a
large portion of them for want of shelter. Very few out of the whole number were in good
health, and the deaths were very numerous. Mine was called a ward for convalescents; it
usually contained from one hundred to one hundred and twenty inmates; the deaths averaged
fully six per day, and sometimes reached ten and twelve. The sickness and mortality were
directly traceable to hunger, exposure, and cold. I can give no just idea in this brief statemPnt of the horrors of the prison and hospitals, and the general treatment of the prisoners.
It is barbarous beyond anything I ever before saw or heard of. I believe it is the deliberate
intention of the rebel authorities to leave the prisoners no alternative between fi.-eezing and
starvation or enlistment in the rebel army.
THOMAS E. WOLFE.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of January, 1865.
JOSEPH CLEMENT,
Justice of tlte Peace ••

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1865.
Mr. ~TuNIUS HENRI BROWNE sworn and examined.
By th~ chairman:
Question. I understand that you were a prisoner at Salisbury, North Carolina, and escaped at the same time Mr. Richardson, who has just testified, made
his escape. You have heard his testimony; will you state whether yon concur
with him in what he has stated, and also give such additional statements as you
may deem necessary 1
Answer. I concur with Mr. Richardson in all his statements, so far as the
facts to which they relate came to my knowledge. In addition to what he
has said, I would further state that I am a journalist by profession; have been
since the breaking out of the war an army correspondent of the New York
~rribune; was captured in that capacity in the middle of the Mississippi river, .
while running the batteries of Vicksburg, on the night of May 3d, 1863, our
expedition having been destroyed by the rebel siege guns. I was held prisoner
some twenty months, having in that time been an occupant of seven southern
prisons, the last being the Salisbury, North Carolina, penitentiary, where I was
kept, with my co-laborer, Albert D. Rit:hardson, for almost eleven months, making
my escape therefrom in his company on the night of December 18, 1864.
The treatment of our prisoners was bad enough everywhere, but it was so
barbarous and inhuman at Salisbury for two months pre...,-ious to my escape that
I regard the exposure thereof a duty I owe to the thousands who still remain
there. Early in October from nine to ten thousand of our enlisted men were
sent to Salisbury from Richmond and other points ; and as they had been
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robbed of their clothing and blankets, and received very little food or shelter,
the mortality among them became almost immediately widespread and alarming.
Every tene:rnent within the prison limits was converted into a hospital, and I
offered my ~ervices as medical dispenser and assistant to the rebel surgeons. I
soon made daily visits to the sick-who could not obtain admission to the overcrowded hospitals-lying in tents on the ground, without covering, and with
very scant raiment, and living in holes they had dug in the earth, or under
buildings where they had crept for protection from the cold rains, the snow, and
the biting winds, and performed such poor service as lay in my limited power.
Their condition was distressing in the extreme. 'rhey had no means of keeping
warm except by fires of very green wood that filled the rude shelters with
bitter smoke; and which, added to the carbonic acidized atmosphere from so
many breaths, and the emanations from unwholesome and unwashed bodies,
packed together like figs, entirely poisoned the air, and destroyed the health
of almost all who inhaled it.
The sickness and mortality in those outside quarters, as well as elsewhere,
continually increased, and the marvel was that any one survived. Starved and
freezing, with hardly water enough to drink, much less to wash their persons,
or the scant clothes they wore, the poor fellows naturally and necessarily despaired, and not a few of them were anxious to die, to escape from the slow
torture of their situation.
I had the best means of knowing, and it is my firmest belief that, out of eight
or nine thousand prisoners at Salisbury, there were not at any time five hundred
of them in sound health-an opinion in which all the rebel surgeons to whom I
expressed it fully coincided.
The deaths during the last two months I passed at Salisbury ranged from
twenty-five to forty-five per day; diarrhooa, dysentery, catrurrh, pneumonia, and
typhoid ±ever, all engendered by scarcity of food, shelter, and raiment, being
the principal diseases. I have no doubt, if the prisoners had beefl properly
treated-as prisoners of war in th~north are, to the best of my knowledge and
information, treated-the mortality in Salisbury would not have been more than
;ne-eighth of what it was-a view in which the rebel surgeons with whom I
talked fully concurred.
The capacity of the so-called hospitals, nine in number, which were without
any of the comforts or concomitants of those institutions, was not to the fullest
over five or six hundred patients; and the number of prisoners who ought to
have been inmates thereof was at least as many thousands. 'rhe hospitals
merely afforded some protection from the cold and rain, and furnished rather
better rations than were given to the men who were supposed by a transparent
fiction to be in good health. Hardly any one would go to the hospitals so long
as he could help himself, or induce any one to help him; the daily r;pectacle of
ghastly and hideous corpses going therefrom to the dead-house filling all beholders with horror, and inducing the soldiers to believe that all who entered
those filthy and pestiferous tenements were doomed.
The prison limits at Salisbury revealed a scene of wretchedness, squalor,
despair, and suffering such as I, accustomed as I am to army life and the horrors of military hospitals and battle-fields, had never before witnessed. The
prison authorities-especially after the massacre attending the attempted outbreak of November 25th-appeared not only indifferent to the miserable condition of the men, but to be actuated by a brutality and malignity towards them
that I could not reconcile with my ideas of human nature. 'rhey permitted
the guards to shoot prisoners whenever they pleased, without the least pretext
or explanation, and no man's life was safe for a day or an hour. 'rhe air was
full of pain and pestilence, and all the horrors of imagined hells seemed realized
in that most wretched place, of which I shall never think without a shudder
and an augmented faith in the naturally abhorrent doctrine of total depravity.
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PoiNT LooKouT, MARYLAND, Arril 14, 18G/).
Brigadier General JAMES BARNES sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch :
Question. What is your rank and position in the army 1
Answer. Brigadier general United States volunteers.
Question. What is your present command, and how long have you held the
same?
· Answer. I am in command of the district of St. Mary's~ which embraces the
county of St. Mary's, Maryland, within which is situated the militmy prison
at Point Lookout, at the entrance of the Potomac river into the Chesapeake bay.
I have been in command of the di~trict since the 6th of July, 1864.
Question. How many prisoners are there now in the camp of the prisoners of
war at Point Looko11t, Maryland 1
Answer. There are at this time twenty-one thousand two hundred and fiftyfive, ( 2l,255.)
Question. What has been the greatest number nf prisoners in the camp, and
how many have they averaged during your command 1
Answer. The present number is the largest that has been here at any one
time. 'l'he table appended, from the provost marshal, (marked A,) exhibits the
average number each month since the establishment of this post as a depot for
the prisoners of war, in J u1y, 1863.
Question. Give a detailed account of your mode of subsisting the prisoners,
including their tlaily ration, the manner in which they are sheltered, their
medical t1 eatment, the average mortality, and all other facts pertaining thereto.
Answer. The annexed statemPntof LieutPnantC. H. Whittemore, (ma1ked B,)
acting as commissary of subsistence for the prisoners of war, presents, in detail,
a correct account of the mode of subsistence of the prisoners of war, and the
daily rations issued to them.
The accompanying statement ofDr. J. H. Thompson, surgeon-in-chief of this
district, (marked C,) exhibits full details of the hospital arrangements provided
for the prisoners and their medical treatment, the average mortality, and other
facts connected with the su~ject.
The statement marked D, presents an exhibit by the provost marshal,
Mnjor Brady, of the veteran reserve corps, of the manner in which the prisoners
are sheltered, the means provided for cleanline~s both of the prisoners and camp,
the weekly inspection, and the general arrangements for preserving order and
the necl'ssary discipline required for their government, the amount of clothing
issued to the prisoners by the guvernment, and a monthly statement of the
number of prisoners in the camp, and all essential particulars relating thereto.
It will be seen that the government has made a liberal provision for the health
and necessary protection of the prisoners.
I would further state that a library has been formed, containing about eight
hundred ( 800) volumes, for their use by contribution. A school has been held
daily by some of the prisoners qualified to teach, and there may be seen grown
men, some learning their letters and studying their spelling-book ; some studying the elements of arithmetic and geography; some, more advanced, studying
Latin, Greek, and French. 'rhrough the camp may be seen ingenious manuf aeturing of fans fiOm pine wood, chains from horse-hair, gutta-percha rings
inlaid neatly with gold and silver ornaments, and all these things are permitted
5M
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to be sold, and the proceeds received by the provost marshal for the benefit of
the prisoners who make them. Money and other valuables, as watches, &c.,
in possession of the prisoners on their arrival at the post, are placed in the hands
of the provost marshal, and recorded in his books, all of which are returned to them
when they leave the post, paroled for exchange; or ir transferred to another
})OSt, a schedule of their private property is made out and the property transferred with the prisoner.
The general conduct of the prisoners has been very good; in a few instances,
perhaps half a dozen, the punishment of a ball and chain, not unusual in armies,
has been awarded for a brief period fur attempting to escape, but these have been
very rare.
A good deal of labor in the quartermaster's and commissary department at
this post has been performed by the prisoners, and also work on the forts.
But this labor is always voluntary on the part of the prisoner, and for which he is
invariably compensated, either in money or in extra. rations of tobacco, &c., as
he may choose. This labor is sought eagerly by the prisoners.
Very rarely has any complaint of any ill treatment on the part of our soldiers
towards the prisoners been made. I cannot at this time recall a single instance,
if I may except a few cases which arose between them and some of the colored
troops. but even with them nothing of any moment.
I believe I have answered as fully as necessary the questions submitted to me.

JAMES BARNES,
Brigadier General, Commanding D1:strict of St. Mary's, Maryland.
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A.
Consolidated report o/ p·risoners qf war at Point Lookout, Md., from the date
if first arri1;al if prisoners, July ~l, 1863, to April 18, 1865, inclusive.

July 31, 1863. * _______ .
August. ______________ .
September. ____ ---- ____
October. _____________ .
November ____________ .
December _ . __________ .
January, 1864 ...... ____
February. ____________ .
March .. ______________ .
April._.----------- ___ .
May·-----·----··----,June.
____ . ___________ .
July ........ - ... - ....... ---August... __ --- _______ .
September ______ . _____ .
October .............. ---·---November . ____ ... _. __ .
December ____________ .
January, 186G. ________ .
February ___ . __________
March. ____ .. _. _.... _..
To April18 ............

1,fi91
2,123
3,676
2,261
286
237
939
:133
122
6,876
3,473
258
1,426
1,603
5,983
717
325
1, 272
1,527
3,7:37
12,276

............... . - .. -- ... - ---3
5

7
439
380
93
57
22
65
21
2
651
4,528
4,111

'51

-------- ......... _ .. _
14

33
1]9
158
1:38
128
82
43
24
105
204
211
110
111
52
86
161
223
175
97

502
1,969
246
362
4
696
2,878
603

62
J
414
232
24
83

556
4, 145
3,230

1]' 243

15, 191

- - -- - -

Total ..... ____ ...... 51,277

1

1
1
2
4
687
38]
218
217
196
250
20
7
5
431
11
27
25
36
76
9

136
1,819
1,018
3,909
11
2,441
7,110
5,012
2
8,867
8,564
3
8,384
8,697
12
7,739
8,179
8,147
7,994
6,146
7, 010
5,741
5,998
8,G34
6 12.027
1 1( 489 13,320
9,993 12,376
2
7,088
2
7,530
1
7,828
7,118
3 10,388
9,465
10,376 10,070
10,588 10,516
10,704 10,722
7,595
9,271
7,825
2
7,025
19,912 14,328

--

2, 274 ~ 2, 607 ~ 50

Totalinprisoners'camp. -·····-- ....................... ---·-·
Total in U. S. gen'l hospital .. ___ .. _____ ....
Paroled prisoners from
other stations .. ___ . _.

----

--------

...• 19,912

Gr~:t~~~~~~-t-~~--~~~~--- =====~~==

130
1, 213

21,255

=================-=======-=~=======

Total average of plisoners of war, from July
31, 1863, to April 18,
1865, inclu'e-equivalent number for the
whole period .. __ .. __ .

=
-

.

8,252

* Date of first arrival of prisoners.
N. B. -T~e average in the last column is obtained by taking the number of prisoners each
day a?d addmg the whole together, and dividing the number thus obtained by the nuniber of
days m the month : the number of prisoners in camp is therefore equivalent to this number
through the whole month.
·
'
HEADQUARTERS DIST. ST. MARY's,
PROVOST MARSHAL'S OFFICE,

Point

Lookoz~t,

Md., Aprill9, 1865.

.A.. G. BRADY,
Major V. R. C. and Provost Marshal.
HEADQUARTERS ST. MARY'S DISTRICT

Sworn to before me.

Office A. A. General, April 19, i865.

. C. C. DREW,
Capt. V. R. C., A. A. A. General, Judge Advocate.
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HEADQUARTFRS ST. MARY'S DISTRICT,

No. - .
5
Point Lookout, Md., Sept. 1, 1864.
The following regulations heretofore established for the government of the camp of the
,
prisoners of war are republished for the information of all concerned:
I. Hereafter at reveille the bugle will sound in front of the ·sergeant major's quarters, when
the several details for general and company police will be formed under their respective noncommissioned officers, and a thorough police of the entire camp will be made.
II. The acting first sergeant, detailed from the prisoners of war, will be under the direction
of the corporal of police for their respective divisions, and will give special attention to their
company streets and quarters, causing all filth and waste water to be thrown into a barrel
kept for that purpose, and emptied every morning, and oftener if necessary.
III. Breakfast hour will be at 6t o'clock a.m., dinner at lt p. m., which will be announced
by the sound of the bugle.
IV. There will be two stated roll-calls each day; that of the enlisted men will take place at
reveille and retreat. Each company will fall into line at the sound of the bugle, and the first
sergeants will make their reports to the sergeant major promptly. Sergeant E. Young will
call roll in the officers' camp at 7 a. m. and 5 p. m., and will make his report to the A. P. M.
immediately.
V. No p1isoners will be permitted to pass above the lower ends of the kitchens unless employed in cook and mess room, except to their meals.
VI. Every company and division, commencing with the first in number, will be kept at
their maximum number of one hundred and one thousand men each, and in ali cases when
any company or division is reduced below the standard by sickness, exchange or otherwise,
they shall be immediately filled by men from the last division, or those discharged from hospital, and all fractional companies shall be provisioned at a design'lted cook-house, from
which all extra meals, coffee, and rations issued to other than prisoners will be supplied.
VII. Mess and cook rooms will be provided for one thousand and fifteen huudred·men
each, in which stoves, cauldrons, and all other necessary cooking utensils will be placed.
VIII. A sufficient number of men will be provided fi·om the prisoners to perform the various
duties required. The arrangement for the present will be as follows: Four men will be
assigned to the duty of cooking tbe victuals, ten to drawing the rations, two to providiug the
cooks with wood and water, and four to attend to the duties in the mess-room. This will
include the setting of the tables, cleaning floor, tables, and all other articles used in me:ssroom.
IX. Each room will be under the superintendence of a sergeant from among the prisoners, who will be held responsible for the faithful performance of the duties assigned to his
room, and will be required to report any neglect of duty by the men under him to the lieutenant in charge of the commissary department, who will make fi·equent inspections of the
quarters.
X. The prisoners will be marched to and from the mess-room by the sergeants in charge of
squads, and no man being absent when his squad is called to meals will be allowed to fall in
with another squad.
XI. Loud talking when in the mess-room will be strictly forbidden, and it will be the duty
of the sergeants in eharge of cook and mess rooms to see that no unnecessary waste is made,
and also that a degree of cleanliness is observed. Meal calls will be made ten minutes bef01e
opening the mess-room doors, when the sergeants in charge will see that their men are ready.
XII. The sergeant major will make all details for fatigue duty from those eating at the
first table on the day such detail is called Jor. All working parties will be formed and
marched by the sergeant in charge precisely at 7i a. m. to the main entrance, but no detail
for any purpose whatever shall be allowed to leave the camp ·w ithout a sufficient guard and
the written authority of the provost marshal. Neither will any prisoner be permitted to visit
the Point for any purpose whatever without special permission frum the general commanding.
All persons in charge of detachments from the camp will be held strictly responsible for their
return before sunset, when the gates will be shut and no one allowed to pass or re-pass except
thA guards and officers having proper authority.
XIII. Prisoners will not be allowed to hold any communication whatever with the guard
or any inJividual without special permission from the provost marshal, and no letters will
pass to or from prisoners except through the proper channels. The guard and patrol ·will not
permit any prisoner to remain outside of his tent after dark except on business of necessity.
XIV. A police sergeant will be detailed with "a sufficient number of men from eacb com- ·
pany to attend to the constant and thorough cleanliness of his company street and quarters.
An efficient non-commissioned officer and fifty (50) men will be permanently detailed as
general police, whose duty it shall be to keep scrupulously clean the vicinity of the kitchens
and parts of the camp not occupied.
XV. Fires and lights will be promptly extinguished and all loud conversation suspended in
the camp of enlisted prisoners at taps ; in the prison camp for officers, lights and conversa, tion will be permitted one-half hour later.
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XVI. No citizen, enlisted man, or officer, except those on guard duty or general officer
from headquarters, will be permitted to walk upon the fences around the prison camps without speeial permission from the provost marshal.
By command of Brigadier General James Barnes:
A. G. BRADY,
Major and Provost Marshal.

(a.)
r!opy if the weekly inspection report qf the provost ma'rshal at Point Lookout,
Maryland, if the prisoners of war, April 2, 1865. Submitted with report
if the p'rovost marshal.
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF ST. MARY'S,
Point Lookout, Md, April 2, 1865.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the followil1g inspection report of the condition of the
prisoners of war at this station for the week ending .April 2, 1865:
1. Conduct-Good.
2. Cleanliness-Good.
3. Clothing-Fair.
4. Bedding-One blanket to each man.
5. State of quarters-Good.
6. State of mess-houses-Good.
7. State of kitchen-Clean and in good order.
8. Food, quality of-Good.
9. Food, quantity of-Fair, and in accordance with reguhtions.
10. Water-Good.
11. Sinks-Clean and in good condition.
12. Police of grounds-Good.
13. Drainage-Fair.
14. Police of hospital-Good.
15 . .Attendance of sick-Good; there are 358 attendants.
16. Hospital diet-Good, same as that of United States General Hospital.
17. General health of prisoners-Good.
18. Vigilance of guard-Good.

Remarks and suggestions.
There were received during the week (4,040) four thousand and forty prisoners of war at
this station, as follows : •
From Fort Monroe, Va., (162) one hundred and sixty-two; from City Point, Va., (3,043)
three thousand and forty three; from Washington, D. C., (149) one hundred and forty-nine;
from United States General Hospital at this post, ( 120) one hundred and twenty; from Newbern,N. C.,(566) five hundred and sixty~six. Transferred to Washington,D. C., (10) ten officers.
Paroled and transferred to Aikin's Landing, Va ., for ''exchange,'' (500) five hundred prisoners
of war. Released upon taking the oath, ( 4) four prisoners. The average rate of mortality
for the week was ( 4t) four and one-seventh per day.
Very respectfully, yo11r obedient servant,
A. G. BRADY,
Major and Provost Mars/tal, Inspecting Officer•.
Brigadier General JAMES BARNES,
Commanding District of St. Mary's.
A true copy:
M. H. CHURCH, Captain and Asst. Pro. Marshal.
Remad•s by con,manding officer.
Respectfully for~arded.

I have nothing of particular importance to add to this report.

Respectfully referred to the commissary general of prisoners.
J. BARNES,
Brig. Gen'l, District of St. Mary's.
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Provost Marshal's Office, Point Lookout, Md., April 18, 1865.
Statement of clothing issued by the United States to prisoners of war at Point
Lookout, .lVId.,from July 1, 1864, io February 1::3, 1865, since which time the
so-called rebel governmenc have issued supplies qf clothing.
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I hereby certify that the above is a true statement of the clothing issued to pris;:mers of
war during the time named.
A. G. BRADY,
lVlajor V. R. C., and Provost Marshal.
HEADQUARTERS OF ST. MARY'S DISTRICT,
Point Lookout, Md., Aprit20, 1865.
Sworn to before me.
C. C. DREW,
Captain V. R. C., A. A. A. G., Judge Advocate.

B.
OFFICE OF A. C. S. OF PRISONERS OF WAR,
Point Lookout, Md., April15, Il:l65.
GENERAL: I have the honor most respectfully to submit the following statement of the
amount of rations daily issued to prisoners of war, mode of issuing the same, and extra rations allowed prisoners employed ou public works. Prisoners of war, in accordance with
General Order No. I of Brigadier General H. W. Wessels, commissary general of prisoners,
dated Washington, January 13, 1865, are now allowed the following rations, viz:
Pork or bacon, 10 ounces, (in lieu of beef;) salt or fresh beef, 14 ounces; flour or soft
bread, 16 ounces; bard bread, 10 ounces, (in lieu of flour or soft bread;) corn meal, 16
ounces, (in lieu of flour or bread.)
To 100 rations: beans or peas, 12t pounds; or 1ice or hominy, 8 pounds; soap, 2 pounds;
vinegar, 2 quarts; salt, 2 pounds; which rations are of the same quality as those issued to
the United States troops, and are drawn by the assistant commissary of subsistence of prison
camp from the post commissary on requisition for the number of prisoners in camp, and reissued to each mess-house in bulk, there to be cooked in large boilers made for the purpose,
and served out to the prisoners thus. Each cook-house-of which there are seven, originally intended to feed one thousand men per diem, being able to accommodate five hundred
at a time-is now made to furnish food for two thousand and upwards-is under the charge
of two sergeants, one to superintend the cooking of the rations, and the other (both are prisoners) the serving of them out. The camp being laid off in divisions of a thousand men each,
it is so arranged that ·each cook-house, as far as practicable, shall feed two divisions twice a
day, and, to avoid any confusion, each division furnishes to the cook-house where it gets its
food daily the number of men present, which must agree with the number stated on the
morning the report is made to the provost marshal.
Bread is delivered each noon, for the twenty-four hours succeeding, to the sergeant in
charge of companies of one hundred men, who issue it to the men they have in charge. Each
day at dinner the prisoners receive a large cup of bean or pea soup, and in the morning receive the ration of beef or pork, as stated. They are marched up by companies to the number of five hundred at a time to each cook-house, and eat the rations prepared for them and
set on long tables, out of tin ware, which is always kept clean and bright.
Rations are drawn from the post commissary by the assistant commissary of subsistence of
prison camp once every ten days, and consist usually of two days' pork, two days' fresh beef,
two days' salt beef, and four days' salt fish, together with beans or peas, salt, vinegar, and
soap. Occasionally, by order of the general commanding, potatoes are drawn and issued to
the prisoners over and above the regular ration. Rations are issued to the cook-houses by
the assistant commissary of subsistence of prison camp daily, and for the exact number of men
reported in the divisions that each house feeds. It requires the entire forenoon to prepare
the soup issued at dinner, and as it is necessary to commence cooking the meat for the next
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day immediately after dinner has been served, it is impossible, for want of time, to furnish
more than two meals daily.
!·. Every eare is taken to keep the cook-houses perfectly clean and the food properly cooked
· and served. Once each week the provost marshal inspeets the houses, and the medical officer of the day inspects the food daily. The assistant commissary of subsistence of prison camp
visits each house daily, and is strict in seeing that food, utensils, and houses are kept clean,
and that each of the employes attends to his duty.
Sugar and coffee or tea are issued to the sick or wounded, in conformity to General Order
No.1, above referred to, in the manner therein specified.
Prisoners employed on public works are allowed the following rations, viz:
Pork or bacon, 12 ounces, (in lieu of beef;) salt or fresh beef, 16 ounces; flour or soft
bread, 18 ounces; hard bread, 12 ounces, (in lieu of flour or soft bread;) corn meal, 18
ounces, (in lieu of flour or bread.)
Per 100 rations: beans or peas, 15 pounds; rice or hominy, 10 pounds, (in lieu of beans
or peas;) coffee, (ground,) 5 pounds; coffee, (green,) 7 pounds, (in lieu of coffee;) tea, 16
ounces, (in lieu of coffee;) sugar, 12 pounds; vinegar, ~ quarts; soap, 4 pounds; salt, 3!
pounds; which they receive in the following manner: These prisoners 1·eceive daily, in the
same way that other prisoners do at the cook-houses, the same rations that are issued to the
bulk of the prisoners, and once every ten days the assistant commissary of subsistence of the
camp issues to the sergeant of each detailed squad the difference between the ration already
received and the allowance as above. The serg-eants in charge of details then divide this
surplus equally between the men under them. There are about one thousand men employed
on public works, viz: 350 on fortifications, and 650 by the post quartermaster.
Soft bread is almost invariably furnished; in fact, hard bread has never been issued except
to prisoners arriving at this depot too late to ha,-e oread baked at the bakery on the Point.
In all instances the rations 'are fresh and good, and are the same in quality as those issued to
the United States troops. Every care is taken to have the rations (r.nd they are) fairly
served out, and especial care is taken to have them properly cooked and prepared. Rations
are now issued to about 19,500 prisoners, exclusive of those in hospitals.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. H. WHITTEMORE,
Lieutenant and A. C. S. of Prisoners of War.
Brigadier General .JAMF.S BARNES,
Comd'g District of St. Mary's, Point Lookout, Md.
HEADQUAR1'ERS DISTRICT OF ST. MARY'S,
Provost Marshal's Office, Point Lookout, Md., April20, 1865.
Sworn to before me this the 20th day of April, 1865.
A. G. BRADY,
Major and Provost Marshal.

List

o/ articles with their appropriate numbers composing

No.
1. Tea.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.

Coffee.
Milk toast.
Bread and butter.
Apple sauce.
Farina.
Corn starch.
Barley.
Vegetable soup.
Baked apples.
Molasses.
White sugar.
Cocoa.
Chicken soup.

Gross amount

o/

the ext?"a diet.

No.
15. Beef tea.
16. Beefsteak.
17. Soft-boiled eggs.
18. Steamed potatoes.
19. Custard.
20. Soda crackers.
21. Milk.
22. Rice.
23. Mackerel.
24. Bread.
25. Raw Irish potatoes.
26. Raw onions.
27. Cheese.
28. Sweet potatoes.

artir:les purchased from hospital fund for extra diet .from
July, 1864, to March, 1865, inclusive.

Butter.----. ---- __ ... _.. pounds._
Cheese ......... __ ....... pounds ..
Condensed milk . ____ ... _.dozen._

6, 087 Corn starch. ___ -- __ . ___ .. dozen ..
5, 107 Macaroni. ... _..... _ .... pounds ..
276 Vermicelli .•• -.- ____ - ____ pounds._

177
3,000
3,000
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Eggs . . . .
• -- ...... dozen..
Soda crackers.-.-- .. -- - .. barrels..
Apples ... --. -.---- . -.- .. barrels..
Farina .. - ..•.... __ .. __ .. pounds..

2, 976 Pearl barley_ ..•••...••.. pounds..
189 Onions._ . _.. _.. __ .. _. _. _barrels__
50 Turnips, and other vegt's .. barrels._
1, 782

2, 498
77
348

I certify that the above is a true statement, compiled from the monthly statement of
hospital fund for the months included above.
J. I-I. THOMPSON,
Surgeon U. S. Voluntee1·s, in charge.

c.
PRISONERS' HosPITAL,
Point Lookout, Md., April15, 1865.
GENERAL: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to submit the following
report regarding the medical treatment of prisoners of war under your command:
The camp is divided into divisions of one thousand men each; ,each division is under the
charge of volunteer medical officers from among the prisoners, whose duty it is to treat those
slightly sick in quarters, and report all serious cases to the United States -medical officers
in charge of all the divisions of camp, for examination with reference to their admission into
hospital.
A daily sick call is held in each company, the same as in regiments of our own troops.
The hospital proper consists of nine large wooden wards, each ward having sixty hospital
beds, complete.
In addition to these wards there are sixty hospital tents, floored, and with beds.
There are separate and detached wards for measles, erysipelas, and other contagious
diseases. (See accompanying plan "A2 • ") The hospital for small-pox is located one mile
from the prisoners' camp and hospital.
The medicines drawn for use of the prisoners are the same in kind and quantity as issued
to our own troops at military posts.
The diet of the sick is the same as in United States general hospitals for the treatment of
our own sick. The savings on the army rations constitute the hospital fund, and is expended
the same as in other hospitals, in the purchase of articles of extra diet for the sick, such as
butter, cheese, milk, corn starch, farina, vermicelli, macaroni, soda crackers, eggs, apples,
onions, and such other vegetables as the market affords; the amount thus expended from
July, 1864, to March, 1865, inclusive, being fourteen thousand four hundred and forty-eight
dollars and six cents ($14,448 06.) (See accompanying list and abstract" B2 . " )
Large issues of clothing have been made to prisoners coming to the hospital in a destitute
and suffering condition.
A large percentage of the sick. treated have been those received from the front in a feeble
condition, or coming from other parts. Especially is this true of scurvy and diseases of scorbutic and malarial origin.
Accompanying this report (abstract "C2") is a copy of the general summary of monthly
report of sick and wounded, with a tabular list of the most common diseases and deaths, by
which it will 'be seen that, with an average of nine thousand three hundred aud seventyfour (9,374) prisoners per month, from July, 1864, to Maroh, 1865, inclusive, there were one
hundred and forty-seven deaths monthly, being a ratio of fifteen and seven-hundredths per one
thousand men. From September, 1863, to June, 1864, inclusive, with an average of seven
thousand four hundred and ninety-one (7,491) prisoners per month; there were sixty-two
deaths monthly, being a ratio of eight and four-tenths per one thousand men.
This, I think, will be regarded as a remarkably light percentage of deaths under the most
favorable circumstances, and especially so when we consider the debilitated condition in
which many of the prisoners are when received, and the depressing effects of long imprisonment, if rendered ever so light.
The prevailing diseases are diarrhrea, dysentery, remittent, intermittent, and typhoid
fevers, pneumonia and scurvy.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. I-I. THOMPSON,
Surgeon U. S. Volunteers, in charge.
Brigadier General J. BARNES, Commanding.
l-IEADQ'Rs DisT. ST. MARY's, PRovosT MARSHAL's OFFICE,
/'oint Lookout, Md., April 20, 1865.
Sworn to before me this the 20th day of April, 1865.
A. G. BRADY,
Major and Provost Marshal.
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0 2 .-Copy if general summary from tlw montltly reports

if sick and wounded, wit!~ tabular list if common

Remaining last report.

I

Months, 1863 and 1864.

Sick.
September, 1863 .......... :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . •. • . .
October, 1863 . . .. . . .. .. .. . .. .• . .. .. . . . . . . . .. .. .. ..
November, 1863...... .... .. ...... ... . . . ...... ......
D ecember, 1863......................... .. • • . . . . . . .
Jauuary,1864................................ .. ... . .
February, 1864. ...... ....... ... .. ...... .... .. ......
March, 1864. .. ... . . ......... ......... .. . . . .. .... ...
April, 1864. ... .. . . .. . . . . . . .. . ..... . . . . . .. . . . . . ... . .
May, 1864 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
June, 1864.............. .. . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . .

~ -~

$

Taken sickthor wouthnded during
e mon ,

.,

I

e.,:;

.

433
2, 062
2,134
2, 219
1,104
J, 013
1,117
1, 452
2, 6 LO
4, 415

14
32
35
86
105
108
77
43
24
105

<ll"'

~

diseases and cause if deaths.

-::J
~

Remaining.

Total.
T~ken Wounded, Total.
~
~ "':j
]l
Sick.
Wounded. Total.
&c.
siCk.
&c.
<
~ '"d
A
---------------------------------------

Iwounded,

219
396
730
543
471
490
567
458
906

5
20
1

666
2, 266
2, 483
2, 114
1,136
1,137
1, 255
1, :n3
a, OflO
4, 961

224
416
731
543
475
502
568
459
944

4
12
1
1
3~

5
20
1
3
5
11
5
13
39
14

671
2, 286
2, 484
2, 117
1,141
1,148
1, 220
1, 386
3, 119
4, 975

671
2, 510
2. 900
2, 848
1,684
1, 623
1, 762
1, 954
3, 578
5, 919

219
396
730
543
471
490
567
458
906
1, 358

5
20
1

224
416
7;31
543
475
502
568
4:39
944
1, 399

4
12
1
1
38
11

~
H

k
· k
d
·
Ta en SIC or woun ed durmg, the month.
Commissioned officers.
Months, 1863 and 1864.

Sick.

!

8

Enlisted men.

Wounded.
ai

~

~

A 8

-----

~

:£;

Sick.

~

A 8

September, 1863. .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. ..
October, 1863 .. ....... . . . . . .
N ovember, 1863 ............ . .......................
D ecember, 1863 .....•..............................
January, 186-l . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
F ebruary, 1864. ...... ..... .
M::;,rcb, 1864. ... . . . .. .... ...
38
April, 1864. ...... ... . ... . ..
99 ..................
May, 1864 . ... .. ... .. . ... . . . 152 ......
9 ......
June, 186-l . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . 240
3 ............

Mean strength of
command.

666
2, 266
2,483
2,114
1,136
1,137
1.217
1,274
2,928
4, 721

I

00

~

1

Wounded.

~

A 8

-----14
31
35
86
J 04
108 .
76
43
23
99
1

.

5
20
1
3
5
11
5
13
30
14

~

A

~

~

~
0

............
1
8
............
1
7
1
8
............
1
335
.... . . 358
1
454
3
4~4

S
~
;@

~

<i

3
~

2, 676 2, 676
5, 007 5, 015
8, 426 8, 426
8, 671 8, 678
8, 181 8, 189
7, 613 7, 613
6, 591 6, 926
5, 613 5, 971
7, 647 8,101
12,839 13,323

•

~

~

~

I>

';::

~

~

~
&

,:l

,:l

30
76
76
191
23:3
272
414
415
380
518

173
203
7
4
263
339
41 . . .. . .
590
666
16
10
357
548
30
18
282
515 . . • • • .
53
239
511
12
86
128
542
3
63
137
b52 .... ..
47
236
616
12
92
622 1, 140
30
69

~

~
'&

"'

~

3

f:j
trj

.
&
DI8eases, &c., c.

Average No. on
sick report daily.

t

~
]

~

~
~
~

~

-

t'-4

-~

•

;:;.

~ .,§

~

§

bJ

0

~
ai

~

~

~

j

&

5 ~A
~ ~ ]
rn

;E

96
160
229
523
230
450
347
628
229
334
176
316
140
341
164
296
365 1, 346
581 2, 751

79
191
320
334
168
116
62
70
100
397

7
76
167
105
42
26
10
1
3
1

~

~

as
97
488
302
3~

16
29
47
30
96
50

~

~ ~~

P>

~

~0.
49
58
63
29
33
13
8
7
3E

5
20
1
3
5
11
5
13
39
14

Mean strength, 7. 491; number of deaths, 629; average deaths per month, 62 9-10; ratio of deaths per 1,000 men, 8 4-10, or 84-100, or nearly- 4-5 of 1 per centum per month.
I certify that the above is an accurate copy of the general summary from the retained copies of the monthly reports of sick and wounded on file in the officP of 1he surgeon in charge.

J. H. THOMPSON, SuTgeon U. S, Vols., in chaTge.

C2. - Copy if general summm·y from

montldy reports if sick and wounded, and tabular list

~he

Remaining last report.

I Takon Ookthe"wounded
dudug I
month.

Months, 1864 and 1865.
Sick.

lwounded, l 'l'otal.
&c.
,

,

41
84
28
6
11
164
179
50
6

Enli ~terl

6

,

Sick.

I

Wounded.

1

5

4, 203
1, 857
1, 655
1, 718
1, :no
1, 651
1, 812
1, 390
797

1, 399
1, 185
1, 170
940
954
969
1, 038
1, 069
763

4, 208
l, 866
1, 662
1, 742
1, 295
1, 666
l, 844
1, 415
858

9

7
24
25
15
32
25
61

Mean strength of
command.

o

~JS
-+"p

~

tlfl

>ci

Remaining.

Sick.

j

s"'

Wounded.

,

4, 2 19
1, 670
1, 782
1, 6l9
1, 328
1, 512
1, 6;)2
1, 495
870

5, 607
3, 051
2, 832
2, 682
2, 349
2, 635
2, 882
2, 484
1, 621

203
211
110
109
52
85
161
226
174

~

;>

~

~

~

24
28
6
ll
164
179
50
6

1,185
1,170
940
954
969
1, 038
1, 069
76:3
577

8

Disease8, &c., &c.

~;>

"'....

,

1, 161
1,142
934
943
805
859
1,019
757
569

~

I:::: ::I::::::
September, 1864 . ........ _............ __

October, 1864 .................... ·----- ...... . .... .
November, 1864 .................................. ..
December, 1864 ... _.• ___ • _... _____ ... __ . ___ . _ .. __ • _
.January, 1865 ......................... ------ -----February, 1865 ............. ------ ------ .......... ..
:1\iarch, 1865 . _.........•.• _. . _.. _. . • • • • . . _.•• _ . - . - - .

4,203
1,857
1,655
1,718
1,370
1,651
1,812
1,390
797

201
201
109
109
52
85
161
226
173

5
9
7
24
25
15
32
25
6l

·~

'd

·c;

~

1
44
5
17
1
1:3
.... -- .... - ------ ......
...... ______
............
............
1 - .. - ..

~

12, 693
7,270
7, 025
9, 805
10,084
10,504
lO, 898
9,602
6, 408

696
12, 737
829
1 7,287
767
7, 0:38
9, 805 1, 1:33
359
10, 084
10,504
582
746
10, 898
598
1' 9,602
571
6, 408

612
309
339
277
294
355
516
326
155

11, 308
1,138
l, 126
l, 410
653
937
1, 262
924
726

tr:j

~

t-3
~

tr:j

z

..,~

t-%j

' oo"
'0

;>

~

]

<:)

1:13

~

0

oi

s

oi

~

·a
0

=<.i
5
il:o<$

~
.£
s
of
§
,<:1
0
'§
;J
"'
,<:1
~ 30
>'><
30
a >-. ~"' t5 5 ~i
p
=
»
I
I 0
r;q
"'
p:;
A
E-<
F-<
E-<
1Ll
~
~
~
A
~
~ c.!:i
_A_,_::_ _A_~_A_~_A_I--1 -- - - l- -,- -'- - 1 - - 1 - -1- -1- -:- -;- - 1- -1- -l....

'd

t-3

t-3

Average No. on
8ick r eport daily.

3

Sick.

,

men.

-~
I i ! I t'l ~ It I ~ I t

~u~~~;~ 1~64 · ~ ~ :::::: :::::: ::::::

"'~

,

d

Months, 1864 and 1865.

----------

,

,

Taken sick or wound~d during the month.
Commi8sioned officers.

I

"de:>

~

Total.

.

..,0

~

!Wounded. I Total.
"'
sick.
&c.
~"d
<11
A
____ ____ ____
____
____ ____
,____
____
,____ ____ ____

1, 358
1, 161
1,14:2
934
943
805
859
1, 019
757

July, 1864 . ............... .
August, 1864 ........ .
September, 1864 ...................... - ........ · · · ·
October, 1864 .............. ..
N ovemb er, 1864 ..
D ecemb er, 1864 .............. .
January, 1865 ... ..
February, 1865 .......... ..
March, 1865 ......... - .... - ...... -- ..

Taken j·wounded,l

if common diseases and cause if deaths.

12
7
2
1
1

34
1
5
3

127
118
120
126
117
85
103
34
19

599 i2, 159
211
708
190
595
706
223
126
475
258
50.2
6l3
250
210
:352
108
146

42:3 1
199
190
187
150
297
284 1
116
58

;::,

43
7
1

9
:37
34

58
200
282
151
74
76
94
202
127

11
4
8
11
14
42
87
66

5
9

7
24
25
15
32
25
61

~
tr:j
ti:l

tr:j

t:-t
"0
pj

H

rn
0

ztr:j
pj

r;n.

Mean strength, 9. 374; number of deaths, 1,331; average deaths per month, 147 8-9; ratio of deaths per 1,000, 15. 07, or H per centum per month.
I certify that the above is an accurate copy of the general summary from the return copies of the monthly reports of sick and wounded on file in the office of surgeon iu charge.
.
J. H. '.riiOMPSON, Surgeon U. S. Vols. , in charge.
N. B.-The "mean strength of command" in thiA report differs from the "average number of prisoners per month" in the provost marshal's report, in consequence of taking the number
preseut every five day8, and ~aking the average from that numb er. It is not, therefore, so accurate as that of the provost marshal's report, which result~ from the actual numb er present
each day. lt is, therefore, only an approximate average.
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D.
HEADQ'RS DIST. ST. MARY'S, PROVOST MARSHAL'S OFFICE,
Point Lookont, Md., April1~, 1865.
GENERAL: In accordance with your instructions, I have the honor to report the manner
in which the prisoners of war camps are conducted at this post.
The prisoners are divided into divisions of one thousand each, in charge of a non-commissioned officer detailed for that purpose from regiments doing duty at this post, and again
divided into companies of one hundred each, in charge of a non-commissioned officer selected
from the prisoners, who are held responsible for the cleanliness and good behavior of the
prisoners under their charge. On the arrival of prisoners, they are required to deliver to
the provost marshal for safe-lL.:eping all moneys and valuables in their possession. , Each
package is marked with the oWLnr's name, regiment and company, and is so registered and
returned to them when leaving for exchange or discharge. Of the available currency a book
is furnished them, upon \vhich they are allow().d to purchase from the sutler such articles as
are allowed by the commissary general of prjsoners. Any money sent them during their
confinement is placed to their credit in the same manner. LettP.rs are allowed to be written
and received by the prisoners, and when examined, if found unexceptionable, are immediately delivered. They are allowed to receive from their fi·iends, "upon a permit from the
provost marshal," sueh articles of clothing as they may require, provided they are of the
proper quality and color.
The prisoners are comfortably quartered in Sibley tents, wedge tents, and wooden structures covered by shelter tents. The camps are thoroughly inspected every Sunday morning,
and the prisoners paraded by divisions, each man with his blanket, and any found in a filthy
condition are required to bathe and wash themselves and clothing at onc.:e. For this purpose
they are allowed free access to the shore in rear of the camp on the Chesapeake bay. Report
of the above inspection is made weekly, a copy of one of which (marked a) is herewith
enclosed. The camps are thoroughly policed daily, and the sanitary condition is fully equal,
if not superior, 1o any regiments of our own troops in the field.
I transmit herewith a tabular statement of prisoners of war at this post from its establishment, July 3J, J863, to April 18, 1865, marked A.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. G. BRADY,
Major and Provost Mars/tal in charge P1·isuners of War.
Brigadier General JAMES BARNES,
Commanding Dist1·ict St. Mary's, Point Lookout, Md.
HEADQ'Rs DisT. ST. MARY's, OFFICE Ass'T AnJ'T GENERAL,
April 19, 1865.
Sworn to before me.
C. C. DREW,
Capt. V. R. C., A. A. A. G., Judge Advocate.

EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS.
Testimo.n y

if

Lieutenant Gewral U. S. G1·ant.
W ASHI~GTO~, Febtuary 11, 1865.

Lieutenant General U. S. GRANT sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Questiun. It is stated, upon what authority I do not know, that you are
charged entirely with the exchange of prisoners.
Answer. That is correct; and what is more, I have effected an arrangement
for the exchange of prisoners, man for man and officer for officer, or his equiv. alent, according to the old cartel, until oue or the other party has exhausted the
number they now bold. I get a great number of letters daily from ~riends of
prisoners in the south, every one of which I cause to be answered, tellmg them
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that this arrangPment bas been made, and that I suppose exchanges can be
made at the rate of 3,000 per week. The fact is, that I do not believe the south
can deliver our prisoners to us as fast as that, on account of want of transportation on their part. But just as fast as they can deliver our prisoners to us I will
receive them, and deliver their prisoners to them.
Question. There is no impediment in the way 1
Answer. No, sir; I will take the prisoners as fast as they can deliver them.
And I would add, that after I have caused the letters to be answered, I refer
the letters to Colonel Mulford, the com~issioner of exchanges, so that he may
effect special exchanges in those cases wherever he can do so. 'J1he Salisbury
prisoners will be coming right on. I myself saw Colonel Hatch, the assistant
commissioner of exchanges on the part of the south, and he told me that the
Salisbury and Danville prisoners would be coming on at once. He said that he
could bring them on at the rate of 5,000 or 6,000 a week. But I do not believe
he can do that. rrheir roads are now taxed to their utmost capacity for military
purposes, and are becoming less and lese efficient every day. .Many of the
bridges are now down. I merely fixed, as a matter of judgment, that 3,000 a
week will be as fast a::; they can deliver them.
Question. The fact is, that there is no impediment now in the way except the
lack of transportation 1
Answer. 'rhat is all. There is no impediment on our side. I could deliver
and receive every one of them in a very short time if they will deliver those
they hold. We have lost some two weeks lately on account of ice in the river.
Question. It has ~been said that we refused to exchange prisoners because we
found ours starved, diseased, and unserviceable when we received them, and did
not like to exchange sound men for such men 1
Answer. 'l~her_e never has been any such reason as that. That has been a
reason for making exchanges. I will confess that if our men who are prisoners
in the south were really well taken care of, suffering nothing except a little privation of liberty, then, in a military point of view, it would not be good policy
for us to exchange, because every man they get back is forced right into the
army at once, while that is not the case with our prisoners when we receive
them. In fact, the half of our returned prisoners will never go into the army
again, and none of them will until after they have had a furlough of thirty or
sixty days. Still, the fact of their suffering as they do is a reason for making
this exchange as rapidly as possible.
Question. And never has been a reason for not making the exchange 1
Answer. It never has. Exchanges having been suspended by reason of dillagreement on the part of agents of exchange on both sides before I came i'n
command of the armies of the United States, and it then being near the opening
of the spring campaign, I did not deem it advisable or just to the men who had
_to fight our battles to re-enforce the enemy with thirty or forty thousand disciplined troops at that time. An immediate resumption of exchanges would
have had that effect without giving us corresponding benefits. The suffering
said to exist among our prisoners south was a powerful argument against the
course pursued, and I so felt it.
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ADMINISTRATION OF DEPARrrMENT OF ARKANSAS.
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DEPOT,

St. Louis, JJ;Jissouri, Jltia1·ck 3, 1864.
Sm : Your letter of the 24th ultimo, as chairman of the Committee on the
Conduct of the War, has just reached me from Cairo.
I will prepare at once a statement as you desire, and forward it in two or
three days. I will endeavor to furnish facts, susceptible of proof, without any
deductions from them of my own ; and I believe they will reveal a state of mismanagement of affairs, both civil and military, in Arkansas, detrimental to the
interests of our country.
I am, sir, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

J. W. DAVIDSON,
Br-igadier General.

Hon. B. F.

WADE,

United Elates Senate.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DEPOT,

St. Luuis, Mo., Ma1'Cit 4, 1864.
SIR: In reply to your letter of the 24th :February I have the honor to submit to the committee the following &taten-.ent of facts in regard to the adu•inistration of the affairs of the
government in Arkansas, both military and civil: Up to the lOth February, 1864, the army
of Arkansas had lain at Little Rock and adjacent posts for five months, within fifty miles of
one of lhe finest navigable rivers of the west-the White river. It is navigable all the year
round up to Jacksonport. There is a railroad connexion with this river from Little Rock
to Duvall's Bluff; and . alongside of the railroad exists a good wagon road, which a few
weeks of labor in laying corduroy in mar:;hy places would have made passable all the winter;
yet, notwithstanding this, the troops of the army have been repeatedly during the winter on
reduced rations, and there was not on the lOth February more than twenty days' subsistence
on hand. Twenty-five hundred horses, as the requisitions will show, have died and been
lost to the service of the goYernment for tl1e waut of hay, which could have been easily
transported by steamer and rail under proper management. The railroad from Duvall's bluff
to Brownsville was taken possession of, with its important bridges, on the 26th of August,
Hl6;~, and on the lOth of September the remaining portion of the road to Little Rock fell into
our hands, with some considerable amount of rolling stock upon it. All the wants of the
road could have beeri. ascertained at once, a competent officer despatched north to supply
them, and the road put in proper working trim in forty days after our occupancy of Little
Hock.
Wben I left Little Rock I was informed by the generals of the infantry divisions that the
lu'n'ses of th eir artillery and field officers were in too poor condition to move. 1 estimate the
loss of stock to the govrrnment, from neg·lect and mismanagement, at over half a million of
dollars. This is a small estimate.
General Steele's encouragement of horse-racing, at the time when the public stock was in
too poor condition to be used and needed the greatest care, was demoralizing in a high degree to the eavalry arm of the service and injurious to the public animals. My chief of cavalry, Major JoLn W. Noble, 3d Iowa cavalry, infon11ed me that he could scarcely get a
squadron of on(' regiment to trot in line, so completely had the stock been spoiled for cavalry
service. I issued 1epeated orders forbidding animals to be taken from the camp except on
public servite, and that horses owned by soldiers and hiied to the United States (some rPgiments of my division mounted themselves) were public horses, but these orders did but little
good where the ~:ommanding general was one of the most prominent mdividuals at the race.
It was a frequent occurrenee to see from five hundred to twenty-five hundred cavalry, oflicers, soldiers, teamstl•rs, and General Steele, all mixed up together at one of these races, and
men gambling upon their blankets spread on the ground near the race-track and the public
road.
General Order No. 109, War Department, series of 1862, requiring commanders in the
field to take in the r0bellious States whatever was necessary for their armies, provided it was
taken in au orderly manner, was not obeyed by General SteeJe. Instead, he flooded the
country with sa1eg uards or protection papers tor property owned alike by loya1 and disloyal
persons. I h ave knu~n forage parties of my div1siun to have to travel twenty miles fi·om
Little Rock for forage to get out of the circle of these protection papers. Some of the most
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noted secession families had them. This system was ruinous to the cavalry service particularly. Many horses taken under this order, as had been the practice in Mississippi under
Grant, and as recommended by the general-in-chief, were ordered to be returned to their
owners. I myself saw an order of General Steele's to return a horse captured in battle by
Lieutenant T. H. Barnes, 1st Iowa cavalry, and purchased from the government after an appraisement of its value, when its claimant was the noted rebel Danley, of Little Rock.
Private freight has been repeatedly passed over the Little Rock railroad to the exclusion
of public stores, when at the time the troops were living on reduced rations. On one occasion (some time in the month of January I think) this was made the subject of serious complaint by Captain W. W. Can tine, subsistence department, chief commissary. On one occasion when Captain Carr, chief quartermaster of the army of Arkansas, thought he was to
be relieved by Captain Swain, of the quartermaster's department, he passed private freight
for individuall;l for three days in succession. This I have from Colonel J. Richmond, 12tith
Tilinois infantry, commanding post at Duvall's Bluff. Lieutenant Wilson, 29th Iowa infantry, former quartermaster at Duvall's Bluff, now on General Samuel Rice's staff, is good evidence of this fact and other facts connected with the mismanagement of this railroad. Colonel
Richmond informed me that where the return of one month showed the proceeds of the road
to have been about four thousand dollars, it bad really amounted to about fifteen thousand.
Every bale of cotton that goes over the road pays ten dollars freight.
On one occasion a flag of truce from the confederate army, borne by a Major Rapsley, I
think in the month of December, was brought into the tvwn of Little H-oek and entertained
at the headquarters of the commanding general, instead of being detained outside of our
lines. This Major Rapsley was permitted to walk about the town of Little Rock, was Yisited
by his rebel friends of the city, and lionized, to the disgust of every loyal officer and soldier
of the army who saw it.
In the month of January another flag of truce, borne by Majors Snead and Schomberg,
adjutant generals respectively to Generals Price and Smith, of the rebel army, was brought
by Colonel F. H. Manter, General Steele's chief of staff, within the camp of the 1st Missouri
cavalry, a regiment camped about four miles from Little Rock, and ordered to be entertained
there. This created a great feeling of dissatisfaction among the officers and men of that
regiment. Colonel Manter came out to visit them and g·ot drunk with them, and made a
public and disgraceful exhibition of himself before the officers and men of the regiment.
Secessionists, both male and female, were permitted to go out and visit them and hold unrestricted intercourse with them. This flag remained in that camp two days.
Major ·W eatherspoon, of the rebel service, who was captured by Lieutenant Colonel Caldwell, :M Iowa cavalry, was sent up north as a prisoner of war some time in January. The
day he left the military prison he was visited by the secessionists of the city and a gala day
held there. When he reached Duvall's Bluff, General Steele ascertained that his wife had
come up from the rebel lines to visit him. He telegraphed to Duvall's Bluff to have the
major sent back to have an interview with his wife. He was brought to Little Rock and an
interview had. Mrs. Weatherspoon returned south, bearing with her several letters and
packages, franked at General Steele's headquarters, to go through our lines unexamined.
Mrs. Judge English, of Little Rock, (whose husband was chief justice of Arkansas under
the rebel rule, and then at Washington, Arkansas,) wrote a letter to the judge and sent it to
him with a box of articles, the whole unexamined and franked at General Steele's headquarters to go through our lines. This was taken south by Mrs. Major Weatherspoon also.
In several instances articles of clothing, blowses, high-top boots, &c., have been permitted
at General Steele's headquarters to go direct to rebel officers.
4
In many instances letters frorri parties in Little Rock to parties in the rebel lines have been
franked without examination at General Steele's headquarters and permitted to g'o through
our lines.
As one instance of the general neg·ligence attending public business, a square redoubt,
which is the only defensive work at Little Rock, and about fifty yards on a side, bad been
four months building, and not a platform for a gun was erected in it when I left. This work
could have been bnilt in three days by the details of any division I ever saw in the army of
the Potomac.
There are no defences at Duvall's Bluff, except a few useless rifle-pits. It is our great
depot of supplies, and the most important point to the army it holds in Arkansas.
On the 14th of September I made the following report to General Steele:
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
Little Rock, September 14, 1863.
Colonel F. H. MANTER, Chief of Staff:
I have the honor to report that the night of my arrival here I org-anized a force out of the
tired troops of my division, consisting of the 7th and ~th Missouri c.avalry, Merrill's horse,
the lOth and 13th Illinois, and the lst Indiana cavalry, and S tanges and Clarkson's lmtteries,
to pursue the enemy, and placed the whole under command of Colonel Lewis Merrill. I
regret to state that the expedition returned the day after its march without accomplishing
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anything, and, in my opinion, did not pursue the enemy with the necessary vigor. The reports
from officers of the expedition make it advisable this should be inquired into.
I am, sir, &c.,
J. W. DAVIDSON, Brigadier General.
Hon. B. F. WADE, U. S. Senate,
Chairman Committee on the Conduct of tlte War.
Our attack upon Little Rock was one of those cases in which we encountered the enemy,
both parties having their lines of retreat free. Our object was the destruction of Price's arwy;
the mere occupancy of Little Rock was a barren victory; therefore the pursuit should have
done the principal work. To abandon the pursuit was to give up the fi'uits of our victory.
Yet, although Colonel Merrill did this-though he allowed Price's army to escape, and the
fact, as the above letter shows, was duly communicated to General Steele, he took no notice
of the grave error committed.
General Orders No. 86, department of the Missouri, series of 1863, requiring returning
rebels not only to take t.he oath of allegiance, but to give bond, with approved security, for
the faithful performance of it, and to reside in such county as is designated by the provost
marshal, was not c.arried out in Arkansas. The only requirement was the taking of the oath;
in some instances that was not required. In one or two instances men who had fought our
troops but a day or two before were mustered into the Arkansas regiments. I have no doubt
this course of action threw many guerillas back of our lines. We were acting at this time
under the general orders of the departrnent of the Missouri.
.
Some time in the month of December, 1863, I think, General Steele directed me to have one
Miss Sophie Urease, a noted rebel woman, paid fur eighteen head of cattle which she claimed
had been taken by officers of the cavalry division for the commissary department of the
division. I examined the matter carefully, and found from the reports of Lieutenant William
White, l st Missouri cavalry, the officer charged with taking the cattle, and Captain Charles
H. Thompson, subsistence department, that the cattle had not been taken by the one nor
received by the other. I so informed General Steele. A few clays afterwards he came down
to my office, sayiug in an angry tone, ·• By God, sir, the cavalry division gives me more
tr'ouble than all the rest of the army; I have been trying for ten days to get Miss Sophie
Crease paid for her cattle, and can't do it." After repeating to General Steele the fact that
they had not been received by my commissary department, I asked him if he still ordered her
paid; he replied that that was his order, and I sat down and directed Captain Thompson, my
commissary of sub5istence, to pay her.
The vou~hers of Captain Charles H. Thompson, a bonded commissary of the subsistence
department, will show that this rebel was paid in treasury notes for eighteen head of cattle
that he, Captain Thompson, never rec.eived. This rebel lived twenty·five miles outside of
Little Rock, and was in the habit of passing in and out of our lines at will almost daily. In
the month of January General Steele came to my quarters one morning, and in a very
excited manner said that "Miss Sophie Crease had been insulted by one of the officers of my
division, Captain Mills, of the 1st Missouri cavalry; that he intended to get her statement,
send it to the Secretary of War, and have him, Captain Mills, mustered out of the service."
I asked him to suspend action until this officer's statement could be heard. Knowing
Captain Mills to be a faithful officer, I sent for him and directed him to furnish me his statement of the matter, together with such other evidence as he might have had at hand. I never
saw an officer so shocked as he was w ben I informed him of the summary action about to be
taken against him on a rebel's word. He furnished me with his own affidavit, and those of
several non-commissioned officers who were with him on the forage party ordered to Sophie
Crease's house. t;o far ti:oi:n having insulted this rebelj she herself was abusive in her language
towards the "Yankees." These affidavits were sworn before the judge advocate of the
division, and I sent them by the hands of my adjutant general to Gen1wal Steele, in order to
extricate this officer fi:om his difficulty. General ~teele's reply was, "By God, sir, I had
rather take 8opLie Crease's word than the affidavits of all the officers and men that were
there. I have known that woman just long enough to know that she won't lie." To show
the criminal negligence and blindness which prevailed at headquarters, on one occasion I
was visiting my outposts in eompany with some ll!embers of my staff, I think in the month
of January, lt:lti4, and in passing ti:om one outpost to another, becoll!ing lost in the woods, I
found a Jurluughed 1·ebcl soldier at a house three (::5) miles outside of our extreme line of
videttes with a pass in his pocket from General Steele's headquarters to pass iu and out of
our lines at will for thirty days. This man was just what I state him to be, a furloughed rebel
soldier, not a rebel who had surrendered himself and taken the oath of allegiance. The
officers present with me at the time of this diseovery were Captain A. S. Burrows, 1st Missouri cavalry, First Lieutenant James R. Gray, 7th Missouri cavalry, and First Lieutenant
G. K. McGunnegle, jr., 1st ·wisconsin cavalry.
Mr. Burgevin, of Little Rock, a rebel, formerly adjutant general of the State of Arkansas,
the man who tore down the United States flag over the United States arsenal at Little Rock,
was permitted to sell his property in Little Rock in the month of October, 1863, said property
being by the acts of Congress confiscated to the United States, and realize the proceeds of
the sale in United States currency, and having done this, allowed to go south under a pass
from Major General Steele. It was ascertained by Lieutenant Colonel H. C. Caldwell, com-
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manding the post of Benton, Arkansas, that said Burgevin had passed through our lines
. with a million of dollars in confederate bonds and scrip upon his person. General Steele
retained upon his staff certain officers in high positions who were obnoxious to the thinking
portion of his general officers, and, with few exceptions, to his colonels, for their profligacy,
drunkenness, imbecility, disgraceful behavior, and neglect of duty. These officers were, his
chief of staff, Colonel F. H. Manter, 32d Missouri infantry, who did not belong to any regiment of General Steele's command, and his adjutant general, Lieutenant George 0. Sokalski,
2d United States cavalry, and his provost marshal general, Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Chandler, 7th Missouri cavalry. General Steele has been repeatedly advised of the injury these
men were doing to him, the army, and the country.
In a conversation which I had with him on one occasion he sai.d to me that his relations with
Lieutenant Sokalski were of such a character that he could not dismiss him. I have told
him often and often that his staff were a millstone around his neck, clogging the business of
the army. I think Colonel Manter injured the re-enlistment of the veterans of that army.
In October before I left for St. Louis Major William Thompson, 1st Iowa cavalry, inspector
of division, had prepared an address to the 1st Iowa cavalry, codifying the War Department
orders upon the subject of veterans, and urging them to re-enlist. It was issued in circulars
and published in the Little Roelc Democrat. This address bad been submitted to me, and
was substantially correct. On my return from St. Louis about the 12th of November I found
that the editor of the Little Rock Democrat had in an editorial commented upon this address,
pronouncing· it erroneous in some respects; that the time had passed by for the men to be
called veterans, &c. I sent fur the editor, and he informed me that he got his information
from Colonel Manter, who authorized him to put it in the paper. Colonel Manter told
Lieutenant Colonel Marks and Dr. Davis, of the 18th Illinois infantry, that the order of the
War Department concerning veterans was a ridiculous one, and they had not made up their
minds yet how to act. This was in response to some inquiries of those gentlemen in
regard to the terms upon which their regiments ·could be re-enlisted .
Iii
8ome statements made to me by Colonel J. Richmond, 126th Illinois infantry, with regard
to an indorsement made by Colonel Manter upon a letter of Bailey Thompson's, left the impression upon my mind, and such an impression also existed in the mind of Colonel Richmond,
that the name of this Bailey Thompson had been used in certain cotton transactions without
his authority, by Colonel Manter.
A rebel bearing the name of Merrick, who informed my adjutant general that he had been
a colonel in the confederate service, and his last service with that army having been as a
clerk in the commissary department, came into our lines and remained in the city of Little
Rock, and was employed as a clerk in the Treasury Department under the eyes and with the
knowledge of the military authorities. He sat daily in that office, under pay, in a rebel
uniform, for two weeks, without having taken the oath of allegiance, until the storm of
public opinion forced the authorities to administer it to him. On his first arrival in the
city Colonel Merrick was brought into my office by the outposts on his way to General
Steele's, and upon being interrogated as to his motives in returning to Little Rock, stated
distinctly that he had simply returned in order to be with his family and provide for their
comfort, and that he did not wish to take the oath of allegiance to the United States government.
General Steele has not only retained in office, but promoted to the positions successively of
provost marshal general of the army of Arkansas, and of the department of Arkansas, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler, 7th Missouri cavalry, an officer who has been guilty of the follow ing named acts : A form of voucher had been established by the subsistence department
in the west to be used by officers of that depmtment in the districts in rebellion. It is not
always in these districts easy to distinguish friends from foes; hence this form, while it effectually, under proper care, excluded the rebel from payment, secured to the loyal man his
claim upon the government. These vouchers were also issued in conformity with the design
of General Orders No. 109, from the War Department, series of 1862.
In the cases of Henry Keatts, M. H. Badgett, R. Fletcher, and D. Lewis, vouchers of this
character vvere issued by my authority as a division commander, having the words "done by
order of Brigadier General Davidson," particularly used, and signed by my division commissary, Captain Charles H. Thompson, a bonded officer of the subsistence department. In
all these cases Lieutenant Colonel Chandler erased himself the words "payable, upon proof
of loyalty, at the end of the rebellion," thus altering the character and intent of these vouchers over Captain Thompson's signature, and certified upon the backs of the vouchers that
the parties were loyal. In the case of Mr. R. Fletcher, whose voucher bore this alteration
and a certificate that he was a loyal man, I ascertained in the presence of these witnesses,
Judge Murphy, Colonel Fishback, and Lieutenant Montgomery of my staff, that Mr. Fletcher
never had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States ; that it was ;not required of him
by Lieutenant Colonel Chandler, the provost marshal; that he was unwilling then and now
to take it ; that he was a " Union as it was" man, and was not prepared to sustain any of
the acts of Congress or the proclamati0n of the President with referenc-e to slaves. I hold
that in tilis case the erasure and alterations upon the face of the voucher and the certificate
of Lieutenant Colonel Chandler upon the back of it made it fraudulent, and would, if not
examined by me, have secured payment from the government to one whose property was by
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law confiscate to that go~ernment. In the case of Andrew McAllister vouchers were issued
by order of Brigadier General Kimball, commanding a division, and signed by his assistant com
missary of subsistence. The same erasures were made in these vouchers by Lieutenant Colonel Chandler and his certificate of the loyalty of the parties placed upon their back. The
vouchers sustaining these statements are in my hands, as also letters of Captain Cantine, subsistence department, Brigadier General Nathan Kimball, United States volunteers,
and Captain Charles H. Thompson, subsistence department.
On the 19th of September, 1863, this provost marshal paroled a prisoner of war who did
not take the oath of allegiance to the United States-this in violation of General Orders
No. 86, department of the Missouri, series of 1863, and the practice of our armies. This
man was arrested by me at the outposts of the army about the 1st of December, 1863. He
had been living, between these two times, twenty miles fi·om Little Rock, on the ground intermediate between the out posts of the United States and rebel armies. His name was
Dodd, belonged to Captain Miller's independent company, never mustered into the service of
nor paid by the so-called Confederate States-in short, a guerilla.
Major John \V. Noble, 3d Iowa cavalry, and Captain J. Baird, 1st Missouri cavalry, were
with me at the time of this arrest and cognizant of all the facts herein stated.
This provost marshal, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler, has stated to Mrs. General Fagan,
now residing in Little Rock, the wife of Brigadier General Fagan, of the rebel army, that the
government of the United States would be forced to pay her, at the end of the rebellion, for
the property taken by the United States troops from her plantation. This information is derived from a letter written by Mrs. Fagan to the person in charge of her plantation, and which
was captured in a mail, and read by Lieutenant Colonel Caldwell, 3d Iowa cavalry, and Surgeon J. E. Lynch, 1st Missouri cavalry.
The provost marshal, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler, had repeatedly franked, and permitted
to be conveyed through the lines of the army, letters from rebels in the city of Little Rock
to rebels within the enemy's lines. In some instances these letters have been so franked and
conveyed through our lines without any examination by him of their contents, thus giving
comfort to the enemy. Surgeon James C. Whitehill, medical department, United States volunteers, is a witness to the last-mentioned fact.
'l'he provost marshal, Colonel Chandler, did, in the month of September, release from imprisonment, and permit to pass through our lines, a prisoner of war, without due exchangP, or
authority for the same. The evidence of this fact is furnished by the affidavit of a person who
heard the agreement made between the provost marshal and the prisoner's wife, ~:nd knows
the release and subsequent escape of the prisoner. I hold this affidavit in my hands. The
officer tow hom this statement was first made is Assistant Surgeon Lothrop, of 1st Iowa cavalry.
Complaints of the alterations of the vouchers referred to were made to General Steele by
General Kimball and myself. 'l'he reply I got was that Colonel Chandler was guilty of a
"misapprehension of power and propriety," yet this officer was promoted to a higher position
immediately by General Steele. Many of the other facts herein stated were made known by
me in conversation to General Steele. After all this, this officer was again promoted to another
high11r position, the provost marshal generalship of the department of Arkansas.
It was a matter of common remark in the army that a better provost marshal for the rebels
than Lieutenant Colonel Chandler couldn't be gotten out of Price's army.
There was a general negligence, and inaptitude, and distaste for public business displayed
at General Steele's headquarters. The file of general orders of the army of Arkansas for
five months will show that there was not one miud at headquarters that grasped the command
of the army, or the magnitude of the enterprise before us. The whole aim seemed to be
pleasure-dogs, horses, drives, dinner:;, women.
I never saw a drill or an inspection of troops ordered by the g·eneral commanding the army
duriug the five months I was with the army. I never saw him among his troops. He never
visiteJ a post or a line of communication.
.
After our entry into Little Rock, on the 10th of September, 1863, I was appointed by General Steele the commander of the city and its vicinity. About two days thereafter I
called on General Steele, asking him to let me pubiish to the people Lhe confiscation act of
Congress and the President's emancipation proclamation, in order that these people might
see the light in which they stood towards a government which they had oftended . His reply
was, substantially, that he did not wish it done; it would be annoying to these people. General Steele, Colonel Manter, and Captain Scammon, of General Steele's staff, have been heard
by Doctor James C. vVhitehill, United States volunteers, medical director, army of Arkansas,
to d enounce the President's emancipation proclamation. I myself have heard General Steele
say that he did not believe the confiscation act would ever be enforced .
A copperhead newspaper, called the National Democrat, edited by one Doctor Meador,
who bad been a surgeon in the rebel army, was fostered at General Steele's headquarters.
Doctor E. D. Ayres and Colonel vVilliam M. Fishback can give a great deal of testimony
upon this subject. It is believed that Colonel Manter wrote a g·reat many of the articles for
it. Doctor Meador has been frequently heard to say, with an air that no words ca:q describe,
that his views ·were indorsed by headquarters; that he was the exponent of the views of headquarters. I and Doctor Kirkwood have told General Steele more than once of the iujury
this man was doing to him in the army, and among the truly loyal men of Arkansas, and to
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the future prospects of the State. The general's reply was, "Oh, this man is only a pimp for
my headquarters." Yet, with all this, this man bad the entree at headquarters, and still continued to publish his pestiferous articles, and to announce his paper as the organ of the military authorities. Now in order to understand the harm done by this paper and by this man,
some account of the political state of Arkansas must be given. The government of Arkansas, just before the rebellion, was an oligarchy. .The Johnson clique manufactured public
opinion, and controlled it. 'Vben we entered Arkansas some few of that clique were still
left. Around them rallied the rich, the Bertrands, the Tuckers, cotton speculators, and those
that held a remnant of pro-slavery doctrines, ancl Meador and his newspaper, and Steele and
the before-mentioned members of his staff. These called themselves "the better class." There
was another class in Arkansas, the middle class, the poor men of the State-men who were
•o fill the confederate ranks·-men who had been hunted like game through the hills of Arkansas by conscriptors, "Mountain Feels," refugees-men in whose bosoms the fires of loyalty had
burned throughout thew bole rebellion-men who were willing to have the State come back into
the Union upon any terms proposed by the administration, so it but came back. I will not call
them radicals, nor immediate emancipationists, uor apply any party phrase to them. They were
men whose views were in accord with those of their government. If the old oak at Hartford that
preserved the Magna Charta is yet regarded with veneratiOn, how much more should have been
those loyal brea:, ts w bich had preserved their fealty to their government ! These are the men who
are to fill, and are now filling, our ranks in that State, who can shoulder the musket, and who
can till the soil. These men bad no rallying point, no newspaper to express their views.
Resolutions passer1 by Union meetings held by this class of men, sound in principle and in devotion to the government, were refused publication in Meador's paper. A set of resolutions
introduced at a public meeting on the night of the 24th of December, under canvas, by
Doctor Meador, '"hich contained a laudatory resolution concerning General Steele, with
a lot of copperhead resolutions appended, having been objected to by a member of that meeting, the reply of Dr. Meador was, "They are indorsed by Colonel Manter." I saw an order
just before I left Little Rock to divide the patronage of the government in public printing
between Meador's paper and the unconditional Union newspaper; all the printing having
previously been given to tbe unconditional Union paper, exeept,that from General Steele's
headquarters, which was given to Meador. It is my firm belief that had the unconditional
Union party-a party tlmt was in accord with the views of the government-been met
with open arms by our military authorities, there would have been but one party in Arkansas
to-clay, and the State been back in the Union more than a month ago. Instead of this the
principal advisers at army headquarters were C. P. Bertrand, Dr. Meador, and Colonel F.
H. Manter. No words of mine can present this matter to your committee as it actually existed. Judge Murphy, General E. \V. Ganett, Dr. E. D. Ayres, Colonel W. M. Fishback,
Judge \Varner, Dr. John Kirkwood, Colonel J. M. Johnson, and Lieutenant Colonel H. C.
-Caldwell, :~d Iowa cavalry, can give you an idea of this matter as they saw it. Colonel J.
M. Johnson, who is now in Washington elaiming a seat in Congress from Arkansas, saw,
n the very few days that he was at Little Rock, that Steele y,ras surrounded oy a set of politicians, who were encle'lvoring to use him tor party purposes ; and that he was either in accord with them, or else bad not the capacity to see through their designs. So thoroughly
heart-sick had I become with the conduct of affairs that about the close of November I
quietly ga; e up the command of the city. There is a move making now in Arkansas to get
the Arkansas troops sent out of the State. Those who have fc~.ttened under confederate and
federal rule alike dread the future if these troops remain in the State.
I want your committee to distinctly understand that it was talked of among the army and
the truly loyal men of Arkansas, and believed by them, that it was better to be a rebel than
one who had been and was loyal, in order to get any favor at army headquarters. Calvin
C. Bliss, named for lieutenant governor of the State of Arkansas by the convention of Jannary last, ean give a good deal of evidence upon this point. He told me distinctly, before I
left Little Rock, that there was not a Union man who felt that he had any sympathy at
army headquarters.
About the first of D ecember I wrote the following letter to the Hon. S. H. Boyd, M. C.
from Missouri :
"I wrote a letter of introduction to you for Mr. E. W. Gault, of Arkansas. He is a reclaimed rebel, and I hope you will do all for him you can. He desires the good of Arkansas,
and is sound not only on the emaucipation proclamation, but on the whole question, and desires a conve11tion of the State to repeal the slavery clause in the constitution of Arkansas.
You will find he is a man of talent, and acts with that great party which proclaims and will
have universal emancipation. Gault stands high with the President, I am informed, for the
course he has taken, and will tell you all about the conciliatory policy here which up to this
hour, ninety days after we took possession of Little Rock, has not reclaimed one rebel, and
is disheartening to the really Union men of this State, and disgusting to this whole army.
All the stories you see in the Chicago Times about secessionists coming in and laying down
their arms and their prejudices are sheer lies. Those who came in were always Union men;
not made so by any conciliatory policy, but, having been hunted like game through the hills
of Arkansas, arc coming in because they found a rallying point-a federal army. Not one
rebel in Little Rock has come forward anp renewed hs allegiance to his government, and no
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-conciliatory policy could make them do it, but it makes them only more obstinate in their
opinions. You may rely on what I write you as facts. The Union men of Arkansas are
'unconditional Uuion men,' and, strange as it may appear, in favor of expunging the perpetual slavery clause, or any other slavery clause, from the State constitution. You can use
my name for these facts whenever you please, for they are vouched for by Gault, Judge
Isaac Mm1)hy, and other thorough men, and my own observation."
This letter was not intended for publication. It was written to Mr. Boyd in his capacity
as a legislator, and, when he used the facts, to give me as authority for it. It was, nevertheless, published by him in the Missouri Democrat of the 5th of January, 1864. On the 11th
of February I was relieved from duty in the department of Arkansas, on General Steele's application, as I am privately, but none the less correctly, informed, and on the same day saw
in ~he columns of the Missouri Democrat of February 4, 1864, the following letter:
"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF ARKANSAS,
"Little Rock, January 17, 1864.
"Hon. S. H. BoYD, ll1. C.:
"DEAR SIR: The Missouri Democrat, of the 5th instant, contains what purports to be a
letter, or an extract from a" letter, addressed to you by Brigadier General J. W. Davidson.
I write to inform you that certain statements therein contained, relating to the 'conciliatory
policy,' are false. If General Davidson is the author of this letter, he has proved himself an
ungrateful scoundrel. 'You can use my name for these facts when ever you please.'
"I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"FRE'K STEELE, ltJajor Geneml."
Now, I desire you to understand that I never learned from General Steele by any messag·e, letter, or interview, that he found any fault with my letter. That the letter of his to
Hon. S. H. Boyd, published above, was the first intimation I ever had from him that he
found fault with my letter, (except camp reports,) and that reached me, as I said before. by
way of 'Vashington city, twenty-five days after he saw my letter in the paper. I leave it
to your committee to judge the act thus committed by an army commander upon one of his
general officers.
The "Articles of "War" forbid the s~nding of a challenge; yet, while they do this, the
government constitutes itself in some sense the custodian of an officer's honor. It remains
for me to see whether that pledge will be kept. Par. 220, Army Regulations, is in these
words: * * "And all publications relative to transactions between officers of a private or
personal nature, whether newspaper or handbill, are strietly prohibited."
True to my principle, that the cause which I had espoused was above all party or personal
consideration, I forbore any assault upon General Steele, because he was at that distance the
representative of my government; I forbore to make any protest against my removal from
a command that I had formed and that regarded me with affection; I forbore to send letters
and a telegram from the provisional governor of the State, which will appear below. I complied with my orders to report at Cairo, and from that place the following telegraphic correspondence occmTed:
CAIRO, Februm·y 26, 1864.
PRESIDENT UNITED STATES, Washington:
I desire to come to Washington; I have facts to lay before the Judge Advocate General;
I have been relieved of a command I bad formed, and no reason assigned made known to
me. I have to send the following telegram from Governor Murphy; I did not send it from
Little Rock, because I did not wish to add to yonr anxiety about the discord there:
LITTLE ROCK, ARK., February 15, 1864.
To A. LINCOLN, P1·esident United States:
Brigadier General Davidson is a true man and soldier; a patriot in whom the unconditional Union men of Arkansas trust with unlimited confidence. Any action against him
will be against the Union element here and against your O"\'Yn policy. This an investigation
will show.
ISAAC MURPHY,
Provisional Govemo1· of Arkansas.
I cannot do duty with honor until this question of the insult put upon me by General
Steele be investigated.
vVith high respect,
J. W. DAVIDSON,
BTigadier General.
vVASHING'rON, February 27, 1864.
To General DAVIDSON, Cairo:
Whether you shall come to Washington I must submit to the g·eneral-in-chief.
A. LINCOLN.
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WASHINGTON, February 27, 1864.
To Brigadier General DAVIDSON, Cairo:
Your application to the President to come toW ashington, not sent through proper channels,
is not granted.
H. W. HALLECK,
·
Gene?·al-in-Chief.
On the f3th of February the President telegraphed Judge Murphy, who had been elected
proviswnal governor of Arkansas by the convention which assembled in January, that he
yielded his plan to the plan of the convention, (this changed the clay of election of State
officers from the 28th of March .to 14th of March;) that General Steele was to aiel Judge
Murphy all in his power, and to show this telegram to him, (General Steele.) Yet why, after
this, was General Steele's address to the people of Arkansas delayed until the 29th February,
about an election that was to come off on the 14th of March? It is proper to state her~ that
there are now two candidates for the governorship of the State of Arkansas. Oljle Judge
Murphy, the people's candidate, the man nominated by the convention, the type of those
· men who will shoulder the musket and till the soil, of those who have always been loyal,
through persecution, to their government; the other, Mr. A. C. Rogers, around whom the
"better class," those who have fattened alike under confederate and federal rule, will cling.
I have endeavored thus far to give your committee only facts which I can substantiate by
my own testimony and that of other intelligent officers and citizens. I will now give you
one or two statements, of the truth of which I am morally convinced in my own mind. I
believe that the administration of the provost marshal's department and the quartermaster's
department is corrupt in the army of Arkansas, and that a thorough investigation, if it can
be had, will develop the fact. Colonel Richmond, 126th Illinois infantry, told me that he
had a copy of a letter from one Marshall to one Price, saying that his permit from the provost
marshal to ship goods was all right; but there was one more thing necessary, and that was to
grease the hands of the authorities. I believe the whole move of getting boats up the Arkansas to be an arrangement gotten up by the cotton speculators. This river is not our true
line of communication. It is parallel to the enemy's front, and is in reach, all along it, of the
enemy's artillery. The true line of communication is the White river and its connecting
railroad. But there are several thousand bales of cotton near Pine Bluff to go out of the
Arkansas! Captain Grace, of the United States gunboat Fawn, of the fleet stationed at
the mouth of the White river, told me that one man alone had offered him a thousand dollars
to aid in getting the gunboats up the Arkansas. I think much information can be gotten
from Commodore Phelps, Captain Pritchard, and Captain Grace on this subject.
I am informed by Dr. Samuel vVhitehom, former assistant surgeon of the 5th Kansas cavalry, that Colonel Clayton, General Steele's commander at Pine Bluff, and Mr. Rogers and
Mr. Snow, of Pine Bluff, were in partnership in cotton speculations; that Colonel Clayton
allowed Rogers and Snow to seize and sell the cotton of rebels in that vicinity, and that none
of the money obtained for this cotton was paid over to the government. I am informed by
several officers that about the same state of affairs existed at Pine Bluff as at Little Rock;
that rebels had protection papers for their property, forage, &c., and that articles of clothing
were permitted to pass through the lines south.
Captain Cantine, commissary of subsistence, is my informant of the iatter fact. In addition to the witnesses spec1ally named throughout these pages, I desire to add the following,
whom it would be well for the committee to call: Brigadier General Nathan Kimball, U.
S. volunteers; Brigadier General Samuel A. Rice, U. S. volunteers; Brigadier General John
M. Thayer, U. S. volunteers; Brigadier General C. C. Andrews, U.S. volunteers; Lieutenant H. C. Caldwell, 3d Iowa cavalry ; General E. W. Ganett, of Arkansas; Major William
Thompson, 1st Iowa cavalry; Division Inspector Judge Warner, of Little Rock; Judge
Youley, of Little Rock; Colonel A. Cummings, 19th Pennsylvania cavalry, superintendent
of colored recruiting service for Arkansas. Major Noble, 3d Iowa cavalry, is with me
in this city, and can be summoned at the same time I am.
I must not forget to mention here that Colonel J. M. Johnson, of Arkansas, informed me
that at Port Smith, and all along the road from Little Rock to Fort Smith, the policy pursued
by General Steele was different from the policy pursued by the commanders at Fort Smith,
under the orders of the department of the Missouri and the policy of the administration.
I am constrained to say here that General Steele forgot the public good in his efforts to attain
popularity.
I ask of your committee that the names of the officers that I have given above may not
be published until after they shall have given their own testimony, as they are most of them
now serving under General Steele's command.
It may be asked how I came to write the Boyd letter, and to have anything to do with the
politics of Arkansas. I have not been able yet in this ·war to separate fighting the rebel
armies and fighting the cause which keeps them in the field. It is forced into my mind by
every forward step I have taken, yet I never attended a political meeting in Little Rock,
much less made a speech at one of them, though other officers of the army have repeatedly
done so there. But, as the general commanding the city, thrown in direct contact with it
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people, I saw the practical ill effects of the mal-administration of affairs at headquarters. I
heard loyal men say it was better to have been a rebel than to have been true.
As the general commanding the cavalry of the army, and having ten times as much stock
as any general of an infantry division, it was ten times more strongly brought to my mind,
the injuries worked upon the special arm of the service by protection papers, ap.d returning
horses taken from rebels.
I saw a magnificent division of cavalry, by the ignorance and maltreatment of headquarters, melt away.
The Joyal people of Little Rock (the unconditional Union men) finding they had no real
sympathy at headquarters, came to me for comfort and counsel, and made me the repository
of their hopes and fears. I would have been a moral traitor to my country had I not
Ustened to them and comforted them. This is why I am here·, and not there, to-day.
I am your committee's most obedient servant,
J. vV. DAVIDSON,
Brigadie1· General U. S. Volunteers.

Ron. B. F.

WADE,

U. S. Senate, Chairman Committee on tlte Conduct of the Wa1·.
I think Bishop Ames, of the Methodist Episcopal church, saw in his twenty-four hours'
visit to Little Rock how affairs generally were conducted.
Captain Gideon Scull, of the subsistence department, sent by Colonel T. J. Haines,
chief commissary of the west, to inspect the affairs of his department in Arkansas, can give
evidence of the looseness he observed there.
General C. C. Andrews can show that the aid obtained from General Steele in furthering
the plans of the convention of January last was drawn out of him instead of being promptly
and eheerfully rendered.
J. ,V. DA. VIDSON,
Brigadier General.
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